

## *Cost of Capital Estimation*

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# **The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity**

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■ In the mid-1960s, Myron Gordon and others began applying the theory of finance to help estimate utilities' costs of capital. Previously, the standard approach in cost of equity studies was the "comparable earnings method," which involved selecting a sample of unregulated companies whose investment risk was judged to be comparable to that of the utility in question, calculating the average return on book equity (ROE) of these sample companies, and setting the utility's service rates at a level that would permit the utility to achieve the same ROE as comparable companies. This procedure has now been thoroughly discredited (see Robichek [15]), and it has been replaced by three market-oriented (as opposed to accounting-oriented) approaches: (i) the DCF method, (ii) the bond-yield-plus-risk-premium method, and (iii) the CAPM, which is a specific version of the generalized bond-yield-plus-risk-premium approach.

Our purpose in this paper is to discuss the risk-premium approach, including the market risk premium that is used in the CAPM. First, we critique the various procedures that have been used in the past to estimate risk premiums. Second, we present some data on esti-

mated risk premiums since 1965. Third, we examine the relationship between equity risk premiums and the level of interest rates, because it is important, for purposes of estimating the cost of capital, to know just how stable the relationship between risk premiums and interest rates is over time. If stability exists, then one can estimate the cost of equity at any point in time as a function of interest rates as reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, or some similar source.<sup>1</sup> Fourth, while we do not discuss the CAPM directly, our analysis does have some important implications for selecting a market risk premium for use in that model. Our focus is on utilities, but the methodology is applicable to the estimation of the cost of

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<sup>1</sup>For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Staff recently proposed that a risk premium be estimated every two years and that, between estimation dates, the last-determined risk premium be added to the current yield on ten-year Treasury bonds to obtain an estimate of the cost of equity to an average utility (Docket RM 80-36). Subsequently, the FCC made a similar proposal ("Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," August 13, 1984, Docket No. 84-800). Obviously, the validity of such procedures depends on (i) the accuracy of the risk premium estimate and (ii) the stability of the relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. Both proposals are still under review.

equity for any publicly traded firm, and also for non-traded firms for which an appropriate risk class can be assessed, including divisions of publicly traded corporations.<sup>2</sup>

### Alternative Procedures for Estimating Risk Premiums

In a review of both rate cases and the academic literature, we have identified three basic methods for estimating equity risk premiums: (i) the *ex post*, or historic, yield spread method; (ii) the survey method; and (iii) an *ex ante* yield spread method based on DCF analysis.<sup>3</sup> In this section, we briefly review these three methods.

#### Historic Risk Premiums

A number of researchers, most notably Ibbotson and Sinquefeld [12], have calculated historic holding period returns on different securities and then estimated risk premiums as follows:

$$\text{Historic Risk Premium} = \left( \begin{array}{c} \text{Average of the} \\ \text{annual returns on} \\ \text{a stock index for} \\ \text{a particular} \\ \text{past period} \end{array} \right) - \left( \begin{array}{c} \text{Average of the} \\ \text{annual returns on} \\ \text{a bond index for} \\ \text{the same} \\ \text{past period} \end{array} \right) \quad (1)$$

Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (I&S) calculated both arithmetic and geometric average returns, but most of their risk-premium discussion was in terms of the geometric averages. Also, they used both corporate and Treasury bond indices, as well as a T-bill index, and they analyzed all possible holding periods since 1926. The I&S study has been employed in numerous rate cases in two ways: (i) directly, where the I&S historic risk premium is added to a company's bond yield to obtain an esti-

mate of its cost of equity, and (ii) indirectly, where I&S data are used to estimate the market risk premium in CAPM studies.

There are both conceptual and measurement problems with using I&S data for purposes of estimating the cost of capital. Conceptually, there is no compelling reason to think that investors expect the same relative returns that were earned in the past. Indeed, evidence presented in the following sections indicates that relative expected returns should, and do, vary significantly over time. Empirically, the measured historic premium is sensitive both to the choice of estimation horizon and to the end points. These choices are essentially arbitrary, yet they can result in significant differences in the final outcome. These measurement problems are common to most forecasts based on time series data.

#### The Survey Approach

One obvious way to estimate equity risk premiums is to poll investors. Charles Benore [1], the senior utility analyst for Paine Webber Mitchell Hutchins, a leading institutional brokerage house, conducts such a survey of major institutional investors annually. His 1983 results are reported in Exhibit 1.

**Exhibit 1.** Results of Risk Premium Survey, 1983\*

Assuming a double A, long-term utility bond currently yields 12½%, the common stock for the same company would be fairly priced relative to the bond if its expected return was as follows:

Total Return	Indicated Risk Premium (basis points)	Percent of Respondents
over 20½%	over 800	10%
20½%	800	
19½%	700	
18½%	600	
17½%	500	
16½%	400	
15½%	300	
14½%	200	8%
13½%	100	29%
under 13½%	under 100	35%
		16%
		0%
		1%
Weighted average	358	100%

<sup>2</sup>The FCC is particularly interested in risk-premium methodologies, because (i) only eighteen of the 1,400 telephone companies it regulates have publicly-traded stock, and hence offer the possibility of DCF analysis, and (ii) most of the publicly-traded telephone companies have both regulated and unregulated assets, so a corporate DCF cost might not be applicable to the regulated units of the companies.

<sup>3</sup>In rate cases, some witnesses also have calculated the differential between the yield to maturity (YTM) of a company's bonds and its concurrent ROE, and then called this differential a risk premium. In general, this procedure is unsound, because the YTM on a bond is a *future expected* return on the bond's *market value*, while the ROE is the *past realized* return on the stock's *book value*. Thus, comparing YTM's and ROE's is like comparing apples and oranges.

\*Benore's questionnaire included the first two columns, while his third column provided a space for the respondents to indicate which risk premium they thought applied. We summarized Benore's responses in the frequency distribution given in Column 3. Also, in his questionnaire each year, Benore adjusts the double A bond yield and the total returns (Column 1) to reflect current market conditions. Both the question above and the responses to it were taken from the survey conducted in April 1983.

Benore's results, as measured by the average risk premiums, have varied over the years as follows:

Year	Average RP (basis points)
1978	491
1979	475
1980	423
1981	349
1982	275
1983	358

The survey approach is conceptually sound in that it attempts to measure investors' expectations regarding risk premiums, and the Benore data also seem to be carefully collected and processed. Therefore, the Benore studies do provide one useful basis for estimating risk premiums. However, as with most survey results, the possibility of biased responses and/or biased sampling always exists. For example, if the responding institutions are owners of utility stocks (and many of them are), and if the respondents think that the survey results might be used in a rate case, then they might bias upward their responses to help utilities obtain higher authorized returns. Also, Benore surveys large institutional investors, whereas a high percentage of utility stocks are owned by individuals rather than institutions, so there is a question as to whether his reported risk premiums are really based on the expectations of the "representative" investor. Finally, from a pragmatic standpoint, there is a question as to how to use the Benore data for utilities that are not rated AA. The Benore premiums can be applied as an add-on to the own-company bond yields of any given utility only if it can be assumed that the premiums are constant across bond rating classes. *A priori*, there is no reason to believe that the premiums will be constant.

#### DCF-Based *Ex Ante* Risk Premiums

In a number of studies, the DCF model has been used to estimate the *ex ante* market risk premium,  $RP_M$ . Here, one estimates the average expected future return on equity for a group of stocks,  $k_M$ , and then subtracts the concurrent risk-free rate,  $R_F$ , as proxied by the yield to maturity on either corporate or Treasury securities:<sup>4</sup>

$$RP_M = k_M - R_F \quad (2)$$

Conceptually, this procedure is exactly like the I&S approach except that one makes direct estimates of future expected returns on stocks and bonds rather than

assuming that investors expect future returns to mirror past returns.

The most difficult task, of course, is to obtain a valid estimate of  $k_M$ , the expected rate of return on the market. Several studies have attempted to estimate DCF risk premiums for the utility industry and for other stock market indices. Two of these are summarized next.

**Vandell and Kester.** In a recently published monograph, Vandell and Kester [18] estimated *ex ante* risk premiums for the period from 1944 to 1978.  $R_F$  was measured both by the yield on 90-day T-bills and by the yield on the Standard and Poor's AA Utility Bond Index. They measured  $k_M$  as the average expected return on the S&P's 500 Index, with the expected return on individual securities estimated as follows:

$$k_i = \left( \frac{D_1}{P_0} \right)_i + g_i \quad (3)$$

where,

$D_1$  = dividend per share expected over the next twelve months,

$P_0$  = current stock price,

$g$  = estimated long-term constant growth rate, and

$i$  = the  $i^{\text{th}}$  stock.

To estimate  $g_i$ , Vandell and Kester developed fifteen forecasting models based on both exponential smoothing and trend-line forecasts of earnings and dividends, and they used historic data over several estimating horizons. Vandell and Kester themselves acknowledge that, like the Ibbotson-Sinquefeld premiums, their analysis is subject to potential errors associated with trying to estimate expected future growth purely from past data. We shall have more to say about this point later.

<sup>4</sup>In this analysis, most people have used yields on long-term bonds rather than short-term money market instruments. It is recognized that long-term bonds, even Treasury bonds, are not risk free, so an  $RP_M$  based on these debt instruments is smaller than it would be if there were some better proxy to the long-term riskless rate. People have attempted to use the T-bill rate for  $R_F$ , but the T-bill rate embodies a different average inflation premium than stocks, and it is subject to random fluctuations caused by monetary policy, international currency flows, and other factors. Thus, many people believe that for cost of capital purposes,  $R_F$  should be based on long-term securities.

We did test to see how debt maturities would affect our calculated risk premiums. If a short-term rate such as the 30-day T-bill rate is used, measured risk premiums jump around widely and, so far as we could tell, randomly. The choice of a maturity in the 10- to 30-year range has little effect, as the yield curve is generally fairly flat in that range.

**Malkiel.** Malkiel [14] estimated equity risk premiums for the Dow Jones Industrials using the DCF model. Recognizing that the constant dividend growth assumption may not be valid, Malkiel used a nonconstant version of the DCF model. Also, rather than rely exclusively on historic data, he based his growth rates on Value Line's five-year earnings growth forecasts plus the assumption that each company's growth rate would, after an initial five-year period, move toward a long-run real national growth rate of four percent. He also used ten-year maturity government bonds as a proxy for the riskless rate. Malkiel reported that he tested the sensitivity of his results against a number of different types of growth rates, but, in his words, "The results are remarkably robust, and the estimated risk premiums are all very similar." Malkiel's is, to the best of our knowledge, the first risk-premium study that uses analysts' forecasts. A discussion of analysts' forecasts follows.

#### Security Analysts' Growth Forecasts

*Ex ante* DCF risk premium estimates can be based either on expected growth rates developed from time series data, such as Vandell and Kester used, or on analysts' forecasts, such as Malkiel used. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with time series-based growth rates, an increasing body of evidence suggests that primary reliance should be placed on analysts' growth rates. First, we note that the observed market price of a stock reflects the consensus view of investors regarding its future growth. Second, we know that most large brokerage houses, the larger institutional investors, and many investment advisory organizations employ security analysts who forecast future EPS and DPS, and, to the extent that investors rely on analysts' forecasts, the consensus of analysts' forecasts is embodied in market prices. Third, there have been literally dozens of academic research papers dealing with the accuracy of analysts' forecasts, as well as with the extent to which investors actually use them. For example, Cragg and Malkiel [7] and Brown and Rozeff [5] determined that security analysts' forecasts are more relevant in valuing common stocks and estimating the cost of capital than are forecasts based solely on historic time series. Stanley, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum [16] and Linke [13] investigated the importance of analysts' forecasts and recommendations to the investment decisions of individual and institutional investors. Both studies indicate that investors rely heavily on analysts' reports and incorporate analysts' forecast information in the formation of their

expectations about stock returns. A representative listing of other work supporting the use of analysts' forecasts is included in the References section. Thus, evidence in the current literature indicates that (i) analysts' forecasts are superior to forecasts based solely on time series data, and (ii) investors do rely on analysts' forecasts. Accordingly, we based our cost of equity, and hence risk premium estimates, on analysts' forecast data.<sup>5</sup>

#### Risk Premium Estimates

For purposes of estimating the cost of capital using the risk premium approach, it is necessary either that the risk premiums be time-invariant or that there exists a predictable relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. If the premiums are constant over time, then the constant premium could be added to the prevailing interest rate. Alternatively, if there exists a stable relationship between risk premiums and interest rates, it could be used to predict the risk premium from the prevailing interest rate.

To test for stability, we obviously need to calculate risk premiums over a fairly long period of time. Prior to 1980, the only consistent set of data we could find came from Value Line, and, because of the work involved, we could develop risk premiums only once a year (on January 1). Beginning in 1980, however, we began collecting and analyzing Value Line data on a monthly basis, and in 1981 we added monthly estimates from Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers to our data base. Finally, in mid-1983, we expanded our analysis to include the IBES data.

#### Annual Data and Results, 1966–1984

Over the period 1966–1984, we used Value Line data to estimate risk premiums both for the electric utility industry and for industrial companies, using the companies included in the Dow Jones Industrial and Utility averages as representative of the two groups. Value Line makes a five-year growth rate forecast, but it also gives data from which one can develop a longer-term forecast. Since DCF theory calls for a truly long-term (infinite horizon) growth rate, we concluded that it was better to develop and use such a forecast than to

<sup>5</sup>Recently, a new type of service that summarizes the key data from most analysts' reports has become available. We are aware of two sources of such services, the Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) and Zack's Icarus Investment Service. IBES and the Icarus Service gather data from both buy-side and sell-side analysts and provide it to subscribers on a monthly basis in both a printed and a computer-readable format.

**Exhibit 2.** Estimated Annual Risk Premiums, Nonconstant (Value Line) Model, 1966-1984

January 1 of the Year Reported	Dow Jones Electrics			Dow Jones Industrials			(3) ÷ (6)
	$k_{Avg}$	$R_F$	RP	$k_{Avg}$	$R_F$	RP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
1966	8.11%	4.50%	3.61%	9.56%	4.50%	5.06%	0.71
1967	9.00%	4.76%	4.24%	11.57%	4.76%	6.81%	0.62
1968	9.68%	5.59%	4.09%	10.56%	5.59%	4.97%	0.82
1969	9.34%	5.88%	3.46%	10.96%	5.88%	5.08%	0.68
1970	11.04%	6.91%	4.13%	12.22%	6.91%	5.31%	0.78
1971	10.80%	6.28%	4.52%	11.23%	6.28%	4.95%	0.91
1972	10.53%	6.00%	4.53%	11.09%	6.00%	5.09%	0.89
1973	11.37%	5.96%	5.41%	11.47%	5.96%	5.51%	0.98
1974	13.85%	7.29%	6.56%	12.38%	7.29%	5.09%	1.29
1975	16.63%	7.91%	8.72%	14.83%	7.91%	6.92%	1.26
1976	13.97%	8.23%	5.74%	13.32%	8.23%	5.09%	1.13
1977	12.96%	7.30%	5.66%	13.63%	7.30%	6.33%	0.89
1978	13.42%	7.87%	5.55%	14.75%	7.87%	6.88%	0.81
1979	14.92%	8.99%	5.93%	15.50%	8.99%	6.51%	0.91
1980	16.39%	10.18%	6.21%	16.53%	10.18%	6.35%	0.98
1981	17.61%	11.99%	5.62%	17.37%	11.99%	5.38%	1.04
1982	17.70%	14.00%	3.70%	19.30%	14.00%	5.30%	0.70
1983	16.30%	10.66%	5.64%	16.53%	10.66%	5.87%	0.96
1984	16.03%	11.97%	4.06%	15.72%	11.97%	3.75%	1.08

use the five-year prediction.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, we obtained data as of January 1 from Value Line for each of the Dow Jones companies and then solved for  $k$ , the expected rate of return, in the following equation:

$$P_0 = \sum_{t=1}^n \frac{D_t}{(1+k)^t} + \left( \frac{D_n(1+g_n)}{k-g_n} \right) \left( \frac{1}{1+k} \right)^n \quad (4)$$

Equation (4) is the standard nonconstant growth DCF model;  $P_0$  is the current stock price;  $D_t$  represents the forecasted dividends during the nonconstant growth period;  $n$  is the years of nonconstant growth;  $D_n$  is the first constant growth dividend; and  $g_n$  is the constant, long-run growth rate after year  $n$ . Value Line provides  $D_t$  values for  $t = 1$  and  $t = 4$ , and we interpolated to obtain  $D_2$  and  $D_3$ . Value Line also gives estimates for


ROE and for the retention rate ( $b$ ) in the terminal year,  $n$ , so we can forecast the long-term growth rate as  $g_n = b(\text{ROE})$ . With all the values in Equation (4) specified except  $k$ , we can solve for  $k$ , which is the DCF rate of return that would result if the Value Line forecasts were met, and, hence, the DCF rate of return implied in the Value Line forecast.<sup>7</sup>

Having estimated a  $k$  value for each of the electric and industrial companies, we averaged them (using market-value weights) to obtain a  $k$  value for each group, after which we subtracted  $R_F$  (taken as the December 31 yield on twenty-year constant maturity Treasury bonds) to obtain the estimated risk premiums shown in Exhibit 2. The premiums for the electrics are plotted in Exhibit 3, along with interest rates. The following points are worthy of note:

1. Risk premiums fluctuate over time. As we shall see in the next section, fluctuations are even wider when measured on a monthly basis.
2. The last column of Exhibit 2 shows that risk premi-

<sup>6</sup>This is a debatable point. Cragg and Malkiel, as well as many practicing analysts, feel that most investors actually focus on five-year forecasts. Others, however, argue that five-year forecasts are too heavily influenced by base-year conditions and/or other nonpermanent conditions for use in the DCF model. We note (i) that most published forecasts do indeed cover five years, (ii) that such forecasts are typically "normalized" in some fashion to alleviate the base-year problem, and (iii) that for relatively stable companies like those in the Dow Jones averages, it generally does not matter greatly if one uses a normalized five-year or a longer-term forecast, because these companies meet the conditions of the constant-growth DCF model rather well.

<sup>7</sup>Value Line actually makes an explicit price forecast for each stock, and one could use this price, along with the forecasted dividends, to develop an expected rate of return. However, Value Line's forecasted stock price builds in a forecasted change in  $k$ . Therefore, the forecasted price is inappropriate for use in estimating current values of  $k$ .

**Exhibit 3. Equity Risk Premiums for Electric Utilities and Yields on 20-Year Government Bonds, 1970-1984\***

\*Standard errors of the coefficients are shown in parentheses below the coefficients.

ums for the utilities increased relative to those for the industrials from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Subsequently, the perceived riskiness of the two groups has, on average, been about the same.

3. Exhibit 3 shows that, from 1970 through 1979, utility risk premiums tended to have a positive association with interest rates: when interest rates rose, so did risk premiums, and vice versa. However, beginning in 1980, an inverse relationship appeared: rising interest rates led to declining risk premiums. We shall discuss this situation further in the next section.

#### Monthly Data and Results, 1980-1984

In early 1980, we began calculating risk premiums on a monthly basis. At that time, our only source of analysts' forecasts was Value Line, but beginning in 1981 we also obtained Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers' data, and then, in mid-1983, we obtained

IBES data. Because our focus was on utilities, we restricted our monthly analysis to that group.

Our 1980-1984 monthly risk premium data, along with Treasury bond yields, are shown in Exhibits 4 and 5 and plotted in Exhibits 6, 7, and 8. Here are some comments on these Exhibits:



1. Risk premiums, like interest rates and stock prices, are volatile. Our data indicate that it would not be appropriate to estimate the cost of equity by adding the current cost of debt to a risk premium that had been estimated in the past. Current risk premiums should be matched with current interest rates.
2. Exhibit 6 confirms the 1980-1984 section of Exhibit 3 in that it shows a strong inverse relationship between interest rates and risk premiums; we shall discuss shortly why this relationship holds.
3. Exhibit 7 shows that while risk premiums based on Value Line, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers

**Exhibit 4.** Estimated Monthly Risk Premiums for Electric Utilities Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts, January 1980-June 1984


Beginning of Month	Value Line	Merrill Lynch	Salomon Brothers	Average Premiums	20-Year Treasury Bond Yield, Constant Maturity Series	Beginning of Month	Value Line	Merrill Lynch	Salomon Brothers	Average Premiums	20-Year Treasury Bond Yield, Constant Maturity Series
Jan 1980	6.21%	NA	NA	6.21%	10.18%	Apr 1982	3.49%	3.61%	4.29%	3.80%	13.69%
Feb 1980	5.77%	NA	NA	5.77%	10.86%	May 1982	3.08%	4.25%	3.91%	3.75%	13.47%
Mar 1980	4.73%	NA	NA	4.73%	12.59%	Jun 1982	3.16%	4.51%	4.72%	4.13%	13.53%
Apr 1980	5.02%	NA	NA	5.02%	12.71%	Jul 1982	2.57%	4.21%	4.21%	3.66%	14.48%
May 1980	4.73%	NA	NA	4.73%	11.04%	Aug 1982	4.33%	4.83%	5.27%	4.81%	13.69%
Jun 1980	5.09%	NA	NA	5.09%	10.37%	Sep 1982	4.08%	5.14%	5.58%	4.93%	12.40%
Jul 1980	5.41%	NA	NA	5.41%	9.86%	Oct 1982	5.35%	5.24%	6.34%	5.64%	11.95%
Aug 1980	5.72%	NA	NA	5.72%	10.29%	Nov 1982	5.67%	5.95%	6.91%	6.18%	10.97%
Sep 1980	5.16%	NA	NA	5.16%	11.41%	Dec 1982	6.31%	6.71%	7.45%	6.82%	10.52%
Oct 1980	5.62%	NA	NA	5.62%	11.75%	Annual Avg.	4.00%	4.54%	5.01%	4.52%	13.09%
Nov 1980	5.09%	NA	NA	5.09%	12.33%	Jan 1983	5.64%	6.04%	6.81%	6.16%	10.66%
Dec 1980	5.65%	NA	NA	5.65%	12.37%	Feb 1983	4.68%	5.99%	6.10%	5.59%	11.01%
Annual Avg.	5.35%			5.35%	11.31%	Mar 1983	4.99%	6.89%	6.43%	6.10%	10.71%
Jan 1981	5.62%	4.76%	5.63%	5.34%	11.99%	Apr 1983	4.75%	5.82%	6.31%	5.63%	10.84%
Feb 1981	4.82%	4.87%	5.16%	4.95%	12.48%	May 1983	4.50%	6.41%	6.24%	5.72%	10.57%
Mar 1981	4.70%	3.73%	4.97%	4.47%	13.10%	Jun 1983	4.29%	5.21%	6.16%	5.22%	10.90%
Apr 1981	4.24%	3.23%	4.52%	4.00%	13.11%	Jul 1983	4.78%	5.72%	6.42%	5.64%	11.12%
May 1981	3.54%	3.24%	4.24%	3.67%	13.51%	Aug 1983	3.89%	4.74%	5.41%	4.68%	11.78%
Jun 1981	3.57%	4.04%	4.27%	3.96%	13.39%	Sep 1983	4.07%	4.90%	5.57%	4.85%	11.71%
Jul 1981	3.61%	3.63%	4.16%	3.80%	13.32%	Oct 1983	3.79%	4.64%	5.38%	4.60%	11.64%
Aug 1981	3.17%	3.05%	3.04%	3.09%	14.23%	Nov 1983	2.84%	3.77%	4.46%	3.69%	11.90%
Sep 1981	2.11%	2.24%	2.35%	2.23%	14.99%	Dec 1983	3.36%	4.27%	5.00%	4.21%	11.83%
Oct 1981	2.83%	2.64%	3.24%	2.90%	14.93%	Annual Avg.	4.30%	5.37%	5.86%	5.17%	11.22%
Nov 1981	2.08%	2.49%	3.03%	2.53%	15.27%	Jan 1984	4.06%	5.04%	5.65%	4.92%	11.97%
Dec 1981	3.72%	3.45%	4.24%	3.80%	13.12%	Feb 1984	4.25%	5.37%	5.96%	5.19%	11.76%
Annual Avg.	3.67%	3.45%	4.07%	3.73%	13.62%	Mar 1984	4.73%	6.05%	6.38%	5.72%	12.12%
Jan 1982	3.70%	3.37%	4.04%	3.70%	14.00%	Apr 1984	4.78%	5.33%	6.32%	5.48%	12.51%
Feb 1982	3.05%	3.37%	3.70%	3.37%	14.37%	May 1984	4.36%	5.30%	6.42%	5.36%	12.78%
Mar 1982	3.15%	3.28%	3.75%	3.39%	13.96%	Jun 1984	3.54%	4.00%	5.63%	4.39%	13.60%

**Exhibit 5.** Monthly Risk Premiums Based on IBES Data

Beginning of Month	Average of Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Value Line Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Entire Electric Industry	Beginning of Month	Average of Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Value Line Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Entire Electric Industry
Aug 1983	4.68%	4.10%	4.16%	Feb 1984	5.19%	5.00%	4.36%
Sep 1983	4.85%	4.43%	4.27%	Mar 1984	5.72%	5.35%	4.45%
Oct 1983	4.60%	4.31%	3.90%	Apr 1984	5.48%	5.33%	4.23%
Nov 1983	3.69%	3.36%	3.36%	May 1984	5.36%	5.26%	4.30%
Dec 1983	4.21%	3.86%	3.54%	Jun 1984	4.39%	4.47%	3.40%
Jan 1984	4.92%	4.68%	4.18%	Average Premiums	4.83%	4.56%	4.01%

**Exhibit 6.** Utility Risk Premiums and Interest Rates, 1980–1984**Exhibit 7.** Monthly Risk Premiums, Electric Utilities, 1981–1984 (to Date)



**Exhibit 8. Comparative Risk Premium Data**

do differ, the differences are not large given the nature of the estimates, and the premiums follow one another closely over time. Since all of the analysts are examining essentially the same data and since utility companies are not competitive with one another, and hence have relatively few secrets, the similarity among the analysts' forecasts is not surprising.

4. The IBES data, presented in Exhibit 5 and plotted in Exhibit 8, contain too few observations to enable us to draw strong conclusions, but (i) the Dow Jones Electrics risk premiums based on our three-analyst data have averaged 27 basis points above premiums based on the larger group of analysts surveyed<sup>4</sup> by IBES and (ii) the premiums on the 11 Dow Jones Electrics have averaged 54 basis points higher than premiums for the entire utility industry followed by IBES. Given the variability in the data, we are, at this point, inclined to attribute these differences to random fluctuations, but as more data become available, it may turn out that the differences are statistically significant. In particular, the 11 electric utilities included in the Dow

Jones Utility Index all have large nuclear investments, and this may cause them to be regarded as riskier than the industry average, which includes both nuclear and non-nuclear companies.

#### Tests of the Reasonableness of the Risk Premium Estimates

So far our claims to the reasonableness of our risk-premium estimates have been based on the reasonableness of our variable measures, particularly the measures of expected dividend growth rates. Essentially, we have argued that since there is strong evidence in the literature in support of analysts' forecasts, risk premiums based on these forecasts are reasonable. In the spirit of positive economics, however, it is also important to demonstrate the reasonableness of our results more directly.

It is theoretically possible to test for the validity of the risk-premium estimates in a CAPM framework. In a cross-sectional estimate of the CAPM equation,

$$(k - R_F)_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \beta_i + u_i, \quad (5)$$

we would expect

$$\hat{\alpha}_0 = 0 \text{ and } \hat{\alpha}_1 = k_M - R_F = \text{Market risk premium.}$$

This test, of course, would be a joint test of both the CAPM and the reasonableness of our risk-premium estimates. There is a great deal of evidence that questions the empirical validity of the CAPM, especially when applied to regulated utilities. Under these conditions, it is obvious that no unambiguous conclusion can be drawn regarding the efficacy of the premium estimates from such a test.<sup>5</sup>

A simpler and less ambiguous test is to show that the risk premiums are higher for lower rated firms than for higher rated firms. Using 1984 data, we classified the

<sup>4</sup>We carried out the test on a monthly basis for 1984 and found positive but statistically insignificant coefficients. A typical result (for April 1984) follows:

$$(k - R_F)_i = 3.1675 + 1.8031 \beta_i \\ (0.91) \quad (1.44)$$

The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Utility risk premiums do increase with betas, but the intercept term is not zero as the CAPM would predict, and  $\alpha_1$  is both less than the predicted value and not statistically significant. Again, the observation that the coefficients do not conform to CAPM predictions could be as much a problem with CAPM specification for utilities as with the risk premium estimates.

A similar test was carried out by Friend, Westerfield, and Granito [9]. They tested the CAPM using expectational (survey) data rather than *ex post* holding period returns. They actually found their coefficient of  $\beta_i$  to be negative in all their cross-sectional tests.

**Exhibit 9. Relationship between Risk Premiums and Bond Ratings, 1984\***

Month	Aaa/AA	AA	Aa/A	A	A/BBB	BBB	Below BBB
January†	—	2.61%	3.06%	3.70%	5.07%	4.90%	9.45%
February	2.98%	3.17%	3.36%	4.03%	5.26%	5.14%	7.97%
March	2.34%	3.46%	3.29%	4.06%	5.43%	5.02%	8.28%
April	2.37%	3.03%	3.29%	3.88%	5.29%	4.97%	6.96%
May	2.00%	2.48%	3.42%	3.72%	4.72%	6.64%	8.81%
June	0.72%	2.17%	2.46%	3.16%	3.76%	5.00%	5.58%
Average	2.08%	2.82%	3.15%	3.76%	4.92%	5.28%	7.84%

\*The risk premiums are based on IBES data for the electric utilities followed by both IBES and Salomon Brothers. The number of electric utilities followed by both firms varies from month to month. For the period between January and June 1984, the number of electric utilities followed by both firms ranged from 96 to 99 utilities.

†In January, there were no Aaa/AA companies. Subsequently, four utilities were upgraded to Aaa/AA.

utility industry into risk groups based on bond ratings. For each rating group, we estimated the average risk premium. The results, presented in Exhibit 9, clearly show that the lower the bond rating, the higher the risk premiums. Our premium estimates therefore would appear to pass this simple test of reasonableness.

### Risk Premiums and Interest Rates


Traditionally, stocks have been regarded as being riskier than bonds because bondholders have a prior claim on earnings and assets. That is, stockholders stand at the end of the line and receive income and/or assets only after the claims of bondholders have been satisfied. However, if interest rates fluctuate, then the holders of long-term bonds can suffer losses (either realized or in an opportunity cost sense) even though they receive all contractually due payments. Therefore, if investors' worries about "interest rate risk" versus "earning power risk" vary over time, then perceived risk differentials between stocks and bonds, and hence risk premiums, will also vary.

Any number of events could occur to cause the perceived riskiness of stocks versus bonds to change, but probably the most pervasive factor, over the 1966–1984 period, is related to inflation. Inflationary expectations are, of course, reflected in interest rates. Therefore, one might expect to find a relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. As we noted in our discussion of Exhibit 3, risk premiums were positively correlated with interest rates from 1966 through 1979, but, beginning in 1980, the relationship turned negative. A possible explanation for this change is given next.

**1966–1979 Period.** During this period, inflation heated up, fuel prices soared, environmental problems

surfaced, and demand for electricity slowed even as expensive new generating units were nearing completion. These cost increases required offsetting rate hikes to maintain profit levels. However, political pressure, combined with administrative procedures that were not designed to deal with a volatile economic environment, led to long periods of "regulatory lag" that caused utilities' earned ROEs to decline in absolute terms and to fall far below the cost of equity. These factors combined to cause utility stockholders to experience huge losses: S&P's Electric Index dropped from a mid-1960s high of 60.90 to a mid-1970s low of 20.41, a decrease of 66.5%. Industrial stocks also suffered losses during this period, but, on average, they were only one third as severe as the utilities' losses. Similarly, investors in long-term bonds had losses, but bond losses were less than half those of utility stocks. Note also that, during this period, (i) bond investors were able to reinvest coupons and maturity payments at rising rates, whereas the earned returns on equity did not rise, and (ii) utilities were providing a rising share of their operating income to debtholders versus stockholders (interest expense/book value of debt was rising, while net income/common equity was declining). This led to a widespread belief that utility commissions would provide enough revenues to keep utilities from going bankrupt (barring a disaster), and hence to protect the bondholders, but that they would not necessarily provide enough revenues either to permit the expected rate of dividend growth to occur or, perhaps, even to allow the dividend to be maintained.

Because of these experiences, investors came to regard inflation as having a more negative effect on utility stocks than on bonds. Therefore, when fears of inflation increased, utilities' measured risk premiums

**Exhibit 10.** Relative Volatility\* of Stocks and Bonds, 1965–1984

\*Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of total returns over the last 5 years.  
Source: Merrill Lynch, *Quantitative Analysis*, May/June 1984.

also increased. A regression over the period 1966–1979, using our Exhibit 2 data, produced this result:

$$RP = 0.30\% + 0.73 R_F; \quad r^2 = 0.48. \\ (0.22)$$

This indicates that a one percentage point increase in the Treasury bond rate produced, on average, a 0.73 percentage point increase in the risk premium, and hence a  $1.00 + 0.73 = 1.73$  percentage point increase in the cost of equity for utilities.

**1980–1984 Period.** The situation changed dramatically in 1980 and thereafter. Except for a few companies with nuclear construction problems, the utilities' financial situations stabilized in the early 1980s, and then improved significantly from 1982 to 1984. Both the companies and their regulators were learning to live with inflation; many construction programs were completed; regulatory lags were shortened; and in general the situation was much better for utility equity investors. In the meantime, over most of the 1980–1984 period, interest rates and bond prices fluctuated violently, both in an absolute sense and relative to common stocks. Exhibit 10 shows the volatility of corporate bonds very clearly. Over most of the eighteen-year period, stock returns were much more volatile than returns on bonds. However, that situation changed in October 1979, when the Fed began to focus

on the money supply rather than on interest rates.<sup>9</sup>

In the 1980–1984 period, an increase in inflationary expectations has had a more adverse effect on bonds than on utility stocks. If the expected rate of inflation increases, then interest rates *will increase* and bond prices *will fall*. Thus, uncertainty about inflation translates directly into risk in the bond markets. The effect of inflation on stocks, including utility stocks, is less clear. If inflation increases, then utilities should, in theory, be able to obtain rate increases that would offset increases in operating costs and also compensate for the higher cost of equity. Thus, with "proper" regulation, utility stocks would provide a better hedge against unanticipated inflation than would bonds. This hedge did not work at all well during the 1966–1979 period, because inflation-induced increases in operating and capital costs were not offset by timely rate increases. However, as noted earlier, both the utilities and their regulators seem to have learned to live better with inflation during the 1980s.

Since inflation is today regarded as a major investment risk, and since utility stocks now seem to provide a better hedge against unanticipated inflation than do

<sup>9</sup>Because the standard deviations in Exhibit 10 are based on the last five years of data, even if bond returns stabilize, as they did beginning in 1982, their reported volatility will remain high for several more years. Thus, Exhibit 10 gives a rough indication of the current relative riskiness of stocks versus bonds, but the measure is by no means precise or necessarily indicative of future expectations.

bonds, the interest-rate risk inherent in bonds offsets, to a greater extent than was true earlier, the higher operating risk that is inherent in equities. Therefore, when inflationary fears rise, the perceived riskiness of bonds rises, helping to push up interest rates. However, since investors are today less concerned about inflation's impact on utility stocks than on bonds, the utilities' cost of equity does not rise as much as that of debt, so the observed risk premium tends to fall.

For the 1980-1984 period, we found the following relationship (see Exhibit 6):

$$RP = 12.53\% - 0.63 R_F; \quad r^2 = 0.73. \\ (0.05)$$

Thus, a one percentage point increase in the T-bond rate, on average, caused the risk premium to fall by 0.63%, and hence it led to a  $1.00 - 0.63 = 0.37$  percentage point increase in the cost of equity to an average utility. This contrasts sharply with the pre-1980 period, when a one percentage point increase in interest rates led, on average, to a 1.73 percentage point increase in the cost of equity.

### Summary and Implications

We began by reviewing a number of earlier studies. From them, we concluded that, for cost of capital estimation purposes, risk premiums must be based on expectations, not on past realized holding period returns. Next, we noted that expectational risk premiums may be estimated either from surveys, such as the ones Charles Benore has conducted, or by use of DCF techniques. Further, we found that, although growth rates for use in the DCF model can be either developed from time-series data or obtained from security analysts, analysts' growth forecasts are more reflective of investors' views, and, hence, in our opinion are preferable for use in risk-premium studies.

Using analysts' growth rates and the DCF model, we estimated risk premiums over several different periods. From 1966 to 1984, risk premiums for both electric utilities and industrial stocks varied widely from year to year. Also, during the first half of the period, the utilities had smaller risk premiums than the industrials, but after the mid-1970s, the risk premiums for the two groups were, on average, about equal.

The effects of changing interest rates on risk premiums shifted dramatically in 1980, at least for the utilities. From 1965 through 1979, inflation generally had a more severe adverse effect on utility stocks than on bonds, and, as a result, an increase in inflationary expectations, as reflected in interest rates, caused an

increase in equity risk premiums. However, in 1980 and thereafter, rising inflation and interest rates increased the perceived riskiness of bonds more than that of utility equities, so the relationship between interest rates and utility risk premiums shifted from positive to negative. Earlier, a 1.00 percentage point increase in interest rates had led, on average, to a 1.73% increase in the utilities' cost of equity, but after 1980 a 1.00 percentage point increase in the cost of debt was associated with an increase of only 0.37% in the cost of equity.

Our study also has implications for the use of the CAPM to estimate the cost of equity for utilities. The CAPM studies that we have seen typically use either Ibbotson-Sinquefeld or similar historic holding period returns as the basis for estimating the market risk premium. Such usage implicitly assumes (i) that *ex post* returns data can be used to proxy *ex ante* expectations and (ii) that the market risk premium is relatively stable over time. Our analysis suggests that neither of these assumptions is correct; at least for utility stocks, *ex post* returns data do not appear to be reflective of *ex ante* expectations, and risk premiums are volatile, not stable.

Unstable risk premiums also make us question the FERC and FCC proposals to estimate a risk premium for the utilities every two years and then to add this premium to a current Treasury bond rate to determine a utility's cost of equity. Administratively, this proposal would be easy to handle, but risk premiums are simply too volatile to be left in place for two years.

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