

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DOCKET NO. 2018-319-E**

IN THE MATTER OF:)

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for)
Adjustments in Electric Rate Schedules)
and Tariffs and Request for an Accounting Order)

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN R.
BARNES ON BEHALF OF
VOTE SOLAR**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND CURRENT**
3 **POSITION.**

4 A. Justin R. Barnes, 1155 Kildaire Farm Rd., Suite 202, Cary, North Carolina,
5 27511. My current position is Director of Research with EQ Research LLC.

6 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL**
7 **BACKGROUND.**

8 A. I obtained a Bachelor of Science in Geography from the University of Oklahoma
9 in Norman in 2003 and a Master of Science in Environmental Policy from
10 Michigan Technological University in 2006. I was employed at the North
11 Carolina Solar Center at N.C. State University for more than five years beginning
12 in August 2007, where I worked as a Policy Analyst and then Senior Policy
13 Analyst on the *Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency*
14 (*"DSIRE"*) project, and several other projects related to state renewable energy
15 and efficiency policy.

16 I left N.C. State University in 2013 to join EQ Research as a Senior Policy
17 Analyst, and later became a Project Manager and then Director. In my current
18 position I coordinate EQ Research's various research projects for clients, assist in
19 the oversight of EQ Research's electric industry legislative, regulatory and
20 general rate case tracking services, and perform customized research and analysis
21 to fulfill client requests. Outside of South Carolina, I have testified before the
22 Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the New Hampshire Public Utilities
23 Commission, the New Orleans City Council, the North Carolina Utilities

1 Commission, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the Public Utility
2 Commission of Texas, and the Utah Public Service Commission as an expert in
3 distributed generation (“DG”) policy, rate design, and cost of service.¹ My
4 *curriculum vitae* is attached as Exhibit JRB-1.

5 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE**
6 **SOUTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION (“COMMISSION”)?**

7 A. Yes. I submitted testimony on behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice in
8 Commission Docket No. 2014-246-E addressing the implementation of 2014
9 Public Act 236, and in Docket Nos. 2015-53-E, 2015-54-E, and 2015-55-E
10 addressing the applications of the state’s three investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”)
11 to establish distributed energy resource programs pursuant to Public Act 246.

12 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?**

13 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Vote Solar.

14 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

15 A. My testimony addresses the rates application put forth by Duke Energy Carolinas
16 (“DEC” or “the Company”) on issues related to the Company’s proposals
17 involving residential basic facilities charges, AMI-enabled rate design, the South
18 Carolina Grid Improvement Plan, and Excess Deferred Income Tax Rider EDIT-
19 1. My testimony on all of these topics relates to cost of service and rate design.
20 The purpose of my testimony is to show that:

¹ The New Orleans City Council regulates Entergy New Orleans in a manner similar to a state regulatory commission.

- 1 1. The Company's proposed increase in the residential basic facilities charge,
2 which if approved would be the highest residential customer charge in the
3 country among IOUs, is based on a fatally flawed methodology, veers
4 away from traditional principles of rate design, and wholly ignores prior
5 Commission precedent rejecting the use of the Minimum System Method
6 for distribution cost classification.
- 7 2. The proposed residential basic facilities charge would disproportionately
8 increase the rates of low-usage customers and reduce the ability of
9 customers to adopt solar energy and energy efficiency to manage their
10 electric bills.
- 11 3. The Company's plan for deploying AMI-enabled rate designs and,
12 consequently, allowing customers to realize the full benefits of AMI, lacks
13 the specificity and detail necessary to inform the Commission of whether
14 the Company's actions will result in just and reasonable rates.
- 15 4. The Company's proposed rate design for recovery of costs associated with
16 its Grid Improvement Plan, to the extent the Commission permits it to
17 move forward, inappropriately classifies costs and over-assigns revenue
18 responsibility to the residential class, without consideration of whether
19 residential customers would see equivalent benefits from Grid
20 Improvement Plan investments.
- 21 5. The volumetric rate design that the Company proposes for the Excess
22 Deferred Income Tax Rider EDIT-1 is unreasonable and should be revised

1 to a percentage of bill-based design if the rider is approved in order to
2 align it with the underlying causes of excess deferred income taxes.

3 6. Residential net metering customers provide an estimated benefit, in
4 addition to any value of solar calculation, of over \$1 million per year to
5 the residential class by reducing the allocation of peak-driven costs to the
6 class.

7 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
8 **COMMISSION ON THE RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES CHARGE.**

9 A. My recommendations for setting the basic facilities charge are as follows:

- 10 1. The Commission should reject the changes the Company has made to its cost
11 of service study and re-affirm precedent by directing the Company to
12 eliminate the use of the Minimum System Method from its cost of service
13 study.
- 14 2. The Commission should make a determination that the basic customer
15 method, which defines customer-related costs as those directly attributable to
16 a customer's service connection, metering, billing, and customer service, is
17 the appropriate method for classifying customer-related costs.
- 18 3. The Commission should reject the Company's proposed residential basic
19 facilities charge and instead limit any increase in the charge to the percentage
20 increase in residential class revenue requirement that is ultimately adopted in
21 this proceeding.

1 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON AMI-
2 ENABLED RATES, THE GRID MODERNIZATION PLAN, AND RIDER
3 EDIT-1.

4 A. My recommendations on these topics are as follows:

5 1. AMI-Enabled Rate Design: The Commission should direct DEC to proceed
6 with rate pilots and planning in a manner that is fully aligned with the
7 directives placed on DEC in North Carolina, including but not limited to filing
8 two pilot rate proposals, one for residential customers and one for small non-
9 residential customers, and a complete rate design plan with the Commission
10 within 60 days of a decision in this proceeding.

11 2. Grid Modernization Plan: The Commission should take several actions to
12 ensure that the costs and benefits of the Company's Grid Improvement Plan
13 are distributed equitably and that cost recovery is consistent with cost
14 causation:

15 a. Make a finding that Grid Improvement Plan investments cannot be
16 considered part of a standard minimum distribution system because by
17 their very nature they are extraordinary in character, regardless of
18 whether the Commission accepts the use of the Minimum System
19 Method in the Company's cost of service study.

20 b. If the Commission approves the Grid Improvement Plan and the
21 Company's proposed allocation and rate design generally, direct the
22 Company to revise the customer-related percentage calculation to fully
23 exclude distribution plant associated with meters and service drops.

1 c. Direct DEC to perform cost-benefit evaluations that address the
2 relative customer class distribution of costs and benefits at the project
3 level, and align the allocation and recovery of costs with the results of
4 the class-level cost-benefit evaluations and proper identification of
5 energy and demand costs.

6 3. Rider EDIT-1: If the Commission approves Rider EDIT-1, the rate design
7 should be revised to a percentage of bill-based mechanism in order to align it
8 with the underlying causes of excess deferred income taxes.

9
10 **II. DEC'S RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES CHARGE PROPOSAL**

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL FOR INCREASES**
12 **TO BASIC FACILITIES CHARGES.**

13 A. The Company proposes to increase the basic facilities charge for customers taking
14 service under Schedule RS and Schedule RE (electric heating) from the current
15 amount of \$8.29/month to \$28.00/month. The increase proposed for Schedule RT,
16 an optional residential time-varying rate with a demand charge component, is
17 from \$9.93/month to \$27.08/month. Current and proposed basic facilities charges
18 for all customer classes are show in Exhibit No. 6 of the Direct Testimony of
19 DEC Witness Michael Pirro ("Pirro Direct"). The Company's derivation of basic
20 facilities charges rests in large part on its use of the "Minimum System Method",
21 which classifies a significant portion of the costs associated with the shared
22 distribution system (*i.e.*, upstream from customer's connection to the grid) as
23 customer-related and therefore includable within the basic facilities charge.

1 Q. DO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSALS CONTAIN ANY CONSIDERATION
2 OF CUSTOMER IMPACTS OR ELEMENTS DESIGNED TO MITIGATE
3 ADVERSE IMPACTS GENERALLY, OR ON CERTAIN TYPES OF
4 CUSTOMERS?

5 A. No. The proposed residential basic facilities charges are derived from costs that
6 DEC's cost of service study classifies as customer-related, without modification.

7 Q. IS THIS LACK OF CONSIDERATION OF CUSTOMER IMPACTS
8 NORMAL IN YOUR EXPERIENCE?

9 A. It is highly unusual. Even utilities that generally believe that higher residential
10 fixed charges are appropriate based on the use of methodologies similar to the
11 Company's typically seek to moderate the impact by proposing charges at lower
12 amounts than those derived from their cost studies. This is one aspect of the
13 ratemaking concept generally known as "gradualism", which seeks to avoid
14 abrupt changes that would have large adverse impacts on one or more groups of
15 customers.

16 DEC is no stranger to this concept. For instance, in its most recent North
17 Carolina general rate case DEC contended that its cost of service study supported
18 a residential basic facilities charge of \$23.78/month, but it only proposed an
19 increase from \$11.80/month to \$17.79/month in order to "moderate any effect on
20 low usage customers."² DEC further offered testimony in this case noting that
21 when pursuing "cost justified" rates "it is important to consider the impact upon

² North Carolina Utility Commission ("NCUC"). Docket No. E-7 Sub 1146. Direct
Testimony of Michael Pirro, p. 13, lines 15-18. August 25, 2017. Available at:
<https://starw1.ncuc.net/ncuc/ViewFile.aspx?Id=dbff898e-22f1-4aa2-8322-96186a4e3987>.

1 customers and to employ the principle of “gradualism.”³ Therefore DEC
 2 proposed an increase in the residential basic facilities charge of 50% of the
 3 difference between the existing charge and the theoretical charge indicated in the
 4 Company’s cost of service study.

5 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOUR TESTIMONY ON THE COMPANY’S**
 6 **PROPOSED RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES CHARGES IS**
 7 **ORGANIZED.**

8 A. In Section II-A, I describe in more detail how the proposals are an extreme
 9 departure from sound ratemaking principles and how those principles have been
 10 put into practice in other states, as evidenced by how dramatically the proposed
 11 rates differ and the amount of the associated increases compare to national
 12 statistics. In Section II-B I describe the considerable flaws in the methodology the
 13 Company uses to arrive at its proposed basic facilities charges. Section II-C of my
 14 testimony contains an alternative calculation of customer-related costs based on
 15 eliminating those flaws.

16
 17 A. The Company’s Proposal Departs From Sound Ratemaking Practices

18 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE ELEMENTS OF GOOD RATEMAKING**
 19 **PRACTICE?**

20 A. Good ratemaking is an exercise in balancing a suite of goals. The oft-cited work
 21 of Dr. James Bonbright offers valuable guidance on the criteria that should be
 22 used in the development of a sound rate structure, listing a set of eight principles

³ *Id.* p. 11, lines 5-7.

1 to consider. I have paraphrased those principles that I believe are most relevant to
2 this proceeding below:

- 3 1. The “practical” attributes of simplicity, understandability, public
4 acceptability and feasibility of application.
- 5 2. Effectiveness in yielding total revenue requirements under the fair
6 return standard.
- 7 3. Stability of the rates themselves, with a minimum of unexpected
8 changes seriously adverse to existing customers (*i.e.*, gradualism).
- 9 4. Fairness of the rates in apportioning the total cost of service among
10 different consumers.
- 11 5. Avoidance of undue discrimination.
- 12 6. Efficiency of the rate classes and blocks in discouraging wasteful use
13 of service (*i.e.*, economic efficiency).⁴

14 The principles themselves are generally non-controversial. However, it is
15 generally recognized that they are sometimes in conflict with one another, hence
16 the need to achieve a balance. Prevailing rate designs for residential customers on
17 the national level are indicative of how that balance is achieved in practice.

18 **Q. HOW DO THE COMPANY’S PROPOSED RESIDENTIAL BASIC**
19 **FACILITIES COMPARE TO THOSE APPROVED BY REGULATORS IN**
20 **OTHER STATES?**

⁴ James Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 291.

1 A. The proposed basic facilities charges for the residential class cannot be described
 2 as anything other than extreme. They would result in the *highest* fixed monthly
 3 charges placed on residential customers of any investor-owned utility (“IOU”) in
 4 the country by a significant margin (\$3.00/month higher than the current highest
 5 charge of \$25.00/month). Furthermore, they would result in increases far in
 6 excess in both monetary and percentage terms, of increases approved by
 7 regulators in other states during rate cases filed during roughly the last four years,
 8 other Duke Energy affiliates, and those of corporations deemed comparable to
 9 Duke Energy as described in the Direct Testimony of Robert Hevert.⁵

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH YOU**
 11 **CONDUCTED TO SUPPORT THIS CLAIM.**

12 A. Table 1 below presents comparisons between current fixed monthly charge
 13 averages and DEC’s current (\$8.29/month) and proposed rates (\$28.00/month).
 14 Table 2 presents averages of *increases* approved in rate cases filed during the last
 15 four years relative to the Company’s proposed increase of \$19.71/month, or
 16 237.76%.

17 **Table 1: Fixed Charge Comparisons**

Basis of Comparison	Fixed Charge (\$)	DEC Current Difference (\$)	DEC Current Difference %	DEC Proposed Difference (\$)	DEC Proposed Difference %
National Average	\$10.42	-\$2.13	-20.47%	\$17.58	168.63%
DEC Affiliate Average	\$10.32	-\$2.03	-19.65%	\$17.68	171.39%
DEC Comparables	\$11.01	-\$2.72	-24.68%	\$16.99	154.38%
DEC Current	\$8.29				
DEC Proposed	\$28.00				

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⁵ Revised Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert (“Hevert Direct”), p. 17, Table 1.

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Table 2: Fixed Charge Increase Comparisons

Basis of Comparison	Increase (\$)	Increase (%)	DEC Above (\$)	DEC Above (%)
National Average	\$0.94	13.55%	\$18.77	224.21%
DEC Affiliate Average	\$2.83	45.65%	\$16.88	192.10%
DEC Comparables	\$1.02	15.41%	\$18.69	222.35%
DEC Proposed	\$19.71	237.76%		

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Table 1 shows that DEC's current residential customer charge is only moderately below the national average and the average for Duke Energy affiliates. Alternatively, though not presented in Table 1, the median fixed charge among IOUs, at \$9.50/month, is lower than the simple average. DEC's proposed charge of \$28.00/month is even more extreme relative to the median than the average.

The increase DEC proposes would place the residential customer charge well in excess of the national average and as shown in Table 2, and would dramatically exceed recent national averages for fixed charge increases and those awarded to Duke Energy affiliates. As with current fixed charges themselves, the median national increases in monetary and percentage terms are lower than the averages, at \$0.25/month and 2.9%. In monetary terms, DEC's proposed increase is *more than 20 times* the average monetary increase approved in recent years by regulators in other states. The percentage increase is *more than 17 times* the national average percentage increase.

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The five increases for Duke Energy affiliates in Table 2 refer to:

- A \$0/month (0%) increase granted to Duke Energy Ohio in 2018 resulting in a current rate of \$6.00/month.
- A \$6.50/month (144.4%) increase granted to Duke Energy Kentucky in 2018 resulting in a current rate of \$11.00/month.

- 1 • A \$2.56/month (39.4%) increase granted to Duke Energy Progress (SC)
2 in 2016 resulting in a current rate of \$9.06/month.
- 3 • A \$2.20/month (18.6%) increase granted to Duke Energy Carolinas (NC)
4 in 2018 resulting in a current rate of \$14.00/month.
- 5 • A \$2.87/month (25.8%) increase granted to Duke Energy Progress (NC)
6 in 2018 that results in a current rate of \$14.00/month.

7 Combined, these translate to the \$2.83/month and 45.65% averages
8 reflected in Table 2.

9 **Q. WHAT RESEARCH DID YOU CONDUCT TO DEVELOP THE DATA**
10 **UNDERLYING THESE RESULTS?**

11 A. I conducted a review of current residential customer charges for 172 IOUs in 49
12 states and the District of Columbia.⁶ The utilities in this survey encompass all
13 major IOUs and nearly all smaller IOUs in each state, thus the survey presents a
14 comprehensive national picture of residential fixed charges. I also conducted a
15 review of adopted increases in residential customer charges for IOU general rate
16 case applications filed since July 2014. A total of 178 general rate cases are
17 represented in this sample, though the total number of utilities is lower because
18 several utilities had multiple rate cases during this time frame. Consequently, the
19 sample of adopted increases reflects these utilities more than once. Both datasets
20 are current as of February 8, 2019.

⁶ Nebraska is the only state not represented in this survey. Nebraska is unique in that it is the only state served entirely by consumer-owned utilities not subject to external rate regulation.

1 As I noted above, the “comparable” utilities are based on the proxy
2 companies that DEC witness Hevert selected for his return on equity analysis. To
3 generate these averages, I selected all of the local distribution utilities affiliated
4 with these companies from my larger dataset of fixed charges and approved
5 increases.

6 **Q. WHY DID YOU INCLUDE A COMPARISON TO COMPANIES**
7 **“COMPARABLE” TO DEC IN YOUR ANALYSIS?**

8 A. DEC witness Hevert describes his selection of proxy companies as intended to
9 consist of those with “risk profiles comparable to the subject company.”⁷ To be
10 clear, none of his selection criteria involve an assessment of a company’s risk
11 profile based on revenue generated via fixed charges. However, it is inescapable
12 that fixed charges do have the effect of providing a high degree of certainty for a
13 portion of a utility’s revenue during a given month or year (*i.e.*, little or no risk of
14 under-recovery), making it less vulnerable to sales fluctuations.

15 I do not make any claims as to how fixed charge revenue may specifically
16 affect a utility’s risk profile. Nevertheless, I do believe that Mr. Hevert’s list of
17 proxy companies is illustrative insofar as it represents an additional basis for
18 comparing different utilities, and shows results similar to the national and Duke
19 Energy affiliate comparisons I have done. Certainly, the comparisons do not
20 suggest that the Company’s financial position presents a driving need for such a
21 large increase in order to reduce its risk profile.

⁷ Hevert Direct. p. 15, lines 11-12.

1 Q. SINCE YOU OBSERVE THAT GRADUALISM IS SOMEWHAT
2 SUBJECTIVE, HOW DO YOU SUGGEST THE COMMISSION
3 EVALUATE IT FOR THE PURPOSES OF SETTING THE BASIC
4 FACILITIES CHARGE?

5 A. The national statistics I have presented on residential fixed charges and recent
6 fixed charge increases are objective indicators of how gradualism is practiced for
7 the purpose of setting residential fixed charges. Whether one considers the
8 statistical means or medians the proper measure, the results are similar.
9 Alternatively, gradualism is often practiced by relating fixed charge increases to
10 the adopted percentage increase in class revenue. In this case, the Company's
11 proposed residential class base revenue increase is roughly 17.5%⁸ That
12 percentage increase equates to a residential basic facilities customer charge of
13 \$9.74/month. Such an approach is also objective because it stems from hard
14 numbers rather than subjective judgments.

15 Q. DOES THE COMPANY'S BASIC FACILITIES CHARGE ADHERE TO
16 THE PRINCIPLE OF GRADUALISM?

17 A. No, even using a very loose definition of the term. Duke Energy affiliates have
18 recently sought large fixed charge increases in other jurisdictions, but none as
19 drastic as what DEC has proposed here. As I have previously described, in North
20 Carolina the Company reduced the amount of the proposed increase in the basic
21 facilities charge by 50% relative to the amount indicated by its cost of service
22 study. While I disagree that the basis for the "cost justified" rate in its North

⁸ Based on Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 4 excluding riders.

1 Carolina cost of service study was accurate (as I do in the instant proceeding) or
2 that the North Carolina proposal reflected a reasonable adherence to gradualism,
3 the North Carolina proposal was at least somewhat more consistent with the
4 principle.

5 In fact, the Company's basic facilities proposal in this proceeding is even
6 more extreme than it appears at first glance. I say this because for the purpose of
7 establishing total class revenue requirements, the Company uses a rate impact
8 mitigation formula shown in Pirro Exhibit No. 4 as the "reduction in variance
9 from the average". Thus for the purpose of determining class revenue
10 requirements, the Company seeks to reduce how much class returns depart from
11 the system average, but does not attempt to create full unity in terms of class rate
12 of return at proposed rates. This reduces the overall residential class revenue
13 requirement from what is indicated by the Company's cost of service study.
14 However, the Company does not propose to make an equivalent downward
15 adjustment in the proposed basic facilities charges, making the basic facilities
16 charge an even larger component of overall rates than it would otherwise be.

17 **Q. WHY SHOULD CUSTOMER PREFERENCES BE CONSIDERED IN**
18 **RATE DESIGN?**

19 A. Customer preferences are an element of public acceptability. Inherent in utility
20 regulation is the idea that regulation should function as a substitute for
21 competition. Since customers cannot select their electric distribution provider
22 based on service characteristics or prices, regulation is critical for protecting them
23 from being sold goods that they do not want or need at a given price point. Or, the

1 corollary, to provide them with the services they do desire at a cost less than or
 2 equal to the value of the good. This concept has been referred to as using
 3 regulation to impose the “disciplines of competitive markets”.⁹

4 There are broader consequences to this idea, involving the costs and
 5 benefits of utility investments and how they are distributed among customers, but
 6 it is also central to rate design. Since customers cannot make their preferences
 7 known by shopping around, those preferences must be discerned through other
 8 means, such as studies or rate pilots. Customer preferences fall within Bonbright’s
 9 “practical attributes”, and should be balanced with the other ratemaking goals
 10 such as economic efficiency, rate stability, and fairness at apportioning cost of
 11 service. Ideally, in replicating the function of a competitive market, a customer
 12 would have a suite of potential options to choose from that maintain this balance
 13 but also respond to their individual preferences.

14 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY CONDUCTED ANY STUDIES OF CUSTOMER**
 15 **PREFERENCES REGARDING FIXED CHARGES?**

16 A. DEC has participated in an Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) study to
 17 consider residential rate design choices. The Company has indicated that the study
 18 addresses fixed charges.¹⁰ However, I have not been able to view the report
 19 because it is not publicly accessible, requiring a download fee of \$25,000.¹¹

⁹ F. Weston, et al., *Charges for Distribution Service: Issues in Rate Design*, p. 17, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2000), available at <http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/536F0210-2354-D714-51CF-037E9E00A724>.

¹⁰ DEC response to VS 4-3, attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.14.

¹¹ See the EPRI website at:

<https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002013359/?lang=en-US>.

1 **Q. WOULD IT BE REASONABLE FOR THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY**
2 **TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

3 A. Yes, and I say this without knowing the findings of the study. I leave how that
4 could or should occur to the Commission to decide. That said, I find it troubling
5 that the Company possesses information that appears likely to be highly relevant
6 to one of the most, if not the most, significant aspects of its application, which it
7 cannot or will not make available to other parties.

8 **Q. HOW WOULD THE COMPANY'S RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES**
9 **CHARGE PROPOSALS AFFECT CUSTOMER BILLS?**

10 A. Customers with relatively high usage would be advantaged, experiencing a lower
11 overall rate increase or even a decrease for the highest using customers. Lower
12 usage customers would be disadvantaged, experiencing rate increases well in
13 excess of the average rate increase. For instance, the Company's collective rates
14 proposals would cause a bill increase of \$17.23/month (27.3%) for a customer on
15 Schedule RS with average usage of 500 kWh per month. By contrast, a customer
16 using 2,000 kWh per month would only experience a \$9.75 (4.21%) monthly
17 increase. Table 3 shows the breakdown of bill impacts for Schedule RS.¹²

¹² Sourced from Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 3, with "Amount of Increase" added as a new column.

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Table 3: Schedule RS Rate Impacts at Different Usage Levels

Monthly kWh	Present Schedule Revenue	Proposed Schedule Revenue	Amount of Increase	Percent Increase
0	\$9.18	\$28.89	\$19.71	214.71%
100	\$19.96	\$39.18	\$19.21	96.24%
250	\$36.14	\$54.61	\$18.47	51.10%
500	\$63.10	\$80.33	\$17.23	27.30%
750	\$90.06	\$106.05	\$15.98	17.75%
1,000	\$117.02	\$131.76	\$14.74	12.60%
2,000	\$231.40	\$241.16	\$9.75	4.21%
3,000	\$345.79	\$350.55	\$4.76	1.38%
4,000	\$460.17	\$459.94	-\$0.23	-0.05%
5,000	\$574.55	\$569.33	-\$5.22	-0.91%
6,000	\$688.93	\$678.72	-\$10.21	-1.48%

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The impacts would be similar though not identical for customers on Schedule RE because they use more electricity on average than Schedule RS customers.

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Q. WHAT TYPES OF CUSTOMERS WOULD BE MOST ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THE LARGE INCREASE IN THE FIXED CHARGE?

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A. Starting at the highest level, the majority of customers on Schedule RS are made worse off by fixed charge rates as opposed to volumetric (\$/kWh) rates. A residential customer is indifferent to fixed versus volumetric charges at a monthly average use of roughly 1,050 kWh. In other words, if a fixed charge was translated to a volumetric charge that raises the same amount of revenue, a residential customer using 1,050 kWh per month would pay approximately the same amount as they would if the charge remained a fixed monthly amount.

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Customers using more than this indifference amount are better off with higher

1 fixed charges, while those using lesser amounts are worse off. Roughly 53% of
2 customers on Schedule RS use less than 1,000 kWh per month so the majority of
3 that class is made worse off.¹³ The farther a customer is from this indifference
4 point in terms of average usage, the greater the impacts are, so lowest usage
5 customers are the most adversely affected and the highest use customers stand to
6 benefit the most.

7 Net-metered customers on Schedule RS would be more adversely affected
8 than the RS class as a whole because 66.8% of these customers average less than
9 1,000 kWh of monthly usage.¹⁴ One would also expect customers with smaller
10 homes, fewer or smaller devices and appliances, and non-electric heating to be
11 made worse off because these customers would generally use less electricity.
12 Customers on Schedule RE, reserved for those with electric space and water
13 heating, are generally made better off. It is not precisely clear how the rate
14 impacts would vary by income level because the Company has not performed
15 such an analysis.¹⁵

16 However, the Company has provided information indicating that
17 households with annual incomes of \$30,000 or less have average usage of 913
18 kWh/month.¹⁶ This suggests that customers in this income category are generally
19 made worse off by fixed charges relative to volumetric charges since this average
20 usage falls below the indifference threshold. It is only suggestive though, because

¹³ DEC response to VS 1-7, attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ DEC response to VS 1-12(a), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.8.

¹⁶ DEC response to VS 5-1(a), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.18.

1 average usage does not indicate the percentage of customers in this income
2 category that fall below or above the indifference threshold.

3 **Q. IS THIS RESULT CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIR**
4 **APPORTIONMENT OF COST OF SERVICE AND ECONOMIC**
5 **EFFICIENCY?**

6 A. No. It causes lower usage customers to subsidize higher usage customers and
7 encourages wasteful use of service. The underlying causes of this outcome are the
8 flaws in the Minimum System Method, which reflects a significant amount of
9 demand-related costs as customer-related. In doing so, it eliminates the price
10 signal that would otherwise be present in rates for the costs of that demand. A
11 zero-load customer adds no demand to the system and therefore does not cause
12 any additional costs beyond those required for grid connection. In other words,
13 that customer does not impose any additional costs on the shared distribution
14 system. That customer does not take up any “space” on the system that could
15 otherwise be used to serve other customers. Yet that customer would still be
16 required to pay for a considerable amount of demand-related costs through the
17 Company’s proposed basic facilities charge. I discuss this flaw in the Minimum
18 System Method in more detail in Section II-B.

19 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF RATES THAT FAIL TO ENCOURAGE**
20 **ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR?**

21 A. It dampens consumer incentives to save electricity, either through behavioral
22 changes or investments in energy-efficient equipment and on-site generation such
23 as solar. That in turn compels additional utility spending to meet those increased

1 needs in the form of future generation, transmission, or distribution investments.
2 This adds risk to the system since some future costs may not be possible to know
3 with certainty (e.g., natural gas prices, coal ash remediation), whereas the present
4 costs of demand-side investments can be known.

5 Fixed charges also directly increase the costs of demand-side programs
6 that provide incentives for energy efficient equipment. By reducing customer
7 savings potential, the incentive necessary to encourage the same amount of
8 investment and achieve the same goals must be larger than it would otherwise be.

9 At the maximum basic facilities charge I propose in the following section of my
10 testimony (\$11.64/month), the energy rate would have to be 1.55 cents/kWh
11 higher to generate the same amount of revenue. A consumer replacing a
12 conventional air-source heat pump with an Energy Star rated model would save
13 roughly \$44 less per year and more than \$870 over a 20-year system lifetime
14 under Company's proposed basic facilities charge relative my recommended
15 charge.¹⁷

16 The foregone savings for even a moderately-sized on-site solar system
17 would be much larger. A five-kilowatt ("kW") residential solar system could be
18 expected to produce roughly 6,300 kWh annually in DEC's South Carolina
19 territory.¹⁸ Based on this, the foregone savings would be roughly \$98 annually

¹⁷ Based on default values in the Federal Energy Management Program's Energy- and Cost-savings Calculator for Energy-Efficient Products, *available at*: <https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/energy-and-cost-savings-calculators-energy-efficient-products>

¹⁸ Based on PVWatts outputs, for Greenville, South Carolina, *available at*: <https://pvwatts.nrel.gov/index.php>. Estimate accounts for energy output degradation at 1% annually.

1 and more than \$1,950 over a 20-year system lifetime. These impacts are sufficient
2 to make material impacts on consumer investment decisions.

3
4 B. The Validity of the Minimum System Method

5 **Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY ARRIVE AT THE PROPOSED BASIC**
6 **FACILITIES CHARGES?**

7 A. The charges are based on the customer unit costs derived from the Company's
8 embedded cost of service study. They represent the monthly payment that would
9 be required to raise the revenue associated with costs that the cost of service study
10 has classified as customer-related (*i.e.*, revenue divided by customer-months).
11 Customer-related costs refer to those that vary in relation to the number of
12 customers the utility serves, composed of costs associated with metering, billing,
13 customer service, and customer service drops.

14 To these costs the Company's cost of service study adds allocations for
15 more generalized administrative and general costs and classifies a significant
16 portion of the shared distribution system that exists beyond the customer
17 connection to the grid as customer-related. These shared distribution costs are
18 composed of line transformers (FERC Account 368), secondary and primary
19 overhead distribution lines (FERC Account 365), secondary and primary
20 distribution lines (FERC Account 367), underground conduit (FERC Account
21 366) and secondary and primary distribution poles (FERC Account 364). I refer to
22 these as the "shared" distribution system because unlike equipment such as meters

1 or a customer's service drop, the shared components serve the system as a whole
2 rather than individual customers.

3 The portion of the shared system that the Company classifies as customer-
4 related, as opposed to demand-related, is derived using the so-called Minimum
5 System Method. The Minimum System Method is based on the premise that a
6 portion of the shared distribution system is related to providing a customer with
7 the ability to take electric service. In other words, it assumes that a certain number
8 of poles and miles of wire are necessary to provide electric service even if a
9 customer had only a minimal demand.

10 **Q. HAS THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD HISTORICALLY BEEN USED**
11 **IN DEC'S SOUTH CAROLINA SERVICE TERRITORY?**

12 A. No. In 1991 on the recommendation of staff, Commission eliminated the use of
13 the Minimum System Method from the Company's South Carolina cost of service
14 study in favor of using a "more appropriate allocation factor."¹⁹

15 **Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD IS A**
16 **VALID METHOD OF CLASSIFYING DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COSTS**
17 **AND DEVELOPING BASIC FACILITIES CHARGES?**

18 A. No. It is not valid for either cost allocation or rate design, though more generally
19 the distinction between cost allocation and rate design is one that should be
20 appreciated. Rate design does not always have to, nor should it, replicate cost
21 allocation. It is sometimes appropriate to allocate certain costs in one way, but use

¹⁹ South Carolina Public Service Commission. Docket No. 91-216-E. Order No. 91-1022.
p. 7. November 18, 1991.

1 rate designs that reflect consideration of other factors of cost causation. The
2 Minimum System Method suffers from considerable flaws that make it unsuitable
3 for either purpose. It should be discarded entirely in favor of more reliable and
4 accurate methods of determining cost causation and responsibility.

5 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD AND HOW IT**
6 **AFFECTS RATEMAKING.**

7 A. As I previously noted, the theory behind the Minimum System Method is that the
8 distribution system is designed to not only serve customer demand, but also to
9 connect customers regardless of their need for electricity. That is, it assumes that
10 some costs of the shared distribution system are incurred solely for the purpose of
11 connecting each customer. It generally relies on an examination of the book costs
12 associated with each cost category (*e.g.*, poles and towers) to establish the costs
13 associated with a hypothetical distribution system that serves some minimal
14 amount of customer load.

15 In ratemaking, the results of a minimum system analysis influence how
16 distribution costs are allocated between rate classes. This is because the allocators
17 based on the number of customers in a class differ from those based on demand.
18 Generally speaking, the result of more costs being classified as customer-related
19 is a higher revenue requirement for classes with the largest number of customers
20 (*e.g.*, the residential class). In practice, it also has a cascading effect because other
21 cost allocators rely in part on the distribution-related allocators. Most directly, it
22 causes a larger share of distribution system operation and maintenance (“O&M”)

1 expenses to be classified as customer-related in line with the percentage of
2 distribution plant that is classified as customer-related.

3 More indirectly, allocating more of the revenue requirement or more
4 distribution plant to the residential class causes dynamic allocators based on net
5 plant or share of class revenue to also increase. Finally, it may also influence how
6 revenue is collected in the form of customer, demand, or energy charges to the
7 extent that charges are based on the classification of costs (*i.e.*, customer costs
8 collected via customer or basic facilities charges).

9 **Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY JUSTIFY THE CLASSIFICATION OF**
10 **SOME PORTIONS OF THE SHARED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AS**
11 **CUSTOMER-RELATED?**

12 A. Company Witness Hager relies on the National Association of Regulatory Utility
13 Commissioners (“NARUC”) Electric Utility Allocation Manual (“Cost Allocation
14 Manual”), which in her words “states that a portion of distribution costs related to
15 FERC Accounts 364-368 are customer-related.”²⁰ Having read through the
16 NARUC Cost Allocation Manual in detail on multiple occasions I can say that
17 this statement mischaracterizes its purpose and its contents in several key ways. I
18 will point to specific examples showing the inaccuracy of this statement later in
19 my testimony.

²⁰ Direct Testimony of Janice Hager (“Hager Direct”), p. 13, lines 4-6.

1 **Q. DOES THE MINIMUM SYSTEM TRULY REPRESENT A ZERO-LOAD**
2 **SYSTEM?**

3 A. No. Company Witness Hager states that the Company's minimum system study is
4 based on the infrastructure required to connect a customer with a *de minimus* load,
5 like a light bulb.²¹ However, in response to an information request, DEC stated
6 that the analysis is based on the smallest equipment that the Company customarily
7 installs.²²

8 There is a large amount of daylight between what the Company typically
9 installs versus what would actually be the smallest size equipment it would install
10 if all customers had *de minimus* lighting loads. In fact, for each category of
11 equipment the Company actually has smaller-sized equipment on its system than
12 what it chose for its minimum system analysis. That equipment is currently
13 contributing to serving full customer loads. Thus not only is the Company's
14 analysis not based on the smallest equipment necessary to meet a minimal load, it
15 has more load carrying capability than some portions of the existing utility system
16 that are serving the full demands of some customers.

17 In practice, it is not possible to accurately assess what a truly "minimum
18 system" would look like because such a system would be so dramatically different
19 from the current utility system and how customers use it. The departure from
20 reality extends to all levels of the system. For instance, in a near zero-load system
21 customer service drops would have smaller load carrying capacity and customer

²¹ Hager Direct, p. 14, line 19.

²² DEC response to VS 1-2(a), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.2.

1 purchases of electricity would be so small that metering, billing, and customer
2 service could be substantially simplified and less costly. Even meters themselves
3 might be unnecessary from a cost-effectiveness standpoint, and it stands to reason
4 that a near zero-load system would substantially affect the character of the
5 transmission and generation system. Ultimately, the specification of a minimum
6 system is a highly subjective departure from the reality of the system and how
7 customers use electric service, and which is made increasingly anachronistic by
8 growing customer loads and technological advances.

9 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE**
10 **MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD IS ANACHRONISTIC.**

11 **A.** In the early stages of electrification the concept of a minimum distribution system
12 would have at least been closer to the reality of the system because electricity
13 users were more dispersed and their electric loads were lower. That is, at some
14 point in the past people desired to be connected to the electric grid to light a small
15 number of light bulbs and perhaps sere a small electric appliance. Over time
16 though, as electricity loads grow, the “single light bulb” scenario departs further
17 and further from the reality of how customers use energy and why they desire to
18 be connected to the grid. The fact is that the equipment that a utility customarily
19 installs now to provide electric service is substantially larger and capable of
20 serving more load than what it would have installed decades ago. Furthermore,
21 with recent technological advances in the arena of distributed generation, modern
22 society would never choose to build a minimum distribution system because it

1 would be more costly to do so than other options of providing equivalent electric
2 service.

3 **Q. PLEASE ELABORATE ON YOUR CONTENTION THAT MODERN**
4 **SOCIETY WOULD NEVER CHOOSE TO BUILD A MINIMUM**
5 **ELECTRIC SYSTEM.**

6 A. In the modern day, if a person only desired electric service capable of lighting a
7 single light bulb they would not need a connection to the grid at all. A small self-
8 generation system composed of a solar panel and a small battery would be
9 sufficient to meet these needs at a lower cost than connecting to the grid.
10 Alternatively, customers might take service from small localized and isolated
11 grids rather than an interconnected system of distribution, transmission, and
12 centralized generation. Of course, a large grid exodus has not occurred because
13 customers do not desire a minimum system, they desire a system that can meet
14 their full electricity needs. Additional load beyond a bare minimum makes grid
15 isolation far more challenging for a customer from both a practical and economic
16 standpoint. The considerable complications of reliably serving their full demand
17 at all times are what compel customers to connect to the grid in the first place.

18 I have performed a high-level analysis of the cost of providing electricity
19 to a single light bulb from a grid isolated distributed generation (“DG”) system.
20 For the purposes of this analysis I assumed that the light bulb is a 17-Watt LED
21 bulb, the modern equivalent of a 100-Watt incandescent light bulb. The power
22 system is composed of a 300-Watt solar panel, a 100 Amp-hour deep cycle
23 battery, and a charge controller. All of these items are available off the shelf at a

1 local home improvement store. The total cost of such a system would be roughly
2 \$700, including \$100 in miscellaneous costs apart from the solar panel, battery,
3 and charge controller. In reality, in this hypothetical scenario the battery and solar
4 panel are oversized relative to the reasonable need because even if one used the
5 light consistently for 10 hours a day every day, a fully charged battery would
6 store enough electricity for nearly nine days of lighting and an average day of
7 solar production, even in the month of December, would be sufficient to provide
8 more than four full days of lighting electricity.

9 At a total cost of \$700, the monthly cost would be \$5.86/month if the
10 system lasted 10 years or \$11.72/month if it had only a five-year lifetime.²³ It
11 would fully pay for itself relative to the Company's proposed customer charge of
12 \$28.00/month in roughly two years. Of course, the solar panel, the single most
13 costly portion of this system would last for at least 20 years. If one assumes a 5-
14 year lifetime for the battery and charge controller, the 20-year cost would still
15 only be \$6.34/month. Again, these numbers are conservative because the on-site
16 system is overbuilt relative to the actual electricity service need. Regardless, no
17 reasonable customer would pay DEC's proposed basic facilities charge, or even
18 the current basic facilities charge, if they only wished to serve a minimal load.
19 The Company's hypothetical minimum system would never be built under these
20 circumstances.

²³ The customer would also avoid having to a small energy charge, roughly \$0.25/month if one assumes the same light bulb operation and an energy rate of \$0.05/kWh.

1 **Q. IS THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS**
2 **AN APPROPRIATE METHOD FOR CLASSIFYING DISTRIBUTION**
3 **SYSTEM COSTS?**

4 A. No. The Minimum System Method is based on the dubious premise that
5 customers will pay to connect to the distribution grid even if they do not intend to
6 use any electricity. In reality, a customer that has no demand for electricity would
7 have no need to be connected to the distribution system. Distribution costs are
8 caused by that demand and the customer density of a service territory, not by the
9 presence of the customer. A zero- or minimum-demand customer of the type
10 represented by the Minimum System Study or the Zero-Intercept variant simply
11 does not exist.

12 Taken to its furthest extent, the flawed premise underlying the Minimum
13 System Method effectively assumes that any distribution cost not proven to fall
14 into another category must be customer-related. Dr. James Bonbright discusses
15 this line of thinking in his seminal work *Principles in Public Utility Rates*. Dr.
16 Bonbright acknowledges that one could devise a so-called minimum system, but
17 dismisses the notion that the costs of that system are customer-related, referring to
18 them as “unallocable”.

19 What this last-named cost imputation overlooks, of course, is the
20 very weak correlation between the area (or the mileage) of a
21 distribution system and the number of customers served by this
22 system. For it makes no allowance for the density factor
23 (customers per linear mile or per square mile). *Indeed, if the*
24 *company's entire service area stays fixed, an increase in the*
25 *number of customers does not necessarily betoken any increase*
26 *whatever in the costs of a minimum-sized distribution system...*
27

1 But if the hypothetical cost of a minimum-sized distribution
 2 system is properly excluded from the demand-related costs...
 3 while it is also denied a place among the customer costs...to
 4 which cost function does it then belong? The only defensible
 5 answer, in my opinion, is that it belongs to none of them. Instead,
 6 it should be recognized as a strictly unallocable portion of total
 7 costs...But fully-distributed cost analyst dare not avail himself
 8 of this solution, since they are prisoners of his own assumption
 9 that “the sum of the parts is equal to the whole.” *He is therefore*
 10 *under impelling pressure to fudge his cost apportionments by*
 11 *using the category of customer costs as a dumping ground for*
 12 *costs that he cannot plausibly impute to any of their other cost*
 13 *categories.*²⁴ [emphasis added]
 14

15 **Q. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATONS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL**
 16 **MINIMUM SYSTEM HAVING THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT NON-ZERO**
 17 **CUSTOMER LOADS?**

18 **A.** It causes demand to be double-counted. A given class receives an allocation based
 19 on the minimum system on a per-customer basis, but because that minimum
 20 system has some level of load carrying capability, it contains demand-related
 21 costs. That same class is then allocated the remaining distribution costs based on
 22 their full demands. This tends to have disproportionately large impacts on
 23 residential classes because those classes typically have the largest number of
 24 customers, and are allocated comparatively more of the costs the Minimum
 25 System Method classifies as customer-related.

26 In light of this criticism, an alternative method typically referred to as the
 27 Zero-Intercept or Minimum Intercept Method has sometimes been used to classify
 28 distribution system costs as customer- or demand-related. The Zero-Intercept

²⁴ Dr. James Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, p. 348-349, Columbia University Press (1961).

1 Method uses statistical regression techniques to define the relationship between
2 cost and load-serving capability. The result is a curve where equipment costs sit
3 on one axis and load-serving capability sits on the other. Following the curve to
4 the point where load-serving capability is zero (*i.e.*, the zero-intercept) produces
5 an implied cost for equipment that is not capable of supporting any load.

6 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY PERFORMED A ZERO-INTERCEPT ANALYSIS?**

7 A. No. Company Witness Hager states that it has not done so because the analysis is
8 more complex and often does not produce results much different than the
9 Minimum System Method.²⁵ I find this explanation strange and unconvincing
10 because the Company is clearly capable of performing complex analyses, such as
11 a cost of service study or an integrated resource plan, and it is not possible to
12 know whether such an analysis would produce results similar to the Minimum
13 System Method unless one actually performs the study.

14 **Q. DO OTHER STATES USE THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM**
15 **METHOD FOR SETTING CUSTOMER CHARGES?**

16 A. Many states confine the definition of “customer” costs to those costs that are
17 directly attributable to a customer, such as metering and billing, excluding
18 portions of the distribution system shared by multiple customers. A report
19 commissioned by the NARUC found that this “Basic Customer Method” (100%
20 demand for shared distribution facilities and 100% customer for meters and
21 services) was the most common approach at the time of the report:

²⁵ Hager Direct. p. 14, lines 6-9.

1 There are a number of methods for differentiating between the
2 customer and demand components of embedded distribution plant.
3 The most common method used is the customer method, which
4 classifies all poles, wires, and transformers as demand-related and
5 meters, meter-reading, and billing as customer-related. This
6 general approach is used in more than thirty states.²⁶

7 In other states, some portion of the shared distribution system may be
8 considered customer-related and allocated on that basis, but the methodology used
9 can vary from state to state.

10 Rate design practices are likewise variable because rate design involves a
11 balance of numerous competing objectives, such as fairness, stability,
12 effectiveness at meeting revenue requirements, cost causation, and customer
13 acceptance. The balancing reflects the fact that these objectives are frequently in
14 conflict with one another. As I showed in Section II-A of my testimony,
15 regulators have *never* adopted residential fixed charges at the level proposed by
16 the Company.

17 **Q. IS THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD ENDORSED BY NARUC FOR**
18 **COST ALLOCATION OR RATE DESIGN PURPOSES?**

19 **A.** No. First, the NARUC Cost Allocation Manual, as indicated by its title, addresses
20 only cost allocation. It does not purport to address rate design based on the results
21 of embedded cost studies. Second, the Cost Allocation Manual refers to the
22 Minimum System Method as *one* method of classifying distribution costs, but it

²⁶ F. Weston, et al., *Charges for Distribution Service: Issues in Rate Design*, p. 19, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2000), available at <http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/536F0210-2354-D714-51CF-037E9E00A724>.

1 does not endorse any method in particular. The preface expressly states this in the
2 context of the objectives for the document, as follows:

3 The writing style should be non-judgmental, not advocating any
4 one particular method, but trying to include all currently used
5 methods with pros and cons.²⁷

6 The section on distribution cost allocation protocols goes on to note that
7 the results are directly related to the assumptions used, such as how the minimum
8 size distribution equipment is selected. Furthermore, the document includes
9 statements advising readers of methodological concerns present with the
10 Minimum System Method and highlighting that the issue of distribution cost
11 classification is in no way settled, as follows:

12 [M]inimum-size distribution equipment has a certain load-carrying
13 capability, which can be viewed as a demand-related cost.²⁸

14
15 The major issue in establishing the marginal cost of the distribution
16 system is the determination of *what costs, if any, should be*
17 *classified as customer related*, rather than demand and energy
18 related. *The issue is a carry-over of the unresolved argument in*
19 *embedded cost studies* with the added query of whether the
20 distribution costs usually identified as customer related are, in fact,
21 marginal.²⁹ [emphasis added]

22
23 Contrary to Company Witness Hager's statements, the Cost Allocation
24 Manual does not affirm the Minimum System Method as the "right" way to
25 allocate costs of the shared distribution system, or any method for that matter.
26 Furthermore, it does not endorse the use of unit costs derived from cost allocation

²⁷ NARUC. Electric Utility Cost Allocation Manual. p. ii. 1991.

²⁸ *Id.* p. 95.

²⁹ *Id.* p 136.

1 studies for setting the rates for different types of charges, such as basic facilities
2 charges.

3 **Q. DO YOU SUPPORT THE USE OF A ZERO-INTERCEPT STUDY TO**
4 **IDENTIFY CUSTOMER AND DEMAND-RELATED COMPONENTS OF**
5 **THE SHARED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM?**

6 A. No. A Zero-Intercept analysis would be better than what the Company has put
7 forth since it at least attempts to isolate and remove the demand component to
8 avoid double-counting. However, it still fails to reflect the fact that a zero-load
9 customer would have no need to be connected to the grid.

10 **Q. WHAT APPROACH DO YOU THEN RECOMMEND THAT THE**
11 **COMMISSION ADOPT FOR THE CONDUCT OF COST OF SERVICE**
12 **STUDIES?**

13 A. I recommend that the Commission use the Basic Customer Method because it
14 more reliability avoids any double-counting of demand, is far simpler to execute,
15 and is more broadly accepted as an appropriate mechanism. Furthermore, it
16 reduces the downstream effects that classifying any portion of shared distribution
17 system has on other dynamic allocators that derive in part from how distribution
18 plant is classified. This avoids rendering the customer costs category “a dumping
19 ground” for unallocable costs that Dr. Bonbright cautions against.

1 Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMPANY'S
2 MINIMUM SYSTEM STUDY AND THE ACCOMPANYING IMPACTS IT
3 HAS ON THE COMPANY'S COST OF SERVICE STUDY?

4 A. Yes. As I previously observed, the Minimum System Method tends to result in the
5 more costs being allocated to the residential class because it defines more costs as
6 customer-related and the residential class has more individual customers than
7 other classes. Therefore, if class rates of return under present rates are evaluated,
8 the residential class shows a lower rate of return than it would without a minimum
9 system assumption. As shown in Pirro Exhibit No. 4, with the Minimum System
10 Method incorporated into the Company's cost of service study, the return at
11 present rates for the collective residential class is 3.82% while the system-wide
12 return is 4.64%. This suggests that the residential class is underperforming
13 relative to other classes (*i.e.*, being subsidized by other classes).

14 However, with the minimum system assumption removed, the residential
15 class shows a return at present rates of 4.40%, only slightly less than the system-
16 wide return at present rates. In addition, discarding the minimum system method
17 generally reduces the class variance from the system average rate of return,
18 meaning that all classes produce returns closer to the system average. Only the
19 lighting class, the smallest rate class, shows an increase (a modest one) in terms of
20 departure from the system average rate of return.³⁰

21 This is significant because when evaluating the potential for inter-class
22 subsidies, a no minimum system assumption provides a more accurate assessment

³⁰ DEC response to VS 1-8, attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.6.

1 of class returns at present rates because it reflects the class return under the
2 adopted cost allocation methods from which present rates are derived. Since the
3 variance from the average rate of return under a no minimum system assumption
4 is smaller than with a minimum system assumption, it follows that the no
5 minimum system assumption is in fact better at accurately assigning class cost
6 responsibility. With lower variances from average, less rate increase mitigation is
7 required and the ultimate class returns after the rate increase and mitigation are
8 clustered more closely around the system average rate of return. From a cost
9 allocation standpoint, a no minimum system assumption produces more rational
10 results.

11

12 C. An Appropriate Maximum Residential Customer Charge

13 **Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR SETTING RESIDENTIAL**
14 **CUSTOMER CHARGES?**

15 A. The customer charge should reflect the cost of a customer that does not impose a
16 demand or consume energy. This cost is represented by the incremental cost of
17 connecting a customer (*i.e.*, the marginal cost), which is generally limited to the
18 costs for a meter and service drop along with expenses for meter reading, billing,
19 and customer service.³¹ Another way to view the appropriate role of the customer
20 charge that typically produces a similar result is to define customer-related costs

³¹ Jim Lazar & Wilson Gonzalez, *Smart Rate Design for a Smart Future*, at 36, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (July 2015), <http://www.raonline.org/document/download/id/7680>.

1 as those that vary directly with the number of customers.³² However, it is a
2 mistake to conflate the costs associated with such a zero-load customer with costs
3 that are not directly correlated with customer demand or energy consumption.
4 Many joint system costs vary more indirectly with one or more cost categories
5 and consequently do not fall neatly within the customer, demand, or energy
6 classification.

7 **Q. BASED ON YOUR REVIEW OF THE COMPANY'S COST OF SERVICE**
8 **STUDY, WHAT WOULD BE A REASONABLE MAXIMUM**
9 **RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHARGE?**

10 A. The Company's cost of service study shows that if the minimum system method
11 is removed, the residential customer charge based on the customer unit cost is
12 \$15.86/month.³³ I have calculated a reasonable *maximum* residential customer
13 charge of \$11.64/month, based on eliminating the use of the Minimum System
14 Method and then excluding a series of other cost components that do not relate to
15 metering, billing, customer service, or the customer's connection to the shared
16 distribution grid. I emphasize that this as a reasonable *maximum* charge because
17 the Commission should also consider other ratemaking principles, such as
18 gradualism, when determining the appropriate charge.

19 My derivation is largely reflective of how the Connecticut Public Utilities
20 Regulatory Authority ("PURA") determined the appropriate costs includable

³² *Id.* at 83.

³³ This translates to \$16.01/month after adjusting for differences in how the Company counts customers for deriving the customer charge versus the customer counts used in the cost of service study.

1 within a Maximum Residential Customer Charge (“MRCC) in response to 2015
 2 legislation limiting residential customer charges to costs directly associated with
 3 billing, metering, customer service, and the customer’s service connection. The
 4 PURA conducted a year-long proceeding to develop a clear and consistent
 5 methodology, culminating in the issuance of a decision in December 2017 and
 6 subsequent revisions to utility charges. I believe the PURA’s determinations
 7 represent a thorough, well-reasoned, and readily understandable evaluation of the
 8 costs directly attributable to metering, billing, customer service, and the
 9 customer’s service connection.^{34 35}

10 **Q. WHAT COST COMPONENTS HAVE YOU EXCLUDED FROM THE**
 11 **CALCULATION OF THE MAXIMUM RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER**
 12 **CHARGE IN ARRIVING AT THE \$11.64/MONTH FIGURE?**

13 A. The costs I have excluded, and the reasons I excluded them are as follows:

14 1. AMI Amortized O&M: AMI serves energy- and demand-related functions far
 15 beyond the simple measurement of customer consumption for billing
 16 purposes, and the customer charge already includes the cost of non-AMI
 17 metering via recovery of the un-depreciated costs of those meters.

³⁴ Connecticut Office of Legislative Research. *Maximum Residential Customer Charge Research Report*. June 12, 2018, available at: <https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0151.pdf>.

³⁵ PURA Docket No. 17-01-12. Final Decision dated December 20, 2017, available at: <http://www.dpuc.state.ct.us/dockcurr.nsf/8e6fc37a54110e3e852576190052b64d/484ed9e80c8e0044852581fc0070a1f6?OpenDocument>.

- 1 2. Overhead Line Maintenance (FERC Account 593): Overhead lines are
2 primarily part of the shared distribution system, not connecting the customer
3 to that system, or serving billing, metering, or customer service functions.³⁶
- 4 3. Uncollectable Accounts (FERC Account 904): Uncollectables are a general
5 cost of doing business that have no relationship to the customer's connection
6 to the grid. Any direct labor associated with collection activities would be
7 contained in FERC Account 903, which I have not excluded.
- 8 4. Sales and Advertising Expenses (FERC Accounts 911-917): These accounts
9 relate to activities such as the promotion of the sale of electricity, customer
10 retention, and other work for sales purposes. While they may appear to be
11 superficially related to customer service, direct customer service and
12 assistance is logged in other accounts that I have not excluded.³⁷
- 13 5. Miscellaneous Distribution Expenses (FERC Account 588): This account is a
14 catch-all for costs that cannot be directly attributed to a more specific purpose.
15 If these costs were truly customer-related they would be included in other
16 applicable accounts (*e.g.*, metering expenses).
- 17 6. Load Dispatch (FERC Account 581): Load dispatch relates to activities
18 associated with operation of the shared distribution system, such as voltage

³⁶ This account may include expenses associated with customer service drops, but it is not possible to separate these out based on the information I have access to. The PURA allows this account to be included in the MRCC calculation, but directs that utilities exclude all costs not associated with the customer's service connection.

³⁷ FERC Account 909 is also associated with miscellaneous informational, instructional, and advertising expenses and therefore merits exclusion as well. However, the Company's cost of service study groups FERC Accounts 906-910 together so it is not possible to separate includable costs in the other accounts from those associated with FERC Account 909.

1 control and switching. It does not relate to the customer connection, metering,
2 billing, or customer service.

3 7. Distribution Pole Rental Revenues (FERC Account 454): This account
4 represents an additional charge in my calculations, since it assigns additional
5 revenue that offsets costs to the customer-related category. In order to
6 maintain consistency with excluding shared system costs from the customer
7 charge, additional revenues that relate to the shared system should be
8 excluded as well.

9 8. Carolinas West Control Center Depreciation and Amortization: These costs
10 relate to the general operation and management of the electric grid, not
11 customer connections, metering, billing or customer service.

12 9. Grid Improvement Plan Depreciation and Amortization: As I discuss in more
13 detail in Section V of my testimony, the Grid Improvement Plan does not
14 feature investments associated with customer connections, metering, billing or
15 customer service.

16 **Q. DID YOU EXCLUDE ANY GENERAL PLANT OR GENERAL**
17 **ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES IN YOUR CALCULATION OF AN**
18 **APPROPRIATE MAXIMUM RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHARGE?**

19 A. I made no exclusions beyond those described above, though it may be appropriate
20 to do so. The Company's cost of service study allocates administrative and
21 general expenses (FERC Accounts 920 – 931) and plant (FERC Accounts 389 –
22 399) based on a Labor allocator or other generalized allocators (e.g., total net
23 plant in service, distribution plant). These plant accounts pertain to assets like

1 office furniture, tools, transportation and communications equipment, while the
2 expense accounts relate to things like salaries not charged to another account,
3 office supplies, insurance, and employee pensions.

4 The Connecticut PURA allows the plant accounts to be included in the
5 calculation of MRCC, but has directed utilities to use a direct assignment
6 methodology (*i.e.*, an examination at the individual asset level) to determine the
7 portions of plant related to the applicable statutory functions. With respect to
8 expenses, it permits the inclusion of property insurance, injuries and damage, and
9 employee pensions and benefits in the MRCC calculation without requiring direct
10 assignment, but requires direct assignment for expenses associated with non-
11 specific salaries (FERC Account 920), office supplies (FERC Account 921), and
12 consultant services (FERC Account 923) with a rebuttable presumption that these
13 costs are not includable in the MRCC. It excludes the remaining administrative
14 and general expenses entirely.

15 I have not made any adjustments to these costs in my calculation because I
16 have no way to discern appropriate direct assignments, and the version of
17 Company's cost of service study that I have access to groups plant and expenses
18 into broad categories (*i.e.*, FERC Accounts 920-931) rather than displaying
19 components at the individual FERC Account level.³⁸

³⁸ The PURA also excluded FERC Account 371 relating to installations on the customer premises on the customer side of the electric meter under the rationale that such costs should be addressed by direct assignment. The Company includes a small amount of plan in this account for customers on Schedule RE.

1 **Q. WHY IS DIRECT ASSIGNMENT IMPORTANT WHEN IT COMES TO**
2 **THE PROPER ASSIGNMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL**
3 **COSTS?**

4 A. Administrative and general costs are highly diverse and many categories bear no
5 relationship to the costs associated with connecting a customer to the grid. For
6 instance, executive compensation and aviation expenses are logged as general
7 costs and allocated using a Labor allocator in the Company's cost of service
8 study. The use of the Labor allocator results in a portion of these costs being
9 classified as customer related. The exact amount depends on the class and cost of
10 service study assumptions, but under the Company's minimum system cost of
11 service study, for the RS class the Labor allocator logs 22.5% of these costs as
12 customer-related. Under a no minimum system cost of service approach, the
13 percentage is lower at 15.8%.³⁹

14 These amounts are often small individually, but they add up, and
15 regardless of their individual size it is inappropriate for them to be considered
16 customer-related components that contribute to the basic facilities charge. This
17 downstream effect also highlights the less easily observable impacts of utilizing
18 the Minimum System Method for cost allocation or as an input to rate design. To
19 wit, the use of the Minimum System Method invariably causes greater amounts of
20 costs that have no discernable relationship to the number of customers a utility
21 serves to be classified as customer-related.

³⁹ See DEC responses to VS 1-20 depicting pro forma adjustments to administrative and general expenses under a minimum system assumption and separately under a no minimum system assumption, Exhibit JRB-2, p. 10.

1 Q. YOU PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT COSTS THAT VARY DIRECTLY
2 WITH THE NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS ARE REASONABLE TO
3 INCLUDE IN THE CUSTOMER CHARGE. PLEASE THEN EXPLAIN
4 MORE DETAIL WHY YOU EXCLUDED AMI COSTS IN YOUR
5 CALCULATION.

6 A. While it is true that metering and associated metering costs are typically
7 recovered through fixed monthly charges, AMI is not “typical” metering. As I
8 previously stated, fixed customer charges should recover the cost of connecting a
9 customer to the grid. Advanced metering and the associated incremental costs
10 above traditional meters are not strictly necessary for the customer to be
11 connected to the grid. A non-advanced meter and associated infrastructure can do
12 so at lower costs. AMI is used for much more than measurement of a customer’s
13 consumption for billing purposes. Furthermore, since customers do not have a
14 meaningful choice of whether to take service through an advanced meter from a
15 cost perspective, those customers are not truly “causing” the incremental
16 advanced metering costs. Treating AMI costs exclusively as customer-related just
17 because they relate to “metering” and consequently recovering them through a
18 fixed charge is an oversimplification of the cost causation factors at play.

19 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ATTRIBUTE THE COSTS OF AMI AS
20 RELATED PRIMARILY TO PRODUCING ENERGY AND PEAK
21 DEMAND SAVINGS?

22 Yes. The incremental costs of AMI above traditional metering are more
23 accurately viewed as primarily energy- and/or demand-related because AMI

1 deployment is generally undertaken with a goal of producing system cost savings
2 associated at least in part with energy- or demand-related functions, or system
3 operation and reliability. Furthermore, including these costs as a component of a
4 fixed monthly charge works at cross-purposes with the goal of enabling greater
5 customer control over their energy bills. Finally, it is fundamentally unfair to
6 require customers to effectively pay two fixed metering charges at the same time,
7 one for the un-depreciated cost of legacy meters and one for AMI infrastructure
8 and associated O&M costs.

9 **Q. ARE NOT CUSTOMERS CURRENTLY BENEFITTING FROM AMI**
10 **DEPLOYMENT?**

11 A. They are according to Company estimates, but not in amounts commensurate with
12 the costs. The annual revenue requirement associated with the Company's
13 proposal to amortize deferred AMI costs is \$15 million.⁴⁰ Company Witness
14 Schneider estimates that during 2017, it avoided costs of \$540,000 via remote
15 order fulfillment capability and \$524,000 via remote meter reading capability
16 made possible by AMI.⁴¹

17 **Q. ARE THE COMPANY'S STATED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMI**
18 **DEPLOYMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE GOAL OF PRODUCING**
19 **ENERGY AND DEMAND COST SAVINGS?**

20 A. Unfortunately, the Company's plans in this area lack specificity and to my
21 knowledge the Company has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of AMI

⁴⁰ Direct Testimony of Kim H. Smith ("Smith Direct"), p. 24, line 19.

⁴¹ Direct Testimony of Donald Schneider ("Schneider Direct"), p. 10, line 20 through p. 21 line 4.

1 deployment in South Carolina. Company Witnesses Hunsicker and Pirro
2 obliquely reference AMI, coupled with the new Customer Connect billing system,
3 as enabling its ability to offer more advanced rate designs in the future. For
4 instance, Company Witness Hunsicker states “As referenced in Witness Pirro’s
5 testimony, the deployment of Customer Connect combined with the nearly
6 complete installation of AMI meters across the Company’s service territory will
7 unlock the tools required to bill innovative rate designs using interval level data to
8 customers.”⁴² Company Witness Pirro notes that while the Company has not
9 proposed any new peak or real-time pricing designs, it continues to review “rate
10 designs that offer customers opportunities to respond to price signals to achieve a
11 lower cost for electric service.”⁴³

12 Nevertheless, the AMI cost-benefit analysis the Company was ordered to
13 conduct in North Carolina provides useful information on this topic, showing that
14 expected AMI benefits to customers are dominated by benefits unrelated to
15 customer-specific costs. Roughly 28% of the estimated long-term benefits display
16 a clear connection to the customer classification, composed of reduced metering
17 reading costs, reduced meter operations costs (including remote connection and
18 disconnection), and reduced failure of legacy meters. The remaining benefits are
19 associated with outage restoration O&M, “miscellaneous” O&M, capital cost

⁴² Direct Testimony of Retha Hunsicker (“Hunsicker Direct”), p. 12, lines 8-12.

⁴³ Pirro Direct, p. 11, lines 6-8.

1 savings such as distribution loading analysis and improved capacitor bank
2 placement, and “non-technical line loss reduction”.⁴⁴

3 Non-technical line loss reduction provides the single largest estimated
4 benefit, totaling roughly 63% of total estimated benefits.⁴⁵ This category of
5 benefit refers to additional revenue capture from a reduction in instances of meter
6 non-performance, power theft, equipment errors, and misconfiguration.⁴⁶ Such
7 revenue erosion is a generalized cost of doing business without any clear tie to
8 customer-related utility functions somewhat akin to uncollectable accounts. When
9 decisions about the merits of AMI deployment are based on future customer
10 benefits of this type, the cost of AMI is properly attributable to achieving those
11 benefits.

12 Furthermore, while the Company has not provided any analysis of
13 potential energy and demand savings enabled by AMI via advanced rate designs,
14 it is generally accepted and recognized that such future savings are one of the
15 primary reasons for AMI deployment. As I discuss in more detail later in my
16 testimony, North Carolina regulators have expressly emphasized peak demand
17 and energy savings as a key benefit of AMI deployment. I encourage the
18 Commission to do so here as well, both from the perspective of the rate design for

⁴⁴ NCUC. Docket No. E-100, Sub 147. 2017 Smart Grid Technologies Plans of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC. October 2, 2017. Appendix C, Exhibit C. Available at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=21f06c4c-f377-4425-a865-65b777e6a18b>

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.* Appendix C, Exhibit F.

1 AMI cost recovery and the need for prompt development of innovative rate
2 designs that make these savings possible.

3 **Q. ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT AMI COSTS BE ALLOCATED IN A**
4 **MANNER OTHER THAN ON A PER CUSTOMER BASIS?**

5 A. No. AMI costs vary directly with the number of meters that must be installed.
6 Therefore, it is reasonable to allocate these costs based on the number of
7 customers. The residential class requires more meters therefore it should bear an
8 equivalent portion of the costs. However, rate design should reflect the fact that
9 the costs are not attributable to the decisions of individual customers, and that the
10 incremental costs of AMI are related primarily, if not exclusively, to long-term
11 energy and demand cost savings for individual ratepayers and the system as a
12 whole.

13 **Q. GIVEN THAT AMI AND THE COMPANY'S CUSTOMER CONNECT**
14 **SYSTEM ARE PART OF AN INTEGRATED PLATFORM, HAVE YOU**
15 **MADE ANY ADJUSTMENTS TO HOW THE COSTS OF CUSTOMER**
16 **CONNECT ARE APPROPRIATE TO REFLECT IN RATE DESIGN?**

17 A. No, but such an adjustment could be reasonable. The Customer Connect system is
18 an integral element to realizing the full value of AMI (and its associated benefits)
19 and is designed to possess capabilities far beyond those necessary for simple
20 billing purposes. It follows that a portion of Customer Connect costs likewise
21 have an energy- and demand-related purpose. If 50% of Customer Connect
22 expenses related to O&M and depreciation and amortization were removed from

1 the customer-related classification, my calculation of a maximum reasonable
2 basic facilities charge would be reduced by \$0.34/month to \$11.30/month.

3 **Q. AT WHAT AMOUNT DO YOU RECOMMEND THE COMMISSION SET**
4 **THE RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES CHARGE?**

5 A. I recommend that the residential basic facilities charge be increased by no more
6 than the percentage revenue increase the Commission adopts for the residential
7 class. Under the Company's proposed cost of service study, including the use of
8 the Minimum System Method, this would result in an increase of \$1.45/month to
9 \$9.74/month. Removing the Minimum System Method produces a slightly lower
10 residential revenue increase and percentage increase, which would lead to a
11 \$1.33/month increase in the basic facilities charge to \$9.62/month. This method
12 strikes a reasonable balance between cost-based pricing and gradualism,
13 especially considering the partially energy- and demand-related aspects of
14 Customer Connect, and the fact that a detailed examination of general and
15 administrative costs was not possible.

16 It also produces a result that is similar to what the Company proposed in
17 North Carolina based on my derivation of maximum cost-based pricing. The
18 increases shown above would move customers roughly 40% of the way towards
19 the maximum charge of \$11.64/month that I have derived. The increase would
20 also be slightly above national averages, but not dramatically so, partly due to the
21 fact that DEC's current charge is moderately below the national average. Overall,
22 this strikes a reasonable balance between competing ratemaking objectives.

23

1 **III. SOLAR BENEFITS IN COST OF SERVICE**

2 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN IN GENERAL HOW ON-SITE SOLAR**
3 **GENERATION AFFECTS AN EMBEDDED COST OF SERVICE STUDY?**

4 **A.** On-site solar generation helps avoid both current and future costs. I focus here on
5 how on-site solar affects the allocation of costs in the Company's embedded cost
6 of service study. In this frame, on-site solar generation reduces and shifts load
7 placed on the generation, transmission, and distribution system by way of
8 reductions in customer loads and exports to the grid. This load reduction and
9 shifting translates to changes in both jurisdictional and South Carolina retail class
10 allocations. That is, when on-site solar generation reduces load in South Carolina
11 at the time of the Company's summer coincident peak, South Carolina customers
12 are allocated fewer costs for utility functions for which allocators are based on
13 contribution to the system peak (*i.e.*, production demand and transmission). The
14 same effect occurs at the retail customer class level.

15 A similar effect can occur at the distribution level, for which costs are
16 allocated based on non-coincident class peak demand. While solar does not
17 generally reduce the non-coincident peaks of individual customers, it can do so at
18 the customer class level if the timing of the class peak coincides with a time
19 period where solar production is occurring. By reducing class demand at that
20 hour, solar may equivalently reduce the class peak to a lower amount, or may
21 cause the class peak hour to shift to another hour with a lower class peak (*i.e.*, the
22 reduction may not have a 1:1 relationship to generation).

1 **Q. CAN THE IMPACTS OF THESE AFFECTS BE QUANTIFIED?**

2 A. Yes. I have estimated that residential net-metered solar production at the time of
3 the Company's test year coincident peak can be expected to have reduced
4 production demand and transmission demand costs allocated to the residential
5 customer class by roughly \$1.08 million dollars. This amount is composed of
6 roughly \$249,000 representing the residential class's share of jurisdictional cost
7 savings and roughly \$827,000 representing South Carolina retail allocation
8 savings. Other classes benefitted from the remaining jurisdictional cost savings of
9 roughly \$395,000.

10 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU MADE THESE CALCULATIONS.**

11 A. I first developed an estimate for what residential solar production would have
12 been at the time of the retail system peak, the hour ending at 3 PM on August 17,
13 2017. For my estimate, I used PVWatts to develop an average solar capacity
14 factor for the hour ending at 3 PM during the month of August. This is reflective
15 of a "typical meteorological year" as used by PVWatts. I applied this to data
16 provided by the Company showing that as of the date of the peak, it had roughly
17 26.3 MW-DC of residential solar net-metered capacity on the system.⁴⁷ I also
18 grossed up the expected solar capacity contribution for marginal capacity losses.

19 I then used this capacity contribution to calculate revised production cost
20 allocators that reflect a no residential solar assumption. To do this I added the
21 solar capacity contribution to applicable system-wide, South Carolina, and

⁴⁷ DEC response to VS 4-11(b), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.16. This response states that this figure is for July 31, 2018, but, per confirmation of DEC counsel, the correct date is July 31, 2017.

1 residential class peaks. These alternates produce higher percentage allocators to
2 South Carolina and the South Carolina residential customer class. For instance,
3 the residential class percentage of the system peak is roughly 0.23% higher under
4 a no residential solar scenario. Applying the percentage differences to the sum of
5 production demand and transmission demand revenues produces the monetary
6 benefits.

7 **Q. DOES THIS REFLECT THE FULL RANGE OF BENEFITS PRODUCED**
8 **BY NET METERED SOLAR SYSTEMS TODAY?**

9 A. No. It only reflects residential systems that existed at the time of the test year
10 peak, excluding all non-residential systems and residential systems installed since
11 then. The savings will grow over time, though they will not be realized until the
12 results of a new cost of service study are reflected in rates. The savings amounts
13 that I have estimated will persist until a new cost of service study is conducted
14 and reflected in rates as an annual benefit because they are based on annual
15 revenue amounts.

16 In addition, the savings amounts do not reflect potential residential class
17 benefits from reductions in non-coincident class peak due to direct reductions or
18 shifting. The data necessary to conduct an examination of this potential source of
19 savings is not available. They also do not reflect the incremental value of net
20 metered energy generation, as reflected in difference between the marginal time
21 differentiated value of net metered generation and the base energy rate.

1 **Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SAVINGS DATA YOU HAVE**
2 **PRESENTED HERE?**

3 A. Beyond contributing to long-term cost savings based on avoided future costs,
4 residential net-metered solar is currently producing recurring, tangible cost
5 savings for the residential class and for South Carolina retail customers as a
6 whole.

7

8 **IV. DEPLOYMENT OF INNOVATIVE RATE DESIGNS**

9 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY DEVELOPED ANY CLEAR PLANS FOR**
10 **DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING INNOVATIVE OR ADVANCED RATE**
11 **DESIGNS?**

12 A. No. As I mentioned previously, Company Witnesses Hunsicker and Pirro make
13 vague references to AMI-enabled rate designs in their testimony, but do not
14 articulate any specifics in terms of the timing or character of future offerings.
15 Company Witness Hunsicker notes that Customer Connect Platform, which is an
16 important element of implementing new rate designs, will not be fully deployed
17 until 2022.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Hunsicker Direct. p. 12, line 22.

1 Q. WOULD IT BE REASONABLE FOR THE COMPANY TO DEFER
2 DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE RATE DESIGN OPTIONS UNTIL AMI
3 AND THE CUSTOMER CONNECT SYSTEM IS FULLY
4 OPERATIONAL?

5 A. No, for several reasons. First, developing new rate designs that respond to both
6 customer preferences and produce system savings is not a quick process. It takes
7 time to design new rates for deployment on a pilot basis, more time (a year or
8 more) to conduct the pilots, time to evaluate the results, and more time to come up
9 with permanent rate options. It would not be unusual for such an effort to extend
10 over several years since the process must generally proceed in a step-wise
11 fashion.

12 Ideally, rate pilots, or at least the planning activities for pilots, are
13 conducted in advance of full deployment or concurrently while deployment is
14 taking place. It is not unusual for regulators to require rate pilot plans as part of
15 applications seeking approval to deploy AMI, or to condition approval of AMI
16 deployment on the prompt commencement of planning and rate pilot
17 development. The rationale for this type of progression is that since customers are
18 paying for AMI deployment (or presumably will be at the conclusion of this rate
19 case for DEC), they should be provided with opportunities to take advantage of
20 AMI capabilities as early as possible. This in part reflects a standard of
21 ratemaking that conditions cost recovery on investments being used and useful.
22 Persistent under-utilization calls the reasonableness of cost recovery into question.

1 Second, in order to ensure that the overall integrated system is capable of
2 supporting the rate designs and features that customers desire, it is important to
3 generate intelligence on those preferences as early as possible. It is tempting to
4 view AMI and modern customer information systems as uniform monoliths that
5 will ultimately be capable of meeting virtually any need. However, constructing
6 an integrated system is a complex affair and decisions about architecture early on
7 may have unanticipated consequences in the longer term. In other words, it is
8 better to know as much as possible as early as possible in order to ensure that the
9 design is consistent with the features that customers need and desire.

10 Third, there is little reason to not begin generating information as early as
11 possible. There is no scenario where developing a suite of new rate options should
12 not involve the conducting pilots to gauge customer preferences and evaluate
13 results. Any costs associated with such an exercise will have to be incurred sooner
14 or later. While it is possible that some costs, such as a need to perform manual
15 billing, might be lessened or eliminated by waiting, waiting has a cost as well in
16 the form of potentially years of foregone savings enabled by AMI.

17 **Q. YOU PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THAT THE COMPANY IS**
18 **PARTICIPATING IN A RATE DESIGN STUDY WITH EPRI. HOW**
19 **SHOULD THAT IMPACT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW RATE**
20 **DESIGNS?**

21 **A.** I expect that the EPRI study contains valuable information and I would expect it
22 to inform the Company's plans. Now would be the perfect time to put the results
23 into tangible practice via rate pilots. To be clear, the precise details of the study

1 are not known to me, but it is hard to see circumstances where the EPRI study
2 could be a substitute for actual on the ground information specific to DEC's
3 customers. In addition, since the study and its results are not publicly accessible,
4 there is a need for transparent evaluations conducted in full view of stakeholders
5 and the Commission.

6 **Q. IS THE COMPANY PURSUING ADVANCED RATE PILOTS IN OTHER**
7 **JURISDICTIONS?**

8 A. Yes. At the conclusion of DEC's most recent North Carolina general rate case, the
9 NCUC ordered it to "design and propose new rate structures to capture the full
10 benefits of AMI".⁴⁹ The Order further required DEC to file the details of proposed
11 dynamic rate structures within six months, in order to "allow ratepayers in all
12 customer classes to use the information provided by AMI to reduce their peak-
13 time usage and to save energy."⁵⁰ DEC filed a report in compliance with this
14 Order in December 2018, but NCUC found the report non-compliant with its prior
15 decision because among other things, the report did not contain any details of new
16 tariffs, and the Company's proposed timeline (March 2022) for finalizing new
17 rate designs was too long.⁵¹

18 In declining to accept the filing, the NCUC observed that this date would
19 be almost three years after the full completion of AMI deployment, and that DEC

⁴⁹ NCUC. Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Order dated June 22, 2018. Finding of Fact No. 39, *available at*: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

⁵⁰ *Id.* p. 124.

⁵¹ NCUC. Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Order dated January 30, 2019. p. 4, *available at*: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=12af76f3-f507-4352-92ec-32facb7eaba0>.

1 should already possess a large amount of information about AMI capabilities and
2 customer usage profiles.⁵² Ultimately, the NCUC directed the Company to file
3 revised rate design pilot program plans and two specific rate design pilots within
4 60 days. One rate pilot must be applicable to residential service and one to small
5 general service customers. A hearing on the progress DEC has made is scheduled
6 for February 26th and the new compliance filing is due on or around April 1st.⁵³

7 **Q. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT ARE YOUR**
8 **RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION REGARDING**
9 **ADVANCED RATE DESIGN DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA?**

10 A. The Commission should direct DEC to make compliance filings at least
11 equivalent to those that the NCUC has required within 60 days, composed of a
12 detailed advanced rate design deployment plan and two specific pilot rate
13 proposals. Such a timeline is short, but not unreasonable because the North
14 Carolina filings will already have been completed by the time the Commission
15 issues a decision in this proceeding. DEC will already have a roadmap from
16 which to work. I also strongly encourage the Commission to seek to align future
17 timelines with those established in North Carolina given the integrated nature of
18 DEC's North Carolina and South Carolina divisions. An integrated approach for
19 AMI-enabled rate design would be more efficient than separate, disconnected
20 efforts.

21

⁵² *Id.* p. 4-5.

⁵³ *Id.* p. 4 and p. 6.

1 **V. GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN COST ALLOCATION AND RATE DESIGN**

2 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THE NATURE OF INVESTMENTS**
 3 **DEC SEEKS TO UNDERTAKE AS PART OF ITS GRID IMPROVEMENT**
 4 **PLAN.**

5 A. Broadly speaking, the Grid Improvement Plan investments are a collection of
 6 transmission and distribution system investments targeted at addressing
 7 “Megatrends” impacting grid operations, incremental to the work the Company
 8 performs “to maintain base-level operations.”⁵⁴

9 **Q. HOW DOES DEC PROPOSE TO RECOVER THE COSTS OF MAKING**
 10 **THESE INVESTMENTS?**

11 A. The Company proposes to establish a special Grid Improvement Plan tariff rider
 12 for two phases of the plan, where Phase 1 begins June 1, 2020 and Phase 2 begins
 13 June 1, 2021 with incrementally higher charges than for Phase 1. The rates in the
 14 proposed tariff are composed of an incremental monthly fixed charge and an
 15 incremental volumetric charge. For the residential class the proposed charges are
 16 as follows:

- 17 • Phase 1: \$0.42/month and \$0.1124/kWh
- 18 • Phase 2: \$0.59/month and \$0.1332/kWh⁵⁵

19 **Q. HOW ARE THESE CHARGES DERIVED?**

20 A. The derivation of the class allocators and the rates themselves stem from the
 21 Company’s cost of service study, inclusive of the effects of the Minimum System

⁵⁴ Direct Testimony of Jay Oliver (“Oliver Direct”), p. 28, lines 3-5.

⁵⁵ Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 7.

1 Method of assigning costs associated with the shared distribution system. The
2 revenue for the fixed charge portion is based on the percentage of distribution
3 plant classified as customer-related in the cost of service study. This has two
4 effects. First, because most investments are distribution-related, the residential
5 class is allocated a disproportionate share of the costs, 61.6% for Phase 1 and
6 61.8% for Phase 2. Second, the charges for the residential class are weighted far
7 more heavily towards the fixed monthly charge component than they are for other
8 classes composed of customers with higher loads. For residential customers the
9 fixed component comprises 22.7% of total revenue for Phase 1 and 29.4% for
10 Phase 2. By comparison, for Phase 1 the fixed component for the large general
11 service class comprises only 2.2% of the revenue requirement.⁵⁶

12 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPANY'S**
13 **GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN?**

14 **A.** My first concern is that while the residential class would pay for most of the costs
15 associated with the plan, it is not clear that it would receive an equivalent share of
16 the benefits. Given the significance of the cost burden on residential customers it
17 is only reasonable that the Company identify at a granular project or asset-based
18 level to whom the benefits will accrue. I have seen no analysis of this variety in
19 the materials the Company has provided in its application and in response to
20 information requests.

21 My second concern is how the proposed rate design is affected by the
22 Company's use of the Minimum System Method in its cost of service study. As I

⁵⁶ Calculations based on Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 7.

1 have previously discussed at length, the Minimum System Method is not a valid
2 or accurate method for cost allocation or rate design and should be disregarded by
3 the Commission. Furthermore, since the investments and costs associated with the
4 Grid Improvement Plan are characterized as incremental to “base-level
5 operations” it is difficult to grasp how they could be considered integral and
6 included within a so-called minimum system. Investments and costs beyond the
7 normal course of business are by their very nature not investments in a minimally
8 capable system and I have not identified any Grid Improvement Plan costs that
9 are truly customer-related in nature.

10 **Q. BEYOND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MINIMUM SYSTEM**
11 **METHOD TO ANY GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN COSTS, DO YOU**
12 **HAVE ANY OTHER CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPANY’S**
13 **PROPOSED RATE DESIGN?**

14 **A.** Yes. The Company’s derivation of the customer-related percentage of distribution
15 costs is incorrect. As I previously noted, that percentage is calculated using the
16 percentage of total distribution plant that is classified as customer-related in the
17 Company’s cost of service study. For Schedule RS customers, that amount of
18 59.46%, resulting in 59.46% of Grid Improvement Plan distribution investments
19 being classified as customer-related and therefore recoverable via the fixed
20 monthly charge.

21 This calculation is erroneous because the 59.46% figure includes costs
22 associated with meters and service drops while none of the Grid Improvement
23 Plan investments relate to these types of equipment. Even if one accepts the

1 Minimum System Method as valid for use in rate design for the Grid
2 Improvement Plan, including meter and service drop costs in calculating the
3 customer-related percentage is in error. A correct calculation removes these costs
4 from both the numerator and denominator. For the RS class, that reduces the
5 customer-related portion from the Company's 59.46% to the correct amount of
6 48.95%, the class percentage of customer-related distribution costs excluding
7 costs with no relation to Grid Improvement Plan investments.

8 **Q. WHAT ACTIONS DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT THE COMMISSION**
9 **TAKE TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS?**

10 A. I recommend that the Commission take several actions to the extent that allows
11 the Company to move forward on any aspects of the Grid Improvement Plan, as
12 follows:

- 13 1. Direct DEC to perform cost-benefit evaluations that address the relative
14 customer class distribution of costs and benefits at the project level, and align
15 the allocation of costs for the Grid Improvement Plan with the results of the
16 class-level cost-benefit evaluations.
- 17 2. Make a finding that no Grid Improvement Plan costs can be considered to be
18 costs associated with a minimum distribution system, even if the Commission
19 allows the use of the Minimum System Method for other purposes.
- 20 3. Direct DEC to perform a granular examination of the costs of any Grid
21 Improvement Plan projects that move forward to identify what portion of
22 those costs are energy- and demand-related.

- 1 4. Direct that the rate structure for recovery of any costs associated with the Grid
2 Improvement Plan be aligned with how those costs would be recovered
3 according to their energy- or demand-related characteristics.
- 4 5. If the Commission approves the Grid Improvement Plan and the Company's
5 proposed allocation and rate design generally, direct the Company to revise
6 the customer-related percentage calculation to fully exclude distribution plant
7 associated with meters and service drops.

8

9

VI. RATE STRUCTURE FOR RIDER EDIT-1

10 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED RIDER EDIT-1**
11 **AND ITS PURPOSE.**

12 A. Rider EDIT-1 is a mechanism for refunding to customers the excess money that
13 the Company has collected for net deferred tax liabilities, stemming primarily to a
14 change in federal corporate income tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. The
15 rates in Rider EDIT-1 reflect a simple division of the excess revenue by class
16 divided by test year sales.⁵⁷ Thus the proposed rate, a credit, is a volumetric price
17 in cents/kWh.

18 **Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY JUSTIFY THE VOLUMETRIC**
19 **STRUCTURE FOR RIDER EDIT-1?**

20 A. The Company's justification for the volumetric rate structure is not spelled out in
21 testimony. However, in response to an information request, DEC stated that the

⁵⁷ Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 8.

1 volumetric design was selected for administrative simplicity and because energy
2 determinants are more predictable than demand determinants.⁵⁸

3 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE EXCESS DEFERRED INCOME TAXES AND HOW**
4 **THEY HAVE ARISEN FOR DEC?**

5 A. Company Witness Panizza discusses the conceptual framework of deferred
6 income tax liabilities and how an “excess” has arisen in detail.⁵⁹ At a very high
7 level though, accumulated deferred income tax liabilities, or assets, arise because
8 of timing differences between when income taxes are collected in rates and when
9 those taxes are actually paid. As Witness Panizza describes, any balances
10 eventually converge to zero over the life of the underlying cause of the deferred
11 balance.⁶⁰ However, a change in tax laws disrupts this eventual convergence
12 because past assumptions of future tax liabilities are no longer accurate. Such is
13 the case with a reduction in the federal corporate income tax rate from 35 percent
14 to 21 percent. Company Witness Panizza states that the net deferred tax liability
15 underlying the excess is “driven overwhelmingly by accelerated and bonus
16 depreciation of fixed assets for tax purposes.”⁶¹

17 **Q. HOW ARE ACCUMULATED DEFERRED INCOME TAXES (“ADIT”)**
18 **ADDRESSED IN THE COMPANY’S COST OF SERVICE STUDY?**

19 A. The class allocation is based on net plant including nuclear fuel, consistent with
20 the fact that ADIT associated almost exclusively with fixed assets. This results in

⁵⁸ DEC response to VS 2-5(a), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.12.

⁵⁹ Direct Testimony of John Panizza (“Panizza Direct”), p. 7-12

⁶⁰ *Id.* p. 9, lines 3-11.

⁶¹ *Id.* p. 7, lines 10-11.

1 the majority being classified as demand-related (production, transmission, or
2 distribution) and 13.6% classified as customer-related.⁶² Only a very small
3 amount, roughly 2.3%, is related to production energy. If the Minimum System
4 Method of classifying distribution costs is eliminated, the customer-related
5 component is 7.2%.⁶³

6 **Q. CONSIDERING THE ORIGINS OF ADIT AND THE COMPANY'S**
7 **TREATMENT OF IT IN ITS COST OF SERVICE STUDY, IS A**
8 **VOLUMETRIC RATE APPROPRIATE FOR RIDER EDIT-1?**

9 A. No. The origins of the excess deferred income taxes giving rise to Rider EDIT-1
10 bear little relationship to energy-related functions.

11 **Q. WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE STRUCTURE FOR RIDER**
12 **EDIT-1, TO THE EXTENT IT IS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION?**

13 A. A percentage of bill-based design would create a better tie between rates and the
14 underlying cost structure and preserve the rate structure that the Commission
15 ultimately adopts for base retail rates in the rider. In other words, the rate design
16 that the Commission determines to be reasonable for base rates would
17 automatically be reflected in bill credits to customers. Customers that pay a large
18 portion of their rates in the form of demand charges would receive effective
19 demand rate reductions while effective customer charges and energy charges
20 would be modified in the same manner. This type of rate structure is no more

⁶² DEC response to VS 1-20 Attachment 1. See Tab titled "Toretail" at line 711.

⁶³ DEC response to VS 1-20 Attachment 2. See Tab titled "Toretail" at line 695.

1 administratively complicated and no less predictable than a credit based on an
2 energy-only bill determinant.

3

4

5

VII. CONCLUSION

6 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
7 **COMMISSION ON THE TOPIC OF THE RESIDENTIAL BASIC**
8 **FACILITIES CHARGE.**

9 A. My recommendations on the establishment of the basic facilities charge
10 are as follows:

- 11 1. The Commission should reject the changes the Company has made to its cost
12 of service study and re-affirm precedent by directing the Company to
13 eliminate the use of the Minimum System Method from its cost of service
14 study.
- 15 2. The Commission should make a determination that the basic customer
16 method, which defines customer-related costs as those directly attributable to
17 a customer's service connection, metering, billing, and customer service, is
18 the appropriate method for classifying customer-related costs.
- 19 3. The Commission should reject the Company's proposed residential basic
20 facilities charge and instead limit any increase in the charge to the percentage
21 increase in the residential class revenue requirement that is ultimately adopted
22 in this proceeding.

1 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON AMI-
2 ENABLED RATES, THE GRID MODERNIZATION PLAN, AND RIDER
3 EDIT-1.

4 A. My recommendations on these topics are as follows:

5 1. AMI-Enabled Rate Design: The Commission should direct DEC to proceed
6 with rate pilots and planning in a manner that is fully aligned with the
7 directives placed on DEC in North Carolina, including but not limited to filing
8 two pilot rate proposals, one for residential customers and one for small non-
9 residential customers, and a complete rate design plan with the Commission
10 within 60 days of a decision in this proceeding.

11 2. Grid Modernization Plan: The Commission should take several actions to
12 ensure that the costs and benefits of the Company's Grid Improvement Plan
13 are distributed equitably and are consistent with cost causation:

14 a. Make a finding that Grid Improvement Plan investments cannot be
15 considered part of a standard minimum distribution system because by
16 their very nature they are extraordinary in character, regardless of
17 whether the Commission accepts the use of the Minimum System
18 Method in the Company's cost of service study.

19 b. If the Commission approves the Grid Improvement Plan and the
20 Company's proposed allocation and rate design generally, direct the
21 Company to revise the customer-related percentage calculation to fully
22 exclude distribution plant associated with meters and service drops.

1 c. Direct DEC to perform cost-benefit evaluations that address the
2 relative customer class distribution of costs and benefits at the project
3 level, and align the allocation and recovery of costs with the results of
4 the class-level cost-benefit evaluations and proper identification of
5 energy and demand costs.

6 3. Rider EDIT-1: If the Commission approves Rider EDIT-1, the rate design
7 should be revised to a percentage of bill-based mechanism in order to align it
8 with the underlying causes of excess deferred income taxes.

9 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

10 **A. Yes.**

JUSTIN R. BARNES

(919) 825-3342, jbarnes@eq-research.com

EDUCATION

Michigan Technological University Houghton, Michigan
Master of Science, Environmental Policy, August 2006
Graduate-level work in Energy Policy.

University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma
Bachelor of Science, Geography, December 2003
Area of concentration in Physical Geography.

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

Director of Research, July 2015 – present

Senior Analyst & Research Manager, March 2013 – July 2015

EQ Research, LLC and Keyes, Fox & Wiedman, LLP Cary, North Carolina

- Oversee state legislative, regulatory policy, and general rate case tracking service that covers policies such as net metering, interconnection standards, rate design, renewables portfolio standards, state energy planning, state and utility incentives, tax incentives, and permitting. Responsible for service design, formulating improvements based on client needs, and ultimate delivery of reports to clients. Expanded service to cover energy storage.
- Oversee and perform policy research and analysis to fulfill client requests, and for internal and published reports, focused primarily on drivers of distributed energy resource (DER) markets and policies.
- Provide expert witness testimony on topics including cost of service, rate design, distributed energy resource DER value, and DER policy including incentive program design, rate design issues, and competitive impacts of utility ownership of DERs.
- Managed the development of a solar power purchase agreement (PPA) toolkit for local governments, a comprehensive legal and policy resource for local governments interested in purchasing solar energy, and the planning and delivery of associated outreach efforts.

Senior Policy Analyst, January 2012 – May 2013;

Policy Analyst, September 2007 – December 2011

North Carolina Solar Center, N.C. State University Raleigh, North Carolina

- Responsible for researching and maintaining information for the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), the most comprehensive public source of renewables and energy efficiency incentives and policy data in the United States.
- Managed state-level regulatory tracking for private wind and solar companies.
- Coordinated the organization's participation in the SunShot Solar Outreach Partnership, a U.S. Department of Energy project to provide outreach and technical assistance for local governments to develop and transform local solar markets.
- Developed and presented educational workshops, reports, administered grant contracts and associated deliverables, provided support for the SunShot Initiative, and worked with diverse group of project partners on this effort.
- Responsible for maintaining the renewable portfolio standard dataset for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for use in its electricity modeling and forecasting analysis.
- Authored the *DSIRE RPS Data Updates*, a monthly newsletter providing up-to-date data and historic compliance information on state RPS policies.



- Responded to information requests and provided technical assistance to the general public, government officials, media, and the energy industry on a wide range of subjects, including federal tax incentives, state property taxes, net metering, state renewable portfolios standard policies, and renewable energy credits.
- Extensive experience researching, understanding, and disseminating information on complex issues associated with utility regulation, policy best practices, and emerging issues.

SELECTED ARTICLES and PUBLICATIONS

- EQ Research and Synapse Energy Economics for Delaware Riverkeeper Network. *Envisioning Pennsylvania's Energy Future*. 2016.
- Barnes, J., R. Haynes. *The Great Guessing Game: How Much Net Metering Capacity is Left?*. September 2015. Published by EQ Research, LLC.
- Barnes, J., Kapla, K. *Solar Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs): A Toolkit for Local Governments*. July 2015. For the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc. under the U.S. DOE SunShot Solar Outreach Partnership.
- Barnes, J., C. Barnes. *2013 RPS Legislation: Gauging the Impacts*. December 2013. Article in Solar Today.
- Barnes, J., C. Laurent, J. Uppal, C. Barnes, A. Heinemann. *Property Taxes and Solar PV: Policy, Practices, and Issues*. July 2013. For the U.S. DOE SunShot Solar Outreach Partnership.
- Kooles, K, J. Barnes. *Austin, Texas: What is the Value of Solar; Solar in Small Communities: Gaston County, North Carolina; and Solar in Small Communities: Columbia, Missouri*. 2013. Case Studies for the U.S. DOE SunShot Solar Outreach Partnership.
- Barnes, J., C. Barnes. *The Report of My Death Was An Exaggeration: Renewables Portfolio Standards Live On*. 2013. For Keyes, Fox & Wiedman.
- Barnes, J. *Why Tradable SRECs are Ruining Distributed Solar*. 2012. Guest Post in Greentech Media Solar.
- Barnes, J., multiple co-authors. *State Solar Incentives and Policy Trends*. Annually for five years, 2008-2012. For the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc.
- Barnes, J. *Solar for Everyone?* 2012. Article in Solar Power World On-line.
- Barnes, J., L. Varnado. *Why Bother? Capturing the Value of Net Metering in Competitive Choice Markets*. 2011. American Solar Energy Society Conference Proceedings.
- Barnes, J. *SREC Markets: The Murky Side of Solar*. 2011. Article in State and Local Energy Report.
- Barnes, J., L. Varnado. *The Intersection of Net Metering and Retail Choice: an overview of policy, practice, and issues*. 2010. For the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc.

TESTIMONY

New Orleans City Council. Docket No. UD-18-07. February 2019. On behalf of the Alliance for Affordable Energy. Entergy New Orleans general rate case application. Analysis of the cost basis for the residential customer charge, rate design for AMI, DSM Riders and Grid Modernization Riders, and DSM program performance incentive proposal. Developed recommendations for the residential customer charge, rider rate design, and a revised DSM performance incentive mechanism.

New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission. Docket No. DE 17-189. May 2018. On behalf of Sunrun Inc. Review of Liberty Utilities application for approval of customer-sited battery storage program, analysis of time-of-use rate design, program cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness of utility-owned vs. non-utility owned storage assets. Developed a proposal for an alternative program utilizing non-utility owned assets under an aggregator model with elements for benefits sharing and ratepayer risk reduction.

North Carolina Utilities Commission. Docket No. E-7 Sub 1146. January 2018. On behalf of the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association. Duke Energy Carolinas general rate case application. Analysis of the cost basis for the residential customer charge and validity of the utility's minimum system



study, allocation of coal ash remediation costs, and grid modernization rider proposal, including the reasonableness of the program, class distribution of costs and benefits, and cost allocation.

Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 17-1263-EL-SSO. November 2017*. On behalf of the Ohio Environmental Council. ***Testimony prepared but not filed due to settlement in related case.** Duke Energy Ohio proposal to reduce compensation to net metering customers. Provided analysis of capacity value of solar net metering resources in the PJM market and distribution of that value to customers. Also analyzed the cost basis of the utility proposal for recovery of net metering credit costs, focused on PJM settlement protocols and how the value of DG customer exports is distributed among ratepayers, load-serving entities, and distribution utilities based on load settlement practices.

North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-2 Sub 1142. October 2017. On behalf of the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association. Duke Energy Progress general rate case application. Analysis of the cost basis for the residential customer charge and validity of the utility's minimum system study, allocation of coal ash remediation costs, and advanced metering infrastructure deployment plans and cost-benefit analysis.

Public Utility Commission of Texas, Control No. 46831. June 2017. On behalf of the Energy Freedom Coalition of America. El Paso Electric general rate case application, including separate DG customer class. Analysis of separate DG rate class and rate design proposal, cost basis, DG load research study, and analysis of DG costs and benefits, and alignment of demand ratchets with cost causation principles and state policy goals, focused on impacts on customer-sited storage.

Utah Public Service Commission, Docket No. 14-035-114. June 2017. On behalf of Utah Clean Energy. Rocky Mountain Power application for separate distributed generation (DG) rate class. Provided analysis of grandfathering of existing DG customers and best practices for review of DG customer rates and DG value. Developed proposal for addressing revisions to DG customer rates in the future.

Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Proceeding No. 16A-0055E. May 2016. On behalf of the Energy Freedom Coalition of America. Public Service Company of Colorado application for solar energy purchase program. Analysis of program design from the perspective of customer demand and needs, and potential competitive impacts. Proposed alternative program design.

Public Utility Commission of Texas, Control No. 44941. December 2015. On behalf of Sunrun, Inc. El Paso Electric general rate case application, including separate DG customer class. Analysis of separate rate class and rate design proposal, cost basis, DG load research study, and analysis of DG costs and benefits.

Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Cause No. PUD 201500271. November 2015. On behalf of the Alliance for Solar Choice. Analysis of Oklahoma Gas & Electric proposal to place distributed generation customers on separate rates, rate impacts, cost basis of proposal, and alignment with rate design principles.

South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2015-54-E. May 2015. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. South Carolina Electric & Gas application for distributed energy programs. Alignment of proposed programs with distributed energy best practices throughout the U.S., including incentive rate design and community solar program design.

South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2015-53-E. April 2015. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. Duke Energy Carolinas application for distributed energy programs. Alignment of proposed programs with distributed energy best practices throughout the U.S., including incentive rate design and community solar program design.



South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2015-55-E. April 2015. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. Duke Energy Progress application for distributed energy programs. Alignment of proposed programs with distributed energy best practices throughout the U.S., including incentive rate design and community solar program design.

South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2014-246-E. December 2014. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. Generic investigation of distributed energy policy. Distributed energy best practices, including net metering and rate design for distributed energy customers.

AWARDS, HONORS & AFFILIATIONS

- Solar Power World Magazine, Editorial Advisory Board Member (October 2011 – March 2013)
- Michigan Tech Finalist for the Midwest Association of Graduate Schools Distinguished Master's Thesis Awards (2007)
- Sustainable Futures Institute Graduate Scholar Michigan Tech University (2005-2006)



**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-2, was provided to me by the following individual: Kaari K. Beard, Rates & Regulatory Manager, Rate Case Planning & Execution, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-2 Please refer to Hager Direct p. 14, lines 16-19.

(a) Does the Company's Minimum System Study consider the distribution assets needed if every customer had "some minimum level of usage" to be composed of: (1) the smallest equipment the Company customarily installs, (2) the smallest equipment present on its system, (3) the smallest size equipment currently available in the market currently, or (4) some other benchmark.

(b) If your response to (a) is "some other benchmark", please explain how the minimum sized equipment is determined in detail.

(c) Please explain in detail the Company's justification for its selection of minimum size system components for use in its Minimum System Study.

(d) Please state whether Witness Hager is aware of any other Duke affiliates that perform Minimum System Studies using a different methodology, and if so, explain why the method Duke Energy Carolinas is employing for the purpose of its cost of service study in this application is more suitable.

Response:

In response to (a), the Company's Minimum System Study is based on the smallest equipment the Company customarily installs.

In response to (b), N/A.

In response to (c), we believe this method is most appropriate because it takes into consideration the Company's actual practices and system and is most consistent with the description of the minimum size method in the NARUC Cost of Service Manual (page 91).

In response to (d), Witness Hager is not aware of any other Duke affiliates that perform Minimum System Studies using a different methodology.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Pirro Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-7, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael Pirro, Director of Rates and Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-7 Please refer to Pirro Direct Exhibit No. 3.

(a) For Schedule RS (p. 1), please identify the number of customers that fell within each monthly energy usage band based on average monthly energy use during the test year. For example XXXX customers had average energy use of 0 – 100 kWh per month. In your response, please separately identify the number of customers:

- i. With on-site solar generation
- ii. Without on-site solar generation

(b) For Schedule RE (p. 2) Please identify the number of customers that fell within each monthly energy usage benchmark based on average monthly energy use during the test year. For example XXXX customers had average energy use from 0 – 100 kWh per month.

- i. With on-site solar generation
- ii. Without on-site solar generation

Response:

Please see attached file:

[Vote Solar Data Request No. 1 Item 1-7]

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Pirro Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-8, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael Pirro, Director of Rates and Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 1-8 Please refer to Pirro Direct Exhibit No. 4. Please provide an alternative version of this exhibit depicting the results of the cost of service study using the Basic Customer method rather than the Minimum System method, in which 100% of the costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364 though 368 are classified as demand related.

Response:

Please see the attached file :

[Vote Solar Data Request No.1 1-8]

Recovering fixed costs via a kwh charge has the following detrimental consequences: 1) high usage customers subsidize low usage customers; 2) low use customers do not pay the full cost of the utility plant installed to serve them; and 3) does not provide an accurate price signal regarding the Company's costs upon which customers can make economic decisions to make investments that reduce kWh consumption.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Rate Design
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-12, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael Pirro, Director of Rates and Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 1-12 Please provide any analysis that the Company has performed for the purpose of evaluating the bill impact of the Company's proposed residential customer charge increases on:
- (a) Low-income customers.
 - (b) Customers in each class with on-site generation participating in the net energy metering schedule.

Response:

The Company's review of rate impacts considers various levels of consumption, but does not separately consider customer attributes such as income level or net metering participation.

Recovering fixed costs via a kwh charge has the following detrimental consequences: 1) high usage customers subsidize low usage customers; 2) low use customers do not pay the full cost of the utility plant installed to serve them; and 3) does not provide an accurate price signal regarding the Company's costs upon which customers can make economic decisions to make investments that reduce kWh consumption.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-20, was provided to me by the following individual: Kaari K. Beard, Rates & Regulatory Manager, Rate Case Planning & Execution, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-20 On page 15 of Witness Hager's testimony, she testifies that "Witness Pirro relied upon costs allocated as being customer-related in the Cost of Service Study in developing his recommendation regarding the Basic Facilities Charge."

(a) Please provide an electronic spreadsheet version, with all cell formulas and file linkages intact, of the unit cost study relied on by Company witness Michael J. Pirro to develop his recommendation regarding the residential Basic Facilities Charge.

(b) Please provide an electronic spreadsheet version, with all cell formulas and file linkages intact, of the unit cost study associated with a version of the Company's cost of service study which classifies 100% of the costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364 through 368 as demand-related (i.e., relies on the Basic Customer method to classify distribution plant costs.)

Response:

In response to (a), please see attached file 'VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study.xlsx' which shows the unit cost study relied on by Company Witness Michael J. Pirro to develop his recommendation regarding the residential Basic Facilities Charge.

In response to (b), please see attached file 'VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study-no Min Sys.xlsx' which shows the unit cost study associated with a version of the Company's cost of service study which classifies 100% of the costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364 through 368 as demand-related.

[VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study]

[VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study-no Min Sys]

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Second Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Reated to Pirro Testimony
Date of Request: January 16, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Second Data Request #2-5, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael Pirro, Director of Rates and Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 2-5 Please refer to Pirro Direct at p. 20, lines 21-22 describing the derivation of class rates for the Company's proposed EDIT-1 Rider.
- (a) Please justify the use of a fully volumetric rider to refund excess deferred income taxes to customers, including how the proposed design is consistent with cost causation.
 - (b) Please confirm or deny that a portion of the accumulated deferred income taxes (ADIT) that give rise to the need for the EDIT-1 Rider are associated with utility plant investments that would be classified as customer or demand-related. If your response is to deny that this statement is true, please explain in detail.

Response:

- a) As an annual adjustment rider, the use of a volumetric rate was selected for administrative ease in collecting and tracking revenues recovered in the rider. Volumetric energy rates apply to all classes allowing a uniform approach for cost recovery purposes. Energy determinants are also more predictable than demand determinants which can be significantly influenced by unusual weather events.
- b) The revenue requirement sought for recovery in the EDIT rider is primarily associated with tax impacts associated with utility plant-related costs.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Fourth Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Rate Design
Date of Request: February 6, 2019
Date of Response: February 15, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Fourth Data Request #4-3, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael J. Pirro, Director, Rates & Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

4-3 Please refer to your response to VS 1-11. Does the “EPRI Study” referred to in this response address customer preferences for fixed charges?

Response:

Yes.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Fourth Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: February 6, 2019
Date of Response: February 15, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Fourth Data Request #4-11, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael J. Pirro, Director, Rates and Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 4-11 Please refer Hager Direct at p. 9, lines 14-15 stating that the 2017 summer coincident peak demand occurred on August 17 at the hour ending at 3 PM. Please provide:
- (a) The total output from residential net-metered systems for this hour in DEC's South Carolina service territory.
 - (b) The total number of residential net-metered systems that had been granted permission to operate as of this date in DEC's South Carolina service territory.
 - (c) The total rated capacity of residential net-metered systems that had been granted permission to operate as of this date in DEC's South Carolina service territory.
 - (d) The total output from non-residential net-metered systems for this hour in DEC's South Carolina service territory.
 - (e) The total number of non-residential net-metered systems that had been granted permission to operate as of this date in DEC's South Carolina service territory.
 - (f) The total rated capacity of non-residential net-metered systems that had been granted permission to operate as of this date in DEC's South Carolina service territory.

Response:

The responses are provided below. Please note that for parts (b), (c), (e) and (f) the Company is able to provide data only for active customers since data was not available for customers, if any, who had been granted permission but were not yet active.

- (a) The Company cannot provide data for net metered customers for a specific hour since the Company does not currently track total output from residential net-metered customers by the hour.
- (b) The number of ACTIVE DEC SC Residential net-metered systems as of 7/31/18 was 2,740. The Company is unable to provide the number of permits as of this date.
- (c) The total KWDC capacity of ACTIVE DEC SC Residential net-metered systems as of 7/31/18 was 26,346 kW. For the reason provided in (b) the Company is unable to calculate this for all permitted customers.
- (d) The Company is unable to provide hourly data for non-residential net metered customers since the Company does not currently track total output from non-residential net-metered customers by the hour.
- (e) The number of active DEC SC Non-residential net-metered systems as of 7/31/18 was 52.
- (f) The total KWDC capacity of active DEC SC Non-residential net-metered systems as of 7/31/18 was 4,868kW.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Fifth Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Basic Facilities Charge
Date of Request: February 11, 2019
Date of Response: February 15, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Fifth Data Request #5-1, was provided to me by the following individual: Leigh A. Puryear, Community Relations Liaison, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

5-1 On February 10, 2019, an opinion article was published in the Greenville News by Mr. Kodwo Ghartey-Tagoe on the Company's proposed basic facilities charge increase, available in online form at <https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/opinion/2019/02/10/opinion-why-duke-seeking-hike-s-c-fixed-basic-facilities-fee/2794505002/>.

(a) Please explain the full basis and understanding, including any supporting data, Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe relied upon in making the following factual assertions:

(1) “[M]ost utilities across South Carolina and the nation have similar charges, and other utilities are moving toward higher customer charges.”

(2) “For instance, low-income families and seniors, who can least afford an increase, are not impacted any more than other customers by using less energy.”

(3) “Many of our low-income customers actually have relatively high bills, which might correlate with a less energy efficient home.”

(b) Is it Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe's contention that all or most solar customers are “low-usage” customers? Please fully explain what average monthly usage level Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe considers to be low-usage and high-usage in the context of this article.

(c) Does Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe acknowledge that currently the only way the Company is allowed to raise the basic facilities charge (or apply any additional recurring fixed fee) for residential solar customers is to raise the basic facilities charge (or apply any additional fee) for all residential customers?

(d) Does Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe acknowledge that the number of DEC's low-usage, low-income residential customers is higher than the number of DEC's low-usage solar customers?

(e) Does Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe acknowledge that the total bill impact of the residential basic facilities charge increase is more severe on low-usage customers than high-usage customers in terms of percentage of bill increase under the Company's proposed residential rates compared to current rates?

(f) Did the Company utilize an outside public relations firm to assist in drafting and placing Mr. Ghartey-Tagoe's article? If so, please identify the firm and

VOTE SOLAR

DOCKET NO. 2018-319-E

identify whether the Company's scope of work and engagement with the firm includes ongoing legislative efforts related to advancing the Company's position on residential solar customers and net energy metering

Response:

(a1): Please refer to the two attachments. The first file named "Vote Solar DR 5-1 _ SC Electric Utilities BFC" illustrates the utilities and cooperatives within South Carolina and their associated BFC. The second file named "Vote Solar DR 5-1 _ 50 States of Solar" from North Carolina Clean Energy contains information across the industry related to current and pending BFCs.

[Vote Solar DR 5-1 _ SC Electric Utilities BFC]

[Vote Solar DR 5-1 _ 50 States of Solar]

(a2): A review of residential usage for households with annual household income of \$30,000 or less identified an average monthly usage of 913 kWh which isn't significantly less than an average South Carolina customer using 1,100 kWh per month.

(a3): The average usage of 913 kWh for households with annual household income of \$30,000 or less includes customers above and below the average consumption. The Company isn't certain of the cause of higher usage other than perhaps extreme weather events, inefficient dwellings and renters who have no incentive to utilize EE products.

(b): No, it is not the Company's contention that all solar customers are low-usage. Solar generation does however reduce a customer's consumption. A "low-usage" customer is one using less than the class average consumption of approximately 1,100 kWh that is being subsidized by high-usage customers using greater than the class average usage.

(c): No, the Company could propose new rate schedules specific to residential solar customers.

(d): Yes.

(e): The Company agrees that customers with less than average usage, all other variables being held constant, will experience an increase in their monthly bills if the Company is allowed to increase its Basic Facilities Charge.

(f): No.

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DOCKET NO. 2018-319-E**

IN THE MATTER OF:

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for
Adjustments in Electric Rate Schedules
and Tariffs and Request for an Accounting Order

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**VOTE SOLAR'S ERRATA TO THE
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN R.
BARNES**

ERRATA TO THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN R. BARNES

1. Page 2 Line 11, replace "246" with "236".
2. Page 4 Line 4, replace "\$1 million" with "\$3.1 million".
3. Page 16 Line 19. After "\$25,000."add "It is my understanding that the Company has allowed counsel to Vote Solar to review the study."
4. Page 51 Line 5, replace "\$1.08 million dollars" with "\$3.18 million".
5. Page 51 Line 6, replace "\$249,000" with "\$1.03 million".
6. Page 51 Line 7, replace "\$827,000" with "\$2.15 million".
7. Page 51 Line 9, replace "\$395,000" with "\$1.64 million".
8. Page 56 Line 3-5, remove "In addition, since the study and its results are not publicly accessible, there is a need for transparent evaluations conducted in full view of stakeholders and the Commission."
9. Page 58 Line 17, replace "\$0.1124/kWh" with "0.1124 cents/kWh".
10. Page 58 Line 18, replace "\$0.1332/kWh" with "0.1332 cents/kWh".

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DOCKET NO. 2018-319-E**

IN THE MATTER OF:)

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for)
Adjustments in Electric Rate Schedules)
and Tariffs and Request for an Accounting Order)

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN R.
BARNES ON BEHALF OF
VOTE SOLAR**

1 Commission, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the Public Utility
2 Commission of Texas, and the Utah Public Service Commission as an expert in
3 distributed generation (“DG”) policy, rate design, and cost of service.¹ My
4 *curriculum vitae* is attached as Exhibit JRB-1.

5 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE**
6 **SOUTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION (“COMMISSION”)?**

7 A. Yes. I submitted testimony on behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice in
8 Commission Docket No. 2014-246-E addressing the implementation of 2014
9 Public Act 236, and in Docket Nos. 2015-53-E, 2015-54-E, and 2015-55-E
10 addressing the applications of the state’s three investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”)
11 to establish distributed energy resource programs pursuant to Public Act 236.

12 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?**

13 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Vote Solar.

14 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

15 A. My testimony addresses the rates application put forth by Duke Energy Carolinas
16 (“DEC” or “the Company”) on issues related to the Company’s proposals
17 involving residential basic facilities charges, AMI-enabled rate design, the South
18 Carolina Grid Improvement Plan, and Excess Deferred Income Tax Rider EDIT-
19 1. My testimony on all of these topics relates to cost of service and rate design.
20 The purpose of my testimony is to show that:

¹ The New Orleans City Council regulates Entergy New Orleans in a manner similar to a state regulatory commission.

1 to a percentage of bill-based design if the rider is approved in order to
2 align it with the underlying causes of excess deferred income taxes.

3 6. Residential net metering customers provide an estimated benefit, in
4 addition to any value of solar calculation, of over \$3.1 million per year to
5 the residential class by reducing the allocation of peak-driven costs to the
6 class.

7 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
8 **COMMISSION ON THE RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES CHARGE.**

9 A. My recommendations for setting the basic facilities charge are as follows:

10 1. The Commission should reject the changes the Company has made to its cost
11 of service study and re-affirm precedent by directing the Company to
12 eliminate the use of the Minimum System Method from its cost of service
13 study.

14 2. The Commission should make a determination that the basic customer
15 method, which defines customer-related costs as those directly attributable to
16 a customer's service connection, metering, billing, and customer service, is
17 the appropriate method for classifying customer-related costs.

18 3. The Commission should reject the Company's proposed residential basic
19 facilities charge and instead limit any increase in the charge to the percentage
20 increase in residential class revenue requirement that is ultimately adopted in
21 this proceeding.

1 corollary, to provide them with the services they do desire at a cost less than or
2 equal to the value of the good. This concept has been referred to as using
3 regulation to impose the “disciplines of competitive markets”.⁹

4 There are broader consequences to this idea, involving the costs and
5 benefits of utility investments and how they are distributed among customers, but
6 it is also central to rate design. Since customers cannot make their preferences
7 known by shopping around, those preferences must be discerned through other
8 means, such as studies or rate pilots. Customer preferences fall within Bonbright’s
9 “practical attributes”, and should be balanced with the other ratemaking goals
10 such as economic efficiency, rate stability, and fairness at apportioning cost of
11 service. Ideally, in replicating the function of a competitive market, a customer
12 would have a suite of potential options to choose from that maintain this balance
13 but also respond to their individual preferences.

14 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY CONDUCTED ANY STUDIES OF CUSTOMER**
15 **PREFERENCES REGARDING FIXED CHARGES?**

16 A. DEC has participated in an Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) study to
17 consider residential rate design choices. The Company has indicated that the study
18 addresses fixed charges.¹⁰ However, I have not been able to view the report
19 because it is not publicly accessible, requiring a download fee of \$25,000.¹¹ It is

⁹ F. Weston, et al., *Charges for Distribution Service: Issues in Rate Design*, p. 17, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2000), available at <http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/536F0210-2354-D714-51CF-037E9E00A724>.

¹⁰ DEC response to VS 4-3, attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.14.

¹¹ See the EPRI website at:

<https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002013359/?lang=en-US>.

1 my understanding that the Company has allowed counsel to Vote Solar to review
2 the study.

3 **Q. WOULD IT BE REASONABLE FOR THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY**
4 **TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

5 A. Yes, and I say this without knowing the findings of the study. I leave how that
6 could or should occur to the Commission to decide. That said, I find it troubling
7 that the Company possesses information that appears likely to be highly relevant
8 to one of the most, if not the most, significant aspects of its application, which it
9 cannot or will not make available to other parties.

10 **Q. HOW WOULD THE COMPANY'S RESIDENTIAL BASIC FACILITIES**
11 **CHARGE PROPOSALS AFFECT CUSTOMER BILLS?**

12 A. Customers with relatively high usage would be advantaged, experiencing a lower
13 overall rate increase or even a decrease for the highest using customers. Lower
14 usage customers would be disadvantaged, experiencing rate increases well in
15 excess of the average rate increase. For instance, the Company's collective rates
16 proposals would cause a bill increase of \$17.23/month (27.3%) for a customer on
17 Schedule RS with average usage of 500 kWh per month. By contrast, a customer
18 using 2,000 kWh per month would only experience a \$9.75 (4.21%) monthly
19 increase. Table 3 shows the breakdown of bill impacts for Schedule RS.¹²

¹² Sourced from Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 3, with "Amount of Increase" added as a new column.

1 **Q. CAN THE IMPACTS OF THESE AFFECTS BE QUANTIFIED?**

2 A. Yes. I have estimated that residential net-metered solar production at the time of
3 the Company's test year coincident peak can be expected to have reduced
4 production demand and transmission demand costs allocated to the residential
5 customer class by roughly \$3.18 million dollars. This amount is composed of
6 roughly \$1.03 million representing the residential class's share of jurisdictional
7 cost savings and roughly \$2.15 million representing South Carolina retail
8 allocation savings. Other classes benefitted from the remaining jurisdictional cost
9 savings of roughly \$1.64 million.

10 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU MADE THESE CALCULATIONS.**

11 A. I first developed an estimate for what residential solar production would have
12 been at the time of the retail system peak, the hour ending at 3 PM on August 17,
13 2017. For my estimate, I used PVWatts to develop an average solar capacity
14 factor for the hour ending at 3 PM during the month of August. This is reflective
15 of a "typical meteorological year" as used by PVWatts. I applied this to data
16 provided by the Company showing that as of the date of the peak, it had roughly
17 26.3 MW-DC of residential solar net-metered capacity on the system.⁴⁷ I also
18 grossed up the expected solar capacity contribution for marginal capacity losses.

19 I then used this capacity contribution to calculate revised production cost
20 allocators that reflect a no residential solar assumption. To do this I added the
21 solar capacity contribution to applicable system-wide, South Carolina, and

⁴⁷ DEC response to VS 4-11(b), attached in Exhibit JRB-2, p.16. This response states that this figure is for July 31, 2018, but, per confirmation of DEC counsel, the correct date is July 31, 2017.

1 are not known to me, but it is hard to see circumstances where the EPRI study
2 could be a substitute for actual on the ground information specific to DEC's
3 customers.

4
5
6 **Q. IS THE COMPANY PURSUING ADVANCED RATE PILOTS IN OTHER**
7 **JURISDICTIONS?**

8 A. Yes. At the conclusion of DEC's most recent North Carolina general rate case, the
9 NCUC ordered it to "design and propose new rate structures to capture the full
10 benefits of AMI".⁴⁹ The Order further required DEC to file the details of proposed
11 dynamic rate structures within six months, in order to "allow ratepayers in all
12 customer classes to use the information provided by AMI to reduce their peak-
13 time usage and to save energy."⁵⁰ DEC filed a report in compliance with this
14 Order in December 2018, but NCUC found the report non-compliant with its prior
15 decision because among other things, the report did not contain any details of new
16 tariffs, and the Company's proposed timeline (March 2022) for finalizing new
17 rate designs was too long.⁵¹

18 In declining to accept the filing, the NCUC observed that this date would
19 be almost three years after the full completion of AMI deployment, and that DEC

⁴⁹ NCUC. Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Order dated June 22, 2018. Finding of Fact No. 39, available at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

⁵⁰ *Id.* p. 124.

⁵¹ NCUC. Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Order dated January 30, 2019. p. 4, available at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=12af76f3-f507-4352-92ec-32facb7eaba0>.

1 **V. GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN COST ALLOCATION AND RATE DESIGN**

2 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THE NATURE OF INVESTMENTS**
3 **DEC SEEKS TO UNDERTAKE AS PART OF ITS GRID IMPROVEMENT**
4 **PLAN.**

5 A. Broadly speaking, the Grid Improvement Plan investments are a collection of
6 transmission and distribution system investments targeted at addressing
7 “Megatrends” impacting grid operations, incremental to the work the Company
8 performs “to maintain base-level operations.”⁵⁴

9 **Q. HOW DOES DEC PROPOSE TO RECOVER THE COSTS OF MAKING**
10 **THESE INVESTMENTS?**

11 A. The Company proposes to establish a special Grid Improvement Plan tariff rider
12 for two phases of the plan, where Phase 1 begins June 1, 2020 and Phase 2 begins
13 June 1, 2021 with incrementally higher charges than for Phase 1. The rates in the
14 proposed tariff are composed of an incremental monthly fixed charge and an
15 incremental volumetric charge. For the residential class the proposed charges are
16 as follows:

- 17 • Phase 1: \$0.42/month and \$0.1124 cents/kWh
- 18 • Phase 2: \$0.59/month and \$0.1332 cents/kWh⁵⁵

19 **Q. HOW ARE THESE CHARGES DERIVED?**

20 A. The derivation of the class allocators and the rates themselves stem from the
21 Company’s cost of service study, inclusive of the effects of the Minimum System

⁵⁴ Direct Testimony of Jay Oliver (“Oliver Direct”), p. 28, lines 3-5.

⁵⁵ Pirro Direct, Exhibit No. 7.

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DOCKET NO. 2018-319-E**

IN THE MATTER OF:

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
for Adjustments in Electric Rate Schedules
and Tariffs and Request for an Accounting
Order

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**SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
JUSTIN R. BARNES ON BEHALF OF
VOTE SOLAR**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND CURRENT POSITION.

A. Justin R. Barnes, 1155 Kildaire Farm Rd., Suite 202, Cary, North Carolina, 27511. My current position is Director of Research with EQ Research LLC.

Q. DID YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMIT DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. Yes. I submitted direct testimony on February 26, 2019 and errata to my direct testimony on March 7, 2019.

II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSES OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTMONY?

A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony filed by Duke Energy Carolinas' ("DEC" or "the Company") witnesses Janice Hager and Michael Pirro regarding the validity of the Minimum System Method of classifying distribution system costs for the purposes of cost allocation and rate design, and the establishment of a reasonable residential basic facilities charge ("BFC"). I also respond to Company Witness Pirro's new proposal that Schedule RS customers take service under rates with a demand component that recovers all non-minimum system distribution costs.¹

¹ Rebuttal Testimony of Michael Pirro ("Pirro Rebuttal"), p. 10, lines 1-5.

1 **Q. HOW IS YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

2 A. In Section III I address the validity of the Minimum System Method, which forms
 3 the basis for the Company's proposed residential BFC, primarily in response to
 4 Company Witness Hager. In Section IV I respond to the Company's assertions
 5 regarding proper amount of the residential BFC, and a new residential BFC
 6 proposal made by Company Witness Pirro. In Section V I address Company
 7 Witness Pirro's residential demand rate proposal. Section IV contains my
 8 concluding remarks and recommendations.

9

10 **III. THE VALIDITY OF THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD**

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD AND HOW
 12 DEC USES IT IN ITS COST OF SERVICE STUDY.**

13 A. As I described in my direct testimony, the Minimum System Method postulates
 14 that some portion of the distribution system shared by all customers is customer-
 15 related and therefore allocable to customer classes based on the number of
 16 customers in a given class. In other words, a certain level of investment in the
 17 shared system would be required to connect a customer even if that customer had
 18 a minimal load. In practice, this results in a portion of costs in FERC Accounts
 19 364-368, involving poles, overhead and underground conductors, and line
 20 transformers being classified as customer-related. Its use also has downstream
 21 effects beyond distribution cost allocation because other dynamic allocators are
 22 influenced by the results. The Company uses this method in its cost of service

1 study to calculate class allocations and the proposed \$28.00/month residential
2 BFC.

3 In my direct testimony I described the methodological failings of the
4 Minimum System Method, summarized below:

5 1) It relies on a flawed premise that a customer with a zero or minimal load
6 would desire a connection to the distribution system.

7 2) It tends to over-allocate distribution costs to highly populous rate classes,
8 because a minimum system is typically capable of serving a considerable
9 amount of demand, resulting in this demand being assigned largely to the
10 highly populous classes, which then receive a further allocation of remaining
11 demand-related costs based on the full class demands.

12 **Q. WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS DID YOU MAKE IN YOUR DIRECT**
13 **TESTIMONY REGARDING THE USE OF THE MINIMUM SYSTEM**
14 **METHOD?**

15 A. I recommended that the Public Service Commission (“Commission”) reject its use
16 for both cost allocation and rate design, and instead rely on the Basic Customer
17 Method to define customer-related costs. The Basic Customer Method confines
18 customer-related costs to those associated with metering, billing and collection,
19 customer service, and the customer’s service drop.

20 **Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY JUSTIFY THE USE OF THE MINIMUM**
21 **SYSTEM METHOD AND RESPOND TO YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS?**

22 A. In discussing the validity of the Minimum System Method, in both direct
23 testimony and rebuttal testimony, Company Witness Hager relies primarily on the

1 National Association of Regulatory Commissioners Electric Utility Cost
 2 Allocation Manual (“NARUC CAM”).² In rebuttal testimony Witness Hager also
 3 contends that Dr. James Bonbright, in his seminal work *Principles of Public*
 4 *Utility Rates*, lends support to the Minimum System Method by way of a
 5 statement that “the exclusion of minimum system costs from demand-related costs
 6 is on “much firmer ground” than its exclusion from customer costs.”³ This
 7 assertion was made in response to statements in my direct testimony relating Dr.
 8 Bonbright’s discussion of the matter, where he characterizes the costs of a
 9 minimum distribution system as “unallocable”.⁴

10 **Q. HOW DO YOU RESPOND THE COMPANY WITNESS HAGER’S**
 11 **CONTENTION THAT THE NARUC CAM SUPPORTS THE COMPANY’S**
 12 **USE OF THE MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD OF CLASSIFYING**
 13 **DISTRIBUTION COSTS?**

14 **A.** I do not disagree that the NARUC CAM does suggest that some distribution costs
 15 could be considered customer-related. However, Company Witness Hager fails to
 16 appreciate that the NARUC CAM also characterizes such a practice as the subject
 17 of an “unresolved argument” among analysts.⁵ In addition, the NARUC CAM
 18 also notes that “minimum-size distribution equipment has a certain load-carrying
 19 capability, which can be viewed as a demand-related cost.”⁶ Witness Hager also

² Rebuttal Testimony of Janice Hager (“Hager Rebuttal”), p. 8, lines 9-17.

³ Hager Rebuttal, p. 8, lines 3-7.

⁴ Dr. James Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, p. 348, Columbia University Press (1961).

⁵ NARUC. Electric Utility Cost Allocation Manual. p. 136. 1991.

⁶ *Id.*, p. 95.

1 fails to address the fact that a subsequent NARUC-commissioned report published
2 nearly a decade later found that more than thirty states (at the time of the report)
3 used the Basic Customer Method of classifying distribution costs rather than the
4 Minimum System Method.⁷

5 Ultimately the fact that the Basic Customer Method is not well-
6 represented in the NARUC CAM is not indicative of its broader level of
7 acceptance, which is higher than the acceptance of the Minimum System Method
8 and associated variations. Earlier draft versions of the NARUC CAM and related
9 discussions included the Basic Customer Method in addition to the Minimum
10 System Method and Zero-Intercept Method as methodologies for classifying
11 distribution costs. The Basic Customer Method was apparently removed from the
12 final version, eliciting concerns by least one state regulatory agency. Surrebuttal
13 Exhibit JRB-1 contains a letter from the Washington Utilities and Transportation
14 Commission (“UTC”) voicing the UTC’s concerns about the omission of the
15 Basic Customer Method from the NARUC CAM. Among other things, the letter
16 notes that UTC staff believes it to be the most common approach taken by
17 regulators throughout the country, citing the states of Arizona, Iowa, and Illinois
18 as states that have explicitly rejected the Minimum System Method and Zero-
19 Intercept Method.

⁷ F. Weston, et al., *Charges for Distribution Service: Issues in Rate Design*, p. 19, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2000), available at: <http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/536F0210-2354-D714-51CF-037E9E00A724>.

1 Q. HAVE OTHER STATES ALSO REJECTED THE USE OF THE
2 MINIMUM SYSTEM METHOD OR THE MINIMUM INTERCEPT
3 METHOD IN RECENT YEARS?

4 A. Yes. As I described in my direct testimony, legislators in Connecticut directed the
5 Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (“PURA”) to utilize the Basic Customer
6 Method in 2015.⁸ Likewise, in 2018 regulators in Colorado directed Black Hills
7 Energy to eliminate the Minimum Intercept Method from its cost of service study
8 in the utility’s most recent general rate case.⁹

9 Q. IS COMPANY WITNESS HAGER’S CHARACTERIZATION OF
10 BONBRIGHT’S VIEWS ON CUSTOMER COST CLASSIFICATION AN
11 ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF HIS THOUGHTS ON THE
12 MATTER?

13 A. No. Company Witness Hager selectively truncates Dr. Bonbright’s writing in a
14 manner that distorts the meaning. First, in discussing distribution cost
15 classification and a hypothetical minimum-sized distribution system, Dr.
16 Bonbright states “the inclusion of the costs of a minimum-sized distribution
17 system among the customer-related costs seems to me clearly indefensible.”¹⁰
18 Witness Hager relates subsequent text where Dr. Bonbright avers that minimum

⁸ Connecticut Public Act 15-5, June Special Session, *available at*:
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/CGAbillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num=1502&which_year=2015

⁹ Colorado Public Utilities Commission. Docket No. 17AL-0477E. Decision No. C18-0445. June 15, 2018, *available at*:
https://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/efi/efi_p2_v2_demo.show_document?p_dms_document_id=887641

¹⁰ James Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 348.

1 system costs ought also to be excluded from demand-related costs (“the exclusion
2 of minimum system costs from demand-related costs is on “much firmer ground”
3 than its exclusion from customer costs.”¹¹). However, she fails note that Dr.
4 Bonbright closes the loop on the matter by concluding that the costs of a
5 minimum-sized distribution system are “strictly unallocable”, while further
6 cautioning against rendering the category of customer costs a “dumping ground”
7 for costs that defy easy categorization.¹²

8 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS TO REACH**
9 **FROM YOUR DISCUSSION OF THE NARUC CAM AND DR.**
10 **BONBRIGHT’S WORK?**

11 A. The most reasonable conclusions are: (1) the costs of a minimum-sized system are
12 not customer-related, and (2) a majority of states recognize this by limiting the
13 customer-related classification to the costs of meters, billing and collection,
14 customer service, and customer service drops, and classifying 100% of the costs
15 associated with the shared distribution system as demand-related. How to allocate
16 those costs is apparently a matter of debate in Dr. Bonbright’s thinking, but he
17 clearly believed that a customer-related classification is inappropriate. A
18 conclusion that the full scope of distribution costs are demand-related makes the
19 most sense because a hypothetical minimum-sized distribution system is typically
20 capable of supporting a sizable amount of customer demand.

¹¹ Hager Rebuttal, p. 8, lines 3-7.

¹² James Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, Columbia University Press, 1961,
p. 348.

1 Q. IN LIGHT OF THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE RAISED ABOUT THE
2 OVERALLOCATION OR DOUBLE-COUNTING OF DISTRIBUTION
3 COSTS TO POPULOUS RATE CLASSES, IS THERE EVIDENCE
4 INDICATING THAT THE COMPANY'S MINIMUM SYSTEM WOULD
5 SUPPORT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF DEMAND?

6 A. Yes. Company Witness Hager voices confusion about my contention that the
7 Minimum System Method causes to be double-counted.¹³ I made this statement in
8 my direct testimony in reference to the fact that, as the NARUC CAM observes, a
9 minimum-sized distribution system has a load carrying capability that can be
10 viewed as a demand-related cost. A populous class such as the residential class is
11 allocated the bulk of these demand costs by the Minimum System Method, while
12 also receiving an allocation of the remaining demand-costs based on full class
13 demand. I referred to this as "double-counting", which I believe is an accurate
14 description, though the effect could also be described as "double-allocation" or
15 "over-allocation".

16 Such an effect is most easily visible in the context of line transformers. If
17 every one of DEC's roughly 709,000 customers had a minimal demand consisting
18 of a 100-Watt light bulb, the system load would be roughly 70.9 MW, on the
19 order of 1% of the Company's South Carolina retail non-coincident peak load of
20 roughly 6,988 MW.¹⁴ The Company's minimum-sized system is composed of

¹³ Hager Rebuttal, p. 14, lines 7-9.

¹⁴ DEC response to VS 1-20(a), Attachment entitled "VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study". Attached in Surrebuttal Exhibit JRB-2, p. 5.

1 approximately 211,000 15-kVa line transformers.¹⁵ Thus the combined kVa rating
2 of the “minimum-sized” system is roughly 3,175 MVA. This amounts to 45.4% of
3 South Carolina retail non-coincident peak load. Clearly, a system composed of the
4 minimum-sized line transformers would support significant demand in excess of a
5 scenario where each customer possesses only a minimal lighting load.

6 **Q. DOES COMPANY WITNESS HAGER TAKE ISSUE WITH ANY OTHER**
7 **PORTIONS OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY THAT YOU WISH TO**
8 **RESPOND TO?**

9 A. Yes. Witness Hager states that my derivation of the costs for a grid-independent
10 solar and battery storage system that would provide the same level of service as
11 system capable of supporting a minimal lighting load is irrelevant because the
12 Company’s cost of service study focuses only on allocating embedded costs.¹⁶

13 **Q. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THIS CRITICISM?**

14 A. Company Witness Hager misses the points I am making based on this analysis.
15 My first point, as I discuss at length in my testimony, is that the Minimum System
16 Method is increasingly anachronistic. It rests on a hypothetical “what if” scenario
17 (i.e., a customer with a minimal service need) that I have demonstrated would not
18 occur in the modern day. When the central element of such a “what if” scenario is
19 at best highly implausible, one should question the conceptual framework of the
20 method itself.

¹⁵ DEC response to VS 1-18, Attachment entitled “VS DR 1-18 DEC MinSys_1217”.
Attached in Surrebuttal Exhibit JRB-2, p. 3.

¹⁶ Hager Rebuttal. p. 13, lines 19-21 and p. 14, lines 1-3.

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY’S RESPONSES TO YOUR**
2 **DIRECT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE RESIDENTIAL BFC.**

3 A. Company Witness Pirro contends that my recommended residential BFC would
4 create inaccurate price signals, cause high usage customers to subsidize low usage
5 customers, and result in low usage customers failing to pay the costs associated
6 with serving them.¹⁷ Company Witness Hager raises a similar concern, that
7 moving costs from the customer classification to other classifications would result
8 in customers such as those with summer homes or on-site solar installations not
9 paying their “fair share of the costs of distribution facilities.”¹⁸ Further portions of
10 Witness Pirro’s rebuttal testimony on the residential BFC:

- 11 • State that he “believes there is merit” to the concerns raised by myself and
12 several other witnesses regarding the lack of gradualism present in the initially
13 proposed residential BFC, and suggest a “possible” alternative approach that
14 would result in a residential BFC of \$18.15/month.¹⁹
- 15 • Opine that the proposed residential BFC would not disproportionately harm
16 low-income customers.²⁰

¹⁷ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 6, lines 8-15.

¹⁸ Hager Rebuttal, p. 6, lines 4-23, quote at lines 21-22.

¹⁹ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 10, lines 8-21.

²⁰ *Id.*, p. 6-7.

1 **Q. HOW SHOULD THE COMMISSION VIEW THE COMPANY'S**
2 **ARGUMENT THAT YOUR RESIDENTIAL BFC RECOMMENDATIONS**
3 **WOULD CAUSE LOW USAGE CUSTOMERS TO BE SUBSIDIZED BY**
4 **HIGH USAGE CUSTOMERS?**

5 A. The Commission should give this argument no weight because the Company has
6 not presented any supporting evidence or analysis. The single most basic question
7 that must be asked when evaluating such an assertion is "What is the definition of
8 a low usage customer?" Yet when Vote Solar asked this simple question to
9 Company Witness Hager based on similar statements contained in her direct
10 testimony, the Company's response stated "the use of the term "low use
11 customer" was meant to be general in nature" and was not intended to refer to any
12 specific usage threshold.²¹ Cost of service is a discipline of evidence and
13 numbers, not broad assertions or generalizations. Statements for which the
14 Company cannot respond to the most basic interrogatory with a substantive
15 answer should not be considered credible.

16 **Q. IS THERE MERIT TO COMPANY WITNESS HAGER'S ASSERTION**
17 **THAT RESIDENTIAL NET METERING CUSTOMERS ARE AVOIDING**
18 **PAYING THEIR "FAIR SHARE" OF SERVICE COSTS?**

19 A. No. In fact based my own calculations there is reason to believe that the value of
20 residential net metering production, in the form of reduced allocations of costs
21 assigned based on coincident peak contribution and the marginal time-varying
22 value of customer-generated energy, exceeds the retail rate that these customers

²¹ DEC response to VS 1-4(a). Attached in Surrebuttal Exhibit JRB-2, p. 1.

1 avoid. In my direct testimony (as updated by subsequent errata) I estimated that
 2 residential net metering customers produced a \$3.1 million benefit to the
 3 residential class due to reductions in allocations based on coincident peak
 4 demand. Based on this estimated cost of service benefit spread across annual
 5 estimated energy production from these same systems, plus the Company's
 6 calculated marginal time-varying energy costs from its 2017 fuel cost proceeding,
 7 the value of that generation translates to roughly 12.2 cents/kWh.²²

8 By way of comparison, if the revenue requirement for Schedule RS and
 9 Schedule RE customers combined was spread across energy sales *with a zero*
 10 *residential BFC*, the total retail energy rate would be 11.85 – 12.00 cents/kWh
 11 depending on whether the total revenue requirement is based on cost of service
 12 without or with the use of the Minimum System Method. At a \$10/month
 13 residential BFC, the retail volumetric rate would be 10.90 – 11.04 cents/kWh,
 14 again varying by whether a minimum distribution system assumption is used.

15 **Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT COMPANY WITNESS PIRRO'S "POSSIBLE**
 16 **APPROACH" TO SETTING THE RESIDENTIAL BFC IS**
 17 **REASONABLE?**

18 A. No. Witness Pirro's derivation is based on increasing the residential BFC by 50%
 19 of the difference between the current charge of \$8.29/month and the Company's
 20 minimum-system derived theoretical residential BFC of \$28.00/month.²³ This
 21 would result in an increase of \$9.86/month, to \$18.15/month. The \$28.00/month

²² Marginal avoided energy costs from Commission Docket No. 2017-3-E. Direct
 Testimony of Jason Martin. p. 8, Table 4. July 28, 2017.

²³ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 10, lines 16-21.

1 amount hinges on the use of the Minimum System Method, which as I have
2 discussed at length, should not be utilized in the Company's cost of service study.
3 Thus the amount of the increase under this approach is biased by the inappropriate
4 upper benchmark. My own derivation of a reasonable maximum residential BFC
5 is \$11.64/month. Even that amount may be overstated because as discussed in my
6 direct testimony, this amount includes the full cost of the Customer Connect
7 platform as customer-related, even though Customer Connect is intended to also
8 serve energy and demand-related use cases, and it was not possible to fully
9 evaluate general and administrative costs that should not be included in a
10 customer charge.

11 I also disagree that such an increase is a reasonable adherence to the
12 principle of gradualism. Such an increase would still be the largest adopted for an
13 investor-owned utility ("IOU") in monetary terms in rate cases filed since July
14 2014. The next largest is a \$7.69/month increase allowed for Alaska Power in
15 October 2017. It would also more than double the current residential BFC, a
16 percentage increase of 119%, which exceeds all other increases in percentage
17 terms except one. That single example is for Duke Energy Kentucky, for which an
18 increase from \$4.50/month to \$11.00/month (144%) was authorized in 2018. The
19 Kentucky result though, is far more consistent with the national average
20 residential customer charge of \$10.42/month.

1 **Q. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO COMPANY WITNESS PIRRO'S**
2 **CONTENTION THAT RESIDENTIAL BFC INCREASES WOULD NOT**
3 **DISPROPORTIONATELY HARM LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS?**

4 A. Witness Pirro provided a chart purporting to illustrate that low-income customers
5 would not be disproportionately harmed by the Company's proposed BFC,
6 showing a wide range of average monthly usage among low-income customers
7 (\$30,000 or less in annual household income).²⁴ The Commission should give no
8 weight to Witness Pirro's assertions associated with this figure. When asked, the
9 Company could not provide the underlying data necessary to reproduce the graph
10 and perform more than a visual evaluation. Vote Solar requested all data
11 associated with the production of this figure, but the Company's response did not
12 include monthly usage data, a core element of the figure and the basis for Witness
13 Pirro's assertions.²⁵

14 Furthermore, based on visual inspection alone, the figure appears to show
15 that a majority of low-income customer bills are for usage below the residential
16 class average. The class average generally defines the usage threshold at which a
17 customer is indifferent to whether revenues are collected via a fixed monthly
18 charge or a volumetric charge. If the percentage of low-income customers with
19 average usage below the class average is larger than the percentage with above
20 average usage, the proposed residential BFC would disproportionately adversely

²⁴ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 7, un-numbered figure between lines 2 and 3.

²⁵ DEC response to VS 8-1(a), Attachment labeled "Vote Solar Data Request 8-1". Attached in Surrebuttal Exhibit JRB-2, p. 7.

1 impact low-income customers because a majority are made worse off by increases
2 in the residential BFC.

3 **Q. IN THE HYPOTHETICAL, IF A MODEST MAJORITY OF LOW-**
4 **INCOME CUSTOMERS ARE MADE BETTER OFF BY LOWER FIXED**
5 **CHARGE RATES, DOES THAT NOT ALSO MEAN THAT A**
6 **SIGNIFICANT MINORITY WOULD BE MADE WORSE OFF?**

7 A. It does, but high fixed charges coupled with lower usage charges are a poor
8 solution for addressing the needs of those high usage customers. For one, in this
9 hypothetical scenario higher fixed charges would be punitive on a group of
10 customers that is larger than the group they help. Second, inordinately high usage
11 can be addressed through targeted energy efficiency initiatives. Such a strategy
12 can produce outcomes that leave all customers better off, rather than just helping
13 some at the expense of others.

14

15 **V. DEMAND CHARGES FOR RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS**

16 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE COMPANY WITNESS PIRRO'S PROPOSAL TO**
17 **ESTABLISH A DEMAND CHARGE FOR SCHEDULE RS CUSTOMERS.**

18 A. Witness Pirro's proposal is only vaguely defined, stating that the Company should
19 revise Schedule RS to establish a demand component that recovers all distribution
20 costs not reflected as customer-related by the Minimum System Method.²⁶ While
21 Witness Pirro's rebuttal testimony refers specifically to Schedule RS customers,
22 in response to an information request, the Company indicates that if approved by

²⁶ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 10, lines 1-5.

1 the Commission, demand rates would apply to all residential rate schedules.²⁷ The
 2 basis for this proposal is Mr. Pirro's opinion that cost causation is best served by
 3 recovering demand-related costs through demand charges.²⁸

4 **Q. DO ANY OTHER IOUS IN THE COUNTRY INCLUDE DEMAND**
 5 **CHARGES UNDER STANDARD OR MANDATORY RESIDENTIAL**
 6 **RATE SCHEDULES?**

7 A. No. I have researched this topic exhaustively and demand charges within standard
 8 residential rates are not present for any IOU. A number of utilities offer optional
 9 residential demand rates, including DEC, but none make them mandatory for the
 10 entire residential class as the Company proposes.

11 **Q. ARE DEMAND CHARGES CONSISTENT WITH COST CAUSATION**
 12 **FOR RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS?**

13 A. It is necessary to speak in generalities here because the details of the Company's
 14 proposal are sparse. That said, as typically practiced in the form of charges based
 15 on monthly non-coincident peak demand, they are not aligned with cost causation.
 16 Demand-related costs are caused by customer contributions to peaks at different
 17 levels of the system. A non-coincident demand charge does not reflect the time-
 18 varying nature of demand that causes these costs, or load diversity.²⁹ For
 19 customers with consistent loads that tend to correspond to peak times, the
 20 inaccuracies may be tolerable. Such is not true for the residential class, as

²⁷ DEC response to VS 8-3(a). Attached in Surrebuttal Exhibit JRB-2, p. 9.

²⁸ Pirro Rebuttal, p. 10, lines 1-5.

²⁹ Load diversity refers to the fact that the sum of non-coincident peak loads of a group of individual customers is less than the maximum load that the same group of customers places on the system because the individual customer peak loads occur at different times.

1 individual customer loads tend to be highly variable over the course of a day,
2 month, or season. Furthermore, demand charges are blunt instruments that fail to
3 capture how much a customer contributes *on average* to the peaks that drive costs,
4 since billing demand is typically measured at time scales ranging from 15 minutes
5 to an hour.

6 **Q. DO RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS CURRENTLY PAY FOR THE COSTS**
7 **ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEMAND THEY PLACE ON THE**
8 **DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM?**

9 A. Yes, they simply do so based on their average demands because volumetric rates
10 effectively spread demand-related costs across all hours, or in the case of time-
11 varying rates, the hours that correspond to peak and off-peak periods.

12 **Q. BEYOND COST CAUSATION, ARE THERE OTHER REASONS THAT**
13 **MANDATORY DEMAND RATE DESIGNS ARE NOT USED IN**
14 **RESIDENTIAL RATES?**

15 A. Yes. There is a general acknowledgement that for residential customers, demand
16 rates effectively act as a fixed charge because most residential customers are
17 relatively unsophisticated and do not understand them. Moreover even customers
18 do possess a conceptual understanding, it is likely that the vast majority do not
19 have the ability manage their demands in the same way that a larger, more
20 sophisticated customers can.

1 **Q. WOULD THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL LEAD TO A MORE**
2 **ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT RATE STRUCTURE FOR**
3 **RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS?**

4 A. No. Economic efficiency is achieved by sending an accurate price signal that
5 customers are equipped to respond to. As I discuss above, as traditionally
6 implemented, demand charges are not consistent with cost causation for
7 residential customers, thus the price signal is not accurate. Second, rates only
8 produce more economically efficient outcomes if customers can respond to them.
9 If customers cannot respond, a new price signal just creates a different set of
10 winners and losers without increasing economic efficiency.

11 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION**
12 **REGARDING WITNESS PIRRO'S RESIDENTIAL DEMAND CHARGE**
13 **PROPOSAL?**

14 A. The Commission should reject the proposal. As a threshold matter, it would be
15 inappropriate to consider a new proposal that contemplates dramatic changes to
16 residential rate structure at this stage of the proceeding. Furthermore, the proposal
17 itself is ill-defined and lacks anything resembling the level of detail and
18 evidentiary support necessary to determine whether it would produce just and
19 reasonable rates and achieve the proper balance of ratemaking objectives.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Q. DOES ANY INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY IN ITS REBUTTAL CHANGE ANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS YOU MADE IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

A. No, my initial recommendations are unchanged. However, I additionally recommend that the Commission disregard Company Witness Pirro’s proposal to establish a demand charge for residential customers. Beyond the fact that it would be inappropriate to consider such a significant new rate design proposal at this stage of the proceeding, the proposal itself is unprecedented and vaguely defined, and the Company has not provided any substantive analysis of why it is needed and how it would impact customers.

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.

Sharon L. Nelson, Chairman
Richard D. Casad, Commissioner
A. J. "Bud" Pardini, Commissioner



(?)
Fand in
Box 27

STATE OF WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

P.O. Box 9022 • 1300 S. Evergreen Park Dr. S.W. • Olympia, Washington 98504-9022 • (206) 753-6423 • (SCAN) 234-6423

REF:6-1132

June 11, 1992

Mr. Julian Ajello
California PUC
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California 94102

Dear Mr. Ajello:

Please accept this belated response to your request for review of the February, 1991 draft of the new NARUC Electric Utility Cost Allocation Manual. Our staff recognizes that the final has now been printed. However, the inconsistent treatment of customer related costs in the manual is of concern. In three areas, three different approaches are presented. The first is an energy weighted approach, the second the so-called "minimum-system" or "zero-intercept" method, and the last is the "basic customer" method.

At page 39 of the draft, distribution plant is identified as being customer, demand, and energy-related. That is consistent with the treatment of gas distribution plant by this Commission, where it has ordered that 50% of distribution mains be treated as commodity-related. Our Commission has not made specific findings on electric distribution plant, except as set forth below.

At pages 91-100 of the draft, the minimum-system and zero intercept methods are presented. These methods do not conform to the matrix on page 39, which incorporates an energy component of distribution plant. Unfortunately, these two methods are the only methods presented. These are the two methods our Commission has explicitly rejected.

Finally, at page 148, in the section on marginal cost determination, the "basic customer" method, counting as customer related costs only meters, services, meter reading, and billing, is identified and defended.

Previous drafts included additional methods which are missing from the final version. For example, the 10/31/88 draft discussed at the fall meeting in San Francisco contained a section explicitly setting forth the basic customer method in the embedded cost section. In November of 1988, a section discussing the energy-weighted method was distributed to the Committee.

Mr. Julian Ajello
June 11, 1992
Page 2


Our Commission has been extremely clear about one thing in this area: that the "minimum-distribution" and "minimum-intercept" methods are not acceptable, and that the only costs which should be considered customer-related are the costs of meters, services, meter reading and billing. Our staff believes that is the most common approach taken by Commissions around the country. For example, in Iowa, the administrative rules of the Commission set this forth explicitly, while in Arizona and Illinois, the Commissions have explicitly rejected the minimum-system or minimum-intercept methods in favor of the basic customer approach.

In gas cost of service, our Commission has explicitly found that distribution plant (including service connections) is partially demand-related and partially commodity related, consistent with the matrix on page 39. The corresponding plant on the electric side -- poles, conductors and transformers -- has not been positively resolved in any cases to date. A recently filed electric cost of service case will provide an opportunity for advocates of the demand-only allocation approach and those favoring an energy weighing approach to make their cases before the Commission.

We hope that it is possible to either correct future editions of the Manual to reflect the variety of approaches to determining customer-related costs, or to even issue a correction to this edition.

Please feel free to contact Bruce Folsom at (206) 586-1132 with any questions you may have.

Sincerely,



Paul Curl
Secretary

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-4, was provided to me by the following individual: Kaari K. Beard, Rates & Regulatory Manager, Rate Case Planning & Execution, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-4 Please refer to Hager Direct, p. 15, lines 16-17.

(a) Please define the term “low use customer”.

(b) Please provide any analysis the Company has conducted supporting this definition and the associated workpapers in electronic spreadsheet format with all formulas and linkages intact.

Response:

In response to (a), Witness Hager’s use of the term “low use customer” was meant to be general in nature. Witness Hager did not intend to imply that there were specific usage thresholds associated with this term.

In response to (b), the Company has no analysis to support a specific definition.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-18, was provided to me by the following individual: Kaari K. Beard, Rates & Regulatory Manager, Rate Case Planning & Execution, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-18 On page 12 of Witness Hager's testimony, she testifies that "the Company has also identified a portion of the costs for distribution lines, poles, and transformers ... to be allocated based on customer factors."

(a) Please provide complete and detailed documentation of the input data, methods, and results of the Minimum System analyses used to determine the customer-related components of the Company's investments in:

- i. Primary poles.
- ii. Secondary poles.
- iii. Primary overhead conductors.
- iv. Secondary overhead conductors.
- v. Primary underground lines.
- vi. Secondary underground lines.
- vii. Line transformers.

(b) Please provide copies of all workpapers, including electronic spreadsheets with cell formulas and file linkages intact, relied on to derive the customer-related portion of costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364-368.

Response:

In response to (a), please find attached 'VS DR 1-18 DEC_MinSys_1217.xlsm' which shows the development of DEC's minimum system amounts for each relevant FERC account. The "SCMinSys" worksheet provides the final calculations. Also note that the calculations are performed at the FERC account level and subsequently allocated to Primary/Secondary classifications.

In response to (b), the attached workbook provides the calculations as well as data source documents.

[VS DR 1-18 DEC_MinSys_1217.xlsm]

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's First Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Hager Testimony
Date of Request: January 14, 2019
Date of Response: January 24, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to First Data Request #1-20, was provided to me by the following individual: Kaari K. Beard, Rates & Regulatory Manager, Rate Case Planning & Execution, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

1-20 On page 15 of Witness Hager's testimony, she testifies that "Witness Pirro relied upon costs allocated as being customer-related in the Cost of Service Study in developing his recommendation regarding the Basic Facilities Charge."

(a) Please provide an electronic spreadsheet version, with all cell formulas and file linkages intact, of the unit cost study relied on by Company witness Michael J. Pirro to develop his recommendation regarding the residential Basic Facilities Charge.

(b) Please provide an electronic spreadsheet version, with all cell formulas and file linkages intact, of the unit cost study associated with a version of the Company's cost of service study which classifies 100% of the costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364 through 368 as demand-related (i.e., relies on the Basic Customer method to classify distribution plant costs.)

Response:

In response to (a), please see attached file 'VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study.xlsxm' which shows the unit cost study relied on by Company Witness Michael J. Pirro to develop his recommendation regarding the residential Basic Facilities Charge.

In response to (b), please see attached file 'VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study-no Min Sys.xlsxm' which shows the unit cost study associated with a version of the Company's cost of service study which classifies 100% of the costs recorded in FERC Accounts 364 through 368 as demand-related.

[VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study.xlsxm]

[VS DR 1-20 DEC_Unit Cost Study-no Min Sys.xlsxm]

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Eighth Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Pirro's Rebuttal Testimony
Date of Request: March 13, 2019
Date of Response: March 15, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Eighth Data Request #8-1, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael J. Pirro, Director, Rates & Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 8-1 Please refer to Pirro Rebuttal, p. 7.
- (a) Please provide copies of all workpapers, including electronic spreadsheets with cell formulas and file linkages intact, relied on to derive all data inputs to the figure positioned between lines 2 and 3.
 - (b) Please reconcile the Company's response to Vote Solar Data Request 3-2 with the figure depicted on Pirro Rebuttal, p. 7.
 - (c) Please provide the distribution of low-income consumer bills (household income <\$30,000) by monthly usage and rate schedule, including at a minimum schedules RS, RE, and RT.

Response:

(a) See the attached file 'Vote Solar Data Request 8-1.xlsx'. Customer Account number and other identifying information has been removed.

['Vote Solar Data Request 8-1.xlsx']

(b) Company billing records do not contain the data that was requested in Vote Solar 3-2. The Company was able to use data from the Acxiom database to provide some representative information around usage at various income levels.

(c) The query did not contain rate code specifics for the residential class of customers. The majority of customers would be under rate schedule RS and RE.

**Duke Energy Carolinas' Response to
Vote Solar's Eighth Set of Written Discovery Request
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-4-55
Docket No. 2018-319-E
Related to Pirro's Rebuttal Testimony
Date of Request: March 13, 2019
Date of Response: March 15, 2019**

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

The attached response to Eighth Data Request #8-3, was provided to me by the following individual: Michael J. Pirro, Director, Rates & Regulatory Planning, and was provided to Vote Solar under my supervision.

Heather Shirley Smith
Deputy General Counsel
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS

Request:

- 8-3 On page 10 of Witness Pirro's Rebuttal Testimony. Pirro states that "The Company should revise its Rate Schedule RS to include a demand component rate to recover all non-minimum distribution costs."
- (a) Please explain why demand charges are recommended for Schedule RS customers but not Schedule RE customers.
- (b) Please provide a list of all examples of all mandatory (or default schedule) residential demand charges that Mr. Pirro is aware of. Please provide the applicable state, utility, rate schedule identifier, and a link to the tariff.

Response:

- (a) If the Commission decides that it is appropriate to recover demand-related cost via a demand rate, the demand recovery component would apply to all residential schedules.
- (b) North Carolina - Duke Energy Carolinas - Schedule RT Residential Service, Time of Use - <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/for-your-home/rates/electric-nc/ncschedulesrt.pdf?la=en>

North Carolina - Duke Energy Progress - Residential Service Time-Of-Use Schedule R-TOUD-53 - <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/for-your-home/rates/electric-nc/r2ncschedulesrtoudep.pdf?la=en>

South Carolina - Duke Energy Carolinas - Schedule RT Residential Service, Time-Of-Use - <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/for-your-home/rates/electric-sc/scschedulesrt.pdf?la=en>

South Carolina - Duke Energy Progress - Residential Service Time-Of-Use Schedule R-TOUD-52 - <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/for-your-home/rates/electric-sc/r2scschedulesrtoudep.pdf?la=en>

[Attached PDFs were provided for each of these rate schedules]