COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

ELECTRONIC APPLICATION OF)
BLUEGRASS WATER UTILITY)
OPERATING COMPANY, LLC FOR AN) Case No. 2022-00432
ADJUSTMENT OF SEWAGE RATES)

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

ON BEHALF OF

BLUEGRASS WATER UTILITY OPERATING COMPANY, LLC

FILED: February 27, 2023

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

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1		DIRECT TESTIMONY
2		OF
3		DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS
4		
5	I.	INTRODUCTION
6		A. <u>WITNESS IDENTIFICATION</u>
7	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
8	A.	My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 200,
9		Mount Laurel, NJ 08054.
10	Q.	By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
11	A.	I am a Partner at ScottMadden, Inc.
12		B. <u>BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS</u>
13	Q.	Please summarize your professional experience and educational background.
14	A.	I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities in 35 state regulatory
15		commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Alberta
16		Utility Commission, one American Arbitration Association panel, and the Superior Court
17		of Rhode Island on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, rate of
18		return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design.
19		On behalf of the American Gas Association ("AGA"), I calculate the AGA Gas
20		Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the American Gas
21		Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas Index and AGIF are
22		a market capitalization-weighted index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the
23		common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the AGA.
		C N 2022 00422

1		I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts
2		("SURFA"). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return
3		Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the successful
4		completion of a comprehensive written examination.
5		I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts
6		("NACVA") and was awarded the professional designation "Certified Valuation Analyst"
7		by the NACVA in 2015.
8		I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor of
9		Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business Administration
10		with high honors and concentrations in Finance and International Business from Rutgers
11		University.
12		The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are
13		included in Appendix A.
14	II.	PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY
15	Q.	What is the purpose of your Direct Testimony in this proceeding?
16	A.	The purpose of my Direct Testimony is to present evidence on behalf of Bluegrass Water
17		Utility Operating Company, LLC ("Bluegrass Water" or the "Company") about the
18		appropriate capital structure and corresponding cost rates the Company should be given
19		the opportunity to earn on its jurisdictional rate base.
20	Q.	Have you prepared any Exhibits in support of your recommendation?
21	A.	Yes. I have prepared Exhibits DWD-1 through DWD-9, which have been prepared by me
22		or under my direct supervision.

Q. What is your recommended cost of capital for Bluegrass Water?

A. I recommend the Kentucky Public Service Commission ("KPSC" or the "Commission")

authorize the Company the opportunity to earn an overall rate of return of 9.77% based on

the actual capital structure of Bluegrass Water, consisting of 38.84% long-term debt at an

embedded cost rate of 6.80%, and 61.16% common equity at my recommended return on

common equity ("ROE") of 11.65%. The overall rate of return is summarized on page 1

of Exhibit DWD-1 and in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Summary of Overall Rate of Return

Type of Capital Long-Term Debt	<u>Ratios</u> 38.84%	<u>Cost Rate</u> 6.80%	Weighted Cost Rate 2.64%
Common Equity	<u>61.16%</u>	11.65%	<u>7.13%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>9.77%</u>

9 III. <u>SUMMARY</u>

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10 Q. Please summarize your recommended common equity cost rate.

11 A. My recommended common equity cost rate of 11.65% is summarized on page 2 of Exhibit

12 DWD-1. I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of

13 relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to Bluegrass Water's. Using

14 companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair

15 rate of return established in the *Hope*¹ and *Bluefield*² Supreme Court cases. No proxy

16 group can be identical in risk to any single company, so there must be an evaluation of

Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). ("Hope")

Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922). ("Bluefield")

relative risk between the company and the proxy group to see if it is appropriate to make adjustments to the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

My recommendation results from the application of several cost of common equity models, specifically the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, the Risk Premium Model ("RPM"), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), to the market data of a proxy group of six water companies ("Utility Proxy Group") whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I also applied the DCF, RPM, and CAPM to a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group ("Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group").

The results derived from each are as follows:

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Table 2: Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

Discounted Cash Flow Model	9.16%
Risk Premium Model	12.09%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	11.58%
Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non- Price Regulated Companies	<u>11.40%</u>
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments for Company-Specific Risk	10.13% - 11.13%
Business Risk Adjustment	1.00%
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	11.13% – 12.13%
Recommended Cost of Common Equity	<u>11.65%</u>

After analyzing the indicated common equity cost rates derived through these
models, the indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy
Group is between 10.13% and 11.13%. ³

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group was then adjusted upward by 1.00% to reflect Bluegrass Water's greater business risk relative to the Utility Proxy Group. These adjustments result in a Company-specific range of common equity cost rates between 11.13% and 12.13%. From this range of results, I recommend the Commission consider a common equity cost rate of 11.65%, or the approximate midpoint, for use in setting rates for the Company.

IV. <u>GENERAL PRINCIPLES</u>

A.

- Q. What general principles have you considered in arriving at your recommended common equity cost rate of 11.65%?
 - In unregulated industries, the competition of the marketplace is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can provide safe and reliable service at all times to their customers requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited *Hope* and *Bluefield*

Case No. 2022-00432 Application Exhibit 6 Direct Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis Page 5 of 53

The indicated range of ROEs applicable to the Utility Proxy Group excluding the Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM") is 9.74% to 10.74%.

decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in *Hope*, when it stated:

The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that 'regulation does not insure [sic] that the business shall produce net revenues.' 315 U.S. at page 590, 62 S.Ct. at page 745. But such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 346 12 S.Ct. 400, 402. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.⁴

In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of corresponding risk. The Commission's decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide the Company with the opportunity to earn a return that is: 1) adequate to attract capital at reasonable cost and terms; 2) sufficient to ensure its financial integrity; and 3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises having corresponding risks.

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⁴ Hope, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), at 603.

1		In addition, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a
2		stand-alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case. Parent
3		entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at the attractiveness of
4		the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment alternative in their capital budgeting
5		process. That is, utility holding companies that own many utility operating companies have
6		choices as to where they will invest their limited capital within the holding company
7		family. Therefore, the opportunity cost concept applies regardless of whether the funding
8		source is public or corporate.
9		When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient to
10		provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business unit rather than
11		other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the regulated subsidiary must
12		compete for capital with all the parent company's affiliates, and with other similar risk
13		companies, which may include non-utilities. In that regard, investors value corporate
14		entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and expect each division within the parent company to
15		provide an appropriate risk-adjusted return.
16		It, therefore, is important that the authorized ROE for the Company reflects the
17		risks and prospects of its operations and supports its financial integrity from a stand-alone
18		perspective.
19	Q.	Within that broad framework, how is the cost of capital estimated in regulatory
20		proceedings?

Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance their

permanent property, plant, and equipment (i.e., rate base). The fair rate of return for a

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regulated utility is based on its weighted average cost of capital, in which, as noted earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital are weighted by their respective book values.

The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they *expect* is equal to, or greater than, the return that they *require* to accept the risk of providing funds to the firm.

The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is based on the economic principle of "opportunity costs." The principle of opportunity costs recognizes that investing in any asset (whether debt or equity securities) represents a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For any investment to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the return expected on alternative investment opportunities with comparable risks. Because investments with like risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the return available on an investment of comparable risk.

The cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt securities. However, the cost of equity must be estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the cost of equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models used to determine it are typically applied to a group of "comparable" or "proxy" companies.

In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the returns available on comparable investments.

A. BUSINESS RISK

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- Q. Please define business risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a
 fair rate of return.
- A. Business risk is the riskiness of a company's common stock without the use of debt and/or preferred capital. Examples of such general business risks faced by all utilities (i.e., electric, natural gas distribution, and water) include size, the quality of management, the regulatory environment in which utilities operate, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory growth, and capital intensity. All of these have a direct bearing on earnings.

Consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, business risk is important to the determination of a fair rate of return, because the higher the level of risk, the higher the rate of return investors demand.

Q. What business risks do the water and wastewater industries face in general?

Water and wastewater utilities have an ever-increasing responsibility to be stewards of the environment from which water supplies are drawn in order to preserve and protect essential natural resources of the United States. This increased environmental stewardship is a direct result of compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act, as well as a response to continuous monitoring by the Environmental Protection Agency and state and local governments, of the water supply for potential contaminants and their resultant regulations. This, plus aging infrastructure, necessitate additional capital investment in the distribution and treatment of water, exacerbating the pressure on free cash flows arising from increased capital expenditures for infrastructure repair and replacement. The significant amount of capital

1	investment and, hence, high capital intensity, is a major risk factor for the water and
2	wastewater utility industry.
3	Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line") observes the following about the
4	water utility industry:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Members of this group are all in the midst of large ongoing construction programs that ought to take decades to complete. For years, insufficient capital was allocated to upgrading and modernizing the country's water infrastructure. Indeed, the average age of many pipelines is now between 60 and 75 years. As a result, in an era in which water has become scarcer, a large volume of it was leaking and being wasted due to a shoddy transmission system.
12	***
13 14 15 16 17	To fund the building projects, most utilities have to depend, in part, on external financing. Over the past 15 years, we have been in a low interest rate environment and debt was the preferred source of financing. With interest rates for long-maturity corporate bonds spiking higher, there is a chance that this could change.
18	***
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	While this sector has several positive attributes, it also has a severe limitations [sic]. For one, the returns on equity are determined by an outside entity. Thus, there is a ceiling to each company's profit potential. Furthermore, regulators can be fickle. The water industry has enjoyed positive relations with regulators over the past decade or so, but that was during a time of very low inflation. Passing along the rate hikes needed to finance the replacement of old pipes will likely remain above the level of inflation, which is currently over 6%. ⁵
28	The water and wastewater industry also experiences low depreciation rates.
29	Depreciation rates are one of the principal sources of internal cash flows for all utilities
30	(through a utility's depreciation expense) and are vital for a company to fund ongoing

Value Line Investment Survey, January 6, 2023.

replacements and repairs of water and wastewater systems. Water/wastewater utility assets have long lives, and therefore have long capital recovery periods. As such, they face greater risk due to inflation, which results in a higher replacement cost per dollar of net plant. Simply, capital that is retiring today will need to be replaced with capital which is significantly more expensive.

Substantial capital expenditures, as noted by *Value Line*, will require significant financing. The three sources of financing typically used are debt, equity (common and preferred), and cash flow. All three are intricately linked to the opportunity to earn a sufficient rate of return as well as the ability to achieve that return. Consistent with *Hope* and *Bluefield*, the return must be sufficient to maintain credit quality as well as enable the attraction of necessary new capital, be it debt or equity capital. If unable to raise debt or equity capital, the utility must turn to either retained earnings or free cash flow,⁶ both of which are directly linked to earning a sufficient rate of return. The level of free cash flow represents a utility's ability to meet the needs of its debt and equity holders. If either retained earnings or free cash flow is inadequate, it will be nearly impossible for the utility to attract the needed capital for new infrastructure investment necessary to ensure quality service to its customers. An insufficient rate of return can be financially devastating for utilities as well as a public safety issue for their customers.

The water and wastewater utility industry's high degree of capital intensity and low depreciation rates, coupled with the need for substantial infrastructure capital spending, require regulatory support in the form of adequate and timely rate relief, and in particular,

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Free Cash Flow = Operating Cash Flow (Funds From Operations) minus Capital Expenditures.

- 1 a sufficient authorized return on common equity, so that the industry can successfully meet 2 the challenges it faces.
 - В. FINANCIAL RISK

- 4 Q. Please define financial risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a 5 fair rate of return.
- 6 Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock A. 7 into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the 8 capital structure, the higher the financial risk (i.e., likelihood of default). Therefore, 9 consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, investors demand a higher 10 common equity return as compensation for bearing higher default risk.
- 11 O. Can bond and credit ratings be a proxy for the combined business and financial risk 12 (i.e., investment risk of an enterprise)?
- Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar 13 A. 14 combined business and financial risks (i.e., total risk) faced by bond investors.⁷ Although 15 specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond/credit 16 rating indicates that the combined risks are roughly similar, albeit not necessarily equal, as the purpose of the bond/credit rating process is to assess credit quality or credit risk (i.e., 17 18 the risk of the company not paying its outstanding debt), and not common equity risk (i.e., 19 the risk of the company not paying its outstanding debt, nor compensating its equity 20 investors).

Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, i.e., within the A category, an S&P rating can be at A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinctions for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, i.e., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

1 Q. That being said, do rating agencies reflect company size in their bond ratings?

- A. No. Neither S&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for any given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis needs to be conducted for
- 4 companies with similar bond ratings.

5 V. <u>BLUEGRASS WATER AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP</u>

- 6 Q. Are you familiar with the operations of Bluegrass Water?
- 7 A. Yes. Bluegrass Water is headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, and provides service to 20 water and sewer service areas in Kentucky, representing 2,488 wastewater connections.⁸
- 9 Q. Why is it necessary to develop a proxy group when estimating the ROE for the10 Company?
 - Because the Company is not publicly traded and does not have publicly traded equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded, comparable companies to serve as "proxies" for the Company. In addition to the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have selected a proxy group that, in my view, is fundamentally risk-comparable to the Company.

Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range, even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how

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⁸ Source: See Direct Testimony of Brent Thies.

1		to estimate the ROE for the target company from within that range. That determination		
2		will be best informed by employing a variety of sound analyses and necessarily must		
3		consider the sort of quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my		
4		Direct Testimony. Additionally, a relative risk analysis between the Company and the		
5		Utility Proxy Group must be made to determine whether explicit Company-specific		
6		adjustments need to be made to the Utility Proxy Group's indicated results.		
7		My analyses are based on the Utility Proxy Group, containing U.S. water and		
8		wastewater utilities. As discussed earlier, utilities must compete for capital with other		
9		companies with commensurate risk (including non-utilities) and, to do so, must be provided		
10		the opportunity to earn a comparable return to these companies having a commensurate		
11		risk. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the Utility Proxy Group's market data in		
12		determining the Company's ROE.		
13	Q.	Please explain how you chose your Utility Proxy Group.		
14	A.	The basis of selection for the Utility Proxy Group was to select those companies which		
15		meet the following criteria:		
16		(i) They are included in the Water Utility Group of Value Line's Standard Edition		
17		(January 6, 2023);		
18		(ii) They have 60% or greater of 2021 total operating income or 60% or greater of 2021		
19		total assets attributable to regulated water operations;		
20		(iii) At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that		
21		they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one publicly		

traded utility merging with or acquiring another);

1		(iv) They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years ending
2		2021 or through the time of the preparation of this testimony;
3		(v) They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services ("Bloomberg")
4		adjusted Beta coefficients ("beta");
5		(vi) They have a positive <i>Value Line</i> five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth rate
6		projection; and
7		(vii) They have Value Line, Zacks or Yahoo! Finance five-year earnings per share
8		("EPS") growth rate projections.
9		The following six companies met these criteria: American States Water Company,
10		American Water Works Company, Inc., California Water Service Group, Essential Utilities
11		Inc., Middlesex Water Company, and SJW Group.
12	Q.	Please describe Exhibit DWD-2, page 1.
13	A.	Page 1 of Exhibit DWD-2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for
14		the Utility Proxy Group identified above for the years 2017 to 2021. During the five-year
15		period ending 2021, the historically achieved earnings rate on book common equity for the
16		group averaged 10.40%. The average common equity ratio based on total permanent
17		capital (excluding short-term debt) was 51.78%, and the average dividend payout ratio was
18		59.46%.
19		Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the
20		years 2017 to 2021 ranges between 3.48x and 5.92x, with an average of 4.88x. Funds from
21		operations to total debt range from 11.39% to 23.56%, with an average of 16.75%.

1	VI.	CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND LONG-TERM DEBT COST RATE							
2		A.	CAPITAL STE	RUCTURE					
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What capital structure ratio do you recommend be employed in developing an overall fair rate of return appropriate for the Company in this proceeding?

5 A. I recommend the use of Bluegrass Water's actual capital structure, which consists of

38.84% long-term debt and 61.16% common equity as shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD
1.9

Q. How does Bluegrass Water's proposed ratemaking common equity ratio of 61.16% compare with the equity ratios maintained by the companies in your Utility Proxy Group?

Bluegrass Water's proposed ratemaking common equity ratio of 61.16% is consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained, on average, by the companies in the Utility Proxy Group on which I base my recommended common equity cost rate. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-2, the common equity ratios of the Utility Proxy Group range from 40.31% to 62.44%, averaging 49.38% in fiscal year 2021.

Bluegrass Water's proposed ratemaking equity ratio is also consistent with the equity ratios expected to be maintained by the Utility Proxy Group in the years 2025 to 2027 as published by *Value Line*. In the years 2025 to 2027, the members of the Utility Proxy Group are expected to maintain equity ratios between 40.00% and 62.50%.¹⁰

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See, Kentucky Public Service Commission, Case No. 2020-00290, Order (August 2, 2021), at 101.

Value Line Investment Survey, January 6, 2023.

B. LONG-TERM DEBT COST RATE

- 2 Q. What is your recommendation regarding the appropriate cost of long-term debt for
- 3 Bluegrass Water in this proceeding?

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- 4 A. In this proceeding, I recommend a cost of long-term debt of 6.80%, which reflects the
- 5 actual effective cost of debt for the Company. The calculation of the effective debt cost
- 6 rate is set forth in page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.

7 VII. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

- 8 Q. Is it important that cost of common equity models be market-based?
- 9 A. Yes. A public utility must compete for equity in capital markets along with all other
- 10 companies of comparable risk, which includes non-utilities. The cost of common equity is
- thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those comparable
- risk companies. If individual investors are choosing to invest their capital among
- companies of comparable risk, they will choose a company providing a higher return over
- a company providing a lower return.
- 15 O. Are your cost of common equity models market-based models?
- 16 A. Yes. The DCF model is market-based because market prices are used in developing the
- dividend yield component of the model. The RPM is market-based because the bond
- ratings and expected bond yields used in the application of the RPM reflect the market's
- assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of beta (β) to determine the equity risk
- premium reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk, since betas are derived
- from regression analyses of market prices. The Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM")
- 22 uses monthly market returns in addition to expectations of the risk-free rate. The CAPM

is market-based for many of the same reasons that the RPM is market-based (i.e., the use of expected bond yields and beta). Selection of the comparable risk non-price regulated companies is market-based because it is based on statistics which result from regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk.

Q. What analytical approaches did you use to determine the Company's ROE?

A.

As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this section.

I rely on these models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model. Moreover, the models on which I rely focus on different aspects of return requirements, and provide different insights to investors' views of risk and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (i.e., the RPM and CAPM approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the Cost of Equity. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

A. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL

2 O. What is the theoretical basis of the DCF model?

- 3 A. The DCF model is based on the theory that the present value of an expected future stream
- 4 of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by discounting
- 5 those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. Mathematically
- 6 this is shown as:

7
$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+ke)^2} + \frac{D_2}{(1+ke)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_t}{(1+ke)^t}$$

- 8 where:
- k =the required Return on Common Equity;
- $D_{l...}D_{t}$ = the future expected dividends; and
- 11 P_{θ} = the current stock price.
- The above equation can be rearranged to form the single-stage constant growth
- DCF model as such:

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$$K_e = (D_0 (1+g))/P + g$$

- where:
- K_e = the required Return on Common Equity;
- 17 D_0 = the annualized Dividend Per Share;
- P =the current stock price; and
- g =the growth rate.
- In this form, the required ROE is equal to the expected dividend yield plus an expected long-term growth rate. The constant growth DCF formula is derived from the present value DCF formula.

1		Under the model's strict assumptions, the growth rate equals the rate of capital
2		appreciation (that is, the growth in the stock price). Given that assumption, it does not
3		matter whether the investor holds the stock in perpetuity, or whether they hold the stock
4		for some period of time, collect the dividends, then sell at the prevailing market price.
5	Q.	Which version of the DCF model did you use?
6	A.	I used the single-stage constant growth DCF model.
7	Q.	Please describe the dividend yield you used in your application of the DCF model.
8	A.	The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of January
9		13, 2023, divided by the average of closing market prices for the 60 trading days ending
10		January 13, 2023. ¹¹
11	Q.	Please explain your adjustment to the dividend yield.
11 12	Q. A.	Please explain your adjustment to the dividend yield. Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an
12		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an
12 13		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or
12 13 14		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.
12 13 14 15		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model. DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or D ₁ , in calculating the
12 13 14 15 16		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model. DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or D ₁ , in calculating the dividend yield component of the model. Since the various companies in the Utility Proxy
12 13 14 15 16 17		Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model. DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or D ₁ , in calculating the dividend yield component of the model. Since the various companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividend at various times during the year, a reasonable

Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1 on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4

See Exhibit DWD-4, page 1, Column 1.

1		have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in
2		Column 5.
3	Q.	Please explain the basis of the growth rates you applied to the Utility Proxy Group in
4		your DCF model.
5	A.	Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely on
6		widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Zacks, and Yahoo!
7		Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the
8		industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as companies' abilities to
9		effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations, and ever-changing
10		economic and market conditions. For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of
11		EPS growth in my DCF analysis.
12		Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Security
13		analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on market prices than
14		dividend expectations. Thus, the use of earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides
15		a better match between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth
16		rate component of the DCF.
17	Q.	Please summarize the DCF model results.
18	A.	As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4, the application of the constant growth DCF model
19		to the Utility Proxy Group results in a wide range of indicated ROEs from 5.81% to
20		12.92%. The mean result is 9.11%, the median result is 9.21%, and the average of the
21		mean and median results is 9.16% for the Utility Proxy Group.

B. THE RISK PREMIUM MODEL

- O. Please describe the theoretical basis of the RPM.
 - A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return, namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from investment in bonds, to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity return cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively) and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings in the event of a liquidation.

- Q. Please explain how you derived your indicated cost of common equity based on the RPM.
- 19 A. I relied on the results of the application of two risk premium methods. The first method is 20 the PRPM, while the second method is a risk premium model using a total market approach.

1. The Predictive Risk Premium Model

2 Q. Please explain the PRPM.

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The PRPM, published in the <u>Journal of Regulatory Economics</u> and <u>The Electricity</u>

<u>Journal</u>¹², was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility ("ARCH")". Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that the volatility in prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.

The PRPM estimates the risk / return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by the prediction of volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an <u>estimate</u> of investor behavior, but rather on the evaluation of the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

14 Q. Please explain your application of the PRPM.

15 A. The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each company 16 in the Utility Proxy Group minus the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury 17 securities through December 2022. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as 18 GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium

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Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. See "A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278 and "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", Richard A. Michelfelder, Pauline M. Ahern, Dylan W. D'Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal (May 2013), 84-89.

www.nobelprize.org.

using Eviews statistical software. When the GARCH Model is applied to the historical
return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series ¹⁴ and a GARCH coefficient ¹⁵ .
Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient, then annualizing
it16, produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted 30-
year U.S. Treasury Bond yield, 3.91% ¹⁷ , to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk
premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30-year Treasury yield is a
consensus forecast derived from the <u>Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip")</u> ¹⁸ .

Q. What are the results of the PRPM?

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As shown on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-5, the mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is 13.05%, the median is 12.23%, and the average of the two is 12.64%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of 12.64%.

Q. Is the PRPM supported by academic literature?

Yes, it is. As is explained above, the PRPM is based on the research of Dr. Robert F. Engle, dating back to the early 1980s. In addition, the GARCH methodology has been well tested by academia since Engle's, *et al.* research was originally published in 1982, 40 years ago. I use the well-established GARCH methodology to estimate the PRPM model using a

Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2 of page 2 of Exhibit DWD-5.

¹⁵ Illustrated on Column 4 of page 2 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Annualized Return = $(1+Monthly Return)^12 - 1$.

See Column 6 of page 2 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 2, 2022, at p. 14 and January 1, 2023 at p. 2.

standard commercial and relatively inexpensive statistical package, Eviews, ©19 to develop
a means by which to estimate a predicted equity risk premium which, when added to a
bond yield, results in a cost of common equity.

Also, the PRPM is in the public domain, having been published six times in academically peer-reviewed journals: *Journal of Economics and Business* (June 2011 and April 2015),²⁰ *The Journal of Regulatory Economics* (December 2011),²¹ *The Electricity Journal* (May 2013 and March 2020),²² and *Energy Policy* (April 2019).²³ Notably, none of these articles have been rebutted in the academic literature.

Finally, the PRPM has also been presented to a number of utility industry/regulatory/academic groups including the following: The Edison Electric Institute Cost of Capital Working Group; The NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance; The National Association of Electric Companies Finance/Accounting/Taxation and Rates and Regulations Committees; the NARUC Electric Committee; The Wall Street Utility Group; the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Cost of Capital Task Force; the

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In addition to Eviews,[®] the GARCH methodology can be applied and the PRPM derived using other standard statistical software packages such as SAS, RATS, S-Plus and JMulti, which are not cost-prohibitive. The software that I used in this proceeding, Eviews,[®] currently costs \$600 - \$700 for a single user commercial license. In addition, JMulti is a free downloadable software with GARCH estimation applications.

Eugene A. Pilotte and Richard A. Michelfelder, "Treasury Bond Risk and Return, the Implications for the Hedging of Consumption and Lessons for Asset Pricing", *Journal of Economics and Business*, June 2011, 582-604. and Richard A. Michelfelder, "Empirical Analysis of the Generalized Consumption Asset Pricing Model: Estimating the Cost of Capital", *Journal of Economics and Business*, April 2015, 37-50.

Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley, and Richard A. Michelfelder, "New Approach to Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", *The Journal of Regulatory Economics*, December 2011, at 40:261-278.

Richard A. Michelfelder, Pauline M. Ahern, Dylan W. D'Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", *The Electricity Journal*, April 2013, at 84-89; and Richard A. Michelfelder, Pauline M. Ahern, and Dylan W. D'Ascendis, "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", *The Electricity Journal*, January 2020.

Richard A. Michelfelder, Pauline M. Ahern, and Dylan W. D'Ascendis, "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", *Energy Policy*, April 2019, 311-319.

1	Financial Research Institute of the University of Missouri Hot Topic Hotline Webinar; and
2	the Center for Research and Regulated Industries Annual Eastern Conference on two
3	occasions.
4 Q.	Has the PRPM been implicitly accepted by other regulatory commissions?
5 A.	Yes. In Docket No. 2017-292-WS, the Public Service Commission of South Carolina
6	("PSC SC") accepted Blue Granite Water Company's entire requested ROE, which
7	included the PRPM. The relevant portion states:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	The Commission finds Mr. D'Ascendis' arguments persuasive. He provided more indicia of market returns, by using more analytical methods and proxy group calculations. Mr. D'Ascendis' use of analysts' estimates for his DCF analysis is supported by consensus, as is his use of the arithmetic mean. The Commission also finds that Mr. D'Ascendis' non-price regulated proxy group more accurately reflects the total risk faced [by] price regulated utilities and CWS. Furthermore, there is no dispute that CWS is significantly smaller than its proxy group counterparts, and, therefore, it may present a higher risk. An appropriate ROE for CWS is 10.45% to 10.95%. The Company used an ROE of 10.5% in computing its Application, a return on the low end of Mr. D'Ascendis' range, and the Commission finds that ROE is supported by the evidence. ²⁴
21	In addition, in Docket No. W-354, Subs 363, 364 and 365, the State of North
22	Carolina Utilities Commission ("NCUC") approved my RPM and CAPM analyses, which
23	used PRPM analyses as presented in this proceeding. The relevant portion of the order
24	states:
25 26 27 28	In doing so the Commission finds that the DCF (8.81%), Risk Premium (10.00%) and CAPM (9.29%) model results provided by witness D'Ascendis, as updated to use current rates in D'Ascendis Late-Filed Exhibit No. 1, as well as the risk premium (9.57%)

PSC SC Docket No. 2017-292-WS - Order No. 2018-345, at 14. (May 17, 2018)

1 2		analysis of witness Hinton, are credible, probative, and are entitled to substantial weight as set forth below. ²⁵
3	Q.	Did the Commission reject the PRPM in Case No. 2021-00214 concerning Atmos
4		Energy Corporation?
5	A.	Yes, it did. The Commission stated:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12		Even though the Commission supports the use and presentation of multiple modelling approaches, the Commission finds that Atmos Kentucky's use of the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) should be rejected. Though the PRPM model has been published and presented in multiple forums, it has been rejected by this Commission and only been addressed by three other regulatory jurisdictions thus far and is not universally accepted.
13	Q.	Do you have a response to the Commission's statement?
14	A.	Yes, I do. I appreciate the Commission's openness to considering multiple models in its
15		determination of ROEs for the utilities they regulate, but I respectfully disagree with their
16		exclusion of the PRPM in Case No. 2021-00214. As noted above, the theory supporting
17		the model is based on the Nobel Prize winning work of Engle, and the model itself has
18		been published six times in four separate peer-reviewed academic journals, which indicates
19		that it has been thoroughly vetted by the academic community. This, in addition to the fact
20		that the model has not been rebutted in the academic literature in the approximately twenty
21		years since it was presented in 2003 should speak to the model's soundness.
22		Regarding the amount of times the model has been addressed in final orders; while
23		it is true that only three (now four) regulatory commissions have addressed the PRPM in
24		their final orders, the model has been presented in over 100 regulatory proceedings in over

NCUC Docket No. W-354, Sub 363, 364, 365, Order Granting Partial Rate Increase and Requiring Customer Notice, at PDF 72 (March 31, 2020).

1		thirty U.S. regulatory jurisdictions and the Alberta Utilities Commission in Canada. This
2		would indicate that while maybe not universally accepted, the model is widely
3		disseminated across the U.S. regulatory landscape.
4		In view of the above, the soundness of the model, as evidenced in the underlying
5		theory and the academic vetting of the PRPM, and the wide dissemination of the model in
6		the U.S. regulatory landscape should lead the Commission to reconsider use of the PRPM
7		as a modeling methodology.
8	Q.	Have you presented your ROE model results excluding the PRPM?
8	Q. A.	Have you presented your ROE model results excluding the PRPM? Yes. While I respectfully disagree with the Commission's finding in Case No. 2021-
9		Yes. While I respectfully disagree with the Commission's finding in Case No. 2021-
9 10		Yes. While I respectfully disagree with the Commission's finding in Case No. 2021-00214, I have presented my ROE model results including and excluding the PRPM for the
9 10 11		Yes. While I respectfully disagree with the Commission's finding in Case No. 2021-00214, I have presented my ROE model results including and excluding the PRPM for the Commission's convenience. As can be gleaned from page 2 of Exhibit DWD-1, my

15 Q. Please explain the total market approach RPM.

16 A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average 17 of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk 18 premium; and 2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P Utilities Index.

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The range of ROEs attributable to the Company excluding the PRPM is from 10.74% to 11.74%.

Q.	Please explain the basis of the expected bond yield of 5.98% applicable to the Utility
	Proxy Group.

Α.

The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. I rely on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the second calendar quarter of 2024, and the long-term projections for 2024 to 2028, and 2029 to 2033 from *Blue Chip*. As shown on line 1 of page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 5.05%. In order to derive an expected yield on A2-rated public utility bonds, I make an upward adjustment of 0.83%, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds, in order to adjust the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent Moody's A2-rated public utility bond.²⁷ Adding that recent 0.83% spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 5.05% results in an expected A2-rated public utility bond of 5.88%.

Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond yield is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of 0.10%, which represents one-third of a recent spread between A2- and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2-rated prospective bond yield applicable to an A3-rated public utility bond.²⁸

As shown on line 2 and explained in note 2 of page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5.

As shown on line 5 and explained in note 4, page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3 rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2 rated and A3 rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1

Adding the 0.10% to the 5.88% prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield results in a

5.98% expected bond yield for the Utility Proxy Group.

Table 3: Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected Bond Yield²⁹

Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (Blue Chip)	5.05%
Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2 Rated Utility Bonds	0.83%
Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3	0.10%
Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	<u>5.98%</u>

To develop the indicated ROE using the total market approach RPM, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums described below.

8 Q. Please explain how the beta-derived equity risk premium is determined.

The components of the beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) beta. The derivation of the beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is shown on lines 1 through 9 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5. The total beta-derived equity risk premium I applied was based on an average of: 1) Kroll-based equity risk premiums; 2) *Value Line*-based equity risk premiums; and 3) Bloomberg-based equity risk premiums. Each of these is described in turn.

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to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2 rated and Baa2 rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

As shown on page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Q.	How did you derive a market equity risk premium based on long-term histori	ca
	lata?	

To derive a historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Kroll Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation ("SBBI") 2022 Yearbook ("SBBI – 2022")³⁰ less the average historical yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2021. The use of holding period returns over a very long period of time is appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was 12.11% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was 5.98% from 1928 to 2021.³¹ As shown on line 1 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 6.13%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in SBBI – 2022.³² The use of the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment.

A.

SBBI-2022 Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, & Inflation 1926-2021.

As explained in note 1 on page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.

SBBI -2022, at 200-201.

1		If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would
2		have no insight into the potential variance of future returns because the geometric mean
3		relates to the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the
4		year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.
5	Q.	Please explain the derivation of the regression-based market equity risk premium.
6	A.	To derive the regression analysis-derived market equity risk premium of 7.26%, shown on
7		line 2 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5, I used the same monthly annualized total returns on
8		large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on Moody's
9		Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. The relationship between interest rates
10		and the market equity risk premium was modeled using the observed monthly market
11		equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-
12		rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I used a linear Ordinary Least Squares
13		("OLS") regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of
14		the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bond yield:
15		$RP = \alpha + \beta \; (R_{Aaa/Aa})$
16		where:
17		RP = the market equity risk premium;
18		α = the regression intercept coefficient;
19		β = the regression slope coefficient; and
20		R _{Aaa/Aa} = the Moody's Aaa/Aa rated corporate bond yield.
21		Using the equation generated by the regression, an expected equity risk premium
22		of 7.26% is calculated using the average forecast of Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of
23		5.05%, as discussed above.

Q. Please explain the derivation of a PRPM equity risk premium.

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I used the same PRPM approach described previously to develop another equity risk premium estimate. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through December 2022.³³ Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews[©] statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted market equity risk premium is 9.76%.³⁴

Q. Please explain the derivation of a projected equity risk premium based on *Value Line*Summary and Index data for your RPM analysis.

As noted previously, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4 on page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5. Consistent with the premise that total returns are the sum of capital appreciation and income returns, this prospective market return is derived from an average of the three to five-year median market price appreciation potential by *Value Line* Summary and Index for the 13 weeks ending January 13, 2023, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in *Value Line*'s Standard Edition.³⁵

As explained in detail in page 2, note 1 of Exhibit DWD-6.

Case No. 2022-00432 Application Exhibit 6 Direct Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis Page 33 of 53

Data from January 1928-December 2021 is from <u>SBBI – 2022</u>. Data from January 2022 – December 2022 is from Bloomberg Professional Services.

Shown on line 3 on page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.

1		The average median expected price appreciation is 68%, which translates to a
2		13.85% annual appreciation, and when added to the average of Value Line's median
3		expected dividend yields of 2.21%, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the
4		market of 16.06%. The forecasted Aaa-rated bond yield of 5.05% is deducted from the
5		total market return of 16.06%, resulting in an equity risk premium of 11.01%, shown on
6		page 8, line 4 of Exhibit DWD-5.
7	Q.	Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on Value Line data for
8		the S&P 500 companies.
9	A.	Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500 using
10		expected dividend yields as a proxy for income return and long-term growth estimates as
11		a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500 is 15.52%.
12		Subtracting the prospective yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 5.05% results in a
13		10.47% projected equity risk premium.
14	Q.	Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on Bloomberg data.
15	A.	Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500 using
16		expected dividend yields as a proxy for income return and long-term growth estimates as
17		a proxy for capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected
18		total return for the S&P 500 is 11.23%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Aaa-rated
19		corporate bonds of 5.05% resulted in a 6.18% projected equity risk premium.

- Q. What is your conclusion of a beta-derived equity risk premium for use in your RPM analysis?
- 3 A. I gave equal weight to the six equity risk premiums in arriving at my conclusion of 8.47%. ³⁶

Table 4: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using Total

Market Returns³⁷

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa2 Rated Corporate Bond Yields (1928 – 2021)	6.13%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	7.26%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	9.76%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from Value Line Summary & Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Value Line for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	11.01%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	6.18%
Average	<u>8.47%</u>

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 8.47%, I adjusted it by beta to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, the beta is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole and is a logical means by which to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6, the average of the mean and median beta for the Utility Proxy Group is 0.77. Multiplying the beta of the Utility Proxy Group of 0.77 by the market equity risk premium of 8.47% resulted in a beta-adjusted equity risk premium of 6.52% for the Utility Proxy Group.

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See line 7 on page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.

As shown on page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Q.	How did you derive the equity risk premium based on the S&P Utility Index and
	Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds?

I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of the S&P Utilities Index, using *Value Line* and Bloomberg data, respectively. Turning first to the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility Index total returns of 10.74% and monthly A2-rated public utility bond yields of 6.46% from 1928 to 2021, to arrive at an equity risk premium of 4.28%.³⁸ I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium of 4.80% based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final S&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to December 2022 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of 5.56% for the S&P Utility Index.

I then derived expected total returns on the S&P Utilities Index of 9.45% and 10.57% using data from *Value Line* and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted the prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield (5.88%)³⁹, which results in risk premiums of 3.57% and 4.69%, respectively. As with the market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk premium to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of 4.58%.

Derived on line 3 of page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5.

A.

As shown on line 1 on page 11 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P Utilities Index and A2 Rated Utility Bond Yields (1928 – 2021)	4.28%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	4.80%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	5.56%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	3.57%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	4.69%
Average	<u>4.58%</u>

3

4 Q. What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your total market

- 5 approach RPM analysis?
- 6 A. The equity risk premium I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is 5.55%, which is the average
- 7 of the beta-derived and the S&P utility equity risk premiums of 6.52% and 4.58%,
- respectively.41 8
- 9 Q. What is the indicated RPM common equity cost rate based on the total market
- 10 approach?
- As shown on line 7 of Exhibit DWD-5, page 3, I calculated a common equity cost rate of 11 A.
- 12 11.53% for the Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach of the RPM.

As shown on page 11 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Table 6: Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model⁴²

Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	5.98%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium	<u>5.55%</u>
Indicated Cost of Common Equity	<u>11.53%</u>

2 Q. What are the results of your application of the PRPM and the total market approach

3 **RPM?**

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- 4 A. As shown on page 1 of <u>Exhibit DWD-5</u>, the indicated RPM-derived common equity cost
- 5 rate is 12.09%, which gives equal weight to the PRPM (12.64%) and the adjusted market
- 6 approach results (11.53%).

C. THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

8 Q. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.

- 9 A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's
- returns as measured by beta (β) . A beta of less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the
- market as a whole, while a beta greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the
- market.
- The CAPM assumes that all other risk (i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk)
- can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through
- diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that
- investors require compensation only for systematic risk, which is the result of
- macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied
- by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted

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⁴² As shown on page 3 of Exhibit DWD-5.

2 market, as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as: 3 R_s $R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$ 4 Where: R_s Return rate on the common stock; $R_{\rm f}$ Risk-free rate of return; 5 Return rate on the market as a whole; and 6 R_{m} 7 β Adjusted beta (volatility of the 8 security relative to the market as a whole).

Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and beta are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML.⁴³ The ECAPM reflects this empirical reality. Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2, below, that "[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low."

proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total

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
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Roger A. Morin, Modern Regulatory Finance, (PUR Books, 2021) at 221. ("Morin")

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama & French"). http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430.

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



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In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

5

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.⁴⁵

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9 10

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Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

 $K = R_F + x \beta(R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$

⁴⁵ Morin, at 207.

1 where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best 2 explains the observed relationship [is] Return = $0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25, the equation becomes: 3 $K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{46}$ 4 5 Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state: The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There 6 7 is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too 'flat.'... 8 The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the 9 average risk-free rate... and the coefficient on beta is less than the average 10 excess market return... This is true in the early tests... as well as in more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992).⁴⁷ 11 Finally, Fama and French further note: 12 13 Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. 14 The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high 15 beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the 16 17 portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 18 19 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.⁴⁸ 20 21 Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French along with their reviews of 22 other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the 23 24 companies in the Utility Proxy Group and averaged the results. 25 Q. What beta did you use in your CAPM analysis? 26 With respect to beta, I considered two methods of calculation: 1) the average beta of the A. 27 Utility Proxy Group companies reported by Bloomberg Professional Services; and 2) the 28 average beta of the Utility Proxy Group companies as reported by Value Line. While both

⁴⁶ Morin, at 221.

Fama & French, at 32.

Fama & French, at 33.

1		of those services adjust their calculated (or "raw") betas to reflect the tendency of beta to
2		regress to the market mean of 1.00, Value Line calculates beta over a five-year period,
3		while Bloomberg's calculation is based on two years of data.
4	Q.	Please describe your selection of a risk-free rate of return.
5	A.	As shown in Exhibits DWD-5 and DWD-6, the risk-free rate adopted for applications of
6		the RPM and CAPM is 3.91%. This risk-free rate of 3.91% is based on the average of the
7		Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for
8		the six quarters ending with the second calendar quarter of 2024, and long-term projections
9		for the years 2024 to 2028 and 2029 to 2033.
10	Q.	Why do you use the 30-year Treasury yield in your analyses?
11	A.	The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds is almost risk-free, and its term is consistent
12		with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields on A2 rated
13		public utility bonds, the long-term investment horizon inherent in utilities' common stocks,
14		and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return
15		(i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more
16		volatile and largely a function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.
17	Q.	Please explain the estimation of the expected risk premium for the market used in
18		your CAPM analyses.
19	A.	The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit
20		<u>DWD-6</u> . As discussed previously, the market risk premium is derived from an average of:
21		(i) Ibbotson-based market risk premiums;

Value Line data-based market risk premiums; and

22

(ii)

(iii) Bloomberg data-based market risk premiums.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government Securities of 5.02% was deducted from the <u>SBBI - 2022</u> monthly historical total market return of 12.37%, which results in a historical market equity risk premium of 7.35%. ⁴⁹ I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government Securities from <u>SBBI - 2022</u>. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of 8.71%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 10.86% and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through December 2022.

The *Value Line* Summary and Index-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 3.91%, discussed above, from the *Value Line* Summary and Index projected total annual market return of 16.06%, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of 12.15%. The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using *Value Line* data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 3.91% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 15.52%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 11.61%.

The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 3.91% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 11.23%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 7.32%.

These six market risk premiums, when averaged, resulted in an average total market equity risk premium of 9.67%.

SBBI - 2022, at 256-258, 274-276.

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Long-Term Government Bond Yields (1926 – 2021)	7.35%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	8.71%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	10.86%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from <i>Value Line</i> Summary & Index less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	12.15%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	11.61%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	7.32%
Average	9.67%

3 Q. What are the results of your application of the traditional and empirical CAPM to

4 the Utility Proxy Group?

- 5 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM analysis is
- 6 11.77%, the median is 11.38%, and the average of the two is 11.58%. Consistent with my
- 7 reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results discussed above, the indicated
- 8 common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM is 11.58%.

As shown on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-6.

1 2 3		D. <u>COMMON EQUITY COST RATES FOR A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES BASED ON THE DCF, RPM, AND CAPM</u>
4	Q.	Why did you also consider a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated
5		companies?
6	A.	In the Hope and Bluefield cases, the U.S. Supreme Court did not specify that comparable
7		risk companies had to be utilities. Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute
8		for the competition of the marketplace, non-price regulated firms operating in the
9		competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the
10		Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. The selection of
11		such domestic, non-price regulated competitive firms theoretically and empirically results
12		in a proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group.
13	Q.	How did you select non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk
14		to the Utility Proxy Group?
15	A.	In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar in total
16		risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on beta and related statistics derived from Value
17		Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five
18		years). Using these selection criteria resulted in a proxy group of 20 domestic, non-price
19		regulated firms comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum
20		of non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The following
21		criteria were used in the selection of the domestic, non-price regulated firms:
22		(i) They must be covered by Value Line;
23		(ii) They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, <i>i.e.</i> , non-utilities;

1		(iii) Their beta must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average
2		unadjusted beta of the Utility Proxy Group; and
3		(iv) The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to the
4		unadjusted betas must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the
5		average residual standard error of the Utility Proxy Group.
6		Betas are a measure of market or systematic risk, which is not diversifiable. The
7		residual standard errors of the regressions were used to measure each firm's company-
8		specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar betas and similar residual standard
9		errors resulting from the same regression analyses have similar total investment risk.
10	Q.	Have you prepared an exhibit which shows the data from which you selected the 20
11		domestic, non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk to the
12		Utility Proxy Group?
13	A.	Yes, the basis of my selection, and both proxy groups' regression statistics, are shown in
14		Exhibit DWD-7.
15	Q.	Did you calculate common equity cost rates using the DCF, RPM, and CAPM for the
16		Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group?
17	A.	Yes. Because the DCF, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical manner as
18		described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and application of each model.
19		One exception is in the application of the RPM, where I did not use public utility-specific
20		equity risk premiums, nor did I apply the PRPM to the individual companies.

1		Page 2 of Exhibit DWD-8 contains the derivation of the DCF cost rates. As shown,
2		the indicated common equity cost rate using the DCF for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy
3		Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, is 9.54%.
4		Pages 3 through 5 of Exhibit DWD-8 contain the data and calculations that support
5		the 12.40% RPM cost rate. As shown on line 1 of page 3 of Exhibit DWD-8, the consensus
6		prospective yield on Moody's Baa2-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending in
7		the second quarter of 2024, and for the years 2024 to 2028 and 2029 to 2033, is 6.05%. ⁵¹
8		Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group has an average Moody's long-term issuer
9		rating of Baa1, a 0.17% downward adjustment of the prospective Baa2-rated corporate
10		bond yield is necessary to reflect a difference in ratings. ⁵²
11		When the beta-adjusted risk premium of 6.52% ⁵³ relative to the Non-Price
12		Regulated Proxy Group is added to the adjusted prospective Baa1-rated corporate bond
13		yield of 5.88%, the indicated RPM cost rate is 12.40%.
14		Page 6 contains the inputs and calculations that support my indicated
15		CAPM/ECAPM cost rate of 11.61%.
16	Q.	What is the cost rate of common equity based on the Non-Price Regulated Proxy
17		Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
18	A.	As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-8, the results of the DCF, RPM, and CAPM applied
19		to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy
20		Group are 9.54%, 12.40%, and 11.61%, respectively. The average of the mean and median

⁵¹ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 2, 2022, at p. 14 and January 1, 2023 at p. 2. The 0.17% downward adjustment is equal to one-third of the spread between A2 and Baa2 corporate bond

⁵² yields, as illustrated in note 2 on page 3 of Exhibit DWD-8.

⁵³ Derived on page 5 of Exhibit DWD-8.

	of these models is 11.40%, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rate for the
	Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.
III.	CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENT
•	What is the indicated range of common equity cost rates before adjustments?
	Based on the results of the application of multiple cost of common equity models to the
	Utility Proxy Group, my recommended range of ROEs attributable to the Utility Proxy
	Group is between 10.13% and 11.13%. The indicated range is equal to 50 basis points
	above and below the midpoint of my results.
	I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my
	recommended common equity cost rate, because no single model is so inherently precise
	that it can be relied on solely to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models. The use
	of multiple models adds reliability to the estimation of the common equity cost rate, and
	the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models is supported in both the
	financial literature and regulatory precedent.
	As discussed previously, after determining the indicated range of ROE attributable
	to a comparable group, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between that group and
	the target company to determine whether it is appropriate to apply adjustments to the
	comparable group's indicated ROE to better reflect the target company's specific risks.
ζ.	ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE
	A. <u>BUSINESS RISK ADJUSTMENT</u>

Does Bluegrass Water have increased business risk compared with your Utility Proxy

21

22

Q.

Group?

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1	A.	Yes, it does. Bluegrass Water faces extraordinary operating risks because of its acquisition
2		of mainly troubled water and wastewater systems, which is only exacerbated by its small
3		size.
4	Q.	Please summarize the extraordinary business risk that faces Bluegrass Water.
5	A.	As described in detail in Messrs. Cox and Freeman's direct testimonies, the Company faces
6		significant risks due to its acquisition of troubled water and wastewater systems, often at
7		the behest of the Commonwealth. These acquired systems often have significant
8		challenges in all phases of service to their existing customers and Bluegrass Water must
9		invest significant capital to ensure safe and reliable service. While rehabilitating troubled
10		systems is generally a small portion of the operations of the companies that comprise my
11		Utility Proxy Group, it is the majority of the operations of Bluegrass Water. As such, the
12		Company's increased business risk as compared to the Utility Proxy Group should be
13		reflected in its authorized ROE.
14	Q.	Does Bluegrass Water's smaller size compared with the Utility Proxy Group increase
15		its business risk?
16	A.	Yes. Bluegrass Water's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies
17		indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being equal, size
18		has a material bearing on risk.
19		Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to cope
20		with significant events that affect sales, revenues, and earnings. For example, smaller
21		companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic conditions, both
22		nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few larger customers

1	would have a greater effect on a small company than on a bigger company with a larger,
2	more diverse, customer base.
3	As further evidence illustrates that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally
4	demand greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and
5	liquidity of their securities. Duff & Phelps' (now Kroll) discusses the nature of the small-
6	size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based on
7	several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Premiums," Kroll
8	states:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a <i>predictor</i> of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size <i>decreases</i> , returns tend to <i>increase</i> , and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) ⁵⁴
18	Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Fama
19	and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when estimating the
20	cost of common equity. On page 38, they note:
21 22 23 24	the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. ⁵⁵
25	Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model which
26	includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of common equity.

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Kroll: Cost of Capital Navigator: U.S. Cost of Capital Module, "Size as a Predictor of Equity Returns," at 1 Fama & French, at 25-43.

1		Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not the
2		source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. ⁵⁶ Eugene Brigham, a well-
3		known authority, states:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11		A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added) ⁵⁷
12		Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above, increased
13		relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of return on common
14		equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate of common equity in this
15		proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of Bluegrass Water, including its
16		small size, which is justified and supported above by evidence in the financial literature.
17	Q.	Is there a way to quantify a relative risk adjustment due to Bluegrass Water's greater
18		business risk relative to the Utility Proxy Group?
19	A.	Yes. In the absence of other empirical methods, I compared Bluegrass Water's and the
20		Utility Proxy Group's relative size, as measured by an estimated market capitalization of
21		common equity for Bluegrass Water.
22 23		Table 8: Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for the Company and the Utility Proxy Group

Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, <u>Principles of Corporate Finance</u> (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

Eugene F. Brigham, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

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	Market Capitalization* (\$ Millions)	Times Greater Than the Company
Bluegrass Water	\$15.374	
Utility Proxy Group Median	\$3,439.009	320.8x
*From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-9.		

The Company's estimated market capitalization was at \$15.374 million as of January 13, 2023, compared with the median market capitalization of the Utility Proxy Group of \$3.44 <u>billion</u> as of January 13, 2023. The Utility Proxy Group's market capitalization is 223.7 times the size of Bluegrass Water's estimated market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates to reflect Bluegrass Water's greater risk due to its smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2021 period. The average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of \$3.44 billion falls in the 5th decile, while Bluegrass Water's market capitalization of \$15.374 million places the Company in the 10th decile. The size premium spread between the 5th decile and the 10th decile is 3.91%. Even though a 3.91% upward size adjustment is indicated, I applied a size premium of 1.00% to Bluegrass Water's indicated range of common equity cost rates.

Q. What is the indicated range of common equity cost rates after adjustment for the Bluegrass Water's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group?

- 1 A. After applying the 1.00% size adjustment to the indicated range of common equity cost
- 2 rates between 10.13% and 11.13%, based on the Utility Proxy Group results, a range of
- 3 common equity cost rates between 11.13% and 12.13% is applicable to Bluegrass Water.

4 X. CONCLUSION

- 5 Q. Using the fair, just and reasonable standard applicable in utility rate cases, what is
- 6 your recommended return on investor-supplied capital for Bluegrass Water?
- 7 A. Given the Company's actual capital structure which consists of 38.84% long-term debt at
- 8 an embedded debt cost rate of 6.80% and 61.16% common equity at my recommended
- 9 ROE of 11.65%, I conclude that an appropriate return on investor-supplied capital for the
- 10 Company is 9.77%. A common equity cost rate of 11.65% is consistent with the *Hope* and
- Bluefield standard of a fair, just and reasonable return which ensures the integrity of
- presently invested capital and enables the attraction of needed new capital on reasonable
- terms. It also ensures that Bluegrass Water will be able to continue providing safe,
- adequate, and reliable service to the benefit of its customers. Thus, it balances the interests
- of both customers and the Company.
- 16 Q. Does this conclude your Direct Testimony?
- 17 A. Yes, it does.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY § COUNTY OF BURLINGTON §

AFFIDAVIT OF DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Dylan W.

D'Ascendis, who having been placed under oath by me did depose as follows:

- 1. "My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am of sound mind and capable of making this affidavit. The facts stated herein are true and correct based on my personal knowledge. My current position is Partner at ScottMadden, Inc.
- 2. I have prepared the foregoing direct testimony and the information contained in this document is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

Further affiant sayeth not.

Dylan W. D'Ascendis

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME by the said Dylan W. D'Ascendis on this day of Feyo., 2023.

MEGAN HALE Notary Public - State of New Jersey My Commission Expires Apr 3, 2026 Notary Public, State of New Jersey

My commission expires: 03, Apr. 2026

APPENDIX A



Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA

Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). Dylan joined ScottMadden in 2016 and has become a leading expert witness with respect to cost of capital and capital structure. He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 14 years. Dylan has testified as an expert witness on over 125 occasions regarding rate of return, cost of service, rate design, and valuation before more than 35 regulatory jurisdictions in the United States and Canada, an American Arbitration Association panel, and the Superior Court of Rhode Island. He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured. Dylan holds a B.A. in economic history from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.B.A. with concentrations in finance and international business from Rutgers University.

Areas of Specialization

- Regulation and Rates
- Rate of Return
- Valuation
- Mutual Fund Benchmarking
- Capital Market Risk
- Regulatory Strategy
- Cost of Service

Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearance

- Regulatory Commission of Alaska Capital Structure
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Rate of Return
- Public Utility Commission of Texas Return on Equity
- Hawaii Public Utilities Commission Cost of Service / Rate Design
- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Valuation

Recent Assignments


- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base

Recent Articles and Speeches

- Co-Author of: "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", co-authored with Richard A.
 Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020
- Co-Author of: "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319
- "Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA
- "Past is Prologue: Future Test Year", Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.
- Co-author of: "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model™, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013
- "Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN



Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Regulatory Commission of Alaska				
ENSTAR Natural Gas Company	08/22	ENSTAR Natural Gas Company	Docket No. TA334-4	Rate of Return
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage		Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage		
Alaska, LLC	07/21	Alaska, LLC	Docket No. TA45-733	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	09/20	Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc.	Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521; TA4-573	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	07/16	Alaska Power Company	Docket No. TA857-2	Rate of Return
Alberta Utilities Commission				<u>'</u>
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	01/20	AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	2021 Generic Cost of Capital, Proceeding ID. 24110	Rate of Return
Arizona Corporation Commission				
Arizona Water Company	12/22	Arizona Water Company – Eastern Group	Docket No. W-01445A-22-0286	Rate of Return
EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	08/22	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	Docket No. WS-01303A-22- 0236	Rate of Return
EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	06/20	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	Docket No. WS-01303A-20- 0177	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	12/19	Arizona Water Company – Western Group	Docket No. W-01445A-19-0278	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	08/18	Arizona Water Company – Northern Group	Docket No. W-01445A-18-0164	Rate of Return
Arkansas Public Service Commission	on			_
Southwestern Electric Power Co.	07/21	Southwestern Electric Power Co.	Docket No. 21-070-U	Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	05/21	CenterPoint Arkansas Gas	Docket No. 21-004-U	Return on Equity
Colorado Public Utilities Commission	on			
Atmos Energy Corporation	08/22	Atmos Energy Corporation	Docket No. 22AL-0348G	Rate of Return
Summit Utilities, Inc.	04/18	Colorado Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 18AL-0305G	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/17	Atmos Energy Corporation	Docket No. 17AL-0429G	Rate of Return
Delaware Public Service Commission	on			
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	01/22	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 22-002 (Gas)	Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	11/20	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 20-0149 (Electric)	Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	10/20	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 20-0150 (Gas)	Return on Equity
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	11/13	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 13-466	Capital Structure
Public Service Commission of the L				
Washington Gas Light Company	04/22	Washington Gas Light Company	Formal Case No. 1169	Rate of Return
Washington Gas Light Company	09/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Formal Case No. 1162	Rate of Return
Federal Energy Regulatory Commis				
LS Power Grid California, LLC	10/20	LS Power Grid California, LLC	Docket No. ER21-195-000	Rate of Return
Florida Public Service Commission				
Tampa Electric Company	04/21	Tampa Electric Company	Docket No. 20210034-EI	Return on Equity
Peoples Gas System	09/20	Peoples Gas System	Docket No. 20200051-GU	Rate of Return
Utilities, Inc. of Florida	06/20	Utilities, Inc. of Florida	Docket No. 20200139-WS	Rate of Return
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission				
Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc.	12/20	Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2020-0217 / Transferred to 2020-0089	Capital Structure






Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Lanai Water Company, Inc.	12/19	Lanai Water Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2019-0386	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Manele Water Resources, LLC	08/19	Manele Water Resources, LLC	Docket No. 2019-0311	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Kaupulehu Water Company	00/19	Kaupulehu Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0363	Rate Design
Raupulent Water Company	02/10	Raupulend Water Company	DOCKEL NO. 2010-0303	Cost of Service /
Aqua Engineers, LLC	05/17	Puhi Sewer & Water Company	Docket No. 2017-0118	Rate Design
Hawaii Resources, Inc.	09/16	Laie Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0229	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Illinois Commerce Commission				
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	02/21	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 21-0198	Rate of Return
Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois	07/20	Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois	Docket No. 20-0308	Return on Equity
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	11/17	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-1106	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Aqua Illinois, Inc.	04/17	Aqua Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-0259	Rate of Return
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	04/15	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 14-0741	Rate of Return
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commiss				1 1010 011 1010
maining carry regulatory commission		Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite		
Aqua Indiana, Inc.	03/16	Wastewater Division	Docket No. 44752	Rate of Return
Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	08/13	Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 44388	Rate of Return
Kansas Corporation Commission	•			
Atmos Energy Corporation	07/19	Atmos Energy Corporation	19-ATMG-525-RTS	Rate of Return
Kentucky Public Service Commissi	on			
Water Service Corporation of KY	06/22	Water Service Corporation of KY	2022-00147	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	07/21	Atmos Energy Corporation	2021-00304	PRP Rider Rate
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/21	Atmos Energy Corporation	2021-00214	Rate of Return
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	06/21	Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	2021-00190	Return on Equity
Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company	10/20	Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company	2020-00290	Return on Equity
Louisiana Public Service Commissi	ion			, ,
Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana	05/21	Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana	Docket No. U-36003	Rate of Return
Southwestern Electric Power		Southwestern Electric Power		
Company	12/20	Company	Docket No. U-35441	Return on Equity
Atmos Energy	04/20	Atmos Energy	Docket No. U-35535	Rate of Return
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	06/13	Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. U-32848	Rate of Return
Maine Public Utilities Commission				
Summit Natural Gas of Maine, Inc.	03/22	Summit Natural Gas of Maine, Inc.	Docket No. 2022-00025	Rate of Return
The Maine Water Company	09/21	The Maine Water Company	Docket No. 2021-00053	Rate of Return
Maryland Public Service Commission	on			
Washington Gas Light Company	08/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Case No. 9651	Rate of Return
FirstEnergy, Inc.	08/18	Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 9490	Rate of Return
Massachusetts Department of Publ	ic Utilities			
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Elec.)	D.P.U. 19-130	Rate of Return
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Gas)	D.P.U. 19-131	Rate of Return
Liberty Utilities	07/15	Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 15-75	Rate of Return
Minnesota Public Utilities Commiss	sion			



Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Northern States Power Company	11/01	Northern States Power Company	Docket No. G002/GR-21-678	Return on Equity
Northern States Power Company	10/21	Northern States Power Company	Docket No. E002/GR-21-630	Return on Equity
Northern States Power Company	11/20	Northern States Power Company	Docket No. E002/GR-20-723	Return on Equity
Mississippi Public Service Commis		Treatment etailer i ener company	Bookerto: 2002/ Ort 20 720	riotam on Equity
Great River Utility Operating Co.	07/22	Great River Utility Operating Co.	Docket No. 2022-UN-86	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy	03/19	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Atmos Energy	07/18	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Missouri Public Service Commission		Turios Energy	DOUNG(140: 2010 014 043	Oupital Otractare
Spire Missouri, Inc.	12/20	Spire Missouri, Inc.	Case No. GR-2021-0108	Return on Equity
Indian Hills Utility Operating	12/20	Indian Hills Utility Operating	0000110. 011 2021 0100	rtotam on Equity
Company, Inc.	10/17	Company, Inc.	Case No. SR-2017-0259	Rate of Return
Raccoon Creek Utility Operating		Raccoon Creek Utility Operating		
Company, Inc.	09/16	Company, Inc.	Case No. SR-2016-0202	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission of Neva	ada			
Southwest Gas Corporation	09/21	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 21-09001	Return on Equity
Southwest Gas Corporation	08/20	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 20-02023	Return on Equity
New Hampshire Public Utilities Con	nmission			
Aquarion Water Company of New		Aquarion Water Company of New		
Hampshire, Inc.	12/20	Hampshire, Inc.	Docket No. DW 20-184	Rate of Return
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities				T
Middlesex Water Company	05/21	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR21050813	Rate of Return
Atlantic City Electric Company	12/20	Atlantic City Electric Company	Docket No. ER20120746	Return on Equity
FirstEnergy	02/20	Jersey Central Power & Light Co.	Docket No. ER20020146	Rate of Return
Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	12/18	Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	Docket No. WR18121351	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	10/17	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR17101049	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	03/15	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR15030391	Rate of Return
The Atlantic City Sewerage	40/44	The Atlantic City Sewerage	B	Cost of Service /
Company	10/14	Company	Docket No. WR14101263	Rate Design
Middlesex Water Company	11/13	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR1311059	Capital Structure
New Mexico Public Regulation Con		0 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	O N 00 00000 UT	
Southwestern Public Service Co.	01/21	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Case No. 20-00238-UT	Return on Equity
North Carolina Utilities Commission			D 1 111 111 051 0 1 100	I D (
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	07/22	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 400	Rate of Return
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	06/22	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 573	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	07/21	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 384	Rate of Return
Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc.	03/21	Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc.	Docket No. G-9, Sub 781	Return on Equity
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214	Return on Equity
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Progress, LLC	Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219	Return on Equity
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	12/19	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 526	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/19	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 364	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	09/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 360	Rate of Return
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	07/18	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 497	Rate of Return
North Dakota Public Service Comm				
Northern States Power Company	09/21	Northern States Power Company	Case No. PU-21-381	Rate of Return
Northern States Power Company	11/20	Northern States Power Company	Case No. PU-20-441	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio				
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.	10/21	Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.	Case No. 21-887-EL-AIR	Return on Equity





Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Agua Ohio, Inc.	07/21	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Case No. 21-0595-WW-AIR	Rate of Return
Agua Ohio, Inc.	05/16	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Case No. 16-0907-WW-AIR	Rate of Return
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commis		1 4 2 2 2		
		Borough of Ambler – Bureau of		
Borough of Ambler	06/22	Water	Docket No. R-2022-3031704	Rate of Return
Citizens' Electric Company of				
Lewisburg	05/22	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2022-3032369	Rate of Return
Valley Energy Company	05/22	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2022-3032300	Rate of Return
Community Utilities of Pennsylvania,	24/24	Community Utilities of Pennsylvania,		
Inc.	04/21	Inc.	Docket No. R-2021-3025207	Rate of Return
Vicinity Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	04/21	Vicinity Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2021-3024060	Rate of Return
Delaware County Regional Water	00/00	Delaware County Regional Water	Darlot No. A 0040 2045472	Maluratian
Control Authority	02/20	Control Authority	Docket No. A-2019-3015173	Valuation
Valley Energy, Inc.	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008209	Rate of Return
Wellsboro Electric Company	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008208	Rate of Return
Citizens' Electric Company of	07/19	CST Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008212	Rate of Return
Lewisburg		C&T Enterprises	Docket No. A-2019-3006880	
Steelton Borough Authority	01/19	Steelton Borough Authority		Valuation
Mahoning Township, PA	08/18	Mahoning Township, PA	Docket No. A-2018-3003519	Valuation
SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	04/18	SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	Docket No. R-2018-000834	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	09/17	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2017-2598203	Rate of Return
Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	06/17	Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2017-2593142	Rate of Return
Emporium Water Company	07/14	Emporium Water Company	Docket No. R-2014-2402324	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	07/13	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2013-2360798	Rate of Return
Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.	12/11	Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. R-2011-2255159	Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost Rate
South Carolina Public Service Com	mission			
Blue Granite Water Co.	12/19	Blue Granite Water Company	Docket No. 2019-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	02/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2017-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/15	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2015-199-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	11/13	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-275-WS	Rate of Return
United Utility Companies, Inc.	09/13	United Utility Companies, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-199-WS	Rate of Return
Utility Services of South Carolina,		Utility Services of South Carolina,		
Inc.	09/13	Inc.	Docket No. 2013-201-WS	Rate of Return
Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	11/12	Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	Docket No. 2012-177-WS	Capital Structure
South Dakota Public Service Commiss	sion			
Northern States Power Company	06/22	Northern States Power Company	Docket No. EL22-017	Rate of Return
Tennessee Public Utility Commission	on			
Piedmont Natural Gas Company	07/20	Piedmont Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 20-00086	Return on Equity
Public Utility Commission of Texas				
Oncor Electric Delivery Co. LLC	05/22	Oncor Electric Delivery Co. LLC	Docket No. 53601	Return on Equity
Southwestern Public Service Co.	02/21	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Docket No. 51802	Return on Equity
Southwestern Electric Power Co.	10/20	Southwestern Electric Power Co.	Docket No. 51415	Rate of Return
Virginia State Corporation Commiss				
Washington Gas Light Company	06/22	Washington Gas Light Company	PUR-2022-00054	Return on Equity
Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.	04/21	Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.	PUR-2020-00095	Return on Equity
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Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Massanutten Public Service		Massanutten Public Service		
Corporation	12/20	Corporation	PUE-2020-00039	Return on Equity
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/20	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2020-00106	Rate of Return
WGL Holdings, Inc.	07/18	Washington Gas Light Company	PUR-2018-00080	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	05/18	Atmos Energy Corporation	PUR-2018-00014	Rate of Return
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/17	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2017-00082	Rate of Return
				Rate of Return /
Massanutten Public Service Corp.	08/14	Massanutten Public Service Corp.	PUE-2014-00035	Rate Design
Public Service Commission of Wes	t Virginia			
Monongahela Power Company and		Monongahela Power Company and		
The Potomac Edison Company	12/21	The Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 21-0857-E-CN (ELG)	Return on Equity
Monongahela Power Company and		Monongahela Power Company and		
The Potomac Edison Company	11/21	The Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 21-0813-E-P (Solar)	Return on Equity

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Table of Contents

Supporting Exhibits Accompanying the Direct Testimony of of Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA

	<u>Exhibit</u>
Recommended Capital Structure and Cost of Capital Rates	DWD-1
Financial Profile of and Capital Structures of the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-2
Calculation of the Effective Long-Term Debt Cost Rate	DWD-3
Application of the Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-4
Application of the Risk Premium Model (RPM) to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-5
Application of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-6
Basis of Selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-7
Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the Comparable Risk Non-Price Regulated Companies	DWD-8
Estimated Market Capitalization for Bluegrass Water (KY) and the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	DWD-9

EXHIBIT 1

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Recommended Capital Structure and Cost Rates <u>for Ratemaking Purposes</u>

Type Of Capital	Ratios (1)	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt Common Equity	38.84% 61.16%	6.80% (2) 11.65% (3)	2.64% 7.13%
Total	100.00%		9.77%

Notes:

- (1) Company provided.
- (2) From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (2) From page 2 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. **Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate**

Line No.	Principal Methods	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	9.16%	9.16%
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	12.09%	11.31%
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	11.58%	11.39%
4.	Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	11.40%	11.24%
5.	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate before Adjustment for Unique Risk	10.13% - 11.13%	9.74% - 10.74%
6.	Business Risk Adjustment (5)	1.00%	1.00%
7.	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate after Adjustment	11.13% - 12.13%	10.74% - 11.74%
8.	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	11.6	55%

- Notes: (1) From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4.
 - (2) From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-5.
 - (3) From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6.
 - (4) From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-8.
 - (5) Business risk adjustment to reflect Bluegrass Water's unique risk compared to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in the accompanying Direct Testimony.

EXHIBIT 2

Proxy Group of Six Water Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2017 - 2021, Inclusive

Capitalization Statistics	2021	202 <u>0</u> (MIL	<u>2019</u> (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)	2018	2017	
Amount of Capital Employed Total Permanent Capital Short-Term Debt Total Capital Employed	\$5,897.865 \$155.749 \$6,053.614	\$5,348.616 \$340.249 \$5,688.865	\$4.493.345 \$220.672 \$4,714.017	\$3,706.817 \$214.758 \$3,921.575	\$3,275.675 \$215.958 \$3,491.633	
Indicated Average Capital Cost Rates (2) Total Debt Preferred Stock	3.51 % 5.76 %	3.78 % 5.76 %	4.01 % 5.84 %	4.55 % 5.92 %	4.62 % 5.91 %	, ,
Capital Structure Ratios Based on Total Permanent Capital: Long-Term Debt Preferred Stock Common Equity Total	50.40 % 0.05 49.55 100.00 %	50.92 % 0.06 49.02 100.00 %	4781 % 0.06 52.13 100.00 %	45.58 % 0.11 54.31 100.00 %	46.01 % 0.12 53.87 100.00 %	5 YEAK AVERAGE 48.14 % 0.08 51.78 100.00 %
Based on Total Capital: Total Debt, Including Short-Term Debt Preferred Stock Common Equity Total	52.56 % 0.05 47.39 100.00	54.67 % 0.06 45.28 100.00 %	51.78 % 0.07 48.16 100.00 %	49.31 % 0.10 50.60 100.00 %	49.87 % 0.11 50.02 100.00 %	51.64 % 0.07 48.29 100.00 %
Financial Statistics						
Financial Ratios - Market Based Earnings / Price Ratio Market / Average Book Ratio Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Ratio	3.20 % 352.63 1.67 52.51	3.24 % 315.40 1.83 56.85	2.64 % 332.39 1.77 74.00	3.33 % 304.57 1.97 59.40	3.79 % 296.61 2.02 54.53	3.24 % 320.32 1.85 59.46
Rate of Return on Average Book Common Equity	11.22 %	10.24 %	9.22 %	% 66'6	11.34 %	10.40 %
Total Debt / EBITDA (3)	5.05 x	5.57 x	5.92 x	4.37 x	3.48 x	4.88 x
Funds from Operations / Total Debt (4)	11.39 %	12.12 %	14.53 %	22.17 %	23.56 %	16.75 %
Total Debt / Total Capital	52.56 %	54.67 %	51.78 %	49.31 %	49.87 %	51.64 %

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
 (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: Company Annual Forms 10-K

Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies 2017 - 2021, Inclusive

	<u>2021</u>	2020	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
American States Water Company						
Long-Term Debt	37.56 %	40.72 %	31.87 %	36.54 %	37.75 %	36.89 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	62.44	59.28	68.13	63.46	62.25	63.11
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
American Water Works Company, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	58.75 %	59.93 %	58.59 %	56.55 %	55.81 %	57.93 %
Preferred Stock	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.04
Common Equity	41.23	40.05	41.38	43.40	44.12	42.03
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
rotal dapital	100.00 70	70	100.00 70	100.00	100.00 /0	100.00
California Water Service Group						
Long-Term Debt	47.28 %	46.04 %	50.90 %	52.74 %	43.40 %	48.07 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	52.72	53.96	49.10	47.26	56.60	51.93
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Essential Utilities Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	53.28 %	54.42 %	44.23 %	56.06 %	52.26 %	52.05 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	46.72	45.58	55.77	43.94	47.74	47.95
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Middlesex Water Company						
Long-Term Debt	46.87 %	44.61 %	42.20 %	38.94 %	38.65 %	42.25 %
Preferred Stock	0.30	0.33	0.37	0.59	0.64	0.45
Common Equity	52.83	55.06	57.43	60.47	60.71	57.30
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
SIW Group						
Long-Term Debt	59.69 %	59.79 %	59.05 %	32.67 %	48.20 %	51.88 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	40.31	40.21	40.95	67.33	51.80	48.12
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
•						
Proxy Group of Six Water Companies						
Long-Term Debt	50.57 %	50.92 %	47.81 %	45.58 %	46.01 %	48.18 %
Preferred Stock	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.12	0.08
Common Equity	49.38	49.02	52.13	54.31	53.87	51.74
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
i otai Capitai	100.00 70	100.00 70	100.00 70	100.00 70	100.00 70	100.00 70

Source of Information Annual Forms 10-K

EXHIBIT 3

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. <u>Calculation of the Effective Cost Rate of Long-Term Debt by Issuance</u>

					Net	Effective
	Loan Amount	Interest Rate	Issuance	Net Proceeds	Proceeds	Cost Rate to
Series	(1)	(1)	Expense (1)	(2)	Ratio (3)	Maturity (4)
Bluegrass Water (KY)	\$ 2,900,000	6.70%	\$ 21,750	\$ 2,878,250	99.25	6.80%

Notes:

- (1) Company provided.
- (2) Loan amount less issuance expenses.
- (3) Net proceeds divided by loan amount.
- (4) Calculated based upon projected cash flows throughout the life of the debt issue.

EXHIBIT 4

Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the <u>Proxy Group of Six Water Companies.</u> Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.

[7]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)	6.70 % 8.28 10.80 10.13 5.81 12.92	9.11 %	9.21 %	9.16 %
[9]	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	1.75 % 1.82 1.70 2.56 1.46	Average	Median	ıd Median
[2]	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	4.95 % 6.46 9.10 7.57 4.35 10.90			Average of Mean and Median
[4]	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	4.40 % 8.28 11.70 6.60 2.70 9.80			At
[3]	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	NA % 8.10 NA 6.10 NA NA			
[2]	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in	5.50 % 3.00 6.50 10.00 6.00 12.00			:
[1]	Average Dividend Yield (1)	1.71 % 1.76 1.63 2.47 1.43			;
	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	American States Water Company American Water Works Company, Inc. California Water Service Group Essential Utilities Inc. Middlesex Water Company SJW Group			

Notes:

NA= Not Available


(1) Indicated dividend at 01/13/2023 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 01/13/2023 for each company.

- (2) From pages 2 through 7 of this Exhibit.
 (3) Average of columns 2 through 4 excluding negative growth rates.
 (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 5) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for American States Water Company, 1.71% x (1+(1/2 x 4.95%)) =
 - (5) Column 5 + Column 6.


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
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
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



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EXHIBIT 5

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Summary of Risk Premium Models for the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

		Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM		
Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1)		12.64 %	NA %		
Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2)		11.53	11.31_		
	Average	12.09 %	11.31		

- (1) From page 2 of this Exhibit.
- (2) From page 3 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1) Indicated ROE

[7]	ee Indicated) ROE (5)	1% 12.93% 1.0% NMF	11			1% 12.23%	age 13.05%	ian 12.23%	ian 12.64%
[9]	Risk-Free Rate (4)	3.91%				3.91%	Average	Median	Average of Mean and Median
[5]	Predicted Risk Premium (3)	9.02%	7.92%	12.46%	7.98%	8.32%			Average of N
[4]	GARCH Coefficient	1.8791			1.8982	1.5887			
[3]	Recommended Variance (2)	0.38%	0.33%	0.45%	0.34%	0.42%		ngful Figure	
[2]	Spot Predicted Variance	0.47%	0.62%	9990	0.82%	0.59%		NMF=Not Meaningful Figure	
[1]	LT Average Predicted Variance	0.38%	0.33%	0.45%	0.34%	0.42%			
	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	American States Water Company	California Water Service Group	Essential Utilities Inc.	Middlesex Water Company	SJW Group			

- The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Services. (1)
- Recommended variance based on the long-term average predicted variance.
 - $(1+(Column [3] * Column [4])^{^{12}}) 1.$
- From note 2 on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-6. (4)
 - Column [5] + Column [6].

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.		Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM
1.	Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	5.05 %	5.05 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A2 Rated Public		
	Utility Bonds (2)	0.83	0.83
3.	Adjusted Prospective Yield on A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	5.88 %	5.88 %
4.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group (3)	0.10	0.10
5.	Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	5.98 %	5.98 %
6.	Equity Risk Premium (4)	5.55	5.33
7.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	11.53 %	11.31 %

- (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 9 and 10 of this Exhibit).
- (2) The average yield spread of A2 rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.83% from page 4 of this Exhibit.
- (3) Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Exhibit. The 0.10% upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds (1/3*0.30% = 0.10%) as derived from page 4 of this Exhibit.
- (4) From page 7 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	Aaa Rated Corporate Bond	A2 Rated Public Utility Bond	Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bond
Dec-2022 Nov-2022	4.41 % 4.90	5.27 % 5.75	5.56 % 6.05
Oct-2022	5.10	5.88	6.18
Average	4.80 %	5.63 %	<u>5.93</u> %

Selected Bond Spreads

A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds
--

0.83 % (1)

Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.30 % (2)

Notes:

- (1) Column [2] Column [1].
- (2) Column [3] Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

	Moody's		Stand	ard & Poor's	
	Long-Term Issuer Rating		Long-Term Issuer Rating		
	Jan	uary 2023	January 2023		
	Long-		Long-		
	Term		Term		
	Issuer	Numerical	Issuer	Numerical	
Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Rating	Weighting (1)	Rating	Weighting (1)	
American States Water Company (2)	A2	6.0	A+	5.0	
American Water Works Company, Inc. (3)	A3	7.0	Α	6.0	
California Water Service Group	NR		A+	5.0	
Essential Utilities Inc. (4)	Baa1	8.0	A	6.0	
Middlesex Water Company	NR		Α	6.0	
SJW Group (5)	NR		A-	7.0	
Average	A3	7.0	A	5.8	

Notes:

- (1) From page 6 of this Exhibit.
- (2) Ratings that of Golden State Water Company.
- (3) Ratings that of New Jersey American Water Co., and Pennsylvania American Water Co.
- (4) Ratings that of PNG Companies and Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc. (S&P).
- (5) Ratings are that of San Jose Water Company, Connecticut Water Inc. and Connecticut Water Service Inc.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service

Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1 A2	5 6 7	A+ A
A3	·	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1 Ba2 Ba3	11 12 13	BB+ BB BB-
B1	14	B+
B2	15	В
В3	16	B-

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

Line No.		Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	6.52 %	6.32 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A2 rated bonds (2)	4.58	4.34
3.	Average equity risk premium	5.55 %	5.33 %

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Exhibit.

(2) From page 11 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM
1.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium (1)	6.13 %	6.13 %
2.	Regression on Kroll Risk Premium Data (2)	7.26	7.26
3.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.76	NA
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	11.01	11.01
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.47	10.47
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	6.18	6.18
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	8.47 %	8.21 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.77	0.77
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	6.52 %	6.32 %

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Kroll 2022 SBBI® Yearbook minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 corporate bonds from 1928-2021.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2021 referenced in Note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Kroll equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Kroll large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa2 corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through December 2022.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.05% (from page 3 of this Exhibit) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 16.06% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-6).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 15.52% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.05% results in an expected equity
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 11.23% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.05% results in an expected equity risk premium of 6.18%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from Exhibit DWD-6.

Sources of Information:

Kroll 2022 SBBI® Yearbook

Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.

Value Line Summary and Index


Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 2, 2022 and January 1, 2023


Bloomberg Professional Services


Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions


	History				Cons	ensus l	Forecas	sts-Qua	arterly	Avg.				
	Av	erage For	Week End					Latest Qtr	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q
Interest Rates	<u>Dec 23</u>	<u>Dec 16</u>	Dec 9	<u>Dec 2</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sep</u>	4Q 2022*	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>2024</u>
Federal Funds Rate	4.33	3.83	3.83	3.83	3.78	3.08	2.56	3.59	4.7	5.0	4.9	4.7	4.4	4.0
Prime Rate	7.50	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.95	6.25	5.73	6.76	7.8	8.1	8.0	7.8	7.5	7.2
SOFR	4.30	4.01	3.80	3.81	3.73	3.04	2.50	3.55	4.6	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.1
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	4.28	4.23	4.15	4.00	3.88	3.28	2.80	3.71	4.8	5.1	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.0
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	4.35	4.34	4.32	4.37	4.32	3.87	3.22	4.17	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.3	3.9
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	4.68	4.71	4.72	4.69	4.61	4.31	3.71	4.53	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.0
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	4.64	4.66	4.72	4.73	4.73	4.43	3.89	4.61	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.4	4.2	3.9
Treasury note, 2 yr.	4.25	4.25	4.33	4.37	4.50	4.38	3.86	4.39	4.5	4.4	4.2	3.9	3.8	3.5
Treasury note, 5 yr.	3.78	3.67	3.72	3.79	4.06	4.18	3.70	4.00	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.4
Treasury note, 10 yr.	3.67	3.51	3.52	3.63	3.89	3.98	3.52	3.82	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.5
Treasury note, 30 yr.	3.73	3.53	3.51	3.71	4.00	4.04	3.56	3.89	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8
Corporate Aaa bond	4.88	4.66	4.68	4.87	5.23	5.41	4.87	5.15	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.1	4.9	4.8
Corporate Baa bond	5.56	5.34	5.38	5.57	5.95	6.22	5.64	5.90	6.1	6.3	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.8
State & Local bonds	4.24	4.18	4.19	4.26	4.50	4.62	4.31	4.46	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2
Home mortgage rate	6.27	6.31	6.33	6.49	6.81	6.90	6.11	6.69	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.0	5.8
				Histor	y				Co	nsensı	ıs Fore	casts-(Quarte i	rly
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q
Key Assumptions	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2022</u>	2022**	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>2024</u>
Fed's AFE \$ Index	103.4	102.9	105.0	107.0	108.4	113.7	119.0	120.6	118.7	118.1	117.6	117.1	116.8	116.9
Real GDP	6.3	7.0	2.7	7.0	-1.6	-0.6	3.2	1.0	-0.2	-0.7	0.3	0.9	1.3	1.7
GDP Price Index	5.2	6.3	6.2	6.8	8.3	9.0	4.4	4.3	3.6	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.2
Consumer Price Index	4.1	8.2	6.7	7.9	9.2	10.5	5.7	4.5	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3
PCE Price Index	4.5	6.4	5.6	6.2	7.5	7.3	4.3	4.2	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Advanced Foreign Economies Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index, CPI and PCE Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; SOFR from the New York Fed. *Interest rate data for 4Q 2022 based on historical data through the week ended December 23. **Data for 4Q 2022 for the Fed's AFE \$ Index based on data through the week ended December 23. Figures for 4Q 2022 Real GDP, GDP Chained Price Index, Consumer Price Index, and PCE Price Index are consensus forecasts from the December 2022 survey.









Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2024 through 2028 and averages for the five-year periods 2024-2028 and 2029-2033. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.

			Five-Year Averages					
		2024	Ave 2025	2026	Year 2027	2028	2024-2028	2029-2033
1. Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	3.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7	3.0	2.8
1. I edelal I ands Itale	Top 10 Average	4.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.4
	Bottom 10 Average	2.7	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3
2. Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	6.8	6.1	5.9	5.9	5.9	6.1	5.9
	Top 10 Average	7.6	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.8	6.5
	Bottom 10 Average	5.9	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.3
3. SOFR	CONSENSUS	3.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7	3.0	2.8
	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.3
	Bottom 10 Average	3.0	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.2
Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.7	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.1	2.9
	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.3
	Bottom 10 Average	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.5
5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.8
	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.4
C.T. DUNCTION	Bottom 10 Average	2.9	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.3
6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.7	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0
	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.7 2.4	3.7	3.6 2.4	3.5	3.8	3.5 2.4
7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	Bottom 10 Average CONSENSUS	3.1 3.8	3.1	2.4 3.1	3.1	2.4 3.0	2.5 3.2	3.1
7. Heastry Bir Heid, 1-11	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.8	3.6
	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	3.6	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1
or freudary frote freia, 2 fr	Top 10 Average	4.4	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.8
	Bottom 10 Average	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4
,	Top 10 Average	4.4	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.1	3.9
	Bottom 10 Average	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9
10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr	CONSENSUS	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7
	Top 10 Average	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3
	Bottom 10 Average	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0
11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr	CONSENSUS	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.0
	Top 10 Average	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7
	Bottom 10 Average	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	5.1	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1
	Top 10 Average	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.7
12.6	Bottom 10 Average	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.5
13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	6.2	5.9	5.9	6.0	5.9	6.0	6.0
	Top 10 Average	6.6 5.7	6.4 5.3	6.5	6.5	6.5 5.4	6.5	6.6 5.5
14. State & Local Bonds Yield	Bottom 10 Average CONSENSUS	3.7 4.4	3.3 4.2	5.3 4.3	5.4 4.3	3.4 4.3	5.4 4.3	3.3 4.4
14. State & Local Bollds Tield	Top 10 Average	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.7	4. 3	4.7	4.8
	Bottom 10 Average	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9
15. Home Mortgage Rate	CONSENSUS	5.9	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.5
15. Home Mongage Tante	Top 10 Average	6.6	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.2
	Bottom 10 Average	5.3	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9
A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	CONSENSUS	117.6	116.0	114.5	113.5	112.2	114.8	110.7
	Top 10 Average	120.7	119.3	118.5	118.0	117.9	118.9	116.7
	Bottom 10 Average	115.1	112.9	110.7	109.2	107.2	111.0	105.4
	-		Year-0	Over-Year, % C	Change		Five-Year	Averages
	=	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2024-2028	2029-2033
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	1.4	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.3
	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.6
C. GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.2
	Bottom 10 Average	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
D. Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.8	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.3
E DOED: I	Bottom 10 Average	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
E. PCE Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.2
	Bottom 10 Average	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies Using Holding Period Returns and Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

Line No.		Implied Equity Risk Premium	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies ex PRPM
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium (1)	4.28 %	4.28 %
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	4.80	4.80
3.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	5.56	NA
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4)	3.57	3.57
5.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)	4.69	4.69
6.	Average Equity Risk Premium (6)	4.58 %	4.34 %

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2021. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
 - (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A2 rated public utility bond yields from 1928 - 2021 referenced in note 1 above.
 - (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A2 rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - December 2022.
 - (4) Using data from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 9.45% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 5.88%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Exhibit results in an equity risk premium of 3.57%. (9.45% - 5.88% = 3.57%)
 - (5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.57% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 5.88%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Exhibit results in an equity risk premium of 4.69%. (10.57% -5.88% = 4.69%
 - (6) Average of lines 1 through 5.

EXHIBIT 6

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

[8]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)	11.12 % 12.90 11.38 12.73 11.12 11.38	11.77 %	11.38 %	11.58 %		Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)	10.95 % 12.68 11.19 12.51 10.95 11.19	11.58 %	11.19 %	11.39 %
[7]	ECAPM Cost Rate	11.47 % 13.00 11.69 12.85 11.47 11.69	12.03 %	11.69 %	11.86 %		ECAPM Cost Rate	11.29 % 12.77 11.50 12.63 11.29 11.50	11.83 %	11.50 %	11.67 %
[9]	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	10.77 % 12.80 11.06 12.61 10.77 11.06	11.51 %	11.06 %	11.29 %		Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	10.61 % 12.59 10.89 12.40 10.61 10.89	11.33 %	10.89 %	11.11 %
[5]	Risk-Free Rate (2)	3.91 % 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91				MRP	Risk-Free Rate (2)	3.91 % 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91			
[4]	Market Risk Premium (1)	9.67 % 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67				CAPM/ECAPM Results Excluding the PRPM MRP	Market Risk Premium (1)	9.43 % 9.43 9.43 9.43 9.43			
[3]	Average Beta	0.71 0.92 0.74 0.90 0.71	0.79	0.74	0.77	APM Results Ex	Average Beta	0.71 0.92 0.74 0.90 0.71	0.79	0.74	0.77
[2]	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	0.76 0.94 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.68				CAPM/EC	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	0.76 0.94 0.78 0.84 0.71 0.68			
[1]	Value Line Adjusted Beta	0.65 0.90 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.80					Value Line Adjusted Beta	0.65 0.90 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.80			
	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	American States Water Company American Water Works Company, Inc. California Water Service Group Essential Utilities Inc. Middlesex Water Company SJW Group	Mean	Median	Average of Mean and Median		Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	American States Water Company American Water Works Company, Inc. California Water Service Group Essential Utilities Inc. Middlesex Water Company SJW Group	Mean	Median	Average of Mean and Median

Notes on page 2 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Kroll, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Measure 1: Kroll Arithmetic Mean MRP (19	926-2021)
--	-----------

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 192 Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Gover MRP based on Kroll Historical Data:		12.37 5.02 7.35	
Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Kro (1926-2021)	ll Historical Data	8.71	%
Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Kroll Historical (January 1926 - December 2022)	Data:	10.86	%
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks	ending January 13, 2023)		
Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence* Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index: *Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plu		16.06 3.91 12.15	% %
Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market	based on the S&P 500		
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500: Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Value Line data		15.52 3.91 11.61	
Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP			
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500: Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	MRP based on Bloomberg data	11.23 3.91 7.32	
	Average of Value Line, Kroll, and Bloomberg MRP:	9.67	%
	Average MRP Excluding the PRPM MRP:	9.43	%

(2) For reasons explained in the Direct Testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit DWD-5.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

First Quarter 2023	4.00 %
Second Quarter 2023	4.00
Third Quarter 2023	3.90
Fourth Quarter 2023	3.90
First Quarter 2024	3.80
Second Quarter 2024	3.80
2024-2028	3.90
2029-2033	4.00
	3.91 %

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:

Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 2, 2022 and January 1, 2023 Kroll 2022 SBBI® Yearbook Bloomberg Professional Services

EXHIBIT 7

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of twenty non-price regulated companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in <u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.48 - 0.78 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.7426 - 3.2710 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1321. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. = Standard Error of the Regression
$$\sqrt{2N}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

Thus,
$$0.1321 = \frac{3.0068}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{3.0068}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., December 2022

Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
American States Water Company American Water Works Company, Inc. California Water Service Group Essential Utilities Inc. Middlesex Water Company SJW Group	0.65 0.85 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.80	0.42 0.75 0.47 0.91 0.52 0.68	2.3839 3.1906 3.0022 2.7036 3.3913 3.3691	0.0593 0.0794 0.0747 0.0673 0.0844 0.0839
Average	0.78	0.63	3.0068	0.0748
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta) 2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.48 0.15	0.78		
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.7426	3.2710		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1321			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2642			

Source of Information: Valueline Proprietary Database, December 2022

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.

Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the

Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

[1] [2] [3] [4] Residual Standard Standard Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Value Line Unadjusted Error of the Deviation of **Regulated Companies** Adjusted Beta Beta Regression Beta 0.75 Adobe Inc. 0.55 3.2558 0.0810 Amgen 0.75 0.56 2.7921 0.0695 0.75 Becton, Dickinson 0.59 2.9628 0.0738 Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.85 0.76 3.0330 0.0755 Broadridge Fin'l 0.85 0.70 2.7610 0.0687 **Check Point Software** 0.75 0.57 2.8358 0.0706 C.H. Robinson 0.75 0.56 3.0116 0.0750 CSG Systems Int'l 0.75 0.58 3.1079 0.0774 **Quest Diagnostics** 0.80 0.69 3.0218 0.0752 **Heartland Express** 0.75 0.55 2.9497 0.0734 Henry (Jack) & Assoc 0.85 0.70 2.8821 0.0717 Kimberly-Clark 0.70 0.51 2.8091 0.0699 Lancaster Colony 0.70 0.50 2.9638 0.0738 McCormick & Co. 0.80 0.66 2.8331 0.0705 Monster Beverage 0.85 0.73 3.0556 0.0761 Northrop Grumman 0.85 0.74 2.9186 0.0727 Progressive Corp. 0.75 0.60 2.8617 0.0712 0.0711 RLI Corp. 0.80 0.66 2.8575 Rollins, Inc. 0.85 0.72 2.9831 0.0743 **Tyler Technologies** 0.75 0.56 3.2280 0.0804 0.78 0.62 2.9562 0.0736 Average Proxy Group of Six Water Companies 0.78 0.63 3.0068 0.0748

Source of Information:

Valueline Proprietary Database, December 2022

EXHIBIT 8

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

Principal Methods		Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Pric Regulated Companies		Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies ex PRPM
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)		9.54	%	9.54 %
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)		12.40		12.20
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)		11.61		11.42
	Mean	11.18	%	<u>11.05</u> %
	Median	11.61	%	11.42 %
Average of	Mean and Median	11.40	%	11.24 %

- (1) From page 2 of this Exhibit.
- (2) From page 3 of this Exhibit.
- (3) From page 6 of this Exhibit.

DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

[8]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)	NA % 9.69 8.06 7.86 12.82 NA 9.78 9.78 11.38 11.44 9.79 9.91 5.00 5.52 NA 11.74 11.74 11.74 11.74 10.74	NA	9.28 %	% 62.6	9.54 %
[2]	Adjusted Dividend Yield	3.21 1.56 3.27 2.17 2.67 1.88 1.82 0.54 1.12 1.75 1.92 1.35 0.84		Mean	Median	ın and Median
[9]	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	13.42 % 6.48 6.48 6.50 4.79 10.65 7.61 7.11 9.50 4.00 10.90 8.67 6.27 3.25 3.60 12.01 3.37 13.20 10.90	09.6			Average of Mean and Median
[4]	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	13.56 % 6.25 5.50 3.88 11.80 7.02 7.02 7.00 (15.60) 13.30 9.00 6.90 3.00 1.4.12 3.00 2.7.12 9.80	7.20			
[3]	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	13.20 % 7.70 9.50 8.70 NA 7.30 9.00 NA NA NA NA 11.40 2.40 19.90 NA	NA			
[2]	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	13.50 % 5.50 4.50 NA NA 9.50 8.50 12.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 10.50 6.50 6.50 10.50	12.00			
[1]	Average Dividend Yield	. % 3.11 1.51 3.00 2.06 2.06 1.79 1.78 0.51 1.07 1.32 1.32 0.31 0.80				NA= Not Available
	Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies	Adobe Inc. Amgen Becton, Dickinson Berton, Dickinson Bristol-Myers Squibb Broadridge Fin'l Check Point Software C.H. Robinson CSG Systems Int'l Quest Diagnostics Heartland Express Heartland Express Heartland Express Kimberly-Clark Lancaster Colony McCormick & Co. Monster Beverage Northrop Grumman Progressive Corp. RLI Corp. RLI Corp.	Tyler Technologies			NA

The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the utility proxy group. The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of January 13, 2023. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield. (1)

Source of Information:

www.zacks.com Downloaded on 01/13/2023 Value Line Investment Survey

www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 01/13/2023

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.		Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies	Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies ex PRPM
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa2 Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	6.05 %	6.05 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond rating Difference of Non-Price Regulated Companies (2)	(0.17)	(0.17)
3.	Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	5.88 %	5.88 %
4.	Equity Risk Premium (3)	6.52	6.32
5.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	12.40 %	12.20 %

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa2 corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated December 2, 2022 and January 1, 2023 (see pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit DWD-5). The estimates are detailed below.

First Quarter 2023	6.10 %
Second Quarter 2023	6.30
Third Quarter 2023	6.20
Fourth Quarter 2023	6.10
First Quarter 2024	5.90
Second Quarter 2024	5.80
2024-2028	6.00
2029-2033	6.00
Average	6.05 %

(2) The average yield spread of Baa rated corporate bonds over A corporate bonds for the three months ending December 2022. To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the non-utility proxy group, the prosepctive yield on Baa corporate bonds must be adjusted by 1/3 of the spread between A and Baa corporate bond yields as shown below:

	A Corp. Bond	Baa Corp.			
	Yield	Bond Yield		Spread	_
Dec-22	5.10	% 5.58	%	0.48	%
Nov-22	5.58	6.07		0.49	
Oct-22	5.74	6.26		0.52	_
	Average yield spread			0.50	_
		1/3 of spread		0.17	_
					-

(3) From page 5 of this Exhibit.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating January 2023 Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating January 2023

Proxy Group of Twenty Non- Price Regulated Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
Adobe Inc.	A2	6.0	A+	5.0
Amgen	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Becton, Dickinson	Baa2	13.0	BBB	12.0
Bristol-Myers Squibb	A2	6.0	A+	5.0
Broadridge Fin'l	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Check Point Software	NA		NA	
C.H. Robinson	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
CSG Systems Int'l	NA		BB+	11.0
Quest Diagnostics	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Heartland Express	NA		NA	
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	NA		NA	
Kimberly-Clark	A2	6.0	A	6.0
Lancaster Colony	NA		NA	
McCormick & Co.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Monster Beverage	NA		NA	
Northrop Grumman	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Progressive Corp.	A2	6.0	A	6.0
RLI Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Rollins, Inc.	NA		NA	
Tyler Technologies	NA		NA	
Average	Baa1	8.1	BBB+	7.9

Notes:

(1) From page 6 of Exhibit DWD-5.

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for

Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the <u>Proxy Group of Six Water Companies</u>

Lina Na	Fauita Diala Dramium Macaura	Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated	Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies
<u>Line No.</u>	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Companies	ex PRPM
1.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium (1)	6.13 %	6.13 %
2.	Regression on Kroll Risk Premium Data (2)	7.26	7.26
3.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.76	NA
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index (4)	11.01	11.01
5	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.47	10.47
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	6.18	6.18
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	8.47 %	8.21 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.77	0.77
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	6.52 %	6.32 %

Notes:

- (1) From note 1 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (2) From note 2 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (3) From note 3 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (4) From note 4 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (5) From note 5 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (6) From note 6 of page 8 of Exhibit DWD-5.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 6 of this Exhibit.

Sources of Information:

Kroll 2022 SBBI® Yearbook

<u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 2, 2022 and January 1, 2023
Bloomberg Professional Services

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company. Inc.
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[2]	[9]	[2]	[8]
Proxy Group of Twenty Non- Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
Adobe Inc. Amgen Becton, Dickinson Bristol-Myers Squibb Broadridge Fin'l Check Point Software C.H. Robinson CSG Systems Int'l Quest Diagnostics Heartland Express Henry (Jack) & Assoc Kimberly-Clark Lancaster Colony McCormick & Co. Monster Beverage Northrop Grumman Proeressive Corn.	0.85 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.75	1.42 0.67 0.69 0.51 0.73 0.88 0.82 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.73	1.14 0.68 0.72 0.94 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75	9.67 % 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67	3.91 % 3.91 % 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91	14.93 % 10.48 10.87 10.19 13.00 11.74 11.55 11.16 11.64 10.48 9.42 11.06 11.55 11.06 11.55 11.06 11.55 11.16	14.59 % 11.26 11.55 11.04 13.14 11.69 12.20 12.05 11.76 11.76 11.26 10.46 11.69 11.69	14.76 % 10.87 11.21 10.62 13.07 11.38 11.46 11.46 11.88 10.87 9.94 11.38 11.38
r rogi essive corp. RLI Corp. Rollins, Inc. Tyler Technologies	0.7.3 0.80 0.85 0.85	0.7.0 0.78 0.86 1.20	0.79 0.85 1.02	7.0.6 9.67 9.67	3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91	11.15 11.55 12.13 13.77	11.70 12.05 12.49 13.72	11.40 11.80 12.31 13.74
Mean			0.78			11.49 %	12.01 %	11.75 %
Median Average of Mean and Median			0.75			11.16 %	11.76 %	11.46 %

Notes:
(1) From Exhibit DWD-6, note 1.
(2) From Exhibit DWD-6, note 2.
(3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company. Inc.
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results Excluding the PRPM MRP for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[2]	[9]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Twenty Non- Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost
Adobe Inc.	0.85	1.42	1.14	9.43 %	3.91 %	14.66 %	14.33 %	14.50 %
Amgen	0.70	0.67	89.0	9.43	3.91	10.32	11.08	10.70
Becton, Dickinson	0.75	69.0	0.72	9.43	3.91	10.70	11.36	11.03
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.80	0.51	0.65	9.43	3.91	10.04	10.86	10.45
Broadridge Fin'l	06.0	86.0	0.94	9.43	3.91	12.77	12.92	12.84
Check Point Software	0.75	0.73	0.74	9.43	3.91	10.89	11.50	11.19
C.H. Robinson	0.75	0.88	0.81	9.43	3.91	11.55	12.00	11.77
CSG Systems Int'l	0.75	0.82	0.79	9.43	3.91	11.36	11.85	11.61
Quest Diagnostics	0.80	69.0	0.75	9.43	3.91	10.98	11.57	11.28
Heartland Express	0.70	08.0	0.75	9.43	3.91	10.98	11.57	11.28
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	0.85	0.74	080	9.43	3.91	11.45	11.93	11.69
Kimberly-Clark	0.70	99.0	89.0	9.43	3.91	10.32	11.08	10.70
Lancaster Colony	0.65	0.50	0.57	9.43	3.91	9.29	10.30	6.79
McCormick & Co.	0.75	0.73	0.74	9.43	3.91	10.89	11.50	11.19
Monster Beverage	0.85	0.74	0.79	9.43	3.91	11.36	11.85	11.61
Northrop Grumman	0.80	0.67	0.73	9.43	3.91	10.79	11.43	11.11
Progressive Corp.	0.75	92.0	0.75	9.43	3.91	10.98	11.57	11.28
RLI Corp.	0.80	0.78	0.79	9.43	3.91	11.36	11.85	11.61
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	98.0	0.85	9.43	3.91	11.93	12.28	12.10
Tyler Technologies	0.85	1.20	1.02	9.43	3.91	13.53	13.48	13.51
Mean			0.78			11.31 %	11.82 %	11.56 %
Median			0.75			10.98 %	11.57 %	11.28 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.77			11.15 %	11.70 %	11.42 %

Notes:
(1) From Exhibit DWD-6, note 1.
(2) From Exhibit DWD-6, note 2.
(3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

EXHIBIT 9

Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon Kroll Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.

[4]	Spread from Applicable Size Premium (4)		3.91%	[a]	Size Premium (Return in Excess of CAPM)*	-0.22% 0.43% 0.55% 0.54% 1.18% 1.34%	1.21% 2.10% 4.80%
[3]	Applicable Size Premium (3)	4.80%	0.89%	[כ]	Market Capitalization of Largest Company (millions)	\$ 2,324,390.219 36,099.221 16,738.364 8,212.638 5,003.747 3,276.553 2,164.524	1,306,038 627,803 289,007 tal Navigator
[2]	Applicable Decile of the NYSE/AMEX/ NASDAQ (2)	10	ις	[B]	Market Capitalization of Smallest Company (millions)	\$ 36,160.584 16,759.390 8,216.356 5,019.883 3,281.009 2,170.315 1,306.402	629.118 290.002 10.588 *From 2022 Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator
-	Market Capitalization on January 13, 2023 (1) (millions) (times larger)		223.7 x	[A]	Decile	11	_
[1]	Market Capitalization (1) (millions)	\$ 15.374	\$ 3,439.009			Largest	Smallest
		Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies				

5.

Line No.

- From page 2 of this Exhibit.
 Gleaned from Columns [B] and [C] on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column [A]) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column [1].
 Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided in Column [D] on the bottom of this page.
 Line No. 1 Column [3] Line No. 2 Column [3]. For example, the 3.91% in Column [4], Line No. 2 is derived as follows 3.91% = 4.8% 0.89%.

Market Capitalization of Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. and the Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. Proxy Group of Six Water Companies

[9]	Market Capitalization on January 13, 2023 (3) (millions)		\$ 15.374 (6)	\$ 3,526.676	28,852.554	3,351.341	12,337.411	1,433.475	2,419.940	\$ 3,439.009
[5]	Market-to-Book Ratio on January 13, 2023 (2)		336.6 (5)	514.1 %	395.3	283.3	238.0	389.8	233.9	336.6 %
[4]	Closing Stock Market Price on January 13, 2023	NA	•	\$ 95.480	158.870	62.390	48.790	81.810	80.180	\$ 80.995
[3]	Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2021 (millions)	4.567 (4)		685.947	7,298.000	1,182.980	5,184.450	367.726	1,034.519	1,108.750
[2]	Book Value per Share at Fiscal Year End 2021 (1)	NA \$		\$ 18.571 \$	40.185	22.023	20.503	20.987	34.277	\$ 21.505 \$
[1]	Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2021 (millions)	NA		36.936	181.611	53.716	252.868	17.522	30.181	45.326
	Exchange	1	ı	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	
	Company	Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc.	Based upon Proxy Group of Six Water Companies	Proxy Group of Six Water Companies American States Water Company	American Water Works Company, Inc.	California Water Service Group	Essential Utilities Inc.	Middlesex Water Company	SJW Group	Median

NA= Not Available

Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1.

(2) Column 4 / Column 2.
(3) Column 1 * Column 4.
(4) Book equity of the Company.
(5) The market-to-book ratio of Bluegrass Water (KY) Utility Operating Company, Inc. on January 13, 2023 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Six Water Companies on January 13, 2023 as appropriate.

(6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

Bloomberg Financial Services Source of Information: 2021 Annual Forms 10K