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IN THE MATTER OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES **COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT TO ITS ELECTRIC RATES, A CERTIFICATE OF** PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADVANCED METERING **INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING** TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A **ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE**

Case No. 2020-00349

IN THE MATTER OF LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT TO ITS ELECTRIC AND GAS RATES, A **CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND**) NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF **CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING** TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A **ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE**

Case No. 2020-00350

Direct Testimony and Exhibits of

Christopher C. Walters

On behalf of

United States Department of Defense and all other Federal Executive Agencies

March 5, 2021



BRUBAKER & ASSOCIATES, INC.

Project 11069.1

IN THE MATTER OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT TO ITS ELECTRIC RATES, A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE

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Case No. 2020-00350

STATE OF MISSOURI)) COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS)

SS

VERIFICATION OF CHRISTOPHER C. WALTERS

Christopher C. Walters, being first duly sworn, states the following: The prepared Direct Testimony and Exhibits constitutes the direct testimony of Affiant in the above-styled cases. Affiant states that he would give the answers set forth in the Direct Testimony if asked the questions propounded therein. Affiant further states that, to the best of his knowledge, his

statements made are true and correct. Further affiant saith not.

Christopher C. Walters

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March, 2021.

SALLY D. WILHELMS Notary Public - Notary Seal STATE OF MISSOURI St. Louis County My Commission Expires: Aug. 5, 2024 Commission # 20078050 BRI

D. Wilhelms Notary Public

IN THE MATTER OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT TO ITS ELECTRIC RATES, A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE)))) Case No. 2020-00349))
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IN THE MATTER OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT TO ITS ELECTRIC RATES, A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO DEPLOY ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE)))) Case No. 2020-00349)))
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METERING INFRASTRUCTURE, APPROVAL OF	Case No. 2020-00350
CERTAIN REGULATORY AND ACCOUNTING)
TREATMENTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A)
ONE-YEAR SURCHARGE)

Direct Testimony of Christopher C. Walters

	I. INTRODUCTION
Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

- 3 A Christopher C. Walters. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,
- 4 Chesterfield, MO 63017.

1

2

- 1 Q WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
 - A I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and an Associate of the firm,
 Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy, economic and regulatory consultants.

4 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND 5 EXPERIENCE.

6 A This information is included in Appendix A to this testimony.

7 Q ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING IN THIS PROCEEDING?

- 8 A I am appearing in this proceeding on behalf of the United States Department of Defense
- 9 and all other Federal Executive Agencies ("DoD/FEA"). The DoD/FEA takes service
- 10 from Kentucky Utilities Company ("KU") and Louisville Gas and Electric Company
- 11 ("LG&E") (collectively, "Companies") on several electric and gas rate schedules.

12 Q WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

13 A My testimony will address the current market cost of equity, and resulting overall rate 14 of return for the Companies. In my analyses, I consider the results of several market 15 models, the current and expected economic environment, as well as the outlook for the 16 regulated utility industry. I will also respond to the Companies' witness Mr. Adrien 17 McKenzie's recommended return on equity of 10.0%.

18 My silence in regard to any issue should not be construed as an endorsement of19 the Companies' position.

1

II. SUMMARY

2 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE BALANCE OF YOUR TESTIMONY.

A In Section III of my testimony, I review and analyze the regulated utility industry's access to capital, credit rating trends and outlooks, as well as the overall trend in the authorized return on equity ("ROE") for electric utilities throughout the country. I conclude that the trend in authorized ROEs for electric utilities has declined over the last several years and has remained below 10.0% more recently. I also review the impact that the Federal Reserve's monetary policy actions have had on the cost of capital.

9 In Section IV of my testimony, I outline how a fair return on equity should be 10 established, provide an overview of the market's perception of the Companies' 11 investment risk, I comment on the Companies' proposed capital structure, and present 12 the analyses I relied on to estimate an appropriate ROE for LG&E and KU. Based on 13 the results of several cost of equity estimation methods performed on publicly traded 14 electric utility companies with comparable risk to the Companies, I estimate the current 15 fair market ROE for the Companies to fall within the range of 9.00% to 9.60%, with a 16 midpoint of 9.30%. As shown on my Exhibit CCW-1, my recommended ROE produces 17 an overall rate of return of 6.78% for LG&E and 6.80% for KU.

In Section V of my testimony, I respond to the Companies' witness Mr. Adrien McKenzie's estimate of the current market cost of equity for LG&E and KU. Mr. McKenzie recommends a cost of equity within the range of 9.4% to 10.6%, with a point estimate of 10.0%. Mr. McKenzie's recommended range and ROE include an upward adjustment of 10 basis points (0.10%) for flotation costs. I show that his estimates are overstated and do not represent an accurate estimate of the current market cost of equity

1	for the Companies, and would be much higher than a fair and balanced ROE for
2	atemaking purposes.

3

In Section VI of my testimony, I provide my concluding comments.

4 III. ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

5 III.A. Electric Industry Authorized ROEs, 6 Access to Capital, and Credit Strength

7 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE OBSERVABLE EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN
8 AUTHORIZED ROEs FOR ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES, UTILITIES'
9 CREDIT STANDING, AND UTILITIES' ACCESS TO CAPITAL TO FUND
10 INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT.

- 11 A Authorized ROEs for both electric and gas utilities have declined over the last ten years,
- 12 as illustrated in Figure 1, and have been reasonably stable well below 10.0% for about

13 the last six years.



1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORIZED ROES FOR

2 **THE LAST FEW YEARS.**

3 A The distribution of authorized returns, annually, since 2016 is summarized in Table 1.

т	ΔR	F	1
	AD		

Distribution of Authorized ROEs (All Electric Utilities)*

Line	Year	<u>Average</u> (1)	<u>Median</u> (2)	Share of Decisions <u>≤ 9.5%</u> (3)	Share of Decisions <u>≤ 9.7%</u> (4)
1	2016	9.60%	9.60%	41%	53%
2	2017 ¹	9.67%	9.60%	42%	67%
3	2018 ²	9.54%	9.57%	47%	63%
4	2019	9.64%	9.65%	39%	58%
5	2020 ³	9.38%	9.48%	64%	79%

Source and Notes:

S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through 12/31/2020.

¹Includes authorized base ROE of 9.4% for Nevada Power Company, which excludes incentives associated with the Lenzie facility.

²Includes authorized base ROE of 9.6% for Interstate Power & Light Co., which excludes allowed ROE for generating facilities subject to special ratemaking principles.

³Includes authorized base ROE of 9.8% for Interstate Power & Light Co., which excludes allowed ROE for generating facilities subject to special ratemaking principles.
 *Excludes Limited Issue Rider Cases.

1 The distribution shows that over the last few years, the majority of authorized

2 ROEs since 2016 have been below 9.7%, with many of those being below 9.5%.

3 Q HOW HAS THE AUTHORIZED COMMON EQUITY RATIO FLUCTUATED

4 **OVER THE SAME TIME PERIOD FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES?**

- 5 A In general, the electric utility industry's common equity ratio has not really deviated too
- 6 much from 50.0%. As shown in Table 2, I have provided the authorized common equity

ratios for electric utilities around the country, excluding the reported common equity
ratios for Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, and Indiana. I have excluded the reported
common equity ratios for these states because these jurisdictions include sources of
capital outside of investor-supplied capital such as accumulated deferred income taxes.
As such, the reported common equity ratios in these states would bias down the reported
permanent common equity ratios authorized for ratemaking purposes.

Irend	as in State Auth	orized Common E (Industry)	
l ine	Year		Median
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	2016	49.70%	49.99%
2	2017	50.02%	49.85%
3	2018	50.60%	50.23%
4	2019	51.55%	51.37%
5	2020	<u>50.94%</u>	<u>51.17%</u>
6	Average	50.56%	50.52%
7	Min	49.70%	49.85%
8	Max	51.55%	51.37%
	Source and Not ¹ S&P Global M ² Excludes Arka because they	e: larket Intelligence. ansas, Florida, India include non-investo	na, and Michigan. or capital.

Q HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS OF DECLINING AUTHORIZED RETURNS ON EQUITY?

A Yes. The credit rating changes for the electric utility industry over the last several years
are the result of marked improvement in overall financial health and credit quality in
the industry. As shown below in Table 3, the credit rating of the industry has improved
over the last 10 years. More recently, a significant majority (72%) of the electric utility
companies have bond ratings in the range of BBB+ to A-. The Companies' A- bond
rating is among the strongest in the electric utility industry.

					Т	ABLE 3						
				S <u>El</u>	&P Ratin <u>ectric Ut</u> (Yo	igs by Ca <u>ility Subs</u> ear End)	ategory aidiaries					
Description	<u>2009</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2019</u>	<u>2020</u>
A or higher	12%	12%	12%	11%	13%	13%	13%	10%	10%	8%	14%	14%
A-	18%	20%	19%	22%	26%	26%	34%	43%	52%	54%	54%	53%
BBB+	23%	24%	28%	28%	25%	28%	24%	32%	21%	22%	18%	19%
BBB	36%	26%	24%	22%	26%	23%	18%	4%	7%	13%	12%	3%
BBB-	9%	16%	15%	17%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	2%	1%	1%
Below BBB-	<u>2%</u>	<u>2%</u>	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	<u>10%</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: S&P CAPITAL IQ, downloaded 02/18/21.

Notes: Value Line Electric Subsidiary ratings used.

2020 increase in below investment grade ratings is due to FirstEnergy's bribery scandal and does not reflect risk to the industry as a whole.

10 Q HAVE UTILITIES BEEN ABLE TO ACCESS EXTERNAL CAPITAL TO

11 SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL PROGRAMS?

12 A Yes. In its October 2020 Utility Capital Expenditures Update report, RRA Financial

13 Focus, a division of S&P Global Market Intelligence, made several relevant comments

14 about utility investments generally:

1 2 3 4	• Projected 2020 capital expenditures for the 47 energy utilities in the Regulatory Research Associates, a [<i>sic</i>] group within S&P Global Market Intelligence, universe currently stands at roughly \$141.3 billion, well above 2019's \$120.7 billion in capital investment.
5	• 2019's energy capital expenditures were a record high, and 5% above
6	the \$115.1 billion posted in 2018.
7	* * *
8	The nation's electric and gas utilities are investing in infrastructure to
9	upgrade aging transmission and distribution systems, build new natural
10	gas, solar and wind generation, and implement new technologies,
11	including smart meter deployment, smart grid systems, cybersecurity
12	measures and battery storage. We expect considerable levels of spending
13	to serve as the basis for solid profit expansion for the foreseeable future. ¹
14	As shown in Figure 2 below, capital expenditures for electric and natural gas
15	utilities have increased considerably over the period 2009 into 2020, and the forecasted
16	capital expenditures remain elevated, but slightly below current levels.

¹S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Financial Focus: "Utility Capital Expenditures Update," October 29, 2020, at 1.



1 As outlined in Figure 2 above, and in the comments made by RRA S&P Global 2 Market Intelligence, capital investments for the utility industry continue to stay at 3 elevated levels, and fuel utilities' profit expansion into the foreseeable future. This is 4 clear evidence that the capital investments are enhancing shareholder value, and are 5 attracting both equity and debt capital to the utility industry in a manner that allows for 6 these accelerated capital investment levels. While these profit-driven capital 7 investments are embraced by the capital markets, regulatory commissions also must 8 keep a careful view toward maintaining reasonable prices, and terms and conditions to 9 protect customers' need for reliable service at competitive prices.

1 Q IS THERE EVIDENCE OF ROBUST VALUATIONS OF REGULATED 2 UTILITY EQUITY SECURITIES?

3 А Yes. Robust valuations are an indication that utilities can sell securities at high prices, 4 which is a strong indication that they can access equity capital under reasonable terms 5 and conditions, and at relatively low cost. As shown on Exhibit CCW-2, the historical 6 valuation of electric utilities followed by Value Line, based on a price-to-earnings 7 ("P/E") ratio, price-to-cash flow ("P/CF") ratio, and market price-to-book value 8 ("M/B") ratio, indicates utility security valuations today are very strong and robust 9 relative to the last several years. These strong valuations of utility stocks indicate that 10 utilities have access to equity capital under reasonable terms and at lower costs.

11 Q HOW SHOULD THE COMMISSION USE THIS MARKET INFORMATION IN 12 ASSESSING A FAIR RETURN FOR THE COMPANIES?

A Observable market evidence is quite clear that capital market costs are near historically low levels. While authorized ROEs have fallen to the mid 9.0% range, utilities continue to have access to large amounts of external capital even as they are funding large capital programs. Furthermore, utilities' investment-grade credit ratings are mostly stable and have improved due, in part, to supportive regulatory treatment. The Commission should carefully weigh all this important observable market evidence in assessing a fair ROE for LG&E and KU.

III.B. Regulated Utility Industry Outlook 1 2 0 PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CREDIT RATING OUTLOOK FOR REGULATED 3 **UTILITIES.** 4 The global economy has faced the extraordinary challenges of the novel Coronavirus, А 5 which led to nearly a complete shutdown of the global economy. This unprecedented 6 event has impacted all sectors and capital markets. With regard to regulated utilities, 7 S&P made the following statement: 8 **Key Takeaways** 9 - Credit quality for the North American regulated utility industry 10 weakened in 2020. At the beginning of the year about 18% of the industry had a negative outlook or ratings on CreditWatch with negative 11 implications. By the end of the year that percentage had doubled, to 12 about 36%. 13 14 - For the first time in a decade downgrades outpaced upgrades for the 15 predominately investment-grade industry. 16 - The industry generally performed well throughout the pandemic and we 17 expect it will continue to mostly manage through the remaining COVID-18 19-related risks. 19 - The main causes of weakening credit quality reflected environment, social, and governance (ESG) risks, regulatory issues, and companies' 20 21 practice of strategically managing financial measures close to their 22 downgrade threshold with little or no cushion. 23 - Despite our negative 2021 industry outlook, we expect a modest improvement to credit quality over the next 12 months. We believe 24 25 Congress is more likely to raise the corporate tax rate, which would 26 improve the industry's financial measures, offset in part by a continued 27 focus on ESG risks. * * * 28 29 **COVID-19** Was Not The Culprit For Weaker Credit Quality 30 In March 2020, we identified five COVID-19-related risks that could 31 lead to a weakening of the industry's credit quality.

1 2 Encouragingly, the industry has generally performed well throughout the 3 pandemic. Lower electric and gas deliveries to C&I customers were 4 mostly offset by higher residential deliveries, the industry generally 5 worked well with regulators to defer COVID-19-related costs for future 6 recovery, market returns improved, and the industry generally had 7 consistent access to the capital markets. The one area that we saw some 8 weakness was with regard to rate cases. Many rate case filings were 9 delayed, rate case orders often took longer than expected, and many of 10 the orders were below expectations. This trend generally reflected the 11 weak economy caused by COVID-19 and the difficulties of passing on higher costs to customers during the pandemic. We expect that as 12 13 vaccines take hold and the pandemic dissipates, the economy will 14 gradually recover, as will the industry's rate case performance.² 15 Moody's opines that there may be delays in rate case decisions due to 16 COVID-19, but views the regulated utilities resilient to withstand the current economic 17 situation. Specifically, Moody's states: 18 We are maintaining a stable outlook for the US regulated utilities 19 industry, reflecting our expectation for continued strong regulatory 20 support, robust residential demand and a recovering economy in 2021. 21 As a critical infrastructure sector with a regulated business model that 22 provides good cost recovery, regulated utilities have remained relatively 23 resilient in the face of the uncertain economic environment caused by the 24 coronavirus pandemic. 25 » Following a decline in 2020 from last year's level, FFO-to-debt will increase slightly on improving economic conditions. We project an 26 27 aggregate industry funds from operations to debt ratio of around 15%

*

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*

28 over the next 12 to 18 months, a slight improvement from an expected 29 decline to between 14% and 15% in 2020 from 15.8% in 2019. Our 30 expectation considers Moody's global macro outlook forecast of a 4.5% 31 growth in US GDP in 2021, although this will be closely tied to the 32 containment of the coronavirus. We expect continued strength in 33 residential demand, improving commercial and industrial load and 34 disciplined O&M cost management to maintain financial stability. 35 However, greater than usual use of debt financing will constrain FFO-36 to-debt.

²S&P Global Ratings: "North American Regulated Utilities' Negative Outlook Could See Modest Improvement," January 20, 2021, at 1 and 3. (emphasis added).

1	» Regulatory support to remain strong, although ROEs will be under
2	pressure. We expect continued supportive regulatory frameworks to
3	underpin the sector's ability to recover costs in a timely manner and earn
4	a fair return even as allowed returns on equity (ROEs) remain under
5	pressure amid low interest rates. We expect most regulators to be
6	supportive of the recovery of coronavirus-related costs and investments,
7	as well as costs associated with the increasing frequency and severity of
8	climate hazards. ³

9 Similarly, Fitch states:

10 Fitch's Sector Outlook: Stable

- 11 Fitch Ratings' stable outlook embeds an expectation that sector credit metrics will begin to stabilize in 2020, driven by an increase in FFO after 12 the record capex in 2019 and conclusion of a majority of tax reform-13 14 related refunds. Low commodity prices and interest rates, O&M cost savings, in part due to the ongoing transition to cleaner generation mix, 15 and tax refunds are providing ample headroom to utilities to seek 16 recovery for capital investments without undue pressure on customer 17 18 bills.
- 19 * * *
- 20 Rating Outlook: Stable
- 21With approximately 88% of ratings on Stable Outlook, we expect limited22rating movement in 2020.4

23 Q HOW IS THIS OBSERVABLE MARKET DATA USED IN FORMING YOUR

24 RECOMMENDED RETURN ON EQUITY AND OVERALL RATE OF

- 25 **RETURN FOR NORTH SHORE?**
- 26 A Generally, authorized returns on equity, credit standing, and access to capital have been
- 27 quite robust for utilities over the last several years. The COVID-19 pandemic is creating

³*Moody's Investors Service Sector Comment*: "2021 Outlook Stable On Strong Regulatory Support and Robust Residential Demand," October 29, 2020 (emphasis added).

⁴*Fitch Ratings*: "Fitch Ratings 2020 Outlook: North American Utilities, Power & Gas," December 4, 2019, (emphasis added).

challenges for the U.S. economy as a whole, and utility companies more specifically. However, like the U.S. economy, utilities are expected to weather the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, and their financial strength will be restored as the economy recovers. In the meantime, it is critical that the Commission ensure that rates are increased no more than necessary to provide fair compensation and maintain financial integrity, but be especially concerned about rate impacts on the service area economies that are severely constrained due to the current economic conditions.

8

III.C. Federal Reserve Monetary Policy

9 Q DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S ACTIONS ARE 10 FULLY KNOWN BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS AND FULLY REFLECTED 11 IN THE VALUATION OF MARKET SECURITIES, BOTH DEBT AND 12 EQUITY?

13 А Yes, I do. While the Federal Reserve's previous actions on Quantitative Easing and 14 more recent reentry into both the Treasury, mortgage-backed security, and now to a 15 limited extent corporate bond market, the Federal Reserve's actions were done in order 16 to preserve stability and liquidity in the market and to calm the marketplace. These 17 Federal Reserve actions are not intended to drive down interest rates or manipulate the 18 market in any way. The effects of these measures, and the outlooks by independent 19 economists, continue to support the notion that capital market costs will stay low for the 20 extended period of time. Indeed, this is illustrated through a comparison of independent 21 economists' projections, effects on short-term market costs and long-term security 22 costs.

An assessment of the market's reaction to the Federal Reserve's impact on the





3	As shown in Figure 3 above, while the Federal Reserve has reduced short-term
4	interest rates currently, as it did back in the period prior to 2015, the market's valuation
5	of long-term securities remains relatively stable, and at very low costs. The Federal
6	Reserve's interaction in short-term securities is specifically stated to manage inflation
7	and support employment in the economy. The Federal Reserve's interaction in these
8	marketplaces is not to manipulate utility valuation or security valuations, or drive capital

1

market costs in one direction or the other. Rather, it is strictly for the purpose of
 supporting the U.S. economy.

3

4

Q WHAT DO INDEPENDENT ECONOMISTS' OUTLOOKS FOR FUTURE INTEREST RATES INDICATE?

5 A Independent economists expect the current low capital costs to prevail over at least the 6 intermediate term. This is illustrated in projections for both short- and long-term 7 changes in interest rates. Further, there is a clear trend in forecasted changes in interest 8 rates over time, indicating that capital market participants are becoming more 9 comfortable with today's low-cost capital market and expect it to prevail over at least 10 the intermediate future.

For example, short-term projections suggest that the market expects capital market costs to remain relatively low. Table 4 below shows capital cost projections over the next two years, and demonstrates that projected Treasry bond yields are not expected to increase significantly over the next two years.

TABLE 4

Publication Date	2Q 2020	3Q 2020	4Q 2020	1Q 2021	2Q 2021	3Q 2021	4Q 2021	1Q 2022	2Q 2022
Federal Funds Bate	2020	2020	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021		
	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		
Sep-20	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		
Oct-20	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	
Nov-20		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
Dec-20		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
Jan-21			0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.
T-Bond, 30 yr.									
Aug-20	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9		
Sep-20	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8		
Oct-20		1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	
Nov-20		1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	
Dec-20		1.4	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	
Jan-21			1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
GDP Price Index									
Aug-20	-1.8	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7		
Sep-20	-2.0	1.9	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6		
Oct-20		1.9	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	
Nov-20		3.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	
Dec-20		3.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	
Jan-21			1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9

Further, the outlook for long-term interest rates in an intermediate to longer term
 is also impacted by the current Federal Reserve actions and the expectation that
 eventually the Federal Reserve's monetary actions will return to more normal levels.
 Its impacts in long-term interest rate projections are illustrated in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5

<u> 30-Year</u>	Treasury	Bond	Yield	Actual	Vs.	Projection

Description	Quarterly <u>Average</u>	2-Year <u>Projected</u>	5- to 10-Year <u>Projected</u>
<u>2015</u>			
Q1	2.97%	4.00%	4.9% - 5.1%
Q2	2.55%	3.70%	
Q3	2.83%	4.00%	4.8% - 5.0%
Q4	2.84%	3.90%	
<u>2016</u>			
Q1	2.96%	3.80%	4.5% - 4.8%
Q2	2.72%	3.60%	
Q3	2.64%	3.40%	4.3% - 4.6%
Q4	2.29%	3.10%	
<u>2017</u>			
Q1	2.82%	3.70%	4.2% - 4.5%
Q2	3.05%	3.80%	
Q3	2.91%	3.70%	4.3% - 4.5%
Q4	2.82%	3.60%	
<u>2018</u>			
Q1	2.82%	3.60%	4.1% - 4.3%
Q2	3.02%	3.80%	
Q3	3.09%	3.80%	4.2% - 4.4%
Q4	3.07%	3.70%	
<u>2019</u>			
Q1	3.27%	3.40%	3.9% - 4.2%
Q2	3.01%	3.10%	
Q3	2.78%	2.60%	3.6% - 3.8%
Q4	2.30%	2.50%	
2020			
Q1	2.30%	2.60%	3.2% - 3.7%
Q2	1.89%	1.90%	
Q3	1.38%	1.90%	2.8% - 3.6%
Q4	1.36%	1.90%	
Sources:	<u> </u>		
Rlue Chin F	inancial Fore	rasts	
December 2	013 through D	ecember 2020).

1	As shown in Table 5 above, independent economists' projections of changes in
2	long-term Treasury rates are very different today than they were over the last five to six
3	years. Specifically, in 2015 economists were expecting that Treasury bond yields,
4	which fell below 3%, would eventually return to the high 4-5% area. That outlook
5	largely remained through 2016, but the outlook for future capital market costs started to
6	decline in 2017. More recently, Treasury bond yields have dropped to historically low
7	levels but are expected to stay low for the next five to ten years.
8	Again, the market is fully aware of the Federal Reserve actions, and these actions

9 are not expected to have significant changes in capital market costs over the next five
10 to ten years. Further, these Federal Reserve actions are expected to maintain relatively
11 stable capital market costs over the next two years.

12 III.D. COVID-19 Pandemic

Q HAVE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS TAKEN SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HELP PROTECT UTILITIES' ABILITY TO FULLY RECOVER THEIR COST OF SERVICE DURING THE ECONOMIC DISTRESS CAUSED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?

17 A Yes. The Commissions have implemented measures that prohibit utilities from 18 disconnecting service for customers that are not paying their bill. While this is an 19 extraordinary measure, and exposes utility companies to increases in uncollectible 20 accounts expense, and waiver of certain utility fees, the Commissions have approved 21 regulatory mechanisms that allow utilities to defer uncollectible accounts, and certain 22 fees, and recover these from customers prospectively. Customers that pay their bills

will effectively make the utility whole and protect it from customers that are not able to
 pay their bills during the national economic downturn.

The Commissions' regulatory mechanisms, while protecting customers to receive essential utility services, were done in concert with the implementation of regulatory mechanisms that preserved the utility's ability to fully recover its cost of service. For these reasons, the economic turmoil caused by the current worldwide pandemic has caused distress for regulatory utilities and its customers, but the Commissions have mitigated the utilities' risk considerably with the implementation of these regulatory mechanisms.

10 IV. RETURN ON EQUITY

11 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY A "UTILITY'S COST OF 12 COMMON EQUITY."

A utility's cost of common equity is the expected return that investors require on an
 investment in the utility. Investors expect to earn their required return by receiving
 dividends and through stock price appreciation.

16 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING A 17 REGULATED UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.

- 18 A In general, determining a fair cost of common equity for a regulated utility has been
- 19 framed by two hallmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: *Bluefield Water Works*
- 20 & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and Fed.
- 21 *Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

1		These decisions identify the general financial and economic standards to be
2		considered in establishing the cost of common equity for a public utility. Those general
3		standards provide that the authorized return should: (1) be sufficient to maintain
4		financial integrity; (2) attract capital under reasonable terms; and (3) be commensurate
5		with returns investors could earn by investing in other enterprises of comparable risk.
6	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE METHODS YOU HAVE USED TO ESTIMATE
7		LG&E'S AND KU'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.
8	А	I have used several models based on financial theory to estimate LG&E's and KU's cost
9		of common equity. These models are: (1) a constant growth Discounted Cash Flow
10		("DCF") model using the consensus of analysts' growth rate projections; (2) a constant
11		growth DCF using sustainable growth rate estimates; (3) a multi-stage DCF model; (4) a
12		Risk Premium model; and (5) a Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). I have applied
13		these models to a group of publicly traded utilities with investment risk similar to LG&E

15 IV.A. The Companies' Investment Risk

16 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MARKET'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTMENT 17 RISK OF LG&E AND KU.

18 A In order to estimate a fair return on equity for the Companies, an assessment of their 19 investment risk must be done. The market's assessment of their investment risk is best 20 described by credit rating analysts' reports. Both LG&E and KU have current corporate 21 bond ratings from Standard and Poor's ("S&P") and Moody's of A- and A3, respectively.⁵ The Companies' outlook from S&P and Moody's is "Stable." For

example, in its most recent report on LG&E, S&P specifically stated:

3 **Outlook: Stable**

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12 13 The stable outlook on LG&E reflects our <u>stable outlook</u> on its parent, PPL Corp., over the next 24 months. The stable outlook on PPL reflects our excellent assessment of its business risk profile, which we consider to be at the stronger end of our range for an excellent assessment. It also incorporates our significant assessment of the company's financial risk profile, which we believe is at the weaker end of our range for a significant assessment. Under our base-case scenario, PPL's adjusted funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio will average about 14% while its adjusted debt to EBITDA remains elevated at about 5x.

*

- 14 * *
- 15 Business Risk: Excellent

16Our assessment of LG&E's business risk profile primarily reflects its17regulated utilities, which comprise vertically integrated electric and18natural gas distribution operations, and Kentucky's generally19constructive regulatory framework.

20With a customer base of about 400,000 electric and about 320,00021natural gas customers, LG&E has some scale. In addition, its largely22residential and commercial customer base insulates it against23fluctuations in demand and stabilizes its cash flows. Our assessment24also incorporates the company's moderate operating diversity due to its25electric and natural gas operations.

26 The company has about 3,000 megawatts of generation capacity, which 27 entails greater operating risk than its transmission and distribution 28 operations. The company has been upgrading its coal-fired generation 29 plants to comply with environmental regulations. While the capital costs for these upgrades are significant, LG&E can recover these costs 30 31 through an environmental cost recovery mechanism, which limits its regulatory lag and supports its credit profile. The company is regulated 32 33 by the Kentucky Public Service Commission and benefits from other mechanisms, such as a gas line tracker and a pass-through fuel cost 34 mechanism, that help stabilize its returns. Moreover, LG&E's low-cost, 35

⁵S&P Global Market Intelligence.

coal-fired generation and efficient operations contribute to the overall
 competitive rates it offers its customers.

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4 Financial Risk: Significant

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5 Under our base-case scenario, we expect that LG&E's adjusted FFO to 6 debt will be in the 19%-21% range in 2020 as it no longer experiences 7 the negative effects of U.S. tax reform. Additionally, we foresee some uplift because the company will increase its regular base rate and 8 9 recovery. This uplift is offset by LG&E's ongoing discretionary cash 10 flow deficits due to its heightened capital expenditure, which we expect it will fund, at least partly, with external debt. We anticipate that the 11 12 company's debt leverage will remain about 3.8x.

13 In 2021 and 2022, we anticipate that LG&E's cost recovery and potential rate cases will be offset by its increased capital spending and 14 15 elevated dividend program, which will slightly weaken its credit measures. We base our risk assessment on our medial volatility table 16 17 benchmarks, which are more relaxed than the benchmarks we use for a typical corporate issuer. This reflects the company's steady cash 18 flow, rate-regulated utility operations, and effective regulatory risk 19 management.⁶ 20

21 IV.B. The Companies' Proposed Capital Structures

22 Q WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURES ARE THE COMPANIES REQUESTING?

23 A The proposed capital structures for the Companies are shown in Table 6:

⁶Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Louisville Gas & Electric Co.," March 16, 2020 at 4-6.

TABLE 6 <u>The Companies' Proposed Capital Structure</u>				
Description	LG&E	KU		
Short-Term Debt	1.53%	2.46%		
Long-Term Debt	45.34%	44.41%		
Common Equity	<u>53.13%</u>	<u>53.14%</u>		
Total Capital Structure	100.00%	100.00%		
Source: Schedule J-1.				

1 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE REQUESTED CAPITAL 2 STRUCTURE FOR THE FORECASTED TEST YEAR?

A Yes. The Companies' requested common equity ratio of approximately 53.1% is significantly higher than the average common equity ratio of my proxy group discussed below, as well as the typical common equity ratio being authorized around the country. While I do not make an explicit adjustment to my recommended return on equity to account for the lower level of financial risk associated with a higher common equity ratio, I have taken it into consideration in developing my recommended range and return.

1 IV.C. Risk Proxy Group

2 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU IDENTIFIED A PROXY GROUP THAT 3 COULD BE USED TO ESTIMATE LG&E'S CURRENT MARKET COST OF 4 EQUITY.

5 A To limit the issues surrounding a fair ROE, I have relied on the same proxy group 6 developed by the Companies' witness Mr. McKenzie, with one exception. I have 7 excluded Algonquin Power

8 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOUR PROXY GROUP'S INVESTMENT RISK 9 COMPARES TO LG&E.

10 A The proxy group shown in Exhibit CCW-3 has an average corporate credit rating from 11 S&P of BBB+, which is one notch below the Companies' rating of A-. The proxy group 12 has an average corporate credit rating from Moody's of Baa1, which is also a notch 13 below the Companies' credit rating from Moody's of A3. Based on these credit ratings 14 parameters, I conclude that the Companies are less risky than the proxy group.

15 As also shown on my Exhibit CCW-3, the proxy group has an average and 16 median common equity ratio (including short-term debt) as reported by S&P Global 17 Market Intelligence ("MI") of 42.9% and 43.7%, respectively. Similarly, as reported 18 by The Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line"), the proxy group has an average 19 and median common equity ratio (excluding short-term debt) of 46.8% and 46.9%, 20 respectively. In this regard, the Companies' proposed common equity ratio of 21 approximately 53.1% including short-term debt is higher than the average and median 22 common equity ratios of the proxy group. As I stated above, given the substantial

discrepancy in the Companies' common equity ratio relative to the industry generally,
 and the proxy group specifically, an ROE in the lower half of my range could be
 warranted should the Commission adopt the Companies' proposed common equity
 ratio.

5 **IV.D**.

IV.D. Discounted Cash Flow Model

6 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL.

7 A The DCF model posits that a stock price equals the sum of the present value of expected 8 future cash flows discounted at the investor's required rate of return or cost of capital. 9 This model is expressed mathematically as follows: 10 $P_0 = D_1 + D_2 \dots D_{\infty}$ (Equation 1)

10
$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+K)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+K)^2} \dots \frac{D_{\infty}}{(1+K)^{\infty}}$$
 (Equation 1)

12	P_0 = Current stock price
----	-----------------------------

13 $D = Dividends in periods 1 - \infty$

14 K = Investor's required return

15 This model can be rearranged in order to estimate the discount rate or investor-required

- 16 return, known as "K." If it is reasonable to assume that earnings and dividends will
- 17 grow at a constant rate, then Equation 1 can be rearranged as follows:
- 18 $K = D_1/P_0 + G$ (Equation 2)

19 K = Investor's required return

- 20 D_1 = Dividend in first year
- 21 $P_0 = Current stock price$
- G = Expected constant dividend growth rate
- Equation 2 is referred to as the annual "constant growth" DCF model.

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF 2 MODEL.

A As shown in Equation 2 above, the DCF model requires a current stock price, expected
dividend, and expected growth rate in dividends.

5 Q WHAT STOCK PRICE HAVE YOU RELIED ON IN YOUR CONSTANT 6 GROWTH DCF MODEL?

A I relied on the average of the weekly high and low stock prices of the utilities in the
proxy group over a 13-week period ending on January 22, 2021. An average stock price
is less susceptible to market price variations than a price at a single point in time.
Therefore, an average stock price is less susceptible to aberrant market price
movements, which may not reflect the stock's long-term value.

12 Q WHAT DIVIDEND DID YOU USE IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF 13 MODEL?

14 A I used the most recently paid quarterly dividend as reported in *Value Line*.⁷ This 15 dividend was annualized (multiplied by 4) and adjusted for next year's growth to 16 produce the D_1 factor for use in Equation 2 above. In other words, I calculate D_1 by 17 multiplying the annualized dividend (D_0) by (1+G).

⁷*The Value Line Investment Survey*, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

1 Q WHAT DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES HAVE YOU USED IN YOUR 2 CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

A There are several methods that can be used to estimate the expected growth in dividends. However, regardless of the method, for purposes of determining the market-required return on common equity, one must attempt to estimate investors' expectations about what the dividend, or earnings growth rate will be and not what an individual investor or analyst may use to make individual investment decisions.

8 As predictors of future returns, securities analysts' growth estimates have been 9 shown to be more accurate than growth rates derived from historical data.⁸ That is, 10 assuming the market generally makes rational investment decisions, analysts' growth 11 projections are more likely to influence investors' decisions, which are captured in 12 observable stock prices, than growth rates derived only from historical data.

For my constant growth DCF analysis, I have relied on a consensus, or mean, of professional securities analysts' earnings growth estimates as a proxy for investors' dividend growth rate expectations. I used the average of analysts' growth rate estimates from three sources: Zacks, MI, and Yahoo! Finance. All such projections were available on January 22, 2021, and all were reported online.

Each growth rate projection is based on a survey of independent securities analysts. There is no clear evidence whether a particular analyst is most influential on general market investors. Therefore, a single analyst's projection does not as reliably predict investor outlooks as does a consensus of market analysts' projections. The

⁸See, e.g., David Gordon, Myron Gordon, and Lawrence Gould, "Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield," *The Journal of Portfolio Management*, Spring 1989.

consensus of estimates is a simple arithmetic average, or mean, of surveyed analysts'
earnings growth forecasts. A simple average of the growth forecasts gives equal weight
to all surveyed analysts' projections. Therefore, a simple average, or arithmetic mean,
of analyst forecasts is a good proxy for investor expectations.
The growth rates I used in my DCF analysis are shown in Exhibit CCW-4. The
average growth rate for my proxy group is 5.32%, while the median growth rate is
5.66%.

8 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

9 A As shown in Exhibit CCW-5, the average and median constant growth DCF returns for
10 my proxy group for the 13-week analysis are 8.96% and 9.26%, respectively.

11 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT

12

GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?

A Yes. The constant growth DCF analysis for my proxy group is based on a group average
 long-term sustainable growth rate of 5.32%. The three- to five-year growth rates are
 higher than the long-term projected GDP growth rate of 4.35%, described below.

16 Q HOW DID YOU IDENTIFY THE LONG-TERM PROJECTED GDP GROWTH

- 17 **RATE?**
- A *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, which is a well-respected and often-cited publication,
 projects that over the next 5 and 10 years, the U.S. nominal GDP will grow at an annual
 rate of approximately 4.35%. These GDP growth projections reflect two components:

(1) a real growth outlook of around 2.25%; and (2) an inflation outlook of around 2.10% 1 going forward. As such, the average growth rate over the next 10 years is around 4.35%, 2 3 which I believe is a reasonable proxy of long-term sustainable growth.⁹

4 In my multi-stage DCF analysis, I discuss academic and investment practitioner 5 support for using the projected long-term GDP growth outlook as a maximum 6 sustainable growth rate projection. A long-term sustainable growth rate for a utility 7 stock cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which it sells its goods and 8 services. Therefore, using the long-term GDP growth rate as a conservative projection 9 for the maximum sustainable growth rate is logical, and is generally consistent with 10 economic theory and practice.

11

IV.E. Sustainable Growth DCF

12 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF METHOD

13 IS AND HOW YOU ESTIMATED A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE FOR 14 YOUR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF MODEL.

15 А A sustainable growth rate, also known as the internal growth rate, is based on the 16 percentage of the utility's earnings that is retained and reinvested in utility plant and 17 equipment. These reinvested earnings increase the earnings base (rate base). Earnings 18 grow when plant funded by reinvested earnings is put into service, and the utility is 19 allowed to earn its authorized return on such additional rate base investment.

20 The internal growth methodology is tied to the percentage of earnings retained 21 in the Company and not paid out as dividends. The earnings retention ratio is 1 minus

⁹Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020, at 14.

the dividend payout ratio. As the payout ratio declines, the earnings retention ratio
 increases. An increased earnings retention ratio will fuel stronger growth because the
 business funds more investments with retained earnings.

The payout ratios of the proxy group are shown in my Exhibit CCW-6. These dividend payout ratios and earnings retention ratios then can be used to develop a sustainable long-term earnings retention growth rate. A sustainable long-term earnings retention ratio will help gauge whether analysts' current three- to five-year growth rate projections can be sustained over an indefinite period of time.

9 The data used to estimate the long-term sustainable growth rate is based on the 10 Company's current market-to-book ratio and on *Value Line*'s three- to five-year 11 projections of earnings, dividends, earned returns on book equity, and stock issuances.

As shown in Exhibit CCW-7, based on my 13-week average stock price, the average and median sustainable growth rate for the proxy group using this internal growth rate model are 4.76% and 4.55%, respectively.

15 Q WHAT IS THE DCF ESTIMATE USING THESE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 16 RATES?

A DCF estimate based on these sustainable growth rates is developed in Exhibit CCW8. As shown there, and using the same formula in Equation 2 above, a sustainable
growth DCF analysis produces proxy group average and median DCF results for the
13-week period of 8.38% and 8.27%, respectively.
1 IV.F. Multi-Stage DCF Model

2 Q HAVE YOU CONDUCTED ANY OTHER DCF STUDIES?

3 А Yes. As previously indicated, the DCF is designed to reflect a present value of an 4 infinite string of future cash flow. That said, however, my first constant growth DCF is 5 based on the analyst growth rate projections, so it is a reasonable reflection of rational investment expectations over the next three- to five- years. The limitation on this 6 7 constant growth DCF model is that it cannot reflect a rational expectation that a period 8 of high or low short-term growth can be followed by a change in growth to a rate that is 9 more reflective of long-term sustainable growth. In order to account for the outlook of 10 changing growth expectations, I performed a multi-stage DCF analysis.

11 Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE GROWTH RATES CAN CHANGE OVER TIME?

Analyst-projected growth rates over the next three to five years will change as utility earnings growth outlooks change. Utility companies go through cycles in making investments in their systems. When utility companies are making large investments, their rate base grows rapidly, which in turn accelerates earnings growth. Once a major construction cycle is completed or levels off, growth in the utility rate base slows and its earnings growth slows from an abnormally high three- to five-year rate to a lower sustainable growth rate.

As major construction cycles extend over longer periods of time, even with an accelerated construction program, the growth rate of the utility will slow simply because rate base growth will slow and the utility has limited human and capital resources available to expand its construction program. Therefore, the three- to five-year growth

rate projection should be used as a long-term sustainable growth rate, but not without 1 2 making a reasonable informed judgment to determine whether it considers the current 3 market environment, the industry, and whether the three- to five-year growth outlook is 4 sustainable.

5 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL.

6 The multi-stage DCF model reflects the possibility of non-constant growth for a А 7 Company over time. The multi-stage DCF model reflects three growth periods: (1) a 8 short-term growth period consisting of the first five years; (2) a transition period, 9 consisting of the next five years (6 through 10); and (3) a long-term growth period 10 starting in year 11 and extending into perpetuity.

11 For the short-term growth period, I relied on the consensus of analysts' growth 12 projections described above in relationship to my constant growth DCF model. For the 13 transition period, the growth rates were reduced or increased by an equal factor 14 reflecting the difference between the analysts' growth rates and the long-term 15 sustainable growth rate. For the long-term growth period, I assumed each Company's 16 growth would converge to the maximum sustainable long-term growth rate.

17

Q WHY IS THE GDP GROWTH PROJECTION A REASONABLE PROXY FOR

18

THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE?

19 Utilities cannot indefinitely sustain a growth rate that exceeds the growth rate of the А 20 economy in which they sell services. Utilities' earnings/dividend growth is created by 21 increased utility investment or rate base. Such investment, in turn, is driven by service The U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration ("EIA") has observed that utility sales growth tracks U.S. GDP growth, albeit at a lower level, as shown in Exhibit CCW-9. Utility sales growth has lagged behind GDP growth for more than a decade. As a result, nominal GDP growth is a very conservative proxy for utility sales growth, rate base growth, and earnings growth. Therefore, the U.S. GDP nominal growth rate is a conservative proxy for the highest sustainable long-term growth rate of a utility.

11 Q IS THERE RESEARCH THAT SUPPORTS YOUR POSITION THAT, OVER

12 THE LONG TERM, A COMPANY'S EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS CANNOT

13 **GROW AT A RATE GREATER THAN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?**

A Yes. This concept is supported in published analyst literature and academic work.
 Specifically, in a textbook titled "Fundamentals of Financial Management," published
 by Eugene Brigham and Joel F. Houston, the authors state as follows:
 The constant growth model is most appropriate for mature Companies
 with a stable history of growth and stable future expectations. Expected
 growth rates vary somewhat among Companies, but dividends for
 mature firms are often expected to grow in the future at about the same

21

rate as nominal gross domestic product (real GDP plus inflation).¹⁰

¹⁰ "*Fundamentals of Financial Management*," Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, Eleventh Edition 2007, Thomson South-Western, a Division of Thomson Corporation at 298 (emphasis added).

- 1 The use of the economic growth rate is also supported by investment practitioners as
- 2 outlined as follows:

3

Estimating Growth Rates

- 4 One of the advantages of a three-stage discounted cash flow model is 5 that it fits with life cycle theories in regards to Company growth. In these 6 theories, Companies are assumed to have a life cycle with varying 7 growth characteristics. Typically, the potential for extraordinary growth 8 in the near term eases over time and eventually growth slows to a more 9 stable level.
- 10 * * *

11Another approach to estimating long-term growth rates is to focus on12estimating the overall economic growth rate. Again, this is the approach13used in the *Ibbotson Cost of Capital Yearbook*. To obtain the economic14growth rate, a forecast is made of the growth rate's component parts.15Expected growth can be broken into two main parts: expected inflation16and expected real growth. By analyzing these components separately, it17is easier to see the factors that drive growth.¹¹

18 Q ARE THERE ANY ACTUAL INVESTMENT RESULTS THAT SUPPORT THE

19 NOTION THAT THE GROWTH IN STOCK INVESTMENTS WILL NOT

20 EXCEED THE NOMINAL GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?

A Yes. This is evident by a comparison of the compound annual growth of the U.S. GDP compared to the geometric growth of the U.S. stock market. Duff & Phelps measures the historical geometric growth of the U.S. stock market over the period 1926-2019 to be approximately 6.1%.¹² During this same time period, the U.S. nominal compound annual growth of the U.S. GDP was approximately 6.0%.¹³

> ¹¹Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 51 and 52. ¹²Duff & Phelps, 2020 SBBI Yearbook at 6-17.

¹³U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, January 28, 2021.

As such, over the past 90 years, the geometric average growth of the U.S. nominal GDP has been higher but comparable to the average geometric growth of the U.S. stock market capital appreciation. This historical relationship indicates that the U.S. GDP growth outlook is a conservative estimate of the long-term sustainable growth of U.S. stock investments.

6 Q WHAT IS THE GEOMETRIC AVERAGE AND WHY IS IT APPROPRIATE TO 7 USE THIS MEASURE TO COMPARE GDP GROWTH TO CAPITAL 8 APPRECIATION IN THE STOCK MARKET?

9 A The geometric average growth rate and compound annual growth rate are used 10 interchangeably. The geometric annual growth rate is the calculated growth rate, or 11 return, that measures the magnitude of growth from start to finish. The geometric 12 average is best, and most often, used as a measurement of performance or growth over 13 a long period of time.¹⁴ Because I am comparing achieved growth in the stock market 14 to achieved growth in U.S. GDP over a long period of time, the geometric average 15 growth rate is most appropriate.

16 Q HOW DID YOU DETERMINE A LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE THAT 17 REFLECTS THE CURRENT CONSENSUS OF INDEPENDENT MARKET 18 PARTICIPANTS?

A I relied on the consensus of long-term GDP growth projections as projected by
 independent economists. *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts* publishes the consensus for

¹⁴New Regulatory Finance, Roger Morin, PhD, at 133-134.

1 GDP growth projections twice a year. These projections reflect current outlooks for 2 GDP and are likely to be influential on investors' expectations of future growth outlooks. The consensus of projected GDP growth is about 4.35% over the next 3 10 years.¹⁵ 4

DO YOU CONSIDER OTHER SOURCES OF PROJECTED LONG-TERM GDP 5 Q 6 **GROWTH?**

Yes, and these alternative sources corroborate the consensus analysts' projections I 7 А 8 relied on. Various commonly relied upon analysts' projections are shown in Table 7 9 below.

TABLE	7		
GDP Forec	asts		
Source	Real <u>GDP</u>	Inflation	Nominal <u>GDP</u>
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts EIA - Annual Energy Outlook Congressional Budget Office Moody's Analytics Social Security Administration The Economist Intelligence Unit	2.3% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2% 1.8%	2.1% 2.2% 2.0% 1.8% 2.0%	4.3% 4.1% 3.8% 4.1% 4.1% 3.9%

10 The EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook projects real GDP out until 2050. In its 11 2020 Annual Report, the EIA projects real GDP through 2050 to be 1.8% and a

¹⁵Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020, at 14.

1	long-term GDP price inflation projection of 2.2%. The EIA data supports a long-term
2	nominal GDP growth outlook of 4.1%. ¹⁶
3	Also, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") makes long-term economic
4	projections. The CBO is projecting real GDP growth to be 1.8% during the next
5	nine years, with a GDP price inflation outlook of 2.0%. The CBO's nine-year outlook
6	for nominal GDP based on this projection is 3.8%. ¹⁷
7	Moody's Analytics also makes long-term economic projections. In its recent
8	over 25-year outlook to 2048, Moody's Analytics is projecting real GDP growth of 2.2%
9	with GDP inflation of 1.8%. ¹⁸ Based on these projections, Moody's Analytics is
10	projecting nominal GDP growth of 4.1% over the next 25 years.
11	The Social Security Administration ("SSA") makes long-term economic
12	projections out to 2095. The SSA's nominal GDP projection, under its "intermediate
13	cost" scenario of approximately 50 years, is 4.1%. ¹⁹
14	The Economist Intelligence Unit, a division of The Economist and a third-party
15	data provider to MI, makes a long-term economic projection out to 2050. The
16	Economist Intelligence Unit is projecting real GDP growth of 1.8% with an inflation
17	rate of 2.0% out to 2050. The real GDP growth projection is in line with the consensus.
18	The long-term nominal GDP projection based on these outlooks is approximately
19	$3.9\%.^{20}$

 ¹⁶DOE/EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2020 With Projections to 2050, March 2020, Table Macroeconomic Indicators.
 ¹⁷CBO: An Update to the Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, July 2020.
 ¹⁸www.economy.com, Moody's Analytics Forecast, May 11, 2020.
 ¹⁹www.ssa.gov, "2020 OASDI Trustees Report," Table VI.G4, April 22, 2020.
 ²⁰S&P Global Market Intelligence, Economist Intelligence Unit, downloaded on January 28,

2021.

1 The real GDP and nominal GDP growth projections made by these independent 2 sources support the use of the consensus for five-year and ten-year projected GDP 3 growth outlooks I use in my analysis as a reasonable estimate of market participants' 4 long-term GDP growth.

5

6

Q WHAT STOCK PRICE, DIVIDEND, AND GROWTH RATES DID YOU USE IN YOUR MULTI-STAGE DCF ANALYSIS?

I relied on the same 13-week and 26-week average stock prices and the most recent 7 Α 8 quarterly dividend payment data discussed above. For the first stage, I used the 9 consensus of analysts' growth rate projections discussed above in my constant growth 10 DCF model. The first stage covers the first five years, consistent with the time horizon 11 of the securities analysts' growth rate projections. The second stage, or transition stage, 12 begins in year 6 and extends through year 10. The second stage growth transitions the 13 growth rate from the first stage to the third stage using a straight linear trend. For the 14 third stage, or long-term sustainable growth stage, starting in year 11, I used a 4.35%15 long-term sustainable growth rate based on the consensus of economists' long-term 16 projected nominal GDP growth rate.

17 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL?

- 18 A As shown in Exhibit CCW-10, the average and median DCF ROEs for my proxy group
- using the 13-week average stock price are 8.17% and 8.40%, respectively.

8.17%

8.40%

1 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES.

- 2 A The DCF results are summarized in Table 8 below. It is my opinion a reasonable ROE
- 3 based on the DCF results summarized in Table 8 is 9.1%.

TABLE 8Summary of DCF ResultsDescriptionProxy CympConstant Growth DCF Model (Analysts' Growth)8.96%9.26%Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth)8.38%8.27%

4 IV.G. Risk Premium Model

Multi-Stage DCF Model

5 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM MODEL.

A This model is based on the principle that investors require a higher return to assume
 greater risk. Common equity investments have greater risk than bonds because bonds
 have more security of payment in bankruptcy proceedings than common equity and the
 coupon payments on bonds represent contractual obligations. In contrast, companies
 are not required to pay dividends or guarantee returns on common equity investments.
 Therefore, common equity securities are considered to be riskier than bond securities.

12 This risk premium model is based on two estimates of an equity risk premium. 13 First, I quantify the difference between regulatory commission-authorized returns on 14 common equity and contemporary U.S. Treasury bonds. The difference between the 15 authorized return on common equity and the Treasury bond yield is the risk premium. I estimated the risk premium on an annual basis for each year since January 1986. The
 authorized ROEs were based on regulatory commission-authorized returns for electric
 utility companies. Authorized returns are typically based on expert witnesses' estimates
 of the investor-required return at the time of the proceeding.

5 The second equity risk premium estimate is based on the difference between 6 regulatory commission-authorized returns on common equity and contemporary "A" rated utility bond yields by Moody's. I selected the period 1986 through 2020 7 8 because public utility stocks consistently traded at a premium to book value during that 9 period. This is illustrated in Exhibit CCW-11, which shows the market-to-book ratio 10 since 1986 for the electric utility industry was consistently above a multiple of 1.0x. 11 Over this period, an analyst can infer that authorized ROEs were sufficient to support 12 market prices that at least exceeded book value. This is an indication that commission 13 authorized returns on common equity supported a utility's ability to issue additional 14 common stock without diluting existing shares. It further demonstrates that utilities 15 were able to access equity markets without a detrimental impact on current shareholders.

Based on this analysis, as shown in Exhibit CCW-12 the average indicated equity risk premium over U.S. Treasury bond yields has been 5.65%. Since the risk premium can vary depending upon market conditions and changing investor risk perceptions, I believe using an estimated range of risk premiums provides the best method to measure the current return on common equity for a risk premium methodology.

I incorporated 5-year and 10-year rolling average risk premiums over the study
 period to gauge the variability over time of risk premiums. These rolling average risk

1 premiums mitigate the impact of anomalous market conditions and skewed risk 2 premiums over an entire business cycle. As shown on my Exhibit CCW-12, the 3 five-year rolling average risk premium over Treasury bonds ranged from 4.25% to 4 7.02%, while the 10-year rolling average risk premium ranged from 4.38% to 6.80%. 5 As shown on my Exhibit CCW-13, the average indicated equity risk premium 6 over contemporary "A" rated Moody's utility bond yields was 4.28%. The five-year 7 and 10-year rolling average risk premiums ranged from 2.88% to 5.77% and 3.20% to 8 5.62%, respectively.

9 Q DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE TIME PERIOD USED TO DERIVE THESE 10 EQUITY RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES IS APPROPRIATE TO FORM 11 ACCURATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CONTEMPORARY MARKET 12 CONDITIONS?

13 А Yes. Contemporary market conditions can change dramatically during the period that 14 rates determined in this proceeding will be in effect. A relatively long period of time 15 where stock valuations reflect premiums to book value indicates that the authorized 16 ROEs and the corresponding equity risk premiums were supportive of investors' return 17 expectations and provided utilities access to the equity markets under reasonable terms 18 and conditions. Further, this time period is long enough to smooth abnormal market 19 movement that might distort equity risk premiums. While market conditions and risk 20 premiums do vary over time, this historical time period is a reasonable period to estimate 21 contemporary risk premiums.

Alternatively, some studies, such as Duff & Phelps referred to later in this 1 2 testimony, have recommended that use of "actual achieved investment return data" in a 3 risk premium study should be based on long historical time periods. The studies find 4 that achieved returns over short time periods may not reflect investors' expected returns 5 due to unexpected and abnormal stock price performance. Short-term, abnormal actual 6 returns would be smoothed over time and the achieved actual investment returns over 7 long time periods would approximate investors' expected returns. Therefore, it is 8 reasonable to assume that averages of annual achieved returns over long time periods 9 will generally converge on the investors' expected returns.

10 My risk premium study is based on data that inherently relied on investor 11 expectations, not actual investment returns, and, thus, need not encompass a very long 12 historical time period.

Q PLEASE EXPLAIN OTHER MARKET EVIDENCE YOU RELIED ON IN DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

15 А The equity risk premium should reflect the market's perception of risk in the utility 16 industry today. I have gauged investor perceptions in utility risk today in Exhibit 17 CCW-14, where I show the yield spread between utility bonds and Treasury bonds over 18 the last 40 years. As shown in this schedule, the average utility bond yield spreads over 19 Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated utility bonds for this historical period are 1.49% 20 and 1.93%, respectively. Yield spreads of "A" and "Baa" rated utility bonds over 21 Treasury bonds during 2018 were 1.14% and 1.56%, respectively, which are lower than 22 the 40-year averages. The yield spreads of "A" and "Baa" rated utility bonds over

1 Treasury bonds during 2019 were 1.18% and 1.61%, respectively. Most recently in 2020, the "A" and "Baa" utility spreads are 1.49% and 1.87%, respectively. 2 3 A current 13-week average "A" rated utility bond yield of 2.84% when 4 compared to the current Treasury bond yield of 1.69%, as shown in Exhibit CCW-15, 5 page 1, implies a yield spread of 1.15%. This current utility bond yield spread is lower 6 than the 40-year average spread for "A" rated utility bonds of 1.49%. The current spread 7 for the "Baa" rated utility bond yield of 1.44% is also lower than the 40-year average of 1.93%. 8 9 The 26-week average "A" rated utility bond yield of 2.84% when compared to 10 the 26-week average Treasury bond yield of 1.56%, as shown in Exhibit CCW-15, 11 page 2, implies a yield spread of 1.28%. This utility bond yield spread is lower than the 40-year average spread for "A" rated utility bonds of 1.49%. The spread for the 26-12 13 week average "Baa" rated utility bond yield of 1.59% is also lower than the 40-year 14 average of 1.93%. 15 The 13-week average spreads are lower than both the 26-week averages and the 16 long-term averages. This indicates that the market has had higher demand for utility 17 bonds in recent weeks relative to longer periods of time. This is evidence that utilities 18 currently have ample access to capital at reasonable prices.

19

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Q WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN FOR THE COMPANIES BASED ON YOUR RISK PREMIUM STUDY?

A Because of today's low interest rates and uncertainty revolving around forecasted
interest rates, I am recommending more weight be given to the high-end risk premium

estimates than the low-end, in order to be conservative. As such, I am recommending
that the most recent five-year average risk premium be used in determining a fair ROE
for the Companies. As shown on my Exhibit CCW-12, the most recent five-year
average risk premium over Treasury yields is 7.02%. A risk premium of 7.02% exceeds
the 35-year average of 5.65% by 1.37%. Adding the 7.02% risk premium to the
projected Treasury yield of 2.10% produces a ROE of 9.12%, rounded to 9.10%.

7 Similarly, as shown on my Exhibit CCW-13, the most recent five-year allowed 8 risk premium over utility bond yields is 5.77%. This risk premium is well above the 9 35-year historical average risk premium of 4.28%. The A-rated utility bond yield has 10 averaged 2.84% over both the 13-week and 26-week periods ending January 22, 2020, 11 respectively. Adding the 5.77% risk premium to the A-rated utility bond yields of 12 2.84% produce an estimated cost of equity of 8.61%. Similarly, the Baa-rated utility 13 bond yield has averaged 3.13% and 3.15% over the same 13-week and 26-week periods, 14 respectively. Adding the 5.77% risk premium to the average Baa-rated utility bond 15 yields of 3.13% and 3.15% produces an estimated cost of equity of approximately 16 8.90%. The estimated cost of equity using the risk premium over utility bond yields is 17 in the range of 8.6% to 8.9%. The results of my risk premium analyses are summarized 18 in Table 9. Based on these results, I conclude that a reasonable ROE based on my risk 19 premium analyses is 9.0%.

TABLE 9	
Summary of Risk Premiu	<u>m Results</u>
Description	ROE <u>Estimate</u>
Projected Treasury Yield	9.10%
13-Week Average Yields	
A-Rated Utility Bond	8.6%
Baa-Rated Utility Bond	8.9%
26-Week Average Yields	
A-Rated Utility Bond	8.6%
	8 00%

1 IV.H. Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")

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PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPM.

3 А The CAPM method of analysis is based upon the theory that the market-required rate of 4 return for a security is equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk premium associated with 5 the specific security. This relationship between risk and return can be expressed mathematically as follows: 6 7 $R_i = R_f + B_i x (R_m - R_f)$ where: 8 R_i = Required return for stock i 9 R_f = Risk-free rate 10 R_m = Expected return for the market portfolio B_i = Beta - Measure of the risk for stock 11 12 The stock-specific risk term in the above equation is beta. Beta represents the

13 investment risk that cannot be diversified away when the security is held in a diversified

portfolio. When stocks are held in a diversified portfolio, stock-specific risks can be
 eliminated by balancing the portfolio with securities that react in the opposite direction
 to firm-specific risk factors (e.g., business cycle, competition, product mix, and
 production limitations).

5 The risks that cannot be eliminated when held in a diversified portfolio are 6 non-diversifiable risks. Non-diversifiable risks are related to the market in general and 7 referred to as systematic risks. Risks that can be eliminated by diversification are 8 In a broad sense, systematic risks are market risks and non-systematic risks. 9 non-systematic risks are business risks. The CAPM theory suggests the market will not 10 compensate investors for assuming risks that can be diversified away. Therefore, the 11 only risk investors will be compensated for are systematic, or non-diversifiable, risks. 12 The beta is a measure of the systematic, or non-diversifiable risks.

13

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PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CAPM.

A The CAPM requires an estimate of the market risk-free rate, the Company's beta, and
the market risk premium.

16 Q WHAT DID YOU USE AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE MARKET RISK-FREE 17 RATE?

A As previously noted, *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*' projected 30-year Treasury bond
 yield is 2.1%.²¹ The current 30-year Treasury bond yield is 1.69%, as shown in Exhibit
 CCW-15 at page 1. Again, in an effort to provide a conservative ROE estimate, I used

²¹Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, January 1, 2021 at 2.

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts' projected 30-year Treasury bond yield of 2.1% for my
 CAPM analysis.

3 Q WHY DID YOU USE LONG-TERM TREASURY BOND YIELDS AS AN 4 ESTIMATE OF THE RISK-FREE RATE?

5 А Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States 6 government, so long-term Treasury bonds are considered to have negligible credit risk. 7 Also, long-term Treasury bonds have an investment horizon similar to that of common 8 stock. As a result, investor-anticipated long-run inflation expectations are reflected in 9 both common stock required returns and long-term bond yields. Therefore, the nominal 10 risk-free rate (or expected inflation rate and real risk-free rate) included in a long-term 11 bond yield is a reasonable estimate of the nominal risk-free rate included in common 12 stock returns.

13 Treasury bond yields, however, do include risk premiums related to 14 unanticipated future inflation and interest rates. In this regard, a Treasury bond yield is 15 not entirely risk-free. Risk premiums related to unanticipated inflation and interest rates 16 reflect systematic market risks. Consequently, for companies with betas less than 1.0, 17 using the Treasury bond yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the CAPM analysis can 18 produce an overstated estimate of the CAPM return.

19 Q WHAT BETA DID YOU USE IN YOUR ANALYSIS?

A As shown in Exhibit CCW-16, the proxy group average and median *Value Line* beta
estimates are both 0.88. In my experience, these beta estimates are abnormally high and

are unlikely to be sustained over the long-term. As such, I have also reviewed the 1 2 historical average of the proxy group's *Value Line* betas. The historical average *Value* 3 Line beta since 2014 is 0.66 and has ranged from 0.54 to 0.87. In addition to Value 4 Line, I have also included adjusted beta estimates as provided by Market Intelligence's 5 Beta Generator model. The model relied on a five-year period on a weekly basis ending 6 January 22, 2021. Unlike the Value Line betas, the Market Intelligence betas were 7 calculated using the S&P 500 as the benchmark for the market, and adjusted using the 8 Vasicek method. The average and median Market Intelligence betas are 0.65 and 0.66, 9 respectively.

10 Q HOW DID YOU DERIVE YOUR MARKET RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATE?

A I derived three market risk premium estimates: a forward-looking estimate using a risk premium methodology and two forward-looking estimates based on the DCF methodology.

14 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MARKET RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATE 15 DERIVED USING THE RISK PREMIUM METHODOLOGY.

16 A The forward-looking risk premium-based estimate was derived by estimating the 17 expected return on the market (as represented by the S&P 500) and subtracting the risk-18 free rate from this estimate. I estimated the expected return on the S&P 500 by adding 19 an expected inflation rate to the long-term historical arithmetic average real return on 20 the market. The real return on the market represents the achieved return above the rate 21 of inflation.

1	Duff & Phelps' 2020 SBBI Yearbook estimates the historical arithmetic average
2	real market return over the period 1926 to 2019 to be 9.0% . ²² A current consensus for
3	projected inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), is 2.0%. ²³ Using
4	these estimates, the expected market return is 11.2%. ²⁴ The market risk premium then
5	is the difference between the 11.2% expected market return and the projected risk-free
6	rate of 2.1%, or 9.1%.

7 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MARKET RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES 8 DERIVED USING THE DCF METHODOLOGY.

9 A I employed two versions of the constant growth DCF model to develop estimates of the
10 market risk premium. I first employed the constant growth DCF model in the traditional
11 sense by adding a projected 3-5 year growth rate to a projected dividend yield.

I obtained the expected growth rate of the S&P 500 Index from State Street Global Advisors ("State Street"). State Street is the creator of several exchange traded funds ("ETF") that cover a multitude of investment strategies. In general, ETFs can be expected to move up or down in value with the value of the applicable index. For example, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (Ticker: SPY) is designed to correspond generally to the price and yield performance of the S&P 500 Index.

On its website, State Street publishes a multitude of comparative data for its SPY ETF and the S&P 500 Index, including the current dividend yield and 3-5 year earnings growth rates. As inputs to my first constant growth DCF analysis, I have relied on the

²²Duff & Phelps, 2020 SBBI Yearbook at 6-18.

²³Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, January 1, 2021 at 2.

²⁴{ [(1 + 0.090) * (1 + 0.02)] – 1 } * 100.

1	published dividend yield and growth rate estimates for the S&P 500 Index as published
2	by State Street on February 1, 2021. The published dividend yield and estimated growth
3	for the S&P 500 as of February 1, 2021 were 1.53% and 12.83%, respectively. Using
4	these inputs, a constant growth DCF produces an expected return on the market of
5	14.56%. ²⁵ Subtracting the projected Treasury yield of 2.10% from the expected return
6	on the market of 14.56% produces a market risk premium estimate of 12.50%.
7	My second DCF-based market risk premium estimate was derived by estimating
8	the expected market return using a version of the FERC's two-step DCF methodology.
9	FERC's two-step DCF analysis is a constant growth DCF using a growth rate that is
10	calculated by weighting the 3-5 year growth rate estimate by 80% and the projected
11	long-term GDP growth rate by 20%. Applying 80% weight to the S&P 500 growth
12	estimate of 12.83%, and 20% weight to the GDP growth rate estimate of 4.35%
13	discussed above, produces a blended growth rate of 11.13%. ²⁶
14	I then used the blended growth rate of 11.13% and the current dividend yield of
15	1.53% to estimate the expected market return by employing the constant growth DCF.
16	This yields an expected market return of 12.83%. ²⁷ Subtracting the projected risk-free
17	rate of 2.10% from this expected market return produces a market risk premium of
18	approximately 10.70%.

 $^{^{25}}$ DCF = 1.53%*(1+12.83%) + 12.83% = 14.56%.

 $^{^{26}(12.83\%*0.80) + (4.35\%*0.20) = 11.13\%.}$

 $^{^{27}}$ Two-Step DCF = 1.53%*(1+11.13%) + 11.13% = 12.83%.

1 Q PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU EMPLOYED THE TWO-STEP DCF METHOD.

2 As I discussed in detail above, the constant growth model assumes the input growth rate А 3 to be the growth rate in perpetuity. No company, regulated or not, can grow at a higher 4 rate than the economy in which it sells goods and services in perpetuity, which is the 5 time period assumed in the DCF model. Because the actual earnings estimates for the 6 underlying holdings are used to calculate a mean 3-5 year earnings growth rate estimate 7 for the index, the individual growth rates for the underlying holdings must be taken into 8 consideration in evaluating the reasonableness, or sustainability, of the growth rate for 9 the index as a whole. For example, S&P 500 member Company Amazon, Inc., (NYSE: 10 AMZN) has a consensus projected growth rate of 38.5% as reported by Yahoo! Finance. 11 This growth rate nearly 9.0x greater than the consensus expected growth rate of 4.35%12 for the U.S. economy discussed earlier.

For these reasons, employing the two-step DCF based on a blended growth rate
that gives some weight to projected GDP growth is reasonable.

15 Q HOW DO YOUR FORWARD-LOOKING ESTIMATES OF THE MARKET 16 RISK PREMIUM COMPARE TO THE HISTORICAL REALIZED MARKET 17 RISK PREMIUM?

18 A Between 1926 and 2019, the arithmetic average of the achieved total return on the S&P 19 500 was $12.1\%^{28}$ and the return on long-term Treasury bonds was 6.0%.²⁹ The indicated 20 market risk premium is 6.1% (12.1% - 6.0% = 6.1%). Therefore, my forward-looking

²⁸Duff & Phelps, 2020 Yearbook at 6-17. ²⁹Id.

1 estimates of the market risk premium of 9.1%, 10.7%, and 12.5% exceed the historical

2 market risk premium by 3.0% to 6.40%.

3 Q HOW DO YOUR EXPECTED MARKET RETURNS COMPARE TO CURRENT

4 **EXPECTATIONS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS?**

5 A As shown in Table 10, my expected market returns of 11.18%, 12.83%, and 14.56%

6 exceed long-term market expectations of several financial institutions.

		Expected	d Return
Source	Term	Large Cap <u>Equities</u>	Nominal <u>US GDP</u>
BlackRock Capital Management ¹	25 Years	7.10%	N/A
JP Morgan Chase ²	10 - 15 Years	4.10%	3.84%
Vanguard ³	10 Years	3.7% - 5.7%	N/A
Research Affiliates ⁴	10 Years	1.99%	3.72%
Morningstar ⁵	10 Years	-0.10%	N/A

³Vanguard economic and market outlook for 2021: Approaching the dawn, December 2020.

⁴Research Affiliates, Asset Allocation Interactive, downloaded 3/1/2021.

⁵Morningstar Markets Observer Q1 2021 at 12.

When compared to the expected market returns of financial institutions above,
 my average expected market return of 12.86% is more than two times higher than all
 but one projection. For these reasons, my expected market returns, and the associated
 market risk premiums, should be considered high-end estimates.

5 Q HOW DO YOUR ESTIMATED MARKET RISK PREMIUMS COMPARE TO 6 THAT ESTIMATED BY DUFF & PHELPS?

A The Duff & Phelps analysis indicates a market risk premium falls somewhere in the
range of 5.5% to 7.15%. My market risk premium estimates are in the range of 9.1% to
12.5%. All of my market risk premium estimates are substantially above the historical
and normalized market risk premiums recommended by Duff & Phelps.

11 Q HOW DOES DUFF & PHELPS MEASURE A MARKET RISK PREMIUM?

A Duff & Phelps makes several estimates of a forward-looking market risk premium based
 on actual achieved data from the historical period of 1926 through 2019 as well as
 normalized data. Using this data, Duff & Phelps estimates a market risk premium
 derived from the total return on large company stocks (S&P 500), less the income return
 on Treasury bonds.

17Duff & Phelps' range is based on several methodologies. First, Duff & Phelps18estimates a market risk premium of 7.15% based on the difference between the total19market return on common stocks (S&P 500) less the income return on 20-year Treasury20bond investments over the 1926-2019 period.³⁰

³⁰Duff & Phelps 2020 SBBI Yearbook at 10-21.

1	Second, Duff & Phelps used the Ibbotson & Chen supply-side model which
2	produced a market risk premium estimate of 6.17%. ³¹ Duff & Phelps explains that the
3	historical market risk premium based on the S&P 500 was influenced by an abnormal
4	expansion of P/E ratios relative to earnings and dividend growth during the period,
5	primarily over the last 30 years. In order to control for the volatility of extraordinary
6	events and their impacts on P/E ratios, Duff & Phelps takes into consideration the
7	three-year average P/E ratio as the current P/E ratio. Therefore, Duff & Phelps adjusted
8	this market risk premium estimate to normalize the growth in the P/E ratio to be more
9	in line with the growth in dividends and earnings.
10	Finally, Duff & Phelps develops its own recommended equity, or market risk
11	premium by employing an analysis that takes into consideration a wide range of
12	economic information, multiple risk premium estimation methodologies, and the current
13	state of the economy by observing measures such as the level of stock indices and
14	corporate spreads as indicators of perceived risk. Based on this methodology, and
15	utilizing a "normalized" risk-free rate of 2.5%, Duff & Phelps concludes that the current
16	expected, or forward-looking, market risk premium is 5.5%, implying an expected

17 return on the market of 9.0%.³²

18 It should be noted that Duff & Phelps' market risk premiums are measured over
19 a 20-year Treasury bond. Because I am relying on a projected 30-year Treasury bond

³¹*Id.* at 10-29.

³²*Duff & Phelps*: "Technical Update: Duff & Phelps Recommended U.S. Equity Risk Premium Decreased from 6.0% to 5.5%," December 10, 2020.

yield, the results of my CAPM analysis should be considered conservative estimates for
 the cost of equity.

3	Q	WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?
4	А	As shown in Exhibit CCW-17, I have provided the results of nine different applications
5		of the CAPM. The first three results presented are based on the proxy group's current
6		average Value Line beta of 0.88, a projected risk-free rate of 2.10%, and my three
7		market risk premium estimates of 9.1%, 10.7%, and 12.5%. The results of the CAPM
8		based on these inputs range from 10.14% to 13.14%.
9		The next three results presented are based on the proxy group's historical Value
10		Line beta of 0.66, a projected risk-free rate of 2.1%, and my three market risk premium

estimates of 9.1%, 10.7%, and 12.5%. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs
range from 8.14% to 10.40%.

The last three results presented are based on the proxy group's current S&P Global Market Intelligence beta of 0.65, a projected risk-free rate of 2.10%, and my three market risk premium estimates of 9.1%, 10.7%, and 12.5%. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from 8.03% to 10.24%. My CAPM results are summarized in Table 11.

18 Based on these results, I conclude that a reasonable CAPM estimate is 9.6%.

Т <u>САРМ </u>	ABLE 11 Results Sum	<u>mary</u>	
	Current	Historical VL	Current S&P GMI
Description	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Beta</u>
Risk Premium Method	10.14%	8.14%	8.03%
FERC 2-Step DCF Method	11.55%	9.20%	9.07%
Constant Growth DCF Method	13.14%	10.40%	10.24%

1 IV.I. Return on Equity Summary

2 Q BASED ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY

- 3 ANALYSES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY
- 4 **DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THE COMPANIES?**
- 5 A The results of my analyses are summarized in Table 12.

TABL	E 12
Return on Common I	Equity Summary
Description	Results
DCF	9.1%
Risk Premium	9.0%
САРМ	9.6%

Based on my analyses described above, I estimate the Companies' current
 market cost of equity to be in the reasonable range of 9.0% to 9.6% with a midpoint
 estimate of 9.3%.

4

V. <u>RESPONSE MR. ADRIEN MCKENZIE</u>

5 V.A. Summary of Rebuttal

6 Q WHAT ROE ARE THE COMPANIES REQUESTING?

A Mr. McKenzie's recommendation of 10.00% is the midpoint of his flotation-cost adjusted range of 9.4% to 10.6%.³³ To arrive at his adjusted range, Mr. McKenzie
9 included a 0.10% upward adjustment to account for flotation costs. Mr. McKenzie's recommended range and the Companies' request are unreasonable and should be rejected.

³³McKenzie Direct Testimony at 3-4.

1 V.B. Return on Equity

2	Q	HOW DID MR. MCKENZIE DEVELOP HIS ROE RANGE?
3	А	Mr. McKenzie developed his ROE recommendation based on the results of his DCF,
4		traditional CAPM, Empirical CAPM ("ECAPM"), and a Risk Premium model. He
5		relies on the results of an Expected Earnings analysis and a non-utility DCF analysis as
6		an attempt to corroborate his results.
7		As shown below in Table 13, I provide the average results of Mr. McKenzie's
8		analyses which he relies on to conclude that a ROE in the range of 9.4% to 10.6% , with
9		a midpoint of 10.0%, is reasonable for the Companies. However, reasonable
10		adjustments to Mr. McKenzie's analyses reduce his ROE estimate for the Companies to
11		no higher than my recommended ROE of 9.3%.

TABLE 13					
<u>Mr. McKe</u>					
Model	Corrected				
	(1)	(2)			
DCF	8.8% - 9.2%	9.0%			
САРМ	10.7%	8.8% - 9.1%			
ECAPM	11.0%	Reject			
<u>Risk Premium</u> Current Yield Projected Yield	9.3% 10.2%	9.0% - 9.3% Reject%			
Range Flotation Cost Adj. Adjusted Range	9.3% - 10.9% <u>0.10%</u> <u>9.4% - 10.6%</u>	Reject			
Recommended ROE	10.0%	9.3%			
Source: Exhibit No. 2.					

1 **V.C. DCF**

2 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MR. MCKENZIE'S DCF ANALYSIS.

A Mr. McKenzie applied the traditional DCF model to his utility proxy group. Mr.
McKenzie observed the average and midpoint results of his proxy group's DCF results
after excluding what he determined to be outliers. The average DCF results fall in the

1	range of 8.3% to 9.2%.	The midpoint	DCF results	fall in th	ne range	of 8.9%	to 10.2%
2	for his proxy group.						

In developing his recommended DCF range, Mr. McKenzie excluded what he
 found to be outlier results. Mr. McKenzie removed 6 low-end outliers and zero high-end
 outliers from his DCF results for his proxy group.³⁴

6

7

Q

CAN MR. MCKENZIE'S DCF ANALYSIS BE ADJUSTED TO PRODUCE MORE REASONABLE RESULTS?

A Yes. Mr. McKenzie's proposal to selectively remove what he believes to be low-end and high-end outliers from the proxy group has the effect of manipulating the results of the proxy group study. Mr. McKenzie simply narrows the range of the proxy group results to produce a result which he finds to be reasonable. This is hardly an independent assessment of what the current market cost of equity is for the Companies.

13 A better methodology would be to rely on all the results of the proxy group, by 14 assessing the central tendency of the proxy group results. In the presence of outliers, a 15 more accurate method of measuring the central tendency of the proxy group's results 16 would be to measure the median of all the DCF return estimates. Relying on the 17 midpoint as Mr. McKenzie has done is not a well-accepted method of measuring the 18 central tendency to my knowledge. The midpoint methodology employed by Mr. 19 McKenzie ignores all but two results, the highest and the lowest. The median DCF 20 results for his proxy group is no higher than 9.0%. Mr. McKenzie's lopsided outlier 21 test clearly biases the results of his analyses upwards and should be rejected. This bias

³⁴Exhibit No. 4, page 3.

is exacerbated with the use of his midpoint methodology. As such, they should be both
 be rejected and the median results should be relied on.

3 V.D. Traditional CAPM

4 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MR. MCKENZIE'S TRADITIONAL CAPM ANALYSES.

5 А Mr. McKenzie developed a traditional CAPM analysis based on current Treasury bond 6 yields. His current bond yield of 1.40% is measured as the six-month average for the 7 period ending September 2020. Mr. McKenzie estimates a market return of 11.6%. 8 From this market return estimate, he subtracts his current risk-free rate of 1.4% to arrive at a current market risk premium of 10.2%.³⁵ He relies on the *Value Line* utility betas 9 10 for the companies included in his proxy group to produce an average cost of equity of 10.2% for his proxy group.³⁶ Then he adjusts each of his CAPM return estimates to 11 12 account for any size premium based on each company's market capitalization. This size 13 adjustment has increased his proxy group's CAPM returns by approximately 50 basis 14 points (0.50%). Therefore, his size-adjusted traditional CAPM analysis produces an 15 average result of 10.7%.

16 Q IS MR. MCKENZIE'S CAPM ANALYSIS REASONABLE?

- 17 A No. I have several concerns with Mr. McKenzie's CAPM analysis. In short, Mr.
 18 McKenzie's CAPM analysis is overstated for at least three reasons: (1) his expected
 19 return on the market of 11.6% is based on an unsustainable growth rate, causing a bias
 - ³⁵Exhibit No. 6. ³⁶*Id*.

and does not include any consideration of the long-run average return on the market;
 (2) his sole reliance on Value Line betas is at odds with his use of the S&P 500 as the
 benchmark for the overall market; and (3) his size adjustment is not reasonable.

WHY DO YOU BELIEVE MR. MCKENZIE'S EXPECTED RETURN ON THE

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MARKET IS UNREASONABLE?

A Mr. McKenzie's expected return on the market of 11.6% is based on a dividend yield
of 2.3% and an expected growth rate of 9.2%. The expected growth rate of 9.2%
incorporated in his expected market return is more than twice the expected growth rate
of the economy of 4.35%.

10 Mr. McKenzie obtained growth rates for the dividend paying S&P 11 500 companies from three sources including Zacks, Value Line, and IBES. He uses 12 these growth rates to perform three DCF analyses on the market. The growth rates Mr. 13 McKenzie relies on include numbers that do not make logical sense from an economic 14 perspective. For example, Mr. McKenzie's expected growth of the market of 9.2% 15 included companies with expected growth rates more than 4.5x higher than that of the 16 overall economy. As I explained in greater detail above, growth rates of this magnitude 17 cannot be reasonably expected to continue into perpetuity, which is the time period for 18 which the DCF is based on. Because of the abnormally high growth rates assumed in 19 his DCF for the return on the market, Mr. McKenzie should have implemented 20 alternative measures of the expected market return and market risk premium. As such, 21 Mr. McKenzie should have incorporated other measures of the expected return on the 22 market. As Dr. Morin notes in his book, New Regulatory Finance,

1 Although realized returns for a particular time period can deviate 2 substantially from what was expected, it is reasonable to believe that long-run average realized returns provide an unbiased estimate of what 3 4 were expected returns. This is the fundamental rationale behind the 5 historical risk premium approach. Analysts and regulators often assume that the average historical risk premium over long periods is the best 6 7 proxy for the future risk premium.³⁷

8 Dr. Morin concludes that "[t]here are two broad approaches to estimating the 9 retrospective and prospective. Each has its own strengths and risk premium: weaknesses, hence the need to utilize both methods."³⁸ As such, Mr. McKenzie should 10 11 have considered the results of multiple estimates of the expected market return from 12 multiple methods.

13

Q WHY DO YOU FIND MR. MCKENZIE'S SOLE RELIANCE ON VALUE LINE **BETAS IN HIS CAPM ANALYSIS TO BE INAPPROPRIATE?** 14

15 А As I explain above, my CAPM analysis relies on beta estimates from Value Line and 16 S&P Global Market Intelligence's Beta Generator model. There are two distinct 17 differences between the MI Beta I relied on and the Value Line Beta: (1) the benchmark 18 index used as the proxy for the market in the MI Beta estimates is the S&P 500 whereas 19 Value Line relies on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"); and (2) the MI Betas I 20 used are adjusted using the Vasicek method whereas the Value Line Betas are adjusted 21 using a modified form of the Blume adjustment.

22 Because Mr. McKenzie is not presenting a CAPM analysis that relies on the 23 NYSE as a proxy for the market, or the expected market return, which the MRP is

³⁷Morin, Dr. Roger A, "New Regulatory Finance," at p. 156. ³⁸*Id.* at p. 162.

1	calculated from, this alone makes the Value Line Betas less preferable. Betas employed
2	in a CAPM should be calculated using the benchmark index that is also used as a proxy
3	for the overall market. Mr. McKenzie and I both relied on the S&P 500 as the proxy
4	for the overall market in estimating our MRP. While Value Line Betas are commonly
5	used in CAPM analyses presented in regulatory proceedings such as this one, it is
6	theoretically incorrect to do so unless the NYSE is used as the proxy for the overall
7	market used to calculate the MRP.

8 Q WHY DO YOU FIND MR. MCKENZIE'S SIZE ADJUSTMENT 9 INAPPROPRIATE?

10 A Mr. McKenzie's size adjustment ROE adder is based on estimates made by Duff & 11 Phelps's Cost of Capital Navigator. Duff & Phelps estimates various size adjustments 12 based on differentials in beta estimates tied to the size of a company. The main concern 13 with these size adjustments as applied by Mr. McKenzie, is that they are not based on 14 risk comparable companies relative to the utility industry or the Companies.

Q WHY IS MR. MCKENZIE'S SIZE ADJUSTMENT TO HIS CAPM RETURN NOT RISK COMPARABLE TO THE COMPANIES?

17 A His size adjustment is based on companies that have significantly more systematic risks
 18 that are not reflective of the utility industry, his proxy group, or the Companies. The
 19 size adjustments relied on by Mr. McKenzie reflects companies that have unadjusted

1 beta estimates well in excess of 1.00.³⁹ I have provided the beta estimates, as calculated

² by Duff & Phelps for each decile below in Table 14.

TABLE 14 Duff & Phelps Size Adjustments and Corresponding Betas ¹ (Dollars in Millions)						
Markot Sizo Bota						
Cap	italization	Premium	D&P OLS	OLS Proxy ^a		
\$	31,090	-0.28%	0.92	0.87	0.77	
\$	13,143	0.50%	1.04	0.87	0.77	
\$	6,619	0.73%	1.11	0.87	0.77	
\$	4,313	0.79%	1.13	0.87	0.77	
\$	2,689	1.10%	1.17	0.87	0.77	
\$	1,670	1.34%	1.17	0.87	0.77	
\$	994	1.47%	1.25	0.87	0.77	
\$	516	1.59%	1.3	0.87	0.77	
\$	230	2.22%	1.33	0.87	0.77	
\$	2	4.99%	1.39	0.87	0.77	
Sou	rce and Note	9				
¹ Duff & Phelps, <i>2020 CRSP Deciles Size Study Supplementary Data Exhibits</i> , Cost of Capital Navigator.						
^a OLS Proxy (Raw) Beta = VL Proxy - 0.35) / 0.67						

These unadjusted beta estimates are substantially higher than the average adjusted beta of 0.87 for the utility group used by Mr. McKenzie as comparable risk proxy of the Companies' investment risk. To put this into a more of an apple-to-apples

³⁹Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator 2019, CRSP Deciles Size Study.

comparison, I have also provided the average unadjusted OLS beta for Mr. McKenzie's 1 2 proxy group (0.77). As shown above, every decile measured by Duff & Phelps has a 3 much higher OLS beta than Mr. McKenzie's utility group. The typical company in each 4 decile is much riskier than the typical utility company Mr. McKenzie relied on as a 5 proxy of comparable risk to the Companies. Because of this significant disparity in risk, 6 as measured by beta, Mr. McKenzie's size adjustment produces a CAPM return estimate 7 that does not produce a risk appropriate return for the Companies and therefore, is not 8 a reasonable and fair return for the Companies.

9 Q CAN YOU EXPLAIN HOW BETA CORRESPONDS WITH THE LEVEL OF

10 INVESTMENT RISK FOR A COMPANY AND THEREFORE PRODUCES AN **APPROPRIATE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURN FOR A SUBJECT COMPANY?**

12 А Yes. Beta represents a measure of systematic or non-diversifiable, market-related risk. 13 All of his proxy company betas are measured relative to that of the overall market 14 (proxied by the NYSE) and adjusted upward by Value Line. The market beta is 15 considered to be 1.0. For companies that have betas greater than 1, they are regarded 16 as having more risk than the overall market. For companies that have betas less than 1, 17 they are regarded to have risk less than the overall market.

18 Q

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CAN MR. MCKENZIE'S CAPM ANALYSIS BE ADJUSTED TO PRODUCE **MORE REASONABLE RESULTS?**

20 Yes. Multiple corrections are required. Such corrections are (1) include an expected А 21 return on the market that is based in part on the long-run average realized return;
1		(2) eliminating his size adjustments; (3) incorporating beta estimates that are calculated
2		relative to the S&P 500 such as those presented in my CAPM analysis; and, (4)
3		removing Algonquin Power from the proxy group. Correcting Mr. McKenzie's CAPM
4		for the material flaws in his analysis would produce a reasonable return on equity within
5		the range of 8.8% to 9.1%.
6	<u>V.E.</u>	Empirical CAPM
7	Q	DID MR. MCKENZIE ALSO PERFORM AN ECAPM ANALYSIS?
8	А	Yes. Mr. McKenzie performed an ECAPM analysis that relied on the same market risk
9		premium of 10.2%, the same risk-free rate of 1.4%, and the same average Value Line
10		beta that he used in his traditional CAPM analyses.
11		He then uses an ECAPM model that applies a 25% weighting factor to the
12		market beta of 1, and a 75% weighting factor to the utility group beta. This produces
13		an average ECAPM range of 10.5% for his utility group.
14		Finally, Mr. McKenzie applied a size adjustment of approximately 0.5% to his
15		utility group's ECAPM estimates. His size-adjusted average is 11.0%. ⁴⁰
16	Q	ARE MR. MCKENZIE'S CURRENT AND PROJECTED ECAPM ANALYSES
17		REASONABLE?
18	А	No. Mr. McKenzie's ECAPM analyses share all of the same flaws as his traditional
19		CAPM analyses. More importantly, Mr. McKenzie's proposal to apply an ECAPM
20		while using adjusted betas published by Value Line, as well as the long-term risk-free

⁴⁰Exhibit No. 7.

1 2 rate further inflates his results. Mr. McKenzie's analysis and results should be disregarded.

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Q PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ISSUES YOU HAVE WITH MR. MCKENZIE'S CURRENT AND PROJECTED ECAPM ANALYSES.

5 А Mr. McKenzie's ECAPM analysis is flawed because his model was developed using 6 adjusted utility betas. An ECAPM analysis flattens the security market line, and is 7 designed for raw beta estimates, not adjusted betas such as the ones published by Value 8 Line. Beta adjustments, on their own, accomplish virtually the same thing as an 9 ECAPM analysis. They flatten the security market line, and increase the intercept at 10 the risk-free rate. ECAPM analysis is not designed to be used with adjusted betas, but rather is designed to be used with unadjusted betas. Mr. McKenzie's proposal to use 11 12 adjusted betas within an ECAPM analysis is unreasonable and double counts the attempt 13 to flatten the security market line and increase CAPM return estimates for companies 14 with betas below 1, and decrease CAPM return estimates for companies with betas 15 greater than 1.

16

17

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS REGARDING THE ECAPM AND ADJUSTED BETAS?

18 A Yes. The notion that an adjustment to beta is only a horizontal axis adjustment is not 19 true. The *Value Line* beta adjustment alters the CAPM return at both the vertical axis 20 (the intercept point) and the horizontal axis, the slope of the CAPM return line (along 21 the horizontal axis). This is depicted in Figure 4 below.

1	As shown in Figure 4, I have modeled the expected returns at various levels of
2	raw beta using both the traditional CAPM and ECAPM methodologies assuming a
3	risk-free rate of 3.50%, and a market risk premium of 7.50%. I also show the expected
4	CAPM and ECAPM returns using the associated adjusted (Value Line) beta estimates
5	for each raw beta estimate. As shown in Figure 4 below, the impact on the traditional
6	CAPM return using a raw beta and a traditional CAPM using an adjusted beta has the
7	effect of increasing the intercept point at a zero raw beta (y axis) from: (1) risk-free rate
8	to (2) the combination of the risk-free rate plus 35% of the market risk premium.
9	Further, as the unadjusted beta is increased above zero, the adjusted beta increases the
10	CAPM return when the raw beta is less than one, and decreases the CAPM return when
11	the raw beta is greater than one. In other words, the beta adjustment raises the CAPM
12	return at the vertical axis point and flattens the security market across the horizontal axis
13	as the raw beta increases above zero.
14	The ECAPM using raw betas has the same impact on the traditional CAPM

The ECAPM using raw betas has the same impact on the traditional CAPM using an adjusted beta: the ECAPM increases the CAPM return at a zero raw beta from: (1) the risk-free rate, to (2) the risk-free rate plus 25% of the market risk premium. Further, the ECAPM using raw betas flattens the traditional CAPM return line across the horizontal axis as the raw betas increase above zero.





Assumptions: Market Risk Premium is 7.50% Risk-Free Rate is 3.50%

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As shown in the graph above, compared to the traditional CAPM using a raw beta, the traditional CAPM using an adjusted beta raises the intercept point (a y axis impact) and flattens the slope of the security market line (an x axis impact). Similarly, using a raw beta estimate, the ECAPM raises the intercept point at the y axis and flattens the CAPM return for all raw beta estimates.

⁶ Significantly, if an adjusted beta is used in an ECAPM return model, the CAPM 7 return at the y axis increases from: (1) the risk-free rate, up to (2) the risk-free rate plus 8 approximately 51% of the market risk premium. Further, the CAPM return for betas 9 less than one starts at an inflated y axis intercept point and increases as the raw beta 10 increases above zero.

1 Mathematically, *Value Line*'s beta adjustments produce nearly the same effect 2 on the estimated CAPM return as does an ECAPM using a raw beta. Using an adjusted 3 beta in an ECAPM model, as Mr. McKenzie has proposed, produces a flawed and 4 inflated CAPM return estimate.

5 V.F. Utility Risk Premium

6 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MR. MCKENZIE'S UTILITY EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 7 ANALYSIS.

A Mr. McKenzie's utility equity risk premium analysis is presented in his Exhibit No. 8.
As shown on page 3 of this exhibit, Mr. McKenzie measured the annual equity risk
premium over the period of 1974 through 2019 by subtracting the average utility bond
yield from the average electric authorized ROE. This produces an average equity risk
premium of 3.76%.

Mr. McKenzie then performs a regression analysis to measure the inverse relationship between interest rates and equity risk premiums. Using this regression analysis, Mr. McKenzie increases his equity risk premium from 3.76%, up to 5.9% and 5.43% based on current and projected utility bond yields, respectively.⁴¹ He then adds these adjusted equity risk premiums to the current and his projected Baa-rated utility bond yields of 3.37% and 4.79%, respectively. This method produces a ROE in the range of 9.27% to 10.22%.⁴²

⁴¹Exhibit No. 8, pages 1 and 2. ⁴²*Id*.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS WITH MR. MCKENZIE'S ELECTRIC UTILITY EQUITY RISK PREMIUM?

3 A Yes. My main concerns with his electric utility equity risk premium analysis are
4 two-fold. First, I disagree with his projected utility bond yield. Second, I disagree with
5 his reliance on a simple regression analysis to inflate the equity risk premium.

6 Q PLEASE COMMENT ON MR. MCKENZIE'S PROJECTED UTILITY BOND 7 YIELD OF 4.79%.

8 Mr. McKenzie uses a projected Aa-rated utility bond yield for the period 2021 through А 9 2025 of 4.12%. He then measures the current yield spread of Baa-utility bond yields 10 over Aa utility bond yields of 0.67%. He then adds this current yield spread 0.67% to the projected AA-utility bond yield of 4.12% to produce his projected yield of 4.79%. 11 12 This projected yield is based on stale data and irrational in today's market. Current 13 Baa-rated utility bond yields are approximately 3.13% as of the 13-week period ending January 22, 2021. Mr. McKenzie's projected increase of 166 basis points⁴³ in Baa-rated 14 15 utility bond yields is not reflective of current market conditions or near-term 16 expectations. A near-term forecasted spread of that magnitude is unreasonable and 17 should not be relied upon.

 $^{^{43}4.79\%}$ - 3.13% = 1.66% or 166 basis points.

Q WHY IS MR. MCKENZIE'S USE OF ONLY A SIMPLE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST RATES AND EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS UNREASONABLE?

A Mr. McKenzie's belief that there is a simple inverse relationship between equity risk
premiums and interest rates is unsupported by academic research. While academic
studies have shown that, in the past, there has been an inverse relationship with these
variables, researchers have found that the relationship changes over time and is
influenced by changes in perception of the risk of bond investments relative to equity
investments, and not simply changes to interest rates.⁴⁴

In the 1980s, equity risk premiums were inversely related to interest rates, but that was likely attributable to the interest rate volatility that existed at that time. Interest rate volatility currently is much lower than it was in the 1980s.⁴⁵ As such, when interest rates were more volatile, the relative perception of bond investment risk increased relative to the investment risk of equities. This changing investment risk perception caused changes in equity risk premiums.

In today's marketplace, interest rate variability is not as extreme as it was during the 1980s. Nevertheless, changes in the perceived risk of bond investments relative to equity investments still drive changes in equity premiums. However, a relative investment risk differential cannot be measured simply by observing nominal interest rates. Changes in nominal interest rates are highly influenced by changes to inflation

⁴⁴"The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts," Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *Journal of Applied Finance*, Volume 11, No. 1, 2001 and "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *Financial Management*, Spring 1985.

⁴⁵Duff & Phelps, 2016 SBBI Yearbook at 6-7 to 6-10.

1 outlooks, which also change equity return expectations. As such, the relevant factor needed to explain changes in equity risk premiums is the relative changes to the risk of 2 3 equity versus debt securities investments, not simply changes to interest rates.

4 Importantly, while Mr. McKenzie acknowledges the existence of potential risk 5 differentials, his analysis ignores them. Later, he actually opts to ignore them by not 6 considering the authorized ROE during 2020. Further, He bases his adjustment to the 7 equity risk premium exclusively on changes in nominal interest rates. This is a flawed 8 methodology and does not produce accurate or reliable risk premium ROE estimates. 9 The Commission should reject Mr. McKenzie's flawed results.

10

Q CAN MR. MCKENZIE'S RISK PREMIUM ANALYSES BE CORRECTED TO 11 **PRODUCE MORE REASONABLE RESULTS?**

12 А Yes. As I explain above, I generally disagree with Mr. McKenzie's use of a simple 13 linear regression analysis to estimate the risk premium, however, his analysis, when 14 coupled with his current yields, produces a risk premium result of 9.27% which 15 consistent with my recommendations. When updating his current Baa-rated yields with 16 more recent yields of 3.13% would produce a result near the bottom of my 17 recommended range. For the reasons described above, the Commission should reject 18 his long-term projected Baa-rated utility bond yield of 4.79% and the Risk Premium 19 results derived from it.

1 V.G. Expected Earnings

2 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MR. MCKENZIE'S EXPECTED EARNINGS ANALYSIS.

A As shown on his Exhibit No. 9, Mr. McKenzie's expected earnings analysis is based on
 Value Line's projected earned return on book equities for his proxy group, adjusted to
 reflect average year equity returns. Based on a review of projected earnings over the
 next three to five years, Mr. McKenzie estimates an average ROE 10.4%.

7 Q

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ESTIMATING A FAIR ROE FOR THE COMPANIES?

IS THE EXPECTED EARNINGS ANALYSIS A REASONABLE METHOD FOR

9 A No. An expected earnings analysis does not measure the return an investor requires in
10 order to make an investment. In other words, the accounting measure of the earned
11 ROE does not measure the opportunity cost of capital. Rather, it measures the earned
12 return on book equity that companies have experienced in the past or are projected to
13 achieve in the future. The returns investors require in order to assume the risk of an
14 investment are measured from prevailing stock market prices.
15 In addition, the FERC has recently found that the Expected Earnings model does

16 not satisfy the requirements of *Hope*. In part, the FERC states as follows:

17As a result, the expected return on a utility's book value does not reflect18"returns on investments in other enterprises" because book value does19not reflect the value of any investment that is available to an investor in20the market, outside of the unlikely situation in which market value and21book value are exactly equal. Accordingly, we find that relying on the22Expected Earnings model would not satisfy the requirements of Hope.

23The return on book value is also not indicative of what return an investor24requires to invest in the utility's equity or what return an investor25receives on the equity investment, because those returns are determined

1 2	with respect to the current market price that an investor must pay in order to invest in the equity. ⁴⁶
3	Later in the same Opinion, FERC observes that Expected Earnings model does
4	not identify investments of comparable risk. It states as follows:
5	Moreover, we find that the record demonstrates that the
6	Expected Earnings model does not identify investments of comparable
7	risk and which alternatives will have a higher expected return as MISO
8	TOs' witness Mr. McKenzie indicates. ^[footnote omitted] In particular.
9	because the Expected Earnings model measures returns on book value.
10	without consideration of what market price an investor would have to
11	pay to invest in the relevant company it does not accurately measure
12	the investor's expected returns on its investment ⁴⁷
12	the investor's expected returns on its investment.
13	Additionally, the historical and projected earned ROE for these holding
14	companies can be significantly influenced by the financial performance of nonregulated
15	operations. For these reasons, Mr. McKenzie's expected earnings analysis should be
16	disregarded.

17 V.H. Non-Utility DCF

18 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS IN REGARDS TO MR. 19 MCKENZIE'S RETURN ESTIMATES?

A Yes. Mr. McKenzie also performed a DCF model on a non-utility proxy group, which
he found to be a reasonable risk proxy for the Companies. The DCF results of his nonutility group range are presented on Exhibit No. 11. The average adjusted DCF results
fall within the range of 9.6% to 10.3%. While Mr. McKenzie did not rely on the results
of his non-utility DCF analysis in arriving at his recommended range of

⁴⁶ Opinion No. 569, 169 FERC ¶ 61,129 at P. 201-202.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at P. 205.

1	reasonableness, ⁴⁸ he did opine that the analysis is relevant in evaluating a fair ROE for
2	the Companies. ⁴⁹ I disagree with his assessment. However, because Mr. McKenzie did
3	not rely on these results in developing his inflated recommendation, I will not comment
4	on his non-utility analysis any further.

5 V.I. Flotation Cost Adjustment

6 Q DID MR. MCKENZIE INCLUDE A FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT IN HIS 7 RECOMMENDED RETURN FOR THE COMPANIES?

8 A Yes. Mr. McKenzie included an upward adjustment of 10 basis points to compensate 9 for flotation costs to his return on equity recommendation.⁵⁰ He acknowledges there is 10 no standard method for reflecting flotation costs in return on equity methodology,⁵¹ and 11 he further acknowledges the Commission's reluctance to approve a flotation cost 12 adjustment.⁵²

Mr. McKenzie states that "[t]he most common method used to account for flotation costs in regulatory proceedings is to apply an average flotation-cost percentage to a utility's dividend yield.⁵³ As shown on his Exhibit No. 10, he calculates the average flotation cost percentage of the most recent share issuances by the electric and gas utility industries as categorized by *Value Line*. He calculates the average flotation cost percentages for the electric utility industry as 2.779%. Similarly, he calculates the gas

⁴⁸McKenzie Direct at 72-73.
⁴⁹Id.
⁵⁰ Id. at 7.
⁵¹Id. at 67-68.
⁵² Id. at 68.
⁵³ Id. at 72.

1	utility industry average flotation cost percentage as 3.140%. He calculates an average
2	flotation cost of the aggregate for both industries to be 2.853%. He then applies the
3	average flotation cost adjustment of 2.85% to his proxy group's average dividend yield
4	of 4.00%. This method produces a flotation cost adjustment of 10 basis points for his
5	proxy group.

6 Q MR. MCKENZIE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE COMMISSION HAS 7 HISTORICALLY NOT AWARDED FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENTS TO 8 THE ROE. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY RECENT DECISIONS ISSUED BY 9 THIS COMMISSION THAT CONTINUE TO REJECT THE ALLOWANCE OF 10 A FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT TO THE ROE?

11 A Yes. In Case no. 2019-00271, this Commission stated as follows:

12In regards to flotation costs, the Commission has historically rejected,13and continues to reject, the notion that flotation costs should be included14in ROE estimates and notes removal of just the flotation costs will lower15Dr. Morin"s recommended ROE from 9.7 percent to 9.5 percent.

16 Q IS MR. MCKENZIE'S FLOTATION COST RETURN ON EQUITY ADDER

17 **REASONABLE?**

18 A No. Mr. McKenzie's flotation cost return on equity adder is not reasonable or justified 19 for several reasons. First, the adder is not based on the recovery of prudent and 20 verifiable actual flotation costs incurred by the Companies. As discussed at page 71 of

21 Mr. McKenzie's direct testimony, he derives a flotation cost adder based on cost

⁵⁴Case No. 2019-00271, Kentucky Public Service Commission in the matter of Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc., *Order*, April 27, 2020 at pg. 46.

information of other publicly traded utility holding companies. Because he does not
show that his adjustment is based on the Companies' actual and verifiable flotation
expenses, there are no means of verifying whether Mr. McKenzie's proposal is
reasonable or appropriate. Stated differently, Mr. McKenzie's flotation cost return on
equity adder is not based on known and measurable costs. Therefore, the Commission
should reject a flotation cost return on equity adder for the Companies.

7 V.J. Additional Comments

8 Q MR. MCKENZIE RELIED, IN PART, ON THE SIGNIFICANT RISE IN THE 9 CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE VOLATILITY INDEX ("VIX") 10 DURING THE PERIOD OF FEBRUARY AND MARCH 2020 AS SUPPORT 11 FOR HIS ASSERTION THAT INVESTORS HAVE DRAMATICALLY 12 REVISED THEIR RISK PERCEPTIONS. PLEASE RESPOND.

13 А Mr. McKenzie observes that between February 19 and March 23, 2020, the VIX rose to 14 levels not seen since the 2008-2009 financial crisis. As he stated, the VIX is a measure 15 of "near-term volatility" expectations. The VIX is calculated based on prices of out-of-16 the-money call and put options for the S&P 500 and is an estimate of the expected 17 volatility in the overall market for approximately the next 30 days at any given time. 18 Mr. McKenzie's reliance on the VIX to support his assertion with regard to investors' 19 risk should be disregarded when assessing a fair ROE for the Companies for at least two 20 reasons.

First, as discussed above, the VIX is a measure of expected volatility in the S&P
500 for approximately the next 30 days at any point in time. Establishing a rate of return

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1that can be expected to last several months, if not years, based on the levels of something2that represents such a short-term outlook does not make sense and should not be3implemented now. If Mr. McKenzie believes that the sharp increase in the VIX levels4experienced in early 2020 are somehow relevant to today's cost of equity, then he cannot5ignore the subsequent and immediate falls in expected volatility. In other words, spikes6in expected short-term volatility are short-lived and should not be relied on in assessing7the long-term cost of capital.

8 Second, the paradigm appears to be shifting as the world transitions toward 9 normalcy given the massive vaccine rollouts are approved and implemented. In fact, 10 the United States is expected to have enough vaccines for every adult citizen by May. 11 It is reasonable to expect a recovery in many sectors throughout our economy, especially 12 those that were most harshly hit during pandemic. Such a recovery would likely quell 13 investor fears as it relates to COVID-19 and its going-forward impact on the market.

14 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS REGARDING MR. 15 MCKENZIE'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A Yes. In its Order in Case No. 2020-00174, which was issued on January 13, 2021, this
Commission awarded Kentucky Power Company an ROE of 9.30%. In its Order, the
Commission states as follows:

19Balancing the needs of Kentucky Power and its customers, and20reviewing the record in its entirety in this proceeding, the Commission21finds that an ROE of 9.3 percent is fair, just and reasonable. The22approved ROE falls within the top range of the Attorney

1	Generals/KIUC's recommended range and although is not in Mr.
2	McKenzie's recommended range it does fall within his models. ⁵⁵
3	An important takeaway from the quote above is that this Commission
4	determined that a fair ROE fell below the low-end of Mr. McKenzie's recommended
5	range just less than two months ago. Notably, the Commission's ROE in the above-
6	mentioned Kentucky Power case is consistent with my recommendation in this case,
7	9.30%.

8

VI. CONCLUSION

9 Q WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE ROE 10 FOR THE COMPANIES BASED ON YOUR ANALYSIS?

11 A My analysis supports a reasonable range of the Companies' current cost of equity to be 12 from 9.0% to 9.6%, with an unbiased midpoint estimate of 9.3%. Further, the 13 Commission should reject Mr. McKenzie's recommended cost of common equity for 14 the reasons outlined above.

15 Q DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

16 A Yes, it does.

⁵⁵ Case No. 2020-00174, Kentucky Public Service Commission in the matter of Kentucky Power Company, *Order*, January 13, 2021 at pg. 50.

Appendix A Christopher C. Walters Page 1

Qualifications of Christopher C. Walters

1 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A Christopher C. Walters. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,
 Chesterfield, MO 63017.

4 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION.

- 5 A I am an Associate with the firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy,
- 6 economic and regulatory consultants in the field of public utility regulation.

7 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND 8 PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE.

- 9 A I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Economics and Finance from
 10 Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. I have also received a Master of Business
 11 Administration Degree from Lindenwood University.
- 12 As an Associate at BAI, I perform detailed technical analyses and research to 13 support regulatory projects including expert testimony covering various regulatory 14 issues. Since my career at BAI began in 2011, I have held the positions of Analyst, 15 Associate Consultant, Consultant, Senior Consultant, and Associate. Throughout my 16 tenure, I have been involved with several regulated projects for electric, natural gas and 17 water and wastewater utilities, as well as competitive procurement of electric power and 18 gas supply. My regulatory project work includes estimating the cost of equity capital, 19 capital structure evaluations, assessing financial integrity, merger and acquisition

BRUBAKER & ASSOCIATES, INC.

1 related issues, risk management related issues, depreciation rate studies, and other 2 revenue requirement issues. 3 BAI was formed in April 1995. BAI and its predecessor firm have participated 4 in more than 700 regulatory proceedings in 40 states and Canada. 5 BAI provides consulting services in the economic, technical, accounting, and 6 financial aspects of public utility rates and in the acquisition of utility and energy 7 services through RFPs and negotiations, in both regulated and unregulated markets. Our 8 clients include large industrial and institutional customers, some utilities and, on 9 occasion, state regulatory agencies. We also prepare special studies and reports, 10 forecasts, surveys and siting studies, and present seminars on utility-related issues. 11 In general, we are engaged in energy and regulatory consulting, economic 12 analysis and contract negotiation. In addition to our main office in St. Louis, the firm 13 also has branch offices in Phoenix, Arizona and Corpus Christi, Texas.

14 Q HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE A REGULATORY BODY?

15 A Yes. I have sponsored testimony before state regulatory commissions including:
16 Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
17 Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
18 Utah, and Wyoming. In addition, I have also sponsored testimony before the City
19 Council of New Orleans and an affidavit before the FERC.

1	Q	PLEASE	DESCRIBE	ANY	PROFESSIONAL	REGISTRATIONS	OR
2		ORGANIZ	ZATIONS TO	WHICH	YOU BELONG.		

A I earned the Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") designation from the CFA Institute.
The CFA charter was awarded after successfully completing three examinations which
covered the subject areas of financial accounting and reporting analysis, corporate
finance, economics, fixed income and equity valuation, derivatives, alternative
investments, risk management, and professional and ethical conduct. I am a member of
the CFA Institute and the CFA Society of St. Louis.

408180

Rate of Return

Rate of Return (June 30, 2022)

Louisville Gas and Electric Company

<u>Line</u>	Description	<u>Weight</u> (1)	<u>Cost</u> (2)	Weighted <u>Cost</u> (3)
1	Long-Term Debt	45.34%	4.04%	1.83%
2	Common Equity	53.13%	9.30%	4.94%
3	Short-Term Debt	1.53%	0.46%	0.01%
4	Total	100.00%		6.78%

Kentucky Utilities Company

5	Long-Term Debt	44.41%	4.16%	1.85%
6	Common Equity	53.14%	9.30%	4.94%
7	Short-Term Debt	2.46%	0.46%	0.01%
8	Total	100.00%		6.80%

Sources:

Kentucky Utilities Company Schedule J-1 and Louisville Gas and Electric Company Schedule J-1.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

										Price	to Earning	gs (P/E) Ra	tio ¹								
		18-Year																			
Line	<u>Company</u>	Average	2020 ²	2019 ³	<u>2018</u>	2017	<u>2016</u>	2015	<u>2014</u>	<u>2013</u>	2012	<u>2011</u>	<u>2010</u>	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004	2003	2002
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
1	ALLETE	17.76	16.40	24.70	17.23	23.05	18.63	15.06	17.23	18.59	15.88	14.66	15.98	16.08	13.95	14.78	16.55	17.91	25.21	N/A	N/A
2	Alliant Energy	16.47	22.50	21.20	16.60	20.60	22.30	18.07	16.60	15.28	14.50	14.45	12.47	13.86	13.43	15.08	16.82	12.59	14.00	12.69	19.93
3	Ameren Corp.	16.25	22.70	22.10	16.71	20.60	18.29	17.55	16.71	16.52	13.35	11.93	9.66	9.26	14.21	17.45	19.39	16.72	16.28	13.51	15.78
4	American Electric Power	14.61	18.90	21.40	15.88	19.33	15.16	15.77	15.88	14.49	13.77	11.92	13.42	10.03	13.06	16.27	12.91	13.70	12.42	10.66	12.68
5	Avangrid, Inc.	27.38	27.30	20.90	N/A	27.27	20.49	40.94	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	17.99	21.70	15.30	17.28	23.37	18.80	17.60	17.28	14.64	19.30	14.08	12.74	11.42	14.97	30.88	15.39	19.45	24.43	13.84	19.27
7	Black Hills	17.96	17.40	21.70	19.03	19.48	22.29	16.14	19.03	18.24	17.13	31.13	18.10	9.93	N/A	15.02	15.77	17.27	17.13	15.95	12.52
8	CenterPoint Energy	15.15	17.70	19.50	16.96	17.91	21.91	18.10	16.96	18.75	14.85	14.58	13.78	11.81	11.27	15.00	10.27	19.06	17.84	6.05	5.59
9	CMS Energy Corp.	17.50	22.20	24.30	17.30	21.32	20.94	18.29	17.30	16.32	15.07	13.62	12.46	13.56	10.87	26.84	22.18	12.60	12.39	N/A	N/A
10	Consol. Edison	15.78	18.60	21.80	15.90	19.77	18.80	15.59	15.90	14.72	15.39	15.08	13.30	12.55	12.29	13.78	15.49	15.13	18.21	14.30	13.28
11	Dominion Resources	18.69	24.70	NMF	22.97	22.17	21.33	22.14	22.97	19.25	18.91	17.27	14.35	12.74	13.78	20.63	15.98	24.89	15.07	15.24	12.05
12	DTE Energy	15.65	17.60	19.90	14.91	18.59	18.97	18.11	14.91	17.92	14.89	13.51	12.27	10.41	14.81	18.27	17.43	13.80	16.04	13.69	11.28
13	Duke Energy	17.07	17.90	17.80	17.91	19.93	21.25	18.22	17.91	17.45	17.46	13.76	12.69	13.32	17.28	16.13	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
14	Edison Int'l	13.89	NMF	14.30	13.05	17.23	17.92	14.77	13.05	12.70	9.71	11.81	10.32	9.72	12.36	16.03	12.99	11.74	37.59	6.97	7.78
15	El Paso Electric	18.26	33.70	23.20	16.38	21.78	18.66	18.33	16.38	15.88	14.47	12.60	10.72	10.79	11.89	15.26	16.92	26.72	22.03	18.26	22.99
16	Entergy Corp.	13.84	18.40	16.50	12.89	15.01	10.92	12.53	12.89	13.21	11.22	9.06	11.57	11.98	16.56	19.30	14.28	16.28	15.09	13.77	11.53
17	Eversource Energy	18.17	24.00	22.10	17.92	19.47	18.69	18.11	17.92	16.94	19.86	15.35	13.42	11.96	13.66	18.75	27.07	19.76	20.77	13.35	16.07
18	Everay, Inc.	20.60	19.40	21.80	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	14.51	13.60	15.80	16.02	13.41	18.68	12.58	16.02	13.43	19.08	11.30	10.97	11.49	17.97	18.22	16.53	15.37	12.99	11.77	10.46
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	18.51	11.80	23.60	39.79	11.41	15.91	17.02	39.79	13.06	21.10	22.39	11.75	13.02	15.64	15.59	14.23	16.07	14.13	22.47	12.95
21	Fortis Inc.	19.62	20.30	19.20	24.29	16.81	21.60	18.00	24.29	19.97	20.12	18.79	18.22	16.36	17.48	21.14	17.68	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
22	Great Plains Energy	15.58	N/A	N/A	16.47	NMF	17.98	19.37	16.47	14.19	15.53	16.11	12.10	16.03	20.55	16.35	18.30	13.96	12.59	12.23	11.09
23	Hawaiian Elec.	18.29	21.60	22.30	15.88	20.69	13.56	20.40	15.88	16.21	15.81	17.09	18.59	19.79	23.16	21.57	20.33	18.27	19.18	13.76	13.47
24	IDACORP. Inc.	16.44	20.00	23.00	14.67	20.60	19.06	16.22	14.67	13.45	12.41	11.54	11.83	10.20	13.93	18.19	15.07	16.70	15.49	26.51	18.88
25	MGE Energy	19.07	25.90	28.40	17.19	29.36	24.90	20.28	17.19	17.01	17.23	15.82	14.98	15.14	14.22	15.01	15.88	22.40	17.98	17.55	15.96
26	NextEra Energy, Inc.	17.38	32.80	26.80	17.25	21.65	20.71	16.89	17.25	16.57	14.43	11.54	10.83	13.42	14.48	18.90	13.65	17.88	13.65	17.88	13.60
27	NorthWestern Corp	17.05	18.90	19.80	16.24	17.85	17.19	18.36	16.24	16.86	15.72	12.62	12.90	11.54	13.87	21.74	25.95	17.09	N/A	N/A	N/A
28	OGE Energy	15.32	15.70	19.00	18.27	18.32	17.68	17.69	18.27	17.69	15.16	14.37	13.31	10.83	12.41	13.75	13.68	14.95	14.13	11.84	14.12
29	Otter Tail Corp.	23.56	16.40	23.50	18.84	22.06	20.19	18.20	18.84	21.12	21.75	47.48	55.10	31.16	30.06	19.02	17.35	15.40	17.34	17.77	16.01
30	PG&E Corp.	16.68	N/A	N/A	15.00	18.28	21.13	26.40	15.00	23.67	20.70	15.46	15.80	13.01	12.08	16.85	14.84	15.37	13.81	9.50	N/A
31	Pinnacle West Capital	15.84	16.00	20.50	15.89	19.28	18.74	16.04	15.89	15.27	14.35	14.60	12.57	13.74	16.07	14.93	13.69	19.24	15.80	13.96	14.43
32	PNM Resources	18.21	20.30	21.80	18.68	20.43	19.83	16.85	18.68	16.13	14.97	14.53	14.05	18.09	N/A	35.65	15.57	17.38	15.02	14.73	15.08
33	Portland General	17.33	29.40	21.90	15.32	20.03	19.06	17.71	15.32	16.88	13.98	12.37	12.00	14.40	16.30	11.94	23.35	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
34	PPL Corp.	14.08	11.80	13.10	14.08	17.65	12.83	13.92	14.08	12.84	10.88	10.52	11.93	25.69	17.64	17.26	14.10	15.12	12.51	10.59	11.06
35	Public Serv, Enterprise	13.58	16.10	15.90	12.61	16.31	15.35	12.41	12.61	13.50	12.79	10.40	10.37	10.04	13.65	16.54	17.81	16.74	14.26	10.58	10.00
36	SCANA Corp.	13.94	N/A	N/A	13.68	14.46	16.80	14.67	13.68	14.43	14.80	13.67	12.93	11.63	12.67	14.96	15.42	14.44	13.57	13.05	12.17
37	Sempra Energy	15.69	19.00	23.00	21.87	24.33	24.37	19.73	21.87	19.68	14.89	11.77	12.60	10.09	11.80	14.01	11.50	11.79	8.65	8.96	8.19
38	Southern Co.	15.97	18.50	18.00	16.04	15.48	17.76	15.85	16.04	16.19	16.97	15.85	14.90	13.52	16.13	15.95	16.19	15.92	14.68	14.83	14.63
39	Vectren Corp.	17.22	N/A	N/A	19.98	23.54	19.18	17.92	19.98	20.66	15.02	15.83	15.10	12.89	16.79	15.33	18.92	15.11	17.57	14.80	14.16
40	WEC Energy Group	16.88	24.60	23.50	17.71	20.01	19.95	21.33	17.71	16.50	15.76	14.25	14.01	13.35	14.77	16.47	15.97	14.46	17.51	12.43	10.46
41	Westar Energy	15.56	N/A	N/A	15.36	23.40	21.59	18.45	15.36	14.04	13.43	14.78	12.96	14.95	16.96	14.10	12.18	14.79	17.44	10.78	14.02
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	17.37	23.80	22.70	15.44	20.20	18.48	16.54	15.44	15.04	14.82	14.24	14.13	12.66	13.69	16.65	14.80	15.36	13.65	11.62	40.80
43	Average	16.77	20.49	20.84	17.39	19.81	18.97	18.00	17.39	16.38	15.69	15.30	14.28	13.56	15.18	17.74	16.47	16.52	16.57	13.70	14.31
44	Median	16.14	19.20	21.75	16.54	19.97	18.80	17.71	16.54	16.27	15.04	14.31	12.91	12.82	14.21	16.41	15.88	15.92	15.29	13.60	13.47

Sources:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 25, 2019.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, and December 11, 2020 and January 22, 2021.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, January 24, February 14, and March 13, 2020.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

										Market Price	e to Cash	Flow (MP/	CF) Ratio ¹								
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	19-Year <u>Average</u> (1)	<u>2020 ^{2/a}</u> (2)	<u>2019 ^{3/a}</u> (3)	<u>2018</u> (4)	<u>2017</u> (5)	<u>2016</u> (6)	<u>2015</u> (7)	<u>2014</u> (8)	<u>2013</u> (9)	<u>2012</u> (10)	<u>2011</u> (11)	<u>2010</u> (12)	<u>2009</u> (13)	<u>2008</u> (14)	<u>2007</u> (15)	<u>2006</u> (16)	<u>2005</u> (17)	<u>2004</u> (18)	<u>2003</u> (19)	<u>2002</u> (20)
1	ALLETE	9.49	9.17	11.13	10.16	10.95	8.26	7.49	8.80	9.15	8.18	7.91	8.04	8.51	9.29	10.30	11.06	11.54	11.46	N/A	N/A
2	Alliant Energy	7.93	10.32	10.48	9.71	13.21	10.67	8.86	8.40	7.52	7.50	7.21	6.59	6.23	7.49	7.92	8.00	5.09	5.52	4.76	5.20
3	Ameren Corp.	7.13	8.98	9.20	7.95	8.38	7.44	6.87	6.95	6.61	5.48	5.02	4.23	4.25	6.35	7.69	8.57	8.57	8.24	6.74	7.96
4	American Electric Power	6.53	8.72	9.01	8.03	8.81	7.57	7.09	7.00	6.57	5.93	5.46	5.54	4.71	5.71	6.84	5.54	6.07	5.50	4.69	5.19
5	Avangrid, Inc.	9.74	9.01	9.20	10.24	10.14	8.56	11.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	6.83	8.34	7.50	10.14	9.35	7.63	6.76	7.30	6.21	6.88	6.40	5.80	4.06	5.12	7.58	5.30	6.58	7.58	5.36	5.90
7	Black Hills	7.85	9.26	10.42	8.83	9.20	9.33	8.06	8.81	8.03	6.04	7.85	6.16	4.25	11.26	7.62	6.92	7.57	6.69	6.89	5.92
8	CenterPoint Energy	5.17	5.59	6.76	8.45	6.97	5.96	5.75	6.25	6.56	5.15	5.39	4.70	4.05	4.29	5.17	3.94	4.70	4.26	2.08	2.16
9	CMS Energy Corp.	6.05	9.14	9.62	8.40	8.75	8.50	7.53	7.13	6.68	6.03	5.41	4.48	3.64	3.45	5.57	4.40	4.04	3.20	2.88	NMF
10	Consol, Edison	8.28	8.31	9.78	8.73	9.64	9.39	7.96	7.89	7.77	8.31	8.15	7.39	6.72	6.89	8.31	8.65	8.59	9.31	7.90	7.64
11	Dominion Resources	9.66	10.85	12.82	10.94	11.35	11.59	11.84	12.27	10.88	9.92	9.45	8.12	6.98	8.27	8.65	7.81	10.09	7.68	7.51	6.53
12	DTE Energy	6.42	7.18	9.32	8.54	9.05	8.64	8.52	6.42	6.65	5.91	5.18	4.69	3.59	4.90	5.73	5.21	5.54	6.00	5.62	5.20
13	Duke Energy	7.54	6.80	7.62	7.65	8.40	8.57	7.95	8.12	8.11	9.53	6.56	6.01	5.96	7.13	7.16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
14	Edison Int'l	5.95	7.70	7.42	13.46	7.05	6.77	5.92	5.68	5.46	4.59	4.22	4.11	3.95	5.63	7.01	5.87	5.61	6.84	2.82	2.96
15	El Paso Electric	6.38	11.07	9.20	9.43	8 54	7 46	6.47	6.33	6 19	5.78	5 16	4 31	3.98	4 95	6 44	6.25	6.67	4 65	3.90	4.39
16	Entergy Corp.	5.75	6.16	5.97	4.92	4.66	4.01	4.11	4.21	4.03	4.23	3.90	4.66	5.68	7.96	9.21	7.16	8.76	7.12	6.84	5.57
17	Eversource Energy	7 12	11.69	10.47	9 16	10.36	10.14	10.12	10.14	8.08	9.30	6.99	4 97	4 61	4 12	6.18	6.02	3 55	3 78	2.85	2 75
18	Everay Inc	8 53	8 53	8 52	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A						
19	Evelon Corp	6.00	4 4 1	5.26	5.05	4 45	4 80	4 70	5.09	4.61	5 54	5.86	5 10	5.98	9.65	9.89	8.62	7 97	6.29	5 71	4.97
20	EirstEnergy Corp	6.83	11.27	10.41	8.84	4.76	5.12	5 38	7 43	6.15	7 4 2	7 33	1 19	4 91	7.58	7 89	7.53	6.04	5.15	6.90	5 10
21	Fortis Inc	8 31	9.01	9.27	7 97	8.23	10.46	7 29	9.25	7 93	8.09	8 38	7.40	6.76	7.50	9.18	7.33	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
22	Great Plains Energy	6.89	N/A	N/A	N/A	14.62	8.63	6.66	6.45	5 73	6.09	5 74	1 49	5.06	7.00	7 13	7.68	6.70	6.52	5.92	5 14
22	Howaiian Eleo	0.03	0.79	0.51	0.24	0.21	7.44	0.00	7.64	9.15	9.05	7.72	7.43	6.05	0.10	7.15	9.47	0.70	9.44	6.12	6.20
23		0.13	9.70	12 70	11 72	11 56	10.05	9.23	9.50	7 79	7.05	6.64	6.52	5.21	9.10 7.10	7.55	7 72	7.55	7 15	7.07	7.52
24	MGE Eporav	11.46	12.00	12.79	15.04	17.00	15.66	10.57	11 42	11.20	10.77	0.04	0.52	0.01	7.10	0.23	0.20	11 72	11.04	10.20	7.55
25	NeutEre Energy	10.20	13.00	10.04	10.77	17.33	15.00	7.03	7.00	7.60	7.50	9.40	9.05	6.40	0.42	9.23	9.30	6.71	6.71	10.20	6.09
20	NextEra Eriergy, Inc.	7 70	0.04	12.20	0.10	11.01	9.24	7.93	7.90	7.60	7.30	5.96	5.33	0.09 E 0E	7.34	9.02	0.01	7.01	0.71	5.97 NI/A	5.77
27	Northwestern Corp	7.79	9.24	9.44	0.19	0.02	0.00	0.99	9.01	7.61	0.00	5.69	5.79	5.05	5.57	0.40	9.39	7.31	0.13	N/A	N/A
28	OGE Energy	7.94	8.57	10.42	9.36	10.52	9.03	9.25	10.65	9.93	7.35	7.48	0.01	5.37	6.43	7.58	7.50	7.04	6.73	5.62	5.39
29	Dear Corp.	9.40	10.34	12.00	11.56	7.09	9.30	9.04	9.45	9.56	0.43	9.04	6.07	0.01	11.65	9.53	0.00	0.10	9.01	0.13	0.33
30	PG&E Corp.	5.55	N/A	N/A	- 5.65	7.09	7.26	7.24	5.65	6.84	5.86	5.32	5.42	4.71	4.61	5.84	5.28	5.07	5.13	4.05	14.69
31	Pinnacie West Capital	6.22	7.11	8.21	7.09	8.73	7.89	6.91	7.03	6.85	6.34	5.80	5.65	3.84	4.19	4.76	4.48	7.48	5.88	4.80	5.21
32	PINM Resources	6.83	7.36	7.99	7.57	7.40	7.64	6.95	7.48	6.47	5.80	4.94	4.58	4.53	7.10	10.67	7.50	7.62	6.84	5.55	5.72
33	Portland General	5.93	7.61	7.31	6.56	7.45	7.12	6.73	5.49	6.06	5.08	4.86	4.13	4.63	4.81	5.34	5.74	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
34	PPL Corp.	7.44	6.61	8.11	7.02	10.11	8.37	8.73	7.32	6.59	5.87	5.98	7.46	8.82	9.17	8.90	7.58	7.57	6.49	5.41	5.30
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	7.51	7.63	8.63	9.48	8.67	8.56	6.66	6.48	6.40	6.40	6.03	6.04	6.20	8.46	9.83	8.41	8.59	7.17	6.79	6.24
36	SCANA Corp.	7.09	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.26	9.59	8.33	7.50	7.49	7.40	6.75	6.52	5.88	6.38	7.15	7.03	5.40	6.86	6.59	6.36
37	Sempra Energy	8.07	9.96	11.69	10.10	10.65	10.88	9.99	10.77	9.37	7.26	6.13	6.53	6.07	7.07	8.61	7.22	6.96	5.16	4.85	4.00
38	Southern Co.	8.16	8.20	8.54	7.05	7.49	8.83	8.23	8.42	8.30	8.75	8.22	7.79	7.08	8.18	8.62	8.47	8.41	8.28	8.28	7.83
39	Vectren Corp.	7.08	N/A	N/A	N/A	10.32	8.60	7.82	7.57	6.82	5.79	5.81	5.58	5.24	6.90	6.53	7.37	7.06	7.63	7.27	6.92
40	WEC Energy Group	8.86	12.96	12.66	10.82	11.04	10.95	12.90	10.27	9.58	9.24	8.43	8.15	6.87	7.57	7.84	7.27	6.40	6.27	4.91	4.27
41	Westar Energy	6.91	N/A	N/A	N/A	10.87	10.86	9.05	7.93	7.23	6.71	6.67	5.51	5.32	7.09	6.88	5.81	7.00	6.54	4.24	2.94
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	6.76	9.32	9.18	7.90	8.50	8.10	7.62	7.31	7.00	6.85	6.47	6.28	5.43	5.71	6.51	5.54	5.62	5.31	4.27	5.46
43	Average	7.48	10.17	9.56	8.64	9.36	8.65	8.05	7.85	7.39	6.98	6.53	6.00	5.59	6.95	7.72	7.12	7.13	6.77	5.70	5.85
44	Median	7.29	9.01	9.27	8.73	9.05	8.57	7.93	7.54	7.12	6.85	6.27	5.80	5.35	7.09	7.76	7.37	7.04	6.71	5.62	5.52

Sources:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 25, 2019.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, and December 11, 2020 and January 22, 2021.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, January 24, February 14, and March 13, 2020.

Note:

^a Based on the average of the high and low price and the projected Cash Flow per share.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

Market Price to Book Value (MP/BV) Ratio ¹																		
		16-Year																
Line	Company	Average	2020 2/b	2019 3/b	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1	ALLETE	1.60	1.45	1.87	1.79	1.78	1.53	1.37	1.42	1.51	1.34	1.35	1.28	1.15	1.55	1.89	2.09	2.22
2	Alliant Energy	1.73	2.08	2.26	2.16	2.38	2.17	1.86	1.86	1.70	1.57	1.46	1.31	1.04	1.33	1.67	1.52	1.33
3	Ameren Corp.	1.49	2.05	2.20	1.95	1.93	1.67	1.46	1.45	1.29	1.18	0.90	0.83	0.78	1.25	1.60	1.62	1.68
4	American Electric Power	1.59	2.05	2.12	1.82	1.88	1.81	1.55	1.54	1.40	1.31	1.23	1.23	1.08	1.48	1.85	1.56	1.57
5	Avangrid, Inc.	0.91	0.94	1.01	1.02	0.93	0.83	0.72	N/A									
6	Avista Corp.	1.33	1.45	1.55	1.88	1.73	1.57	1.36	1.33	1.25	1.21	1.19	1.07	0.94	1.11	1.29	1.30	1.13
7	Black Hills	1.52	1.66	1.87	1.61	2.06	1.94	1.59	1.79	1.62	1.21	1.14	1.07	0.83	1.22	1.57	1.47	1.63
8	CenterPoint Energy	2.34	1.79	2.13	2.18	2.59	2.73	2.43	2.27	2.30	1.99	1.87	1.96	1.77	2.49	3.13	2.75	3.06
9	CMS Energy Corp.	2.08	2.97	3.20	2.81	2.93	2.72	2.43	2.26	2.09	1.91	1.66	1.48	1.10	1.23	1.82	1.42	1.32
10	Consol. Edison	1.41	1.41	1.57	1.49	1.63	1.58	1.42	1.34	1.38	1.47	1.38	1.22	1.08	1.17	1.47	1.47	1.52
11	Dominion Resources	2.61	2.45	2.19	2.40	2.94	3.15	3.34	3.55	2.97	2.84	2.37	2.01	1.80	2.42	2.69	2.07	2.50
12	DTE Energy	1.49	1.63	1.99	1.91	2.01	1.82	1.65	1.62	1.51	1.35	1.20	1.16	0.89	1.10	1.35	1.29	1.39
13	Duke Energy	1.21	1.34	1.46	1.33	1.41	1.35	1.29	1.28	1.19	1.12	1.11	1.00	0.91	1.06	1.15	N/A	N/A
14	Edison Int'l	1.67	1.67	1.71	1.97	2.17	1.92	1.76	1.68	1.57	1.53	1.24	1.07	1.04	1.56	2.05	1.80	1.93
15	El Paso Electric	1.63	2.09	2.06	1.94	1.87	1.68	1.48	1.52	1.49	1.59	1.64	1.17	0.98	1.33	1.69	1.71	1.76
16	Entergy Corp.	1.75	1.97	2.00	1.74	1.76	1.67	1.40	1.33	1.21	1.31	1.35	1.62	1.66	2.44	2.65	1.89	2.01
17	Eversource Energy	1.48	1.86	1.99	1.68	1.73	1.64	1.53	1.47	1.38	1.28	1.50	1.31	1.12	1.31	1.60	1.22	1.05
18	Evergy, Inc.	1.58	1.55	1.62	N/A													
19	Exelon Corp.	2.16	1.18	1.42	1.31	1.20	1.20	1.14	1.28	1.17	1.46	1.95	2.07	2.57	4.39	4.79	3.89	3.60
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	2.02	3.18	3.03	2.67	3.53	2.37	1.16	1.15	1.28	1.44	1.33	1.36	1.54	2.52	2.23	1.92	1.64
21	Fortis Inc.	1.46	1.33	1.38	1.24	1.41	1.26	1.33	1.35	1.45	1.59	1.59	1.56	1.33	1.48	1.63	1.96	N/A
22	Great Plains Energy	1.21	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.33	1.17	1.12	1.11	1.02	0.96	0.93	0.87	0.80	1.11	1.66	1.77	1.86
23	Hawaiian Elec.	1.67	2.01	2.02	1.76	1.76	1.63	1.71	1.49	1.54	1.62	1.54	1.44	1.16	1.61	1.57	2.01	1.78
24	IDACORP, Inc.	1.45	1.80	2.08	1.96	1.94	1.76	1.54	1.45	1.33	1.19	1.17	1.13	0.92	1.09	1.26	1.37	1.22
25	MGE Energy	2.10	2.40	2.79	2.59	2.88	2.60	2.10	2.10	2.06	1.92	1.75	1.65	1.54	1.62	1.75	1.83	2.09
26	NextEra Energy, Inc.	2.65	11.84	2.74	2.32	2.35	2.30	2.09	2.15	1.93	1.74	1.55	1.49	1.70	2.06	2.34	1.80	1.93
27	NorthWestern Corp	1.47	1.53	1.67	1.48	1.64	1.68	1.60	1.54	1.56	1.42	1.35	1.22	1.07	1.15	1.48	1.65	1.42
28	OGE Energy	1.85	1.91	2.03	1.75	1.82	1.73	1.79	2.22	2.24	1.94	1.90	1.70	1.37	1.52	1.98	1.91	1.80
29	Otter Tail Corp.	1.85	2.11	2.66	2.49	2.33	1.90	1.78	1.90	1.96	1.58	1.35	1.19	1.18	1.71	1.93	1.76	1.74
30	PG&E Corp.	1.60	N/A	N/A	1.70	1.71	1.69	1.57	1.39	1.38	1.41	1.46	1.56	1.41	1.50	1.94	1.83	1.84
31	Pinnacle West Capital	1.43	1.65	1.90	1.74	1.91	1.72	1.52	1.44	1.47	1.39	1.25	1.14	0.95	1.00	1.26	1.26	1.25
32	PNM Resources	1.28	1.75	2.23	1.83	1.84	1.56	1.33	1.21	1.09	0.98	0.80	0.69	0.56	0.66	1.23	1.21	1.45
33	Portland General	1.34	1.64	1.77	1.56	1.69	1.56	1.42	1.37	1.28	1.14	1.09	0.94	0.92	1.05	1.32	1.36	N/A
34	PPL Corp.	2.09	1.56	1.84	1.81	2.40	2.46	2.24	1.64	1.55	1.58	1.47	1.61	2.10	3.19	3.05	2.43	2.50
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	1.89	1.54	1.92	1.81	1.68	1.67	1.58	1.57	1.44	1.46	1.59	1.67	1.78	2.58	2.99	2.46	2.45
36	SCANA Corp.	1.51	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.65	1.74	1.47	1.48	1.48	1.48	1.36	1.33	1.20	1.45	1.62	1.64	1.72
37	Sempra Energy	1.80	1.73	2.13	2.06	2.24	2.00	2.17	2.20	1.84	1.53	1.28	1.35	1.32	1.60	1.87	1.70	1.73
38	Southern Co.	2.05	2.13	2.05	1.89	2.07	2.01	1.99	2.02	2.04	2.15	1.99	1.83	1.73	2.12	2.24	2.23	2.35
39	Vectren Corp.	1.83	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.75	2.29	2.11	2.08	1.82	1.57	1.53	1.41	1.34	1.64	1.74	1.77	1.82
40	WEC Energy Group	1.97	2.68	2.58	2.11	2.10	2.09	1.82	2.34	2.21	2.05	1.81	1.65	1.40	1.57	1.77	1.71	1.62
41	Westar Energy	1.37	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.94	1.95	1.49	1.44	1.33	1.26	1.20	1.10	0.93	1.10	1.36	1.30	1.41
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	1.63	2.26	2.26	1.97	2.06	1.88	1.66	1.55	1.50	1.51	1.41	1.32	1.19	1.30	1.53	1.40	1.38
	- 37																	
43	Average	1.72	2.13	2.03	1.88	2.00	1.85	1.67	1.68	1.60	1.51	1.43	1.35	1.25	1.63	1.90	1.78	1.80
44	Median	1.61	1.79	2.02	1.83	1.91	1.74	1.57	1.53	1.49	1.47	1.37	1.31	1.15	1.48	1.71	1.71	1.73

Sources:

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² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, and December 11, 2020 and January 22, 2021.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, January 24, February 14, and March 13, 2020.

Notes:

^b Based on the average of the high and low price and the projected Book Value per share.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		45 Maan							Dividen	d Yield							
Line	Company	Average (1)	2020 ^{2/a} (2)	2019 ^{3/a} (3)	<u>2018</u> (4)	<u>2017</u> (5)	<u>2016</u> (6)	<u>2015</u> (7)	<u>2014</u> (8)	<u>2013</u> (9)	<u>2012</u> (10)	<u>2011</u> (11)	<u>2010</u> (12)	<u>2009</u> (13)	<u>2008</u> (14)	<u>2007</u> (15)	<u>2006</u> (16)
1	ALLETE	3.93%	3.72%	2.92%	2.99%	2.97%	3.56%	3.97%	3.92%	3.89%	4.49%	4.58%	5.03%	5.79%	4.37%	3.60%	3.16%
2	Alliant Energy	3.71%	3.10%	2.95%	3.20%	3.07%	3.21%	3.60%	3.53%	3.74%	4.07%	4.28%	4.61%	5.73%	4.10%	3.13%	3.32%
3	Ameren Corp.	4.38%	2.73%	2.67%	3.04%	3.12%	3.50%	3.96%	4.02%	4.61%	4.97%	5.28%	5.76%	5.98%	6.21%	4.88%	4.93%
4	American Electric Power	4.04%	3.34%	3.22%	3.60%	3.42%	3.54%	3.80% N/A	3.83% N/A	4.23% N/Δ	4.58% N/Δ	4.96% N/A	4.90% N/Δ	5.5U% N/A	4.20% N/Δ	3.40% N/A	4.06% N/Δ
6	Avista Corp.	3.74%	3.81%	3.47%	2.93%	3.14%	3.39%	3.97%	3.99%	4.51%	4.55%	4.54%	4.76%	4.49%	3.39%	2.68%	2.52%
7	Black Hills	3.73%	3.21%	2.87%	3.31%	2.75%	2.87%	3.55%	2.84%	3.19%	4.39%	4.64%	4.79%	6.17%	4.21%	3.40%	3.79%
8	CenterPoint Energy	4.42%	3.79%	3.09%	4.09%	4.79%	4.70%	5.06%	3.94%	3.57%	4.04%	4.27%	5.29%	6.37%	4.98%	3.87%	4.39%
10	CMS Energy Corp.	3.24%	2.83%	2.70%	3.03%	2.88%	2.99%	3.36%	3.59%	3.76%	4.16%	4.25%	3.98%	3.97%	2.69%	1.16%	N/A 5.04%
11	Dominion Resources	4.08%	4.64%	4.85%	4.72%	3.88%	3.82%	3.66%	3.43%	3.78%	4.06%	4.13%	4.41%	5.20%	3.77%	3.32%	3.60%
12	DTE Energy	4.15%	3.98%	3.19%	3.34%	3.15%	3.34%	3.53%	3.54%	3.84%	4.19%	4.68%	4.75%	6.29%	5.24%	4.36%	4.86%
13	Duke Energy	4.73%	4.61%	4.17%	4.54%	4.15%	4.26%	4.34%	4.26%	4.45%	4.68%	5.21%	5.71%	6.25%	5.16%	4.44%	N/A
14	Edison Int'i	3.15%	4.21%	3.82%	3.84%	2.87%	2.81%	2.83%	2.62%	2.85%	2.97%	3.37%	3.66%	3.95%	2.69%	2.21% N/A	2.58%
16	Enteray Corp.	4.05%	3.55%	2.40%	4.41%	4.49%	4.55%	4.59%	4.47%	5.07%	4.91%	4.85%	4.20%	3.97%	2.92%	2.39%	2.82%
17	Eversource Energy	3.28%	2.84%	2.86%	3.32%	3.14%	3.22%	3.34%	3.40%	3.48%	3.52%	3.23%	3.64%	4.16%	3.25%	2.60%	3.27%
18	Evergy, Inc.	3.31%	3.46%	3.15%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	3.85%	3.83%	3.07%	3.32%	3.51%	3.75%	3.88%	3.69%	4.69%	5.73%	4.96%	4.95%	4.26%	2.78%	2.48%	2.83%
20	Fortis Inc.	4.32%	3.90%	3.69%	4.07%	3.69%	3.80%	4.23%	3.88%	3.84%	4.90%	3.58%	3.80%	4.21%	3.21%	3.01%	2 79%
22	Great Plains Energy	4.52%	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.58%	3.64%	3.76%	3.62%	3.84%	4.08%	4.15%	4.49%	5.03%	6.96%	5.49%	5.60%
23	Hawaiian Elec.	4.52%	3.03%	3.10%	3.54%	3.65%	3.99%	4.05%	4.76%	4.72%	4.70%	5.04%	5.51%	6.89%	5.00%	5.18%	4.59%
24	IDACORP, Inc.	3.20%	2.98%	2.52%	2.61%	2.58%	2.77%	3.06%	3.12%	3.21%	3.28%	3.10%	3.44%	4.46%	3.95%	3.55%	3.39%
25	NextEra Energy Inc.	2.93%	0.61%	2.01%	2.10%	2.79%	2.23%	2.76%	3.02%	3.30%	3.65%	3.96%	3.90%	4.30% N/A	4.24% N/A	4.14% N/A	4.23% N/A
27	NorthWestern Corp	4.07%	3.82%	3.43%	3.86%	3.52%	3.43%	3.61%	3.30%	3.66%	4.17%	4.51%	4.93%	5.75%	5.38%	4.09%	3.65%
28	OGE Energy	3.68%	4.55%	3.60%	3.98%	3.61%	3.87%	3.51%	2.63%	2.48%	2.94%	3.06%	3.68%	4.96%	4.52%	3.77%	3.99%
29	Otter Tail Corp.	4.10%	3.37%	2.70%	2.92%	3.12%	3.87%	4.33%	4.14%	4.11%	5.21%	5.57%	5.68%	5.38%	3.63%	3.46%	3.92%
30	Picke Corp. Pinnacle West Canital	3.70%	N/A 3.90%	3 35%	3.55%	2.42%	3.22%	3.45%	3.96%	3.98%	4.25%	4.24%	4.08%	4.26% 6.76%	6.17%	3.07% 4.75%	3.22%
32	PNM Resources	3.24%	3.00%	2.55%	2.79%	2.53%	2.69%	2.90%	2.79%	2.99%	2.96%	3.19%	4.09%	4.76%	4.85%	3.36%	3.21%
33	Portland General	3.67%	3.34%	2.97%	3.27%	2.92%	3.06%	3.27%	3.34%	3.67%	4.11%	4.37%	5.20%	5.36%	4.28%	3.34%	2.54%
34	PPL Corp.	4.54%	6.05%	5.15%	5.61%	4.24%	4.25%	4.55%	4.45%	4.81%	5.07%	5.10%	5.12%	4.51%	3.10%	2.69%	3.41%
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	3.82%	4.05% N/A	3.30% N/A	3.49% N/A	3.74%	3.78%	3.81%	3.92%	4.35%	4.55%	4.24%	4.30%	4.30%	3.26%	2.73%	3.47%
37	Sempra Energy	2.97%	3.35%	2.97%	3.20%	2.92%	2.92%	2.71%	2.61%	3.03%	3.71%	3.65%	3.08%	3.23%	2.62%	2.08%	2.47%
38	Southern Co.	4.70%	4.49%	4.57%	5.27%	4.63%	4.42%	4.78%	4.69%	4.61%	4.29%	4.63%	5.13%	5.52%	4.58%	4.39%	4.52%
39	Vectren Corp.	4.38%	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.79%	3.31%	3.60%	3.62%	4.15%	4.82%	5.06%	5.53%	5.85%	4.79%	4.53%	4.52%
40	WEC Energy Group	3.04%	2.85%	2.85%	3.38%	3.31%	3.35%	3.49%	3.40%	3.49%	3.24%	3.35%	2.97%	3.16%	2.41%	2.14%	2.18%
42	Xcel Energy	3.84%	2.80%	2.85%	3.25%	3.00%	3.33%	3.69%	3.83%	3.86%	4.57%	4.04%	4.54%	5.14%	4 70%	4.16%	4.20%
43 44	Average Median	3.87% 3.85%	3.51% 3.55%	3.23% 3.10%	3.56% 3.36%	3.34% 3.15%	3.49% 3.43%	3.71% 3.71%	3.66% 3.76%	3.87% 3.85%	4.18% 4.18%	4.30% 4.42%	4.63% 4.76%	5.13% 5.17%	4.24% 4.22%	3.53% 3.43%	3.72% 3.62%
45	20-Yr Treasury Yields ⁴	3.26%	1.35%	2 40%	3.02%	2.65%	2.23%	2.55%	3.07%	3 12%	2 54%	3.62%	4.03%	4.11%	4.36%	4.91%	4 99%
46	20-Yr TIPS ⁴	1.15%	-0.30%	0.60%	0.94%	0.75%	0.66%	0.78%	0.87%	0.75%	0.21%	1.19%	1.73%	2.21%	2.19%	2.36%	2.31%
47	Implied Inflation ^b	2.09%	1.66%	1.79%	2.06%	1.89%	1.56%	1.75%	2.19%	2.35%	2.33%	2.40%	2.26%	1.85%	2.13%	2.49%	2.62%
48	Real Dividend Yield ^c	1.75%	1.82%	1.42%	1.47%	1.42%	1.90%	1.93%	1.44%	1.49%	1.81%	1.86%	2.32%	3.22%	2.07%	1.01%	1.07%
10	A-Rated Utility	4 759	2 009/	2 779/	4 959/	4.00%	2 0.2%	4 109/	4 000/	4 409/	4 1 29/	E 0.4%	E 469/	6 0.49/	6 5 29/	6 079/	6.07%
49	Nominal "A" Rated Yield"	4.75%	3.02%	3.77%	4.25%	4.00%	3.93%	4.12%	4.28%	4.48%	4.13%	2.58%	5.46% 3.12%	6.04%	0.53%	2.40%	3.36%
50		2.00%	1.55 /6	1.34 /8	2.14/6	2.07 /6	2.34/6	2.33 /6	2.04/8	2.00/8	1.70%	2.30 /6	3.13%	4.1176	4.31/6	3.43 /6	3.30%
51	Nominal "Baa" Bated Vield	5 21%	2 66%	4 10%	4 67%	4 29%	4 67%	5.02%	4 90%	4 09%	4 9 2%	5 57%	5 96%	7.06%	7 25%	6 22%	6 2 2%
52	Real "Baa" Bated Vield	3 16%	1 97%	2 36%	2 55%	2 44%	3.07%	3 22%	2 55%	2 57%	2 44%	3.09%	3.62%	5 11%	5.01%	3 74%	3.60%
02		0.10%		2.00%	2.00 /0	2.4470	0.01 /0	0.22 /0	2.00%	2.07 /0	2	0.00 /0	0.02 /0	0.117,0	0.0170	0.1470	0.00 /0
50	Spreads (A-Rated Utility Bond - Stock)	-															
54	Nominal Spread	0.87%	-0.49%	0.53%	0.69%	0.65%	0.44%	0.40%	0.60%	0.51%	-0.05%	0.74%	0.84%	0.91%	2.29%	2.34%	2.35%
54	lical Spreau	0.03%	-0.40%	0.52%	0.00%	0.03%	0.4476	0.4076	0.00%	0.39%	-0.03%	0.7276	0.0276	0.09%	2.2470	2.40 %	2.23%
	Spreads (Baa-Rated Utility Bond - Stock)	_															
55	Nominal Spread ^b	1.44%	0.15%	0.96%	1.11%	1.04%	1.19%	1.31%	1.14%	1.11%	0.65%	1.26%	1.34%	1.92%	3.00%	2.80%	2.60%
56	Real Spread ^c	1.41%	0.15%	0.94%	1.09%	1.02%	1.17%	1.29%	1.11%	1.09%	0.63%	1.23%	1.31%	1.89%	2.94%	2.73%	2.53%
	Spreads (Treasury Bond - Stock)	_															
57	Nominal	-0.61%	-2.15%	-0.83%	-0.54%	-0.69%	-1.26%	-1.17%	-0.59%	-0.75%	-1.64%	-0.68%	-0.60%	-1.02%	0.12%	1.38%	1.27%
58	Real*	-0.60%	-2.12%	-0.82%	-0.53%	-0.68%	-1.24%	-1.15%	-0.58%	-0.73%	-1.60%	-0.67%	-0.58%	-1.01%	0.12%	1.34%	1.24%



Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		Earnings per Share ¹															
		15-Year		3													
Line	Company	Average (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	2008 (14)	2007 (15)	(16)
		0.97	2 20	0.00	2.20	2.12	2.14	0.00	2.00	0.60	0.50	0.65	2.10	1.90	2 92	2.09	0.77
0	Allient Energy	2.07	3.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	3.14 1.6E	1.60	2.90	2.03	1.50	2.00	2.19	1.09	2.02	1.06	2.77
2	Amoron Corp	2.76	2.40	2.33	2.19	0.77	2.69	2.09	2.40	2.10	2.41	2.47	2.77	0.95	2.99	2.09	2.66
4	American Electric Power	2.70	4 20	4.09	2.02	2.11	4.00	2.50	2.40	2.10	2.41	2.47	2.77	2.70	2.00	2.30	2.00
4	American Electric Fower	3.30	4.30	4.00	3.90	3.02	4.20	0.09	3.34 N/A	3.10	2.90	3.13	2.00	2.97	2.99	2.00	2.00
6	Avalight, Inc.	1.77	1.00	2.40	2.07	1.07	2.15	1.00	1.94	1.95	1.22	1 72	1.65	1.59	1.26	0.72	1.47
7	Riack Hills	2.46	2.65	2.30	2.07	2.20	2.13	2.03	2.90	2.61	1.02	1.72	1.65	2.30	0.19	2.69	2.21
6	ConterBaint Energy	1.00	1.04	1.40	0.74	1.50	1.00	1.09	1.40	1.04	1.57	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.20	1.17	1.00
å	CMS Enorgy Corp	1.22	2.65	2 20	0.74	2.17	1.00	1.00	1.42	1.24	1.50	1.27	1.07	0.02	1.30	0.64	1.33
10	Consol Edicon	2 72	4.00	2.05	4.55	4.10	2.04	4.05	2.62	2.02	2.96	2.57	2.47	2.14	2.26	2.49	2.05
11	Dominian Resources	3.73	4.00	3.95	4.00	4.10	0.94	4.05	3.02	3.93	0.00	3.37	3.47	0.14	3.30	0.40	2.95
10	DTE Energy	2.09	5.10	2.13	3.23	5.00	3.44	3.20	5.05	3.09	2.73	2.70	2.09	2.04	3.04	2.13	2.40
12	Dife Energy	4.37	0.00 E 00	6.31 E 0E	0.17	3.73	4.00	4.44	3.10	3.70	3.00	3.67	3.74	3.24	2.73	2.00	2.43
14	Edison Int'l	3.94	1.70	5.05 4.6E	4.13	4.22	3.71	4.10	4.13	3.90	3.71	4.14	4.02	3.39	3.03	3.60	2.73
14	Edison Inti El Dasse Electric	3.30	1.70	4.65	-1.20	4.51	3.94	4.15	4.33	3.78	4.55	3.23	3.35	3.24	3.68	3.32	3.28
10	El Faso Electric	2.07	2.00	2.70	2.07	Z.4Z	2.39	2.03	2.27	2.20	2.20	2.40	2.07	6.30	6.20	1.63	1.27 E 26
10	Entergy Corp.	0.01	5.65	0.30	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.70	5.77	4.90	0.02	7.00	0.00	0.30	0.20	3.60	0.00
10	Eversource Energy	2.44	3.60	3.45	3.25	3.11 N/A	2.90	2.70	2.58	2.49	1.89	2.22	2.10	1.91	1.86	1.59	0.82
18	Evergy, Inc.	2.72	2.00	2.79	IN/A	N/A	IN/A	IN/A	N/A	N/A	IN/A	N/A	N/A	IN/A	N/A	IN/A	IN/A
19	Exelon Corp.	3.00	2.90	3.00	2.07	2.78	1.80	2.54	2.10	2.31	1.92	3.75	3.87	4.29	4.10	4.03	3.50
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	2.57	1.75	1.85	1.33	2.73	2.10	2.00	0.85	2.97	2.13	1.88	3.25	3.32	4.38	4.22	3.82
21	Fortis Inc.	1.87	2.50	2.68	2.52	2.66	1.89	2.11	1.38	1.63	1.65	1.74	1.62	1.51	1.52	1.29	1.36
22	Great Plains Energy	1.33	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.06	1.61	1.37	1.57	1.62	1.35	1.25	1.53	1.03	1.16	1.85	1.62
23	Hawaiian Elec.	1.53	1.80	1.90	1.85	1.64	2.29	1.50	1.64	1.62	1.67	1.44	1.21	0.91	1.07	1.11	1.33
24	IDACORP, Inc.	3.45	4.65	4.45	4.49	4.21	3.94	3.87	3.85	3.64	3.37	3.36	2.95	2.64	2.18	1.86	2.35
25	MGE Energy	1.98	2.65	2.51	2.43	2.20	2.18	2.06	2.32	2.16	1.86	1.76	1.67	1.47	1.59	1.51	1.37
26	NextEra Energy, Inc.	1.32	1.85	1.94	1.67	1.63	1.45	1.52	1.40	1.21	1.14	1.21	1.19	0.99	1.02	0.82	0.81
27	NorthWestern Corp	2.58	3.15	3.55	3.40	3.34	3.39	2.90	2.99	2.46	2.26	2.53	2.14	2.02	1.77	1.44	1.31
28	OGE Energy	1.72	2.05	2.24	2.12	1.92	1.69	1.69	1.98	1.94	1.79	1.73	1.50	1.33	1.25	1.32	1.23
29	Otter Tail Corp.	1.44	2.30	2.17	2.06	1.86	1.60	1.56	1.55	1.37	1.05	0.45	0.38	0.71	1.09	1.78	1.69
30	PG&E Corp.	1.49	N/A	N/A	-13.25	3.50	2.83	2.00	3.06	1.83	2.07	2.78	2.82	3.03	3.22	2.78	2.76
31	Pinnacle West Capital	3.58	5.10	4.50	4.54	4.43	3.95	3.92	3.58	3.66	3.50	2.99	3.08	2.26	2.12	2.96	3.17
32	PNM Resources	1.37	2.20	2.20	1.66	1.92	1.65	1.64	1.45	1.41	1.31	1.08	0.87	0.58	0.11	0.76	1.72
33	Portland General	1.89	1.55	2.40	2.37	2.29	2.16	2.04	2.18	1.77	1.87	1.95	1.66	1.31	1.39	2.33	1.14
34	PPL Corp.	2.36	2.35	2.40	2.58	2.11	2.79	2.37	2.38	2.38	2.61	2.61	2.29	1.19	2.45	2.63	2.29
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	2.89	3.40	3.70	2.76	2.82	2.83	3.30	2.99	2.45	2.44	3.11	3.07	3.08	2.90	2.59	1.85
36	SCANA Corp.	3.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.20	4.16	3.81	3.79	3.39	3.15	2.97	2.98	2.85	2.95	2.74	2.59
37	Sempra Energy	4.77	6.80	5.85	5.48	4.63	4.24	5.23	4.63	4.22	4.35	4.47	4.02	4.78	4.43	4.26	4.23
38	Southern Co.	2.68	3.15	3.10	3.00	3.21	2.83	2.84	2.77	2.70	2.67	2.55	2.36	2.32	2.25	2.28	2.10
39	Vectren Corp.	1.94	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.60	2.55	2.39	2.02	1.66	1.94	1.73	1.64	1.79	1.63	1.83	1.44
40	WEC Energy Group	2.43	3.75	3.58	3.34	3.14	2.96	2.34	2.59	2.51	2.35	2.18	1.92	1.60	1.52	1.42	1.32
41	Westar Energy	1.96	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.27	2.43	2.09	2.35	2.27	2.15	1.79	1.80	1.28	1.31	1.84	1.88
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	1.95	2.80	2.60	2.47	2.30	2.21	2.10	2.03	1.91	1.85	1.72	1.56	1.49	1.46	1.35	1.35
43	Average	2.59	3.13	3.23	2.87	2.90	2.81	2.67	2.66	2.50	2.43	2.44	2.36	2.19	2.21	2.26	2.11
44	Industry Average Growth	2.95%	-3.09%	12.53%	-0.78%	3.24%	5.25%	0.08%	6.36%	3.26%	-0.70%	3.61%	7.71%	-1.07%	-2.17%	7.14%	

Sources:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 25, 2019.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, and December 11, 2020 and January 22, 2021.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, January 24, February 14, and March 13, 2020.

Notes: PG&E is excluded from 2017, 2018, and 2019 average calculations due to their Dividend Suspension.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		Cash Flow / Capital Spending						
Line	Company	<u>2019</u>	<u>2020</u>	<u>2021</u>	3 - 5 yr Projection			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
1		0.63v	0.74x	0.82v	1 95v			
2	Alliant Energy	0.00X	0.745	0.02x	1.00x			
2	Ameren Corn	0.70x	0.51x	0.30x	0.95x			
4	American Electric Power	0.75x	0.31x	0.70x	0.95%			
5	Avangrid Inc	0.75	0.74%	0.70x	0.67x			
6	Avista Corp	0.707	0.30x	0.34x	1.04x			
7	Black Hills	0.000	0.00x	0.78x	1.04×			
8	CenterPoint Energy	0.31x	0.72	0.70x	0.76y			
a	CMS Epergy Corp	0.00	0.00x	0.68x	0.70x			
10	Consol Edison	0.73	0.02x	0.00x	1.02v			
11	Dominion Resources	0.73	1.00x	0.30x	1.02X			
12	DTE Energy	0.017	0.67x	0.00	1.00×			
13	Duke Energy	0.00X	0.07X	0.02x	1.01X			
14	Edison Int'l	0.70x	0.00x	0.07 x	0.89x			
15	El Paso Electric	0.007	1.00x	0.73x	0.00x			
16	Entergy Corp	0.30x	0.81	0.00x	1 1 1 v			
17	Eversource Energy	0.73x	0.01X	0.86x	1.06x			
18	Everav Inc	1.34x	1.06x	1 00x	1.38x			
19	Evelop Corp	1 18x	1.30x	1.30x	1 43x			
20	EirstEnergy Corp	0.74x	0.96x	0.91x	1.10x			
21	Fortis Inc	0.68x	0.60x	0.73x	0.85x			
22	Hawaijan Elec	1 12x	1 10x	1.35x	1 17x			
23	IDACOBP Inc	1.25x	1 25x	1 21x	1.39x			
24	MGE Energy	0.97x	0.73x	1.09x	1.00x			
25	NextEra Energy Inc	0.67x	0.58x	0.68x	0.68x			
26	NorthWestern Corp	1 07x	0.98x	0.83x	1 13x			
27	OGE Energy	1.26x	1 43x	1 21x	1 40x			
28	Otter Tail Corp	0.80x	0.45x	1.21x	1 75x			
29	Pinnacle West Capital	0.98x	0.98x	0.78x	1.13x			
30	PNM Resources	0.72x	0.59x	0.51x	1 25x			
31	Portland General	0.99x	0.75x	1.01x	1.46x			
32	PPL Corp.	0.92x	1.06x	1.12x	1.54x			
33	Public Serv. Enterprise	1.07x	1.00x	1.27x	1.48x			
34	Sempra Energy	0.66x	0.92x	0.80x	1.29x			
35	Southern Co.	0.88x	1.01x	0.95x	1.19x			
36	WEC Energy Group	0.91x	0.70x	0.74x	0.97x			
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.69x	0.99x	0.94x	1.09x			
38	Average	0.86x	0.86x	0.90x	1.15x			
39	Median	0.80x	0.85x	0.86x	1.11x			

Sources:

The Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software,

downloaded on June 25, 2019.

The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, and December 11, 2020 and Janu The Value Line Investment Survey, January 24, February 14, and March 13, 2020.

Notes:

Based on the projected Cash Flow per share and Capital Spending per share.

Proxy Group

Proxy Group

		Credit	Ratings ¹	Common I	Equity Ratios
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>S&P</u> (1)	<u>Moody's</u> (2)	<u>MI¹</u> (3)	<u>Value Line²</u> (4)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	BBB	Baa1	56.1%	61.4%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	A-	Baa2	43.5%	48.5%
3	Ameren Corporation	BBB+	Baa1	44.7%	47.1%
4	Avangrid, Inc.	BBB+	Baa1	64.2%	69.4%
5	Avista Corporation	BBB	Baa2	46.2%	50.6%
6	Black Hills Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	39.6%	42.9%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa1	27.3%	29.4%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	A-	Baa2	44.2%	49.3%
9	DTE Energy Company	BBB+	Baa2	39.6%	42.3%
10	Duke Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa1	40.5%	44.1%
11	Entergy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	33.4%	37.1%
12	Eversource Energy	A-	Baa1	44.4%	46.6%
13	NorthWestern Corporation	BBB	Baa2	47.5%	47.5%
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	BBB+	Baa1	47.7%	52.3%
15	Sempra Energy	BBB+	Baa2	36.6%	43.4%
16	Southern Company	A-	Baa2	34.1%	39.5%
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	A-	Baa1	43.9%	47.4%
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	A-	Baa1	39.2%	43.2%
19	Average	BBB+	Baa1	42.9%	46.8%
20	Median			43.7%	46.9%
21	Kentucky Utilities Company and Louisville Gas and Electric Company	A- ³	A3 ³	53.1% ⁴	

Sources:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on February 1, 2021.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

³ McKenzie direct at 15.

⁴ Schedule J-1.

Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates

		Za	cks	Ν	AI	Yahoo!	Average of	
		Estimated	Number of	Estimated	Number of	Estimated	Number of	Growth
Line	Company	Growth % ¹	Estimates	Growth % ²	Estimates	Growth % ³	Estimates	Rates
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	inance Number of Estimates (6) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	(7)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	N/A	N/A	5.33%	3	7.00%	N/A	6.17%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	5.90%	N/A	5.95%	3	5.80%	N/A	5.88%
3	Ameren Corporation	6.80%	N/A	6.66%	7	6.60%	N/A	6.69%
4	Avangrid, Inc.	4.70%	N/A	7.62%	4	3.40%	N/A	5.24%
5	Avista Corporation	5.40%	N/A	5.01%	3	5.40%	N/A	5.27%
6	Black Hills Corporation	5.80%	N/A	5.45%	4	4.72%	N/A	5.32%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	7.00%	N/A	6.89%	7	7.23%	N/A	7.04%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	2.00%	N/A	3.20%	4	2.56%	N/A	2.59%
9	DTE Energy Company	5.70%	N/A	6.08%	9	6.03%	N/A	5.94%
10	Duke Energy Corporation	3.60%	N/A	4.14%	5	2.36%	N/A	3.37%
11	Entergy Corporation	5.40%	N/A	5.58%	4	5.35%	N/A	5.44%
12	Eversource Energy	6.50%	N/A	6.59%	9	6.51%	N/A	6.53%
13	NorthWestern Corporation	3.40%	N/A	3.67%	4	2.70%	N/A	3.26%
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	3.00%	N/A	4.43%	4	1.15%	N/A	2.86%
15	Sempra Energy	7.30%	N/A	6.76%	6	7.70%	N/A	7.25%
16	Southern Company	5.00%	N/A	5.56%	5	4.36%	N/A	4.97%
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	6.10%	N/A	5.88%	3	6.10%	N/A	6.03%
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	6.10%	N/A	5.34%	5	6.20%	N/A	5.88%
19	Average	5.28%	N/A	5.56%	5	5.07%	N/A	5.32%
20	Median							5.66%

Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates

Sources:

¹ Zacks, http://www.zacks.com/, downloaded on January 22, 2021.

² S&P Global Market Intelligence, https://platform.mi.spglobal.com, downloaded on January 22, 2021.

³ Yahoo! Finance, http://www.finance.yahoo.com/, downloaded on January 22, 2021.

Note:

Yahoo! Finance next year number of estimates.

Constant Growth DCF Model (**Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates**)

Constant Growth DCF Model (Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates)

<u>Line</u>	Company	13-Week AVG <u>Stock Price¹</u> (1)	Analysts' <u>Growth²</u> (2)	Annualized <u>Dividend³</u> (3)	Adjusted <u>Yield</u> (4)	Constant <u>Growth DCF</u> (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$59.59	6.17%	\$2.47	4.40%	10.57%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$52.43	5.88%	\$1.52	3.07%	8.95%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$78.57	6.69%	\$2.06	2.80%	9.48%
4	Avangrid, Inc.	\$47.11	5.24%	\$1.76	3.93%	9.17%
5	Avista Corporation	\$38.02	5.27%	\$1.62	4.49%	9.76%
6	Black Hills Corporation	\$60.62	5.32%	\$2.26	3.93%	9.25%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$61.02	7.04%	\$1.63	2.86%	9.90%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$74.79	2.59%	\$3.06	4.20%	6.78%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$124.55	5.94%	\$4.34	3.69%	9.63%
10	Duke Energy Corporation	\$92.12	3.37%	\$3.86	4.33%	7.70%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$102.70	5.44%	\$3.80	3.90%	9.35%
12	Eversource Energy	\$88.12	6.53%	\$2.27	2.74%	9.28%
13	NorthWestern Corporation	\$57.05	3.26%	\$2.40	4.34%	7.60%
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$58.21	2.86%	\$1.96	3.46%	6.32%
15	Sempra Energy	\$127.91	7.25%	\$4.18	3.50%	10.76%
16	Southern Company	\$60.68	4.97%	\$2.56	4.43%	9.40%
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$94.47	6.03%	\$2.53	2.84%	8.87%
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$67.94	5.88%	\$1.72	2.68%	8.56%
19	Average	\$74.77	5.32%	\$2.56	3.64%	8.96%
20	Median					9.26%

Sources:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on February 1, 2021.

² Exhibit CCW-4.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

Payout Ratios

Payout Ratios

		Dividend	s Per Share	Earnings	Per Share	Payout Ratio		
Line	Company	<u>2019</u>	Projected	<u>2019</u>	Projected	<u>2019</u>	Projected	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$2.35	\$2.80	\$3.33	\$4.25	70.57%	65.88%	
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$1.42	\$1.96	\$2.33	\$3.00	60.94%	65.33%	
3	Ameren Corporation	\$1.92	\$2.45	\$3.35	\$4.50	57.31%	54.44%	
4	Avangrid, Inc.	\$1.76	\$1.80	\$2.26	\$2.50	77.88%	72.00%	
5	Avista Corporation	\$1.55	\$1.90	\$2.97	\$2.50	52.19%	76.00%	
6	Black Hills Corporation	\$2.05	\$2.75	\$3.53	\$4.25	58.07%	64.71%	
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$1.53	\$2.15	\$2.39	\$3.50	64.02%	61.43%	
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$2.96	\$3.50	\$4.08	\$5.00	72.55%	70.00%	
9	DTE Energy Company	\$3.85	\$5.20	\$6.31	\$8.50	61.01%	61.18%	
10	Duke Energy Corporation	\$3.75	\$4.15	\$5.07	\$6.00	73.96%	69.17%	
11	Entergy Corporation	\$3.66	\$4.55	\$6.30	\$7.00	58.10%	65.00%	
12	Eversource Energy	\$2.14	\$2.85	\$3.45	\$4.50	62.03%	63.33%	
13	NorthWestern Corporation	\$2.30	\$2.75	\$3.53	\$4.00	65.16%	68.75%	
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$1.88	\$2.30	\$3.90	\$4.25	48.21%	54.12%	
15	Sempra Energy	\$3.87	\$5.60	\$5.97	\$10.00	64.82%	56.00%	
16	Southern Company	\$2.46	\$2.86	\$3.17	\$3.75	77.60%	76.27%	
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$2.36	\$3.20	\$3.58	\$4.75	65.92%	67.37%	
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$1.62	\$2.15	\$2.64	\$3.50	61.36%	61.43%	
19	Average	\$2.41	\$3.05	\$3.79	\$4.76	63.98%	65.13%	

Source:

The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

Sustainable Growth Rate
3 to 5 Year Projections Sustainable Dividends Earnings Book Value Book Value Adjustment Adjusted Retention Internal Growth Payout Line Company Per Share Per Share Per Share Growth ROE Factor ROE Ratio Rate Growth Rate Rate (2) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1) (4) (6) ALLETE, Inc. \$2.80 \$4.25 \$51.25 3.49% 8.29% 1.02 8.43% 65.88% 34.12% 2.88% 3.25% 1 2 Alliant Energy Corporation \$1.96 \$3.00 \$28.45 6.02% 10.54% 1.03 10.85% 65.33% 34.67% 3.76% 6.08% 3 Ameren Corporation \$2.45 \$4.50 \$44.50 6.34% 10.11% 1.03 10.42% 54.44% 45.56% 4.75% 7.36% 4 Avangrid, Inc. \$1.80 \$2.50 0.77% 4.88% 1.00 4.90% 72.00% 28.00% 1.37% 1.37% \$51.25 5 Avista Corporation \$1.90 \$2.50 \$32.25 2.24% 7.75% 1.01 7.84% 76.00% 24.00% 1.88% 2.41% 6 Black Hills Corporation \$2.75 \$4.25 \$47.75 4.44% 8.90% 1.02 9.09% 64.71% 35.29% 3.21% 3.95% 7 CMS Energy Corporation \$2.15 \$3.50 \$25.75 7.81% 13.59% 1.04 14.10% 61.43% 38.57% 5.44% 8.17% 8 Consolidated Edison, Inc. \$3.50 \$5.00 \$62.50 2.92% 8.00% 1.01 8.12% 70.00% 30.00% 2.43% 3.14% 9 DTE Energy Company 5.40% 4.29% \$5.20 \$8.50 \$79.00 10.76% 1.03 11.04% 61.18% 38.82% 5.65% \$4.15 2.43% 2.71% 3.41% 10 Duke Energy Corporation \$6.00 \$69.00 8.70% 1.01 8.80% 69.17% 30.83% 11 Entergy Corporation \$4.55 \$7.00 \$64.50 4.67% 10.85% 1.02 11.10% 65.00% 35.00% 3.89% 4.95% 12 Eversource Energy \$2.85 \$4.50 \$50.75 5.80% 8.87% 1.03 9.12% 63.33% 36.67% 3.34% 5.71% 13 NorthWestern Corporation \$2.75 \$4.00 \$45.75 2.51% 8.74% 1.01 8.85% 68.75% 31.25% 2.77% 3.17% 14 Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated \$2.30 \$4.25 \$38.75 5.29% 10.97% 1.03 11.25% 54.12% 45.88% 5.16% 5.20% \$5.60 \$89.00 15 Sempra Energy \$10.00 8.00% 11.24% 1.04 11.67% 56.00% 44.00% 5.13% 7.91% 16 Southern Company \$2.86 \$3.75 \$30.75 3.33% 12.20% 1.02 12.39% 76.27% 23.73% 2.94% 3.73% 17 WEC Energy Group, Inc. \$3.20 \$4.75 \$38.00 3.46% 12.50% 1.02 12.71% 67.37% 32.63% 4.15% 4.15% 18 Xcel Energy Inc. \$2.15 \$3.50 \$33.25 5.67% 10.53% 1.03 10.82% 61.43% 38.57% 4.17% 6.09% 19 Average \$3.05 \$4.76 \$49.03 4.48% 9.86% 1.02 10.08% 65.13% 34.87% 3.57% 4.76% 20 Median 4.55%

Sustainable Growth Rate

Sources and Notes:

Cols. (1), (2) and (3): *The Value Line Investment Survey*, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021. Col. (4): [Col. (3) / Page 2 Col. (2)] ^ (1/number of years projected) - 1. Col. (5): Col. (2) / Col. (3). Col. (6): [2 * (1 + Col. (4))] / (2 + Col. (4)). Col. (7): Col. (6) * Col. (5). Col. (8): Col. (1) / Col. (2). Col. (9): 1 - Col. (8). Col. (10): Col. (9) * Col. (7). Col. (10): Col. (9) * Col. (7). Col. (11): Col. (10) + Page 2 Col. (9).

Sustainable Growth Rate

		13-Week	<u>2019</u>	Market	Common	n Shares				
		Average	Book Value	to Book	Outstanding (in Millions) ²					
Line	<u>Company</u>	Stock Price ¹	Per Share ²	Ratio	<u>2019</u>	3-5 Years	Growth	S Factor ³	V Factor ⁴	<u>S * V</u>
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$59.59	\$43.17	1.38	51.70	54.25	0.97%	1.34%	27.55%	0.37%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$52.43	\$21.24	2.47	245.02	265.00	1.58%	3.90%	59.49%	2.32%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$78.57	\$32.73	2.40	246.20	270.00	1.86%	4.47%	58.34%	2.61%
4	Avangrid, Inc.	\$47.11	\$49.31	0.96	309.01	309.00	- 0.00%	- 0.00%	- 4.66%	0.00%
5	Avista Corporation	\$38.02	\$28.87	1.32	67.18	73.00	1.68%	2.21%	24.07%	0.53%
6	Black Hills Corporation	\$60.62	\$38.42	1.58	61.48	65.50	1.27%	2.01%	36.62%	0.74%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$61.02	\$17.68	3.45	283.86	300.00	1.11%	3.84%	71.03%	2.73%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$74.79	\$54.12	1.38	333.00	365.00	1.85%	2.56%	27.64%	0.71%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$124.55	\$60.73	2.05	192.21	205.00	1.30%	2.66%	51.24%	1.36%
10	Duke Energy Corporation	\$92.12	\$61.20	1.51	733.00	785.00	1.38%	2.08%	33.57%	0.70%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$102.70	\$51.34	2.00	199.15	210.00	1.07%	2.13%	50.01%	1.07%
12	Eversource Energy	\$88.12	\$38.29	2.30	329.88	361.00	1.82%	4.19%	56.55%	2.37%
13	NorthWestern Corporation	\$57.05	\$40.42	1.41	50.45	53.00	0.99%	1.40%	29.15%	0.41%
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporatec	\$58.21	\$29.94	1.94	504.00	505.00	0.04%	0.08%	48.57%	0.04%
15	Sempra Energy	\$127.91	\$60.58	2.11	291.71	330.00	2.50%	5.27%	52.64%	2.78%
16	Southern Company	\$60.68	\$26.11	2.32	1,053.30	1,085.00	0.59%	1.38%	56.97%	0.79%
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$94.47	\$32.06	2.95	315.43	315.43	0.00%	0.00%	66.06%	0.00%
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$67.94	\$25.24	2.69	524.54	555.00	1.14%	3.06%	62.85%	1.92%
19	Average	\$74.77	\$39.53	2.01	321.73	339.23	1.24%	2.50%	47.78%	1.19%

Sources and Notes:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on February 1, 2021.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

³ Expected Growth in the Number of Shares, Column (3) * Column (6).

⁴ Expected Profit of Stock Investment, [1 - 1 / Column (3)].

Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)

Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)

		13-Week AVG	Sustainable	Annualized	Adjusted	Constant
Line	Company	Stock Price ¹	Growth ²	Dividend ³	Yield	Growth DCF
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$59.59	3.25%	\$2.47	4.28%	7.53%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$52.43	6.08%	\$1.52	3.08%	9.16%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$78.57	7.36%	\$2.06	2.81%	10.17%
4	Avangrid, Inc.	\$47.11	1.37%	\$1.76	3.79%	5.16%
5	Avista Corporation	\$38.02	2.41%	\$1.62	4.36%	6.78%
6	Black Hills Corporation	\$60.62	3.95%	\$2.26	3.88%	7.82%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$61.02	8.17%	\$1.63	2.89%	11.06%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$74.79	3.14%	\$3.06	4.22%	7.36%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$124.55	5.65%	\$4.34	3.68%	9.33%
10	Duke Energy Corporation	\$92.12	3.41%	\$3.86	4.33%	7.74%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$102.70	4.95%	\$3.80	3.88%	8.84%
12	Eversource Energy	\$88.12	5.71%	\$2.27	2.72%	8.43%
13	NorthWestern Corporation	\$57.05	3.17%	\$2.40	4.34%	7.51%
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$58.21	5.20%	\$1.96	3.54%	8.74%
15	Sempra Energy	\$127.91	7.91%	\$4.18	3.53%	11.44%
16	Southern Company	\$60.68	3.73%	\$2.56	4.38%	8.11%
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$94.47	4.15%	\$2.53	2.79%	6.94%
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$67.94	6.09%	\$1.72	2.69%	8.78%
19	Average	\$74.77	4.76%	\$2.56	3.62%	8.38%
20	Median					8.27%

Sources:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on February 1, 2021.

² Exhibit CCW-7, page 1.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

Electricity Sales Are Linked to U.S. Economic Growth

Electricity Sales Are Linked to U.S. Economic Growth



Note:

1988 represents the base year. Graph depicts increases or decreases from the base year.

Sources:

U.S. Energy Information Administration Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

13-Week AVG First Stage Third Stage Annualized Second Stage Growth Multi-Stage Line Stock Price¹ Dividend² Growth³ Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Growth⁴ Growth DCF Company (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 1 ALLETE. Inc. \$59.59 \$2.47 6.17% 5.86% 5.56% 5.26% 4.95% 4.65% 4.35% 9.18% 2 Alliant Energy Corporation \$52.43 \$1.52 5.88% 5.63% 5.37% 5.11% 4.86% 4.60% 4.35% 7.68% 5.52% 7.52% 3 Ameren Corporation \$78.57 \$2.06 6.69% 6.30% 5.91% 5.13% 4.74% 4.35% \$47.11 \$1.76 4.94% 4.79% 4.64% 8.47% 4 Avangrid, Inc. 5.24% 5.09% 4.49% 4.35% 5 Avista Corporation \$1.62 5.27% 4.96% 4.81% 4.65% 9.05% \$38.02 5.12% 4.50% 4.35% 6 Black Hills Corporation \$60.62 \$2.26 5.32% 5.16% 5.00% 4.83% 4.67% 4.51% 4.35% 8.48% 7 CMS Energy Corporation \$61.02 \$1.63 7.04% 6.59% 6.14% 5.69% 5.24% 4.79% 4.35% 7.65% 8 Consolidated Edison, Inc. \$74.79 \$3.06 2.59% 2.88% 3.17% 3.47% 3.76% 4.05% 4.35% 8.16% DTE Energy Company \$4.34 5.94% 5.67% 5.41% 5.14% 4.88% 8.36% 9 \$124.55 4.61% 4.35% 10 Duke Energy Corporation \$92.12 \$3.86 3.37% 3.53% 3.69% 3.86% 4.02% 4.18% 4.35% 8.45% \$3.80 5.44% 5.26% 5.08% 4.89% 4.71% 4.53% 4.35% 8.48% 11 Entergy Corporation \$102.70 5.07% 12 Eversource Energy \$88.12 \$2.27 6.53% 6.17% 5.80% 5.44% 4.71% 4.35% 7.43% NorthWestern Corporation \$57.05 \$2.40 3.26% 3.44% 3.62% 3.80% 3.98% 4.35% 8.44% 13 4.16% 14 Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporate \$58.21 \$1.96 2.86% 3.11% 3.36% 3.60% 3.85% 4.35% 7.53% 4.10% 15 Sempra Energy \$127.91 \$4.18 7.25% 6.77% 6.28% 5.80% 5.31% 4.83% 4.35% 8.44% Southern Company \$60.68 \$2.56 4.97% 4.87% 4.76% 4.66% 4.56% 4.45% 4.35% 8.92% 16 WEC Energy Group, Inc. 4.91% 7.45% 17 \$94.47 \$2.53 6.03% 5.75% 5.47% 5.19% 4.63% 4.35% 18 Xcel Energy Inc. \$67.94 \$1.72 5.88% 5.63% 5.37% 5.11% 4.86% 4.60% 4.35% 7.25% 19 Average \$74.77 \$2.56 5.32% 5.16% 4.99% 4.83% 4.67% 4.51% 4.35% 8.17% 8.40% 20 Median

Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

Sources:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on February 1, 2021.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

³ Exhibit CCW-4.

⁴ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020 at 14.

Common Stock Market/Book Ratio

Kentucky Utilities Company and Louisville Gas and Electric Company





Source:

1980 - 2000: Mergent Public Utility Manual.

2001 - 2015: AUS Utility Reports, multiple dates.

2016 - 2019: Value Line Investment Survey, multiple dates.

* Value Line Investment Survey Reports, November 13, November 27, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

Equity Risk Premium – Treasury Bond

		Authorized Electric	30 yr. Treasurv	Indicated Risk	Rolling 5 - Year	Rolling 10 - Year				
Line Year		Returns ¹	Bond Yield ²	Premium	Average	Average				
	<u></u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
1	1986	13.93%	7.80%	6.13%						
2	1987	12.99%	8.58%	4.41%						
3	1988	12.79%	8.96%	3.83%						
4	1989	12.97%	8.45%	4.52%						
5	1990	12.70%	8.61%	4.09%	4.60%					
6	1991	12.55%	8.14%	4.41%	4.25%					
7	1992	12.09%	7.67%	4.42%	4.26%					
8	1993	11.41%	6.60%	4.81%	4.45%					
9	1994	11.34%	7.37%	3.97%	4.34%					
10	1995	11.55%	6.88%	4.67%	4.46%	4.53%				
11	1996	11.39%	6.70%	4.69%	4.51%	4.38%				
12	1997	11.40%	6.61%	4.79%	4.59%	4.42%				
13	1998	11.66%	5.58%	6.08%	4.84%	4.65%				
14	1999	10.77%	5.87%	4.90%	5.03%	4.68%				
15	2000	11.43%	5.94%	5.49%	5.19%	4.82%				
16	2001	11.09%	5.49%	5.60%	5.37%	4.94%				
17	2002	11.16%	5.43%	5.73%	5.56%	5.07%				
18	2003	10.97%	4.96%	6.01%	5.55%	5.19%				
19	2004	10.75%	5.05%	5.70%	5.71%	5.37%				
20	2005	10.54%	4.65%	5.89%	5.79%	5.49%				
21	2006	10.34%	4.87%	5.47%	5.76%	5.57%				
22	2007	10.31%	4.83%	5.48%	5.71%	5.64%				
23	2008	10.37%	4.28%	6.09%	5.73%	5.64%				
24	2009	10.52%	4.07%	6.45%	5.88%	5.79%				
25	2010	10.29%	4.25%	6.04%	5.90%	5.85%				
26	2011	10.19%	3.91%	6.28%	6.07%	5.91%				
27	2012	10.01%	2.92%	7.09%	6.39%	6.05%				
28	2013	9.81%	3.45%	6.36%	6.44%	6.09%				
29	2014	9.75%	3.34%	6.41%	6.44%	6.16%				
30	2015	9.60%	2.84%	6.76%	6.58%	6.24%				
31	2016	9.60%	2.60%	7.00%	6.72%	6.40%				
32	2017	9.68%	2.90%	6.79%	6.66%	6.53%				
33	2018	9.55%	3.11%	6.44%	6.68%	6.56%				
34	2019	9.64%	2.58%	7.06%	6.81%	6.62%				
35	2020 ³	9.39%	1.56%	7.83%	7.02%	6.80%				
36	Average	10.99%	5.34%	5.65%	5.59%	5.59%				
37	Minimum				4.25%	4.38%				
38	Maximum				7.02%	6.80%				

Equity Risk Premium - Treasury Bond

Sources:

¹ *Regulatory Research Associates, Inc.*, Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Jan. 1997 p. 5, and Jan. 2011 p. 3. *S&P Global Market Intelligence*, RRA Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, January - December 2020, February 2, 2021, p. 1.

2006 - 2019 Authorized Returns exclude limited issue rider cases.

² St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

The yields from 2002 to 2005 represent the 20-Year Treasury yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank. ³ Data represents January - December, 2020.

Equity Risk Premium – Utility Bond

Authorized Average Indicated Rolling Rolling Electric "A" Rated Utility Risk 5 - Year 10 - Year Bond Yield² Line Year Returns¹ Premium Average Average (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1986 9.58% 4.35% 1 13.93% 1987 2 12 99% 10 10% 2 89% 3 1988 12.79% 10.49% 2.30% 12.97% 4 1989 9.77% 3.20% 5 1990 12.70% 9.86% 2.84% 3.12% 6 1991 12 55% 9 36% 3.19% 2.88% 7 8.69% 2.99% 1992 12.09% 3.40% 8 1993 11.41% 7.59% 3.82% 3.29% 9 1994 11.34% 8.31% 3.03% 3.26% 3.27% 10 1995 11.55% 7.89% 3.66% 3.42% 1996 7.75% 3.51% 3.20% 11 11.39% 3.64% 3.29% 12 1997 11.40% 7.60% 3.80% 3.59% 13 1998 11.66% 7.04% 4.62% 3.75% 3.52% 14 1999 10.77% 7.62% 3.15% 3.77% 3.52% 15 2000 11.43% 8.24% 3.19% 3.68% 3.55% 2001 7.76% 3.62% 3.56% 16 11.09% 3.33% 17 2002 7.37% 3.79% 3.61% 3.60% 11.16% 18 2003 10.97% 6.58% 4.39% 3.57% 3.66% 19 2004 10.75% 6.16% 4.59% 3.86% 3.82% 2005 20 10.54% 5.65% 4.89% 4.20% 3.94% 21 2006 10.34% 6.07% 4.27% 4.39% 4.00% 22 2007 10.31% 6.07% 4.24% 4.48% 4.04% 23 2008 10.37% 6.53% 3.84% 4.37% 3.97% 24 2009 10.52% 6 04% 4 48% 4 34% 4 10% 25 2010 10.29% 5.47% 4.82% 4.33% 4.26% 26 2011 5.04% 5.15% 4.51% 4.45% 10.19% 27 2012 10.01% 4.13% 5.88% 4.83% 4.66% 28 2013 9.81% 4 48% 5 33% 5 13% 4 75% 29 2014 9.75% 4.28% 5.47% 5.33% 4.84% 5.48% 30 2015 4.12% 5.46% 4.90% 9.60% 31 2016 9.60% 3.93% 5.67% 5.57% 5.04% 32 2017 9.68% 4.00% 5.68% 5.53% 5.18% 33 2018 9.55% 4.25% 5.30% 5.52% 5.33% 34 2019 9.64% 3.77% 5.87% 5.60% 5.47% 35 2020³ 9.39% 3.05% 6.34% 5.77% 5.62%

Equity Risk Premium - Utility Bond

Sources:

36

37

38

Average

Minimum

Maximum

4.28%

4.23%

2.88%

5.77%

4.21%

3.20%

5.62%

10.99%

6.70%

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Jan. 1997 p. 5, and Jan. 2011 p. 3. S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, January - December 2020, February 2, 2021, p. 1.

^{2006 - 2019} Authorized Returns exclude limited issue rider cases.

² St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

The yields from 2002 to 2005 represent the 20-Year Treasury yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank.

³ Data represents January - December, 2020.

Bond Yield Spreads

Bond Yield Spreads

		Public Utility Bond						Co	Utility to Corporate			
		T-Bond			A-T-Bond	Baa-T-Bond	Aaa-T-Bond Baa-T-Bon			Baa-T-Bond	Baa	A-Aaa
Line	Year	Yield ¹	A ²	Baa ²	Spread	Spread	Aaa ³	Baa ³	Spread	Spread	Spread	Spread
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1	1980	11.30%	13.34%	13.95%	2.04%	2.65%	11.94%	13.67%	0.64%	2.37%	0.28%	1.40%
2	1981	13.44%	15.95%	16.60%	2.51%	3.16%	14.17%	16.04%	0.73%	2.60%	0.56%	1.78%
3	1982	12.76%	15.86%	16.45%	3.10%	3.69%	13.79%	16.11%	1.03%	3.35%	0.34%	2.07%
4	1983	11.18%	13.66%	14.20%	2.48%	3.02%	12.04%	13.55%	0.86%	2.38%	0.65%	1.62%
5	1984	12.39%	14.03%	14.53%	1.64%	2.14%	12.71%	14.19%	0.32%	1.80%	0.34%	1.32%
6	1985	10.79%	12.47%	12.96%	1.68%	2.17%	11.37%	12.72%	0.58%	1.93%	0.24%	1.10%
7	1986	7.80%	9.58%	10.00%	1.78%	2.20%	9.02%	10.39%	1.22%	2.59%	-0.39%	0.56%
8	1987	8.58%	10.10%	10.53%	1.52%	1.95%	9.38%	10.58%	0.80%	2.00%	-0.05%	0.72%
9	1988	8.96%	10.49%	11.00%	1.53%	2.04%	9.71%	10.83%	0.75%	1.87%	0.17%	0.78%
10	1989	8.45%	9.77%	9.97%	1.32%	1.52%	9.26%	10.18%	0.81%	1.73%	-0.21%	0.51%
11	1990	8.61%	9.86%	10.06%	1.25%	1.45%	9.32%	10.36%	0.71%	1.75%	-0.30%	0.54%
12	1991	8.14%	9.36%	9.55%	1.22%	1.41%	8.77%	9.80%	0.63%	1.67%	-0.25%	0.59%
13	1992	7.67%	8.69%	8.86%	1.02%	1.19%	8.14%	8.98%	0.47%	1.31%	-0.12%	0.55%
14	1993	6.60%	7.59%	7.91%	0.99%	1.31%	7.22%	7.93%	0.62%	1.33%	-0.02%	0.37%
15	1994	7.37%	8.31%	8.63%	0.94%	1.26%	7.96%	8.62%	0.59%	1.25%	0.01%	0.35%
16	1995	6.88%	7.89%	8.29%	1.01%	1.41%	7.59%	8.20%	0.71%	1.32%	0.09%	0.30%
17	1996	6.70%	7.75%	8.17%	1.05%	1.47%	7.37%	8.05%	0.67%	1.35%	0.12%	0.38%
18	1997	6.61%	7.60%	7.95%	0.99%	1.34%	7.26%	7.86%	0.66%	1.26%	0.09%	0.34%
19	1998	5.58%	7.04%	7.26%	1.46%	1.68%	6.53%	7.22%	0.95%	1.64%	0.04%	0.51%
20	1999	5.87%	7.62%	7.88%	1.75%	2.01%	7.04%	7.87%	1.18%	2.01%	0.01%	0.58%
21	2000	5.94%	8.24%	8.36%	2.30%	2.42%	7.62%	8.36%	1.68%	2.42%	-0.01%	0.62%
22	2001	5.49%	7.76%	8.03%	2.27%	2.54%	7.08%	7.95%	1.59%	2.45%	0.08%	0.68%
23	2002	5.43%	7.37%	8.02%	1.94%	2.59%	6.49%	7.80%	1.06%	2.37%	0.22%	0.88%
24	2003	4.96%	6.58%	6.84%	1.62%	1.89%	5.67%	6.77%	0.71%	1.81%	0.08%	0.91%
25	2004	5.05%	6.16%	6.40%	1.11%	1.35%	5.63%	6.39%	0.58%	1.35%	0.00%	0.53%
26	2005	4.65%	5.65%	5.93%	1.00%	1.28%	5.24%	6.06%	0.59%	1.42%	-0.14%	0.41%
27	2006	4.87%	6.07%	6.32%	1.20%	1.44%	5.59%	6.48%	0.71%	1.61%	-0.16%	0.48%
28	2007	4.83%	6.07%	6.33%	1.24%	1.50%	5.56%	6.48%	0.72%	1.65%	-0.15%	0.52%
29	2008	4.28%	6.53%	7.25%	2.25%	2.97%	5.63%	7.45%	1.35%	3.17%	-0.20%	0.90%
30	2009	4.07%	6.04%	7.06%	1.97%	2.99%	5.31%	7.30%	1.24%	3.23%	-0.24%	0.73%
31	2010	4.25%	5.47%	5.96%	1.22%	1.71%	4.95%	6.04%	0.70%	1.79%	-0.08%	0.52%
32	2011	3.91%	5.04%	5.57%	1.13%	1.66%	4.64%	5.67%	0.73%	1.76%	-0.10%	0.40%
33	2012	2.92%	4.13%	4.83%	1.21%	1.90%	3.67%	4.94%	0.75%	2.02%	-0.11%	0.46%
34	2013	3.45%	4.48%	4.98%	1.03%	1.53%	4.24%	5.10%	0.79%	1.65%	-0.12%	0.24%
35	2014	3.34%	4.28%	4.80%	0.94%	1.46%	4.16%	4.86%	0.82%	1.52%	-0.06%	0.12%
36	2015	2 84%	4 12%	5.03%	1 27%	2 19%	3.89%	5.00%	1.05%	2 16%	0.03%	0.23%
37	2016	2.60%	3 93%	4 67%	1 33%	2.08%	3.66%	4 71%	1.07%	2 12%	-0.04%	0.27%
38	2017	2 90%	4 00%	4 38%	1 10%	1 48%	3 74%	4 44%	0.85%	1 55%	-0.06%	0.26%
30	2017	2.30 /8	4.00 /0	4.67%	1 1/0/	1.56%	3 030/	4.80%	0.00%	1.60%	-0.00%	0.20%
40	2010	0.11/0	9 770/	4.07 /0	1.14 /0	1.50 /0	2,20%	4.00 /0	0.02 /0	1 70%	-0.13%	0.32 /0
40	2019	2.30%	2.05%	9 / / 0/	1.10%	1.01%	0.09%	9.66%	0.01%	2 109/	-0.10%	0.30%
41	2020	1.00%	3.03%	3.44%	1.49%	1.0/70	2.00%	3.00%	0.90%	2.10%	-0.2270	0.00%
42	Average	6.31%	7.80%	8.24%	1.49%	1.93%	7.15%	8.24%	0.84%	1.93%	0.00%	0.65%

Yield Spreads Treasury Vs. Corporate & Treasury Vs. Utility





Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

² The utility yields for the period 1980-2000 were obtained from Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003.

- The utility yields for the period 2001-2009 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record.
- The utility yields for the period 2010-2019 were obtained from http://credittrends.moodys.com/.
- ³ The corporate yields for the period 1980-2009 were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

The corporate yields from 2010-2019 were obtained from http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

⁴ Data represents January - December, 2020.

Treasury and Utility Bond Yields

Treasury and Utility Bond Yields

Line	Date	Treasury <u>Bond Yield¹</u> (1)	"A" Rated Utility <u>Bond Yield²</u> (2)	"Baa" Rated Utility <u>Bond Yield²</u> (3)
	01/00/01		0.000/	0.400/
1	01/22/21	1.85%	2.92%	3.18%
2	01/15/21	1.85%	2.93%	3.20%
3	01/08/21	1.87%	2.96%	3.24%
4	12/31/20	1.65%	2.74%	3.00%
5	12/24/20	1.66%	2.77%	3.07%
6	12/18/20	1.70%	2.81%	3.08%
7	12/11/20	1.63%	2.72%	3.00%
8	12/04/20	1.73%	2.83%	3.09%
9	11/27/20	1.57%	2.74%	3.03%
10	11/20/20	1.53%	2.72%	3.08%
11	11/13/20	1.65%	2.89%	3.21%
12	11/06/20	1.60%	2.89%	3.21%
13	10/30/20	1.65%	2.99%	3.35%
14	Average	1.69%	2.84%	3.13%
15	Spread To Treasury		1.15%	1.44%

Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org.

² http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

Treasury and Utility Bond Yields

		Treasury	"A" Rated Utility	"Baa" Rated Utility		
Line	Date	Bond Yield ¹	Bond Yield ²	Bond Yield ²		
		(1)	(2)	(3)		
1	01/22/21	1.85%	2.92%	3.18%		
2	01/15/21	1.85%	2.93%	3.20%		
3	01/08/21	1.87%	2.96%	3.24%		
4	12/31/20	1.65%	2.74%	3.00%		
5	12/24/20	1.66%	2.77%	3.07%		
6	12/18/20	1.70%	2.81%	3.08%		
7	12/11/20	1.63%	2.72%	3.00%		
8	12/04/20	1.73%	2.83%	3.09%		
9	11/27/20	1.57%	2.74%	3.03%		
10	11/20/20	1.53%	2.72%	3.08%		
11	11/13/20	1.65%	2.89%	3.21%		
12	11/06/20	1.60%	2.89%	3.21%		
13	10/30/20	1.65%	2.99%	3.35%		
14	10/23/20	1.64%	2.98%	3.28%		
15	10/16/20	1.52%	2.90%	3.24%		
16	10/09/20	1.58%	2.97%	3.30%		
17	10/02/20	1.48%	2.93%	3.28%		
18	09/25/20	1.40%	2.86%	3.19%		
19	09/18/20	1.45%	2.86%	3.18%		
20	09/11/20	1.42%	2.83%	3.16%		
21	09/04/20	1.46%	2.87%	3.19%		
22	08/28/20	1.52%	2.92%	3.24%		
23	08/21/20	1.35%	2.74%	3.06%		
24	08/14/20	1.45%	2.79%	3.11%		
25	08/07/20	1.23%	2.59%	2.93%		
26	07/31/20	1.20%	2.56%	2.93%		
27	Average	1.56%	2.84%	3.15%		
28	Spread To Treasury		1.28%	1.59%		

Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org.

² http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

Trends in Bond Yields



Sources:

Mergent Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/

Yield Spread Between Utility Bonds and 30-Year Treasury Bonds



Sources:

Mergent Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/

Value Line Beta

Value Line Beta

		- 1	S&P Global Market Intelligence
Line	Company	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Beta</u>
1	ALLETE, Inc.	0.85	0.69
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	0.85	0.65
3	Ameren Corporation	0.85	0.61
4	Avangrid, Inc.	0.85	0.55
5	Avista Corporation	0.95	0.66
6	Black Hills Corporation	1.00	0.72
7	CMS Energy Corporation	0.80	0.62
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	0.75	0.53
9	DTE Energy Company	0.95	0.67
10	Duke Energy Corporation	0.85	0.62
11	Entergy Corporation	0.95	0.71
12	Eversource Energy	0.90	0.68
13	NorthWestern Corporation	0.95	0.75
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	0.90	0.69
15	Sempra Energy	1.00	0.67
16	Southern Company	0.90	0.67
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	0.80	0.61
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.80	0.64
19	Average	0.88	0.65
20	Median	0.88	0.66
21	Historical Beta ³	0.66	

Source:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey,

November 13, December 11, 2020, and January 22, 2021.

² S&P Global Market Intelligence, betas for the period 1/22/2016 - 1/22/2021.

³ Exhibit CCW-16, page 2.

Historical Betas (Gas Utilities)

Line	Company	Average	3Q20	2Q20	1Q20	4Q19	3Q19	2Q19	1Q19	4Q18	3Q18	2Q18	1Q18	4Q17	3Q17	2Q17	1Q17	4Q16	3Q16	2Q16	1Q16	4Q15	3Q15	2Q15	1Q15	4Q14	3Q14
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	0.75	0.85	0.85	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	0.72	0.85	0.80	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.60	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
3	Ameren Corporation	0.68	0.80	0.80	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
4	Avangrid, Inc.	0.45	0.80	0.80	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.35	NMF	NMF	NMF	NMF	NMF	N/A								
5	Avista Corporation	0.72	0.95	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.75
6	Black Hills Corporation	0.86	1.00	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.75	0.80	0.85	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.85	0.85	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.85
7	CMS Energy Corporation	0.66	0.80	0.80	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.70	0.75
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	0.54	0.75	0.75	0.40	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
9	DTE Energy Company	0.67	0.90	0.90	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
10	Duke Energy Corporation	0.59	0.85	0.85	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
11	Entergy Corporation	0.67	0.95	0.95	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
12	Eversource Energy	0.69	0.90	0.90	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
13	NorthWestern Corporation	0.67	0.90	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
14	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	0.71	0.90	0.90	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
15	Sempra Energy	0.78	0.95	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.75	0.75	0.75
16	Southern Company	0.58	0.90	0.90	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.60	0.55	0.55	0.60
17	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	0.62	0.80	0.80	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.65	0.65
18	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.60	0.75	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.65
19	Average	0.66	0.87	0.77	0.54	0.56	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.60	0.65	0.66	0.68	0.66	0.66	0.68	0.67	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.72

Source: Value Line Software Analyzer

CAPM Return

CAPM Return

<u>Line</u>	Description	Risk Premium ² Derived <u>MRP</u> (1)	FERC 2-Step DCF ³ Derived <u>MRP</u> (2)	DCF ³ Derived <u>MRP</u> (3)
	Current Beta	(-)	(-)	(0)
1	Risk-Free Rate ¹	2.10%	2.10%	2.10%
2	Market Risk Premium	9.10%	10.70%	12.50%
3	Beta ⁴	0.88	0.88	0.88
4	САРМ	10.14%	11.55%	13.14%
F	Historical Beta	0.100/	0.100/	0.100/
5	RISK-Free Rate	2.10%	2.10%	2.10%
6	Market Risk Premium	9.10%	10.70%	12.50%
7	Historical Beta ⁺	0.66	0.66	0.66
8	САРМ	8.14%	9.20%	10.40%
	Current S&P Global Market Inte	elligence Beta		
9	Risk-Free Rate ¹	2.10%	2.10%	2.10%
10	Market Risk Premium	9.10%	10.70%	12.50%
11	Beta ⁴	0.65	0.65	0.65
12	САРМ	8.03%	9.07%	10.24%

Sources:

¹ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, January 1, 2021, at 2.

² Duff & Phelps, 2020 SBBI Yearbook at 6-18.

³ State Street Global Advisors, downloaded 2/1/2021.

⁴ Exhibit CCW-16, page 1.

Exhibit CCW-17 Page 2 of 2

Kentucky Utilities Company and Louisville Gas and Electric Company

Development of the Market Risk Premium

Line	Description	MRP
Risk	Premium Based Method:	
1	Lg. Co. Stock Real Market Return	9.00% ¹
2	Projected Consumer Price Index	2.00% ²
3	Expected Market Return	11.18%
4	Risk-Free Rate	2.10% ²
5	Market Risk Premium	9.10%
FERC	2-Step DCF Based Method:	
6	Short-Term S&P 500 Growth	12.83% ³
7	Long-Term GDP Growth	<u>4.35%</u> 4
8	Blended Growth Rate	11.13% ⁵
9	Index Dividend Yield	1.53% ³
10	Adjusted Yield	<u>1.70%</u>
11	Expected Market Return	12.83%
12	Risk-Free Rate	<u>2.10%</u> ²
13	Market Risk Premium	10.70%
DCF I	Based Method:	
14	S&P 500 Growth	12.83% ³
15	Index Dividend Yield	1.53% ³
16	Adjusted Yield	1.73%
17	Expected Market Return	14.56%
18	Risk-Free Rate	2.10% ²
19	Market Risk Premium	12.50%

Sources & Note:

- ¹ Duff & Phelps 2020 SBBI Yearbook at 6-18.
- ² Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, January 1, 2021.
- ³ State Street Global Advisors, SPDR S&P 500 ETF, downloaded 2/1/2021.
- ⁴ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020.
- $^{5}(80\%^{*}12.83\%) + (20\%^{*}4.35\%) = 11.13\%.$