

JOHN N. HUGHES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
124 WEST TODD STREET
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601

TELEPHONE: (502) 227-7270

JNHUGHES@JOHNNHUGHESPSC.COM

March 4, 2016

James Gardner
Acting Executive Director
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Blvd.
Frankfort, KY 40601

Re: Atmos Energy Corporation
Case No. 2015-00343

Dear Mr. Gardner:


Atmos Energy Corporation submits its responses to the Attorney General's First Data Request. A petition for confidentiality for certain responses to the Attorney General's responses is also being filed. I certify that the electronic documents are true and correct copies of the original documents.

If you have any questions about this filing, please contact me.

Submitted By:

Mark R. Hutchinson
Wilson, Hutchinson and Littlepage
611 Frederica St.
Owensboro, KY 42301
270 926 5011
randy@whplawfirm.com

And



John N. Hughes
124 West Todd St.
Frankfort, KY 40601
502 227 7270
jnhughes@johnnhughespsc.com

Attorneys for Atmos Energy Corporation

**COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF:

Application of Atmos Energy Corporation)
for an Adjustment of Rates) Case No. 2015-00343
and Tariff Modifications)

PETITION FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
FOR ITEMS 1, 13, 18, 21, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, AND 47 OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FIRST DATA REQUEST

Atmos Energy Corporation (Atmos Energy) petitions for an order granting confidential protection of its responses to Items 1;13; 18; 21; 39; 43; 44; 45; 46 and 47 of the Attorney General's first data request. This petition is filed pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001, Section 13 and KRS 61.878. The information sought in the data requests is commercial information which if disclosed could cause substantial competitive harm to Atmos Energy. This information is not publicly available. It would be difficult or impossible for someone to discover this information from other sources. If this information were available to competitors in this form, they could use it to the competitive detriment of Atmos Energy. This information is not generally disclosed to non-management employees of Atmos Energy and is protected internally by the Company as proprietary information. The disclosure of this proprietary information would result in significant or irreparable competitive harm to Atmos Energy by providing its competitors with non-reciprocal competitive advantage. No public purpose is served by the disclosure of such information.

The Kentucky Open Records Act exempts from disclosure certain confidential or proprietary information. KRS 61.878(1)(c). To qualify for this exemption, and, therefore,

maintain the confidentiality of the information, a party must establish that disclosure of the information would permit an unfair commercial advantage to competitors of the party seeking confidentiality.

The Attorney General's requests 43 through 47 seek information about confidential special contracts:

43. Please provide an unredacted copy of the Company's confidential response to PSC-1-59, Attachment 55 in executable electronic (Excel) format with all formulae and links intact.

44. Please provide a copy of all correspondence, emails, internal reports, notes, etc. concerning contract negotiations for negotiated rates for each special contract customer involved subsequent to the Commission's Order in Case No. 2013-00148. In this response, please categorize and separate all documents by individual customer.

45. In Case No. 2013-00148, the Commission's Order stated: "The Commission will therefore require Atmos-Ky. to internally conduct and maintain studies, analyses, reports, quantifications, etc., that demonstrate the threat of bypass by each of its special-contract customers, and that the special contracts continue to generate sufficient revenue to cover variable costs and contribute to fixed costs. This information is to be provided in Atmos-Ky.'s next base-rate case application." (page 38)

Please identify specifically where each of these requirements are contained in the Company's filing by individual customer or contract. If such information has not specifically been provided within the Company's application, please provide each requirement by customer. In this response, please provide in hardcopy as well as in executable electronic (Excel) format with all formulae and links intact.

46. If not specifically provided in response to OAG-1-73 above, please provide the following:

- a. a copy of all documents, including Commission evaluations, that provided the acceptance by the Commission of each contract for each special contract customer;
- b. an identification of each customer by rate schedule taking discounted service that is included in the test year in this case;
- c. the actual rate(s) currently being charged for each

special contract customer, as well as the applicable billing determinants;

- d. the revenues collected from each special contract customer;
- e. the revenues that would have been collected at full tariff rates from each special contract customer, as well as the identification of the applicable full tariff rate schedule;
- f. the treatment of the revenue shortfall (difference between full rates and discounted rates revenues) in this case;
- g. all records, documents, evaluations and analyses undertaken by or for the Company associated with each special contract customer that supports the necessity for a tariff rate lower than the full tariff rate;
- h. copies of each special contract service contract; map(s) showing the location of each special contract customer and proximity to closest transmission pipeline;
- j. the annual throughput, revenues collected, and full tariff revenues associated with discounted services provided by the Company separated by rate schedule for each of the last three years;
- k. list of each Atmos affiliate that provides gas supply or storage services to each special contract customer; and,
 - 1. itemization and gross investment of dedicated facilities (e.g., mains, compressors, regulators, and services) used to serve each special contract customer.

47. Please provide all workpapers, source documents, electronic spreadsheets, etc. that supports the Company's verification for each of the 17 existing special contract customers "that special contract rates continue to generate sufficient revenue to cover variable costs and contribute to fixed system costs that would otherwise be borne by tariff customers" (Page 14, Lines 12 through 15 of Mr. Smith's Direct Testimony).

The Attorney General also requests information about certain customer curtailments in item 1-39:

39. For each request for interruption or curtailment of interruptible customers during the last five years, please provide the date, duration, requested level of load reduction, and actual load reduction for each request

The responses to these items provide information that identifies customer name, customer identifiable information, such as contracts, location, and specific

volumetric usage and plant facilities associated with the customer. All of this information is protected by the scope of confidentiality. The applicable statutes provide that "records confidentially disclosed to an agency or required by any agency to be disclosed to it, generally recognized as confidential or proprietary, which if openly disclosed would permit an unfair commercial advantage to competitors of the entity that disclosed the records" shall remain confidential unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction." KRS 81.878(1).

The natural gas industry is very competitive. Atmos Energy has competitors, who could use this information to their advantage and to the direct disadvantage of Atmos Energy. Atmos Energy would be at a competitive threat of loss of business due to the ability of its competitors to leverage the information to their advantage. The public disclosure of the customer name, customer identifiable information, monetary terms negotiated with each customer and critical monetary terms would permit an unfair advantage to those competitors. With the identity of the customer and the knowledge of the contract terms, competitors would have inside information to target these customers. For these reasons, the customer name, customer identifiable information, and monetary terms in the contracts are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to KRS 61.878(c)(1).

As for the information specifically requested in Items 43 through 47 of the Attorney General's request, the Commission has previously ruled that these contract submissions are confidential in the prior rate case 2013-00148. The contract terms are also excluded from public disclosure by KRS 278.160(3). This same information is the subject of a pending petition for confidentiality in response to the Commission's first data request in this case.

The information requested also includes maps of Atmos Energy's' and its customers' infrastructure. Exemption from public disclosure of the information relevant to this petition are provided in KRS 61.878(1)(m). Under the Kentucky Open Records Act, the Commission is entitled to withhold from public disclosure information disclosed to it to the extent that open disclosure would "have a reasonable likelihood of threatening the public safety by exposing a vulnerability in preventing, protecting against, mitigating, or responding to a terrorist act and limited to: . . . ,

(f) infrastructure records that expose a vulnerability referred to in this subparagraph through the disclosure of the location, configuration, or security of critical systems, including public utility critical systems. These critical systems shall include but not be limited to information technology, communications, electrical, fire suppression, ventilation, water, wastewater, sewage, and **gas** systems and;

(g) The following records when their disclosure will expose a vulnerability referred to in this subparagraph: **detailed drawings, schematics, maps, or specifications of structural elements**, floor plans, and operating, utility, or security systems of any building or facility owned, occupied, leased, or maintained by a public agency."

This Commission has recognized that similar reports with diagrams and maps "are infrastructure records that disclose the location, configuration, or security of public utility systems" and therefore, should be treated as confidential. See Case No. 2014-00166 *In the Matter of 2104 Integrated Resource Plan of Big Rivers Electric Corporation*, KY PSC Order, p. 7 (August 26, 2014).

The information contained in the specified document may provide detailed information about Atmos' Energy's distribution system and the location of critical components; as such, the disclosure of which could threaten the public safety generally and provide sensitive information relevant to the security against terroristic events.

The Attorney General also seeks confidential information about the company's state and federal income tax returns in items 18 and 21;

18. Please provide a schedule showing the history of the taxable income and losses for AEC in total and separated into utility, nonregulated, and other for each fiscal year since 2006. Show the taxable income or loss in each fiscal year; the loss carrybacks, if any, to the year carried back; the carryforward balance at the beginning of the fiscal year, if any; and the related carryforward ADIT at the end of the fiscal year, if any. In addition, please further separate the utility amounts into the Kentucky/Mid-States division, the Kentucky division/jurisdiction, and all other utility divisions. Provide all calculations, assumptions, data, and electronic spreadsheets with formulas intact. In addition, please provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the calculations each year.

21. Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att2 - ADIT for KY - Fall 2015" provided in response to Staff 1-59. Refer further to cell rows 105, 106 and 107 on worksheet tab "Division 002" that provide the account 190 ADIT amounts for "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward - Non Reg", "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward - Utility", and "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward- Other", respectively.

a. Please provide a detailed description of the methodology used to disaggregate or separately determine the actual and projected NOL carryforward amounts for utility, nonregulated, and other.

b. Please provide copies of all supporting documentation used to quantify the actual NOL carryforward amounts in fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, the base year, and the test year.

c. Balances in these lines changed on a quarterly basis until the last month of actual data provided in June 2015. Please explain how those quarterly changes in the NOL carryforward amounts are determined separately for the utility and nonregulated.

d. Please provide the actual balances for utility and nonregulated NOL carryforward amounts as of September 30, 2015 and December 31, 2015 and provide copies of all supporting documentation used to quantify the balances.

KRS 61.878(1)(k) exempts from public disclosure "all public records or information the disclosure of which is prohibited by federal law or regulation." Federal law codified in 26 U.S.C.A. 5 6103(a), prohibits state officials from publicly disclosing any federal income tax return or its contents, making the requested federal income tax return exempt.

Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this title ... no officer or employee of any State ... shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section....

The term "return information" means a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense. The effect of these two statutes is to preclude disclosure of the federal tax return.

Additionally, KRS 131.190(1) requires that all income tax information filed with the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet be treated in a confidential manner:

131.190 Information acquired in tax administration not to be divulged

-- Exceptions.

(1) (a) No present or former commissioner or employee of the Department of Revenue, present or former member of a county board of assessment appeals, present or former property valuation administrator or employee, present or former secretary or employee of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, former secretary or employee of the Revenue Cabinet, or any other person, shall intentionally and without authorization inspect or divulge any information acquired by him of the affairs of any person, or information regarding the tax schedules, returns, or reports required to be filed with the department or other proper officer, or any information produced by a hearing or investigation, insofar as the information may have to do with the affairs of the person's business.

Thus, the requested state income tax return is also confidential and protected from disclosure by KRS 61.878(1)(1), which exempts from the Kentucky Open Records Act "...public records or information the disclosure of which is prohibited or restricted or otherwise made confidential by enactment of the General Assembly."

This information was determined to be confidential in Atmos Energy's prior rate application - Case No 2013-00148.

The Attorney General's request 1 seeks workpapers:

1. Please provide all workpapers not already provided in the filing and/or in response to the Staff discovery. Provide all electronic workpapers with formulas and links intact, including all supporting and linked workpapers.

Attorney General request 13 relates to the Atmos Energy financing plan, which details the company's current and expected financial activities, assumptions, plans and other detailed information about the company's financial condition and expectations.

13. Please refer to the Company's response to Staff 1-03, which provides the components of the capital structure for Atmos Energy Corporation for the last ten calendar years using ending balances and daily average balances of short term debt. Please identify and describe all reasons why the Company increased the common equity ratio to 53.3% in 2014 from 50.0% or less in prior years by issuing a significant amount of common equity. Provide a copy of all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the issuance of such a significant amount of common equity. In addition, explain why the Company did not issue long term debt in lieu of some or all of the issuance of common equity.

Certain workpapers associated with Mr. Schneider's testimony include documents related to the Sarbanes-Oxley audit. The financing plan associated with the information requested in AG 1-13 includes information about accounting controls; provides information that details the internal financial operations of the company, procedures, methodologies and controls for assuring financial accuracy, all of which directly expose the most sensitive details of the company's financial workings.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that "disclosure of [this financial information] would unfairly advantage competing operators. The most obvious disadvantage may be the ability to ascertain the economic status of the entities without the hurdles systematically associated with acquisition of such information. *Marina Management Servs. v. Cabinet for Tourism, Dep't of Parks*, 906 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. 1995); see also *Hoy v. Kentucky Indus. Revitalization*


Auth., 907 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Ky. 1995) ("It does not take a degree in finance to recognize that such information concerning the inner workings of a corporation is generally recognized as confidential or proprietary and falls within the wording of KRS 61.878(1)(c).").

Atmos Energy requests that the information be held confidentially indefinitely. The statutes cited above do not allow for disclosure at any time. Given the competitive nature of the natural gas business and the efforts of non-regulated competitors to encroach upon traditional markets, it is imperative that regulated information remain protected and that the integrity of the information remain secure.

For these reasons, Atmos Energy requests that the items identified in this petition be treated as confidential. Should the Commission determine that some or all of the material is not to be given confidential protection, Atmos Energy requests an hearing prior to any public release of the information to preserve its rights to notice of the grounds for the denial and to preserve its right of appeal of the decision.

Submitted by:

Mark R. Hutchinson
Wilson, Hutchinson & Littlepage
611 Frederica St.
Owensboro, KY 42303
270 926 5011
Fax: 270-926-9394
Randy@whplawfirm.com



John N. Hughes
124 West Todd Street
Frankfort, KY 40601
502 227 7270
jnhughes@johnnhughesp.com
Attorneys for Atmos Energy Corporation

**COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF:

Application of Atmos Energy Corporation)
for an Adjustment of Rates) **Case No. 2015-00343**
and Tariff Modifications)

MOTION TO DEVIATE FROM REGULATION

Atmos Energy Company, (Atmos Energy) by counsel, moves the Public Service Commission ("Commission") to grant authorization pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001 § 22 to deviate from the requirement that it upload an electronic version of all papers filed in this case to the Commission's website using the Commission's E-Filing System. Atmos Energy additionally moves the Commission to grant approval pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001 § 22 to deviate from the requirement that it file with the Commission one copy in paper medium of all papers electronically filed with the Commission. This motion is based on the number, size and nature of the files associated with Mr. Watson's depreciation study, requested by the Attorney General in item 1 of the first data request, more particularly:

AG_1-01_Attachment 3 – Watson Alliance Study KY Direct Workpapers Final, 586 Files.
AG_1-01_Attachment 4 – Watson Alliance Study Midstates GO Workpapers Final, 142 Files.
AG_1-01_Attachment 5 – Watson Alliance Study Shared Services Unit Workpapers Final, 387 Files.

1. On October 28, Atmos Energy filed its notice of election of use of electronic filing procedures.
2. On that same date, the Commission acknowledged receipt of the notice of election of use of electronic which requires that documents submitted to the Commission in this proceeding must comply with the rules of procedure adopted by the Commission found in 807 KAR 5:001 and that any deviation from these rules must be submitted in writing to the Commission for consideration.

3. 807 KAR 5:001 § 8(3) provides: "All papers shall be filed with the commission by uploading an electronic version using the commission's E-Filing System. In addition, the filing party shall file one (1) copy in paper medium with the commission as required by subsection (12)(a)2 of this section."

4. 807 KAR 5:001 § 8(12)(a)(2) provides: "A paper shall be consider timely filed with the commission if: "The paper, in paper medium, is filed at the commission's offices no later than the second business day following the successful electronic transmission."

5. Atmos Energy seeks a deviation from the Commission's Rules of Procedure (807 KAR 5:001) for approval to file the attachments referenced above in electronic format on a compact disk (CD), rather than as an upload into the E-Filing system. Each of the three depreciation studies is broken out into dozens of folders and sub-folders containing raw and unformatted data files, graphs, statistics, analyses, fitting of the curves, and other supporting data. There are approximately 1,100 files in various program formats, folders and sub-folders, which cannot be assembled into a document capable of electronic submission into the E-File system. Viewing the data on CD allows for easier understanding of the documentation organization supporting each study.

6. Atmos Energy also requests authority to deviate from the Commission's Rules of Procedure by substituting a CD for the paper copy of those attachments, due to the voluminous nature – approximately several thousand pages – and large number of files, folders and sub folders.


7. Atmos has served the Commission and the Attorney General with a CD containing the attachments.

WHEREFORE, Atmos Energy requests deviations from the requirement that parties upload all filings to the Commission's E-Filing System and submit a copy of the filing in to the Commission in paper medium and allow service of a CD of the attachments to the Commission and Attorney General in lieu of the requirements of 807 KAR 5:001.

Submitted by:

Mark R. Hutchinson
Wilson, Hutchinson & Littlepage
611 Frederica St.
Owensboro, KY 42303
270 926 5011
Fax: 270-926-9394

And




John N. Hughes
124 West Todd St.
Frankfort, KY 40601
502 227 7270
jnhughes@johnnhughespsc.com

Attorneys for Atmos Energy Corporation

Certification:

I certify that this is a true and accurate copy of the documents to be filed in paper medium; that the electronic filing was transmitted to the Commission on March 4, 2016; that one copy of the filing will be delivered to the Commission within two days; and that no party has been excused from participation by electronic means.



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT


The Affiant, Mark A. Martin, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.




Mark A. Martin

STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF DAVISS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Mark A. Martin on this the 1st day of March, 2016.





Notary Public - State of KY at Large
My Commission Expires: Sept. 26, 2017
Notary ID: 496385

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)


AFFIDAVIT


The Affiant, Pace McDonald, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.


Pace McDonald

STATE OF Texas
COUNTY OF Dallas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Pace McDonald on this the 3rd day of March, 2016.




Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 10-29-16


COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT

The Affiant, Paul H. Raab, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.




Paul H. Raab

STATE OF Maryland
COUNTY OF Montgomery

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Paul H. Raab on this the 1st day of March, 2016.





Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 05/13/2019


COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT

The Affiant, Jason L. Schneider, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.



Jason L. Schneider

STATE OF Texas
COUNTY OF Dallas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Jason L. Schneider on this the 1st day of March, 2016.





Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 7/16/18

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT


The Affiant, Gary L. Smith, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.




Gary L. Smith

STATE OF Texas
COUNTY OF Dallas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Gary L. Smith on this the 1st day of March, 2016.





Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 10-29-16

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)


AFFIDAVIT

The Affiant, James H. Vander Weide, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

James H. Vander Weide
James H. Vander Weide

STATE OF NC
COUNTY OF Durham

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by James H. Vander Weide on this the
29 day of February, 2016.



Christiana S Chamberlain
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 9/10/19

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT


The Affiant, Gregory K. Waller, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.




Gregory K. Waller

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF Dallas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Gregory K. Waller on this the 2nd day of March, 2016.





Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 10-29-16

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)
RATE APPLICATION OF) Case No. 2015-00343
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)

AFFIDAVIT

The Affiant, Dane A. Watson, being duly sworn, deposes and states that the attached responses to the Office of the Attorney General's first request for information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Dane A. Watson
Dane A. Watson

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF COLLIN

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Dane A. Watson on this the 29 day of ~~March~~, 2016.

February



Laura Solano
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 5/12/2019

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-01
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please provide all workpapers not already provided in the filing and/or in response to the Staff discovery. Provide all electronic workpapers with formulas and links intact, including all supporting and linked workpapers.

RESPONSE:

Please see Confidential Attachment 1 for Mr. Schneider's workpaper.

Please see Attachment 2 for Mr. McDonald and Mr. Waller's workpaper.

Please see the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-28 for Dr. Vander Weide's workpapers.

Due to their voluminous nature, Mr. Watson's workpapers related to the three depreciation studies are being provided on CD only. Please see the three folders marked "AG_1-01_Att3 - Watson Alliance Study KY Direct Workpapers Final", "AG_1-01_Att4 - Watson Alliance Study Midstates GO Workpapers Final", and "AG_1-01_Att5 - Watson Alliance Study Midstates GO Workpapers Final".

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-01_Att1 - Schneider Workpaper (CONFIDENTIAL).pdf, 1 Page.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-01_Att2 - KY projection for rates revised.xlsx, 6 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 3 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-01_Att3 - Watson Alliance Study KY Direct Workpapers Final, 586 Files (CD Only).

ATTACHMENT 4 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-01_Att4 - Watson Alliance Study Midstates GO Workpapers Final, 142 Files (CD Only).

ATTACHMENT 5 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-01_Att5 - Watson Alliance Study Shared Services Unit Workpapers Final, 387 Files (CD Only).

Respondents: Pace McDonald, Jason Schneider, Dr. James Vander Weide, Greg Waller and Dane Watson

KY Rate Case
Oct-15
Deferred Balances

	6/30/2015	7/31/2015	8/31/2015	9/30/2015	10/31/2015	11/30/2015	12/31/2015
002 SSU							
Book Cost	197,628,004	188,483,242	188,703,283	191,233,913	192,745,862	195,474,107	200,100,668
Tax Cost	107,981,211	107,981,211	107,981,211	107,981,211	108,060,703	108,204,143	108,447,388
FXA01	(89,646,799)	(80,502,031)	(80,722,072)	(83,252,702)	(84,685,159)	(87,269,965)	(91,653,260)
Tax Effected	(32,721,079)	(29,383,241)	(29,463,556)	(30,387,236)	(30,910,083)	(31,853,537)	(33,453,447)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		3,337,838	(80,315)	(923,680)	(522,847)	(943,454)	(1,599,910)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		3,337,838	(80,315)	(923,680)	(522,847)	(943,454)	(1,599,910)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(32,721,079)	(29,383,241)	(29,463,556)	(30,387,236)	(30,910,083)	(31,853,537)	(33,453,447)
	(0)						
Book Accum	(123,277,117)	(113,824,242)	(114,830,433)	(115,861,917)	(116,932,548)	(118,018,698)	(119,131,165)
Tax Accum	(102,362,282)	(102,362,282)	(102,362,282)	(102,362,282)	(102,555,421)	(102,751,380)	(102,952,046)
FXA02	20,914,835	11,461,960	12,468,151	13,499,636	14,377,127	15,267,338	16,179,119
Tax Effected	7,633,915	4,183,616	4,560,875	4,927,367	5,247,651	5,572,578	5,905,378
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		(3,450,299)	367,260	376,492	320,284	324,927	332,800
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		(3,450,299)	367,260	376,492	320,284	324,927	332,800
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	7,633,914						
	1	4,183,616	4,560,875	4,927,367	5,247,651	5,572,578	5,905,378
CWIP							
FXA26	813,916	(2,882,991)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)
Tax Effected	297,078	(1,052,292)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		(1,349,371)	(143,841)	-	-	-	-
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		(1,349,371)	(143,841)	-	-	-	-
Sec481(a) Cushion Gas	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888
Sec 481(a) Line Pack Gas	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597
	(66,230,557)	(70,235,576)	(69,843,511)	(71,342,657)	(71,897,622)	(73,592,216)	(77,063,751)
012 Call Center							
Book Cost	161,147,877	156,854,047	156,866,959	157,636,437	157,997,071	158,360,301	158,728,652
Tax Cost	38,056,589	38,056,589	38,056,589	38,056,589	38,077,189	38,097,938	38,118,865
FXA01	(123,091,288)	(118,797,458)	(118,810,370)	(119,579,848)	(119,919,882)	(120,282,363)	(120,607,787)
Tax Effected	(44,928,320)	(43,381,072)	(43,365,785)	(43,646,644)	(43,770,757)	(43,885,763)	(44,021,842)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		1,567,248	(4,713)	(280,860)	(124,112)	(125,006)	(126,080)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		1,567,248	(4,713)	(280,860)	(124,112)	(125,006)	(126,080)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(44,928,320)	(43,381,072)	(43,365,785)	(43,646,644)	(43,770,757)	(43,885,763)	(44,021,842)
	(0)						
Book Accum	(52,182,230)	(48,357,213)	(49,115,994)	(49,895,044)	(50,678,409)	(51,463,796)	(52,251,219)
Tax Accum	(10,246,537)	(10,246,537)	(10,246,537)	(10,246,537)	(10,452,930)	(10,659,856)	(10,867,318)
FXA02	41,836,693	38,110,676	38,869,457	39,648,507	40,225,479	40,803,940	41,383,901
Tax Effected	15,306,528	13,910,397	14,187,352	14,471,705	14,882,300	14,893,438	15,105,124
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		(1,396,131)	276,955	284,353	210,595	211,138	211,686
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		(1,396,131)	276,955	284,353	210,595	211,138	211,686
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	15,306,528						
	(0)	13,910,397	14,187,352	14,471,705	14,882,300	14,893,438	15,105,124
CWIP							
FXA26	(2,362,282)	(2,616,908)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)
Tax Effected	(862,233)	(955,171)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity		(92,838)	(312,533)	-	-	-	-
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated		(92,838)	(312,533)	-	-	-	-
		(955,171)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
	(83,517,877)	(83,303,690)	(83,414,076)	(83,404,504)	(83,167,566)	(82,931,586)	(82,697,046)

KY Rate Case
 Oct-15
 Deferred Balances

	1/31/2016	2/29/2016	3/31/2016	4/30/2016	5/31/2016	6/30/2016	7/31/2016	8/31/2016	9/30/2016
002 SSU									
Book Cost	202,222,674	203,984,143	205,608,557	206,684,586	207,910,920	208,796,868	209,605,113	210,887,499	212,199,506
Tax Cost	108,568,954	108,652,091	108,738,970	108,794,069	108,858,019	108,904,598	108,947,093	109,014,515	109,083,495
FXA01	(93,663,720)	(95,342,052)	(96,871,587)	(97,900,517)	(98,952,901)	(99,892,270)	(100,658,021)	(101,872,984)	(103,116,011)
Tax Effected	(34,187,258)	(34,799,849)	(35,358,129)	(35,733,689)	(36,154,309)	(36,460,679)	(36,740,178)	(37,183,839)	(37,637,344)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	(733,810)	(612,591)	(558,280)	(375,559)	(420,620)	(306,370)	334	303	273
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	(733,810)	(612,591)	(558,280)	(375,559)	(420,620)	(306,370)	(255,761)	(368,134)	(339,346)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(94,187,258)	(94,799,849)	(95,358,128)	(95,733,689)	(96,154,309)	(96,460,679)	(96,718,439)	(97,084,573)	(97,423,920)
Book Accum	(120,255,703)	(121,390,317)	(122,534,115)	(123,684,090)	(124,840,985)	(126,010,488)	(127,183,871)	(128,364,547)	(129,552,685)
Tax Accum	(103,154,911)	(103,359,592)	(103,565,931)	(103,773,384)	(103,982,085)	(104,193,061)	(104,404,736)	(104,617,727)	(104,832,065)
FXA02	17,100,792	18,030,725	18,968,184	19,910,707	20,858,900	21,817,428	22,779,135	23,746,819	24,720,620
Tax Effected	6,241,789	6,581,215	6,923,887	7,267,408	7,613,498	7,963,381	8,314,384	8,667,589	9,023,026
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	336,411	339,425	342,173	344,021	346,091	349,863	351,023	353,205	355,437
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	336,411	339,425	342,173	344,021	346,091	349,863	321,210	293,208	265,848
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	6,241,789	6,581,215	6,923,887	7,267,408	7,613,498	7,963,381	8,314,384	8,667,589	9,023,026
CWIP									
FXA26	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)
Tax Effected	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sec481(a) Cushion Gas	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888
Sec 481(a) Line Pack Gas	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597
	(78,162,517)	(78,900,917)	(79,492,993)	(79,579,400)	(79,783,591)	(79,664,432)	(79,468,478)	(79,715,755)	(79,984,981)
012 Call Center									
Book Cost	159,101,838	159,388,434	159,707,372	159,984,801	160,261,100	160,531,840	160,801,582	161,074,346	161,530,287
Tax Cost	38,140,296	38,156,667	38,174,886	38,190,733	38,206,516	38,221,981	38,237,390	38,252,971	38,279,015
FXA01	(120,961,542)	(121,231,767)	(121,532,486)	(121,794,068)	(122,054,584)	(122,309,859)	(122,564,192)	(122,821,375)	(123,251,272)
Tax Effected	(44,150,963)	(44,249,595)	(44,359,357)	(44,454,835)	(44,549,923)	(44,643,098)	(44,735,930)	(44,829,802)	(44,986,714)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	(129,120)	(98,632)	(108,763)	(95,477)	(95,088)	(93,175)	(92,832)	(93,872)	(156,912)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	(129,120)	(98,632)	(108,763)	(95,477)	(95,088)	(93,175)	(84,947)	(77,926)	(117,362)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(44,150,963)	(44,249,595)	(44,359,357)	(44,454,835)	(44,549,923)	(44,643,098)	(44,728,068)	(44,809,972)	(44,924,334)
Book Accum	(53,040,697)	(53,832,279)	(54,625,468)	(55,420,445)	(56,216,878)	(57,009,700)	(57,803,935)	(58,599,701)	(59,398,024)
Tax Accum	(11,075,322)	(11,283,880)	(11,492,861)	(11,702,313)	(11,912,176)	(12,121,034)	(12,330,291)	(12,539,951)	(12,750,285)
FXA02	41,985,376	42,548,400	43,132,607	43,718,132	44,304,803	44,898,688	45,473,644	46,059,750	46,647,739
Tax Effected	16,317,362	15,530,166	15,743,402	15,957,118	16,171,253	16,384,363	16,597,890	16,811,809	17,026,425
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	212,238	212,804	213,236	213,717	214,135	213,110	213,517	213,928	214,616
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	212,238	212,804	213,236	213,717	214,135	213,110	195,383	177,590	160,521
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	16,317,362	15,530,166	15,743,402	15,957,118	16,171,253	16,384,363	16,579,743	16,767,399	16,917,637
CWIP									
FXA26	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)
Tax Effected	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
	(82,469,328)	(82,156,529)	(81,873,041)	(81,549,098)	(81,222,944)	(80,894,355)	(80,563,710)	(80,234,788)	(80,076,696)

KY Rate Case
Oct-15
Deferred Balances

	10/31/2016	11/30/2016	12/31/2016	1/31/2017	2/28/2017	3/31/2017	4/30/2017	5/31/2017
002 SSU								
Book Cost	213,711,455	216,439,700	221,066,261	223,188,267	224,959,736	226,574,150	227,660,179	228,876,513
Tax Cost	109,162,987	109,306,427	109,549,673	108,661,239	109,754,376	109,839,255	109,896,354	109,960,304
FXA01	(104,548,468)	(107,133,273)	(111,516,589)	(113,527,028)	(115,205,361)	(116,734,895)	(117,763,825)	(118,916,209)
Tax Effected	(38,160,191)	(38,103,645)	(40,703,555)	(41,437,365)	(42,049,957)	(42,808,237)	(42,983,796)	(43,404,416)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	(522,847)	(943,454)	(1,599,910)	(733,810)	(612,591)	(558,280)	(375,559)	(420,620)
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	(346,655)	(547,979)	(793,380)	(301,566)	(204,757)	(139,186)	(82,765)	(34,572)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(37,770,674)	(66,318,953)	(39,111,893)	(39,413,109)	(38,613,266)	(39,767,443)	(39,826,209)	(39,854,779)
Book Accum	(130,749,423)	(131,961,678)	(133,200,247)	(134,450,886)	(135,711,601)	(136,981,498)	(138,257,571)	(139,540,563)
Tax Accum	(104,993,132)	(105,156,287)	(105,322,984)	(105,491,306)	(105,660,983)	(105,831,897)	(106,003,641)	(106,176,317)
FXA02	25,756,291	26,805,391	27,877,263	28,959,581	30,050,618	31,149,601	32,253,930	33,364,246
Tax Effected	9,401,046	9,783,988	10,175,201	10,570,247	10,968,475	11,369,604	11,772,685	12,177,950
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	376,020	362,921	391,233	395,046	398,229	401,129	403,080	405,265
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	250,632	222,409	194,009	162,348	133,107	100,007	67,364	33,309
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	9,694,260	9,416,899	8,519,679	8,679,026	8,808,192	8,908,139	9,079,603	9,205,813
CWIP								
FXA26	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)	(3,277,075)
Tax Effected	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)	(1,196,132)
Sec481(a) Cushion Gas	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888	1,504,888
Sec 481(a) Line Pack Gas	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597	182,597
	(80,381,767)	(81,917,473)	(85,228,915)	(86,157,037)	(86,744,333)	(87,174,884)	(87,099,485)	(87,141,563)
012 Call Center								
Book Cost	161,890,921	162,254,151	162,620,502	162,995,688	163,282,284	163,601,222	163,878,651	164,154,950
Tax Cost	38,299,615	38,320,364	38,341,291	38,362,722	38,379,093	38,397,312	38,413,159	38,428,842
FXA01	(123,591,308)	(123,933,787)	(124,279,211)	(124,632,968)	(124,903,191)	(125,203,910)	(125,465,492)	(125,726,008)
Tax Effected	(45,110,827)	(45,235,832)	(45,361,812)	(45,491,032)	(45,589,665)	(45,699,427)	(45,794,905)	(45,889,993)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	(124,112)	(125,006)	(126,080)	(128,120)	(98,632)	(109,763)	(95,477)	(95,088)
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	(82,288)	(72,808)	(62,522)	(53,063)	(32,967)	(27,365)	(15,956)	(7,815)
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	(45,608,922)	(45,078,226)	(45,140,756)	(45,195,813)	(45,229,781)	(45,264,146)	(45,270,103)	(45,277,218)
Book Accum	(60,198,370)	(61,000,754)	(61,805,193)	(62,611,737)	(63,419,889)	(64,229,830)	(65,041,327)	(65,854,374)
Tax Accum	(12,841,453)	(12,932,853)	(13,024,486)	(13,116,360)	(13,208,417)	(13,300,677)	(13,393,115)	(13,485,729)
FXA02	47,356,917	48,067,802	48,780,707	49,495,377	50,211,472	50,928,163	51,648,212	52,368,645
Tax Effected	17,285,275	17,544,784	17,804,958	18,065,813	18,327,187	18,589,141	18,851,597	19,114,555
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	258,850	259,509	260,174	260,855	261,375	261,953	262,457	262,958
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	171,621	150,729	129,018	107,201	87,364	65,309	43,863	21,613
Per mostly recently provided ADIT Difference	17,089,478	17,240,207	17,389,234	17,476,326	17,553,703	17,629,697	17,676,980	17,694,573
CWIP								
FXA26	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)	(3,473,162)
Tax Effected	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
Tax Effected Monthly Activity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	242	212	181	150	122	91	61	30
Tax Effected Monthly Activity Pro Rated	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)	(1,267,704)
	(79,707,551)	(79,339,046)	(78,971,667)	(78,610,751)	(78,164,881)	(77,747,920)	(77,290,442)	(76,830,526)

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-02
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to Schedule B.2 B of the Fall 2015 Rev Req Model provided in response to Staff 1-59. Please provide the actual data in the same level of detail and in the same format for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available in live spreadsheet format.

RESPONSE:

While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-02_Att1 - Plant Data.xlsx, 12 Pages.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Atmos Energy Corporation
Plant Data

Row Labels	Cost											
	10/2011	11/2011	12/2011	1/2012	2/2012	3/2012	4/2012	5/2012	6/2012	7/2012	8/2012	9/2012
002 - Dallas Atmos Rate Division	168,157,370	170,335,370	166,314,081	166,345,266	166,360,149	165,794,382	165,831,632	165,872,414	165,873,925	166,053,213	166,076,044	166,601,304
39000-Structures & Improvements										2,641	5,877	5,871
39005-G-Structures & Improvements	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	8,253,038	8,253,038	8,592,758	8,593,230	8,593,230	8,576,886	8,576,886	8,576,886	8,576,886	8,576,886	8,576,886	8,576,886
39029-Improv. to Leased Prem-AEAM												
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	11,475,202	11,482,508	11,516,992	11,524,958	11,524,958	10,736,150	10,745,072	10,745,072	10,745,068	10,777,277	10,770,555	10,782,602
39102-Remittance Processing												
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39104-G-Office Furniture & Equip.	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741
39120-Office Furniture & Equip-AEAM												
39200-Transportation Equipment	96,290	96,290	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	83,933	83,933	184,233	185,288	185,380	185,402	185,402	185,868	185,896	185,896	212,213	212,213
39420-Tools And Garage-AEAM												
39500-Laboratory Equipment			12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	12,100	23,632
39700-Communication Equipment	2,355,236	2,355,236	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,193,131	2,439,868
39720-Communication Equip-AEAM												
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	236,331	236,331	380,416	380,416	380,416	380,416	388,191	388,191	388,189	388,189	388,189	388,189
39820-Miscellaneous Equipment-AEAM												
39900-Other Tangible Property	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	24,806,700	25,425,605	23,671,182	23,671,074	23,671,074	23,670,982	23,671,015	23,671,018	23,671,009	23,671,009	23,671,009	23,688,912
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	13,461,222	13,499,655	13,829,702	13,829,692	13,841,388	14,090,395	14,090,494	14,090,502	14,090,500	14,097,312	14,097,312	14,097,636
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	3,911,025	4,139,008	3,877,627	3,876,784	3,876,590	3,871,538	3,861,610	3,861,193	3,861,396	3,861,396	3,861,396	3,877,059
39904-Mainframe Cpu	1,095,465	1,095,465	0									
39905-Mainframe Hardware	1,159,864	1,159,964	0									
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	4,697,256	4,886,599	2,560,176	2,565,276	2,558,608	2,557,781	2,564,852	2,581,801	2,581,884	2,581,900	2,581,900	2,581,901
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	1,769,409	1,835,363	1,844,063	1,847,480	1,855,236	1,854,955	1,854,955	1,857,296	1,857,264	1,867,740	1,867,740	1,867,740
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	82,763,384	83,791,459	85,557,643	85,571,781	85,573,980	85,570,587	85,593,866	85,615,299	85,616,542	85,743,678	85,743,678	85,954,740
39909-Oth Tang Prop - Mainframe S/W	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619
39921-OthTang Prop-Servers-H/W-AEAM												
39922-OthTang Prop-Servers-S/W-AEAM												
39923-OthTang Prop-Network-H/W-AEAM												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39926-OthTang Prop-PC Hardware-AEAM												
39928-Oth Tang Prop-Appl SW-AEAM												
RWIP												
009 - WRKG Division	354,298,430	354,418,345	356,054,222	356,692,439	357,341,367	358,208,610	359,185,981	359,997,580	361,340,394	362,216,029	363,433,632	370,136,905
30100-Organization	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330
30200-Franch & Consent Grp	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853
32520-Producing Leaseholds	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353
32540-Rights-Of-Way	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422
33100-Producing Gas Wells -	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492
33100-Production Gas Wells Equipmen												
33201-Field Lines	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163
33202-Tributary Lines	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218
33400-Field Measuring And R	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384
33600-Purification Equipment	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369
33600-Purification Equipment												
35010-Land	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127
35020-Rights-Of-Way	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682
35100-Structures & Improvements	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916
35102-Compressor Station Equipment	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261
35103-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Structures	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138
35104-Other Structures	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443
35200-Wells	2,823,137	2,823,542	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449	2,823,449
35201-Well Construction	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595	1,867,595
35202-Well Equipment	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309
35203-Cushion Gas	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833
35210-Leaseholds	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530
35211-Storage Rights	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614
35301-Field Lines	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497
35302-Tributary Lines	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458

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Row Labels	Cost											
	10/2011	11/2011	12/2011	1/2012	2/2012	3/2012	4/2012	5/2012	6/2012	7/2012	8/2012	9/2012
35400-Compressor Station Equipment	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446
35500-Meas. & Reg. Equipment	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883
35600-Purification Equipment	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979
36510-Land & Land Rights	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970
36520-Rights-Of-Way	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772
36602-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Str	41,715	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002
36603-Other Structures	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826
36700-Mains - Cathodic Protection	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035
36701-Mains - Steel	28,784,759	28,798,449	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,878,393	28,873,489
36900-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equipment	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023
36901-Measuring And Reg. St	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,960	2,276,827	2,276,827
37400-Land & Land Rights	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	428,256	426,001	426,001
37401-Land	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326
37402-Land Rights	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401
37403-Land Other	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784
37500-Structures & Improvements	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	327,881	336,204
37501-Structures & Improvements T.B	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507
37502-Land Rights	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591
37503-Improvements	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005
37600-Mains - Cathodic Protection	11,231,866	11,278,777	11,369,323	11,415,440	11,230,552	11,273,116	11,313,226	11,340,977	11,100,925	10,967,118	10,997,379	11,034,734
37601-Mains - Steel	77,933,189	78,002,125	77,938,381	78,062,292	77,991,487	77,993,689	77,918,064	77,939,331	77,551,079	77,687,694	77,724,692	80,352,132
37602-Mains - Plastic	35,381,680	35,419,372	35,803,696	36,157,798	36,381,075	36,693,427	36,981,353	37,084,932	37,337,103	37,491,639	37,737,839	40,784,063
37800-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Eq-General	4,671,916	4,671,909	4,670,457	4,681,915	4,696,888	4,696,746	4,696,192	4,696,013	4,691,259	4,700,853	4,706,941	4,849,479
37900-Meas. & Reg. - City Gate	1,868,615	1,868,615	1,878,866	1,876,143	1,876,143	1,876,140	1,876,140	1,876,140	1,876,140	1,876,140	1,876,140	1,963,784
37905-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equip T.B.	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,083	1,425,054	1,425,054	1,424,849	1,415,373
38000-Services	87,026,880	86,771,059	87,430,708	87,263,387	87,644,688	87,832,235	88,157,991	88,536,374	88,768,866	89,183,413	89,691,845	89,981,698
38100-Meters	15,812,164	15,658,419	15,794,143	15,836,884	15,920,574	15,994,688	16,155,277	16,281,086	16,688,430	16,842,304	16,855,990	17,237,107
38200-Meter Installations	47,240,672	47,398,948	47,612,713	47,737,233	47,844,644	47,989,941	48,133,476	48,246,594	48,021,017	48,125,720	48,289,624	48,425,869
38300-House Regulators	6,026,325	6,107,854	6,242,184	6,318,441	6,397,288	6,482,481	6,562,476	6,604,380	6,730,728	6,791,405	6,875,814	6,868,568
38400-House Reg. Installations	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276
38500-Industrial Measuring	4,853,624	4,969,877	4,971,288	4,972,568	4,972,645	4,972,670	4,972,670	4,972,670	4,972,670	4,972,670	4,972,670	4,985,574
38500-Industrial Measuring												
38900-Land & Land Rights	88,638	88,638	88,638	88,638	88,638	88,638	88,638	88,638	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216
38900-Land & Land Rights												
39000-Structures & Improvements	895,426	895,426	895,531	895,531	910,529	911,438	910,545	910,545	1,344,984	1,344,984	1,344,984	1,496,980
39002-Structures - Brick	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755
39003-Improvements	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,377,695	1,377,695	1,378,870	1,378,870	1,378,870	1,378,870	1,359,057	1,359,057	1,423,449	1,423,449	1,426,302	1,453,652
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39200-Transportation Equipment	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444
39201-Wkg Trucks - Group												
39202-WKG Trailers	34,697	34,697	34,697	34,697	34,697	34,697	34,697	34,697	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	1,987,329	1,987,783	1,987,910	2,002,644	1,986,652	2,023,651	2,042,870	2,042,837	1,990,481	2,061,843	2,087,849	2,110,125
39603-Ditchers	104,581	104,581	104,581	104,581	104,581	104,581	104,581	104,581	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704
39604-Backhoes	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747
39605-Welders	24,405	24,405	24,405	24,405	24,405	24,405	24,405	24,405	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236
39700-Communication Equipment	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663	377,663
39701-Communication Equip.												
39701-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39705-Comm. Equip. - Telemetering	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	3,340,077	3,340,140	3,328,931	3,328,264	3,344,301	3,344,301	3,344,301	3,344,301	3,343,835	3,343,835	3,343,835	3,329,293
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473	113,473
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781	511,781
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	3,601,976	3,601,976	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,602,994	3,455,424
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331	247,331
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710	411,710
RWIP												
RWIP Recon												

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Row Labels	Cost											
	10/2011	11/2011	12/2011	1/2012	2/2012	3/2012	4/2012	5/2012	6/2012	7/2012	8/2012	9/2012
RWIP-Recon												
012 - Call Center Division	204,859,707	204,911,091	179,186,401	179,195,005	179,199,713	179,179,031	159,696,381	159,715,913	159,723,335	159,723,121	159,727,435	159,962,518
38900-Land	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240
38910-CKV Land&Land Rights	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123
39000-Structures & Improvements	13,177,653	13,180,113	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,180,105	13,181,947
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	4,437,465	4,437,465	4,437,465	4,437,465	4,437,465	4,418,390	4,418,390	4,418,390	4,418,390	4,418,390	4,418,390	4,418,390
39010-CKV-Structures & Improvements	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,057,799	1,099,091	1,128,497	1,128,497	1,128,497	1,128,497	1,128,497	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39700-Communication Equipment	26,149,421	26,149,421	14,207,925	14,207,925	14,207,925	14,207,925	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080
39710-CKV-Communication Equipment	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	9,533	4,891	2,980	2,980	2,980	2,980	2,980	2,980	2,980	4,914	4,914	9,812
39900-Other Tangible Property												
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	13,047,925	13,047,925	6,143,377	6,143,377	6,143,377	6,143,377	5,383,786	5,383,786	5,383,786	5,383,572	5,383,572	5,383,572
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	7,582,366	7,582,366	2,426,469	2,429,116	2,433,823	2,432,216	2,370,206	2,370,206	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,370,174
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	913,069	913,069	518,162	518,162	518,162	518,162	344,625	344,625	344,625	344,625	344,625	435,051
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	2,556,546	2,556,539	1,094,080	1,100,278	1,100,278	1,100,278	276,093	280,543	286,062	286,062	290,376	289,767
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	3,327,195	3,327,435	3,414,376	3,414,136	3,414,136	3,414,136	495,399	495,833	495,833	495,833	495,833	496,433
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	93,619,811	93,621,850	93,652,240	93,652,240	93,652,240	93,652,240	91,051,500	91,051,500	91,051,500	91,051,500	91,051,500	91,189,428
39910-CKV-Other Tangible Property	90,541	90,541	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341
39916-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Hardware	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015
39917-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Software	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,172,326
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
RWIP												
091 - Brentwood Division	5,719,679	5,719,679	5,713,217	5,527,835	5,527,835	5,557,181	5,557,181	5,557,281	5,556,654	5,556,654	5,556,654	5,556,654
30100-Organization	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309
30300-Misc. Intangible Plant	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552
39001-Structures - Frame	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450	63,450
39200-Transportation Equipment	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110
39300-Stores Equipment	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559
39600-Power Operated Equipment	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534
39700-Communication Equipment	320,786	320,786	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545	317,545
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	860,082	860,082	860,082	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695	825,695
39900-Other Tangible Property	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	251,698	251,698	251,698	248,089	248,089	248,089	248,089	251,698	251,698	251,698	251,698	251,698
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	1,237,293	1,237,293	1,234,072	1,086,687	1,086,687	1,116,033	1,116,033	1,112,423	1,111,896	1,111,896	1,111,896	1,111,896
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631	128,631
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111	739,111
RWIP												
Grand Total	733,035,186	735,384,485	707,267,921	707,760,546	708,429,064	708,739,204	690,271,175	691,143,088	692,494,308	693,549,016	694,793,764	702,257,381

Atmos Energy Corporation
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Row Labels	10/2012	11/2012	12/2012	1/2013	2/2013	3/2013	4/2013	5/2013	6/2013	7/2013	8/2013	9/2013
002 - Dallas Atmos Rate Division	166,747,792	169,545,991	175,809,436	176,071,682	176,374,530	176,230,699	176,351,566	174,882,956	175,624,985	175,693,257	175,714,408	175,137,651
39000-Structures & Improvements	40,547	46,106	49,305	49,306	49,306	49,306	49,306	49,306	145,273	212,987	212,987	462,279
39005-G-Structures & Improvements	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	8,668,900	8,668,800	8,855,976	8,856,030	8,856,030	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029
39029-Improv. to Leased Prem-AEAM												
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	10,787,789	10,787,789	10,810,676	10,809,372	10,809,371	10,515,340	10,515,340	9,206,381	9,215,810	9,215,810	9,215,810	9,215,810
39102-Remittance Processing												
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39104-G-Office Furniture & Equip.	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741
39120-Office Furniture & Equip-AEAM												
39200-Transportation Equipment	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	212,213	212,213	212,213	212,213	212,213	212,213	212,213	212,213	221,680	222,469	240,167	240,098
39420-Tools And Garage-AEAM												
39500-Laboratory Equipment	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632
39700-Communication Equipment	2,439,868	2,439,868	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692
39720-Communication Equip-AEAM												
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	388,189	388,189	388,189	388,189	388,189	388,189	388,189	437,555	437,555	437,555	437,555	437,555
39820-Miscellaneous Equipment-AEAM												
39900-Other Tangible Property	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	769,103	769,103	772,557	162,268
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	23,698,912	25,846,749	26,107,815	26,113,779	26,220,352	26,305,182	26,316,210	26,316,150	26,319,264	26,319,264	26,319,264	26,319,264
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	14,097,696	14,152,308	14,454,168	14,453,987	14,623,951	14,634,075	14,640,759	14,641,311	14,646,369	14,646,369	14,646,369	14,646,369
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	3,891,769	3,891,776	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,795,559
39904-Mainframe Cpu												
39905-Mainframe Hardware												
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	2,581,901	2,609,002	2,641,150	2,641,052	2,641,052	2,648,461	2,648,572	2,648,483	2,648,483	2,648,483	2,648,483	2,648,483
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	1,867,740	1,869,066	1,597,817	1,597,814	1,597,814	1,602,718	1,602,735	1,602,712	1,602,712	1,602,712	1,602,712	1,602,712
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	85,854,740	86,516,438	92,330,186	92,587,999	92,614,312	92,657,246	92,760,273	92,550,875	92,563,035	92,562,802	92,562,802	92,347,111
39909-Oth Tang Prop - Mainframe S/W	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619	2,614,619
39921-OthTang Prop-Servers-H/W-AEAM												
39922-OthTang Prop-Servers-S/W-AEAM												
39923-OthTang Prop-Network-H/W-AEAM												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39926-OthTang Prop-PC Hardware-AEAM												
39928-Oth Tang Prop-Appl SW-AEAM												
RWIP												
009 - WKG Division	381,306,516	382,330,084	382,249,004	383,487,613	384,713,708	385,788,686	387,326,223	388,123,524	389,640,692	391,077,598	393,067,955	396,742,114
30100-Organization	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330
30200-Franch & Consent Grp	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853
32520-Producing Leaseholds	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353
32540-Rights-Of-Way	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422
33100-Producing Gas Wells -	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492
33100-Production Gas Wells Equipmen												
33201-Field Lines	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163
33202-Tributary Lines	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218
33400-Field Measuring And R	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384
33600-Purification Equipment	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369
33600-Purification Equipment												
35010-Land	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127
35020-Rights-Of-Way	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682
35100-Structures & Improvements	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916
35102-Compressor Station Equipment	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261
35103-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Structures	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138
35104-Other Structures	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443
35200-Wells	3,705,764	3,705,170	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	3,706,441	4,674,802
35201-Well Construction	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999
35202-Well Equipment	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	455,309	449,149	449,149	449,149	449,149	437,438
35203-Cushion Gas	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833
35210-Leaseholds	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530
35211-Storage Rights	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614
35301-Field Lines	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497
35302-Tributary Lines	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458

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Row Labels	10/2012	11/2012	12/2012	1/2013	2/2013	3/2013	4/2013	5/2013	6/2013	7/2013	8/2013	9/2013
35400-Compressor Station Equipment	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446
35500-Meas. & Reg. Equipment	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883
35600-Purification Equipment	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	163,979	405,597
36510-Land & Land Rights	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970
36520-Rights-Of-Way	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772
36602-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Str	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002
36603-Other Structures	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826
36700-Mains - Cathodic Protection	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	406,035	435,307
36701-Mains - Steel	28,673,489	28,570,796	28,570,796	28,547,050	28,547,050	28,547,050	28,547,050	28,544,551	28,544,551	28,544,551	28,544,551	28,544,551
36900-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equipment	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	578,023	615,022	615,022	615,022
36901-Measuring And Reg. St	2,276,827	2,276,827	2,276,827	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023
37400-Land & Land Rights	440,848	440,848	440,848	483,722	483,722	483,722	483,722	483,722	483,722	483,722	483,722	526,452
37401-Land	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326
37402-Land Rights	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401
37403-Land Other	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784
37500-Structures & Improvements	336,178	336,173	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168
37501-Structures & Improvements T.B	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	101,507	100,539	100,539	100,539	100,501	100,501	100,501
37502-Land Rights	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591
37503-Improvements	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005
37600-Mains - Cathodic Protection	11,064,896	11,092,857	11,124,397	11,154,891	11,186,008	11,224,071	11,244,296	11,273,978	11,293,692	11,321,699	11,353,521	11,388,679
37601-Mains - Steel	88,893,191	89,036,167	89,188,173	89,296,526	89,083,017	89,230,213	89,123,033	89,025,337	89,128,686	89,183,703	89,232,261	88,891,098
37602-Mains - Plastic	41,419,526	41,620,913	42,045,520	42,403,429	42,903,732	42,993,187	43,630,330	43,745,831	44,502,816	44,709,338	44,978,449	47,084,919
37800-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Eq-General	4,899,516	4,900,618	5,001,533	5,031,110	5,075,036	5,075,091	5,074,185	5,082,066	5,087,890	5,087,211	5,087,198	5,093,806
37900-Meas. & Reg. - City Gate	1,966,561	1,984,869	1,986,345	2,035,319	2,092,610	2,127,169	2,126,652	2,126,557	2,151,247	2,175,999	2,175,993	2,259,130
37905-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equip T.B.	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,415,373	1,414,780	1,405,100	1,405,100	1,405,100
38000-Services	90,582,153	91,052,495	91,616,811	91,857,241	92,296,631	92,672,646	93,328,088	93,689,617	94,085,289	94,745,665	95,611,279	95,874,383
38100-Meters	17,566,409	17,947,996	18,644,506	18,878,960	19,079,482	19,304,894	19,492,396	19,710,145	20,022,968	20,163,240	20,361,594	20,544,649
38200-Meter Installations	48,526,688	48,671,311	48,654,954	48,758,314	48,839,784	48,875,819	48,921,581	49,013,018	49,053,757	49,250,415	49,521,126	49,532,817
38300-House Regulators	6,926,096	6,957,457	6,976,370	6,997,333	7,035,991	7,031,694	7,113,984	7,137,161	7,081,105	7,115,137	7,134,828	7,188,811
38400-House Reg. Installations	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276
38500-Industrial Measuring	4,995,298	5,000,250	5,004,778	5,016,473	5,016,597	5,025,479	5,026,193	5,030,053	5,092,005	5,056,663	5,127,958	5,127,370
38500-Industrial Measuring												
38900-Land & Land Rights	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216	786,216
38900-Land & Land Rights												
39000-Structures & Improvements	1,496,980	1,496,803	1,567,760	1,585,948	1,585,948	1,580,879	1,580,879	1,588,851	1,589,039	1,589,021	1,884,925	1,876,997
39002-Structures - Brick	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755
39003-Improvements	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,453,652	1,453,652	1,453,652	1,453,652	1,453,652	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39200-Transportation Equipment	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	395,444	358,343	358,343	358,343
39201-Wkg Trucks - Group												
39202-WKG Trailers	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	2,110,326	2,110,326	2,110,344	2,123,510	2,145,044	2,158,367	2,176,395	2,188,716	2,103,095	2,082,533	2,092,869	2,105,336
39603-Ditchers	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704
39604-Backhoes	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747
39605-Welders	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236
39700-Communication Equipment	377,663	377,663	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222
39701-Communication Equip.												
39701-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39705-Comm. Equip. - Telemetering	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	3,326,688	3,329,125	3,117,649	3,126,372	3,126,372	3,245,533	3,245,533	3,275,674	3,275,674	3,363,318	3,363,318	3,413,287
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	113,473	113,473	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	511,781	511,781	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	3,455,424	3,455,424	2,507,892	2,507,892	2,533,161	2,533,188	2,533,188	2,533,188	2,533,188	2,533,188	2,452,177	2,460,141
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	247,331	247,331	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	411,710	411,710	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014
RWIP												
RWIP Recon												

Atmos Energy Corporation
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Row Labels	10/2012	11/2012	12/2012	1/2013	2/2013	3/2013	4/2013	5/2013	6/2013	7/2013	8/2013	9/2013
RWIP-Recon												
012 - Call Center Division	159,962,518	159,993,650	160,051,262	160,052,332	160,053,552	160,788,289	160,818,671	150,640,182	151,746,657	151,772,096	151,807,203	153,019,115
38900-Land	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240
38910-CKV Land&Land Rights	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123
39000-Structures & Improvements	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,181,947	13,182,141	13,197,279	13,197,279	13,222,138	12,331,919
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	4,418,390	4,424,651	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649	4,424,649
39010-CKV-Structures & Improvements	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,400,518	10,414,698	10,414,698	10,414,663
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,143,140	1,277,906	1,330,884	1,334,673	1,334,673	2,268,134
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39700-Communication Equipment	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	2,064,080	1,945,225	1,945,225	1,945,225	1,945,225	1,945,225
39710-CKV-Communication Equipment	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	9,812	14,443	14,443	14,443
39900-Other Tangible Property												610,289
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	5,383,572	5,383,572	5,383,572	5,383,572	5,383,572	5,451,037	5,451,037	7,878,639	7,877,147	7,877,024	7,877,024	7,877,050
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,370,174	2,695,956	2,695,956	1,639,161	1,618,301	1,618,292	1,618,292	1,618,294
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	435,051	435,051	435,051	435,051	435,051	435,051	435,051	450,276	450,457	450,456	450,456	450,456
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	289,767	293,752	341,995	342,736	342,736	684,125	714,506	719,467	722,589	735,597	745,844	749,347
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	496,433	496,433	496,433	496,433	496,433	496,433	496,433	491,869	491,869	491,869	491,869	491,869
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	91,189,428	91,210,314	91,229,032	91,229,032	91,229,032	91,229,032	91,229,032	102,810,985	103,868,886	103,858,359	103,858,359	104,413,245
39910-CKV-Other Tangible Property	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	90,341	91,890	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992
39916-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Hardware	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015
39917-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Software	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.	23,172,326	23,172,326	23,162,979	23,162,979	23,162,979	23,162,979	23,162,979	0				
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
RWIP												
091 - Brentwood Division	5,556,607	5,556,607	4,031,062	4,031,062	4,281,047	4,257,533	4,257,533	4,206,295	4,206,295	4,206,295	4,211,622	4,958,561
30100-Organization	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309
30300-Misc. Intangible Plant	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552
35001-Structures - Frame	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	63,450	63,450	68,248	68,248	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917
39200-Transportation Equipment	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110
39300-Stores Equipment	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	4,161	0
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,559	142,978	142,978	142,978	142,978	142,978
39600-Power Operated Equipment	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534
39700-Communication Equipment	317,545	317,545	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	230,940	230,940
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	825,695	825,695	825,463	825,463	825,463	825,463	825,463	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796
39900-Other Tangible Property	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	251,698	251,698	240,507	240,507	240,507	240,507	240,507	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	1,111,849	1,111,849	481,398	481,398	735,714	673,624	673,624	660,783	660,783	660,783	660,783	664,795
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	128,631	128,631	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	739,111	739,111	31,388	31,388	31,388	69,964	69,964	69,964	69,964	69,964	69,964	817,052
RWIP												
Grand Total	713,573,493	717,426,332	722,134,764	723,642,690	725,422,838	727,065,207	728,753,993	717,852,957	721,218,629	722,749,245	724,801,187	729,857,441

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Plant Data

Row Labels	10/2013	11/2013	12/2013	1/2014	2/2014	3/2014	4/2014	5/2014	6/2014	7/2014	8/2014	9/2014
002 - Dallas Atmos Rate Division	176,211,114	177,264,574	177,798,045	176,794,951	176,825,107	176,901,632	178,092,510	178,105,544	178,482,024	178,818,174	178,893,467	183,264,217
39000-Structures & Improvements	480,148	481,439	486,269	466,287	466,287	492,992	938,477	940,822	940,720	940,720	940,720	1,309,246
39005-G-Structures & Improvements	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,154,286	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,856,029
39029-Improv. to Leased Prem-AEAM												
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	9,218,296	9,218,296	9,298,222	9,298,222	9,298,222	9,347,436	9,347,436	9,359,619	9,416,214	9,421,895	9,421,895	10,496,896
39102-Remittance Processing												
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39104-G-Office Furniture & Equip.	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741
39120-Office Furniture & Equip-AEAM												
39200-Transportation Equipment	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	99,143	103,416	103,416
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	240,098	252,397	252,397	252,397	252,397	252,397	252,397	252,397	252,397	254,975	264,481	264,476
39420-Tools And Garage-AEAM												
39500-Laboratory Equipment	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632
39700-Communication Equipment	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,448,692
39720-Communication Equip-AEAM												
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	437,555	466,272	466,272	466,272	474,355	474,925	474,925	474,925	474,925	481,673	481,673	481,521
39820-Miscellaneous Equipment-AEAM												
39900-Other Tangible Property	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	162,268	168,103	168,103	168,103
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	26,561,336	26,561,336	29,080,621	28,844,353	28,844,358	28,844,299	29,086,086	29,086,041	29,085,997	29,085,997	29,087,101	29,891,192
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	14,646,369	14,646,369	14,345,090	14,348,480	14,348,484	14,348,448	14,845,692	14,844,245	15,006,936	15,054,132	15,055,891	16,346,608
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	3,795,559	3,795,559	3,559,602	3,560,460	3,560,460	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,560,450
39904-Mainframe Cpu												
39905-Mainframe Hardware												
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	2,666,778	2,666,778	2,621,505	2,621,505	2,621,505	2,621,505	2,627,937	2,627,937	2,630,968	2,645,606	2,666,092	2,696,309
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	1,612,149	1,612,149	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,019,047	1,029,795	1,029,795	1,029,795
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	93,130,416	94,141,569	94,850,996	94,099,905	94,121,969	94,122,109	94,122,038	94,122,038	94,265,598	94,473,958	94,512,123	95,314,477
39909-Oth Tang Prop - Mainframe S/W	2,614,619	2,614,619	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232
39921-OthTang Prop-Servers-H/W-AEAM												
39922-OthTang Prop-Servers-S/W-AEAM												
39923-OthTang Prop-Network-H/W-AEAM												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39926-OthTang Prop-PC Hardware-AEAM												
39928-Oth Tang Prop-Appl SW-AEAM												
RWIP												
009 - WKG Division	397,656,093	399,611,900	401,105,145	407,028,840	407,695,128	411,730,895	414,395,486	412,466,316	413,517,598	416,151,742	418,008,105	424,189,446
30100-Organization	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330
30200-Franch & Consent Grp	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853
32520-Producing Leaseholds	2,353	2,353	2,353	2,353	0							
32540-Rights-Of-Way	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,422	83,272	83,272	83,272	83,272	83,272	83,272	83,272	83,272
33100-Producing Gas Wells -												
33100-Production Gas Wells Equipmen	3,492	3,492	3,492	3,492	0							
33201-Field Lines	47,163	47,163	47,163	47,163	24,694	24,694	24,694	24,694	24,694	24,694	24,694	24,694
33202-Tributary Lines	528,218	528,218	528,218	528,218	518,838	518,838	518,838	518,838	518,838	518,838	518,838	518,838
33400-Field Measuring And R	192,384	192,384	192,384	192,384	9,180	9,180	9,180	9,180	9,180	9,180	9,180	9,180
33600-Purification Equipmen												
33600-Purification Equipment	44,369	44,369	44,369	44,369	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
35010-Land	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127
35020-Rights-Of-Way	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682
35100-Structures & Improvements	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916
35102-Compressor Station Equipment	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261
35103-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Structures	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138
35104-Other Structures	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443
35200-Wells	4,675,943	4,684,300	4,704,871	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	4,704,737	5,870,418
35201-Well Construction	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999
35202-Well Equipment	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	437,438	424,750
35203-Cushion Gas	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833
35210-Leaseholds	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530
35211-Storage Rights	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614
35301-Field Lines	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497
35302-Tributary Lines	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458

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Row Labels	10/2013	11/2013	12/2013	1/2014	2/2014	3/2014	4/2014	5/2014	6/2014	7/2014	8/2014	9/2014
35400-Compressor Station Equipment	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446
35500-Meas. & Reg. Equipment	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883
35600-Purification Equipment	404,690	404,426	404,426	404,426	404,426	404,426	404,426	404,426	414,684	414,655	414,652	414,663
36510-Land & Land Rights	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970
36520-Rights-Of-Way	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772
36602-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Str	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002
36603-Other Structures	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826
36700-Mains - Cathodic Protection	431,856	431,512	431,159	431,159	431,159	431,159	431,159	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509
36701-Mains - Steel	28,544,551	28,544,551	28,634,766	27,926,003	27,925,971	27,924,437	27,852,709	27,845,816	27,845,816	27,845,816	27,845,816	27,845,816
36900-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equipment	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022
36901-Measuring And Reg. St	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,276,023	2,273,521	2,273,521	2,273,521
37400-Land & Land Rights	526,350	526,345	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	526,289	531,192
37401-Land	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326
37402-Land Rights	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401	253,401
37403-Land Other	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784
37500-Structures & Improvements	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168
37501-Structures & Improvements T.B	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	100,501	99,818	99,818
37502-Land Rights	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591	46,591
37503-Improvements	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005
37600-Mains - Cathodic Protection	11,415,400	11,440,444	11,467,832	11,488,518	11,520,513	11,556,729	11,587,355	20,793,197	20,511,819	20,518,621	20,562,526	20,715,876
37601-Mains - Steel	88,824,423	88,818,399	89,000,451	94,183,264	94,259,171	94,189,632	94,045,804	84,375,421	84,339,308	84,332,907	84,364,086	83,615,075
37602-Mains - Plastic	47,263,382	48,216,725	48,306,994	48,905,522	49,018,786	52,077,640	53,852,531	53,956,247	54,013,679	55,107,251	56,101,778	60,719,622
37800-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Eq-General	5,088,863	5,087,493	5,087,493	5,095,039	5,095,039	5,121,651	5,123,640	5,123,156	5,122,989	5,121,744	5,129,321	5,234,987
37900-Meas. & Reg. - City Gate	2,297,170	2,322,087	2,325,610	2,325,610	2,358,974	2,365,465	2,366,771	2,399,228	2,392,558	2,441,385	2,523,679	2,717,836
37905-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equip T.B.	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,398,298	1,397,972	1,395,942
38000-Services	96,289,989	96,852,116	97,635,419	98,032,418	98,393,651	99,186,101	99,870,604	100,651,651	101,403,891	102,346,184	102,674,606	102,590,801
38100-Meters	20,652,617	20,917,710	21,338,819	21,546,246	21,720,712	22,017,415	22,241,972	22,186,076	22,320,050	22,542,739	22,673,798	22,987,936
38200-Meter Installations	49,663,229	49,758,186	49,771,268	49,830,328	49,816,256	49,919,490	49,989,961	50,113,132	49,987,819	50,088,588	50,185,867	50,095,568
38300-House Regulators	7,216,971	7,236,539	7,247,802	7,266,589	7,272,086	7,279,006	7,285,157	7,290,487	7,580,772	7,610,524	7,623,646	7,896,127
38400-House Reg. Installations	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276
38500-Industrial Measuring	5,137,044	5,147,453	5,158,392	5,161,875	5,166,632	5,168,569	5,170,749	5,178,040	5,179,668	5,183,383	5,205,072	5,196,746
38500-Industrial Measuring												
38900-Land & Land Rights	786,216	786,216	786,216	923,479	923,479	923,479	923,479	924,555	1,024,633	1,024,626	1,024,626	1,024,626
38900-Land & Land Rights												
39000-Structures & Improvements	1,876,997	1,876,997	1,876,997	1,876,997	1,876,997	1,901,118	1,968,966	2,047,078	2,053,520	2,139,282	2,139,216	2,139,227
39002-Structures - Brick	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	178,755	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115
39003-Improvements	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022	725,022
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,279,376
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,449,816	1,446,133	1,446,133	1,394,033	1,438,579	1,450,743	1,450,681	1,450,410
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39200-Transportation Equipment	358,343	358,343	358,343	358,343	358,343	260,695	260,695	260,695	260,695	260,695	260,695	417,941
39201-Wkg Trucks - Group												
39202-WKG Trailers	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	2,105,336	2,105,336	2,105,336	2,105,336	2,146,224	2,202,942	2,205,143	1,705,861	1,726,481	1,726,481	1,726,481	1,738,370
39603-Ditchers	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704
39604-Backhoes	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747
39605-Welders	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236
39700-Communication Equipment	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	377,222	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722
39701-Communication Equip.												
39701-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39705-Comm. Equip. - Telemetering	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	66,316	0				
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	3,413,962	3,413,962	3,253,901	3,253,901	3,258,190	3,276,407	3,289,832	3,288,002	3,365,422	3,463,406	3,602,935	3,668,753
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	175,990	0				
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	100,775	0				
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	52,297	82,165
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	2,460,141	2,460,141	2,460,141	2,460,141	2,460,141	2,345,478	2,345,478	1,019,996	1,019,996	1,019,996	986,913	1,021,622
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,883	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	139,014	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515
RWIP												
RWIP Recon												

Atmos Energy Corporation
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Row Labels	10/2013	11/2013	12/2013	1/2014	2/2014	3/2014	4/2014	5/2014	6/2014	7/2014	8/2014	9/2014
RWIP-Recon												
012 - Cal Center Division	153,111,081	156,464,594	156,219,881	157,232,983	157,232,983	157,234,940	157,240,625	157,240,738	157,241,182	157,244,484	157,266,324	159,091,056
38900-Land	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240
38910-CKV Land&Land Rights	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123
39000-Structures & Improvements	12,537,933	12,554,732	12,556,050	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,576,032	12,583,275
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434
39010-CKV-Structures & Improvements	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,414,663	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	2,268,640	2,268,640	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,268,664	2,290,657	2,303,598
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type							3,761	3,761	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058
39700-Communication Equipment	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785
39710-CKV-Communication Equipment	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	25,390	25,390	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	25,439	28,617
39900-Other Tangible Property	610,178	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	7,892,587	8,115,294	7,682,644	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,716
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	1,618,294	1,786,585	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	461,847	494,467	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406
39905-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	749,347	749,347	864,718	864,718	864,718	866,675	868,600	868,600	867,018	866,866	866,866	872,783
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	491,869	491,869	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710	499,710
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	104,369,582	107,263,687	107,327,365	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	108,078,413	109,873,866
39910-CKV-Other Tangible Property	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992
39916-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Hardware	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015
39917-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Software	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
RWIP												
091 - Brentwood Division	4,958,561	4,979,948	4,993,956	4,993,956	5,010,663	4,988,938	4,988,877	4,988,868	4,988,874	4,988,874	4,988,874	5,054,276
30100-Organization	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309
30300-Misc. Intangible Plant	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552
39001-Structures - Frame	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	63,917	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784
39200-Transportation Equipment	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	142,978	142,978	142,978	142,978	148,256	148,540	148,479	148,470	148,476	148,476	148,476	148,476
39600-Power Operated Equipment	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534
39700-Communication Equipment	230,940	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796	817,796
39900-Other Tangible Property	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	664,795	664,795	663,469	663,469	674,897	675,021	675,021	675,021	675,021	675,021	675,021	722,503
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816	39,816
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	817,052	843,767	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	859,101	877,021
RWIP												
Grand Total	731,936,850	738,321,017	740,117,026	746,050,730	746,763,880	750,856,404	754,717,498	752,801,465	754,229,678	757,203,274	759,156,770	771,598,895

Atmos Energy Corporation
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Row Labels	10/2014	11/2014	12/2014	1/2015	2/2015	3/2015	4/2015	5/2015	6/2015	7/2015	8/2015	9/2015
002 - Dallas Atmos Rate Division	183,330,586	183,569,237	195,570,965	195,888,030	195,919,916	195,592,886	195,601,150	195,852,576	197,628,004	188,483,242	188,703,283	188,771,987
39000-Structures & Improvements	1,316,487	1,345,646	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,097,104	2,101,891	2,122,651	2,122,072
39005-G-Structures & Improvements	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	8,856,029	8,856,029	8,883,224	8,883,224	8,883,224	8,883,224	8,883,224	8,965,959	8,968,284	8,968,284	8,968,580	8,968,572
39029-Improv. to Leased Prem- AEAM												
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	10,560,772	10,660,617	10,933,939	10,936,551	10,936,551	10,585,817	10,587,983	10,631,819	10,645,619	10,648,934	10,648,934	10,685,891
39102-Remittance Processing												
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39104-G-Office Furniture & Equip.	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741	63,741
39120-Office Furniture & Equip-AEAM												
39200-Transportation Equipment	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	264,476	264,476	264,476	271,572	294,948	309,560	310,208	310,208	433,307	439,357	439,357	440,789
39420-Tools And Garage-AEAM												
39500-Laboratory Equipment	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632
39700-Communication Equipment	2,448,692	2,448,692	2,460,470	2,461,160	2,461,160	2,461,161	2,461,161	2,461,161	2,461,161	2,426,749	2,439,990	2,439,990
39720-Communication Equip-AEAM												
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	481,521	489,083	488,909
39820-Miscellaneous Equipment-AEAM												
39900-Other Tangible Property	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103	168,103
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	29,891,161	29,891,161	38,341,759	38,686,600	38,694,244	38,696,557	38,701,448	38,699,116	38,699,085	30,257,065	30,336,525	30,336,294
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	16,346,357	16,346,357	16,894,391	16,885,735	16,885,891	16,886,100	16,886,414	16,886,594	17,001,892	16,922,077	16,948,934	16,948,310
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	3,560,450	3,560,450	3,294,832	3,253,171	3,253,171	3,254,075	3,253,713	3,253,713	3,270,656	3,256,714	3,256,714	3,256,714
39904-Mainframe Cpu												
39905-Mainframe Hardware												
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	2,696,306	2,694,298	2,539,324	2,549,204	2,549,525	2,555,286	2,555,286	2,560,471	2,560,471	1,608,182	1,667,012	1,669,448
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	1,029,795	1,027,518	1,011,760	1,013,548	1,013,532	1,013,537	1,013,537	1,013,537	1,013,537	686,133	686,133	686,133
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	95,310,014	95,423,946	97,799,640	97,800,114	97,799,920	97,800,419	97,801,026	97,922,848	99,426,841	100,145,393	100,158,426	100,187,922
39909-Oth Tang Prop - Mainframe S/W	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	1,010,232	982,650	982,650	982,650
39921-OthTang Prop-Servers-H/W-AEAM												
39922-OthTang Prop-Servers-S/W-AEAM												
39923-OthTang Prop-Network-H/W-AEAM												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39926-OthTang Prop-PC Hardware-AEAM												
39928-Oth Tang Prop-Appl SW-AEAM												
RWIP												
009 - WRG Division	425,495,780	440,260,477	443,434,030	446,222,219	445,083,204	448,172,032	450,824,784	452,521,048	453,545,378	462,073,954	465,677,479	470,188,396
30100-Organization	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330
30200-Franch & Consent Grp	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853
32520-Producing Leaseholds												
32540-Rights-Of-Way	83,272	83,272	83,272	74,962	0							
33100-Producing Gas Wells -												
33100-Production Gas Wells Equipmen												
33201-Field Lines	24,694	24,694	24,694	0								
33202-Tributary Lines	518,838	518,838	518,838	0								
33400-Field Measuring And R	9,180	9,180	9,180	0								
33600-Purification Equipmen												
33600-Purification Equipment	150	150	150	0								
35010-Land	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127
35020-Rights-Of-Way	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682
35100-Structures & Improvements	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916
35102-Compressor Station Equipment	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261
35103-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Structures	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138
35104-Other Structures	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443
35200-Wells	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	5,870,020	6,650,497	6,646,226
35201-Well Construction	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999
35202-Well Equipment	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	424,750	415,819	415,819
35203-Cushion Gas	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833
35210-Leaseholds	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530
35211-Storage Rights	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614
35301-Field Lines	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497
35302-Tributary Lines	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458

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Row Labels	10/2014	11/2014	12/2014	1/2015	2/2015	3/2015	4/2015	5/2015	6/2015	7/2015	8/2015	9/2015
35400-Compressor Station Equipment	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446
35500-Meas. & Reg. Equipment	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883
35600-Purification Equipment	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663
36510-Land & Land Rights	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970
36520-Rights-Of-Way	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772
36602-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Str	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002
36609-Other Structures	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826
36700-Mains - Cathodic Protection	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509	185,509
36701-Mains - Steel	27,845,816	27,801,529	27,801,529	27,784,987	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,762,017	27,752,220
36900-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equipment	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022
36901-Measuring And Reg. St	2,273,521	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871
37400-Land & Land Rights	531,192	531,190	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167
37401-Land	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326
37402-Land Rights	253,401	1,108,681	1,199,125	1,382,508	1,486,119	1,488,744	1,486,775	1,486,560	1,486,694	1,487,092	1,491,639	1,489,940
37403-Land Other	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784
37500-Structures & Improvements	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168
37501-Structures & Improvements T.B	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818
37502-Land Rights	46,591	46,591	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264
37503-Improvements	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005
37600-Mains - Cathodic Protection	20,750,736	20,774,895	20,836,506	20,860,292	20,900,394	20,979,600	21,037,180	21,072,972	20,725,421	20,660,765	20,684,473	20,723,609
37601-Mains - Steel	83,654,366	94,245,318	94,208,879	95,848,795	95,861,464	95,638,536	95,261,212	95,295,990	95,240,784	99,910,938	99,853,076	100,471,477
37602-Mains - Plastic	60,963,771	61,421,436	62,722,728	63,521,248	64,132,672	64,980,045	67,032,645	67,497,990	68,390,060	70,598,096	72,125,093	74,404,182
37800-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Eq-General	5,610,724	6,041,576	6,130,527	6,238,726	6,240,180	6,239,800	6,234,159	6,259,597	6,280,164	6,436,852	6,536,027	6,593,739
37900-Meas. & Reg. - City Gate	2,750,883	2,760,308	2,725,115	2,725,115	2,725,115	2,725,119	2,725,119	2,740,054	2,739,860	2,837,887	2,828,379	2,800,097
37905-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equip T.B.	1,393,125	1,393,859	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821
38000-Services	102,930,328	103,452,667	104,187,585	104,592,704	102,853,729	103,492,093	104,047,254	104,757,776	104,894,962	105,782,479	106,567,573	107,256,513
38100-Meters	23,171,797	23,417,181	23,649,693	23,605,889	23,763,492	25,381,438	25,483,958	25,652,765	25,930,077	26,167,837	26,407,453	27,093,283
38200-Meter Installations	50,112,004	50,206,430	50,164,630	49,956,729	50,089,151	50,097,254	50,360,782	50,392,019	50,366,004	50,397,414	50,462,608	50,424,827
38300-House Regulators	7,929,743	7,940,909	7,985,388	7,996,109	7,999,041	8,001,065	7,962,070	7,970,451	7,989,039	8,029,871	8,102,197	7,941,983
38400-House Reg. Installations	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276
38500-Industrial Measuring	5,202,801	5,202,517	5,207,153	5,214,498	5,217,901	5,236,997	5,237,834	5,238,441	5,247,798	5,256,103	5,270,160	5,272,087
38500-Industrial Measuring												
38900-Land & Land Rights	1,024,626	1,024,626	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,027,350	1,204,502
38900-Land & Land Rights												
39000-Structures & Improvements	2,139,227	3,711,706	4,354,938	4,387,240	4,390,063	4,414,908	4,455,317	4,455,317	4,563,322	4,594,618	4,594,618	4,591,849
39002-Structures - Brick	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115
39003-Improvements	725,022	725,022	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	1,279,376	1,279,376	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,450,410	1,450,410	1,561,887	1,569,555	1,622,172	1,628,849	1,629,519	1,631,937	1,662,714	1,662,714	1,699,920	1,696,628
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type												
39200-Transportation Equipment	417,941	417,941	419,004	419,004	419,004	362,906	362,906	362,906	362,906	362,906	362,906	362,906
39201-Wkg Trucks - Group												
39202-WKG Trailers	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	33,192	24,458
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	1,738,370	1,866,087	1,866,087	1,866,087	1,864,905	1,963,824	1,963,824	1,956,326	1,956,326	2,055,908	2,055,908	2,169,503
39603-Ditchers	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	53,704	47,303	47,303	47,303	47,303
39604-Backhoes	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747
39605-Welders	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236
39700-Communication Equipment	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	332,722	349,727	349,727	349,727
39701-Communication Equip.												
39701-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39702-Communication Equip.												
39705-Comm. Equip. - Telemetering												
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	3,669,723	3,542,064	3,549,316	3,549,316	3,594,624	3,623,462	3,624,052	3,642,610	3,657,133	3,759,184	3,762,558	3,888,728
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W												
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W												
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	82,165	82,165	93,895	94,601	94,601	94,628	94,628	94,628	94,628	94,628	94,628	94,628
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	1,021,622	1,021,622	1,021,622	1,021,622	954,329	948,517	951,302	1,144,460	1,089,640	1,093,810	1,121,866	1,120,514
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515
RWIP												
RWIP Recon												

Atmos Energy Corporation
Plant Data

Row Labels	10/2014	11/2014	12/2014	1/2015	2/2015	3/2015	4/2015	5/2015	6/2015	7/2015	8/2015	9/2015
RWIP-Recon												
012 - Call Center Division	159,200,571	159,216,190	159,216,257	159,228,084	159,264,785	159,264,820	159,264,820	160,335,954	161,147,877	156,854,047	156,866,959	156,855,879
38900-Land	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240
38910-CKV Land&Land Rights	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123
39000-Structures & Improvements	12,642,635	12,644,711	12,644,612	12,644,612	12,644,612	12,644,612	12,644,612	12,644,612	12,635,280	12,657,017	12,657,017	12,657,017
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434
39010-CKV-Structures & Improvements	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	2,303,598	2,303,598	2,303,598	2,317,521	2,333,049	2,333,081	2,333,081	2,340,590	2,340,472	2,322,793	2,322,793	2,322,793
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	4,058	0		
39700-Communication Equipment	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785
39710-CKV-Communication Equipment	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	28,617	37,949	37,949	37,949
39900-Other Tangible Property	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	7,924,716	7,924,716	7,924,915	7,924,619	7,924,717	7,924,717	7,924,716	8,003,136	8,006,705	8,007,132	8,006,992	8,006,981
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,786,302	1,788,636	1,800,594	1,800,655	1,800,635	1,800,635
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	494,406	533,685	533,775	534,223	534,074	534,068
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	872,792	876,897	988,895	988,895	988,895	988,895	988,895	988,895	1,002,637	870,516	907,639	907,504
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	499,710	499,710	491,799	491,799	491,799	491,799	491,799	491,799	491,799	188,782	188,782	188,782
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	109,924,012	109,933,449	109,829,627	109,827,531	109,838,707	109,838,698	109,838,698	110,782,290	111,574,883	107,715,256	107,691,353	107,680,427
39910-CKV-Other Tangible Property	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992
39916-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Hardware	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015
39917-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Software	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.												
RWIP												
091 - Brentwood Division	5,047,688	5,085,601	5,085,472	5,100,162	4,723,590	4,722,568	4,719,783	4,719,783	4,711,286	4,714,384	4,714,384	4,746,113
30100-Organization	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309
30300-Misc. Intangible Plant	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552
39001-Structures - Frame	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784	41,784	39,554	39,554	39,554	39,554	42,653	42,653	42,503
39200-Transportation Equipment	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110
39300-Stores Equipment												
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	148,476	148,476	148,476	163,166	163,166	163,707	163,707	163,707	163,707	163,707	163,707	177,699
39600-Power Operated Equipment	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	19,534	11,037	11,037	11,037	15,719
39700-Communication Equipment	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614	225,614
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	811,208	814,167
39900-Other Tangible Property	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993	76,993
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194	344,194
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273	8,273
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358	209,358
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	722,503	722,503	722,503	722,503	327,866	327,866	325,080	325,080	325,080	325,080	325,080	335,326
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	39,816	75,008	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880	74,880
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	877,021	879,742	879,742	879,742	897,807	898,473	898,473	898,473	898,473	898,473	898,473	898,473
RWIP												
Grand Total	773,074,624	788,131,505	803,306,725	806,438,495	804,991,494	807,752,306	810,410,537	813,429,360	817,032,544	812,125,627	815,962,105	820,562,375

Atmos Energy Corporation
Plant Data

Row Labels	Cost Total				
	10/2015	11/2015	12/2015	1/2016	
002 - Dallas Atmos Rate Division	188,838,128	188,833,480	196,754,978	196,743,173	9,307,333,081
39000-Structures & Improvements	2,146,247	2,146,247	2,180,967	2,176,307	42,652,773
39005-G-Structures & Improvements	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	9,199,401	476,880,042
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	8,968,572	8,968,572	8,968,040	8,968,040	457,334,784
39029-Improv. to Leased Prem-AEAM			532	532	1,063
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	10,685,891	10,685,891	10,476,421	10,464,530	537,850,524
39102-Remittance Processing					
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type					
39104-G-Office Furniture & Equip.	63,741	63,741	63,741	(2,645)	3,248,138
39120-Office Furniture & Equip-AEAM			221,289	221,289	442,578
39200-Transportation Equipment	103,416	103,416	103,416	103,416	5,226,631
39300-Stores Equipment					
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	439,016	439,171	411,276	484,225	13,507,397
39420-Tools And Garage-AEAM			42,919	42,919	85,838
39500-Laboratory Equipment	23,632	23,632	23,632	23,632	1,077,819
39700-Communication Equipment	2,439,990	2,439,990	2,431,166	2,431,166	124,813,345
39720-Communication Equip-AEAM			8,824	8,824	17,649
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	488,909	488,909	814,832	836,286	23,305,984
39820-Miscellaneous Equipment-AEAM			7,388	7,388	14,777
39900-Other Tangible Property	168,103	168,103	168,103	183,671	10,386,333
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	30,336,299	30,336,300	31,577,360	31,576,701	1,488,289,787
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	16,948,323	16,948,323	18,136,963	18,136,923	791,245,810
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	3,256,714	3,256,714	3,276,588	3,276,588	188,461,531
39904-Mainframe Cpu					2,190,930
39905-Mainframe Hardware					2,319,929
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	1,669,448	1,669,448	2,338,177	2,341,851	134,881,701
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	686,133	686,133	688,902	689,166	69,345,300
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	100,231,642	100,226,838	83,232,308	83,240,232	4,796,887,185
39909-Oth Tang Prop - Mainframe S/W	982,650	982,650	982,650	982,650	94,053,061
39921-OthTang Prop-Servers-H/W-AEAM			1,628,900	1,628,900	3,257,800
39922-OthTang Prop-Servers-S/W-AEAM			961,256	961,256	1,922,511
39923-OthTang Prop-Network-H/W-AEAM			37,965	37,965	75,930
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.					
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.					
39926-OthTang Prop-PC Hardware-AEAM			36,616	36,616	75,233
39928-Oth Tang Prop-Appl SW-AEAM			18,735,344	18,735,344	37,470,689
RW/IP					
009 - WKG Division	473,889,806	474,463,062	476,619,542	477,642,843	21,188,842,377
30100-Organization	8,330	8,330	8,330	8,330	433,145
30200-Franch & Consent Grp	119,853	119,853	119,853	119,853	6,232,340
32520-Producing Leaseholds					65,870
32540-Rights-Of-Way					3,326,783
33100-Producing Gas Wells -					85,819
33100-Production Gas Wells Equipmen					13,970
33201-Field Lines					1,592,189
33202-Tributary Lines					20,497,318
33400-Field Measuring And R					5,487,744
33600-Purification Equipmen					1,064,863
33600-Purification Equipment					179,127
35010-Land	261,127	261,127	261,127	261,127	13,578,588
35020-Rights-Of-Way	4,682	4,682	4,682	4,682	243,442
35100-Structures & Improvements	17,916	17,916	17,916	17,916	931,642
35102-Compressor Station Equipment	153,261	153,261	153,261	153,261	7,969,588
35103-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Structures	23,138	23,138	23,138	23,138	1,203,196
35104-Other Structures	137,443	137,443	137,443	137,443	7,147,012
35200-Well	6,646,226	6,646,226	6,646,226	6,646,226	236,482,122
35201-Well Construction	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	1,699,999	90,411,086
35202-Well Equipment	415,819	415,819	415,819	415,819	22,863,975
35203-Cushion Gas	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	1,694,833	86,131,314
35210-Leaseholds	178,530	178,530	178,530	178,530	9,283,565
35211-Storage Rights	54,614	54,614	54,614	54,614	2,839,942
35301-Field Lines	178,497	178,497	178,497	178,497	9,281,839
35302-Tributary Lines	209,458	209,458	209,458	209,458	10,891,827

Atmos Energy Corporation
Plant Data

Row Labels	Cost Total				
	10/2015	11/2015	12/2015	1/2016	
35400-Compressor Station Equipment	923,446	923,446	923,446	923,446	48,019,195
35500-Meas. & Reg. Equipment	240,883	240,883	240,883	240,883	12,525,918
35600-Purification Equipment	414,663	414,663	414,663	414,663	15,706,065
36510-Land & Land Rights	26,970	26,970	26,970	26,970	1,402,459
36520-Rights-Of-Way	867,772	867,772	867,772	867,772	45,124,144
36602-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Str	49,002	49,002	49,002	49,002	2,540,803
36603-Other Structures	60,826	60,826	60,826	60,826	3,162,967
36700-Mains - Cathodic Protection	166,665	166,665	166,665	166,665	16,594,747
36701-Mains - Steel	27,752,220	27,752,220	27,752,220	27,752,220	1,470,201,817
36900-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equipment	615,022	615,022	615,022	615,022	31,204,163
36901-Measuring And Reg. St	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	2,269,871	118,264,298
37400-Land & Land Rights	531,167	531,167	531,167	531,167	25,677,513
37401-Land	37,326	37,326	37,326	37,326	1,940,974
37402-Land Rights	1,509,683	1,509,699	1,509,699	1,510,177	31,008,950
37403-Land Other	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	144,762
37500-Structures & Improvements	336,168	336,168	336,168	336,168	17,389,607
37501-Structures & Improvements T.B	99,818	99,818	99,818	99,818	5,231,972
37502-Land Rights	46,264	46,264	46,264	46,264	2,418,157
37503-Improvements	4,005	4,005	4,005	4,005	208,264
37600-Mains - Cathodic Protection	20,738,815	20,756,423	20,828,024	20,842,050	786,027,403
37601-Mains - Steel	100,417,597	100,497,767	100,548,859	100,531,137	4,618,389,695
37602-Mains - Plastic	76,826,432	76,107,239	76,896,285	77,794,834	2,698,646,880
37800-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Eq-General	6,690,337	6,693,712	6,711,225	6,724,544	280,013,124
37900-Meas. & Reg. - City Gate	2,800,097	2,883,484	3,076,430	3,084,342	121,565,222
37905-Meas. & Reg. Sta. Equip T.B.	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	1,393,821	73,123,416
38000-Services	108,043,145	108,717,480	109,485,509	109,425,735	5,062,116,406
38100-Meters	27,369,542	27,512,179	27,780,960	27,876,480	1,100,303,522
38200-Meter Installations	50,540,363	50,630,362	50,544,950	50,558,164	2,567,309,417
38300-House Regulators	7,953,442	7,962,008	8,025,996	8,023,019	379,321,954
38400-House Reg. Installations	154,276	154,276	154,276	154,276	6,022,371
38500-Industrial Measuring	5,280,740	5,286,709	5,289,232	5,292,521	266,027,829
38500-Industrial Measuring					
38900-Land & Land Rights	1,204,900	1,207,372	1,208,801	1,209,292	41,694,458
38900-Land & Land Rights					
39000-Structures & Improvements	4,594,405	4,758,482	4,758,463	4,770,609	125,489,465
39002-Structures - Brick	173,115	173,115	173,115	173,115	9,165,547
39003-Improvements	709,199	709,199	709,199	709,199	37,479,618
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	7,461	7,461	7,461	7,461	387,997
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	1,246,194	66,062,987
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	1,696,628	1,696,628	1,696,628	1,696,628	77,492,020
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type					
39200-Transportation Equipment	362,906	379,824	380,705	380,705	19,290,563
39201-Wkg Trucks - Group					
39202-WKG Trailers	24,458	9,891	9,891	9,891	1,650,647
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	2,169,503	2,185,404	2,185,133	2,219,955	105,501,314
39603-Ditchers	47,303	47,303	47,303	47,303	3,148,407
39604-Backhoes	62,747	62,747	62,747	62,747	3,262,859
39605-Welders	33,236	33,236	33,236	33,236	1,726,667
39700-Communication Equipment	349,727	349,727	349,727	349,727	18,806,244
39701-Communication Equip.					
39701-Communication Equip.					
39702-Communication Equip.					
39702-Communication Equip.					
39705-Comm. Equip. - Telemetering					2,055,784
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	3,888,728	3,890,314	3,890,284	3,890,284	179,251,474
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W			14,390	14,390	5,484,472
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W					3,301,795
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	94,628	94,628	94,628	94,628	3,833,666
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	1,120,514	1,120,514	1,120,514	1,120,514	114,177,537
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	13,752	13,752	13,752	13,752	3,987,431
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	123,515	123,515	123,515	123,515	10,720,990
RWIP					
RWIP Recon					

Atmos Energy Corporation
 Plant Data

Row Labels	Cost Total			
	10/2015	11/2015	12/2015	1/2016
RWIP-Recon				
012 - Call Center Division	159,360,412	159,387,551	161,347,652	161,376,374
38900-Land	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240	2,874,240
38910-CKV Land&Land Rights	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123	1,887,123
39000-Structures & Improvements	12,657,017	12,657,017	12,657,017	12,657,017
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434	4,298,434
39010-CKV-Structures & Improvements	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807	10,419,807
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	2,332,119	2,340,558	2,341,952	2,338,066
39103-Office Furn. - Copiers & Type				60,274
39700-Communication Equipment	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785	1,962,785
39710-CKV-Communication Equipment	271,621	271,621	271,621	271,621
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	37,949	37,949	42,912	42,912
39900-Other Tangible Property	629,166	629,166	629,166	629,166
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	8,973,259	8,994,037	9,337,089	9,346,274
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	1,857,260	1,857,210	1,884,820	1,884,902
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	534,163	534,163	628,992	629,268
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	910,958	910,958	938,805	938,805
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	188,782	188,782	190,247	190,247
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	109,149,181	109,147,153	110,606,094	110,629,158
39910-CKV-Other Tangible Property	91,992	91,992	91,992	91,992
39916-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Hardware	194,015	194,015	194,015	194,015
39917-CKV-Oth Tang Prop-PC Software	90,541	90,541	90,541	90,541
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.				440,227,461
39924-Oth Tang Prop - Gen.				
RWIP				
091 - Brentwood Division	4,746,113	4,753,091	3,822,932	3,822,821
30100-Organization	185,309	185,309	185,309	185,309
30300-Misc. Intangible Plant	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552	1,109,552
39001-Structures - Frame	179,339	179,339	179,339	179,339
39004-Air Conditioning Equipment	5,771	5,771	5,771	5,771
39009-Improv. to Leased Premises	38,834	38,834	38,834	38,834
39100-Office Furniture & Equipment	42,503	42,503	42,503	42,503
39200-Transportation Equipment	4,110	4,110	4,110	4,110
39300-Stores Equipment				95,704
39400-Tools Shop And Garage	177,699	178,789	178,767	178,767
39600-Power Operated Equipment	15,719	20,691	20,626	20,516
39700-Communication Equipment	225,614	225,614	0	12,590,179
39800-Miscellaneous Equipment	814,167	814,167	814,167	814,167
39900-Other Tangible Property	76,993	76,993	0	3,849,661
39901-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - H/W	344,194	344,194	6,124	6,124
39902-Oth Tang Prop - Servers - S/W	8,273	8,273	0	413,657
39903-Oth Tang Prop - Network - H/W	209,358	209,358	0	11,201,957
39906-Oth Tang Prop - PC Hardware	335,326	336,242	335,681	335,681
39907-Oth Tang Prop - PC Software	74,880	74,880	35,064	35,064
39908-Oth Tang Prop - Appl Software	898,473	898,473	867,085	867,085
RWIP				
Grand Total	826,834,458	827,437,184	838,545,104	839,585,211

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-03
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to Schedule D.2.2.1 of the Fall2015 Rev Req Model showing adjustments to revenues and expenses.

- a. Provide the electronic workpapers supporting this schedule.
- b. Please disaggregate each of the revenue amounts shown on this schedule into base, PGA, PRP, and other revenue components.
- c. Please indicate whether Adj 1 also reflects a reduction in PRP revenues in the test year compared to the base year" If so, why wasn't this identified as an additional reason for the adjustment in the description"

RESPONSE:

- a) Please see Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-59, specifically the file titled "Fall 2015 KY Rev Req Model - Final Copy - External Links to 1-59 WPs.xlsx." This file will allow you to trace back to the various supporting workpapers, which have also been provided as part of the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-59.
- b) Please see Attachment 1
- c) The proposed rates in this proceeding are based upon the Company's cumulative cost of service, including the \$30 million of forecasted PRP investment from October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016. Thus, the test period revenues reflect the PRP surcharge going to zero and the inclusion of the PRP revenue requirement into base rates.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-03_Att1 - Schedule D-2.1 Detailed Adjustments.xlsx, 1 Page.

Respondents: Gary Smith and Greg Waller

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-04
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please refer to the allocation percentages shown on Exhibit GWK-1 for the 2015 fiscal year based on cost data for the twelve months ended September 30, 2014.

- a. Please provide Exhibit GWK-1 in electronic format with all formulas intact.
- b. Please provide an updated version of Exhibit GWK -1 using actual data for the twelve months ended September 30, 2015 in the same format. Please provide in electronic format with all formulas intact.
- c. Please provide an updated version of Exhibit GWK -1 using actual data for the twelve months ended December 31, 2015 in the same format. Please provide in electronic format with all formulas intact.
- d. Please provide the number of employees for each division/nonregulated affiliate shown on Exhibit GWK-1 for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month for which actual information is available and all budget/forecast months thereafter through the end of the test year. Please provide in electronic format with all formulas intact.
- e. Please provide total operating expenses, excluding income taxes, for each division/nonregulated affiliate shown on Exhibit GWK-1 for each month from January 2011 through the most recent month for which actual information is available and all budget/forecast months thereafter through the end of the test year. Please provide in electronic format with all formulas intact.

RESPONSE:

- a) Please see Attachment 1 for Exhibit GWK-1 with formulas included.
- b) Please see Attachment 2. Please note that these are the composite factors used in the Company's books and records for Fiscal 2016.
- c) Please see Attachment 3.
- d) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 4. Please note that our employees in Atmos Energy Holdings (non-regulated) are not recorded by individual company in our reporting system. Thus, they have all

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-04
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been included in the line, "Atmos Energy Holding Rollup" in Attachment 4. Most of our non-regulated employees work in Atmos Energy Marketing (AEM).

- e) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 5.

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-04_Att1 - Exhibit GKW-1 with Formulas.xlsx, 2 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-04_Att2 - Composite Factors Using FY15 Data.xlsx, 2 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 3 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-04_Att3 - Composite Factors Using CY15 Data.xlsx, 2 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 4 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-04_Att4 - Number of Employees.xls, 5 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 5 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-04_Att5 - Total Operating Expenses.xlsx, 48 Pages.

Respondent: Greg Waller

ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

Allocation of Atmos Corporate (Co. # 10) Cost Based on 12 Month Period Ended 9/30/14

A. Composite Allocation Factor:		Total	West Tex Div	CO/KS Div	LA Div 007	LA Div 077	Kentucky/ MidStates Div	Mississippi Div	Mid-Tex Div	Atmos P/L
Gross Direct PP&E	\$	8,527,002,426	588,658,574	522,666,022	196,802,776	532,048,476	946,876,781	494,873,746	3,393,212,543	1,757,100,641
Average Number of Customers	#	3,061,941	299,553	243,084	74,693	272,260	332,626	250,173	1,588,126	347
Total O&M Expense *	\$	373,655,056	30,013,523	24,974,685	8,753,909	22,587,103	38,004,205	33,429,741	109,826,806	81,576,653
(* w/o Allocation)										
Total Composite Factor										
Gross Direct PP&E	%	100.00%	6.91%	6.13%	2.31%	6.24%	11.10%	5.80%	39.79%	20.61%
Average Number of Customers	%	100.00%	9.79%	7.94%	2.44%	8.89%	10.86%	8.17%	51.87%	0.01%
Total O&M Expense	%	100.00%	8.05%	6.68%	2.34%	6.04%	10.17%	8.95%	29.39%	21.83%
Total Composite Factor for FY 2015	%	100.00%	8.25%	6.92%	2.36%	7.06%	10.71%	7.64%	40.35%	14.15%

		AEM	UCG Storage	WKG Storage	TLGP	Remaining non reg
Gross Direct PP&E		36,175,456	8,579,774	14,517,166	24,532,139	10,958,332
Average Number of Customers		1,064			15	-
Total O&M Expense *		24,247,740	512,520	758,107	1,132,882	(2,162,819)
(* w/o Allocation)						
Total Composite Factor						
Gross Direct PP&E		0.42%	0.10%	0.17%	0.29%	0.13%
Average Number of Customers		0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Total O&M Expense		6.49%	0.14%	0.20%	0.30%	-0.58%
Total Composite Factor for FY 2015		2.31%	0.08%	0.12%	0.20%	-0.15%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Atmos Energy Mid States Div
Development of Allocation Factors
For Fiscal Year 2015

Div #	Division Name	Sept '14 Direct Property Plant & Equipment (1)	Percent of MidStates Property (2)	YE Sept '14 Total O &M w/o 922 (3)	Percent of MidStates O & M (4)	YE Sept '14 Avg Number of Customers (5)	Percent of MidStates Customers (6)	MidStates Allocation Percent (7)
09	KENTUCKY	424,189,446	45.04%	14,546,900	49.63%	174,958	52.60%	49.09%
93	TENNESSEE	439,670,059	46.68%	10,204,309	34.82%	134,946	40.57%	40.69%
96	VIRGINIA	77,963,001	8.28%	4,557,634	15.55%	22,722	6.83%	10.22%
Total		941,822,505.68	100.00%	29,308,843.07	100.00%	332,626	100.00%	100.00%

ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

Allocation of Atmos Corporate (Co. # 10) Cost Based on 12 Month Period Ended 9/30/15

A. Composite Allocation Factor:		Total	West Tex Div	CO/KS Div	LA Div 007	LA Div 077	Kentucky/ MidStates Div	Mississippi Div	Mid-Tex Div	Atmos P/L
Gross Direct PP&E	\$	9,284,626,782	652,745,151	556,770,002	220,793,722	568,893,960	1,017,265,170	531,795,843	3,663,720,621	1,980,795,729
Average Number of Customers	#	3,071,905	300,052	246,505	74,458	272,555	334,625	247,660	1,594,629	336
Total O&M Expense *	\$	406,452,781	29,874,554	25,093,067	8,919,945	24,124,494	36,066,524	28,949,599	111,747,644	106,697,111
(* w/o Allocation)										
Total Composite Factor										
Gross Direct PP&E	%	100.00%	7.03%	6.00%	2.38%	6.13%	10.96%	5.73%	39.46%	21.33%
Average Number of Customers	%	100.00%	9.79%	8.02%	2.42%	8.87%	10.89%	8.06%	51.91%	0.01%
Total O&M Expense	%	100.00%	7.35%	6.42%	2.19%	5.94%	8.87%	7.12%	27.49%	26.25%
Total Composite Factor for FY 2016	%	100.00%	8.06%	6.81%	2.33%	6.98%	10.24%	6.97%	39.62%	15.86%

		AEM	UCG Storage	WKG Storage	TLGP	Remaining non reg
Gross Direct PP&E		37,422,226	8,757,455	14,537,861	22,516,173	8,612,867
Average Number of Customers		1,066			20	
Total O&M Expense *		27,142,217	445,540	1,787,409	1,084,476	3,520,202
(* w/o Allocation)						
Total Composite Factor						
Gross Direct PP&E		0.40%	0.09%	0.16%	0.24%	0.09%
Average Number of Customers		0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Total O&M Expense		6.68%	0.11%	0.44%	0.27%	0.87%
Total Composite Factor for FY 2016		2.37%	0.07%	0.20%	0.17%	0.32%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Atmos Energy Mid States Div
Development of Allocation Factors
For Fiscal Year 2016

Div #	Division Name	Sept '15 Direct Property Plant & Equipment (1)	Percent of MidStates Property (2)	YE Sept '15 Total O & M w/o 922 (3)	Percent of MidStates O & M (4)	YE Sept '15 Avg Number of Customers (5)	Percent of MidStates Customers (6)	MidStates Allocation Percent (7)
09	KENTUCKY	470,188,396	46.44%	15,069,806	57.97%	174,857	52.25%	52.22%
93	TENNESSEE	460,185,235	45.45%	11,260,780	43.31%	136,978	40.93%	43.23%
96	VIRGINIA	82,079,245	8.11%	(332,937)	-1.28%	22,790	6.81%	4.55%
Total		1,012,452,876.38	100.00%	25,997,649.29	100.00%	334,625	100.00%	100.00%

ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

Allocation of Atmos Corporate (Co. # 10) Cost Based on 12 Month Period Ended 12/31/15

<u>A. Composite Allocation Factor:</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>West Tex Div</u>	<u>CO/KS Div</u>	<u>LA Div 007</u>	<u>LA Div 077</u>	<u>Kentucky/ MidStates Div</u>	<u>Mississippi Div</u>	<u>Mid-Tex Div</u>	<u>Atmos P/L</u>
Gross Direct PP&E	\$	9,595,402,998	660,231,914	563,103,026	224,602,882	580,591,499	1,028,683,203	541,311,840	3,732,588,647	2,172,417,253
Average Number of Customers	#	3,075,864	299,933	247,199	74,443	272,903	335,204	247,449	1,597,314	332
Total O&M Expense *	\$	411,464,778	29,520,131	26,025,820	9,455,594	24,135,140	35,282,961	33,079,437	112,182,533	108,642,922
(* w/o Allocation)										
Total Composite Factor										
Gross Direct PP&E	%	100.00%	6.89%	5.87%	2.34%	6.05%	10.72%	5.64%	38.90%	22.64%
Average Number of Customers	%	100.00%	9.76%	8.04%	2.42%	8.87%	10.90%	8.04%	51.93%	0.01%
Total O&M Expense	%	100.00%	7.17%	6.33%	2.30%	5.87%	8.57%	8.04%	27.26%	26.40%
Total Composite Factor (Based on CY15)	%	100.00%	7.93%	6.75%	2.35%	6.93%	10.06%	7.24%	39.36%	16.35%

	<u>AEM</u>	<u>UCG Storage</u>	<u>WKG Storage</u>	<u>TLGP</u>	<u>Remaining non reg</u>
Gross Direct PP&E	37,413,988	8,802,491	14,612,461	22,430,927	8,612,867
Average Number of Customers	1,067			20	-
Total O&M Expense *	26,121,308	439,926	1,934,115	1,109,801	3,535,089.60
(* w/o Allocation)					
Total Composite Factor					
Gross Direct PP&E	0.39%	0.09%	0.15%	0.23%	0.09%
Average Number of Customers	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Total O&M Expense	6.35%	0.11%	0.47%	0.27%	0.86%
Total Composite Factor (Based on CY15)	2.26%	0.07%	0.21%	0.17%	0.32%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Atmos Energy Mid States Div
Development of Allocation Factors
Based on Calendar 2015

Div #	Division Name	Dec '15 Direct Property Plant & Equipment (1)	Percent of MidStates Property (2)	YE Dec '15 Total O &M w/o 922 (3)	Percent of MidStates O & M (4)	YE Dec '15 Avg Number of Customers (5)	Percent of MidStates Customers (6)	MidStates Allocation Percent (7)
09	KENTUCKY	476,619,542	46.51%	14,926,689	58.89%	174,901	52.18%	52.52%
93	TENNESSEE	464,442,723	45.32%	11,466,555	45.24%	137,508	41.02%	43.86%
96	VIRGINIA	83,798,006	8.18%	(1,046,293)	-4.13%	22,795	6.80%	3.62%
Total		1,024,860,271.24	100.00%	25,346,950.82	100.00%	335,204	100.00%	100.00%

Atmos Energy Corporation Employee Count by Division

	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12
Atmos Energy-Colorado-Kansas	289	287	286	285	283	281	283	283	283	288	281	279
Atmos Energy-Louisiana	435	433	431	429	432	433	431	429	431	428	430	428
KY/Mid States	568	570	570	569	571	568	568	565	570	566	466	467
MVG Regulated companies	366	368	365	365	364	363	363	361	363	361	361	359
Atmos Energy-West Texas	355	353	350	350	349	349	347	346	350	347	348	349
Atmos Energy-Mid-Tex	1,675	1,666	1,670	1,665	1,672	1,665	1,670	1,657	1,654	1,645	1,639	1,663
Atmos Pipeline - Texas	62	62	61	61	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	61
Atmos Energy Holding Rollup	132	133	134	134	133	132	133	133	129	129	126	113

Atmos Energy Corporation Employee Count by Division

	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13
Atmos Energy-Colorado-Kansas	278	278	278	277	277	278	277	277	276	275	278	278
Atmos Energy-Louisiana	426	428	426	426	427	425	422	427	429	429	427	425
KY/Mid States	466	467	465	464	466	461	401	399	401	401	400	403
MVG Regulated companies	359	360	360	358	358	358	353	352	351	350	347	349
Atmos Energy-West Texas	350	351	353	354	354	352	349	348	346	344	345	345
Atmos Energy-Mid-Tex	1,658	1,669	1,664	1,679	1,679	1,675	1,682	1,683	1,680	1,680	1,689	1,690
Atmos Pipeline - Texas	59	59	61	61	60	60	60	59	59	60	60	60
Atmos Energy Holding Rollup	113	113	113	112	114	112	111	112	113	112	109	109

Atmos Energy Corporation Employee Count by Division

	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14
Atmos Energy-Colorado-Kansas	278	278	277	275	278	280	280	280	280	279	280	280
Atmos Energy-Louisiana	414	417	412	409	413	426	427	422	420	421	419	421
KY/Mid States	406	408	408	408	408	406	406	408	408	405	405	409
MVG Regulated companies	336	337	336	333	332	333	333	334	337	341	340	340
Atmos Energy-West Texas	342	344	347	345	347	344	348	348	348	345	347	349
Atmos Energy-Mid-Tex	1,698	1,694	1,705	1,718	1,722	1,721	1,731	1,748	1,749	1,738	1,730	1,729
Atmos Pipeline - Texas	60	60	60	60	60	61	61	61	61	61	62	62
Atmos Energy Holding Rollup	111	112	113	113	112	112	110	110	111	112	111	111

Atmos Energy Corporation Employee Count by Division

	Oct-14	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15
Atmos Energy-Colorado-Kansas	282	283	285	284	284	284	284	283	284	279	278	279
Atmos Energy-Louisiana	426	424	426	424	422	424	428	428	424	420	417	416
KY/Mid States	412	411	409	402	400	398	399	397	397	394	392	392
MVG Regulated companies	340	340	340	337	339	339	337	335	333	329	328	329
Atmos Energy-West Texas	347	347	345	341	342	344	345	346	347	344	346	344
Atmos Energy-Mid-Tex	1,733	1,724	1,722	1,710	1,707	1,713	1,709	1,709	1,709	1,701	1,708	1,709
Atmos Pipeline - Texas	62	62	61	61	62	62	63	62	62	62	61	61
Atmos Energy Holding Rollup	111	109	108	108	109	109	109	109	109	108	110	111

Atmos Energy Corporation

Employee Count by Division

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Atmos Energy-Colorado-Kansas	280	280	281	284
Atmos Energy-Louisiana	418	417	413	420
KY/Mid States	396	393	394	397
MVG Regulated companies	329	332	330	329
Atmos Energy-West Texas	342	339	339	339
Atmos Energy-Mid-Tex	1,709	1,717	1,705	1,705
Atmos Pipeline - Texas	61	61	62	62
Atmos Energy Holding Rollup	106	107	107	106

Atmos Energy - West Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,234,219	2,116,379	2,316,228	2,016,494	2,395,481	2,200,155	2,043,926	2,187,721	2,117,515	2,212,228	2,307,591	2,424,855	2,409,327	2,298,347	2,332,258	2,162,884
Bad Debt Expense	25,351	22,033	18,071	10,498	8,478	8,089	7,705	7,680	(423,064)	8,488	14,221	21,404	24,597	18,384	16,361	10,141
Depreciation and Amortization	1,367,518	1,371,630	1,392,663	1,393,895	1,366,432	1,405,953	905,155	1,556,529	1,859,257	1,421,891	1,584,726	1,564,478	1,583,162	2,470,021	1,656,478	1,652,557
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	2,285,854	2,013,363	1,444,178	1,613,931	1,292,176	1,369,657	990,531	941,236	855,684	1,059,457	1,439,471	2,088,128	2,068,622	1,790,882	1,628,703	1,119,946
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,912,952	5,523,405	5,171,136	5,034,918	5,092,585	4,983,834	3,947,317	4,703,168	4,409,392	4,703,074	5,326,009	6,096,885	6,065,708	6,575,434	5,633,800	4,945,828

Atmos Energy - West Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,150,285	2,202,066	2,011,782	2,271,559	2,195,503	2,463,152	2,145,211	1,881,377	2,335,866	2,411,315	2,218,010	2,327,395	2,251,929	1,831,439	2,389,990
Bad Debt Expense	8,034	7,364	7,154	7,351	84,932	8,560	11,788	15,724	18,667	14,899	13,753	10,082	10,560	51,772	8,876
Depreciation and Amortization	1,878,661	1,701,285	1,718,182	1,774,398	1,880,707	1,741,771	1,746,514	1,865,235	1,709,323	1,713,367	1,728,910	1,742,548	1,755,930	1,743,364	1,791,596
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,233,483	1,251,190	830,850	851,160	850,458	1,068,955	1,312,327	1,695,291	2,176,950	1,841,808	1,685,303	1,533,490	1,398,332	1,683,836	1,228,284
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,088,463	5,161,935	4,587,968	4,904,467	5,011,600	5,278,438	5,215,820	5,197,627	6,240,808	5,981,380	5,845,976	5,613,513	5,416,752	5,310,411	5,398,727

Atmos Energy - West Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,128,402	2,568,899	2,485,540	2,265,710	2,208,559	2,418,958	2,050,074	2,537,614	2,681,915	2,249,027	2,114,875	2,361,197	2,443,199	2,328,207	2,482,624
Bad Debt Expense	8,728	847,520	9,636	11,706	17,212	19,576	39,588	32,028	12,568	56,311	74,838	10,333	10,495	1,570,357	28,169
Depreciation and Amortization	1,811,784	1,885,407	1,799,241	1,798,873	1,785,964	1,782,710	1,764,588	1,766,385	2,118,247	2,049,540	2,058,857	2,070,035	2,094,076	2,916,530	2,088,719
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,168,737	1,112,595	1,116,422	1,516,754	2,150,789	2,693,528	2,643,387	2,195,022	2,087,436	1,844,677	1,675,658	1,275,786	1,304,256	897,454	1,259,834
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,117,651	6,414,421	5,410,838	5,593,043	6,162,534	6,884,774	6,511,617	6,584,048	6,881,186	6,199,555	5,922,328	6,718,352	6,852,026	7,682,548	5,859,348

Atmos Energy - West Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,441,653	2,452,257	2,579,322	2,182,225	2,210,495	2,151,077	2,256,419	2,163,198	2,814,890	2,041,032	2,266,198	2,272,061	2,275,149	2,469,254	2,219,967
Bad Debt Expense	34,754	49,108	57,020	46,672	152,837	33,865	29,361	247,296	29,485	28,078	1,097,490	29,698	34,913	53,065	54,980
Depreciation and Amortization	2,110,487	2,162,499	2,212,507	2,165,832	2,027,387	1,961,993	2,029,040	2,044,480	2,035,870	2,035,496	2,075,845	2,037,968	2,043,914	2,040,776	2,045,640
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,646,576	2,328,537	2,894,790	2,367,353	2,238,698	1,947,383	1,781,288	1,597,889	1,257,874	1,213,132	1,371,340	1,311,551	1,612,589	1,976,667	2,280,046
Total Direct Operating Expenses	6,283,472	6,992,401	7,743,839	6,762,082	6,929,417	6,094,338	6,095,088	6,052,863	6,138,129	5,317,739	6,809,874	5,661,279	6,986,666	6,541,983	6,600,833

Atmos Energy - Colorado/Kansas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,071,620	1,991,084	2,016,620	1,742,484	1,873,624	1,893,789	1,870,401	1,961,177	2,202,869	1,839,950	2,114,454	1,984,338	2,110,192	1,875,621	1,811,289	1,924,559
Bad Debt Expense	43,603	39,695	32,988	24,764	20,109	18,361	17,473	17,395	95,428	19,623	27,561	39,788	42,858	35,837	32,827	23,892
Depreciation and Amortization	1,408,922	1,410,395	1,437,488	1,426,892	1,432,106	1,439,050	1,464,386	1,485,698	1,567,069	1,472,240	1,478,646	1,476,822	1,468,716	1,461,757	1,507,230	1,499,747
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	865,804	881,028	889,532	734,250	882,766	631,702	671,663	741,250	712,248	834,735	713,917	785,969	824,705	817,910	744,880	723,734
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,390,848	4,322,201	4,176,628	3,928,460	4,008,605	3,982,881	4,023,943	4,205,520	4,577,613	4,016,548	4,334,578	4,286,917	4,446,472	4,311,325	4,096,026	4,171,032

Atmos Energy - Colorado/Kansas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,141,866	2,010,280	1,727,961	2,007,758	1,873,144	1,776,192	1,819,592	1,643,559	2,091,009	1,958,867	1,935,825	2,713,777	2,155,325	2,041,964	1,848,967
Bad Debt Expense	17,410	17,676	17,525	16,907	360,215	19,285	26,705	36,589	45,313	36,733	32,183	21,632	23,092	118,175	18,130
Depreciation and Amortization	1,504,063	1,505,201	1,518,240	1,503,411	1,516,088	1,452,913	1,455,773	1,462,741	1,465,571	1,485,641	1,472,421	1,480,242	1,482,298	1,491,273	1,509,769
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	895,784	883,328	631,919	595,798	574,587	760,027	827,459	884,050	968,134	945,853	935,012	853,840	890,385	754,297	741,383
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,360,123	4,216,485	3,895,645	4,123,872	4,224,014	4,008,418	4,130,529	4,026,939	4,571,026	4,407,095	4,375,422	5,069,491	4,564,101	4,405,709	4,119,249

Atmos Energy - Colorado/Kansas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,003,977	2,531,543	1,753,719	1,799,189	2,091,435	2,254,324	1,825,902	2,122,965	2,352,753	1,816,493	1,980,385	2,135,610	1,895,284	1,544,733	1,883,241
Bad Debt Expense	17,876	928,065	49,739	70,588	103,073	119,564	189,299	192,314	59,578	279,865	373,340	48,734	47,458	(111,491)	59,585
Depreciation and Amortization	1,526,637	1,653,657	1,528,155	1,635,950	1,547,377	1,523,516	1,525,071	1,543,663	1,581,459	1,528,191	1,581,903	1,570,378	1,596,879	1,878,198	1,601,543
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	773,595	738,686	765,268	921,256	793,795	1,206,839	1,004,435	916,400	889,732	799,791	1,031,393	508,414	744,386	546,735	840,300
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,324,085	5,849,971	4,085,881	4,326,882	4,635,680	5,104,242	4,544,708	4,775,363	4,883,522	4,422,140	4,927,022	4,283,134	4,283,818	3,658,175	4,484,670

Atmos Energy - Colorado/Kansas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,022,561	2,202,253	2,066,431	1,840,950	1,909,301	2,052,056	2,107,408	2,277,304	2,375,650	1,884,326	2,171,577	2,127,329	1,848,327	2,260,410	2,068,012
Bad Debt Expense	85,920	117,932	141,452	100,260	330,996	72,270	195,107	384,529	43,021	42,399	(273,582)	56,984	82,408	126,807	152,348
Depreciation and Amortization	1,603,444	1,610,472	1,619,497	1,622,840	1,629,486	1,634,251	1,642,185	1,654,483	1,670,510	1,689,116	1,720,868	1,684,184	1,686,576	1,693,720	1,693,255
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,038,012	978,704	1,137,755	914,175	852,229	678,584	910,390	827,607	881,613	841,458	828,209	881,241	954,274	802,243	943,888
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,749,956	4,909,361	4,959,145	4,478,225	4,721,992	4,637,162	4,855,090	5,144,024	4,970,794	4,457,298	4,447,072	4,749,738	4,371,587	4,885,190	4,857,503

Atmos Energy - Louisiana
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,495,909	2,491,754	2,531,320	2,271,381	2,526,936	2,390,969	2,264,285	2,397,687	2,285,809	2,802,472	2,899,799	2,494,342	3,670,299	2,071,182	2,355,367	2,342,810
Bad Debt Expense	184,095	130,300	101,202	63,598	60,948	57,033	54,404	53,401	9,912	86,987	89,139	127,759	139,584	117,911	79,487	58,588
Depreciation and Amortization	2,016,853	2,010,047	2,022,548	2,025,621	2,023,203	2,030,207	2,088,445	2,089,945	2,180,204	2,082,216	2,104,449	2,090,080	2,091,428	2,096,155	2,086,012	2,070,075
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	898,315	897,438	833,491	899,006	904,377	858,819	898,798	846,392	722,635	884,329	928,431	908,381	930,708	927,956	930,296	971,237
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,595,172	5,529,540	5,288,561	5,259,605	5,515,485	5,335,027	5,286,932	5,387,425	5,178,660	5,828,003	5,991,818	5,620,542	6,831,999	5,213,207	5,481,162	5,442,810

Atmos Energy - Louisiana
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,402,895	2,377,525	2,430,123	2,303,577	2,985,498	2,340,055	2,328,390	2,401,784	2,591,373	2,468,621	2,402,704	2,434,964	2,347,902	2,231,811	2,420,670
Bad Debt Expense	52,671	52,395	52,953	51,851	405,676	72,719	105,832	136,513	154,701	125,615	113,836	78,748	63,102	392,049	60,559
Depreciation and Amortization	2,076,151	2,082,898	2,054,800	2,084,925	2,156,113	2,061,703	2,068,116	2,065,951	2,032,637	2,037,782	2,053,548	2,108,558	2,148,265	2,083,354	2,098,133
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	949,859	988,714	943,854	915,900	930,419	875,564	945,470	888,553	942,056	910,691	908,767	922,324	970,268	899,828	911,138
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,481,576	5,481,531	5,481,539	5,356,333	6,479,644	5,360,041	5,447,808	5,502,801	5,730,766	5,542,809	5,476,654	5,644,592	5,547,535	5,607,952	5,480,501

Atmos Energy - Louisiana
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,481,628	2,906,935	2,242,723	2,345,446	2,360,595	2,478,132	2,237,530	2,219,856	2,831,299	2,331,804	2,163,715	2,544,522	2,207,825	2,818,258	2,174,083
Bad Debt Expense	63,325	382,469	73,204	113,519	172,278	244,517	348,894	332,806	96,169	425,294	568,551	89,485	87,365	247,187	70,088
Depreciation and Amortization	2,073,663	1,998,801	2,042,052	2,045,788	2,048,819	2,054,883	2,061,292	2,070,293	2,152,450	2,004,281	2,084,954	2,144,967	2,174,777	2,304,076	2,144,141
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	901,648	900,271	982,655	1,107,142	(397,928)	1,001,501	1,018,938	999,002	1,030,384	1,033,133	1,043,963	901,246	993,491	881,099	1,068,358
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,500,464	6,189,497	5,310,633	5,611,896	4,183,765	5,779,033	5,686,654	5,622,157	6,110,302	5,794,512	5,871,182	5,680,130	5,443,288	5,850,619	5,454,651

Atmos Energy - Louisiana
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,287,052	2,466,055	2,710,834	2,320,320	2,603,705	2,656,219	2,677,275	2,678,779	3,369,694	2,505,549	2,678,378	2,455,269	2,501,153	2,596,848	2,579,640
Bad Debt Expense	123,758	150,522	194,419	172,055	353,305	76,283	63,901	594,222	84,309	62,170	79,453	63,960	86,898	123,951	162,905
Depreciation and Amortization	2,156,061	2,164,815	2,165,138	2,165,824	2,019,994	2,175,043	2,192,152	2,188,458	2,199,072	2,218,218	2,231,664	2,220,810	2,222,077	2,234,570	2,235,642
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,139,099	998,126	1,089,837	1,057,773	1,056,826	1,080,341	1,135,221	1,048,943	1,048,475	1,047,796	1,033,349	1,076,692	1,187,325	976,941	1,131,125
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,715,990	5,779,617	6,170,228	5,715,972	6,033,830	5,999,896	6,068,548	6,421,402	6,681,560	5,833,733	6,022,844	5,816,731	5,997,251	6,932,310	8,109,512

Atmos Energy - Kentucky/Mid-States
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	4,243,407	4,065,318	4,607,812	3,963,288	4,137,646	4,321,005	3,423,027	3,926,205	4,181,702	4,338,965	4,400,633	3,633,125	4,191,236	3,922,919	4,072,622	3,765,131
Bad Debt Expense	185,089	137,726	121,632	66,002	57,122	60,223	48,137	82,994	(176,112)	70,370	99,192	143,604	143,011	132,031	88,467	67,568
Depreciation and Amortization	2,868,755	2,875,225	3,143,652	2,942,693	2,926,483	2,914,044	2,975,552	3,007,575	3,238,355	3,016,839	3,018,805	3,009,677	3,012,077	3,015,843	3,022,524	3,003,913
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,532,988	1,402,219	62,410	1,227,192	1,321,652	1,059,962	1,196,894	1,080,621	517,286	1,146,181	1,246,109	1,299,582	1,471,159	1,293,266	1,404,130	1,225,445
Total Direct Operating Expenses	8,830,239	8,480,487	7,925,706	8,199,176	8,445,103	8,345,234	7,644,580	8,057,294	7,761,241	8,572,355	8,764,739	8,385,988	8,817,483	8,364,088	8,587,742	8,062,056

Atmos Energy - Kentucky/Mid-States
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct C&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	3,940,144	3,954,851	3,672,460	4,001,835	4,182,137	3,131,705	3,269,044	3,587,590	3,746,176	3,285,275	3,964,044	3,168,251	3,176,988	2,819,895	3,141,474
Bad Debt Expense	47,445	49,451	51,571	39,123	111,551	48,165	67,518	89,784	103,336	90,656	73,528	46,228	40,301	209,717	34,809
Depreciation and Amortization	3,000,532	3,011,796	3,039,961	2,489,786	2,719,250	2,513,400	2,519,363	2,507,320	2,512,595	2,527,893	2,551,371	2,208,577	2,227,245	2,235,751	2,258,739
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,079,018	1,188,827	1,114,466	993,321	953,230	990,869	1,123,237	1,124,587	1,247,078	1,117,033	1,124,953	925,866	1,001,891	833,914	866,672
Total Direct Operating Expenses	8,067,139	8,184,724	7,872,456	7,524,065	7,966,168	6,684,140	6,978,562	7,309,262	7,509,185	7,021,858	7,713,897	6,348,942	6,446,423	6,099,277	6,301,894

Atmos Energy - Kentucky/Mid-States
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct C&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	3,020,763	3,978,767	2,514,455	2,626,073	3,103,360	3,613,672	3,051,638	3,141,927	3,400,631	2,886,979	2,719,745	2,720,356	2,835,916	4,153,165	2,725,939
Bad Debt Expense	35,642	363,696	38,748	51,669	67,750	81,363	152,762	128,888	42,665	183,264	237,923	34,002	33,224	639,868	43,673
Depreciation and Amortization	2,289,678	2,452,584	2,300,725	2,304,842	2,313,491	2,323,695	2,327,751	2,347,309	2,375,324	2,448,597	2,479,040	2,500,773	2,539,093	2,646,187	2,555,816
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	846,827	909,051	909,558	1,071,768	260,086	1,171,772	1,038,615	1,006,751	1,101,140	948,649	854,100	872,156	933,140	516,672	1,021,355
Total Direct Operating Expenses	6,193,128	7,694,098	5,763,486	6,354,352	5,744,887	7,190,492	6,570,766	6,624,676	6,919,760	6,467,479	6,390,807	6,127,267	6,341,373	7,856,193	6,346,983

Atmos Energy - Kentucky/Mid-States
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,785,842	3,855,224	4,574,510	2,956,481	2,819,210	(1,124,199)	3,301,370	2,954,859	3,777,205	2,771,044	3,393,982	2,945,033	2,987,758	2,978,491	2,799,172
Bad Debt Expense	56,249	74,771	85,337	70,538	232,104	45,480	35,701	324,221	35,097	35,439	370,834	45,185	55,382	73,801	87,200
Depreciation and Amortization	2,576,149	2,592,437	2,592,470	2,590,088	2,616,722	2,629,425	2,647,101	2,651,556	2,667,790	2,715,013	2,867,084	2,724,070	2,728,487	2,734,589	2,713,145
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,126,924	1,049,252	1,287,851	1,141,867	1,135,873	1,180,182	1,225,218	1,125,683	1,163,379	1,140,718	2,088,037	1,187,101	1,352,627	1,208,231	1,398,666
Total Direct Operating Expenses	6,545,164	7,571,684	8,540,168	6,768,951	6,801,908	2,730,898	7,209,389	7,056,318	7,643,470	6,882,213	8,719,937	6,902,389	7,124,252	6,995,121	6,998,183

Atmos Energy - Mississippi
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,518,668	2,839,255	2,715,255	2,557,054	2,636,124	2,920,635	2,269,646	2,486,899	2,226,109	2,458,001	2,598,154	2,488,811	3,128,134	2,528,800	2,785,919	2,199,714
Bad Debt Expense	222,841	164,149	106,567	42,904	59,948	37,977	38,814	41,927	(229,821)	81,487	82,804	152,049	121,281	134,501	88,389	40,045
Depreciation and Amortization	1,075,197	1,077,040	1,082,409	1,085,288	1,087,243	1,101,787	1,124,003	1,133,933	1,184,740	1,134,516	1,142,511	1,134,945	1,131,241	1,073,202	937,834	1,049,201
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,558,114	1,409,856	1,401,065	1,008,964	1,117,371	967,093	1,009,671	971,129	885,157	974,079	1,081,658	1,283,485	1,271,204	1,335,395	1,210,550	1,081,763
Total Direct Operating Expenses	5,374,717	5,290,400	5,305,296	4,694,211	4,891,686	5,027,492	4,442,134	4,633,828	4,047,185	4,628,092	4,905,227	5,082,391	5,651,860	5,072,697	5,022,692	4,370,724

Atmos Energy - Mississippi
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,584,890	2,211,910	2,359,250	2,405,090	2,761,087	2,481,662	2,211,719	2,487,873	2,817,437	2,457,501	2,544,820	2,658,320	2,982,103	2,871,719	2,610,871
Bad Debt Expense	37,485	34,123	35,059	32,979	169,846	54,898	88,387	145,375	155,785	105,335	118,152	77,781	65,846	227,408	36,707
Depreciation and Amortization	1,053,577	1,087,508	1,078,048	1,083,447	1,067,754	1,021,881	1,028,350	1,030,581	1,027,352	1,100,228	1,062,888	1,045,659	1,057,832	1,068,859	1,072,035
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,018,517	1,030,236	987,792	986,150	995,341	1,073,349	1,253,951	1,369,297	1,434,241	1,303,963	1,323,039	1,161,020	1,280,936	1,111,795	1,078,879
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,674,109	4,343,779	4,458,150	4,507,664	4,994,028	4,631,700	4,580,417	5,033,126	5,444,816	4,957,028	5,048,900	4,942,790	5,387,518	5,279,781	4,796,282

Atmos Energy - Mississippi
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	2,897,783	3,182,041	2,179,898	1,487,090	2,441,076	2,960,494	2,089,371	2,685,600	2,863,644	3,790,057	2,512,304	2,371,948	2,318,567	2,927,782	2,268,470
Bad Debt Expense	34,658	1,287,877	56,771	82,343	183,020	221,968	367,098	319,376	73,015	262,376	331,438	42,209	41,333	1,352,963	58,695
Depreciation and Amortization	1,083,041	1,143,536	1,076,070	1,071,140	1,127,039	1,128,759	1,132,103	1,095,702	1,139,395	1,041,948	1,170,181	1,168,973	1,147,862	1,489,898	1,214,027
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,073,897	1,089,988	1,122,800	1,321,334	1,834,932	1,714,184	1,639,684	1,460,608	1,280,986	1,185,222	1,160,690	1,055,365	1,120,550	873,739	1,201,845
Total Direct Operating Expenses	4,889,479	6,683,422	4,435,540	3,931,907	5,386,067	5,625,396	5,228,256	5,461,285	5,356,043	6,279,811	5,174,823	4,638,415	4,626,311	6,624,382	4,743,037

Atmos Energy - Mississippi
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	(1,985,350)	2,748,983	3,096,859	2,429,609	2,705,248	2,465,340	2,510,354	2,678,142	2,989,865	2,210,791	2,793,860	2,229,751	2,511,709	2,495,091	2,112,431
Bad Debt Expenses	103,862	179,647	197,776	182,771	491,946	62,367	51,776	385,894	43,361	41,797	330,408	55,382	69,263	142,989	163,971
Depreciation and Amortization	1,215,631	1,190,949	1,177,143	1,176,733	1,180,892	1,228,507	1,249,368	1,271,448	1,288,341	1,276,506	1,313,736	1,288,137	1,251,192	1,243,176	1,245,795
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,337,170	1,501,446	1,641,256	1,551,842	1,558,305	1,285,316	1,157,634	1,145,757	1,158,739	1,155,401	1,395,008	1,271,944	1,407,909	1,404,841	1,558,321
Total Direct Operating Expenses	671,344	6,621,024	6,113,032	5,340,955	5,936,391	5,051,529	4,978,132	5,379,342	5,480,368	4,684,495	5,833,009	4,825,224	5,240,073	5,286,076	5,080,517

Atmos Energy - Mid-Tex
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	8,080,591	8,004,726	8,973,548	8,941,587	8,175,749	8,453,328	8,192,192	8,790,374	10,132,132	7,254,674	8,505,403	8,959,178	7,840,832	7,809,588	9,150,821	7,472,827
Bad Debt Expense	488,591	485,638	370,030	253,714	232,320	208,105	203,323	218,257	(2,277,133)	245,978	293,456	576,099	888,045	387,979	398,081	312,081
Depreciation and Amortization	7,852,163	7,878,011	7,821,738	7,961,342	7,969,634	8,002,719	7,964,383	7,960,148	9,101,538	8,189,032	8,248,569	8,188,773	8,198,153	8,223,591	8,238,570	8,195,217
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	11,172,876	11,322,429	10,171,988	12,852,448	10,793,983	8,846,832	6,883,374	6,258,091	3,931,966	6,142,147	7,055,784	9,315,696	11,251,472	11,082,676	9,990,353	10,121,057
Total Direct Operating Expenses	27,604,221	28,690,804	27,437,303	30,009,088	27,201,687	25,510,762	21,043,233	23,225,670	20,888,503	21,831,830	24,103,212	27,039,745	27,954,502	27,303,833	27,775,825	26,101,182

Atmos Energy - Mid-Tex
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	7,382,056	7,870,579	7,162,594	7,393,976	8,278,583	7,560,649	6,651,199	8,170,882	9,891,431	8,030,330	8,444,011	7,458,365	9,306,003	7,580,896	7,894,284
Bad Debt Expense	203,854	198,672	192,917	183,660	(10,656)	264,866	380,720	228,332	504,483	410,115	381,143	313,828	281,913	1,433,141	242,412
Depreciation and Amortization	8,238,710	8,164,934	8,204,381	8,234,017	8,292,583	8,183,302	8,219,811	8,287,546	7,343,669	7,370,207	7,383,635	7,411,750	7,434,616	7,634,068	7,487,418
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	9,194,952	8,309,983	8,916,335	8,681,902	7,867,393	6,733,032	6,656,821	8,460,124	11,120,368	9,876,238	9,948,836	10,806,315	8,621,235	9,037,047	7,083,938
Total Direct Operating Expenses	25,019,572	24,541,547	21,476,227	21,493,555	24,427,903	21,751,852	21,908,550	25,144,883	28,859,931	25,788,890	28,157,625	25,980,258	26,653,666	25,695,092	22,708,063

Atmos Energy - Mid-Tex
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	9,238,061	11,189,035	6,952,518	8,145,041	9,049,051	8,941,018	8,065,667	8,216,021	9,091,259	8,487,873	8,438,190	8,738,601	8,779,797	9,837,500	7,807,898
Bad Debt Expense	237,362	1,601,077	226,725	279,118	480,982	547,737	1,002,650	872,636	304,212	1,294,587	1,873,717	249,981	283,156	(258,570)	324,726
Depreciation and Amortization	7,562,715	7,828,187	7,578,070	7,817,907	7,828,329	7,831,548	7,833,896	7,853,463	8,094,808	8,068,291	8,578,423	8,585,902	8,624,384	9,029,650	8,890,990
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	7,199,624	6,743,581	6,485,024	7,653,929	7,697,880	12,887,981	13,034,871	13,468,981	14,084,948	13,114,855	12,350,252	8,831,810	7,872,421	4,888,550	7,759,351
Total Direct Operating Expenses	24,237,762	27,362,879	21,243,237	23,894,965	25,055,242	30,208,282	29,937,023	30,432,392	31,576,326	30,948,208	31,241,582	26,204,494	25,509,797	28,477,131	24,372,965

Atmos Energy - Mid-Tex
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	8,443,946	8,439,847	8,671,128	8,324,768	9,180,354	8,922,466	8,980,738	8,683,747	9,683,709	7,991,454	9,676,931	8,578,699	7,703,328	8,536,195	8,645,631
Bad Debt Expense	445,602	241,312	456,612	416,432	1,252,433	310,520	293,319	2,688,635	279,928	273,026	378,033	303,870	362,651	451,679	496,662
Depreciation and Amortization	8,683,735	8,733,847	8,734,505	8,744,359	8,717,650	8,554,562	8,584,076	9,142,748	9,086,049	9,084,873	9,162,142	9,151,979	9,161,806	9,205,222	9,216,062
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	9,202,821	13,048,571	14,742,008	13,748,080	13,514,095	13,675,002	12,353,859	11,807,256	8,373,767	7,832,210	9,306,714	7,195,791	9,591,037	9,762,007	13,729,043
Total Direct Operating Expenses	26,776,204	30,463,577	32,604,154	31,233,639	32,664,513	31,482,550	30,211,992	32,202,586	27,323,453	25,191,669	28,523,821	25,230,239	26,918,820	27,957,003	32,087,239

Atmos Energy - Atmos Pipeline - Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	4,223,309	4,211,217	4,925,972	4,972,055	6,290,636	5,798,014	6,021,388	6,048,431	7,028,362	5,075,445	4,839,777	4,959,384	4,805,541	4,689,161	4,269,011	3,442,714
Bad Debt Expense	1	2	(100)	0	0	(11,759)	0	0	8,787	0	0	45,427	0	0	129	0
Depreciation and Amortization	1,943,740	1,926,274	1,927,988	1,928,280	2,437,262	2,424,838	2,431,741	2,443,357	2,735,260	2,503,620	2,549,348	2,597,793	2,595,884	2,600,321	2,595,575	2,600,643
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,295,483	1,321,849	1,495,901	1,254,447	1,249,660	1,224,628	1,272,117	1,289,357	744,222	1,229,866	1,284,042	1,280,244	1,320,989	1,320,497	1,274,025	1,257,019
Total Direct Operating Expenses	7,452,513	7,459,341	8,349,741	8,154,782	9,977,758	9,435,710	9,725,246	9,781,145	10,516,631	8,808,931	8,683,168	8,852,828	8,722,414	8,609,979	8,138,740	7,300,376

Atmos Energy - Atmos Pipeline - Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	5,508,140	5,259,868	5,408,458	7,111,088	7,670,954	5,145,263	4,828,953	4,007,039	4,873,104	4,272,563	4,585,758	4,475,737	5,164,998	5,032,076	5,936,345
Bad Debt Expense	(284)	(1,165)	0	0	10,940	0	0	(584)	0	0	(88,917)	0	0	8,626	0
Depreciation and Amortization	2,605,740	2,590,317	2,598,660	2,635,783	2,983,454	2,737,333	2,768,446	2,884,311	2,883,447	2,888,281	2,888,112	2,891,899	2,888,536	2,885,853	2,903,509
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,293,377	1,281,632	1,274,738	1,352,874	1,402,401	1,277,801	1,375,814	1,294,919	1,447,573	1,423,364	1,401,494	1,426,446	1,455,209	1,404,957	1,562,698
Total Direct Operating Expenses	9,410,972	9,130,652	9,281,756	11,099,525	11,947,749	9,160,397	9,073,213	8,185,585	9,214,124	8,599,207	8,776,447	8,793,882	9,508,743	9,341,512	10,402,552

Atmos Energy - Atmos Pipeline - Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	8,793,385	10,077,001	5,349,444	4,808,096	4,650,227	4,823,640	4,460,222	4,904,413	6,265,323	6,572,095	7,936,512	9,290,150	11,474,239	11,031,548	6,140,640
Bad Debt Expense	0	(14,173)	0	0	5,180	0	0	10,650	0	0	(4,355)	0	0	(731)	0
Depreciation and Amortization	3,120,405	3,522,265	3,193,542	3,212,821	3,379,973	3,382,548	3,384,575	3,388,580	3,408,026	3,419,503	3,453,475	3,480,448	3,528,921	3,797,571	3,700,036
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,459,418	1,530,100	1,440,855	1,584,206	1,637,690	1,620,752	1,643,868	(4,495,772)	1,685,889	1,655,218	1,732,260	1,680,110	1,765,026	1,212,317	1,595,654
Total Direct Operating Expenses	13,387,208	15,115,183	9,983,841	9,605,123	9,673,070	9,826,941	9,488,664	3,807,850	11,339,217	11,646,816	13,117,912	14,450,708	16,769,186	16,040,705	11,436,340

Atmos Energy - Atmos Pipeline - Texas
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	7,038,031	8,869,123	6,742,914	5,634,208	7,193,255	7,321,633	7,111,184	9,333,048	12,260,186	13,207,129	15,841,873	6,641,408	7,559,655	9,886,451	8,663,288
Bad Debt Expense	0	(11,307)	0	0	15,341	0	0	(224)	0	0	77	0	(27)	(2,190)	0
Depreciation and Amortization	3,774,039	3,937,733	3,910,874	3,921,954	3,915,068	3,924,820	3,940,195	3,950,962	3,931,431	4,023,327	4,335,526	4,194,699	4,189,492	4,376,243	4,362,067
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,759,441	1,509,671	1,767,489	1,769,160	1,701,400	1,627,670	2,255,143	2,110,263	2,133,617	2,195,250	2,118,553	1,799,686	2,063,246	1,707,787	2,281,840
Total Direct Operating Expenses	12,571,511	14,276,420	12,421,077	11,325,321	12,825,062	13,074,122	13,306,522	15,394,048	18,325,233	19,425,706	22,295,030	12,535,794	13,819,366	15,968,300	13,337,195

Atmos Energy - Atmos Energy Marketing
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	1,994,388	1,581,281	2,150,214	1,709,522	1,750,582	1,701,076	1,657,003	1,881,890	3,848,245	1,773,901	1,917,825	541,162	1,871,972	894,888	1,359,219	1,184,263
Bad Debt Expense	62,500	62,500	(500,000)	62,500	62,500	62,500	62,500	62,500	(1,283,077)	90,000	90,000	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	166,754	152,054	151,642	152,144	148,785	155,214	150,504	149,000	159,518	83,502	88,508	88,827	86,741	85,991	84,360	80,029
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	181,948	183,838	(748,281)	183,293	243,176	140,421	151,857	471,120	(21,951)	167,945	249,170	159,692	173,843	78,724	150,493	136,298
Total Direct Operating Expenses	2,415,588	1,979,450	1,053,575	2,087,468	2,205,043	2,059,212	2,021,963	2,564,450	2,733,733	2,115,348	2,346,303	787,681	2,132,556	1,060,693	1,594,072	1,400,610

Atmos Energy - Atmos Energy Marketing
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	1,754,813	3,217,610	1,849,254	1,782,428	2,751,440	2,560,105	1,105,425	1,568,212	1,911,773	1,640,288	1,663,723	1,951,468	2,088,838	5,538,028	1,821,699
Bad Debt Expense	0	19,000	0	0	793,458	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667
Depreciation and Amortization	80,279	365,001	388,594	372,250	393,261	232,469	227,796	228,957	228,583	228,666	228,521	228,101	225,847	226,182	235,012
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	211,888	129,936	147,245	144,808	126,252	152,814	110,931	62,270	195,381	135,140	(38,946)	138,197	184,310	114,438	143,055
Total Direct Operating Expenses	2,046,780	3,731,547	2,385,094	2,299,588	4,067,409	2,987,055	1,485,218	1,901,106	2,377,384	2,045,741	1,892,964	2,357,432	2,540,482	5,920,316	2,241,423

Atmos Energy - Atmos Energy Marketing
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	1,940,771	7,231,675	1,921,901	2,054,812	3,120,063	2,369,242	1,743,690	(1,162,373)	3,541,196	1,757,007	2,223,308	2,012,012	1,677,598	1,680,720	2,206,923
Bad Debt Expense	41,667	106,345	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667
Depreciation and Amortization	235,912	236,042	243,277	242,736	244,004	243,738	243,236	242,388	242,427	242,298	242,856	253,095	244,260	270,131	241,966
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	127,843	190,649	135,453	250,458	49,370	234,938	145,979	149,664	156,530	172,545	143,324	149,847	137,463	21,626	161,672
Total Direct Operating Expenses	2,345,993	7,764,710	2,343,298	2,689,673	3,465,104	2,889,585	2,174,814	(728,644)	3,981,820	2,213,517	2,651,154	2,486,621	2,100,978	2,622,477	2,652,259

Atmos Energy - Atmos Energy Marketing
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	1,600,295	2,348,679	2,218,012	1,880,074	2,103,970	2,031,806	2,161,518	2,009,136	3,985,124	1,650,642	3,576,702	2,023,553	1,719,203	2,133,899	2,122,909
Bad Debt Expense	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	41,667	(1,300,000)	41,667	41,667	(500,000)	0
Depreciation and Amortization	247,361	245,974	241,854	241,863	247,960	247,983	249,322	249,242	243,104	240,434	258,680	243,019	243,212	244,181	244,289
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	281,352	138,529	273,631	154,916	139,625	171,325	181,751	158,757	158,531	150,581	146,954	137,346	270,227	6,602	238,677
Total Direct Operating Expenses	2,370,676	2,774,849	2,775,164	2,318,520	2,533,582	2,492,781	2,634,258	2,458,803	4,439,426	2,083,324	2,682,376	2,445,585	2,274,309	1,884,681	2,607,054

Atmos Energy - UCG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	33,035	25,018	27,368	24,533	27,458	176,324	46,244	40,870	43,608	32,026	31,512	41,363	26,124	35,497	29,684	28,555
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	12,877	12,676	12,877	12,676	12,677	12,877	12,677	12,968	28,033	13,411	13,411	13,411	13,411	13,411	13,316	13,409
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	900	900	(14,223)	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	1,000	1,025	1,025	1,025
Total Direct Operating Expenses	46,812	38,594	25,842	38,109	41,034	189,901	59,820	54,738	72,541	46,337	45,824	55,674	40,535	49,933	44,025	42,999

Atmos Energy - UCG Storage
 Total Direct Operating Expenses
 January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	22,700	25,017	42,432	27,496	36,197	36,399	29,280	38,926	31,555	25,305	24,366	23,323	26,521	23,551	25,210
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	13,406	22,995	14,094	14,094	14,473	14,551	14,544	14,552	14,552	14,552	14,527	14,507	14,502	14,503	14,504
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,025	1,025	1,025	1,025	1,025	1,283	1,482	1,529	1,338	1,301	(330)	1,310	1,368	1,288	1,323
Total Direct Operating Expenses	37,134	49,037	57,551	42,614	51,694	52,222	45,306	55,007	47,446	41,158	38,584	39,140	42,392	39,342	41,038

Atmos Energy - UCG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	25,858	81,109	28,610	31,746	25,467	38,306	25,670	46,947	50,657	22,813	50,949	61,263	67,674	82,397	29,036
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	14,504	14,511	14,501	14,501	14,501	14,501	14,501	14,502	14,503	15,529	15,532	15,535	15,537	15,665	15,698
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,305	1,284	2,137	2,375	2,068	2,266	2,196	2,203	2,206	2,228	2,191	2,212	2,178	(420)	1,328
Total Direct Operating Expenses	41,667	96,905	45,248	48,623	42,055	55,073	42,367	63,651	67,366	40,570	68,672	79,011	85,389	77,671	46,060

Atmos Energy - UCG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	18,466	24,913	26,288	27,858	31,979	46,457	48,885	33,578	29,520	63,379	68,201	20,802	17,613	28,587	435,048
Bad Debt Expenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	15,898	15,790	15,770	15,771	15,770	15,770	15,815	15,810	15,602	16,609	16,054	16,281	16,148	16,200	16,200
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	1,615	1,273	1,561	1,421	1,444	1,422	1,495	1,451	1,475	1,435	3,960	4,352	3,912	3,912	4,031
Total Direct Operating Expenses	35,779	41,976	43,619	45,050	49,193	62,649	64,175	50,838	46,598	80,423	85,690	40,823	38,113	48,658	455,281

Atmos Energy - WKG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	31,213	17,755	22,162	22,875	99,076	48,727	(170,678)	42,161	47,582	34,739	34,808	41,677	39,378	24,899	30,156	39,009
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	23,797	23,798	23,788	23,788	23,802	23,783	23,810	26,988	27,491	26,681	26,662	26,650	26,650	26,651	26,650	26,650
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	5,376	3,095	5,167	3,345	6,016	3,638	2,801	3,642	3,344	3,045	4,797	8,091	6,880	3,614	3,222	3,095
Total Direct Operating Expenses	60,386	44,648	51,136	49,808	127,893	74,148	(144,067)	72,791	78,417	64,466	66,297	76,418	71,879	55,154	60,028	66,754

Atmos Energy - WKG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	24,990	15,758	24,668	21,514	37,101	15,383	21,935	33,686	41,956	25,278	30,828	18,017	26,642	25,578	24,702
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	26,651	26,651	26,653	26,654	26,867	34,416	27,468	28,283	27,694	27,696	27,697	27,698	27,690	27,703	27,704
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	3,107	3,533	3,536	3,171	3,025	8,575	2,497	3,413	5,364	4,066	15,668	4,108	7,085	4,326	3,957
Total Direct Operating Expenses	54,747	45,942	54,857	51,338	68,594	58,358	51,899	65,382	75,018	57,040	74,184	49,822	61,417	57,605	56,362

Atmos Energy - WKG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	31,208	138,105	65,008	31,512	28,735	44,428	30,273	25,400	30,898	27,789	30,193	27,775	39,377	376,719	41,521
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	27,704	27,878	27,730	27,784	27,728	27,720	27,720	27,720	27,732	27,732	27,737	27,742	27,744	27,969	28,071
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	4,258	4,164	5,154	10,068	6,524	9,758	6,057	5,442	6,006	8,190	5,273	4,953	4,339	1,123	5,280
Total Direct Operating Expenses	63,169	170,146	97,932	69,314	62,986	81,905	64,050	58,562	64,636	63,711	63,203	60,480	72,010	408,811	74,972

Atmos Energy - WKG Storage
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	(112,440)	31,431	31,550	33,114	32,052	53,302	280,648	50,036	44,938	346,586	974,535	28,954	51,835	26,728	(655,330)
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	28,072	28,160	28,161	28,161	28,160	28,160	28,162	28,186	27,808	27,917	28,153	28,522	38,323	29,944	28,945
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	10,559	3,255	9,471	6,254	6,231	8,090	8,375	5,325	5,034	5,093	5,065	7,392	10,082	4,638	8,405
Total Direct Operating Expenses	(73,710)	62,847	69,182	67,529	66,444	87,552	297,185	83,606	77,878	379,575	1,007,753	65,868	101,041	61,310	(626,980)

Atmos Energy - TLGP
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	96,282	62,955	63,317	61,762	125,885	98,032	63,465	94,852	97,542	75,957	67,692	82,052	81,541	97	64,085	88,919
Bad Debt Expenses	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	66,017	66,358	65,021	66,022	66,042	66,014	66,055	66,060	66,813	66,530	66,942	66,632	67,430	66,766	65,765	66,766
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	61,360	62,014	(288,938)	61,268	61,441	61,811	61,278	65,283	(282,409)	61,420	61,845	61,360	40,552	47,112	47,277	47,097
Total Direct Operating Expenses	223,669	191,327	(169,598)	189,051	253,368	225,857	190,788	226,285	(128,053)	203,907	198,380	210,045	189,923	113,976	178,128	202,780

Atmos Energy - TLGP
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	81,577	105,508	128,648	59,751	453,189	96,668	61,242	97,275	31,175	96,287	78,701	73,167	134,897	71,347	74,072
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	66,767	66,767	66,793	66,797	68,148	67,190	67,228	67,321	67,324	67,483	67,626	67,818	68,201	68,253	68,809
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	47,256	47,026	49,284	47,071	47,011	55,241	65,815	65,951	64,005	66,644	124,451	65,948	66,123	65,882	62,888
Total Direct Operating Expenses	185,600	219,299	244,726	173,618	968,349	229,096	194,285	230,546	162,504	230,394	270,779	206,933	269,220	205,482	225,769

Atmos Energy - TLGP
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	106,802	92,720	113,399	93,169	80,093	84,966	80,289	79,065	99,271	93,821	101,377	82,715	95,772	128,926	81,510
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	71,907	72,361	69,074	68,957	68,944	68,928	69,968	68,988	69,012	69,012	69,022	68,958	69,667	71,043	69,398
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	82,834	82,771	81,236	81,816	100,089	68,482	75,780	88,281	60,789	69,354	68,247	67,308	67,209	59,786	64,646
Total Direct Operating Expenses	261,543	247,852	263,708	244,043	249,126	222,356	225,017	216,364	229,071	231,186	238,848	218,981	232,648	259,756	215,453

Atmos Energy - TLGP
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	90,707	79,554	116,336	70,213	94,230	85,134	110,188	90,655	97,080	91,403	97,468	75,889	74,099	127,307	66,593
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	69,328	69,474	69,450	69,450	69,448	69,448	69,751	69,791	68,604	62,059	63,264	63,265	63,265	63,399	63,403
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	65,268	64,412	63,882	66,532	63,589	63,535	63,718	63,607	63,210	62,447	62,251	23,636	25,449	24,072	23,712
Total Direct Operating Expenses	225,303	213,440	249,567	206,195	227,267	218,117	243,655	214,053	246,894	205,909	222,983	162,580	162,813	214,779	153,708

Atmos Energy - Remaining Nonregulated
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12
Operating Expenses																
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	586,641	315,548	19,168,013	681,150	(33,367)	11,323,960	257,379	291,914	209,980	225,299	191,411	324,190	273,159	196,277	376,936	127,727
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	112,353	112,293	112,230	112,231	112,314	53,102	53,278	53,004	55,928	85,725	18,506	48,578	48,934	48,935	48,932	48,934
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	45,385	43,916	(195,368)	43,884	44,626	43,731	44,180	55,041	(337,810)	49,894	60,626	44,558	42,282	46,142	47,594	46,845
Total Direct Operating Expenses	744,379	471,758	19,084,875	817,265	123,572	11,420,794	354,837	399,959	(71,902)	380,918	270,543	417,325	364,354	291,354	473,462	223,506

Atmos Energy - Remaining Nonregulated
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Mar-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	220,122	331,108	203,381	139,089	6,662,415	228,195	209,417	194,479	170,378	215,598	306,125	142,095	208,710	83,303	217,228
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	48,937	48,937	51,729	55,230	35,318	34,567	34,838	34,748	34,754	(222,345)	33,062	25,332	25,294	25,351	25,354
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	47,504	47,064	46,813	57,297	46,754	30,834	31,920	32,662	31,225	30,099	(187,839)	28,871	28,198	28,746	28,947
Total Direct Operating Expenses	316,562	427,109	302,003	251,616	6,634,487	291,595	275,974	261,880	236,354	23,353	141,249	196,299	261,202	137,400	271,529

Atmos Energy - Remaining Nonregulated
Total Direct Operating Expenses
January 2011 - January 2016

	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Oct-14
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	111,661	137,885	115,239	371,271	58,442	92,147	38,867	(2,848,518)	126,289	32,541	111,243	(344,088)	78,160	5,590	48,384
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	25,357	26,136	22,840	22,750	22,759	22,710	22,711	22,712	22,741	22,866	22,695	22,708	22,726	22,646	16,834
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	41,993	28,726	21,542	22,382	(506,598)	23,025	22,773	22,788	22,809	22,890	22,757	7,833	26,914	28,430	25,601
Total Direct Operating Expenses	179,011	192,747	159,621	418,414	(425,396)	137,882	84,350	(2,803,009)	171,839	78,096	156,894	(313,548)	127,800	58,666	90,789

Atmos Energy - Remaining Nonregulated
 Total Direct Operating Expenses
 January 2011 - January 2016

	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16
Operating Expenses															
Direct O&M Expenses (Excl Bad Debt)	35,627	77,919	65,301	67,080	79,233	45,781	28,322	58,797	62,423	54,174	2,907,179	78,633	62,805	37,360	(60,528)
Bad Debt Expense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation and Amortization	16,833	16,602	16,639	16,638	16,640	16,643	16,558	16,185	30,009	16,997	16,099	22,486	22,494	22,752	22,753
Taxes - Other Than Income Taxes	25,059	26,264	26,418	26,611	26,632	26,609	26,472	26,555	26,509	33,024	26,584	38,158	39,949	38,501	38,617
Total Direct Operating Expenses	77,520	120,785	108,357	110,330	122,505	89,033	71,351	101,637	108,941	104,195	2,949,862	137,277	126,248	88,613	842

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-05
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please refer to confidential electronic workpaper "Att30- O&M for KY- Fall2015 case updated" provided in response to Staff 1-59 and the tab entitled "Div 2 forecast."

- a. Please provide the actual data in the same level of detail and in the same format for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available with all formulas intact.
- b. Please provide a variance analysis for each category of expense (labor, benefits, employee welfare, etc.) that identifies and describes all reasons for the change projected in the test year compared to the base year. In addition, provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the change projected in the test year compared to the base year.
- c. Refer further to cell row 248 of this tab showing the monthly capitalization percentages. Please identify and describe all reasons for the change in the average capitalization percentage projected for the test year compared to the base year. Provide a copy of all documents relied upon to determine or calculate the capitalization percentages and to determine or calculate the change.
- d. Please provide the actual capitalization percentage rate for labor and related costs for each month for division 2 from October 2011 through the most recent month available in a spreadsheet with cells and formulae intact.
- e. Refer to cell row 77 of this tab showing injuries and damages insurance reserve. Please describe the entries in April and May of the base year and explain whether or not these amounts are recurring. If they are not recurring, then please explain why they are not.
- f. Please provide in electronic format a schedule showing the activity and balances in the injuries and damages reserve for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available with all formulas intact, starting with the beginning balance, accruals to the reserve, charges to the reserve, and ending balance each month. For the accruals to the reserve, provide all supporting documentation as well as the account/subaccount used to record the accruals. For the charges to the reserve, provide a description of each such charge or related group of charges.

RESPONSE:

- a) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-05
Page 2 of 2

relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.

- b) Please see Attachment 2.
- c) All amounts relied upon for calculation of percentages are in Attachment 30 to the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-59.
- d) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.
- e) Amounts charged to the Shared Services Injury and Damages Reserve Account 9250-07115 are recorded to Cost Center 1903, which does not allocate to the business units. Thus, the amounts referenced in the question, along with other expenses charged to this account in Shared Services, are not allocated to Kentucky operations.
- f) Please see response to subpart (e).

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-05_Att1 - Div 002 O&M Oct11-Jan16.xlsx, 19 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-05_Att2 - SSU Variance (02 and 012).xlsx, 1 Page.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Total Fiscal 2012
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Reimbursements 9210-09911	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(271,136)	(271,136)
Miscellaneous	(3,522,190)	(3,647,440)	(2,877,854)	(4,693,838)	(4,037,713)	(3,927,034)	(3,119,684)	(3,377,206)	(5,575,925)	(3,183,219)	(3,394,441)	(3,682,221)	(46,038,764)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	5,822,207	5,669,909	6,600,646	6,073,733	4,475,109	3,965,880	4,915,737	4,979,322	7,387,589	5,023,778	4,091,950	15,243,092	74,249,950
Div 2 gross expenses	5,822,207	5,669,909	6,600,646	6,073,733	4,475,109	3,965,880	4,915,737	4,979,322	7,387,589	5,023,778	4,091,950	15,243,092	74,249,950
Div 12 gross expenses	3,606,463	3,982,726	4,092,738	4,318,139	3,678,709	3,735,934	3,308,162	3,265,802	3,174,247	3,325,167	3,342,744	3,443,739	43,580,368
SSU Capital Credits	3,204,000	3,850,164	3,882,857	3,692,604	4,038,754	3,866,458	3,123,530	3,379,181	6,568,597	3,185,604	3,355,297	3,428,064	45,399,011
pre-capitalization totals	12,935,670	13,302,799	14,576,238	14,084,376	12,193,573	11,558,272	11,347,429	11,624,105	17,131,433	11,538,547	10,819,991	22,115,896	163,226,329
effective average cap rate	24.77%	27.44%	28.64%	28.22%	33.13%	33.37%	27.53%	28.07%	38.35%	27.64%	31.28%	15.49%	27.81%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Regulated Shared Services (002)

	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Total Fiscal 2013
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04863	(4,624,131)	(3,969,732)	(4,112,736)	(4,519,262)	(3,684,279)	(4,067,762)	(2,155,672)	(6,004,717)	(3,693,723)	(3,726,939)	(3,944,208)	(4,030,599)	(48,532,757)
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Misc General Expense 9120-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	753	-	-	-	-	-	753
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	2,085	(25,169)	50	392	731	(108,801)	1,607	27,550	(46,581)	(154,842)	(18,598)	202,086	(119,581)
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	0	0	0	83	(13)	-	52	1,383	117	-	-	321	1,942
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Use only for HR exp default ***Forme 9210-09185	0	0	22	-	-	-	(22)	0	0	0	0	0	-
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Reimbursements 9210-09911	0	(64,538)	(97,593)	(69,359)	(58,205)	-	(101,841)	-	(71,154)	-	-	(53,423)	(503,015)
Miscellaneous	(4,622,046)	(4,059,428)	(4,200,169)	(4,585,142)	(3,741,765)	(4,176,511)	(2,256,274)	(5,975,764)	(3,811,341)	(3,860,782)	(3,962,807)	(3,881,609)	(49,152,658)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	5,817,891	6,116,553	6,442,948	4,712,972	5,691,871	4,186,874	10,535,176	2,916,212	5,118,010	6,047,808	5,742,447	14,311,780	77,540,343
Div 2 gross expenses	5,817,891	6,116,553	6,442,948	4,712,972	5,691,871	4,186,874	10,535,176	2,916,212	5,118,010	6,047,808	5,742,447	14,311,780	77,640,343
Div 12 gross expenses	3,488,417	3,463,213	4,282,027	4,363,660	3,846,497	3,915,171	4,221,268	4,666,778	3,820,938	4,107,340	4,487,310	4,532,228	49,162,846
SSU Capital Credits	4,624,131	3,969,732	4,112,736	4,519,262	3,684,279	4,067,762	2,155,672	6,004,717	3,693,723	3,726,939	3,944,208	4,030,599	48,532,757
pre-capitalization totals	13,926,439	13,538,497	14,817,713	13,595,894	13,222,847	12,169,806	18,912,116	13,587,707	12,632,671	13,880,887	14,173,964	22,874,804	175,335,946
effective average cap rate	33.20%	29.32%	27.76%	33.24%	27.86%	33.43%	12.75%	44.19%	29.24%	26.84%	27.83%	17.62%	27.68%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Total Fiscal 2014
Mains expenses - Work Environment Training 8560-05429	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	112	-	112
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Work Environment Training 9210-05429	0	471	-	129	-	989	791	-	-	-	-	857	3,036
Training	142,964	28,322	34,017	94,112	66,302	53,836	91,018	266,496	87,624	98,358	57,595	106,692	1,128,336
A&G-Administrative & general s - Contract Labor 9200-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,653
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	15,418	74,144	118,650	27,799	60,415	88,635	140,490	43,134	470,442	(301,990)	35,990	429,495	1,202,100
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	660,694	668,275	598,652	799,845	470,620	428,300	555,686	559,017	522,903	725,392	472,125	1,117,364	7,578,544
A&G-Regulatory commission exps - Contract Labor 9290-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18,800	-	18,800
Miscellaneous general expenses - Contract Labor 9302-06111	12,949	17,600	3,767	24,106	11,258	(1,792)	4,463	4,424	5,539	15,908	10,677	5,108	114,204
A&G-Rentis - Contract Labor 9310-06111	4,230	6,152	10,692	1,593	4,988	2,213	5,782	5,638	4,495	6,450	5,647	5,692	63,483
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Contract Labor 9320-06111	0	12,000	960	-	-	-	455	-	-	-	-	-	13,445
Miscellaneous general expenses - Legal 9302-06121	1,877	-	-	682	266	-	1,627	9,217	896	-	100	-	14,565
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-06121	604	3,573	-	81,773	11,683	20,977	12,108	1,978	966	3,455	1,800	15,605	154,221
Outside Services	695,743	781,744	732,651	935,537	559,150	538,332	720,521	623,308	1,005,241	449,251	544,840	1,577,915	9,164,134
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04883	(6,905,462)	(7,507,304)	(4,574,478)	(4,846,297)	(3,854,048)	(4,182,816)	(4,069,454)	(6,595,042)	(4,638,817)	(4,316,749)	(3,762,667)	(3,795,355)	(58,857,481)
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Misc General Expense 9120-07590	0	0	0	0	0	805	-	-	-	-	-	-	805
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	57,595	4,817	45,306	(26,449)	2,880	(97,595)	10,973	35,746	6,311	24,800	(144,065)	385,581	306,849
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	74	-	-	91	228	223	-	-	-	745	-	-	1,381
Miscellaneous	(6,847,813)	(7,502,487)	(4,629,172)	(4,670,656)	(3,850,939)	(4,289,386)	(4,058,481)	(6,559,296)	(4,632,505)	(4,291,204)	(3,906,752)	(3,409,774)	(58,548,466)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	8,465,038	3,468,340	6,617,933	6,889,103	5,811,705	16,337,891	170,183	6,514,037	5,141,345	4,887,891	4,888,224	7,438,456	75,430,146
Div 2 gross expenses	8,465,038	3,468,340	6,617,933	6,889,103	5,811,705	16,337,891	170,183	6,514,037	5,141,345	4,887,891	4,888,224	7,438,456	76,430,146
Div 12 gross expenses	5,555,814	4,696,673	4,734,913	5,262,714	4,393,542	4,811,982	5,109,007	4,921,458	4,568,188	5,127,246	4,891,422	5,339,219	59,412,058
SSU Capital Credits	6,905,452	7,507,304	4,674,478	4,645,297	3,854,048	4,192,816	4,069,454	6,595,042	4,638,817	4,316,749	3,762,667	3,795,355	58,857,481
pre-capitalization totals	20,926,304	16,672,217	15,927,324	16,697,114	14,059,294	25,342,890	9,348,844	18,030,337	14,348,330	14,331,897	13,542,813	16,573,029	194,699,684
effective average cap rate	33.00%	47.80%	28.72%	27.99%	27.41%	16.54%	43.53%	36.58%	32.33%	30.12%	27.76%	22.90%	30.23%

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-14	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Total Fiscal 2015
Miscellaneous	(4,692,248)	(4,916,440)	(4,735,427)	(3,088,451)	(5,089,142)	(6,091,239)	(4,321,315)	(3,259,347)	(5,981,730)	(8,787,591)	(7,773,536)	(2,280,024)	(59,994,482)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	6,539,178	5,965,744	3,343,408	10,490,930	5,649,161	7,246,876	5,107,074	5,845,266	10,959,009	6,110,725	1,666,572	10,697,874	79,821,818
Div 2 gross expenses	6,539,178	5,965,744	3,343,408	10,490,930	5,649,161	7,246,876	5,107,074	5,845,266	10,959,009	6,110,725	1,666,572	10,697,874	79,821,818
Div 12 gross expenses	5,387,522	4,886,206	5,122,202	4,991,437	4,930,840	5,012,946	5,016,255	4,967,862	4,893,949	5,310,275	4,726,287	5,578,984	60,304,577
SSU Capital Credits	4,440,435	4,875,681	4,746,480	3,088,874	5,092,435	4,740,221	4,321,279	3,254,885	5,880,828	5,767,436	7,774,961	198	57,064,866
pre-capitalization totals	16,347,135	15,527,631	13,214,090	18,571,241	15,372,236	17,000,044	14,444,618	14,067,784	21,833,786	20,188,440	14,167,220	16,477,056	197,211,291
effective average cap rate	27.16%	31.40%	35.93%	16.63%	33.13%	27.86%	29.82%	23.14%	27.39%	43.43%	54.88%	0.00%	28.95%

Atmos Energy Corporation

Operation & Maintenance Expenses

Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Customer accounts-Operation su - Non-project Labor 9010-01000	42,449	-	-	-	42,449
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Non-project Labor 9030-01000	212,743	146,473	151,701	172,150	683,067
A&G-Administrative & general s - Non-project Labor 9200-01000	4,483,125	3,034,213	3,014,188	3,044,888	13,576,415
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor 9200-01001	234,500	141,383	137,964	100,831	614,678
Mains expenses - Capital Labor Contra 8560-01002	(5,300)	(4,958)	-	(3,297)	(13,556)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Contra 8700-01002	(26,328)	(13,480)	(16,914)	(8,542)	(65,261)
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Contra 9200-01002	(167,334)	(108,492)	(100,069)	(79,907)	(452,901)
Mains expenses - O&M Project Labor and Contra 8560-01008	0	236	118	-	353
Customer accounts-Operation su - Expense Labor Accrual 9010-01008	(22,805)	(7,075)	-	-	(29,880)
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Expense Labor Accrual 9030-01008	(57,828)	8,485	24,324	17,809	(7,010)
A&G-Administrative & general s - Expense Labor Accrual 9200-01008	(1,099,954)	156,477	447,321	171,460	(324,697)
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8560-01008	0	(71)	71	0	-
A&G-Administrative & general s - PTO Accrual 9200-01010	0	0	152,106	-	152,106
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Transfer In 9200-01011	137,956	90,670	67,444	67,852	363,722
Mains expenses - Capital Labor Transfer In 8560-01011	5,300	4,958	-	3,297	13,556
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Transfer In 8700-01011	26,326	13,480	16,914	8,542	65,261
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Transfer Out 9200-01012	(205,122)	(123,561)	(105,340)	(91,577)	(525,600)
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Transfer Out 8560-01014	0	(236)	(118)	-	(353)
Labor	3,557,930	3,338,602	3,789,710	3,406,307	14,092,450
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Load 9260-01202	263,287	245,421	266,295	252,067	1,029,069
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Load 9260-01203	138,759	129,344	141,399	132,846	542,347
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Variance 9260-01206	(43,816)	(18,403)	(70,006)	(3,167)	(136,393)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Variance 9260-01207	(5,916)	6,403	(21,692)	3,596	(17,609)
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Variance 9250-01208	2,004	1,622	(898)	121,946	124,674
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Load 9250-01221	30,601	29,145	32,066	29,841	121,653
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Load 9260-01251	626,196	583,704	638,106	599,510	2,447,517
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Variance 9260-01252	(131,359)	6,806	63,709	167,040	106,297
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Load 9260-01257	124,528	116,078	126,896	119,221	486,722
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Variance 9260-01258	3,361	1,277	(2,492)	77,024	79,171
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Load 9260-01260	3,558	3,317	3,626	3,408	13,906
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Variance 9260-01261	(6,182)	(5,729)	(6,513)	44,621	26,197
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Load 9260-01263	26,463	26,532	29,005	27,250	111,251
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Variance 9260-01264	28,497	6,041	706	(22,474)	12,771
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Load 9260-01266	17,790	16,582	18,128	17,032	69,532
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Variance 9260-01267	2,741	4,338	658	(15,183)	(7,446)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Load 9260-01269	28,463	26,532	29,005	27,250	111,251
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Variance 9260-01270	(1,363)	1,163	(4,597)	(36,261)	(41,059)
Benefits	1,109,613	1,179,274	1,245,400	1,545,565	5,079,851
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Service Awards 9260-07421	6,382	24,117	8,720	1,223	40,442
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Uniforms 9210-07443	0	0	119	150	269
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Education Assistance Program 9260-07447	11,451	9,950	58,065	22,549	100,014
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Variable Pay & Mgmt Incentive Plans 9260-07452	245,825	389,459	1,007,000	1,309,000	2,951,284
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Exec Compensation-Other 9260-07453	87	-	76	27	130
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - VPP & MIP - Capital Credit 9260-07454	453,175	(453,175)	0	0	-
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Restricted Stock - Long Term Incenti 9260-07458	254,558	289,070	296,706	291,376	1,133,710
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Long Term Incentive Plan - Time 9260-07460	68,275	178,039	105,875	105,875	457,864
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Management Incentive Plan 9260-07463	10,998	317,314	22,865	11,912	363,089
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Rabbi Trust Gain/Loss 9260-07486	(62,072)	(63)	(2,433,235)	(573,201)	(3,068,570)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - COLI CSV & Premiums 9260-07487	(32,942)	(32,942)	(32,942)	(32,942)	(131,768)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - COLI Loan Interest 9260-07488	81,390	88,029	88,029	88,029	345,478
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - NQ Retirement Cost 9260-07489	697,811	717,218	696,408	701,652	2,813,087
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Employee Broadcast and Publication 9210-07495	21,680	76,934	23,608	12,781	135,002
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9030-07499	0	0	64	-	64
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9210-07499	14,883	7,762	13,851	1,905	38,401
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9260-07499	0	163	-	3,115	3,278
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9302-07499	0	0	273	-	273
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8700-07499	0	0	150	-	150
Employee Welfare	1,771,440	1,611,874	(144,571)	1,943,251	5,181,994
A&G-Property insurance - Blueflame Property Insurance 9240-04069	13,537	13,537	13,537	13,537	54,148
A&G-Injuries & damages - Insurance-Other 9250-04070	6,521	6,521	6,521	6,609	26,173
A&G-Injuries & damages - Insurance - D&O 9250-07119	144,283	144,283	144,283	144,283	577,051
A&G-Injuries & damages - Insurance - Public Liability 9250-07121	1,470,769	1,475,464	1,475,464	1,475,464	5,897,220
Insurance	1,635,090	1,639,805	1,639,805	1,639,893	6,554,592
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Building Lease/Rents 9210-04581	2,175	2,175	2,175	2,175	8,899
A&G-Rents - Building Lease/Rents 9310-04581	354,439	354,525	354,506	348,097	1,411,567
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Building Maintenance 9210-04582	45,281	13,170	23,087	6,879	88,216
A&G-Rents - Building Maintenance 9310-04582	41,434	42,418	25,873	28,042	137,766
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Building Maintenance 9320-04582	1,855	2,183	2,500	1,715	8,253
A&G-Rents - Utilities 9310-04590	19,031	10,426	17,255	17,771	64,483
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Utilities 9210-04590	4,155	4,108	3,888	3,945	16,195

Atmos Energy Corporation

Operation & Maintenance Expenses

Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	468,369	429,004	429,382	408,423	1,735,179
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Lease Payments 8740-03002	4,632	4,067	5,003	4,164	17,865
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Expense 8740-03004	8,919	4,688	5,947	10,349	29,913
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vehicle Expense 9210-03004	101	795	273	-	1,169
Mains and Services Expenses - Equipment Lease 8740-04301	24	24	24	24	96
Vehicles & Equip	13,676	9,583	11,247	14,537	49,043
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Inventory Materials 9210-02001	23,098	16,293	6,759	6,179	52,337
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Non-Inventory Supplies 9030-02005	0	106	-	28	134
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Non-Inventory Supplies 9210-02005	6,200	5,317	38,950	3,623	54,090
Miscellaneous general expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 9302-02005	29	-	-	378	404
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Purchasing Card Charges 9210-02006	(2,159)	-	-	-	(2,159)
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Office Supplies 9030-05010	0	53	-	-	53
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Office Supplies 9210-05010	34,653	36,577	30,887	31,247	133,364
A&G-Rents - Office Supplies 9310-05010	0	23	-	46	69
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Office Supplies 9320-05010	0	0	254	-	254
Materials & Supplies	61,816	58,370	76,859	41,501	238,546
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Offsite Storage 9320-04065	16,379	-	34,382	16,018	66,779
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Offsite Storage 9210-04065	4,221	4,443	4,240	4,234	17,138
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Software Maintenance 9320-04201	4,983	758	713	10,817	17,271
A&G-Rents - Software Maintenance 9310-04201	1,918	1,918	1,920	1,925	7,682
Miscellaneous general expenses - Software Maintenance 9302-04201	0	30,443	54,315	9,049	93,806
A&G-Outside services employed - Software Maintenance 9230-04201	0	105,121	-	-	105,121
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Software Maintenance 9210-04201	1,065,485	923,685	938,726	900,467	3,858,364
A&G-Office supplies & expense - IT Equipment 9210-04212	78,355	128,703	102,204	104,492	413,754
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - IT Equipment 9320-04212	1,208	-	547	866	2,618
Information Technologies	1,202,547	1,195,072	1,137,047	1,047,869	4,582,534
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Monthly Lines and service 9210-05310	12,073	10,459	7,858	16,180	48,370
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Long Distance 9210-05312	6,896	(6,838)	(2,779)	(2,631)	(5,151)
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Toll Free Long Distance 9210-05314	1,033	1,063	1,038	1,004	4,138
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Telecom Maintenance & Repair 9210-05316	20,391	30,766	11,604	(1,478)	81,282
A&G-Office supplies & expense - WAN/LAN/Internet Service 9210-05331	39,808	41,645	45,318	40,370	167,141
Distribution-Operation supervi - WAN/LAN/Internet Service 8700-05331	158	-	341	173	682
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cellular, radio, pager charges 9210-05364	22,161	23,169	21,017	18,455	84,803
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cell service for data uses 9210-05376	2,754	2,554	2,496	2,328	10,133
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cell phone equipment and accessories 9210-05377	3,855	8,665	2,612	4,964	20,095
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Audio Conference 9210-05390	2,468	(282)	1,082	1,009	4,277
Telecom	111,606	111,402	90,388	82,374	395,770
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Promo Other, Misc 9030-04021	0	0	84	-	84
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Promo Other, Misc 9210-04021	0	0	8,345	279	8,623
Miscellaneous general expenses - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9302-04040	0	0	0	1,895	1,895
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9120-04040	0	0	0	2,500	2,500
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9210-04040	4,080	1,183	3,332	1,326	9,921
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Advertising 9210-04044	158	300	14,086	4,812	19,157
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Customer Relations & Assist 9210-04046	2,160	782	2,777	6,249	11,968
Marketing	6,398	2,265	28,624	16,861	54,147
Miscellaneous general expenses - Director's Fees 9302-04111	285,592	-	-	235,516	521,109
Miscellaneous general expenses - Board Meeting Expenses 9302-04112	1,169	59	-	-	1,247
Miscellaneous general expenses - Directors Retirement Expenses 9302-04113	0	0	135,852	-	135,852
Miscellaneous general expenses - Newswire/Blast Fax/Mail List 9302-04120	275	2,635	-	284	3,195
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Newswire/Blast Fax/Mail List 9210-04120	312	-	-	-	312
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Annual Report Design, Printing & Dis 9210-04122	3,383	-	88,589	196,770	288,741
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Proxy Solicitation Exp 9210-04125	0	0	2,000	120	2,120
Miscellaneous general expenses - Proxy Solicitation Exp 9302-04125	9,432	-	116,034	203,703	329,169
Miscellaneous general expenses - Transfer Agent Administration 9302-04126	6,706	-	18,315	14,643	39,663
Miscellaneous general expenses - Tr & Reg of Bonds/Debt Fee 9302-04127	11,000	40,859	100,140	195,000	346,999
Miscellaneous general expenses - NYSE Fees & Exps 9302-04129	68	138	68	68	342
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Analyst Activities 9210-04140	0	23	-	-	23
Miscellaneous general expenses - Analyst Activities 9302-04140	3,543	-	4,159	9,076	18,779
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Web Site 9210-04141	1,919	-	16,160	959	19,038
Miscellaneous general expenses - Web Site 9302-04141	677	677	677	-	2,030
Miscellaneous general expenses - Printing/Slides/Graphics 9302-04145	1,364	3,485	40,677	-	45,527
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Public Relations 9210-04146	2,578	465	2,142	157	5,342
Directors & Shareholders & PR	328,037	46,342	524,812	866,297	1,787,488
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Membership Fees 9210-05415	2,371	10,402	46,693	38,639	98,105
Miscellaneous general expenses - Membership Fees 9302-05415	727	-	690	795	2,212
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Club Dues - Nondeductible 9210-05416	110	20	-	-	130
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Association Dues 9210-07510	0	0	30,575	-	30,575
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	3,480	-	6,900	3,450	13,800
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Donations 9210-07520	0	2,250	-	250	2,500

Atmos Energy Corporation

Operation & Maintenance Expenses

Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 002)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Dues & Donations	6,658	12,672	84,858	43,134	147,322
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	10,088	16,361	15,040	7,445	48,935
Miscellaneous general expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 9302-05111	180	149	47	51	427
Print & Postages	10,269	16,510	15,087	7,496	49,362
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	620	1,515	794	1,766	4,895
A&G-Administrative & general s - Meals and Entertainment 9200-05411	0	110	-	-	110
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	43,403	79,514	35,913	52,870	211,700
Miscellaneous general expenses - Meals and Entertainment 9302-05411	153	213	296	224	887
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9210-05412	1,319	772	783	2,832	5,805
A&G-Administrative & general s - Transportation 9200-05413	0	842	-	-	842
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	22,135	37,499	25,725	25,980	111,339
Miscellaneous general expenses - Transportation 9302-05413	1,926	2,213	1,509	87	5,736
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	1,744	588	412	1,249	3,991
A&G-Administrative & general s - Lodging 9200-05414	0	675	-	-	675
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	24,368	32,916	16,455	13,269	87,009
Miscellaneous general expenses - Lodging 9302-05414	452	830	274	-	1,556
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	965	898	-	339	2,202
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc Employee Expense 9210-05419	32,522	47,629	(31,007)	4,295	53,438
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	0	0	166	-	166
Travel & Entertainment	129,608	206,211	51,320	102,711	489,850
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Employee Development 9030-05420	0	0	70	3,912	3,982
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Employee Development 9210-05420	13,268	21,102	52,287	(1,607)	85,050
A&G-Outside services employed - Employee Development 9230-05420	0	0	0	21,000	21,000
Miscellaneous general expenses - Employee Development 9302-05420	2,160	55	30	-	2,245
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Training 9210-05421	15,250	22,835	26,582	10,139	74,806
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Books & Manuals 9210-05424	16,744	8,279	19,402	15,708	59,133
Miscellaneous general expenses - Books & Manuals 9302-05424	428	-	2,735	191	3,354
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Safety Training 9210-05426	16,918	41,800	14,350	93,217	166,285
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Technical (Job Skills) Training 9210-05427	600	-	14,959	24,480	40,039
A&G-Outside services employed - Technical (Job Skills) Training 9230-05427	0	0	0	5,188	5,188
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Computer Skills & Systems Training 9210-05428	3,600	-	15,000	1,238	19,838
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Work Environment Training 9210-05429	0	0	235	-	235
Training	68,968	94,071	144,650	173,464	481,154
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Settlement 9210-05418	0	575	-	-	575
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-08111	188,688	85,875	64,211	213,704	562,478
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-08111	686,214	637,726	462,477	488,503	2,274,919
Miscellaneous general expenses - Contract Labor 9302-06111	54,875	40,584	25,739	11,104	132,298
A&G-Rents - Contract Labor 9310-06111	7,290	6,183	5,257	6,825	25,555
Miscellaneous general expenses - Legal 9302-06121	5,438	-	-	-	5,438
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-08121	24,100	25,178	27,486	57,383	134,146
Outside Services	956,604	796,121	605,166	777,519	3,135,411
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04863	(4,468,359)	(4,428,375)	(4,368,478)	(3,131,812)	(16,397,023)
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Misc General Expense 9030-07590	0	0	226	-	226
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	1,283	6,740	1,890	(876)	9,016
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	0	64	1,493	-	1,557
Miscellaneous	(4,467,096)	(4,421,571)	(4,364,869)	(3,132,688)	(16,386,224)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	6,971,533	6,327,506	5,364,915	8,974,514	27,638,468
Div 2 gross expenses	6,971,533	6,327,506	5,364,915	8,974,514	27,638,468
Div 12 gross expenses	4,409,855	4,403,959	4,811,827	4,636,147	18,261,788
SSU Capital Credits	4,468,359	4,428,375	4,368,478	3,131,812	16,397,023
pre-capitalization totals	15,849,747	15,159,840	14,545,220	16,742,472	62,287,279
effective average cap rate	28.19%	29.21%	30.03%	18.71%	28.32%

	Total SSU			
	Base	Test	Difference	
Labor	4,000,050	4,213,831	213,781	5.34%
Benefits	1,458,383	1,528,659	70,276	4.82%
Employee Welfare	1,894,915	1,698,936	(195,979)	-10.34%
Insurance	1,040,013	1,076,439	36,426	3.50%
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	437,291	431,037	(6,253)	-1.43%
Vehicles & Equip	8,133	9,228	1,095	13.46%
Materials & Supplies	50,143	56,580	6,437	12.84%
Information Technologies	877,722	863,784	(13,938)	-1.59%
Telecom	170,627	150,224	(20,403)	-11.96%
Marketing	18,242	15,187	(3,055)	-16.75%
Directors & Shareholders & PR	264,517	295,264	30,747	11.62%
Dues & Donations	29,169	29,477	309	1.06%
Print & Postages	12,790	14,973	2,183	17.07%
Travel & Entertainment	152,621	154,903	2,282	1.50%
Training	81,384	73,742	(7,642)	-9.39%
Outside Services	688,387	656,921	(31,476)	-4.57%
Provision for Bad Debt	-	-	-	
Miscellaneous	(3,612,045)	(3,313,964)	298,081	-8.25%
Total O&M Expenses	7,572,350	7,955,221	382,870	5.06%

Variance Explanation

	Div 002			
	Base	Test	Difference	
Labor	2,114,745	2,270,683	155,938	7.37%
Benefits	784,290	830,465	46,174	5.89%
Employee Welfare	1,848,788	1,662,640	(186,148)	-10.07%
Insurance	1,036,413	1,076,439	40,026	3.86%
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	292,543	293,466	923	0.32%
Vehicles & Equip	6,806	7,816	1,010	14.85%
Materials & Supplies	45,578	52,134	6,556	14.38%
Information Technologies	763,052	861,711	98,660	12.93%
Telecom	103,957	134,578	30,621	29.46%
Marketing	18,108	14,952	(3,156)	-17.43%
Directors & Shareholders & PR	249,439	279,829	30,390	12.18%
Dues & Donations	28,584	28,973	379	1.32%
Print & Postages	11,482	13,483	2,002	17.43%
Travel & Entertainment	107,059	119,951	12,892	12.04%
Training	74,288	64,908	(9,381)	-12.63%
Outside Services	540,760	575,481	34,722	6.42%
Provision for Bad Debt	-	-	-	
Miscellaneous	(3,612,859)	(3,314,643)	298,216	-8.25%
Total O&M Expenses	4,413,042	4,972,866	559,823	12.69%

Primary drivers include budgeted merit increase and longer than normal vacancies in base period

Primary drivers include budgeted merit increase and longer than normal vacancies in base period

Test year based on FY 2016 budget where assumption of normal (100% of target) incentive payout is anticipated. Incentive compensation is removed from revenue requirement as a ratemaking adjustment.

3.86% Higher budgeted premiums in test period

0.32% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

14.85% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

14.38% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

These costs are budgeted in division 002 and recorded to both 002 and 012. The variance for SSU in total is negative.

These costs are budgeted in division 002 and recorded to both 002 and 012. The variance for SSU in total is negative.

-17.43% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

12.18% Base period is lower than normal due to timing of bank service charges

1.32% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

17.43% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

Amount necessary to adjust base period to expected level of expense budgeted for test period. Variance for SSU in total is immaterial.

-12.63% Base period higher than normal due to security training for enterprise

Amount necessary to adjust base period to expected level of expense budgeted for test period. The variance for SSU in total is negative.

-8.25% Higher capitalization rate in base period

	Div 012			
	Base	Test	Difference	
Labor	1,885,305	1,943,148	57,843	3.07%
Benefits	674,093	698,194	24,101	3.58%
Employee Welfare	46,127	36,296	(9,831)	-21.31%
Insurance	3,600	-	(3,600)	-100.00%
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	144,747	137,571	(7,176)	-4.96%
Vehicles & Equip	1,327	1,411	84	6.36%
Materials & Supplies	4,566	4,447	(119)	-2.61%
Information Technologies	114,670	2,072	(112,598)	-98.19%
Telecom	66,670	15,646	(51,024)	-76.53%
Marketing	134	236	102	75.68%
Directors & Shareholders & PR	15,078	15,435	357	2.37%
Dues & Donations	575	505	(70)	-12.17%
Print & Postages	1,308	1,490	181	13.87%
Travel & Entertainment	45,561	34,951	(10,610)	-23.29%
Training	7,095	8,834	1,739	24.51%
Outside Services	147,637	81,440	(66,198)	-44.84%
Provision for Bad Debt	-	-	-	
Miscellaneous	814	679	(135)	-16.62%
Total O&M Expenses	3,159,308	2,982,355	(176,953)	-5.60%

3.07% Primary driver is budgeted merit increase

3.58% Primary driver is budgeted merit increase

Test year based on FY 2016 budget where assumption of normal (100% of target) incentive payout is anticipated. Incentive compensation is removed from revenue requirement as a ratemaking adjustment.

-100.00% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

-4.96% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

6.36% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

-2.61% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

These costs are budgeted in division 002 and recorded to both 002 and 012. The variance for SSU in total is negative.

These costs are budgeted in division 002 and recorded to both 002 and 012. The variance for SSU in total is negative.

75.68% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

2.37% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

-12.17% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

13.87% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

Expect normal travel activity to call centers in test year. Base period was higher than normal.

24.51% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

Lower contract labor activity and collection fees related to credit card processing fees expected in test period

-44.84%

-16.62% Change between base and test period is immaterial.

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-06
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att30- O&M for KY- Fall 2015 case_updated" provided in response to Staff 1-59 and the tab entitled "Div 12 forecast."

- a. Please provide the actual data in the same level of detail and in the same format for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available in spreadsheet with cells and formulae intact.
- b. provide a variance analysis for each category of expense (labor, benefits, employee welfare, etc.) that identifies and describes all reasons for the change projected in the test year compared to the base year. In addition, provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the change projected in the test year compared to the base year.

RESPONSE:

- a) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.
- b) Please see the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-05 subpart (b).

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-06_Att1 - Div 012 O&M Oct11-Jan16.xlsx, 10 Pages.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 012)

	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Total Fiscal 2013
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Cell phone equipment and accessories 9030-05377	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	43
Telecom	90,816	88,353	65,010	165,058	89,552	121,935	103,495	105,443	123,178	92,922	111,222	131,275	1,288,287
Customer service-Operating inf - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9090-04040	0	0	0	0	0	3,220	(3,220)	0	0	0	0	0	-
Marketing	0	0	0	0	0	3,220	(3,220)	0	0	0	0	0	-
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bank Service Charge 9030-04130	57,261	7,104	-	81,219	-	4,015	45,780	6,740	13,213	49,613	6,752	6,419	258,118
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Bank Service Charge 9210-04130	531	541	541	569	541	541	805	541	541	541	541	541	6,578
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Public Relations 9210-04145	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Directors & Shareholders & PR	63,792	7,645	541	81,788	541	4,556	46,386	7,281	13,754	50,154	7,294	6,960	270,594
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Membership Fees 9210-05415	50	50	430	215	140	50	1,124	410	50	50	299	5,166	6,034
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Club Dues - Deductible 9210-05417	0	0	0	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Association Dues 9210-07510	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	655	-	-	50	230	935
Dues & Donations	50	50	430	415	140	50	1,124	1,085	50	50	349	5,396	9,169
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	0	0	0	11	-	-	-	-	292	40	679	-	1,022
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	1,505	1,778	1,107	2,508	1,875	2,393	2,626	2,293	1,980	2,082	2,180	3,828	28,477
Print & Postages	1,505	1,778	1,107	2,520	1,875	2,393	2,606	2,293	2,251	2,102	2,839	3,828	27,499
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	489	164	91	744
Distribution-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8800-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	-	-	35
Customer accounts-Operation su - Meals and Entertainment 9010-05411	0	0	120	-	-	280	(280)	-	-	-	-	-	8,372
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Meals and Entertainment 9020-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	-	-	67
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	0	0	14	55	7	311	88	121	-	-	-	-	8,758
Customer accounts-Miscellaneous - Meals and Entertainment 9050-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	46	-	-	46
Customer service-Supervision - Meals and Entertainment 9070-05411	0	0	0	320	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	320
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	12,316	8,131	9,280	18,238	35,432	35,919	22,057	64,512	20,933	14,411	35,280	26,814	303,303
A&G-Outside services employed - Meals and Entertainment 9230-05411	0	402	191	370	280	309	384	928	343	-	-	-	3,208
A&G-Rents - Meals and Entertainment 9310-05411	31	30	-	83	48	31	65	135	87	118	51	-	890
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9210-05412	0	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,623	1,004	491	-	9,973
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	12,355	14,480	17,518	24,735	30,310	17,001	13,271	15,703	23,309	17,782	31,746	34,756	252,969
A&G-Outside services employed - Transportation 9230-05413	0	3,231	1,272	3,116	1,716	1,781	2,203	5,179	2,224	-	-	-	20,721
Customer accounts-Operation su - Transportation 9010-05413	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,466
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Transportation 9020-05413	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	380	-	380
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	150	-	-	-	-	899	1,375	173	424	-	-	-	3,116
Customer accounts-Miscellaneous - Transportation 9050-05413	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	929	-	929
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	6,202	9,298	10,680	38,872	43,775	10,001	6,461	18,554	17,729	1,019	18,012	24,331	205,734
A&G-Outside services employed - Lodging 9230-05414	0	2,111	729	1,707	1,447	776	1,370	2,022	2,717	-	-	-	12,880
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	534	-	800
Customer accounts-Operation su - Lodging 9010-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Lodging 9020-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	158	-	158
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	0	0	0	0	0	1,273	1,229	224	345	-	-	-	2,499
Customer accounts-Miscellaneous - Lodging 9050-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	281	-	281
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc Employee Expense 9210-05419	20	8	10,024	757	9,318	662	279	-	-	3,550	7,410	1,020	33,047
Travel & Entertainment	31,073	37,701	48,808	88,060	122,333	69,242	48,502	107,851	71,615	38,373	96,524	121,981	882,834
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Employee Development 9210-05420	11,369	89	-	45	9,032	-	1,566	500	3,750	11,924	18,180	12,778	67,212
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Training 9210-05421	0	0	0	0	3,375	-	-	-	20	-	5,020	50	8,466
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Books & Manuals 9210-05424	0	48	-	-	16	185	11	-	-	-	110	-	348
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Technical (Job Skills) Training 9210-05427	0	0	0	0	0	2,121	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,121
Training	11,369	137	-	45	12,422	2,285	1,577	500	3,770	11,924	21,290	12,828	78,147
A&G-Injuries & damages - Settlement 9250-05419	0	0	0	295	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	295
A&G-Administrative & general s - Contract Labor 9200-06111	0	2,040	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86,072	88,112
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	232,935	352,585	459,850	417,856	375,272	297,339	281,038	239,762	227,850	199,811	814,638	805,011	4,302,557
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	43,141	38,462	35,979	58,446	57,282	65,603	62,854	80,720	21,673	3,050	742	27,961	495,911
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11,270	11,270
Outside Services	276,076	393,087	494,829	476,397	432,554	362,941	343,892	320,481	249,333	202,861	615,380	710,314	4,878,145
Customer accounts-Operation su - Misc General Expense 9010-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,209	1,209
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	1,251	609	242	604	987	412	351	3,208	1,941	588	3,007	1,507	14,989
Miscellaneous general expenses - Vendor Comp Sales Tax 9302-07592	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	-	-	75
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Use only for HR exp default ***Forms 9210-09195	0	0	1,801	-	-	-	(1,991)	0	0	0	0	0	-
Miscellaneous	1,251	609	2,143	604	987	412	(1,550)	3,208	1,941	643	3,007	2,717	15,973
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	3,486,417	3,453,213	4,282,027	4,353,660	3,846,497	3,915,171	4,221,288	4,856,778	3,820,938	4,107,340	4,487,310	4,532,226	49,162,846

Atmos Energy Corporation

Operation & Maintenance Expenses

Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 012)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Customer accounts-Operation su - Non-project Labor 9010-01000	577,568	393,357	396,525	396,931	1,744,381
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Non-project Labor 9030-01000	2,483,363	1,665,433	1,693,056	1,712,139	7,553,991
A&G-Administrative & general s - Non-project Labor 9200-01000	474,815	326,990	336,518	333,682	1,472,006
Distribution-Operation supervi - Non-project Labor 8700-01000	0	267	30	-	297
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor 9200-01001	51,069	21,643	15,813	17,661	106,386
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Contra 9200-01002	(119,086)	(54,372)	(50,719)	(39,781)	(257,961)
Customer accounts-Operation su - Expense Labor Accrual 9010-01008	(202,077)	21,749	55,929	19,529	(104,878)
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Expense Labor Accrual 9030-01008	(650,284)	65,736	262,245	94,194	(208,069)
A&G-Administrative & general s - Expense Labor Accrual 9200-01008	(121,222)	18,961	53,336	15,408	(35,517)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Accrual 8700-01008	0	80	(67)	(14)	-
A&G-Administrative & general s - PTO Accrual 9200-01010	0	0	(8,036)	-	(8,036)
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Transfer In 9200-01011	74,005	37,679	37,095	26,275	175,053
A&G-Administrative & general s - Capital Labor Transfer Out 9200-01012	(11,985)	(4,948)	(2,189)	(4,355)	(23,478)
Labor	2,562,182	2,512,571	2,779,537	2,561,871	10,416,160
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Load 9260-01202	189,601	185,930	206,280	189,578	771,391
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Load 9260-01203	99,925	97,990	108,715	89,913	406,544
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Load 9260-01251	450,944	442,212	490,613	450,899	1,834,659
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Load 9260-01257	88,676	87,940	97,565	89,685	364,847
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Load 9260-01260	2,562	2,513	2,788	2,582	10,424
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Load 9260-01263	20,497	20,101	22,301	20,495	83,394
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Load 9260-01266	12,811	12,563	13,938	12,809	52,121
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Load 9260-01269	20,497	20,101	22,301	20,495	83,394
Benefits	886,515	869,360	964,500	886,407	3,606,772
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Service Awards 9260-07421	10,513	4,472	9,781	2,052	26,819
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Restricted Stock - Long Term Incenti 9260-07458	10,829	10,479	10,828	10,828	42,965
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Long Term Incentive Plan - Time 9260-07460	9,113	8,819	9,113	9,113	36,156
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Management Incentive Plan 9260-07463	1,254	21,473	(9,977)	976	13,726
A&G-Office supplies & expense - SERP Capitalized 9210-07490	0	34	-	-	34
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Employee Broadcast and Publication 9210-07495	71	-	-	-	71
Customer accounts-Operation su - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9010-07499	547	291	1,703	1,078	3,619
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9030-07499	1,298	55	1,361	24	2,738
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9210-07499	9,773	11,978	14,937	3,353	40,042
Employee Welfare	43,397	57,602	37,747	27,425	166,172
A&G-Property insurance - Blueflame Property Insurance 9240-04069	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472	41,886
Insurance	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472	41,886
A&G-Rents - Building Lease/Rents 9310-04581	152,485	152,485	152,485	152,485	609,942
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Building Maintenance 9210-04582	56,435	37,914	56,868	56,253	207,470
A&G-Rents - Building Maintenance 9310-04582	0	487	-	-	487
A&G-Rents - Utilities 9310-04590	930	698	658	606	2,892
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Utilities 9030-04590	9,916	8,174	7,323	7,295	32,709
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Utilities 9210-04590	9,548	11,584	6,303	14,957	42,392
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	229,315	211,343	223,638	231,596	856,892
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Lease Payments 8740-03002	1,300	1,298	1,299	1,777	5,673
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Expense 8740-03004	654	244	508	379	1,785
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vehicle Expense 9210-03004	26	-	-	45	71
Vehicles & Equip	1,980	1,543	1,806	2,201	7,530
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Non-Inventory Supplies 9210-02005	271	281	339	605	1,497
Customer accounts-Operation su - Office Supplies 9010-05010	229	478	691	196	1,594
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Office Supplies 9030-05010	0	110	711	333	1,154
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Office Supplies 9210-05010	7,700	7,158	5,844	3,786	24,497
Distribution-Operation supervi - Office Supplies 8700-05010	0	0	36	-	36
Materials & Supplies	8,200	8,028	7,623	4,930	28,780
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - Software Maintenance 9320-04201	771	72	-	232	1,075
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Software Maintenance 9210-04201	335,954	303,699	323,162	320,700	1,283,515
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Software Maintenance 9030-04201	256	-	-	-	256
Customer accounts-Operation su - Software Maintenance 9010-04201	192	-	-	-	192
Customer accounts-Operation su - IT Equipment 9010-04212	0	18	-	-	16
A&G-Office supplies & expense - IT Equipment 9210-04212	2,035	4,174	-	-	6,210
A&G-Maintenance of general pla - IT Equipment 9320-04212	258	-	-	-	258
Information Technologies	339,466	307,962	323,162	320,932	1,291,521
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Monthly Lines and service 9210-05310	46,223	44,902	43,079	32,787	166,990
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Long Distance 9030-05312	0	9	-	-	9
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Long Distance 9210-05312	2,031	2,206	2,163	2,138	8,539
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Toll Free Long Distance 9210-05314	5,838	7,490	6,113	7,627	27,067
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Telecom Maintenance & Repair 9210-05316	(10,349)	37,025	66,166	5,080	97,920
A&G-Office supplies & expense - WAN/LAN/Internet Service 9210-05331	46,184	20,281	74,394	47,014	187,853

Atmos Energy Corporation

Operation & Maintenance Expenses

Atmos Regulated Shared Services (Div 012)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cellular, radio, pager charges 9210-05364	9,102	9,029	8,383	7,827	34,342
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cell service for data uses 9210-05376	281	281	234	246	1,042
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Cell phone equipment and accessories 9210-05377	1,082	1,733	536	514	3,885
Customer accounts-Operation su - Cell phone equipment and accessories 9010-05377	35	-	-	-	35
Telecom	100,405	122,955	201,067	103,233	527,661
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9210-04040	225	-	-	-	225
Marketing	225	-	-	-	225
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bank Service Charge 9030-04130	48,500	7,279	4,911	43,821	102,511
Directors & Shareholders &PR	48,500	7,279	4,911	43,821	102,511
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Membership Fees 9210-05415	235	-	-	-	235
Dues & Donations	235	-	-	-	235
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Postage/Delivery Services 9030-05111	0	13	-	-	13
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	2,040	1,722	1,919	2,316	7,987
Print & Postages	2,040	1,735	1,919	2,316	8,010
Customer accounts-Operation su - Meals and Entertainment 9010-05411	10,213	6,669	19,125	3,976	39,983
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	6,471	5,355	8,191	1,651	20,668
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	3,137	13,773	8,455	2,303	27,687
Customer accounts-Operation su - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9010-05412	(1,592)	0	4,422	10	2,840
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9030-05412	0	0	295	30	324
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9210-05412	0	1,460	5,221	-	6,681
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	6,331	13,353	6,766	8,989	35,439
Customer accounts-Operation su - Transportation 9010-05413	14,740	9,467	5,561	7,936	37,704
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	2,219	2,775	2,038	6,483	13,514
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	4,552	9,481	3,732	3,472	21,238
Customer accounts-Operation su - Lodging 9010-05414	4,710	10,200	2,079	2,437	19,426
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	3,547	12,713	511	1,442	18,213
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc Employee Expense 9210-05419	0	1,605	26	792	2,424
Customer accounts-Operation su - Misc Employee Expense 9010-05419	144	70	-	-	214
Travel & Entertainment	54,472	87,922	64,421	39,520	246,334
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Employee Development 9030-05420	199	-	-	1,197	1,396
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Employee Development 9210-05420	1,480	1,350	295	17,910	21,015
Customer accounts-Operation su - Training 9010-05421	13	-	-	-	13
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Training 9210-05421	5,845	-	1,085	-	6,930
Customer accounts-Operation su - Books & Manuals 9010-05424	0	0	72	-	72
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Books & Manuals 9210-05424	39	-	438	195	672
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Technical (Job Skills) Training 9210-05427	0	0	2,415	159	2,575
Training	7,566	1,350	4,305	19,461	32,672
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Contract Labor 9030-06111	0	0	237	-	237
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	99,855	188,498	167,570	195,686	651,609
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	16,921	15,053	18,282	54,913	105,169
Customer accounts-Operation su - Collection Fees 9010-06112	0	0	100	-	100
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Bill Print Fees 9210-06116	0	0	0	42,592	42,592
Outside Services	116,776	203,552	186,188	293,191	799,707
Customer accounts-Operation su - Misc General Expense 9010-07590	(68)	-	21	-	(48)
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	192	297	508	409	1,407
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	0	0	0	88,382	88,382
Miscellaneous	123	297	529	88,771	89,721
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	4,409,855	4,403,959	4,811,827	4,636,147	18,261,788

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-07
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att30- O&M for KY- Fall 2015 case_ updated" provided in response to Staff 1-59 and the tab entitled "Div 9 forecast."

- a. Please provide the actual data in the same level of detail and in the same format for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available in electronic format with all formulas intact
- b. Please provide a variance analysis for each category of expense (labor, benefits, employee welfare, etc.) that identifies and describes all reasons for the change projected in the test year compared to the base year. In addition, provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the change projected in the test year compared to the base year.

RESPONSE:

- a) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.
- b) Please see Attachment 2.

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-07_Att1 - Div 009 O&M Oct11-Jan16.xlsx, 29 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-07_Att2 - Div 009 Variance.xlsx, 1 Page.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Total Fiscal 2012
Compressor station expenses - Contract Labor 8180-08111	0	0	0	330	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	236	666
Storage-Measuring and regulati - Contract Labor 8200-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	183	-	-	183
Maintenance of compressor stat - Contract Labor 8340-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	-	-	-	60
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8560-08111	37,000	-	1,598	3,198	-	1,598	1,598	10,984	-	1,598	1,598	1,598	60,770
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Contract Labor 8570-06111	0	0	1,598	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,493	90	1,583
Transmission-Maintenance of rna - Contract Labor 8630-08111	0	0	1,136	-	-	-	-	-	1,598	-	-	-	3,198
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	1,420	1,953	1,136	-	450	-	-	1,829	-	802	-	-	7,583
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-08111	60,120	36,385	29,855	25,894	24,859	27,180	27,280	43,980	31,244	37,156	44,483	58,308	446,438
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Contract Labor 8750-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,789	-	-	-	-	1,789
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Contract Labor 8770-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,880	3,880
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	816	-	-	-	-	-	75	277	809	-	137	(27)	2,089
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-08121	161,502	101,366	(87,880)	14,473	26,954	46,212	(21,091)	22,612	40,839	27,609	19,868	23,413	374,861
Outside Services	755,936	205,331	24,153	128,551	135,130	166,144	134,515	136,185	183,543	140,053	141,216	905,787	3,056,543
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncol Acct-Write Off 9040-09927	17,685	22,514	29,321	32,050	27,613	24,393	18,066	15,378	15,226	(69,712)	15,286	63,979	211,801
Provision for Bad Debt	17,685	22,514	29,321	32,050	27,613	24,393	18,066	15,378	15,226	(69,712)	15,286	63,979	211,801
Distribution-Operation supervi - Land Rights 8700-04869	30	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	79
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Misc General Expense 9020-07590	419	-	-	1,875	113	138	85	-	2,275	-	801	967	6,872
Customer service-Operating inf - Misc General Expense 9090-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	-	-	-	-	-	42
Sales-Miscellaneous sales expe - Misc General Expense 9160-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	220	-	-	-	-	220
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc General Expense 9260-07590	0	0	42	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	92
A&G-Franchise requirements - Misc General Expense 9270-07590	9,798	251	479	21,433	493	508	35,787	-	302	12,459	1,469	-	82,951
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Misc General Expense 9280-07590	21,581	21,581	20,932	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	15,275	201,572
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9300-07590	0	0	0	0	0	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Storage-Operation supervision - Misc General Expense 8140-07590	(817)	(290)	(270)	(270)	(279)	(299)	(289)	-	(558)	(279)	(299)	(841)	(4,481)
Wells expenses - Misc General Expense 8160-07590	(1,713)	(2,691)	(298)	(298)	(318)	(398)	(341)	-	(636)	(318)	(398)	(3,670)	(11,081)
Storage well royalties - Misc General Expense 8250-07590	33	73	127	114	222	163	45	41	11	7	6	6	847
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	480	201	365	306	674	265	125	1,177	4	319	627	707	5,248
Distribution load dispatching - Misc General Expense 8710-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	(5)	0	0	0	-
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	995	39	425	87	711	984	935	2,500	513	2,159	7	895	10,230
Meter and house regulator expe - Misc General Expense 8780-07590	0	0	1,048	139	553	725	-	-	74	-	-	-	2,538
Distribution-Other expenses - Misc General Expense 8900-07590	0	219	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	219
Distribution-Rents - Misc General Expense 8810-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,457	-	-	2,457
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vendor Comp Sales Tax 9210-07592	(1,413)	(1,430)	(1,486)	(1,478)	(1,500)	(1,501)	(1,500)	-	(1,194)	(1,212)	(1,905)	(1,189)	(15,808)
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Use only for HR exp default ***Forme 9210-09195	0	37	-	(37)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	(967)	-	-	(2,220)	-	-	(3,934)	62	-	(1,245)	-	-	(8,303)
Mains and Services Expenses - Reimbursements 8740-08911	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(431)	(431)
Miscellaneous	28,425	17,989	21,360	34,925	15,944	15,990	46,211	19,276	16,122	29,617	15,574	11,719	273,152
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	1,646,299	1,159,116	929,871	1,061,821	931,898	1,029,829	984,520	1,007,899	958,231	891,623	1,002,997	1,746,269	13,380,391

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Total Fiscal 2014
Distribution-Maint of mains - Contract Labor 8870-06111	586	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	586
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Contract Labor 9020-06111	92,630	63,581	77,352	86,594	66,001	108,135	81,349	109,840	94,623	74,195	69,756	133,874	1,078,030
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30,000	30,000
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Contract Labor 9280-06111	2,907	2,655	12,277	21,388	12,503	590	-	-	3,658	-	-	-	55,828
Production and gathering-Other - Contract Labor 7690-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,000	-	-	-	5,000
Wells expenses - Contract Labor 8160-06111	3,263	0	0	16,916	660	0	0	0	-	-	4,286	9,800	33,827
Lines expenses - Contract Labor 8170-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	315	-	-	-	315
Storage-Purification expenses - Contract Labor 8210-06111	0	0	330	0	360	990	330	0	-	282	0	0	2,322
Storage-Maintenance of structu - Contract Labor 8310-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	375	675
Maintenance of compressor stat - Contract Labor 8340-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	525	-	-	-	-	525
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8560-06111	1,598	1,598	1,598	3,758	2,042	3,748	1,598	2,798	1,598	12,398	1,598	26,129	60,483
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	0	0	0	975	2,248	150	-	701	-	-	-	-	4,074
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-06111	48,673	31,488	30,383	34,546	42,289	33,181	29,826	63,542	63,548	72,307	69,085	52,488	571,368
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Contract Labor 8750-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,100	-	4,034	-	-	12,134
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Contract Labor 8770-06111	0	0	0	0	480	-	-	4,300	-	2,800	-	-	7,580
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Legal 9280-06121	0	0	33,478	-	175,808	-	-	5,225	-	3,556	-	-	218,067
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-06121	5,000	6,792	5,689	1,085	7,785	10,062	5,000	-	15	15,071	-	-	66,597
Outside Services	154,667	166,748	177,257	164,214	333,742	161,068	119,770	201,393	178,776	191,184	176,368	278,647	2,239,633
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncol Acct-Write Off 9040-09627	19,435	24,917	31,563	37,743	83,430	66,165	20,780	94,146	120,424	18,549	17,614	544,342	1,079,108
Provision for Bad Debt	19,435	24,917	31,563	37,743	83,430	66,165	20,780	94,146	120,424	18,549	17,614	544,342	1,079,108
Distribution-Maint of mains - Misc General Expense 8870-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30,000	-	30,000
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Misc General Expense 9020-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	21	36	10	73
Customer service-Operating inf - Misc General Expense 9090-07590	0	0	133	-	-	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	165
Sales-Advertising expenses - Misc General Expense 9130-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	449	-	-	-	-	-	449
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc General Expense 9260-07590	131	97	-	-	-	-	-	6	75	-	36	-	345
A&G-Franchise requirements - Misc General Expense 9270-07590	0	0	0	0	211	-	-	120	1,482	-	-	-	1,793
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Misc General Expense 9280-07590	0	84	529	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	614
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	97	-	-	-	97
Storage-Operation supervision - Misc General Expense 8140-07590	(283)	(283)	(283)	(304)	(283)	(283)	(283)	(304)	(283)	(283)	(304)	(283)	(3,462)
Wells expenses - Misc General Expense 8160-07590	(329)	(329)	(329)	(544)	(435)	(435)	(435)	(544)	(435)	(435)	(544)	(435)	(5,230)
Storage well royalties - Misc General Expense 8250-07590	0	0	441	286	355	275	192	108	28	12	9	-	1,687
Mains expenses - Misc General Expense 8560-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	116	-	-	116
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	443	885	1,127	844	1,167	823	466	607	401	650	623	1,315	9,141
Odorization - Misc General Expense 8711-07590	0	149	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	149
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	(102)	-	927	1,983	-	-	481	2,004	2,861	261	657	52	9,124
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Misc General Expense 8750-07590	149	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	149
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Misc General Expense 8770-07590	17	-	1,473	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,490
Meter and house regulator expe - Misc General Expense 8780-07590	0	0	279	-	-	275	-	-	-	-	-	-	554
Distribution-Other expenses - Misc General Expense 8800-07590	0	0	0	0	0	125	78	-	-	-	-	-	203
Distribution-Rents - Misc General Expense 8810-07590	0	14	-	-	475	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	489
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vendor Comp Sales Tax 9210-07592	432	(50)	(50)	(51)	(50)	(50)	(35)	(36)	(50)	(43)	(50)	(50)	(32)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-08811	(1,115)	-	-	(2,754)	-	-	(5,779)	-	-	(1,742)	-	-	(11,390)
Mains and Services Expenses - Reimbursements 8740-09911	0	0	132	-	-	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	307
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Reimbursements 8940-09911	0	0	255	-	-	(221)	(603)	-	(2,108)	(1,346)	476	(16)	(3,560)
Miscellaneous	(656)	567	4,633	(750)	1,428	597	(5,469)	1,961	2,088	(2,905)	31,056	680	33,220
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	1,141,916	1,046,798	1,174,674	1,276,884	1,413,846	1,104,331	1,090,823	1,221,935	1,121,357	1,157,271	1,048,270	1,748,678	14,546,900

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-14	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Total Fiscal 2015
Distribution-Operation supervi - Operator Qualifications Training 8700-05422	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	817	49	-	-	-	866
Distribution-Operation supervi - Books & Manuals 8700-05424	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
Customer service-Operating inf - Books & Manuals 8090-05424	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	69	-	-	69
Mains and Services Expenses - Safety Training 8740-05426	0	0	29	144	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	127	300
Distribution-Operation supervi - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8700-05427	0	0	0	0	83	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83
Mains and Services Expenses - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8740-05427	0	0	0	525	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	525
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Technical (Job Skills) Training 9260-05427	0	0	0	0	0	0	880	-	-	-	-	-	880
Mains and Services Expenses - Work Environment Training 8740-05429	0	0	0	0	2,100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,100
Training	13	-	29	2,364	2,409	1,000	880	1,850	315	98	69	526	9,552
A&G-Injuries & damages - Settlement 9250-05418	98,618	-	3,322	3,340	10,717	304	114,633	4,449	-	3,888	917	58,384	298,573
Distribution-Rents - Contract Labor 8810-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	-	590	5,400	2,902	175	9,217
Distribution-Maint of mains - Contract Labor 8870-08111	5,000	2,162	12,650	-	-	-	-	-	185	3,600	-	-	23,597
Maintenance of measuring and req - Contract Labor 8910-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,800	-	-	-	5,800
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Contract Labor 8940-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,750	-	6,650	-	23,400
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Contract Labor 9020-08111	120,917	65,021	108,020	98,968	82,378	59,892	80,382	82,721	83,036	93,593	72,730	78,229	1,025,297
Sales-Supervision - Contract Labor 9110-08111	0	0	12,581	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,581
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	-	-	-	750
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-08111	(10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	-	-	-	50,000
Wells expenses - Contract Labor 8160-08111	0	0	0	18,568	-	-	13,808	-	-	-	12,704	-	51,388
Compressor station expenses - Contract Labor 8180-08111	0	21	-	360	-	-	-	546	-	-	-	-	927
Storage-Purification expenses - Contract Labor 8210-08111	0	0	0	0	0	330	-	-	-	-	14,600	-	14,930
Storage-Maintenance of structu - Contract Labor 8310-08111	300	675	-	1,300	375	600	-	750	-	300	600	-	4,900
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8660-08111	63,731	5,195	2,122	1,598	4,221	-	15,478	1,800	15,538	1,128	27,914	5,288	144,011
Transmission-Measuring and req - Contract Labor 8570-08111	0	4,200	-	-	140	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,340
Transmission-Maintenance of co - Contract Labor 8540-08111	246	103	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	350
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-08111	44,277	(21,065)	(10,570)	638	-	85	-	0	(6,980)	82	45,959	37,235	89,660
Distribution load dispatching - Contract Labor 8710-08111	70,771	56,513	28,148	62,547	56,882	48,466	80,795	90,304	100,517	81,702	75,462	114,934	857,032
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-08111	313	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	-	-	-	-	5,013
Distribution-Measuring and req - Contract Labor 8750-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	800	-	-	-	-	-	800
Distribution-Measuring and req - Contract Labor 8770-08111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	4,125	-	-	-	4,625
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	0	0	0	231	-	-	624	-	-	-	164	271	1,290
Meter and house regulator expe - Bill Print Fees 8780-06116	0	0	0	0	0	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Legal 9260-06121	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,257	2,300	-	-	-	6,556
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-08121	722	10,040	5,000	5,089	5,000	5,000	16,506	15,128	16,698	28,801	17,476	27,579	183,039
Outside Services	404,886	122,866	161,271	182,039	159,713	114,681	323,185	205,455	243,509	224,234	278,089	381,547	2,801,613
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncol Acct-Write Off 9040-09927	23,859	27,656	37,521	42,878	33,739	116,325	24,247	19,571	175,706	19,482	19,404	506,812	1,047,199
Provision for Bad Debt	23,859	27,656	37,521	42,878	33,739	116,325	24,247	19,571	175,706	19,482	19,404	506,812	1,047,199
Mains and Services Expenses - Land Rights 8740-04889	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,000	2,000
Distribution-Maint of mains - Misc General Expense 8870-07590	0	5,000	-	-	-	-	485	2,457	-	-	-	-	7,953
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Misc General Expense 9020-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,620	5,620
Customer service-Operating inf - Misc General Expense 9090-07590	0	0	106	-	-	-	-	42	-	-	-	-	148
A&G-Franchise requirements - Misc General Expense 9270-07590	200	-	-	-	-	-	321	-	-	-	-	-	521
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Misc General Expense 9280-07590	10,373	44,848	3,024	4,247	-	(259)	-	-	-	-	-	-	62,234
Miscellaneous general expenses - Misc General Expense 9302-07590	0	0	87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	187
Storage-Operation supervision - Misc General Expense 8140-07590	0	(591)	(285)	-	(591)	(285)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1,752)
Wells expenses - Misc General Expense 8180-07590	0	(988)	(439)	-	(988)	(439)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(2,855)
Storage well royalties - Misc General Expense 8250-07590	22	74	171	228	250	280	166	48	17	13	7	7	1,274
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	314	218	1,895	133	319	407	1,372	216	1,224	848	565	187	7,669
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	366	169	123	960	0	0	5,376	(1,623)	295	16,693	49	497	25,376
Distribution-Measuring and req - Misc General Expense 8750-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	70	-	-	-	70
Meter and house regulator expe - Misc General Expense 8780-07590	0	0	99	-	275	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	374
Distribution-Other expenses - Misc General Expense 8800-07590	97	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vendor Comp Sales Tax 9210-07592	(50)	(46)	(50)	(57)	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)	(51)	(50)	(42)	(597)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	(1,012)	-	-	(2,198)	-	-	(4,228)	-	-	(1,498)	-	-	(8,924)
Mains and Services Expenses - Reimbursements 8740-09911	0	0	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Reimbursements 8940-09911	0	0	84	-	-	(3,332)	387	204	(334)	-	2	(189)	(3,199)
Miscellaneous	10,309	48,682	4,809	3,324	(285)	(3,678)	3,830	1,295	1,152	18,078	673	8,050	96,240
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	1,424,070	1,069,173	1,138,235	1,237,253	1,049,232	1,295,425	1,293,666	1,095,840	1,287,173	1,202,440	1,134,850	1,842,450	15,069,806

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Distribution-Maint of mains - Non-project Labor 8870-01000	4,230	1,618	2,003	1,336	9,187
Maintenance of services - Non-project Labor 8920-01000	1,013	1,139	-	-	2,149
Maintenance of meters and hous - Non-project Labor 8930-01000	13,016	5,988	5,939	3,054	28,477
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Non-project Labor 9020-01000	32,358	28,511	23,741	28,414	109,024
Customer accounts-Customer res - Non-project Labor 9030-01000	63,795	28,627	27,883	26,569	148,973
Customer service-Operating Inf - Non-project Labor 9090-01000	11,805	8,021	8,021	8,021	35,869
Sales-Supervision - Non-project Labor 9110-01000	18,865	12,890	12,890	12,690	58,935
A&G-Administrative & general s - Non-project Labor 9200-01000	15,164	10,493	10,273	10,264	46,194
Wells expenses - Non-project Labor 8160-01000	4,618	4,556	3,280	2,738	15,082
Lines expenses - Non-project Labor 8170-01000	1,645	2,960	2,748	2,975	10,528
Compressor station expenses - Non-project Labor 8180-01000	3,848	1,999	1,228	719	7,591
Storage-Measuring and regulati - Non-project Labor 8200-01000	0	0	0	161	161
Storage-Purification expenses - Non-project Labor 8210-01000	0	918	2,521	2,315	5,754
Maintenance of compressor stat - Non-project Labor 8340-01000	0	710	-	-	710
Other storage expenses-Operati - Non-project Labor 8410-01000	9,896	6,153	8,696	11,939	36,684
Mains expenses - Non-project Labor 8560-01000	28,229	12,934	10,174	12,128	63,464
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Non-project Labor 8570-01000	258	887	1,858	1,888	4,970
Transmission-Maintenance of ma - Non-project Labor 8630-01000	2,791	1,631	97	-	4,519
Distribution-Operation supervi - Non-project Labor 8700-01000	65,635	32,005	40,100	50,084	187,805
Mains and Services Expenses - Non-project Labor 8740-01000	151,970	97,566	97,874	80,060	427,473
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-project Labor 8750-01000	42,277	31,306	30,120	34,406	138,109
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-project Labor 8760-01000	737	186	-	-	923
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-project Labor 8770-01000	3,022	-	1,268	4,408	8,674
Meter and house regulator expe - Non-project Labor 8780-01000	119,370	89,741	81,320	84,796	374,197
Distribution-Other expenses - Non-project Labor 8800-01000	12,004	11,266	4,381	9,769	37,419
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor 8700-01001	851,850	543,710	582,873	532,364	2,490,598
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Contra 8700-01002	(848,743)	(542,930)	(557,721)	(532,119)	(2,481,514)
Mains expenses - O&M Project Labor and Contra 8560-01008	51	-	-	-	51
Mains and Services Expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8740-01008	(38,151)	3,842	14,773	(4,013)	(21,449)
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Expense Labor Accrual 8750-01008	(5,577)	2,346	4,162	3,849	4,580
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Expense Labor Accrual 8760-01008	(2,628)	(87)	(56)	-	(2,651)
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Expense Labor Accrual 8770-01008	(467)	(500)	570	1,633	1,235
Meter and house regulator expe - Expense Labor Accrual 8780-01008	(25,726)	7,194	9,672	5,789	(3,071)
Customer installations expense - Expense Labor Accrual 8790-01008	(161)	-	-	-	(161)
Distribution-Other expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8800-01008	(4,563)	1,379	(1,409)	2,913	(1,679)
Distribution-Maint of mains - Expense Labor Accrual 8870-01008	(2,148)	(220)	416	(232)	(2,183)
Maintenance of services - Expense Labor Accrual 8920-01008	169	172	(341)	0	-
Maintenance of meters and hous - Expense Labor Accrual 8930-01008	(1,827)	71	432	(1,146)	(2,469)
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Expense Labor Accrual 9020-01008	(5,351)	2,590	2,730	2,524	2,463
Customer accounts-Customer res - Expense Labor Accrual 9030-01008	(7,477)	2,166	4,004	652	(695)
Customer service-Operating Inf - Expense Labor Accrual 9090-01008	(3,103)	422	1,203	401	(1,078)
Sales-Supervision - Expense Labor Accrual 9110-01008	(4,934)	883	1,904	635	(1,734)
A&G-Administrative & general s - Expense Labor Accrual 9200-01008	(3,910)	621	1,475	509	(1,306)
Wells expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8160-01008	(735)	614	109	(107)	(119)
Lines expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8170-01008	(663)	580	349	251	518
Compressor station expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8180-01008	152	(8)	(48)	(192)	(97)
Storage-Measuring and regulati - Expense Labor Accrual 8200-01008	(278)	-	-	81	(197)
Storage-Purification expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8210-01008	0	276	859	23	1,157
Maintenance of compressor stat - Expense Labor Accrual 8340-01008	0	213	(213)	0	-
Other storage expenses-Operati - Expense Labor Accrual 8410-01008	(3,229)	198	2,202	1,922	1,082
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8560-01008	(7,530)	(825)	698	1,485	(6,171)
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Expense Labor Accrual 8570-01008	(168)	217	621	62	734
Transmission-Other expenses - Expense Labor Accrual 8590-01008	(576)	-	-	-	(576)
Transmission-Maintenance of ma - Expense Labor Accrual 8630-01008	169	24	(446)	(44)	(278)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Accrual 8700-01008	(23,846)	(1,246)	7,990	7,333	(9,769)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Transfer In 8700-01011	481,483	312,369	333,184	340,331	1,467,367
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Transfer Out 8700-01012	(484,690)	(313,149)	(338,136)	(340,678)	(1,476,451)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Transfer In 8700-01013	59	718	(768)	-	49
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Transfer In 8560-01013	51	-	-	-	51
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Transfer Out 8560-01014	(51)	-	-	-	(51)
Labor	465,245	412,864	427,597	410,849	1,716,554
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Load 9260-01202	38,553	36,117	37,531	36,004	148,205
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Load 9260-01203	23,565	22,094	22,954	22,024	90,658
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Employer 401K Expense 9260-01230	-	(1,642)	-	0	-
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Load 9260-01251	81,708	76,551	79,558	76,310	314,128
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Projects 9260-01253	27	134	(143)	-	18
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Load 9260-01257	17,968	16,933	17,492	16,780	69,073
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Projects 9260-01259	6	30	(32)	-	4
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Load 9260-01260	440	412	428	411	1,691
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Projects 9260-01262	0	1	(1)	-	0
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Load 9260-01263	1,805	1,692	1,761	1,686	6,944
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Projects 9260-01265	1	3	(3)	-	0
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Load 9260-01268	2,199	2,081	2,142	2,054	8,468
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Projects 9260-01268	1	4	(4)	-	1
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Load 9260-01269	3,518	3,297	3,427	3,267	13,530
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Projects 9260-01271	1	5	(6)	-	1
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Projects 9260-01291	13	83	(88)	-	9
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Projects 9260-01292	16	39	(45)	-	9
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Projects 9250-01293	4	18	(20)	-	3
Benefits	168,204	159,354	166,614	158,557	652,729
Mains expenses - Uniforms 8560-07443	0	150	2,504	2,336	4,990
Distribution-Operation supervi - Uniforms 8700-07443	218	-	-	-	218
Mains and Services Expenses - Uniforms 8740-07443	521	1,687	3,798	1,481	7,466

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Uniforms 8750-07443	0	277	209	355	841
Meter and house regulator expe - Uniforms 8780-07443	301	290	1,630	335	2,556
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Uniforms 9020-07443	0	571	502	150	1,224
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Uniforms 9260-07443	17,325	5,222	8,109	8,999	37,654
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Uniforms Capitalized 9020-07444	0	(332)	(318)	(182)	(730)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Uniforms Capitalized 9260-07444	(11,280)	(3,276)	(4,932)	(4,204)	(23,692)
Mains expenses - Uniforms Capitalized 8550-07444	0	(23)	(314)	(254)	(591)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Uniforms Capitalized 8700-07444	(143)	-	-	-	(143)
Mains and Services Expenses - Uniforms Capitalized 8740-07444	(278)	(978)	(2,187)	(836)	(4,280)
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Uniforms Capitalized 8750-07444	0	(130)	(103)	(179)	(412)
Meter and house regulator expe - Uniforms Capitalized 8780-07444	(171)	(172)	(1,017)	(192)	(1,550)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Non-Qual Retirement Exp 9260-07449	0	0	46	-	46
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Restricted Stock - Long Term Incenti 9260-07458	910	880	910	910	3,600
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Long Term Incentive Plan - Time 9260-07460	914	884	914	914	3,625
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Management Incentive Plan 9260-07463	144	180	153	153	630
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9020-07499	0	0	204	-	204
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9030-07499	335	1,050	108	119	1,608
A&G-Injuries & damages - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9250-07499	402	398	1,288	55	2,143
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9260-07499	6,495	3,621	4,652	3,619	18,588
Storage-Rents - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8280-07499	0	0	400	400	400
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8700-07499	885	208	25	250	1,367
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8740-07499	2,184	3,225	1,497	61	6,968
Distribution-Rents - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8810-07499	0	0	120	-	120
Employee Welfare	18,760	13,714	17,995	12,390	62,860
A&G-Property Insurance - Blueflame Property Insurance 9240-04069	31,531	31,531	31,531	31,531	126,122
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Insurance-Other 9210-04070	0	0	0	937	937
A&G-Property Insurance - Insurance Capitalized 9240-04072	(18,216)	(17,785)	(18,142)	(18,234)	(72,378)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Environmental & Safety 9260-07120	0	0	287	-	287
Distribution-Operation supervi - Environmental & Safety 8700-07120	25	-	630	169	824
Mains and Services Expenses - Environmental & Safety 8740-07120	1,650	79	-	1,310	3,038
Insurance	14,990	13,824	14,306	15,712	58,831
Storage well royalties - Building Lease/Rents Capitalized 8250-04580	(19)	-	(10)	(50)	(79)
Distribution-Rents - Building Lease/Rents Capitalized 8810-04580	(39,928)	(40,662)	(39,120)	(46,135)	(165,845)
Storage well royalties - Building Lease/Rents 8250-04581	149	-	62	457	688
Distribution-Rents - Building Lease/Rents 8810-04581	66,914	68,323	69,656	70,997	276,690
A&G-Rents - Building Lease/Rents 9310-04581	1,282	1,262	1,262	17	3,803
Distribution-Operation supervi - Building Maintenance 8700-04582	42	5,830	208	3,862	9,743
Mains and Services Expenses - Building Maintenance 8740-04582	3,799	-	2,737	198	6,734
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Building Maintenance 8750-04582	0	0	-	0	0
Distribution-Rents - Building Maintenance 8810-04582	24,456	21,456	21,822	28,879	96,613
Distribution-Maintenance of st - Building Maintenance 8860-04582	212	32	1,485	264	1,993
Maintenance of measuring and r - Building Maintenance 8910-04582	0	0	195	-	195
Distribution-Rents - Utilities 8810-04590	1,370	341	1,172	1,779	4,663
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Utilities 8570-04590	678	482	1,513	1,483	4,165
Wells expenses - Utilities 8160-04590	0	0	0	533	533
Lines expenses - Utilities 8170-04590	111	60	77	158	404
Compressor station expenses - Utilities 8180-04590	148	80	38	197	463
Compressor station fuel and po - Utilities 8190-04590	86	86	-	96	268
Storage-Measuring and regulati - Utilities 8200-04590	89	135	140	173	538
Storage-Purification expenses - Utilities 8210-04590	172	59	188	170	590
Distribution-Operation supervi - Utilities 8700-04590	8,423	8,061	6,325	7,295	30,284
Distribution load dispatching - Utilities 8710-04590	44	48	49	44	184
Mains and Services Expenses - Utilities 8740-04590	5,111	2,857	3,770	3,666	15,405
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Utilities 8750-04590	177	110	98	119	501
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Utilities 8770-04590	368	318	112	427	1,223
Meter and house regulator expe - Utilities 8780-04590	965	873	928	882	3,668
Storage well royalties - Utilities 8250-04590	178	362	414	997	1,952
Other fuel & power for compres - Utilities 8550-04590	31	30	32	33	125
Mains expenses - Utilities 8560-04590	1,698	1,186	1,671	1,984	6,539
Distribution-Rents - Capitalized Utility Costs 8810-04599	(18,771)	(13,378)	(15,532)	(18,251)	(63,933)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized Utility Costs 8700-04599	(5,259)	(8,823)	(4,318)	(6,841)	(25,041)
Mains expenses - Capitalized Utility Costs 8580-04599	(1,050)	(688)	(1,012)	(1,152)	(3,901)
Compressor station expenses - Capitalized Utility Costs 8160-04599	(123)	(68)	(32)	(96)	(319)
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	53,352	49,323	54,447	51,970	209,092
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Lease Payments 8740-03002	100,749	100,988	103,459	80,843	385,837
Compressor station expenses - Capitalized transportation costs 8180-03003	0	0	0	(11)	(11)
Mains expenses - Capitalized transportation costs 8580-03003	0	(5)	-	(46)	(51)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized transportation costs 8700-03003	(71)	(67)	(72)	(58)	(257)
Mains and Services Expenses - Capitalized transportation costs 8740-03003	(85,493)	(124,218)	(107,344)	(87,860)	(404,715)
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Capitalized transportation costs 8750-03003	0	(37)	-	-	(37)
Meter and house regulator expe - Capitalized transportation costs 8780-03003	(120)	(365)	(537)	(159)	(1,180)
Distribution-Maintenance of of - Capitalized transportation costs 8940-03003	0	0	0	(21)	(21)
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Capitalized transportation costs 9020-03003	0	0	0	(14)	(14)
Compressor station expenses - Vehicle Expense 8180-03004	0	0	0	100	100
Mains expenses - Vehicle Expense 8560-03004	0	34	-	425	459
Distribution-Operation supervi - Vehicle Expense 8700-03004	219	30	338	94	882
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Expense 8740-03004	79,979	70,764	74,889	70,681	296,093
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Vehicle Expense 8750-03004	40	37	-	-	77
Meter and house regulator expe - Vehicle Expense 8780-03004	169	582	820	257	1,847
Distribution-Maintenance of of - Vehicle Expense 8940-03004	0	0	0	36	36
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Vehicle Expense 9020-03004	0	0	0	25	25
Mains and Services Expenses - Equipment Lease 8740-04302	46,007	42,095	50,100	43,076	181,276
Distribution-Maint of mains - Heavy Equipment 8870-04302	1,456	-	-	-	1,456
Mains and Services Expenses - Heavy Equipment 8740-04302	22,041	16,169	16,048	13,477	67,733

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div.009)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Meter and house regulator expe - Heavy Equipment 8780-04302	0	119	-	-	119
Mains expenses - Heavy Equipment 8590-04302	0	1,760	379	2,152	4,281
Distribution-Operation supervi - Heavy Equipment 8700-04302	144	117	-	30	281
Mains expenses - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8700-04307	0	(1,725)	(371)	(2,109)	(4,205)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8700-04307	(141)	(114)	-	(30)	(285)
Distribution-Maint of mains - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8870-04307	(1,427)	-	-	-	(1,427)
Mains and Services Expenses - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8740-04307	(68,888)	(57,099)	(64,823)	(55,421)	(244,029)
Meter and house regulator expe - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8780-04307	0	(118)	-	-	(118)
Vehicles & Equip	96,884	48,956	72,555	65,488	283,973
Maintenance of measuring and r - Inventory Materials 8890-02001	170	-	-	-	170
Mains and Services Expenses - Inventory Materials 8740-02001	12,321	10,963	11,438	6,310	41,033
Mains and Services Expenses - Warehouse Loading Charge 8740-02004	2,464	2,193	2,283	757	7,702
Maintenance of measuring and r - Warehouse Loading Charge 8890-02004	34	-	-	-	34
Odorization - Non-Inventory Supplies 8711-02005	137	-	3,037	2,988	6,161
Mains and Services Expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8740-02005	16,718	13,361	10,077	12,493	62,649
Distribution-Measuring and req - Non-Inventory Supplies 8760-02005	3,574	4,529	856	2,061	11,021
Distribution-Measuring and req - Non-Inventory Supplies 8760-02005	287	-	-	-	287
Distribution-Measuring and req - Non-Inventory Supplies 8770-02005	6,804	-	-	-	6,804
Meter and house regulator expe - Non-Inventory Supplies 8780-02005	488	446	470	147	1,551
Customer Installations expense - Non-Inventory Supplies 8790-02005	6	-	-	-	6
Distribution-Other expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8800-02005	139	870	1,630	35	2,673
Distribution-Maint of mains - Non-Inventory Supplies 8870-02005	448	-	-	-	448
Maintenance of measuring and r - Non-Inventory Supplies 8890-02005	2,241	270	-	742	3,253
Maintenance of measuring and r - Non-Inventory Supplies 8900-02005	101	165	314	-	581
Maintenance of measuring and r - Non-Inventory Supplies 8910-02005	0	0	0	2,322	2,322
Maintenance of services - Non-Inventory Supplies 8920-02005	5	-	-	-	5
Maintenance of meters and hous - Non-Inventory Supplies 8930-02005	91	-	-	-	91
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Non-Inventory Supplies 8940-02005	1,931	389	384	1,995	3,610
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Non-Inventory Supplies 9020-02005	0	12	1	35	48
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Non-Inventory Supplies 9030-02005	0	0	32	-	32
Wells expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8160-02005	374	1,189	345	15	1,923
Lines expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8170-02005	18	787	-	419	1,223
Compressor station expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8180-02005	2,582	518	2,840	126	6,087
Storage-Purification expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8210-02005	317	447	2,832	74	3,670
Storage-Maintenance of structu - Non-Inventory Supplies 8310-02005	0	735	424	325	1,483
Maintenance of compressor stat - Non-Inventory Supplies 8340-02005	0	0	40	-	40
Other storage expenses-Operati - Non-Inventory Supplies 8410-02005	0	0	0	18	18
Mains expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8560-02005	3,719	1,030	1,810	567	7,227
Transmission-Measuring and req - Non-Inventory Supplies 8570-02005	0	0	96	723	819
Transmission-Maintenance of me - Non-Inventory Supplies 8650-02005	0	29	-	-	29
Distribution-Operation supervi - Non-Inventory Supplies 8700-02005	435	463	1,986	83	2,967
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Office Supplies 9030-05010	887	1,056	434	887	2,844
Customer service-Operating inf - Office Supplies 9090-05010	477	-	-	-	477
Sales-Supervision - Office Supplies 9110-05010	0	112	28	41	181
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Office Supplies 9280-05010	0	629	-	42	671
Storage-Operation supervision - Office Supplies 8140-05010	0	0	0	84	84
Distribution-Operation supervi - Office Supplies 8700-05010	5,254	4,846	4,724	4,801	19,124
Mains and Services Expenses - Office Supplies 8740-05010	388	1,316	91	1,502	3,278
Distribution-Measuring and req - Office Supplies 8750-05010	55	-	-	45	100
Meter and house regulator expe - Office Supplies 8780-05010	1,608	960	1,630	888	4,985
Materials & Supplies	63,165	47,092	47,906	39,427	197,589
Distribution-Operation supervi - Software Maintenance 8700-04201	0	0	0	5,835	5,835
Information Technologies	0	0	0	5,835	5,835
Distribution-Operation supervi - Monthly Lines and service 8700-05310	12,863	12,363	12,344	12,348	49,628
Distribution-Operation supervi - Long Distance 8700-05312	13	670	419	355	1,358
Distribution-Operation supervi - Toll Free Long Distance 8700-05314	3,832	6,120	6,074	5,689	21,715
Distribution-Operation supervi - WAN/LAN/Internet Service 8700-05331	1,102	719	741	725	3,287
Customer accounts-Meter readin - AMI Tower Rent 9020-05361	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	4,200
Customer accounts-Meter readin - AMI Tower Fees 9020-05352	43	32	25	29	129
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Cellular, radio, pager charges 8940-05364	0	0	32	-	32
Mains and Services Expenses - Cellular, radio, pager charges 8740-05364	21	-	-	-	21
Distribution-Measuring and req - Cellular, radio, pager charges 8770-05364	64	-	-	-	64
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cellular, radio, pager charges 8700-05364	11,184	11,169	10,222	4,943	37,508
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cell service for data uses 8700-05376	5,272	5,080	5,088	5,021	20,441
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8700-05377	511	68	157	164	900
Mains expenses - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8680-05377	0	99	-	-	99
Mains and Services Expenses - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8740-05377	20	11	-	167	197
Distribution-Measuring and req - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8750-05377	0	0	42	-	42
Meter and house regulator expe - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8780-05377	89	11	-	-	100
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8940-05399	0	0	(18)	-	(18)
Mains and Services Expenses - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8740-05399	(24)	(6)	-	(94)	(123)
Distribution-Measuring and req - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8750-05399	0	0	(24)	-	(24)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8770-05399	(37)	-	-	-	(37)
Meter and house regulator expe - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8780-05399	(62)	(6)	-	-	(68)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8700-05399	(17,358)	(18,239)	(15,953)	(12,778)	(62,328)
Telecom	18,316	21,000	20,199	17,621	77,136
Meter and house regulator expe - Required By Law, Safety 8780-04002	0	50	-	-	50
Mains and Services Expenses - Required By Law, Safety 8740-04002	0	0	0	479	479
A&G-Injuries & damages - Safety 9250-04018	0	175	-	-	175
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Promo Other, Misc 9120-04021	168	81	204	341	773
Sales-Supervision - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9110-04040	699	132	105	325	1,161
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9120-04040	0	1,618	1,576	846	3,939
Sales-Advertising expenses - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9130-04040	0	417	370	-	787

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9030-04040	25	-	-	-	25
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Advertising 9030-04044	0	0	198	-	198
Sales-Advertising expenses - Advertising 9130-04044	4,279	-	1,457	2,017	7,753
Customer service-Operating inf - Customer Relations & Assist 9090-04046	189	2,979	-	-	3,168
Sales-Supervision - Customer Relations & Assist 9110-04046	558	2,849	-	2,709	5,916
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Customer Relations & Assist 9120-04046	4,940	6,784	2,613	3,228	17,564
Sales-Advertising expenses - Customer Relations & Assist 9130-04046	1,545	376	-	-	1,921
Marketing	12,301	15,141	6,524	9,843	43,909
Mains and Services Expenses - Membership Fees 8740-05415	0	0	0	25	25
Distribution-Other expenses - Membership Fees 8800-05415	0	87	291	-	378
Customer service-Operating inf - Membership Fees 9090-05415	0	117	-	-	117
Miscellaneous general expenses - Membership Fees 9302-05415	0	50	-	-	50
Distribution-Operation supervi - Club Dues - Nondeductible 8700-05416	0	21	-	-	21
Distribution-Operation supervi - Club Dues - Deductible 8700-05417	0	0	165	-	165
Distribution-Other expenses - Association Dues 8800-07510	0	0	0	775	775
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	3,000	13,400	1,830	5,980	24,210
Sales-Supervision - Association Dues 9110-07510	0	0	258	-	258
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Association Dues 9120-07510	715	200	1,015	500	2,430
Dues & Donations	3,715	13,875	3,557	7,280	28,427
Mains expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8560-05111	0	1,245	-	-	1,245
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	414	201	371	128	1,112
Mains and Services Expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8740-05111	113	262	96	94	565
Distribution-Maintenance super - Postage/Delivery Services 8850-05111	98	476	26	40	640
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Postage/Delivery Services 9030-05111	161	-	511	-	672
Sales-Supervision - Postage/Delivery Services 9110-05111	1,345	184	55	-	1,584
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Postage/Delivery Services 9120-05111	0	0	98	-	98
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Postage/Delivery Services 9280-05111	0	0	1,690	210	1,900
Print & Postages	2,131	2,367	2,847	470	7,815
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	3,657	7,319	5,974	7,219	24,169
Mains and Services Expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8740-05411	295	1,120	988	340	2,741
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Meals and Entertainment 8750-05411	295	972	136	156	1,559
Meter and house regulator expe - Meals and Entertainment 8780-05411	861	168	209	195	1,423
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Meals and Entertainment 9020-05411	1,113	-	-	-	1,113
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	1,802	480	267	280	2,630
Customer service-Operating inf - Meals and Entertainment 9090-05411	338	113	193	-	645
Sales-Supervision - Meals and Entertainment 9110-05411	731	473	284	482	1,970
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	0	74	135	-	209
Distribution-Operation supervi - Spousal & Dependent Travel 8700-05412	43	-	18	430	491
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9030-05412	0	0	0	325	325
Customer service-Operating inf - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9090-05412	120	-	34	-	154
Sales-Supervision - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9110-05412	28	-	38	-	66
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	0	28	87	-	115
Distribution-Operation supervi - Transportation 8700-05413	1,521	2,510	701	1,371	6,102
Mains and Services Expenses - Transportation 8740-05413	772	1,826	1,209	-	3,807
Meter and house regulator expe - Transportation 8780-05413	167	715	-	1,384	2,266
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Transportation 9020-05413	1,692	-	-	-	1,692
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	0	374	-	149	523
Customer service-Operating inf - Transportation 9090-05413	857	777	999	-	2,632
Sales-Supervision - Transportation 9110-05413	3,240	2,611	1,691	2,630	10,072
Customer service-Operating inf - Lodging 9090-05414	666	-	243	-	910
Sales-Supervision - Lodging 9110-05414	2,139	1,179	629	333	4,279
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	0	386	361	-	728
Other storage expenses-Operati - Lodging 8410-05414	372	-	-	-	372
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	6,843	3,679	4,935	2,211	17,568
Mains and Services Expenses - Lodging 8740-05414	0	1,960	1,357	153	3,470
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Lodging 8750-05414	743	-	163	-	896
Meter and house regulator expe - Lodging 8780-05414	160	-	2,914	-	3,073
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Lodging 9020-05414	11,186	-	-	-	11,186
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	442	293	-	-	735
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	23,912	(93)	1,021	(1,995)	22,845
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc Employee Expense 8740-05419	6,272	344	-	715	7,331
Meter and house regulator expe - Misc Employee Expense 8780-05419	0	0	0	123	123
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Misc Employee Expense 9020-05419	0	0	63	-	63
Travel & Entertainment	70,063	27,176	24,535	16,501	138,277
Distribution-Operation supervi - Employee Development 8700-05420	0	275	-	-	275
Mains and Services Expenses - Employee Development 8740-05420	0	0	88	150	238
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Employee Development 8750-05420	0	0	0	2,250	2,250
Mains and Services Expenses - Training 8740-05421	0	0	45	120	165
Distribution-Other expenses - Training 8800-05421	1,916	45	56	-	2,016
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Training 9120-05421	595	-	-	-	595
Mains and Services Expenses - Operator Qualifications Training 8740-05422	755	-	-	-	755
Mains and Services Expenses - Books & Manuals 8740-05424	0	0	0	143	143
Distribution-Other expenses - Books & Manuals 8800-05424	55	-	-	-	55
Training	3,320	320	189	2,653	6,492
A&G-Injuries & damages - Settlement 9250-05418	2,361	574	3,237	6,823	14,996
Distribution-Maint of mains - Contract Labor 8870-06111	0	0	2,100	-	2,100
Customer accounts-Meter readin - Contract Labor 9020-06111	91,807	85,941	87,729	77,382	342,859
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Contract Labor 9030-06111	10	-	-	-	10
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	0	0	841	-	841
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Contract Labor 9260-06111	1,414	(1,414)	0	0	-
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Contract Labor 9280-06111	1,321	12,359	11,136	607	25,423
Wells expenses - Contract Labor 8160-06111	0	0	0	15,968	15,968

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 009)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Compressor station expenses - Contract Labor 8180-06111	0	0	0	360	360
Storage-Purification expenses - Contract Labor 8210-06111	0	0	2,901	-	2,901
Storage-Maintenance of structu - Contract Labor 8310-06111	300	675	5,103	675	6,753
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8560-06111	2,389	17,646	2,580	1,598	24,213
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	0	(615)	-	-	(615)
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-06111	78,372	70,260	78,281	49,712	276,625
Distribution-Measuring and req - Contract Labor 8770-06111	0	1,925	-	-	1,925
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	104	-	-	-	104
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Legal 9280-06121	0	0	0	26,121	26,121
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-06121	13,626	15,726	23,235	28,698	81,286
Outside Services	191,704	203,079	216,942	209,313	821,039
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncol Acct-Write Off 9040-09927	23,960	28,399	37,427	44,559	134,345
Provision for Bad Debt	23,960	28,399	37,427	44,559	134,345
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Misc General Expense 9030-07590	0	0	0	87	87
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Misc General Expense 9260-07590	0	0	106,663	-	106,663
Storage well royalties - Misc General Expense 8250-07590	19	42	86	133	280
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	463	-	257	2,308	3,028
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	1,992	318	4,327	199	6,836
Meter and house regulator expe - Misc General Expense 8780-07590	0	0	502	-	502
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Vendor Comp Sales Tax 9210-07592	(55)	(32)	(34)	(50)	(171)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	(910)	-	-	(1,596)	(2,476)
Mains and Services Expenses - Reimbursements 8740-09911	0	(520)	52	28	(439)
Distribution-Maintenance of ot - Reimbursements 8940-09911	(1,412)	-	258	-	(1,154)
Miscellaneous	97	(192)	112,110	1,139	113,155
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	1,206,207	1,056,292	1,225,861	1,089,697	4,558,058

Atmos Energy Corporation
Kentucky / Mid-States Division
Kentucky Operations

	Base	Test	Difference	Explanation
Labor	\$ 4,929,596.88	\$ 4,927,623.32	\$ (1,973.56)	-0.04% Change between base and test period is (0.04%) variance and immaterial.
Benefits	\$ 2,093,177.11	\$ 2,114,994.17	\$ 21,817.06	1.04% Change between base and test period is 1.04% variance and immaterial.
Employee Welfare	\$ 115,988.53	\$ 82,353.92	\$ (33,634.61)	-29.00% Test year based on FY 2016 budget where assumption of normal (100% of target) incentive payout is anticipated. Incentive compensation is removed from revenue requirement as a ratemaking adjustment. Various miscellaneous employee welfare expenses (ex. flu shots, newspapers, etc.) are budgeted at the General Office rate division (091) but coded to the state specific rate division when applicable.
Insurance	\$ 89,947.10	\$ 8,633.00	\$ (81,314.10)	-90.40% Insurance is budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As insurance expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	\$ 621,710.18	\$ 564,851.24	\$ (56,858.94)	-9.15% Rent expense is no longer incurred for the Paducah and Campbellsville offices. The Company built new offices in these locations which are owned and not leased.
Vehicles & Equip	\$ 999,843.41	\$ 1,063,544.96	\$ 63,701.55	6.37% Primary driver is the replacement of leased vehicles in accordance with our company vehicle replacement guidelines.
Materials & Supplies	\$ 773,591.78	\$ 708,550.70	\$ (65,041.08)	-8.41% Items such as odorant and office supplies are budgeted at the general Office rate division (091). As these expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division.
Information Technologies	\$ 50.00	\$ -	\$ (50.00)	-100.00% Change between base and test period is \$50.00 and immaterial.
Telecom	\$ 165,304.88	\$ 77,442.84	\$ (87,862.04)	-53.15% Some telecom expenses are budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As actual expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division where applicable. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Marketing	\$ 130,353.51	\$ 126,741.29	\$ (3,612.22)	-2.77% Change between base and test period is (2.77%) variance and immaterial.
Directors & Shareholders & PR	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	0.00% N/A
Dues & Donations	\$ 61,617.48	\$ 44,701.20	\$ (16,916.28)	-27.45% Dues and Donations are primarily budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As actual expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division when applicable. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Print & Postages	\$ 10,070.29	\$ 11,278.50	\$ 1,208.21	12.00% Change between base and test period is \$1,208.21 and immaterial.
Travel & Entertainment	\$ 434,610.81	\$ 398,830.78	\$ (35,780.03)	-8.23% Expect less traveling of Kentucky operation employees.
Training	\$ 8,310.15	\$ 10,216.40	\$ 1,906.25	22.94% Change between base and test period is \$1,906.25 and immaterial.
Outside Services	\$ 2,553,017.34	\$ 2,367,320.00	\$ (185,697.34)	-7.27% Legal is budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As legal expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Provision for Bad Debt	\$ 564,321.71	\$ 313,426.18	\$ (250,895.53)	-44.46% Company reviews the bad debt balances on a quarterly basis and makes any necessary true-up provision entries. Provision entries were made in March and June 2015 which are reflected in the base period.
Miscellaneous	\$ 25,714.40	\$ 5,500.00	\$ (20,214.40)	-78.61% Company incurred charges for station painting in July '15 that should have been coded to outside services.
Total O&M Expenses	\$ 13,577,225.56	\$ 12,826,008.50	\$ (751,217.06)	

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-08
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att30- O&M for KY- Fall 2015 case_updated" provided in response to Staff 1-59 and the tab entitled "Div 91 forecast."

- a. Please provide the actual data in the same level of detail and in the same format for each month from October 2011 through the most recent month available in electronic format with all formulas intact
- b. Please provide a variance analysis for each category of expense (labor, benefits, employee welfare, etc.) that identifies and describes all reasons for the change projected in the test year compared to the base year. In addition, provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the change projected in the test year compared to the base year.

RESPONSE:

- a) While the Company does not believe that data from two years prior to the Company's most recent general case (Case No. 2013-00148) should have any relevance in determining the revenue requirement in this case, the Company is nonetheless providing the requested data. Please see Attachment 1.
- b) Please see Attachment 2.

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-08_Att1 - Div 091 O&M Oct11-Jan16.xlsx, 16 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-08_Att2 - Div 091 Variance.xlsx, 1 Page.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Total Fiscal 2012
Distribution-Operation supervi - Natural Gas Vehicle Demo 8700-04038	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	70	-	-	-	70
Customer service-Operating ass - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9080-04040	0	0	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Customer service-Operating inf - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9080-04040	0	0	0	0	0	0	539	20,293	-	120	623	17,762	39,337
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9210-04040	0	0	0	0	534	-	-	-	322	(10)	-	-	846
Distribution-Operation supervi - Community Rel&Trade Shows 8700-04040	0	0	0	0	300	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	340
Mains and Services Expenses - Community Rel&Trade Shows 8740-04040	0	0	0	1,700	824	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,580
Distribution-Operation supervi - Advertising 8700-04044	0	0	0	0	-	595	-	-	-	-	-	-	595
Customer service-Miscellaneous - Customer Relations & Assist 9100-04048	86	88	-	-	176	-	-	-	188	263	79	145	1,023
Sales-Supervision - Customer Relations & Assist 9110-04046	0	0	0	(750)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(750)
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Customer Relations & Assist 9120-04046	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24,697	24,697
Sales-Advertising expenses - Customer Relations & Assist 9130-04046	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,121	2,121
Marketing	97	62,584	2,336	79,528	6,427	15,790	5,447	38,921	10,999	681	24,646	50,498	298,626
Distribution-Operation supervi - Membership Fees 8700-05415	250	672	8,131	295	1,645	12	400	693	400	400	145	1,725	14,767
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Membership Fees 9120-05415	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	240	240
Miscellaneous general expenses - Membership Fees 9302-05415	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,880	2,880
Distribution-Operation supervi - Club Dues - Deductible 8700-05417	640	-	-	248	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,188
Distribution-Operation supervi - Association Dues 8700-07510	0	0	8,000	-	50	-	-	-	250	-	-	-	6,300
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	8,050	8,050	19,600	8,569	8,569	8,569	8,569	8,569	16,569	18,569	7,299	7,299	128,278
Distribution-Operation supervi - Donations 8700-07520	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	-	-	-	-	44
Dues & Donations	8,940	8,722	33,731	9,112	10,314	8,581	9,217	9,305	16,969	19,219	7,444	12,144	163,697
Mains expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8560-05111	0	0	0	0	0	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	53
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	1,773	1,203	2,083	3,485	664	1,080	1,348	3,832	903	1,134	904	997	19,405
Mains and Services Expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8740-05111	90	107	4	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	215
Distribution-Measuring and rep - Postage/Delivery Services 8760-05111	35	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	114
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	11	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46
Print & Postages	1,908	1,424	2,087	3,485	678	1,133	1,348	3,832	903	1,134	904	997	19,832
Transmission-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8500-05411	0	0	0	525	17	127	321	-	-	80	-	-	1,089
Mains expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8560-05411	0	0	0	0	0	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Transmission-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8590-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	-	-	35
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	3,753	9,984	7,624	8,133	12,936	8,899	6,893	10,222	5,900	5,066	6,073	9,004	95,589
Mains and Services Expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8740-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	-	-	49
Distribution-Measuring and rep - Meals and Entertainment 8750-05411	0	0	0	15	-	129	-	-	216	-	-	-	360
Distribution-Measuring and rep - Meals and Entertainment 8760-05411	0	0	0	16	-	134	-	-	224	-	-	-	373
Distribution-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8800-05411	0	0	0	0	194	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	194
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	65	151	31	8	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	273
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	88	44	287	125	393	-	63	-	339	40	29	-	1,408
Distribution-Operation supervi - Spousal & Dependent Travel 8700-05412	0	609	242	180	156	15	70	142	24	7	141	-	1,636
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	817	611	850	2,423	1,287	306	1,998	-	1,775	852	1,337	-	12,223
Transmission-Operation supervi - Transportation 8500-05413	0	0	0	0	0	287	30	498	-	-	-	-	798
Mains expenses - Transportation 8560-05413	0	0	0	0	0	240	446	-	-	-	-	-	686
Distribution-Operation supervi - Transportation 8700-05413	13,751	21,493	9,451	6,786	13,495	7,896	21,138	9,772	11,785	14,719	9,040	17,547	166,914
Distribution-Other expenses - Transportation 8800-05413	0	0	0	0	215	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	215
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	278	627	195	158	92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,351
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	75	79	403	424	99	-	368	-	738	178	-	-	2,364
Transmission-Operation supervi - Lodging 8500-05414	0	0	346	255	-	-	474	291	-	-	-	-	1,365
Mains expenses - Lodging 8560-05414	0	0	0	0	0	334	271	-	-	-	-	-	605
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	6,910	15,340	8,632	7,878	11,989	9,428	10,356	10,835	12,108	7,068	9,390	11,288	120,999
Distribution-Measuring and rep - Lodging 8750-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	183	-	-	309	-	-	492
Distribution-Measuring and rep - Lodging 8760-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	190	-	-	320	-	-	510
Distribution-Other expenses - Lodging 8800-05414	0	0	0	0	501	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	501
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	214	686	96	113	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,112
Transmission-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8500-05419	154	-	-	-	-	495	387	-	-	1,282	11	-	2,328
Mains expenses - Misc Employee Expense 8560-05419	0	0	0	0	64	82	-	-	-	-	-	-	128
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	20	12	45	158	223	114	180	146	33	33	27	601	1,591
Travel & Entertainment	26,105	49,637	28,205	27,993	41,616	28,225	43,780	31,905	32,700	30,427	26,006	38,561	405,165
Distribution-Operation supervi - Employee Development 8700-05420	0	0	990	119	2,777	1,702	750	200	20	475	-	1,884	8,937
Distribution-Operation supervi - Training 8700-05421	0	1,295	1,275	1,100	1,125	384	8	2,310	146	1,868	-	197	9,707
Mains and Services Expenses - Training 8740-05421	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,824	-	-	-	1,824
Distribution-Operation supervi - Operator Qualifications Training 8700-05422	0	0	0	0	0	375	-	-	-	-	-	-	375
Distribution-Operation supervi - Books & Manuals 8700-05424	0	168	-	913	-	369	-	654	61	-	-	-	2,145
Distribution-Operation supervi - Regulatory Compliance Training 8700-05425	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	-	2,125	-	2,425
Distribution-Operation supervi - Safety Training 8700-05426	1,000	1,943	-	9,831	1,823	2,824	6,628	6,874	1,618	2,863	1,477	3,881	40,665
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Safety Training 9290-05426	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	928	-	-	-	928
Distribution-Operation supervi - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8700-05427	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Distribution-Other expenses - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8800-05427	0	0	0	0	1,391	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,391
Distribution-Operation supervi - Work Environment Training 8700-05429	0	0	0	0	0	15	-	15	-	-	30	15	75
Training	2,000	3,416	2,285	11,763	7,220	5,659	7,383	10,163	4,797	5,206	3,632	5,977	69,472
Distribution-Rents - Contract Labor 8810-06111	480	490	607	80	490	1,122	499	-	-	-	-	-	3,787
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 8290-06111	0	0	1,688	-	211	-	-	-	-	3,866	716	5,128	11,589
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Contract Labor 8280-06111	0	3,180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,180
Transmission-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8500-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,100	3,100
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8560-06111	0	0	0	3,100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,100
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-06111	503	384	6,074	-	2,948	8,089	9,931	7,055	6,880	2,811	1,267	3,861	51,434
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	102,933	119,004	70,392	151,070	122,269	116,559	94,855	102,476	115,278	65,597	123,198	96,300	1,280,031
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bill Print Fees 9030-06116	241,868	201,168	221,312	238,143	254,708	225,297	226,814	220,892	249,613	201,633	205,481	144,952	2,631,890
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-06121	0	26,084	9,070	-	4,171	6,749	5,312	11,993	9,950	37	7,330	-	15,427
Outside Services	345,784	350,289	309,123	393,964	394,797	358,326	337,612	343,587	381,821	273,932	337,992	268,767	4,085,995
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncof Acct-Writ Off 9040-09627	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	53,144	-	(261)	52,883
Provision for Bad Debt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	53,144	-	(261)	52,883

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Total
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04883	(3,595)	(3,158)	(3,139)	(5,107)	(5,012)	(4,314)	(4,486)	(5,064)	(4,515)	(3,491)	(3,438)	(2,717)	(48,034)
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	0	0	0	0	6,250	-	-	-	-	236,607	-	-	241,857
Mains expenses - Misc General Expense 8560-07590	0	1,270	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,270
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	0	40	447	90	376	-	384	688	250	(93,281)	13	-	(80,992)
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	0	1,304	(1,304)	1,157	(1,157)	1,712	(1,712)	0	0	0	1,264	(1,264)	-
Distribution-Measuring and req - Misc General Expense 8750-07590	0	0	0	235	(232)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Use only for HR exp default ***Forme 9210-09195	0	7,797	4,895	(11,921)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	761
Miscellaneous	(3,595)	7,253	889	(15,546)	225	(2,602)	(5,813)	(4,376)	(4,266)	138,835	(2,171)	(3,971)	104,864
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	853,739	994,672	918,913	1,065,979	1,013,748	928,009	824,916	927,090	905,130	913,028	1,144,379	1,119,811	11,609,415

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Total Fiscal 2013
Distribution-Operation supervi - Required By Law, Safety 8700-04002	82,705	-	356	12,579	84,038	6,056	6,318	59,001	785	-	60,623	(11,413)	245,028
Distribution-Operation supervi - Safety 8700-04018	0	0	123	-	-	-	125	-	-	-	-	-	248
Distribution-Operation supervi - Promo Other, Misc 8700-04021	0	70	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70
Sales-Advertising expenses - Promo Other, Misc 9130-04021	0	0	0	0	268	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,465	4,733
Customer service-Operating ass - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9080-04040	0	0	0	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Sales-Supervision - Community Rel&Trade Shows 9110-04040	0	0	0	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
Distribution-Operation supervi - Community Rel&Trade Shows 8700-04040	89	60	0	-	400	24	192	453	89	-	20,878	1,106	23,291
Mains and Services Expenses - Community Rel&Trade Shows 8740-04040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	-	-	-	35
Customer service-Miscellaneous - Customer Relations & Assist 9100-04046	13	80	7	161	153	94	92	88	7	-	-	-	799
Sales-Demonstrating and sellin - Customer Relations & Assist 9120-04046	(205)	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,284
Sales-Advertising expenses - Customer Relations & Assist 9130-04046	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,861
Marketing	52,601	210	486	15,241	64,859	6,174	6,727	53,543	898	-	81,501	2,111	284,349
Distribution-Operation supervi - Membership Fees 8700-05415	500	-	-	455	255	270	460	310	11,920	143	147	1,180	15,850
Miscellaneous general expenses - Membership Fees 8302-05415	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,400
Distribution-Operation supervi - Club Dues - Deductible 8700-05417	548	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,045
Distribution-Operation supervi - Association Dues 8700-07510	0	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,989
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	28,818	7,255	7,286	7,517	7,517	7,517	6,403	13,903	8,403	7,653	6,403	16,403	123,071
Dues & Donations	29,865	13,285	7,286	7,972	7,772	7,787	7,631	14,213	18,323	7,796	6,719	22,243	150,354
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	881	1,260	1,739	1,536	1,185	717	888	1,460	240	432	778	466	11,571
Mains and Services Expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8740-05111	0	0	119	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	119
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Postage/Delivery Services 8780-05111	0	0	17	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
Distribution-Other expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8800-05111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	0	0	0	0	15	28	14	-	-	-	-	-	178
Print & Postages	881	1,280	1,875	1,536	1,200	775	882	1,450	240	432	778	466	11,935
Transmission-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8500-05411	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	105	-	-	147
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	5,579	9,363	7,102	7,798	9,707	15,428	11,932	20,537	4,247	4,333	8,828	19,105	123,947
Distribution-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8900-05411	0	0	0	0	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	143
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	0	12	185	132	147	348	138	-	-	17	-	-	878
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	0	21	66	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	143
Distribution-Operation supervi - Spousal & Dependent Travel 8700-05412	20	13	211	758	149	387	-	530	83	-	10	185	2,357
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	0	444	27	-	514	-	1,559	-	-	-	330	751	3,625
Transmission-Operation supervi - Transportation 8500-05413	0	0	0	0	0	0	521	-	-	-	-	-	521
Mains expenses - Transportation 8560-05413	0	0	0	0	0	0	471	-	-	-	-	-	471
Distribution-Operation supervi - Transportation 8700-05413	5,894	12,728	12,753	11,307	19,186	18,326	14,970	14,863	12,859	13,668	12,140	22,402	169,091
Distribution-Other expenses - Transportation 8800-05413	0	0	180	-	41	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	241
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	0	191	186	709	2,785	1,634	95	419	-	842	-	-	6,881
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	0	223	-	-	-	-	683	-	-	-	-	1,269	2,165
Transmission-Operation supervi - Lodging 8500-05414	327	-	-	-	-	-	286	-	-	-	-	-	613
Mains expenses - Lodging 8560-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	281	-	-	-	-	-	281
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	5,970	8,618	6,014	7,230	12,687	19,545	22,829	11,481	11,884	8,549	13,887	19,815	147,503
Distribution-Other expenses - Lodging 8800-05414	0	0	0	0	153	-	-	291	-	208	175	-	825
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	0	144	554	1,574	838	1,861	422	-	-	281	-	-	5,873
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	265	1,758	502	499	173	967	563	1,284	145	756	-	36	6,968
Distribution-Other expenses - Misc Employee Expense 8800-05419	0	0	0	2,250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,250
Travel & Entertainment	18,097	33,503	28,780	32,255	46,420	55,498	54,802	49,405	29,535	27,812	36,124	63,577	474,808
Distribution-Operation supervi - Employee Development 8700-05420	450	760	495	510	954	-	11,155	825	1,012	850	845	2,785	20,642
Mains expenses - Training 8560-05421	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,600	-	-	-	-	-	1,600
Distribution-Operation supervi - Training 8700-05421	0	225	1,559	502	505	-	1,980	1,100	150	1,220	-	-	7,220
Miscellaneous general expenses - Training 9302-05421	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	795
Distribution-Operation supervi - Books & Manuals 8700-05424	183	-	610	-	737	356	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,886
Distribution-Operation supervi - Safety Training 8700-05426	0	4,263	1,557	4,867	1,674	3,317	523	1,051	853	1,056	2,492	3,531	25,183
Distribution-Operation supervi - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8700-05427	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	125	-	-	-	-	125
Distribution-Operation supervi - Work Environment Training 8700-05429	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	-	-	-	-	323
Training	628	5,248	4,231	5,879	3,899	3,673	15,229	3,401	2,015	3,126	3,337	7,119	67,754
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	0	0	0	0	935	117	101	4,886	1,312	1,158	351	1,936	10,794
A&G-Regulatory commission expe - Contract Labor 9280-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,395	-	-	-	-	-	9,395
Mains expenses - Contract Labor 8560-06111	0	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
Transmission-Maintenance of me - Contract Labor 8650-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,425	7,150	-	-	-	14,575
Transmission-Maintenance of ot - Contract Labor 8670-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	825	-	-	-	-	825
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	871	1,809	2,143	5,945	4,042	1,304	3,932	1,721	4,779	1,708	1,325	20,174	49,754
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-06111	0	0	0	4,651	-	-	900	-	-	-	-	-	5,551
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	95,260	87,924	96,931	109,284	141,821	84,778	130,240	58,688	59,055	51,219	102,566	46,806	1,061,672
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bill Print Fees 9030-06116	179,131	166,887	155,298	183,105	175,829	184,093	242,025	116,440	119,985	132,931	127,088	1,909,432	1,909,432
A&G-Outside services employed - Local 9230-06121	8,619	8,418	4,673	8,874	7,384	7,886	12,225	-	42,824	182,400	(191,897)	12,121	114,526
Outside Services	283,882	286,238	259,013	317,868	330,010	278,177	397,919	180,533	236,215	384,280	36,276	208,126	3,176,626
Customer accounts-Uncollectibl - Cust Uncol Acct-Write Off 9040-09927	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(4,630)	(4,630)
Provision for Bad Debt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(4,630)
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04863	(5,148)	(5,480)	(10,219)	(9,806)	(2,970)	(3,821)	(4,808)	(4,547)	5,870	(3,907)	(2,165)	(2,325)	(43,233)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Land Rights 8700-04889	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1,013)	-	-	-	-	-	(1,013)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc General Expense 9260-07590	0	0	0	853	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	870
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	129	1,203	123	6,991	389	87	1,459	408	(826)	(35)	(128)	7,486	17,494
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	4,903	(4,808)	2,787	(2,787)	252	2,999	(3,250)	2,794	2,832	(5,727)	-	-	(2)
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Use only for HR exp default ***Forme 9210-09195	0	0	847	-	-	-	(847)	0	0	0	0	0	(2)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Taxes Other Than Inc Tax 8700-09345	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	-	-	-	-	400
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	0	0	0	0	(116,808)	780	-	-	-	-	-	-	(116,128)
Miscellaneous	(112)	(9,195)	(6,452)	956	(119,228)	245	(8,457)	(948)	8,176	(9,669)	(2,293)	5,156	(141,817)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	440,594	572,862	914,246	808,541	882,382	605,386	773,632	874,512	792,265	801,424	605,919	1,420,781	9,572,235

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-14	Nov-14	Dec-14	Jan-15	Feb-15	Mar-15	Apr-15	May-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Total Fiscal 2015
Distribution-Operation supervi - Membership Fees 8700-05415	0	0	89	298	833	-	692	11,684	323	149	481	83	14,491
Miscellaneous general expenses - Membership Fees 9302-05415	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	-	-	-	4,400	5,100
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Club Dues - Deductible 9030-05417	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	-	-	-	-	150
Distribution-Operation supervi - Club Dues - Deductible 8700-05417	498	-	-	-	-	-	-	995	-	-	-	-	1,493
Distribution-Operation supervi - Association Dues 8700-07510	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	79	-	-	-	79
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	6,772	6,772	6,772	7,228	7,228	7,323	7,244	14,744	7,244	7,244	7,244	7,244	93,055
Distribution-Operation supervi - Donations 8700-07520	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	-	-	-	-	100
Dues & Donations	7,269	6,772	6,861	7,525	8,061	7,323	7,935	28,253	7,646	7,393	7,695	11,737	114,468
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	724	1,162	658	(1,143)	678	399	1,650	1,403	559	634	831	953	8,518
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Postage/Delivery Services 9030-05111	0	44	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55
Sales-Supervision - Postage/Delivery Services 9110-05111	0	0	22	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	13	47
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	0	14	-	-	-	-	20	-	46	-	-	-	80
Print & Postages	724	1,219	680	(1,131)	678	399	1,682	1,403	605	634	831	966	8,700
Transmission-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8500-05411	0	0	0	0	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	6,230	14,991	7,697	7,101	7,310	8,453	8,730	8,644	9,874	8,229	8,211	21,992	113,371
Distribution-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8600-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	-	-	-	-	10
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Meals and Entertainment 9030-05411	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	51	-	-	-	-	51
Sales-Supervision - Meals and Entertainment 9110-05411	314	121	1,359	9	40	8	876	394	1,048	188	505	751	5,610
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	0	0	49	-	-	-	2	294	-	-	-	-	345
Distribution-Operation supervi - Spousal & Dependent Travel 8700-05412	578	142	30	106	-	-	164	678	-	927	69	93	2,787
Sales-Supervision - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9110-05412	0	0	49	-	-	-	77	-	-	-	-	9	135
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Spousal & Dependent Travel 9210-05412	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	84	-	-	-	-	64
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	0	1,132	-	-	-	-	558	-	-	-	-	-	1,690
Transmission-Operation supervi - Transportation 8500-05413	0	0	0	248	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	275
Mains expenses - Transportation 8580-05413	0	0	0	250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250
Distribution-Operation supervi - Transportation 8700-05413	10,519	9,345	4,585	6,940	6,100	7,845	10,063	10,590	9,775	20,735	12,147	17,594	128,237
Distribution-Other expenses - Transportation 8800-05413	0	190	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	190
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Transportation 9030-05413	641	493	480	-	-	-	-	216	178	187	-	181	2,377
Sales-Supervision - Transportation 9110-05413	288	110	1,551	816	89	89	2,010	428	5,224	459	1,531	3,306	15,900
Sales-Supervision - Lodging 9110-05414	111	137	2,257	-	-	-	1,087	113	1,635	146	313	1,982	7,771
Transmission-Operation supervi - Lodging 8500-05414	0	0	0	0	303	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	303
Mains expenses - Lodging 8580-05414	0	0	0	288	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	288
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	9,428	25,837	8,238	15,636	7,939	9,683	9,973	9,789	13,887	10,501	13,308	21,919	155,917
Distribution-Other expenses - Lodging 8800-05414	0	0	0	0	363	-	-	494	-	-	-	-	857
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Lodging 9030-05414	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	175	371	-	-	-	546
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	156	70	640	20	375	103	-	21	426	100	20,883	36	22,809
Sales-Supervision - Misc Employee Expense 9110-05419	0	0	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Travel & Entertainment	28,284	52,558	26,896	31,413	22,555	26,180	33,519	29,932	42,217	39,470	56,744	67,872	487,520
Distribution-Operation supervi - Employee Development 8700-05420	0	0	89	1,898	249	1,025	520	-	2,288	-	490	1,975	8,533
Mains and Services Expenses - Employee Development 8740-05420	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,074
Sales-Supervision - Employee Development 9110-05420	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	-	-	-	-	-	250
Distribution-Operation supervi - Training 8700-05421	564	3	1,443	9	158	250	774	566	86	2,790	760	750	8,141
Mains and Services Expenses - Training 8740-05421	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,088	-	-	-	-	1,088
Miscellaneous general expenses - Training 9302-05421	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	520	-	-	-	-	520
Distribution-Operation supervi - Books & Manuals 8700-05424	0	0	0	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
Mains and Services Expenses - Books & Manuals 8740-05424	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	577
Distribution-Operation supervi - Regulatory Compliance Training 8700-05425	0	0	0	0	0	245	-	-	-	-	-	-	245
Distribution-Operation supervi - Safety Training 8700-05426	5,439	2,573	953	1,640	82	-	3,118	3,820	1,819	4,142	-	2,168	25,586
Distribution-Operation supervi - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8700-05427	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	610	-	610
Customer service-Miscellaneous - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8100-05427	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,590	1,590
Distribution-Operation supervi - Computer Skills & Systems Training 8700-05428	0	0	0	0	909	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	909
Distribution-Operation supervi - Work Environment Training 8700-05429	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	-	16
Training	6,003	2,576	2,515	3,564	1,397	1,520	4,471	5,994	3,993	6,932	1,855	8,374	49,204
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Contract Labor 9030-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	99	-	-	-	-	50
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	0	0	0	410,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,250	-	-	68,000
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	0	1,575	1,306	4,209	188	888	166	1,681	2,768	-	1,605	895	15,158
Transmission-Maintenance of co - Contract Labor 8840-06111	0	185	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	185
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-06111	28,911	2,722	3,428	940	9,570	5,229	2,832	11,327	3,501	2,013	487	40	72,001
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	393	(393)	-	-	-	-	616
Distribution-Measuring and req - Contract Labor 8770-06111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,675	-	-	-	-	3,675
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	87,968	91,415	85,790	83,136	97,003	102,591	95,876	89,875	94,504	77,408	81,897	87,244	1,074,818
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bill Print Fees 9030-06116	143,175	137,589	139,550	152,831	149,876	145,915	154,070	132,810	131,541	191,877	127,011	127,376	1,673,401
Distribution-Operation supervi - Legal 8700-06121	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-06121	0	37,782	8,878	5,139	21,915	21,680	12,088	14,292	7,059	-	15,105	21,056	164,985
Outside Services	281,053	271,228	238,953	556,257	278,353	276,302	265,366	249,632	243,872	213,548	226,044	304,645	3,484,953
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04863	(6,918)	(3,790)	(4,507)	(5,684)	(5,393)	(4,567)	(4,657)	(5,150)	(4,164)	(4,788)	(3,965)	(3,757)	(67,282)
Sales-Supervision - Misc General Expense 9110-07590	0	0	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Misc General Expense 9210-07590	(97,404)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1)	-	(97,405)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	36	7	236	-	-	540	635	(19)	27	(36)	678	1,937	4,041
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	0	5,614	2,235	(8,949)	916	804	3,925	(3,978)	(2,227)	1,262	2,296	(3,498)	(759)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	0	0	0	(128)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(128)
Miscellaneous	(104,289)	2,031	(2,066)	(13,851)	(4,410)	(3,424)	(96)	(9,145)	(6,365)	(3,562)	(1,052)	(5,318)	(151,502)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	523,311	802,941	824,587	1,095,933	775,668	755,678	785,580	919,771	721,490	1,326,377	697,810	839,729	10,056,876

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Non-project Labor 9030-01000	15,310	9,596	11,170	11,844	47,920
Sales-Supervision - Non-project Labor 9110-01000	11,019	7,435	7,435	7,435	33,324
Distribution-Operation supervi - Non-project Labor 8700-01000	226,338	136,979	136,475	134,345	633,138
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-project Labor 8750-01000	3,216	5,552	6,127	6,005	20,940
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor 8700-01001	354,475	240,051	238,466	229,804	1,062,836
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Contra 8700-01002	(354,313)	(239,317)	(236,427)	(224,486)	(1,054,543)
Mains expenses - O&M Project Labor and Contra 8550-01008	162	82	-	-	245
Distribution-Operation supervi - O&M Project Labor and Contra 8700-01006	3,162	363	(255)	924	4,195
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Expense Labor Accrual 8750-01008	536	1,142	1,080	245	3,003
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Expense Labor Accrual 9030-01008	(4,245)	327	2,146	898	(874)
Sales-Supervision - Expense Labor Accrual 9110-01008	(2,667)	394	1,115	372	(986)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Accrual 8700-01008	(58,233)	3,915	20,151	5,241	(28,926)
Distribution-Operation supervi - PTO Accrual 8700-01010	0	0	24,994	-	24,994
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Transfer In 8700-01011	331,264	221,637	220,478	208,537	981,908
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capital Labor Transfer Out 8700-01012	(331,416)	(222,371)	(222,517)	(213,659)	(989,959)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Transfer In 8700-01013	1,474	1,026	-	257	2,757
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Transfer In 8550-01013	162	82	-	-	245
Distribution-Operation supervi - Expense Labor Transfer Out 8700-01014	(3,162)	(363)	255	(924)	(4,195)
Mains expenses - Expense Labor Transfer Out 8550-01014	(162)	(82)	-	-	(245)
Labor	193,711	166,488	210,694	166,641	737,533
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Load 9260-01202	16,903	14,553	16,342	14,642	62,439
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Load 9260-01203	10,372	8,930	10,028	8,985	38,315
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Variance 9260-01208	(14,923)	(7,896)	(14,881)	(6,042)	(43,742)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Variance 9260-01207	(18,231)	(14,253)	(18,337)	(13,274)	(64,094)
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Variance 9250-01208	(8,970)	(7,429)	(8,198)	28,163	5,588
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Load 9250-01221	26,111	24,780	25,940	24,445	101,276
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Employer 401K Expense 9260-01239	(9,229)	-	9,229	0	0
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Load 9260-01251	35,728	30,780	34,540	30,547	131,874
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Variance 9260-01252	(34,938)	(2,749)	679	(26,010)	(63,018)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Medical Benefits Projects 9260-01253	301	207	-	48	556
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Load 9260-01257	7,875	6,781	7,614	8,822	29,091
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Variance 9260-01258	(2,100)	(1,758)	(803)	(1,451)	(6,210)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - ESOP Benefits Projects 9260-01259	87	46	-	11	124
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Load 9260-01260	192	165	186	166	709
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Variance 9260-01261	(1,003)	(925)	(982)	18,191	15,282
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - HSA Benefits Projects 9260-01262	2	1	-	0	4
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Load 9260-01263	768	662	743	666	2,838
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Variance 9260-01264	2,202	1,014	685	1,191	5,093
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSP FACC Benefits Projects 9260-01265	9	4	-	-	12
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Load 9260-01268	960	827	929	832	3,548
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Variance 9260-01267	(17)	396	(58)	(2,431)	(2,110)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Life Benefits Projects 9260-01268	9	6	-	1	16
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Load 9260-01269	1,537	1,323	1,486	1,331	5,676
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Variance 9260-01270	(822)	(186)	(875)	(4,196)	(6,079)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - LTD Benefits Projects 9260-01271	12	8	-	2	23
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Pension Benefits Projects 9260-01291	144	98	-	23	264
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - OPEB Benefits Projects 9260-01292	113	59	-	14	186
A&G-Injuries & damages - Workers Comp Benefits Projects 9260-01293	42	26	-	7	77
Benefits	15,111	55,457	64,167	83,101	217,836
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Service Awards 9260-07421	3,399	3,543	8,109	2,010	17,062
Distribution-Operation supervi - Uniforms 8700-07443	150	150	-	122	422
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Uniforms 9260-07443	335	-	-	-	335
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Uniforms Capitalized 9260-07444	(157)	-	-	-	(157)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Uniforms Capitalized 8700-07444	(70)	(140)	-	(113)	(323)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Capitalized Restricted Stock 9260-07450	(10,842)	(16,707)	(10,874)	(10,870)	(49,294)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Variable Pay & Mgmt Incentive Plans 9260-07452	127,000	172,358	184,000	239,000	722,358
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - VPP & MIP - Capital Credit 9260-07454	(73,000)	(95,810)	(105,000)	(137,000)	(410,810)
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Restricted Stock - Long Term Incent 9260-07458	12,614	12,207	12,614	12,614	50,048
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Long Term Incentive Plan - Time 9260-07460	9,014	8,723	9,014	9,014	35,764
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - RSU-Management Incentive Plan 9260-07483	0	15,838	-	-	15,838
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - COLI CSV & Premiums 9260-07487	435	435	435	435	1,738
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - NQ Retirement Cost 9260-07489	12,928	12,928	12,928	12,928	51,703
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - SERP Capitalized 9260-07490	(5,270)	(5,270)	(5,270)	(5,270)	(21,080)
A&G-Injuries & damages - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9260-07499	0	579	-	-	579
A&G-Employee pensions and bene - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 9260-07499	1,713	867	1,451	1,463	5,494
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Welfare Exp 8700-07499	621	(25)	1,557	2,423	4,576
Employee Welfare	78,866	109,474	108,960	126,753	424,053
A&G-Property Insurance - Blueflame Property Insurance 9240-04069	611	611	611	811	2,442
A&G-Injuries & damages - Insurance-Other 9250-04070	1,894	1,894	1,894	2,718	8,401
A&G-Property Insurance - Insurance Capitalized 9240-04072	(1,447)	(1,413)	(1,441)	(1,869)	(6,171)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Environmental & Safety 8700-07120	735	-	45	620	1,400
Insurance	1,793	1,092	1,109	2,079	6,073
Storage well royalties - Building Lease/Rents Capitalized 8250-04580	(102)	-	(2)	(123)	(227)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Building Lease/Rents Capitalized 8700-04580	0	(294)	-	-	(294)
Distribution-Rents - Building Lease/Rents Capitalized 8810-04580	(41,948)	(42,822)	(42,312)	(41,005)	(167,888)
Storage well royalties - Building Lease/Rents 8250-04581	788	-	13	1,138	1,937
Distribution-Operation supervi - Building Lease/Rents 8700-04581	0	608	-	-	608
Distribution-Rents - Building Lease/Rents 8810-04581	67,544	67,544	67,544	67,544	270,176
Distribution-Operation supervi - Building Maintenance 8700-04582	579	-	19	-	598
Distribution-Rents - Building Maintenance 8810-04582	4,729	6,089	1,813	3,605	16,015
Distribution-Rents - Utilities 8810-04590	(81)	-	-	-	(81)

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
 Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div.091)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-15	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Utilities 8570-04590	84	86	84	86	351
Lines expenses - Utilities 8170-04590	47	43	42	43	175
Compressor station expenses - Utilities 8190-04590	331	301	295	300	1,227
Compressor station fuel and po - Utilities 8190-04590	3,572	5	481	277	4,334
Storage-Purification expenses - Utilities 8210-04590	119	123	129	216	587
Distribution-Operation supervi - Utilities 8700-04590	4,288	3,285	3,318	3,290	14,150
Mains and Services Expenses - Utilities 8740-04590	436	408	450	448	1,743
Storage well royalties - Utilities 8250-04590	301	597	628	1,338	2,864
Mains expenses - Utilities 8560-04590	425	388	380	388	1,578
Transmission-Maintenance of me - Misc Rents 8650-04692	0	0	35	-	35
Distribution-Rents - Misc Rents 8810-04692	0	0	2,980	-	2,980
Distribution-Rents - Capitalized Utility Costs 8810-04599	(3,978)	(5,167)	(1,374)	(3,069)	(13,588)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized Utility Costs 8700-04599	(3,162)	(2,087)	(2,297)	(2,260)	(9,807)
Mains expenses - Capitalized Utility Costs 8560-04599	(369)	(330)	(323)	(328)	(1,341)
Compressor station expenses - Capitalized Utility Costs 8180-04599	(280)	(257)	(252)	(255)	(1,043)
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	33,382	28,702	31,453	31,615	125,121
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Lease Payments 8740-03002	9,845	9,928	11,360	3,712	34,846
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized transportation costs 8700-03003	0	(280)	(491)	(72)	(843)
Mains and Services Expenses - Capitalized transportation costs 8740-03003	(6)	(21,875)	(15,061)	(7,764)	(44,708)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Vehicle Expense 8700-03004	324	195	959	124	1,602
Mains and Services Expenses - Vehicle Expense 8740-03004	7,925	5,558	10,317	6,138	29,937
Mains and Services Expenses - Equipment Lease 8740-04301	16	16	16	16	64
Mains and Services Expenses - Heavy Equipment 8740-04302	437	2,321	55	116	2,928
Mains and Services Expenses - Heavy Equipment Capitalized 8740-04307	(444)	(2,290)	(70)	(129)	(2,932)
Vehicles & Equip	18,196	(6,427)	7,085	2,140	20,994
Mains and Services Expenses - Non-Inventory Supplies 8740-02005	1,733	936	344	233	3,246
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-Inventory Supplies 8750-02005	1,160	2,175	946	1,017	5,299
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Non-Inventory Supplies 8770-02005	0	907	54	-	961
Transmission-Measuring and reg - Non-Inventory Supplies 8570-02005	0	0	0	18	18
Transmission-Maintenance of me - Non-Inventory Supplies 8650-02005	0	0	17	-	17
Distribution-Operation supervi - Non-Inventory Supplies 8700-02005	1,742	27	-	233	2,001
Sales-Supervision - Office Supplies 9110-05010	0	0	60	-	60
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Office Supplies 9210-05010	107	-	-	-	107
Distribution-Operation supervi - Office Supplies 8700-05010	5,882	5,626	5,640	6,214	24,361
Mains and Services Expenses - Office Supplies 8740-05010	0	0	600	-	600
Materials & Supplies	11,624	9,670	7,661	7,715	36,671
Distribution-Operation supervi - Software Maintenance 8700-04201	3,113	3,004	3,513	4,367	14,016
Distribution-Operation supervi - IT Equipment 8700-04212	0	195	1,909	491	2,578
Information Technologies	3,113	3,198	5,415	4,877	16,594
Mains and Services Expenses - Monthly Lines and service 8740-05310	29	7	27	58	122
Distribution-Operation supervi - Monthly Lines and service 8700-05310	3,384	1,212	3,252	2,342	10,189
Distribution-Operation supervi - Long Distance 8700-05312	380	330	284	263	1,256
Distribution-Operation supervi - Toll Free Long Distance 8700-05314	188	182	185	184	740
Distribution-Operation supervi - Telephone Directory 8700-05317	5,365	-	10,806	4,224	20,496
Distribution-Operation supervi - Measurement & Meter Reading 8700-05323	6,806	5,445	6,813	6,378	25,442
Distribution-Operation supervi - WAN/LAN/Internet Service 8700-05331	15,380	21,272	13,105	15,369	65,106
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cellular, radio, pager charges 8700-05364	8,571	8,956	2,888	7,322	27,737
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cell service for data uses 8700-05376	22,805	17,088	7,184	26,853	73,911
Distribution-Operation supervi - Cell phone equipment and accessories 8700-05377	1,052	3,400	523	1,071	6,105
Mains and Services Expenses - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8740-05399	(17)	(4)	(16)	(33)	(69)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Capitalized Telecom Costs 8700-05399	(29,891)	(29,614)	(15,766)	(29,891)	(105,283)
Telecom	34,033	28,333	29,366	34,039	125,771
Distribution-Operation supervi - Required By Law, Safety 8700-04002	1,559	42,730	4,382	19,052	67,723
Sales-Advertising expenses - Promo Other, Misc 9130-04021	0	0	191	-	191
Distribution-Operation supervi - Community Rel&Trade Shows 8700-04040	200	-	-	-	200
Customer service-Miscellaneous - Customer Relations & Assist 9100-04046	16	50	80	86	213
Sales-Supervision - Customer Relations & Assist 9110-04046	0	500	-	-	500
Sales-Advertising expenses - Customer Relations & Assist 9130-04046	0	525	3,223	-	3,748
Marketing	1,776	43,805	7,858	19,138	72,575
Distribution-Operation supervi - Printing/Slides/Graphics 8700-04145	0	9	-	-	9
Directors & Shareholders & PR	0	9	-	-	9
Distribution-Operation supervi - Membership Fees 8700-05415	100	-	2	185	287
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Club Dues - Deductible 9030-05417	0	0	165	-	165
Distribution-Operation supervi - Association Dues 8700-07510	0	0	1,000	-	1,000
Miscellaneous general expenses - Association Dues 9302-07510	7,286	7,266	7,266	-	21,797
Dues & Donations	7,386	7,266	8,433	185	23,249
Distribution-Operation supervi - Postage/Delivery Services 8700-05111	779	1,182	849	1,018	3,808
Odorization - Postage/Delivery Services 8711-05111	0	0	0	142	142
Mains and Services Expenses - Postage/Delivery Services 8740-05111	0	13	-	-	13
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Postage/Delivery Services 9210-05111	16	-	-	10	26
Print & Postages	795	1,174	849	1,170	3,998
Transmission-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8500-05411	62	-	-	-	62
Distribution-Operation supervi - Meals and Entertainment 8700-05411	5,688	5,042	3,610	10,008	24,548
Distribution-Measuring and reg - Meals and Entertainment 8750-05411	166	166	219	-	551
Distribution-Other expenses - Meals and Entertainment 8800-05411	0	0	0	40	40
Sales-Supervision - Meals and Entertainment 9110-05411	136	-	1,842	-	1,978
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Meals and Entertainment 9210-05411	0	89	-	-	89
Distribution-Operation supervi - Spousal & Dependent Travel 8700-05412	212	31	237	-	480

Atmos Energy Corporation
Operation & Maintenance Expenses
Atmos Energy-KY/Mid-States (Div 091)

	Oct-15	Nov-15	Dec-15	Jan-16	Total YTD Fiscal 2016
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Transportation 9210-05413	0	394	-	-	394
Distribution-Operation supervi - Transportation 8700-05413	7,809	10,631	8,731	7,166	34,337
Distribution-Other expenses - Transportation 8800-05413	0	0	0	169	169
Sales-Supervision - Transportation 9110-05413	(114)	-	2,073	63	2,022
Sales-Supervision - Lodging 9110-05414	888	-	1,763	-	2,651
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Lodging 9210-05414	0	0	287	-	287
Distribution-Operation supervi - Lodging 8700-05414	11,343	8,231	9,201	12,987	38,762
Distribution-Measuring and req - Lodging 8750-05414	668	1,212	158	-	2,238
Distribution-Other expenses - Lodging 8800-05414	0	0	0	639	639
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc Employee Expense 8700-05419	56	12	-	67	135
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc Employee Expense 8740-05419	0	58	-	-	58
Travel & Entertainment	27,112	23,866	25,302	31,139	107,419
Distribution-Operation supervi - Employee Development 8700-05420	0	549	394	-	943
Distribution-Measuring and req - Employee Development 8750-05420	0	0	0	1,200	1,200
Sales-Supervision - Employee Development 9110-05420	0	0	98	-	98
Distribution-Operation supervi - Training 8700-05421	0	0	0	1,500	1,500
Distribution-Operation supervi - Safety Training 8700-05428	210	417	87	-	694
Distribution-Operation supervi - Technical (Job Skills) Training 8700-05427	(610)	-	-	-	(610)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Work Environment Training 8700-05428	0	4	-	-	4
Training	(400)	970	559	2,700	3,829
A&G-Office supplies & expense - Contract Labor 9210-06111	0	0	(68,000)	-	(68,000)
A&G-Outside services employed - Contract Labor 9230-06111	909	3,824	1,792	1,367	7,891
Distribution-Operation supervi - Contract Labor 8700-08111	266	126	126	126	643
Mains and Services Expenses - Contract Labor 8740-08111	0	0	5,754	-	5,754
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Collection Fees 9030-06112	85,728	85,366	81,183	79,702	331,979
Customer accounts-Customer rec - Bill Print Fees 9030-06116	132,548	137,111	129,081	136,796	536,535
A&G-Outside services employed - Legal 9230-08121	14,827	11,255	10,755	10,498	47,335
Outside Services	234,278	237,661	160,691	228,487	861,137
A&G-Administrative & general s - A&G Overhead Clearing 9200-04863	(4,222)	(3,431)	(13,270)	(5,966)	(26,889)
Distribution-Operation supervi - Misc General Expense 8700-07590	127	325	(8)	-	444
Mains and Services Expenses - Misc General Expense 8740-07590	1,995	774	(2,789)	1,455	1,455
Distribution-Operation supervi - Reimbursements 8700-09911	0	0	(2,487)	(562)	(3,029)
Miscellaneous	(2,101)	(2,332)	(18,514)	(5,072)	(28,019)
Total O&M Expenses Before Allocations	658,825	708,414	651,086	736,708	2,754,832

Atmos Energy Corporation
Kentucky / Mid-States Division
Kentucky Operations
Case No. 2015-00343
AG 1 - 8 Part B

	Base	Test	Difference	Explanation
Labor	\$ 1,167,647.53	\$ 1,309,001.78	\$ 141,354.24	12.11% The increase is primarily driven by: 1.) assumed merit increase of 3% in FY16 budget and additional 3% for October '16 to May '17 (FY17 Budget). 2.) The average labor expense percentage for the actual months of March '15 to August '15 (base period) is 40%. The budgeted FY16 expense rate for the general office is 44%. The test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Benefits	\$ 542,524.58	\$ 735,823.04	\$ 193,298.46	35.63% The actual months of the base period include a positive benefit variance (actual claims paid were less than the budgeted benefits load factor). Positive or negative load factor variances are not assumed in the budget (test year)
Employee Welfare	\$ 889,407.15	\$ 584,207.06	\$ (305,200.09)	-34.32% Test year based on FY 2016 budget where assumption of normal (100% of target) incentive payout is anticipated. Incentive compensation is removed from revenue requirement as a ratemaking adjustment.
Insurance	\$ 121,590.19	\$ 215,431.02	\$ 93,840.83	77.18% Insurance is budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As insurance expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Rent, Maint., & Utilities	\$ 180,109.42	\$ 192,090.96	\$ 11,981.54	6.65% Increase due to extension of lease at division office headquarters.
Vehicles & Equip	\$ 37,854.85	\$ 39,269.62	\$ 1,414.76	3.74% Change between base and test period is \$1,414.76 and immaterial.
Materials & Supplies	\$ 106,611.69	\$ 136,815.31	\$ 30,203.62	28.33% Items such as odorant and office supplies are budgeted at the general Office rate division (091). As these expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division when applicable.
Information Technologies	\$ 54,539.05	\$ 50,940.64	\$ (3,598.41)	-6.60% Change between base and test period is \$3,598.41 and immaterial.
Telecom	\$ 232,457.84	\$ 305,604.56	\$ 73,146.72	31.47% Some telecom expenses are budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As actual expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division where applicable. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Marketing	\$ 179,954.10	\$ 213,259.53	\$ 33,305.43	18.51% Marketing expenses are largely budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As actual expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division where applicable. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Directors & Shareholders & PR	\$ 1,043.27	\$ 2,503.61	\$ 1,460.35	139.98% Change between base and test period is \$1,460.35 and immaterial.
Dues & Donations	\$ 77,659.70	\$ 93,301.05	\$ 15,641.34	20.14% Dues and Donations are primarily budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As actual expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division when applicable. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Print & Postages	\$ 6,015.18	\$ 6,050.64	\$ 35.47	0.59% Change between base and test period is \$35.47 and immaterial.
Travel & Entertainment	\$ 267,182.86	\$ 291,375.00	\$ 24,192.13	9.05% Increase in Division representation on Enterprise teams and associated travel costs.
Training	\$ 32,540.63	\$ 43,467.15	\$ 10,926.52	33.58% Expected increase in registration costs for attending various conferences (i.e. Safety, Compliance, Rates, Human Resources, etc.)
Outside Services	\$ 1,615,040.10	\$ 1,853,658.34	\$ 238,618.24	14.77% Legal is budgeted at the General Office rate division (091). As legal expenses are incurred, they are coded to the state specific rate division. As such, the test period is largely based on the FY 2016 budget.
Provision for Bad Debt	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	0.00% N/A
Miscellaneous	\$ (14,309.35)	\$ (2,742.68)	\$ 11,566.66	-80.83% Change in A&G overhead clearing 9200-04863.
Total O&M Expenses	\$ 5,497,868.79	\$ 6,070,056.61	\$ 572,187.81	

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-09
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to Exhibit GKW-2, which shows base year and test year allocated amounts by division and cost element and the difference in the test year compared to the base year.

- a. Please identify and describe all reasons why the "Labor" and "Benefits" for the "Division General Office" show cost increases of 12% and 36%, respectively, while the "Employee Welfare" costs, which includes incentive compensation costs, shows a decrease of 34%.
- b. Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att30 - O&M for KY - Fall 2015 case_updated" provided in response to Staff 1-59 supporting Exhibit GKW -2 and the tab entitled "final summary," which shows the amount of incentive compensation in the test year compared to the base year. Please identify and describe all reasons for the change in incentive compensation expense in the test year compared to the base year for each division.
- c. Please confirm that the Company removed *all* incentive compensation expense from the test year revenue requirement, including "short-term cash incentive awards," as shown on page 3 of the Atmos 2015 proxy statement. Please indicate if "short term cash incentive awards" are shown on Schedule F -10 and, if so, indicate which lines include these amounts and provide the amounts that are included.

RESPONSE:

- a) Please see the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-08 subpart (b).
- b) The Company has removed all incentive compensation from this filing consistent with the final Order from Case No. 2013-00148 and is not seeking recovery of the referenced expenses.
- c) Confirm. The Company has removed all incentive compensation from this filing consistent with the final Order from Case No. 2013-00148. "Short-term cash incentive awards" as referenced in the request are within the VPP and MIP plans listed on Schedule F-10.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-10
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please provide a copy of the summary pages for all Cash Working Capital lead/lag studies submitted in other rate proceedings in other jurisdictions over the last five years and identify the states and case citations for each.

RESPONSE:

Please see the following summary of Cash Working Capital lead/lag studies Atmos Energy has submitted in jurisdictions other than Kentucky between CY 2010 and CY 2015. Please see Attachment 1 for the related summary pages from these studies.

Colorado	Docket No. 13AL-0496G Docket No. 14AL-0300G Docket No. 15AL-0299G
Mid-Tex	GUD 10170 (2012)
Tennessee	Docket No. 12-00064 Docket No. 14-00146
Virginia	Case No. PUE-2015-00119
West Texas	GUD 10174 (2012) 2013 Statement of Intent (city-level)

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-10_Att1 - Atmos Energy CWC Summary Pages.pdf, 12 Pages.

Respondent: Greg Waller

Schedule CWC1

Atmos Energy Corporation - Colorado Service Area
Cash-Basis Cash Working Capital Analysis
Test Year Ended December 31, 2012

Line No.	Description	Amount	CWC Factor	Cash Working Capital
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Gas Purchased	51,775,138	(0.029452)	(1,524,881)
2				
3	<u>O&M Expense:</u>			
4	Labor O&M	5,665,015	0.029014	164,365
5	Other O&M	8,134,548	0.007644	62,180
6				
7	Franchise Tax	2,711,555	(0.042082)	(114,108)
8	Sales Tax	3,172,923	(0.010932)	(34,686)
9				
10	State Income Tax	480,387	(0.017205)	(8,265)
11	Federal Income Tax	3,463,319	(0.017205)	(59,586)
12	Other Taxes	2,265,142	(0.555260)	(1,257,743)
13				
14	Total	<u>\$77,668,027</u>		<u>(\$2,772,724)</u>

Schedule CWC1

Atmos Energy Corporation - Colorado Service Area
Cash-Basis Cash Working Capital Analysis
Test Year Ended December 31, 2013

Line No.	Description (a)	Amount (b)	CWC Factor (c)	Cash Working Capital (d)
1	Gas Purchased	74,284,446	(0.030548)	(2,269,241)
2				
3	<u>O&M Expense:</u>			
4	Labor O&M	5,835,949	0.026411	154,133
5	Other O&M	9,947,637	(0.012000)	(119,372)
6				
7	Franchise Tax	3,041,301	(0.046082)	(140,149)
8	Sales Tax	3,507,592	(0.013808)	(48,433)
9				
10	State Income Tax	501,673	(0.020082)	(10,075)
11	Federal Income Tax	3,616,781	(0.020082)	(72,632)
12	Other Taxes	2,354,754	(0.564877)	(1,330,147)
13				
14	Total	<u>\$103,090,133</u>		<u>(3,835,915)</u>

Schedule CWC1

Atmos Energy Corporation - Colorado Service Area
Cash-Basis Cash Working Capital Analysis
Test Year Ended December 31, 2014

Line No.	Description (a)	Amount (b)	CWC Factor (c)	Cash Working Capital (d)
1	Gas Purchased	\$ 76,248,824	(0.019726)	\$(1,504,084)
2				
3	<u>O&M Expense:</u>			
4	Labor O&M	5,935,506	0.045205	268,315
5	Other O&M	8,624,556	0.039041	336,711
6				
7	Franchise Tax	3,484,729	(0.026301)	(91,652)
8	Sales Tax	4,043,314	(0.002712)	(10,965)
9				
10	State Income Tax	580,197	(0.008301)	(4,816)
11	Federal Income Tax	4,182,892	(0.008301)	(34,722)
12	Other Taxes	2,622,760	(0.585918)	(1,536,722)
13				
14	Total	<u>\$ 105,722,777</u>		<u>\$(2,577,936)</u>

Atmos Energy Corporation-Mid Tex
Cash Working Capital Lead/Lag Analysis
For Test Period Twelve Months Ended September 30, 2011

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense (b) / 365 days	Revenue Lag	Expense Lag	Net Lag (d) - (e)	CWC Requirement (c) x (f)
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	588,359,610	1,611,944	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 3 40.40	(4.15)	(6,688,880)
3	Upstream Gas	144,363,267	395,516	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 3 38.20	(1.95)	(771,256)
4	Total Gas Expense	<u>732,722,877</u>	<u>2,007,460</u>				<u>(7,460,136)</u>
5							
6	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
7	O&M, Labor	56,457,085	154,677	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 4 25.71	10.54	1,630,295
8	O&M, Non-Labor	96,063,392	263,187	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 5 28.73	7.52	1,979,169
9	Total O&M Expense	<u>152,520,477</u>	<u>417,864</u>				<u>3,609,464</u>
10							
11							
12	Taxes Other Than Income [1]						
13	Ad Valorem	21,129,326	57,889	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 213.50	(177.25)	(10,260,748)
14	Payroll Taxes	2,722,791	7,460	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 31.61	4.64	34,613
15	Local Gross Receipts Tax	28,034,548	76,807	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 99.24	(62.99)	(4,838,256)
16	Railroad Commission Fee	63,120	173	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 94.84	(58.59)	(10,132)
17							
18	Allocated Taxes-Shared Services						
19	Ad Valorem	278,713	764	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 213.50	(177.25)	(135,348)
20	Payroll Taxes	1,715,908	4,701	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 6 31.61	4.64	21,813
21	Total Taxes Other Than Income	<u>53,944,406</u>	<u>147,793</u>				<u>(15,188,058)</u>
22							
23	Franchise Tax/State Margin Tax	4,684,638	12,835	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 7 (47.00)	83.25	1,068,483
24							
25	Federal Income Tax						
26	Current Taxes	0	0	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 8 36.75	(0.50)	0
27							
28	Interest on Customer Deposits	26,170	72	Sch 2 36.25	Sch 9 331.83	(295.58)	(21,193)
29							
30	TOTAL	943,898,568	2,586,023				(17,991,440)

[1] Excludes DOT tax, State Gross Receipts Tax and Prepaid Local Gross Receipts Tax.

Atmos Energy Corporation-Tennessee
Cash Working Capital Lead/Lag Analysis
For Attrition Period Ended November 30, 2013

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense (b) / 365 days	Revenue Lag	Expense Lag	Net Lag (d) - (e)	CWC Requirement (c) x (f)
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	69,266,324	189,771	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 3 39.46	(2.98)	(565,518)
3							
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
5	O&M, Labor	7,362,569	20,171	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 4 14.14	22.34	450,620
6	O&M, Non-Labor	13,507,187	37,006	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 5 22.78	13.70	506,982
7	Total O&M Expense	20,869,756					957,602
8							
9							
10	Taxes Other Than Income						
11	Ad Valorem	3,318,150	9,091	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(1,863,837)
12	State Gross Receipts Tax	1,228,602	3,366	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 (151.50)	187.98	632,741
13	Payroll Taxes	280,781	769	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	13,298
14	Franchise Tax	602,000	1,649	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 37.00	(0.52)	(857)
15	TRA Inspection Fee	433,803	1,189	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 272.50	(236.02)	(280,628)
16	DOT	18,035	49	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 60.00	(23.52)	(1,152)
17							
18	Allocated Taxes-Shared Services						
19	Ad Valorem	21% 60,510	166	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(34,033)
20	Payroll Taxes	79% 227,633	624	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	10,791
21							
22	Allocated Taxes-Business Unit						
23	Ad Valorem	45% 42,039	115	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(23,577)
24	Payroll Taxes	55% 51,381	141	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	2,438
25	Total Taxes Other Than Income	6,262,934					(1,544,818)
26							
27	Federal Income Tax	6,345,272					
28	Current Taxes	1,938,704	5,312	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 7 37.00	(0.52)	(2,762)
29	Deferred Taxes	4,406,568	12,073	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 7 0.00	36.48	440,423
30							
31	State Excise Tax	1,260,891					
32	Current Taxes	385,246	1,055	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 8 37.00	(0.52)	(549)
33	Deferred Taxes	875,644	2,399	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 8 0.00	36.48	87,516
34							
35	Depreciation	10,620,298	29,097	Sch 2 36.48	0	36.48	1,061,459
36							
37	Interest on Customer Deposits	129,748	355	Sch 2 36.48	15.5	20.98	7,448
38							
39	Interest Expense - LTD	6,426,760	17,608	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 9 91.19	(54.71)	(963,251)
40							
41	Interest Expense - STD	41,732	114	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 10 24.05	12.43	1,417
42							
43	Return on Equity	11,760,772	32,221	Sch 2 36.48	0	36.48	1,175,422
44							
45							
46	TOTAL	132,984,486					652,972

Atmos Energy Corporation-Tennessee
Cash Working Capital Lead/Lag Analysis
For Test Year Ended March 31, 2012

Line No.	Description (a)	Test Year Expenses (b)	Average Daily Expense (b) / 365 days (c)	Revenue Lag (d)	Expense Lag (e)	Net Lag (d) - (e) (f)	CWC Requirement (c) x (f) (g)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	69,266,324	189,771	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 3 39.46	(2.98)	(565,517)
3							
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
5	O&M, Labor	6,792,433	18,609	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 4 14.14	22.34	415,734
6	O&M, Non-Labor	10,521,682	28,827	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 5 22.78	13.70	394,923
7	Total O&M Expense	17,314,115					810,658
8							
9							
10	Taxes Other Than Income						
11	Ad Valorem	3,045,257	8,343	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(1,710,517)
12	State Gross Receipts Tax	1,554,329	4,258	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 (151.50)	187.98	800,501
13	Payroll Taxes	267,597	733	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	12,678
14	Franchise Tax	527,019	1,444	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 37.00	(0.52)	(751)
15	TRA Inspection Fee	460,103	1,261	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 272.50	(236.02)	(297,517)
16	DOT	36,570	100	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 60.00	(23.52)	(2,357)
17							
18	Allocated Taxes-Shared Services						
19	Ad Valorem	21% 54,203	149	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(30,445)
20	Payroll Taxes	79% 203,905	559	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	9,660
21							
22	Allocated Taxes-Business Unit						
23	Ad Valorem	45% 34,194	94	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 241.50	(205.02)	(19,207)
24	Payroll Taxes	55% 41,792	114	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 6 19.19	17.29	1,980
25	Total Taxes Other Than Income	6,224,968					(1,235,973)
26							
27	Federal Income Tax	5,971,359					
28	Current Taxes	2,841,794	7,786	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 7 37.00	(0.52)	(4,049)
29	Deferred Taxes	3,129,565	8,574	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 7 0.00	36.48	312,785
30							
31	State Excise Tax	1,188,769					
32	Current Taxes	565,740	1,550	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 8 37.00	(0.52)	(806)
33	Deferred Taxes	623,029	1,707	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 8 0.00	36.48	62,269
34							
35	Depreciation	10,216,011	27,989	Sch 2 36.48	0	36.48	1,021,041
36							
37	Interest on Customer Deposits	123,809	339	Sch 2 36.48	15.5	20.98	7,116
38							
39	Interest Expense - LTD	6,059,162	16,600	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 10 91.19	(54.71)	(908,133)
40							
41	Interest Expense - STD	39,345	108	Sch 2 36.48	Sch 10 24.05	12.43	1,343
42							
43	Return on Equity	11,086,445	30,374	Sch 2 36.48	0	36.48	1,108,037
44							
45							
46	TOTAL	127,490,307					607,429

Atmos Energy Corporation-Tennessee
Cash Working Capital Lead/Lag Analysis
For Attrition Period Ended May 31, 2016

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense (b) / 366 days	Revenue Lag	Expense Lag	Net Lag (d) - (e)	CWC Requirement (c) x (f)
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	87,478,439	239,012 CWC2	37.50 CWC3	39.33	(1.83)	(437,392)
3							
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
5	O&M, Labor	7,915,572	21,627 CWC2	37.50 CWC4	14.07	23.43	506,721
6	O&M, Non-Labor	12,100,932	33,063 CWC2	37.50 CWC5	29.40	8.10	267,810
7	Total O&M Expense	20,016,504					774,531
8							
9							
10	Taxes Other Than Income						
11	Ad Valorem	3,801,021	10,385 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	(2,118,540)
12	State Gross Receipts Tax	1,241,962	3,393 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	(151.50)	189.00	641,277
13	Payroll Taxes	272,080	743 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	15,569
14	Franchise Tax	622,004	1,699 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	37.50	0.00	0
15	TRA Inspection Fee	530,084	1,448 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	272.50	(235.00)	(340,280)
16	DOT	0	0 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	59.00	(21.50)	0
17							
18	Allocated Taxes-Shared Services						
19	Ad Valorem	16% 49,974	137 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	(27,948)
20	Payroll Taxes	84% 255,485	698 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	14,626
21							
22	Allocated Taxes-Business Unit						
23	Ad Valorem	46% 48,815	133 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	(27,132)
24	Payroll Taxes	54% 57,959	158 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	3,311
25	Total Taxes Other Than Income	6,879,384					(1,839,117)
26							
27	Federal Income Tax	8,128,108					
28	Current Taxes	2,864,727	7,827 CWC2	37.50 CWC7	37.50	0.00	0
29	Deferred Taxes	5,263,381	14,381 CWC2	37.50 CWC7	0.00	37.50	539,288
30							
31	State Excise Tax	1,614,444					
32	Current Taxes	569,006	1,555 CWC2	37.50 CWC8	37.50	0.00	0
33	Deferred Taxes	1,045,438	2,856 CWC2	37.50 CWC8	0.00	37.50	107,100
34							
35	Depreciation	12,468,039	34,066 CWC2	37.50	0	37.50	1,277,475
36							
37	Interest on Customer Deposits	118,049	323 CWC2	37.50	182.5	(145.00)	(46,835)
38							
39	Interest Expense - LTD	6,623,097	18,096 CWC2	37.50 CWC9	91.25	(53.75)	(972,660)
40							
41	Return on Equity	15,166,903	41,440 CWC2	37.50	0	37.50	1,554,000
42							
43							
44	TOTAL	158,492,968					956,389

Atmos Energy Corporation-Tennessee
 Cash Working Capital Lead/Lag Analysis
 For Test Year Ended June 30, 2014

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense (b) / 365 days	Revenue Lag	Expense Lag	Net Lag (d) - (e)	CWC Requirement (c) x (f)	
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	
1	Gas Supply Expense							
2	Purchased Gas	87,478,439	239,667 CWC2	37.50 Sch 3	39.33	(1.83)	(438,591)	
3								
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense							
5	O&M, Labor	7,652,390	20,965 CWC2	37.50 Sch 4	14.07	23.43	491,221	
6	O&M, Non-Labor	12,983,102	35,570 CWC2	37.50 Sch 5	29.40	8.10	288,118	
7	Total O&M Expense	20,635,493					779,339	
8								
9								
10	Taxes Other Than Income							
11	Ad Valorem	3,498,394	9,585 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	(1,955,267)	
12	State Gross Receipts Tax	1,084,335	2,971 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	(151.50)	189.00	561,478	
13	Payroll Taxes	257,296	705 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	14,771	
14	Franchise Tax	618,254	1,694 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	37.50	0.00	0	
15	TRA Inspection Fee	425,046	1,165 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	272.50	(235.00)	(273,660)	
16	DOT	19,392	53 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	59.00	(21.50)	(1,142)	
17								
18	Allocated Taxes-Shared Services							
19	Ad Valorem	0%	0	0 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	0
20	Payroll Taxes	100%	247,649	678 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	14,217
21								
22	Allocated Taxes-Business Unit							
23	Ad Valorem	10%	6,231	17 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	241.50	(204.00)	(3,482)
24	Payroll Taxes	90%	55,697	153 CWC2	37.50 CWC6	16.55	20.95	3,198
25	Total Taxes Other Than Income	6,212,295					(1,639,888)	
26								
27	Federal Income Tax	7,465,832						
28	Current Taxes	0	0 CWC2	37.50 CWC7	37.50	0.00	0	
29	Deferred Taxes	7,465,832	20,454 CWC2	37.50 CWC7	0.00	37.50	767,038	
30								
31	State Excise Tax	1,483,046						
32	Current Taxes	0	0 CWC2	37.50 CWC8	37.50	0.00	0	
33	Deferred Taxes	1,483,046	4,063 CWC2	37.50 CWC8	0.00	37.50	152,368	
34								
35	Depreciation	10,700,686	29,317 CWC2	37.50	0	37.50	1,099,386	
36								
37	Interest on Customer Deposits	110,242	302 CWC2	37.50	182.5	(145.00)	(43,795)	
38								
39	Interest Expense - LTD	6,084,048	16,669 CWC2	37.50 CWC9	91.25	(53.75)	(895,939)	
40								
41	Return on Equity	13,927,092	38,156 CWC2	37.50	0	37.50	1,430,866	
42								
43								
44	TOTAL	154,097,173					1,210,783	

Atmos Energy Corporation-Virginia
Lead / Lag Cash Working Capital Calculation - Total Company Per Books (GAAP)
TME: September 30, 2015
Case No. PUE-2015-00119

Line No.	Cost Category (1)	Per Books Expense (2)	Daily Amount (3)=(2)/365	Rev Lag Days (4)	Expense Lead Days (5)	Reference (6)	Net Lag Days (7)=(4)-(5)	Working Capital Req. (8)=(3)*(7)
1	OPERATING EXPENSES:							
2	Purchased Gas Expense	\$ 1,043,550,773	\$ 2,859,043	40.93	39.63	Sheet 4	1.30	\$ 3,706,847
3	Deferred Gas Expense	(63,125,790)	(172,947)	40.93	40.93	Note 3	0.00	-
4	Stored Gas Expense	48,197,347	132,048	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	5,404,725
5	Prepaid Insurance Expense	12,457,311	34,130	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	1,396,841
6	Payroll Costs	178,828,231	489,940	40.93	14.10	Sheet 5	26.83	13,145,090
7	Employee Benefits Expense	35,591,227	97,510	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	3,991,084
8	Incentive Compensation Exp	34,408,040	94,269	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	3,858,430
9	Pension and RIP Expense	25,899,122	70,956	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	2,904,229
10	OPEB Expense	12,871,162	35,263	40.93	63.41	Sheet 6	(22.48)	(792,676)
11	Other O & M Costs:							
12	Accrued Vacation	(4,370,892)	(11,975)	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	(490,137)
13	Uncollectible Expense	15,904,325	43,573	40.93	459.53	Sheet 7	(418.60)	(18,239,459)
14	Injuries and Damage Expense	26,254,702	71,931	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	2,944,136
15	Other	181,279,089	496,655	40.93	36.70	Sheet 8	4.23	2,100,851
16	Depreciation and Amort Exp	281,102,498	770,144	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	31,521,994
17								
18	TAXES OTHER THAN INCOME:							
19	Payroll Tax Expense	13,874,044	38,011	40.93	19.25	Sheet 9	21.68	824,032
20	Property Tax Expense	93,719,214	256,765	40.93	100.03	Sheet 10	(59.10)	(15,175,930)
21	Other Taxes	123,369,644	337,999	40.93	31.96	Sheet 11	8.97	3,032,213
22	TOTAL OPERATING EXP & OTH TAX	2,059,810,047						
23	INCOME TAXES:							
24	Current (including state)	(9,898,087)	(27,118)	40.93	37.50	Sheet 12	3.43	(93,015)
25	Deferred FIT included in RB	194,351,594	532,470	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	21,793,997
26	TOTAL INCOME TAX EXP	184,453,507						
27	OTHER EXPENSES:							
28	Charitable Donations	3,456,343	9,469	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
29	Interest on Customer Deposits	665,643	1,824	40.93	182.50	Sheet 13	(141.57)	(258,224)
30	Interest Expense on LT Debt	144,874,613	396,917	40.93	91.25	Sheet 14	(50.32)	(19,972,863)
31	AFUDC	(2,374,770)	(6,506)	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
32	Other Income	(14,974,677)	(41,027)	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
33	TOTAL OTHER INCOME	131,647,153						
34	Income Avail for Common Eq	299,475,209	820,480	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
35	Subtotal							41,602,265
36	Customer Utility Taxes	707,783	1,939	40.93	27.76	Sheet 15	13.17	25,537
37	State & Local Consumption Taxes	366,594	1,004	40.93	32.71	Sheet 16	8.22	8,248
38	Plus: Balance Sheet Analysis					Schedule 28		(374,367)
39								41,261,683

Note 5: 0 Net Lead days assigned in compliance with Staff Report
 Note 1: Item is included in the Balance Sheet Analysis; therefore, 0 lead days assigned.
 Note 2: 0 Net Lead days assigned in compliance with the Staff in Case No. PUE950033.
 Note 3: Per Case No. PUE950033, 0 Cash Working Capital used due to a timing difference between deferred gas expense and the average defer

Atmos Energy Corporation-Virginia
Lead / Lag Cash Working Capital Calculation - Jurisdictional Per Books (GAAP)
TME: September 30, 2015
Case No. PUE-2015-00119

Line No.	Cost Category (1)	Alloc Factor Ref (2)	Alloc Factor % (3)	Jurisdictional Per Books Expense (4)	Allocated Per Books Expense (5)=(3)*(4)	Juris. Daily Amount (6)=(5)/365	Rev Lag Days (7)	Expense Lead Days (8)	Ref (9)	Net Lag Days (10)=(7)-(8)	Jurisdictional CWC Requirement (11)=(10)*(6)
1	OPERATING EXPENSES:										
2	Purchased Gas Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	\$ 23,490,569	\$ 21,204,936	\$ 58,096	40.93	39.63	Sheet 4	1.30	\$ 75,323
3	Deferred Gas Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	-	-	-	40.93	40.93	Note 3	0.00	-
4	Stored Gas Expense	WP 40-1 "AA"	86.980%	844,857	734,856	2,013	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	82,392
5	Prepaid Insurance Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	5,238	4,728	13	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	532
6	Payroll costs	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	976,858	881,809	2,416	40.93	14.10	Sheet 5	26.83	64,821
7	Employee Benefits Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	226,415	204,385	560	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	22,921
8	Incentive Compensation	WP 40-1 "S"	89.880%	144,593	129,960	356	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	14,571
9	Pension and RIP expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	84,239	76,043	208	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	8,513
10	OPEB expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	121,932	110,068	302	40.93	63.41	Sheet 6	(22.48)	(6,789)
11	Other O & M Costs:										
12	Accrued Vacation	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	(411,103)	(371,103)	(1,017)	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	(41,626)
13	Uncollectible Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	115,921	104,642	287	40.93	459.53	Sheet 7	(418.60)	(120,137)
14	Injuries and Damage Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	3,418	3,086	8	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	327
15	Other	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	804,089	725,851	1,989	40.93	36.70	Sheet 8	4.23	8,413
16	Depreciation and Amort Exp	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	2,300,769	2,076,904	5,690	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	232,892
17											
18	TAXES OTHER THAN INCOME										
19	Payroll Tax Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	130,025	117,373	322	40.93	19.25	Sheet 9	21.68	6,981
20	Property Tax Expense	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	456,800	412,353	1,130	40.93	100.03	Sheet 10	(59.10)	(66,788)
21	Other Taxes	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	92,692	83,673	229	40.93	31.96	Sheet 11	8.97	2,054
22	TOTAL OPERATING EXP	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	29,387,311		72,602					
23	INCOME TAXES:										
24	Current (including state)	WP 40-1 "AE"	88.630%	2,830,952	2,509,073	6,874	40.93	37.50	Sheet 12	3.43	23,578
25	Deferred FIT Included in RB	WP 40-1 "AE"	88.630%	(430,209)	(381,294)	(1,045)	40.93	0.00	Note 1	40.93	(42,772)
26	TOTAL INCOME TAX EXP			2,400,743	-	5,829					
27	OTHER EXPENSES:										
28	Charitable Donations		100.000%	16,913	16,913	46	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
29	Interest on Customer Deposits	WP 40-1 "F"	96.820%	559	541	1	40.93	182.50	Sheet 13	(141.57)	(142)
30	Interest Expense on LT Debt	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	1,032,753	932,266	2,554	40.93	91.25	Sheet 14	(50.32)	(128,517)
31	AFUDC	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	206	186	1	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
33	TOTAL OTHER INCOME			1,050,431		2,602					
34	Income Avail for Common Eq	Sch 40b; p. 1		4,677,085		12,814	40.93	40.93	Note 2	0.00	-
35	Subtotal			42,192,655		93,847					136,547
36	Customer Utility Taxes	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	707,783		1,939	40.93	27.76	Sheet 15	13.17	25,537
37	State & Local Consumption Taxes	WP 40-1 "V"	90.270%	366,594		1,004	40.93	32.71	Sheet 16	8.22	8,248
38	Plus: Balance Sheet Analysis	Sch 28							Schedule 28		(338,127)
39											TOTAL CASH WORKING CAPITAL REQUIREMENT/(SOURCE) \$ (167,796)

Note 1: Item is included in the Balance Sheet Analysis; therefore, 0 lead days assigned.

Note 2: 0 Net Lead days assigned in compliance with the Staff in Case No. PUE950033

Note 3: Per Case No. PUE950033, 0 Cash Working Capital used due to a timing difference.

THP-CWC1

Atmos Energy Corporation - West Texas
Cash Working Capital Lead/ Lag Analysis
For Test Period Twelve Months Ended September 30, 2011

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense	Revenue Lag Ref. Days	Expense Lag Ref. Days	Net Lag	CWC Requirement
	(a)	(b)	(c) = (b)/365	(d)	(e)	(f) = (d) - (e)	(g) = (c) x (f)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	137,507,303	376,732	CWC 2 39.03	CWC3 41.41	(2.38)	(896,623)
3							
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
5	O&M, Labor	11,585,306	31,741	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 4 28.22	10.81	343,115
6	O&M, Non-Labor	21,695,928	59,441	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 5 32.80	6.23	370,317
7	Total O&M Expense	33,281,234	91,181				713,432
8							
9							
10	Taxes Other Than Income [1]						
11	Ad Valorem	3,659,051	10,025	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 213.50	(174.47)	(1,749,027)
12	Payroll Taxes	534,370	1,464	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 33.96	5.07	7,423
13	Local Franchise Tax	2,868,088	7,858	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 66.28	(27.25)	(214,104)
14	State Gas Transportation	1,576	4	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 94.69	(55.66)	(240)
15							
16	Allocated Taxes						
17	Ad Valorem	79,904	219	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 213.50	(174.47)	(38,194)
18	Payroll Taxes	348,509	955	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 6 33.96	5.07	4,841
19	Total Taxes Other Than Income	7,491,498	20,525				(1,989,302)
20							
21	Franchise Tax/State Margin Tax	933,185	2,557	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 7 (47.00)	86.03	219,950
22							
23	Federal Income Tax						
24	Current Taxes	0	0	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 8 36.75	2.28	0
25							
26	Interest on Customer Deposits	6,115	17	CWC 2 39.03	CWC 9 331.83	(292.80)	(4,905)
27							
28	TOTAL	179,219,334	491,012				<u>(1,957,448)</u>

[1] Excludes DOT tax and State Gross Receipts Tax.

THP-CWC1

**Atmos Energy Corporation - West Texas
Cash Working Capital Lead/ Lag Analysis
For Test Period Twelve Months Ended June 30, 2013**

Line No.	Description	Test Year Expenses	Average Daily Expense	Revenue Lag Ref. Days	Expense Lag Ref. Days	Net Lag	CWC Requirement
	(a)	(b)	(c) = (b)/365	(d)	(e)	(f) = (d) - (e)	(g) = (c) x (f)
1	Gas Supply Expense						
2	Purchased Gas	115,600,453	316,714	CWC 2 38.54	CWC3 41.65	(3.11)	(984,979)
3							
4	Operation and Maintenance Expense						
5	O&M, Labor	11,904,423	32,615	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 4 29.29	9.25	301,687
6	O&M, Non-Labor	22,671,849	62,115	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 5 33.37	5.17	321,133
7	Total O&M Expense	34,576,272	94,730				622,820
8							
9							
10	Taxes Other Than Income [1]						
11	Ad Valorem	4,133,461	11,325	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 213.50	(174.96)	(1,981,344)
12	Payroll Taxes	474,451	1,300	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 34.49	4.05	5,264
13	Allocated Taxes						
14	Ad Valorem and other	89,188	244	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 213.50	(174.96)	(42,752)
15	Payroll Taxes	509,122	1,395	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 34.49	4.05	5,649
16	Total Taxes Other Than Income	5,206,223	14,264				(2,013,182)
17							
18	Revenue Taxes [1]						
19	Local Franchise Tax	8,536,899	23,389	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 65.68	(27.14)	(634,833)
20	State Gas Transportation	1,762	5	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 6 94.73	(56.19)	(271)
21							
22	State Gross Margin Tax	1,000,916	2,742	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 7 (46.50)	85.04	233,200
23							
24	Federal Income Tax						
25	Current Taxes	8,736,560	23,936	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 8 37.50	1.04	24,893
26							
27	Interest on Customer Deposits	5,432	15	CWC 2 38.54	CWC 9 331.83	(293.29)	(4,365)
28							
29	TOTAL	173,664,518	452,400				(2,756,717)

[1] Excludes DOT tax and State Gross Receipts Tax.

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-11
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please explain why the Company did not submit a lead/lag study to support the level of Cash Working Capital in this proceeding and provide authoritative citations in support of the explanation.

RESPONSE:

The Company did not submit a lead/lag study and instead elected Cash Working Capital to be 1/8th of O&M, consistent with the Company's last two approved rate cases in Case Nos. 2013-00148 and 2009-00354 (while Case 2009-00354 was settled, Case No. 2013-00148 was fully litigated. In both cases, the detail underlying the revenue requirement included the 1/8th O&M method for estimating Cash Working Capital). In addition, the 1/8th O&M method for Cash Working Capital has been affirmatively approved by the Commission in other cases, such as in Case Nos. 99-176 for Delta Natural Gas and 2000-439 for Kentucky Utilities Company.

Respondent: Greg Waller

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-12
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to Schedule J-1 showing the 13 month average capital structure for the base and projected test periods. Please explain all reasons for the proposed increase in the common equity ratio from 52.99% in the base year to 55.32% in the test year. Provide a copy of all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support this assumption. If none, then please so state. In addition, please indicate whether, and if so, how, the Company relied on each such document in developing this assumption.

RESPONSE:

Please see Attachment 10 to the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-59 for the workpaper on which the capital structure for the base and test periods are calculated. This workpaper is linked directly to the revenue requirement model ("Fall 2015 KY Rev Req Model - Final Copy - External Links to 1-59 WPs.xlsx"). Please also see Mr. Waller's testimony at page 36, line 13 through page 37, line 8 and the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-13.

Respondent: Greg Waller

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-13
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please refer to the Company's response to Staff 1-03, which provides the components of the capital structure for Atmos Energy Corporation for the last ten calendar years using ending balances and daily average balances of short term debt. Please identify and describe all reasons why the Company increased the common equity ratio to 53.3% in 2014 from 50.0% or less in prior years by issuing a significant amount of common equity. Provide a copy of all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the issuance of such a significant amount of common equity. In addition, explain why the Company did not issue long term debt in lieu of some or all of the issuance of common equity.

RESPONSE:

In the Company's Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2015, we disclosed, "We (Atmos) regularly evaluate our funding strategy and capital structure to ensure that we (i) have sufficient liquidity for our short-term and long-term needs in a cost-effective manner and (ii) maintain a balanced capital structure with a debt-to-capitalization ratio in a target range of 45 to 55 percent." In order to maintain a balanced capital structure we must issue debt and equity from time to time. It is important to note at the time of the equity offering in 2014, we had issued \$500 million Unsecured 4.15% Senior Notes on January 11, 2013. These notes replaced our \$250 million Unsecured 5.125% Senior Notes that matured in January 2013. Additionally, we had additional debt maturing of \$500 million on October 15, 2014. That is a total of \$1 billion of debt financing needs within approximately one year before and after the equity offering. Frequent issuances of long-term debt could impact our debt ratings and debt investor interest which would both unfavorably impact our cost of debt financing. In Fitch's May 21, 2014 ratings update (where we were placed on positive watch and later upgraded) they noted, "Atmos has completed, or will have completed within Fitch's rating horizon, several measures that reduce leverage and lower the cost of debt. In February 2014, Atmos raised \$390 million of new equity, substantially meeting the equity component of its large five-year capital investment program. The equity raise improves Atmos capitalization..." Since the equity offering in 2014, we have received a two notch upgrade from Moody's (Baa1 to A2), a one notch upgrade from Fitch, and been placed on positive watch by Standard and Poor's. As our bond ratings have improved following the equity offering, our debt costs have fallen such that our overall required return on rate base is lower even if a constant allowed ROE is assumed. Equity is not typically raised in small amounts due to cost, and as such large amounts must be raised that can move the capital structure. Based on that fact, we have historically been infrequent equity issuers with issue before 2014 coming in December of 2006. See table below outlining the major external financings completed since 2006:

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Question No. 1-13
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Offering Type	Offering Date	Notional Issued	Interest Rate if Applicable
Debt	10/7/2014	\$500 million	4.125%
Equity	2/12/2014	9.2 million shares	
Debt	1/9/2013	\$500 million	4.15%
Debt	6/7/2011	\$400 million	5.50%
Debt	3/24/2009	\$450 million	8.50%
Debt	6/13/2007	\$250 million	6.35%
Equity	12/18/2006	6.3 million shares	

In support, please see Confidential Attachment 1 for a copy of the Company's annual Financing Plan for fiscal year 2014.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-13_Att1 - 2014 Financing Plan (CONFIDENTIAL).pdf, 4 Pages.

Respondent: Greg Waller

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-14
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please refer to page 9 of the Direct Testimony of Mr. Waller related to the Pipe Replacement Program ("PRP") established in Case No. 2009-00354.

- a. Please explain how the current PRP surcharge is accounted for in base period revenues and provide citations for the schedules in which the PRP surcharge is included as part of the filing. If the PRP surcharge revenues are not distinguished in some way in the filing, please explain why.
- b. Please refer to the billing notice provided as part of Filing Requirement 17(4) which indicates that PRP charges were included as part of present rates. Please provide a breakout of present rates which shows the PRP surcharge separately for each customer class as well as the components of the average monthly bills.
- c. Please provide all components (all rate base components, operating expense components, and revenue components) related to the PRP surcharge revenue requirement that are included in the base year. Source each such amount to the appropriate schedule in the filing.
- d. Please provide all components (all rate base components, operating expense components, and revenue components) related to the PRP surcharge revenue requirement that are included in the test year base revenue requirement. Source each such amount to the appropriate schedule in the filing.
- e. Please provide an accounting of the PRP costs that are included with all other costs in the forecast test year.

RESPONSE:

- a) Please see the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-03 subpart (b).
- b) Please see "Rate Design" tab of Attachment 41 to the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-59.
- c) All PRP cost of service items and revenue at present rates have been incorporated into the cost of service components and revenue at present rates of this filing as described in the Direct Testimony of Greg Waller and required by the Company's PRP tariff. For the components of the Company's PRP cost of service and rates, please see the revenue requirement calculation and supporting materials in Case No. 2015-00272.
- d) Please see the response to subpart (c).

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Question No. 1-14
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e) Please see the response to subpart (c).

Respondents: Greg Waller and Gary Smith

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-15
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please refer to the confidential response attachment to Staff 1-43 (a) (9). The question asked for the most recent federal and state income tax returns. The Company responded by providing copies of the 2013 income tax returns, including all supporting schedules. Please provide copies of the 2014 federal and state income tax returns that were due to be filed by September 15, 2015, including all supporting schedules. If they have not yet been filed with the federal and/or state governments, then please provide the estimated date(s) for the filing(s) and supplement this response when they are filed.

RESPONSE:

The 2013 tax returns provided in the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-47 are the most recently filed tax returns. Atmos Energy operates on a fiscal year ending on September 30. The 2014 federal and state tax returns relating to fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, have not yet been filed. The federal tax return is due June 15, 2016 and the state tax returns are due on various dates throughout June, July and August of 2016.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-16
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please indicate whether Atmos Energy Corporation, Inc. filed a consolidated federal tax return for all years 2008 through 2015.

RESPONSE:

The Company has filed consolidated federal tax returns for years 2008 through 2013. Please see the Company's response to AG DR No. 1-15. The 2014 federal consolidated tax return has not yet been filed but is due to be filed on or before June 15, 2016.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-17
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please identify each of the affiliates/subsidiaries of Atmos Energy Corporation, Inc. that comprise the affiliate group included in the Company's consolidated federal tax return.

RESPONSE:

- Atmos Energy Corporation, Inc.
- Atmos Power Systems, Inc.
- UCG Storage, Inc.
- WKG Storage, Inc.
- Trans Louisiana Gas Storage, Inc.
- Phoenix Gas Gathering Company
- Trans Louisiana Gas Pipeline, Inc.
- Atmos Exploration & Production, Inc.
- Atmos Energy Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries (includes the following LLCs)
 - Atmos Energy Marketing, LLC
 - Atmos Energy Services, LLC
 - Egasco, LLC
 - Atmos Pipeline and Storage, LLC
 - Atmos Gathering Company, LLC
 - Fort Necessity Gas Storage, LLC

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-18
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please provide a schedule showing the history of the taxable income and losses for AEC in total and separated into utility, nonregulated, and other for each fiscal year since 2006. Show the taxable income or loss in each fiscal year; the loss carrybacks, if any, to the year carried back; the carryforward balance at the beginning of the fiscal year, if any; and the related carryforward ADIT at the end of the fiscal year, if any. In addition, please further separate the utility amounts into the Kentucky/Mid-States division, the Kentucky division/jurisdiction, and all other utility divisions. Provide all calculations, assumptions, data, and electronic spreadsheets with formulas intact. In addition, please provide all documents, including studies and/or other analyses developed by the Company to support the calculations each year.

RESPONSE:

The Company does not file tax returns or calculate federal taxable income at a Kentucky/Mid-States standalone basis. All utility operations are included in one single legal entity, Atmos Energy Corporation. In preparing the consolidated tax return, a separate calculation of taxable income for each legal entity is made. A taxable income calculation for a single division of Atmos Energy Corporation, such as Kentucky/Mid States, is not performed in the normal course of preparing the Company's tax returns.

Please see Attachment 1 (Federal NOL Roll Forward - Utility and Non-Reg 9-30-15) for a schedule that shows the NOL position by year for both the utility and the consolidated operations.

Please see Attachment 2 (Fed NOL_9_30_14) for a schedule that shows the NOL carryforward/carryback by year for both the utility and the consolidated operations.

Please see Attachment 3 (FY06-FY14 Consol 1120 Selected Pages) for schedules that show the NOL calculation by year for both the utility and the consolidated operations.

Please see Attachment 4 (FY05-FY07 Form 4549-B) that explains changes to taxable income made by the IRS.

Please see Attachment 5 (FY04-FY07) for IRS audit adjustment summaries.

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-18_Att1 - Federal NOL Roll Forward - Utility and Non-Reg 9-30-15 (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 1 Page.

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
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Question No. 1-18
Page 2 of 2

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-18_Att2 - Fed NOL_09_30_2014 (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 1 Page.

ATTACHMENT 3 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-18_Att3 - FY06-FY14 Consol 1120 Selected Pages (CONFIDENTIAL).pdf, 32 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 4 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-18_Att4 - FY05-FY07 Form 4549-B (CONFIDENTIAL).pdf, 6 Pages.

ATTACHMENT 5 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-18_Att5 - FY04-FY07 Audit Adjustment Summary (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 4 Pages.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-19
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Refer to Schedule E, Computation of State & Federal Income Tax.

- a. Please confirm that by using Operating Income before Income Tax & Interest, the Company's methodology assumes full normalization for income tax expense. If the Company cannot confirm this, then provide a detailed explanation as to why this is not correct.
- b. Please disaggregate the income tax expense included in the base year and in the test year as shown on Schedule E into current income tax expense and deferred income tax expense. Provide all supporting data, assumptions, and calculations, including all electronic workpapers with formulas intact.

RESPONSE:

- a) Confirm.
- b) Because the Company is in a taxable loss position and owes no current taxes, all tax expense in the filing is deferred income tax expense.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-20
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Refer to Schedule A.1 lines 6 - 8.

- a. Please confirm that the gross-up of the operating income deficiency by the gross revenue conversion factor reflects full normalization for income tax expense. If the Company cannot confirm this, then provide a detailed explanation as to why this is not correct.
- b. Please confirm that the difference between lines 8 and 6 is the income tax expense in addition to that shown on Schedule E resulting from and included in the Company's requested rate increase.
- c. Please confirm that the difference between lines 8 and 6 reflects the increase in current income tax expense and that there is no effect on deferred tax expense. If that is not correct, then please disaggregate this difference into current income tax expense and deferred income tax expense. Provide all supporting data, assumptions, and calculations, including all electronic workpapers with formulas intact.

RESPONSE:

- a) Confirm.
- b) The difference between line 8 and 6 is \$1,300,638. It represents the amount necessary to gross up the Operating Income Deficiency on line 6 to account for the 4 components in the gross-up factor (Uncollectible Accounts, PSC Fees, State Income Taxes and Federal Income Taxes). The four components are included in the calculation of the gross up factor on Schedule H.1 and the dollar amounts associated with each component are itemized on Schedule C.1 in the column labeled "Proposed Increase" and summarized below. They are in addition to the amounts on Schedule E and are included in the requested rate increase as shown on Schedule C.1.

Uncollectible Accounts Expense (recorded as Other O&M Expenses on C.1)	\$ 16,538
PSC Fees (recorded as Taxes Other Than Income on C.1)	\$ 6,288
State and Federal Income Taxes	\$ 1,277,811
Total	\$ 1,300,638

- c) Because the Company is in a taxable loss position and owes no current taxes, all tax expense in the filing is deferred income tax expense

Respondents: Greg Waller and Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-21
Page 1 of 3

REQUEST:

Please refer to electronic workpaper "Att2 - ADIT for KY - Fall 2015" provided in response to Staff 1-59. Refer further to cell rows 105, 106 and 107 on worksheet tab "Division 002" that provide the account 190 ADIT amounts for "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward - Non Reg", "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward - Utility", and "FD-NOL Credit Carryforward- Other", respectively.

- a. Please provide a detailed description of the methodology used to disaggregate or separately determine the actual and projected NOL carryforward amounts for utility, nonregulated, and other.
- b. Please provide copies of all supporting documentation used to quantify the actual NOL carryforward amounts in fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, the base year, and the test year.
- c. Balances in these lines changed on a quarterly basis until the last month of actual data provided in June 2015. Please explain how those quarterly changes in the NOL carryforward amounts are determined separately for the utility and nonregulated.
- d. Please provide the actual balances for utility and nonregulated NOL carryforward amounts as of September 30, 2015 and December 31, 2015 and provide copies of all supporting documentation used to quantify the balances.

RESPONSE:

- a) Actual NOL carryforward amounts are derived from the Company's tax filings. Atmos files a consolidated tax return, which includes both utility and non-regulated operations. The utility NOL represents that portion of the consolidated net operating loss resulting from utility operations. Utility operations are all included in one single legal entity, Atmos Energy Corporation. In preparing the consolidated tax return, a separate calculation of taxable income for each legal entity is made. Therefore it is possible to isolate the amount of losses generated by the utility operations by referring to the taxable income of Atmos Energy Corporation.

GAAP reporting requirements differ from tax return calculations of the NOL Carryforward ("NOLC"). These differences result in both increases and decreases to the Company's NOLC deferred tax asset recorded on the Company's books. Several such differences have resulted in a net decrease to the Company's NOLC deferred tax asset recorded on its books. This net decrease is reflected as Book/Tax Differences NOL on the NOL Carryforward

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-21
Page 2 of 3

Schedule and titled FD-NOL Credit Carryforward - Other in the referenced workpaper. This decrease has no impact on the Company's tax filings.

The Company has projected net operating losses for the period included in this filing. To the extent that the Company's deferred tax liabilities exceed income tax expense computed at the composite rate in the filing, the Company has projected additional net operating loss carryforward.

- b) Please see Confidential Attachment 1 through Confidential Attachment 4.
- c) Total federal and state tax expense is estimated at a quarter-end using projected fiscal year pre-tax book income for each business unit. Total federal expense is calculated using the statutory rate of 35%. Total state tax expense is calculated using current state tax rates and the most recent apportionment data calculated for each legal entity. The deferred taxes recorded at a quarter-end are estimates based on a high level analysis conducted at a business unit level. Current federal and state tax expense is calculated as the difference between total tax expense and deferred tax expense.

Since the Company is in a federal net operating loss position, no current federal liability or receivable should be recorded. The net operating loss carryforward is debited or credited at non-year end quarters to offset any calculated federal payable or receivable. Since the large losses the Company experiences are due to utility operations, the Company applies the statutory rate to nonregulated pre-tax book income and records this as a decrease to the net operating loss carryforward. The balance of the adjustment to the NOL is recorded to utility operations.

A full and detailed calculation of taxable income by legal entity is prepared at year end and the resulting generation or utilization of NOL Carryforward by utility and nonregulated operations is recorded to the financial statements.

- d) Please see the response to subpart (c).

ATTACHMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-21_Att1 - NOL Carryforward Schedule (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 1 Page.

ATTACHMENT 2 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-21_Att2 - Selected Pages Atmos 1120 FY13 - FY14 (CONFIDENTIAL).pdf, 7 Pages.

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
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ATTACHMENT 3 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-21_Att3 - FY15 September Provision (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 1 Page.

ATTACHMENT 4 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-21_Att4 - FY16 December Provision (CONFIDENTIAL).xlsx, 9 Pages.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-22
Page 1 of 4

REQUEST:

Refer to page 19 of 32 of the request for PLR included in Exhibit PM-I wherein it states:

"The type of ratemaking for the DT A claimed by the regulators in PLR 201418024 is not practiced (or even claimed to be practiced) by the regulators in Kentucky."

- a. Please describe the party and the manner, and identify the forum, in which each such party would have "claimed" that the KPSC practiced the "type of ratemaking for the DTA claimed by the regulators in PLR 20 1418024," for both rate base and income tax. expense purposes. Provide a copy of all documentation relied on for your response.
- b. Please provide a copy of PLR 201418024.
- c. Please confirm that the "rate making for the DT A claimed by the regulators in PLR 20 1418024" is described in that PLR as follows:
 - i. Taxpayer filed a general rate case on Date A (Case). The test year used in the Case was the 12 month period ending on Date B. In establishing the income tax expense element of its cost of service, the tax benefits attributable to accelerated depreciation were normalized in accordance with Commission policy and were not flowed through to ratepayers. In establishing the rate base on which Taxpayer was to be allowed to earn a return Commission generally offsets rate base by Taxpayer's plant based ADIT balance, using a 13-month average of the month-end balances of the relevant accounts. Taxpayer argued that the ADIT balance should be reduced by the amounts that Taxpayer calculates did not actually defer tax due to the presence of NOLCs or the AMT. Commission, in an order issued on Date C, did not use the amounts that Taxpayer calculates did not defer tax due to NOLCs or AMT but only the amount in the ADIT account. Taxpayer filed a petition for reconsideration based on the normalization implications of the order. On Date D, Commission rejected Taxpayer's request. Taxpayer again requested reconsideration and the Commission denied that request on Date E. Commission asserts that, in setting rates it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has, such as this case, an NOLC or AMT. Thus, Commission asserts that it has already recognized the effects of the NOLC in setting rates and there is no need to reduce the ADIT by the other amounts due to NOLCs or AMT.

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-22
Page 2 of 4

- d. Please confirm that the "ratemaking for the DTA" in KPSC Case No. 2013-00148 is identical to that claimed by the regulator in PLR 201418024, except that the KPSC used the DTA to reduce the DTL while the regulator in PLR 201418024 did not do so. If the Company cannot confirm this, then please identify and describe all differences the Company believes exist, and in particular, all differences in the calculation of income tax expense, if any.
- e. Please confirm that the KPSC reflected full income tax normalization in the income tax expense allowed in Case No. 2013-00148, meaning that it included the deferred income tax expense debit related to accelerated tax depreciation with no reduction for any deferred income tax expense credit related to an NOL. Cite to the Order and all other record evidence that supports your response.
- f. Please confirm that the regulators in PLR 201418024 did not reduce the DTL by the DTA related to the NOL and that the PLR found this was not a violation of the normalization requirements of the IRC or Treasury Regulations.
- g. Please identify who drafted the referenced statement in the Atmos Request for PLR.
- h. Please provide a copy of all support and analysis relied upon for the referenced statement in the Atmos Request for PLR.
- i. Please indicate whether Mr. McDonald believes today that the referenced statement is accurate and correct with respect to the income tax expense allowed in Case No. 2013-00148. If so, then please provide all support and analysis relied upon to reach this conclusion. In addition, please provide all support relied upon to reach the conclusion that the deferred income tax expense allowed in Case No. 2013-00148 was reduced by a credit deferred income tax expense related to an NOL. Finally, provide all schedules that demonstrate and quantify the credit deferred income tax expense related to an NOL.

RESPONSE:

- a. The type of ratemaking for deferred taxes and tax expense claimed by the regulators in PLR 201418024 would be presented in Kentucky in the form of a rate case. Atmos Energy is not aware of any case past or present in which the Kentucky PSC has ruled that balance of deferred taxes and tax provision should be calculated in a manner consistent with PLR 20148024.
- b. See Attachment 1.

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
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Question No. 1-22
Page 3 of 4

- c. The section of PLR 201418024 cited above along with the following section cited below is the IRS summary of the ratemaking for the DTA claimed by the regulators in PLR 201418024:

"Commission has stated that, in setting rates it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has an NOLC or MTCC. Such a provision allows a utility to collect amounts from ratepayers equal to income taxes that would have been due absent the NOLC and MTCC. Thus, Commission has already taken the NOLC and MTCC into account in setting rates."

- d. The Company cannot confirm because the statement is incomplete. The ratemaking for tax provision and ADIT in KPSC Case No. 2013-00148 is not identical to that claimed by the regulator in PLR 201418024. The question as stated notes only one difference between PLR 201418024 and KPSC Case No. 2013-00148 when, in fact, there are two.

The first difference, as identified in the question, is in PLR 201418024 the Commission did not reduce the DTL by the NOLC DTA. However there is a second critical difference not noted as an exception in the question.

In setting the provision (or tax expense) for deferred taxes in the case, the Commission in PLR 201418024 took into account the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation. It did not adjust the deferred tax provision for the establishment of an NOLC DTA.

Unlike PLR 201418024, the provision for deferred taxes in KPSC 2013-00148 was impacted by both the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation AND the recording of an NOLC DTA. If the Company's NOLs had been excluded from the deferred tax provision, the Company's provision for income taxes would have been higher than a tax provision included in the filing.

This is a critical difference and central to why the IRS reached a different conclusion in the PLR issued to the Company.

- e. The Company cannot confirm because the statement is incomplete. The Company did reflect full income tax normalization but the meaning of full income tax normalization as described in the question is incorrect. Full income tax normalization would result in a provision for income taxes which includes the debit (increase) related to accelerated tax depreciation AND a credit (decrease) related to the recording of an NOL. While not specifically addressed in the order,

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-22
Page 4 of 4

deferred income tax expense in KPSC Case No. 2013-00148 was calculated in this manner.

- f. The Company cannot confirm because the statement is incomplete. In PLR 201418024, the IRS found the rate making as represented by the regulators was not in violation of the normalization requirements. This conclusion was reached because the regulators in that case represented that the NOL had already been taken into account by not reflecting its effect in the provision for deferred taxes and thereby necessarily recording a higher deferred tax provision than would have been the case had its effect been recognized. Since the NOL had been taken into account in this manner, it was permissible to not reduce the DTL by the NOLC DTA.
- g. The Atmos Request for PLR was jointly drafted by Mr. James Warren of Miller Chevalier and Mr. Pace McDonald of Atmos Energy.
- h. The support of the statement is the filing and resulting order received in KPSC Case No. 2013-00148. Furthermore, the Commission issued a letter dated December 15, 2014 to Atmos Energy in which it found the Atmos Request for PLR to be adequate and complete.
- i. Mr. McDonald believes the statement to be correct.

The calculation of the tax provision in Case No. 2013-00148 was made with a composite tax rate of 38.9%. This rate is the combined federal and state rate. Applying a composite rate to the revenue requirement results in the accrual of all taxes that will be owed for the revenue requirement. It is the total tax burden regardless of whether it is currently paid or deferred to a future period. Since the composite rate accrues all taxes, including all deferred taxes, it therefore includes the deferred taxes associated with both accelerated depreciation and NOLs.

If the Company's NOLs had been excluded from the deferred tax provision, the Company's provision for income taxes would have been higher than a tax provision calculated using a composite tax rate.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-22_Att1 - PLR 201418024.pdf, 7 Pages.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Internal Revenue Service

Department of the Treasury
Washington, DC 20224

Number: **201418024**
Release Date: 5/2/2014
Index Number: 167.22-01

Third Party Communication: None
Date of Communication: Not Applicable

Person To Contact:
, ID No.

Telephone Number:

Refer Reply To:
CC:PSI:B06
PLR-133813-13
Date:
January 27, 2014

LEGEND:

Taxpayer =
Parent =
State =
Commission =
Year A =
Year B =
Year C =
Year D =
Year E =
X =
Y =
Date A =
Date B =
Date C =
Date D =
Date E =
Case =
Director =

Dear . :

This letter responds to the request, dated July 30, 2013, of Taxpayer for a ruling on whether the Commission's treatment of Taxpayer's Accumulated Deferred Income

PLR-133813-13

2

Tax (ADIT) account balance in the context of a rate case is consistent with the requirements of the normalization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

The representations set out in your letter follow.

Taxpayer is a regulated public utility incorporated in State. It is wholly owned by Parent. Taxpayer distributes and sells natural gas to customers in State. Taxpayer is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of Commission with respect to terms and conditions of service and particularly the rates it may charge for the provision of service. Taxpayer takes accelerated depreciation where available and, for the period beginning in Year A and ending in Year E, Taxpayer has, in the aggregate, produced more net operating losses (NOL) than taxable income. After application of the carryback and carryforward rules, Taxpayer represents that it has net operating loss carryforward (NOLC), produced in Year C and Year E, of \$X as of the end of Year E. The amount of claimed accelerated depreciation in Year C and Year E exceeded the amount of the NOLCs for those years. In Year D, Taxpayer produced regular taxable income as well as alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI); the regular taxable income was offset by the NOLCs from Year B and year C but could not offset the entire alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability due to the limitation in § 56(d). Taxpayer paid \$Y of AMT in Year D and had a minimum tax credit carryforward (MTCC) as of the end of year E of \$Y.

On its regulatory books of account, Taxpayer "normalizes" the differences between regulatory depreciation and tax depreciation. This means that, where accelerated depreciation reduces taxable income, the taxes that a taxpayer would have paid if regulatory depreciation (instead of accelerated tax depreciation) were claimed constitute "cost-free capital" to the taxpayer. A taxpayer that normalizes these differences, like Taxpayer, maintains a reserve account showing the amount of tax liability that is deferred as a result of the accelerated depreciation. This reserve is the accumulated deferred income tax (ADIT) account. Taxpayer maintains an ADIT account and also maintains an offsetting series of entries that reflect that portion of those 'tax losses' which, while due to accelerated depreciation, did not actually defer tax because of the existence of an NOLC. With respect to the \$Y AMT liability from Year D, Taxpayer carried that amount as an offset to the ADIT because the AMT increased the payment of tax.

Taxpayer filed a general rate case on Date A (Case). The test year used in the Case was the 12 month period ending on Date B. In establishing the income tax expense element of its cost of service, the tax benefits attributable to accelerated depreciation were normalized in accordance with Commission policy and were not flowed thru to ratepayers. In establishing the rate base on which Taxpayer was to be allowed to earn a return Commission generally offsets rate base by Taxpayer's plant based ADIT balance, using a 13-month average of the month-end balances of the relevant accounts. Taxpayer argued that the ADIT balance should be reduced by the amounts that Taxpayer calculates did not actually defer tax due to the presence of

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NOLCs or the AMT. Commission, in an order issued on Date C, did not use the amounts that Taxpayer calculates did not defer tax due to NOLCs or AMT but only the amount in the ADIT account. Taxpayer filed a petition for reconsideration based on the normalization implications of the order. On Date D, Commission rejected Taxpayer's request. Taxpayer again requested reconsideration and the Commission denied that request on Date E. Commission asserts that, in setting rates it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has, such as in this case, an NOLC or AMT. Thus, Commission asserts that it has already recognized the effects of the NOCL in setting rates and there is no need to reduce the ADIT by the other amounts due to NOLCs or AMT.

Taxpayer requests that we rule as follows:

Under the circumstances described above, the reduction of Taxpayer's rate base by the full amount of its ADIT account without regard to the balances in its NOLC-related account and its MTCC-related account was consistent with the requirements of § 168(i)(9) and § 1.167(l)-1 of the Income Tax regulations.

Law and Analysis

Section 168(f)(2) of the Code provides that the depreciation deduction determined under section 168 shall not apply to any public utility property (within the meaning of section 168(i)(10)) if the taxpayer does not use a normalization method of accounting.

In order to use a normalization method of accounting, section 168(i)(9)(A)(i) of the Code requires the taxpayer, in computing its tax expense for establishing its cost of service for ratemaking purposes and reflecting operating results in its regulated books of account, to use a method of depreciation with respect to public utility property that is the same as, and a depreciation period for such property that is not shorter than, the method and period used to compute its depreciation expense for such purposes. Under section 168(i)(9)(A)(ii), if the amount allowable as a deduction under section 168 differs from the amount that would be allowable as a deduction under section 167 using the method, period, first and last year convention, and salvage value used to compute regulated tax expense under section 168(i)(9)(A)(i), the taxpayer must make adjustments to a reserve to reflect the deferral of taxes resulting from such difference.

Section 168(i)(9)(B)(i) of the Code provides that one way the requirements of section 168(i)(9)(A) will not be satisfied is if the taxpayer, for ratemaking purposes, uses a procedure or adjustment which is inconsistent with such requirements. Under section 168(i)(9)(B)(ii), such inconsistent procedures and adjustments include the use of an estimate or projection of the taxpayer's tax expense, depreciation expense, or reserve for deferred taxes under section 168(i)(9)(A)(ii), unless such estimate or projection is

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also used, for ratemaking purposes, with respect to all three of these items and with respect to the rate base.

Former section 167(l) of the Code generally provided that public utilities were entitled to use accelerated methods for depreciation if they used a "normalization method of accounting." A normalization method of accounting was defined in former section 167(l)(3)(G) in a manner consistent with that found in section 168(i)(9)(A). Section 1.167(1)-1(a)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the normalization requirements for public utility property pertain only to the deferral of federal income tax liability resulting from the use of an accelerated method of depreciation for computing the allowance for depreciation under section 167 and the use of straight-line depreciation for computing tax expense and depreciation expense for purposes of establishing cost of services and for reflecting operating results in regulated books of account. These regulations do not pertain to other book-tax timing differences with respect to state income taxes, F.I.C.A. taxes, construction costs, or any other taxes and items.

Section 1.167(1)-1(h)(1)(i) provides that the reserve established for public utility property should reflect the total amount of the deferral of federal income tax liability resulting from the taxpayer's use of different depreciation methods for tax and ratemaking purposes.

Section 1.167(1)-1(h)(1)(iii) provides that the amount of federal income tax liability deferred as a result of the use of different depreciation methods for tax and ratemaking purposes is the excess (computed without regard to credits) of the amount the tax liability would have been had the depreciation method for ratemaking purposes been used over the amount of the actual tax liability. This amount shall be taken into account for the taxable year in which the different methods of depreciation are used. If, however, in respect of any taxable year the use of a method of depreciation other than a subsection (1) method for purposes of determining the taxpayer's reasonable allowance under section 167(a) results in a net operating loss carryover to a year succeeding such taxable year which would not have arisen (or an increase in such carryover which would not have arisen) had the taxpayer determined his reasonable allowance under section 167(a) using a subsection (1) method, then the amount and time of the deferral of tax liability shall be taken into account in such appropriate time and manner as is satisfactory to the district director.

Section 1.167(1)-1(h)(2)(i) provides that the taxpayer must credit this amount of deferred taxes to a reserve for deferred taxes, a depreciation reserve, or other reserve account. This regulation further provides that, with respect to any account, the aggregate amount allocable to deferred tax under section 167(1) shall not be reduced except to reflect the amount for any taxable year by which Federal income taxes are greater by reason of the prior use of different methods of depreciation. That section also notes that the aggregate amount allocable to deferred taxes may be reduced to

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reflect the amount for any taxable year by which federal income taxes are greater by reason of the prior use of different methods of depreciation under section 1.167(1)-1(h)(1)(i) or to reflect asset retirements or the expiration of the period for depreciation used for determining the allowance for depreciation under section 167(a).

Section 1.167(1)-(h)(6)(i) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (1) of that paragraph, a taxpayer does not use a normalization method of regulated accounting if, for ratemaking purposes, the amount of the reserve for deferred taxes under section 167(l) which is excluded from the base to which the taxpayer's rate of return is applied, or which is treated as no-cost capital in those rate cases in which the rate of return is based upon the cost of capital, exceeds the amount of such reserve for deferred taxes for the period used in determining the taxpayer's expense in computing cost of service in such ratemaking.

Section 1.167(1)-(h)(6)(ii) provides that, for the purpose of determining the maximum amount of the reserve to be excluded from the rate base (or to be included as no-cost capital) under subdivision (i), above, if solely an historical period is used to determine depreciation for Federal income tax expense for ratemaking purposes, then the amount of the reserve account for that period is the amount of the reserve (determined under section 1.167(1)-1(h)(2)(i)) at the end of the historical period. If such determination is made by reference both to an historical portion and to a future portion of a period, the amount of the reserve account for the period is the amount of the reserve at the end of the historical portion of the period and a pro rata portion of the amount of any projected increase to be credited or decrease to be charged to the account during the future portion of the period.

Section 55 of the Code imposes an alternative minimum tax on certain taxpayers, including corporations. Adjustments in computing alternative minimum taxable income are provided in § 56. Section 56(a)(1) provides for the treatment of depreciation in computing alternative minimum taxable income. Section 56(a)(1)(D) provides that, with respect to public utility property the Secretary shall prescribe the requirements of a normalization method of accounting for that section.

Section 1.167(l)-1(h) requires that a utility must maintain a reserve reflecting the total amount of the deferral of federal income tax liability resulting from the taxpayer's use of different depreciation methods for tax and ratemaking purposes. Taxpayer has done so. Section 1.167(1)-(h)(6)(i) provides that a taxpayer does not use a normalization method of regulated accounting if, for ratemaking purposes, the amount of the reserve for deferred taxes which is excluded from the base to which the taxpayer's rate of return is applied, or which is treated as no-cost capital in those rate cases in which the rate of return is based upon the cost of capital, exceeds the amount of such reserve for deferred taxes for the period used in determining the taxpayer's expense in computing cost of service in such ratemaking. Section 56(a)(1)(D) provides

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that, with respect to public utility property the Secretary shall prescribe the requirements of a normalization method of accounting for that section.

In the rate case at issue, Commission has excluded from the base to which the Taxpayer's rate of return is applied the reserve for deferred taxes, unmodified by the accounts which Taxpayer has designed to calculate the effects of the NOLCs and MTCC. There is little guidance on exactly how an NOLC or MTCC must be taken into account in calculating the reserve for deferred taxes under §§ 1.167(1)-1(h)(1)(iii) and 56(a)(1)(D). However, it is clear that both must be taken into account in calculating the amount of the reserve for deferred taxes (ADIT) for the period used in determining the taxpayer's expense in computing cost of service in such ratemaking.

Both Commission and Taxpayer have intended, at all relevant times, to comply with the normalization requirements. Commission has stated that, in setting rates it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has an NOLC or MTCC. Such a provision allows a utility to collect amounts from ratepayers equal to income taxes that would have been due absent the NOLC and MTCC. Thus, Commission has already taken the NOLC and MTCC into account in setting rates. Because the NOLC and MTCC have been taken into account, Commission's decision to not reduce the amount of the reserve for deferred taxes by these amounts does not result in the amount of that reserve for the period being used in determining the taxpayer's expense in computing cost of service exceeding the proper amount of the reserve and violate the normalization requirements. We therefore conclude that the reduction of Taxpayer's rate base by the full amount of its ADIT account without regard to the balances in its NOLC-related account and its MTCC-related account was consistent with the requirements of § 168(i)(9) and § 1.167(l)-1 of the Income Tax regulations.

This ruling is based on the representations submitted by Taxpayer and is only valid if those representations are accurate.

Except as specifically determined above, no opinion is expressed or implied concerning the Federal income tax consequences of the matters described above. In particular, while we accept as true for purposes of this ruling Commission's assertions that it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has an NOLC or AMT, we do not conclude that it has done so and those assertions are subject to verification on audit.

This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides it may not be used or cited as precedent. In accordance with the power of attorney on file with this office, a copy of this letter is being sent to your

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authorized representative. We are also sending a copy of this letter ruling to the Director.

Sincerely,

Peter C. Friedman
Senior Technician Reviewer, Branch 6
(Passthroughs & Special Industries)

cc:

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-23
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Refer to page 19 of 32 of the request for PLR included in Exhibit PM-I wherein it states:

"In Taxpayer's context, if the NOLC-related DTA is not included in the calculation of rate base, then it is not "taken into account" at all."

- a. Please identify who drafted the referenced statement in the Atmos Request for PLR.
- b. Please provide a copy of all support and analysis relied upon for the referenced statement in the Atmos Request for PLR.
- c. Please confirm that i) the IRS found in PLR 201418024 that there was no normalization violation where the NOLC-related DTA was not used to reduce the DTL if the income tax expense allowed the "utility to collect amounts from ratepayers equal to income taxes that would have been due absent the NOLC and MTCC" and ii) cited and relied on the regulators' statement that "in setting rates it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situation in which a utility has an NOLC or MTCC." If the Company cannot confirm either statement, then please provide a detailed explanation why each statement does not accurately reflect the determination and facts as set forth in the PLR.
- d. Please confirm that the IRS determined that the "Commission has already taken the NOLC and MTCC into account in setting rates" through the deferred income tax expense allowance included in the revenue requirement. If the Company cannot confirm this statement, then please provide a detailed explanation why it does not accurately reflect the determination as set forth in the PLR.
- e. Please indicate if Mr. McDonald believes that the KPSC "has already taken the NOLC and MTCC into account in setting rates" through the deferred income tax expense allowance included in the revenue requirement. If not, then please provide all facts that differentiate the KPSC calculation of the Company's income tax expense allowance in Case No. 2013-00148 from the calculation of the taxpayer's income tax expense allowance in PLR 201418024.

RESPONSE:

- a. The Atmos Request for PLR was jointly drafted by Mr. James Warren of Miller Chevalier and Mr. Pace McDonald of Atmos Energy.

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-23
Page 2 of 2

- b. The support of the statement is the filing and resulting order received in KPSC Case No. 2013-00148.
- c. Confirm.
- d. The Company cannot confirm because the statement is incomplete. The IRS did not determine that the Commission had already taken the NOLC and MTCC into account in setting rates. Instead the Commission represented that it had and the IRS based its ruling off such representation. The IRS made no findings of fact or determination as to whether this representation was accurate or true. The IRS even went so far as to add this language in the PLR to highlight that it was not ruling on whether the Commission had in fact taken the NOLC into account as represented:

"Except as specifically determined above, no opinion is expressed or implied concerning the Federal income tax consequences of the matters described above. In particular, while we accept as true for purposes of this ruling Commission's assertions that it includes a provision for deferred taxes based on the entire difference between accelerated tax and regulatory depreciation, including situations in which a utility has an NOLC or AMT, we do not conclude that it has done so and those assertions are subject to verification on audit."
- e. In Case No. 2013-00148, Mr. McDonald believes the Commission correctly included the credit related to the NOL in the deferred income tax provision and included the DTA for NOLC in the balance of deferred taxes applied to rate base. This approach is widely accepted ratemaking. Numerous jurisdictions set rates using this approach and it is based first and foremost on sound ratemaking principles. Failure to make the adjustments the Commission did in Case No. 2013-00148 would result in a rate base and an associated return requested from rate payers that would not be reflective of the economic realities embodied in the Company's tax filings and associated cash flow. Furthermore, had the Commission not accepted these NOL-related adjustment to the tax provision in Case No. 2013-00148, the result would have been a higher tax charge to ratepayers than the one that was actually included in cost of service.

Please see the response to 22(d) for a description of the difference between PLR 201418024 and Case No. 2013-00148.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-24
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Refer to page 19 of 32 of the request for PLR included in Exhibit PM-1 wherein it states:

"Under these circumstances, the Service ruled that the DTA did not have to be included in the ADIT calculation because it had already been 'taken into account' in computing tax expense."

- a. Please indicate if Mr. McDonald believes that statement is accurate and correct with respect to PLR 201418024.
- b. Please indicate if Mr. McDonald believes that statement is accurate and correct if it were to be applied to Atmos in this proceeding. If not, then provide all facts that differentiate Atmos from the utility taxpayer in PLR 201418024. Provide a copy of all support relied on for your response.

RESPONSE:

- a. The statement is a direct quote from the Company's ruling request. For context, it is important to include the preceding sentence. The statement would then read:

"The way in which the regulators asserted that they "took it into account" was by imposing on customers a deferred tax charge on the entire difference between book and tax depreciation whether or not the deduction created an NOLC. Under these circumstances, the Service ruled that the DTA did not have to be included in the ADIT calculation because it had already been 'taken into account' in computing tax expense."

With the context of the preceding sentence, it is accurate and complete.

- b. Mr. McDonald does not believe that statement would be accurate or correct in this proceeding. The filing in this proceeding does not impose on customers a deferred tax charge on the entire difference between book and tax depreciation whether or not the deduction created an NOLC. The deferred charge imposed in this proceeding includes a credit related to the NOL.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-25
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Refer to PLR 201436037.

- a. Please indicate if Mr. James Warren drafted and/or signed the Request for the referenced PLR.
- b. Please indicate whether Mr. Warren relied in any way upon the Request for the referenced PLR when drafting the Request for PLR on behalf of Atmos. If so, please describe what he relied upon and how this was reflected in the Request on behalf of Atmos.
- c. Please provide a copy of the Request for the referenced PLR and all related documentation filed with the IRS.

RESPONSE:

- a. The Company does not know who drafted and/or signed the Request for the referenced PLR. Such information is confidential to the taxpayer requesting the ruling unless otherwise disclosed by the taxpayer. The Company does not know what taxpayer requested the ruling and whether the taxpayer has disclosed the request to the public.
- b. The Company does not know if Mr. Warren participated in or would have had access to the Request for the referenced PLR. A ruling request is confidential taxpayer information.
- c. The Company does not possess a copy of the Request. The request filed with the IRS is confidential and not released publically by the IRS. The Company does not know what taxpayer requested the ruling and whether the taxpayer has disclosed the request to the public.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-26
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Refer to PLR 201436038.

- a. Please indicate if Mr. James Warren drafted and signed the Request for the referenced PLR.
- b. Please indicate whether Mr. Warren relied in any way upon the Request for the referenced PLR when drafting the Request for PLR on behalf of Atmos. If so, please describe what he relied upon and how this was reflected in the Request on behalf of Atmos.
- c. Please provide a copy of the Request for the referenced PLR and all related documentation filed with the IRS.

RESPONSE:

- a. The Company does not know who drafted and/or signed the Request for the referenced PLR. Such information is confidential to the taxpayer requesting the ruling unless otherwise disclosed by the taxpayer. The Company does not know what taxpayer requested the ruling and whether the taxpayer has disclosed the request to the public.
- b. The Company does not know if Mr. Warren participated in or would have had access to the Request for the referenced PLR. A ruling request is confidential taxpayer information.
- c. The Company does not possess a copy of the Request. The request filed with the IRS is confidential and not released publically by the IRS. The Company does not know what taxpayer requested the ruling and whether the taxpayer has disclosed the request to the public.

Respondent: Pace McDonald

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-27
Page 1 of 2

REQUEST:

Please refer to page 8, lines 8-15 of Mr. Martin's Direct Testimony wherein he states that since the last rate case in 2013, "Atmos Energy has undertaken substantial investments in technology and process improvements to ensure that it provides the best and most efficient customer service possible" and how this will enable the Company "to be more productive."

- a. Please identify, describe and quantify each of the substantial investments in technology and process improvements that have occurred since the last rate case in 2013 and those that are projected and included in the test year. Provide this information for all such investments, not only those related specifically to customer service. Provide this information by project if it is available.
- b. Please provide a copy of the capital expenditure authorizations/justifications, including all economic analyses developed and reviewed by management for each of the substantial investments identified in response to part (a) of this question, by project if it is available.
- c. Identify all rate base and operating expense impacts for the base period and forecasted test period, along with all other assumptions, which reflect the impact of reductions in employees, expenses and costs related to improvements in efficiency and productivity, including, but not limited to, those investments identified and described in response to part (a) of this question. Provide the historical costs (by account number and description) before the related efficiency/productivity and compare this to the reduced costs (by account number and description), and identify the difference related to cost savings from efficiency/productivity.

RESPONSE:

- a) In addition to the investment in WMR, the Company has invested in the following:
 - Several "CSS Enhancement" projects. Each of these are a collective of functional enhancements that improve operations within the customer contact centers handling customer calls, billing & payment processing, collections, service order dispatching and/or field service order automation.
 - Project No. 010.25524 - CSS Q3 release, approximately \$251,000, in service July 2015
 - Project No. 010.25933 - CSS Q3 release, approximately \$461,000, in service November 2015

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Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-27
Page 2 of 2

- Project No. 010.20959 - CSS Miscellaneous Enhancements, approximately \$1,750,000, in service September 2014
 - Click Schedule Upgrade and Click Roster Implementation for dispatching processes.
 - Project No. 010.22040 - Click Upgrade and Roster, approximately \$819,000, in service June 2015
 - Cash Forecasting. Better automation for Treasury functions.
 - Project No. 010.21252 - Cash Forecasting for Treasury, approximately \$1,573,000, in service June 2015
 - Image Capture and Automation. Automation of back office accounting processes.
 - Project No. 010.21251 : Image Capture and Automation, approximately, \$1,007,000, in service December 2014
- b) Projects are proposed within the annual budgeting cycle. Each project is reviewed by a governance team and the items listed in subpart (a) were approved due to their importance. The authorizations/approvals are processed within the Company's PowerPlant system. Please see Attachment 1 for a flow chart of the process.
- c) The Company strives to operate effectively and efficiently throughout its normal course of business. To the extent efficiency and productivity gains were achieved and/or expected from any of the initiatives cited above or through the Company's normal course of business, those adjustments would be reflected in the actual results and budgeted amounts that became the basis for the forward looking level of operating expenses in this case. The actual costs of the projects listed above are included in Plant in Service (and therefore rate base) from the time they were put into service.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-27_Att1 - Process Chart.pdf, 1 Page.

Respondent: Mark Martin




Prioritization Process

Multiple groups generate, scope, and prioritize project opportunities across all areas of the business

Leaders from each group organize, consolidate, prioritize and propose recommendations

Business leadership reviews, refines, and confirms prioritization for input into enterprise budgeting & planning



Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-28
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please provide all of Dr. Vander Weide's workpapers and supporting documentation for his Direct Testimony and exhibits. Please provide all spreadsheets with cell formulas intact.

RESPONSE:

Please see Attachment 54 to the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-54 for Dr. Vander Weide's Exhibit JWV-1 and supporting documentation in Excel format. Also, please see Attachment 1.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-28_Att1 - Vander Weide VL Workpapers.pdf, 17 Pages.

Respondent: Dr. James Vander Weide

ATMOS ENERGY CORP. NYSE-ATO		RECENT PRICE	53.20	P/E RATIO	17.5 (Trailing: 17.8 Median: 15.8)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.92	DIV YLD	3.0%	VALUE LINE														
TIMELINESS 2	Raised 3/13/15	High: 27.6	30.0	33.1	33.5	29.3	30.3	32.0	35.6	37.3	47.4	58.2	59.3	Target Price	Range									
SAFETY 1	Raised 6/6/14	Low: 23.4	25.0	25.5	23.9	19.7	20.1	25.9	28.5	30.4	34.9	44.2	51.3	2018	2019									
TECHNICAL 4	Lowered 5/22/15	LEGENDS 1.00 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession										120	100											
BETA .85	(1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price: High 70, Low 55 Gain: (+30%), (+5%) Ann'l Total Return: 10%, 4%										80	64											
Insider Decisions J A S O N D J F M to Buy: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 to Sell: 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0											48	32												
Institutional Decisions 2Q2014 3Q2014 4Q2014 to Buy: 128 141 133 to Sell: 139 120 142 Hlds(000): 69353 69403 68718											24	20												
2018-20 PROJECTIONS Percent shares traded: 12, 8, 4											16	12												
2018-20 PROJECTIONS % TOT. RETURN 4/15 1 yr: 8.9, 3 yr: 83.5, 5 yr: 120.5 VI. ARTH. INDEX: 9.1, 58.8, 84.6											8	8												
Atmos Energy's history dates back to 1906 in the Texas Panhandle. Over the years, through various mergers, it became part of Pioneer Corporation, and, in 1981, Pioneer named its gas distribution division Energas. In 1983, Pioneer organized Energas as a separate subsidiary and distributed the outstanding shares of Energas to Pioneer shareholders. Energas changed its name to Atmos in 1988. Atmos acquired Trans Louisiana Gas in 1986, Western Kentucky Gas Utility in 1987, Greeley Gas in 1993, United Cities Gas in 1997, and others.											2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUBL. LLC	18-20
											61.75	75.27	66.03	79.52	53.69	53.12	48.15	38.10	42.88	49.22	43.15	46.35	Revenues per sh ^A	54.15
											3.90	4.26	4.14	4.19	4.29	4.64	4.72	4.76	5.14	5.42	5.55	5.75	"Cash Flow" per sh	6.60
											1.72	2.00	1.94	2.00	1.97	2.16	2.26	2.10	2.50	2.96	3.00	3.20	Earnings per sh ^{A,B}	3.80
											1.24	1.26	1.28	1.30	1.32	1.34	1.36	1.38	1.40	1.48	1.56	1.64	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C	1.90
											4.14	5.20	4.39	5.20	5.51	6.02	6.90	8.12	9.32	8.32	9.05	8.90	Cap'l Spending per sh	9.40
											19.90	20.16	22.01	22.60	23.52	24.16	24.98	26.14	28.47	30.74	31.85	32.70	Book Value per sh	36.65
											80.54	81.74	89.33	90.81	92.55	90.16	90.30	90.24	90.64	100.39	105.00	110.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^D	120.00
											16.1	13.5	15.9	13.6	12.5	13.2	14.4	15.9	15.9	16.1	Bold figures are Value Line estimates		Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	16.5
											.86	.73	.84	.82	.83	.84	.90	1.01	.89	.84			Relative P/E Ratio	1.05
											4.5%	4.7%	4.2%	4.8%	5.3%	4.7%	4.2%	4.1%	3.5%	3.1%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.0%
											4973.3	6152.4	5898.4	7221.3	4969.1	4789.7	4347.6	3438.5	3886.3	4940.9	4530	5100	Revenues (\$mill) ^A	6500
											135.8	162.3	170.5	180.3	179.7	201.2	199.3	192.2	230.7	289.8	315	350	Net Profit (\$mill)	460
											37.7%	37.6%	35.8%	38.4%	34.4%	38.5%	36.4%	33.8%	38.2%	39.2%	39.5%	39.5%	Income Tax Rate	40.0%
											2.7%	2.6%	2.9%	2.5%	3.8%	4.2%	4.6%	5.6%	5.9%	5.9%	7.0%	6.9%	Net Profit Margin	7.1%
											57.7%	57.0%	52.0%	50.8%	49.9%	45.4%	49.4%	45.3%	48.8%	44.3%	44.5%	45.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	45.0%
											42.3%	43.0%	48.0%	49.2%	50.1%	54.6%	50.6%	54.7%	51.2%	55.7%	55.5%	55.0%	Common Equity Ratio	55.0%
											3785.5	3828.5	4092.1	4172.3	4346.2	3987.9	4461.5	4315.5	5036.1	5542.2	6030	6540	Total Capital (\$mill)	8000
											3374.4	3629.2	3836.8	4136.9	4439.1	4793.1	5147.9	5475.6	6030.7	6725.9	7500	8100	Net Plant (\$mill)	10200
											5.3%	6.1%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	6.9%	6.1%	6.1%	5.9%	6.4%	6.5%	6.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	7.0%
											8.5%	9.8%	8.7%	8.8%	8.3%	9.2%	8.8%	8.1%	8.9%	9.4%	9.5%	9.5%	Return on Shr. Equity	10.5%
											8.5%	9.8%	8.7%	8.8%	8.3%	9.2%	8.8%	8.1%	8.9%	9.4%	9.5%	9.5%	Return on Com Equity	10.5%
											2.3%	3.6%	3.0%	3.1%	2.7%	3.5%	3.3%	2.8%	4.0%	4.7%	4.5%	4.5%	Retained to Com Eq	5.5%
											73%	63%	65%	65%	68%	62%	62%	65%	56%	51%	52%	52%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	50%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$2680.2 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$950.0 mill. LT Debt \$2455.2 mill. LT Interest \$145.0 mill. (LT interest earned: 4.7%; total interest coverage: 4.7x) Leases, Un capitalized Annual rentals \$16.7 mill. Pfd Stock None Pension Assets-9/14 \$434.8 mill. Oblig. \$493.6 mill. Common Stock 101,018,788 shs. as of 5/1/15 MARKET CAP: \$5.4 billion (Large Cap)											BUSINESS: Atmos Energy Corporation is engaged primarily in the distribution and sale of natural gas to more than three million customers through six regulated natural gas utility operations: Louisiana Division, West Texas Division, Mid-Tex Division, Mississippi Division, Colorado-Kansas Division, and Kentucky/Mid-States Division. Gas sales breakdown for 2014: 65%, residential; 30%, commercial; 3%, industrial; and 2% other. 2014 depreciation rate 3.0%. Has around 4,760 employees. Officers and directors own 1.6% of common stock (12/14 Proxy). President and Chief Executive Officer: Kim R. Cocklin. Incorporated: Texas. Address: Three Lincoln Centre, Suite 1800, 5430 LBJ Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75240. Telephone: 972-934-9227. Internet: www.atmosenergy.com.													
CURRENT POSITION 2013 2014 3/31/15 (\$MILL.) Cash Assets 66.2 42.3 95.5 Other 617.1 733.5 722.1 Current Assets 683.3 775.8 817.6 Accts Payable 241.6 311.6 295.6 Debt Due 368.0 196.7 225.0 Other 368.9 402.4 497.9 Current Liab. 978.5 910.7 1018.5 Fix. Chg. Cov. 537% 637% 645%											Atmos Energy had a tough time making progress on the earnings-per-share front in the first two quarters of fiscal 2015. (Years end on September 30th.) The nonregulated segment experienced a drop in realized margins, reflecting lower natural gas price volatility. During the same period in fiscal 2014, strong demand in the natural gas market caused by substantially colder-than-normal weather led to a more attractive business environment. It should also be noted that the weighted number of diluted shares outstanding was higher. But the natural gas distribution unit benefited partly from higher rates, particularly in the Mid-Tex, Kentucky/Mid-States, Colorado-Kansas, and West Texas divisions. Greater transportation revenues and higher revenue-related taxes helped here, too. Finally, the performance of the regulated pipeline operation enjoyed the benefits of the Gas Reliability Infrastructure Program (GRIP) filings approved in 2014 and 2015.													
ANNUAL RATES Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '12-'14 of change (per sh) Revenues .5% -8.0% 4.0% "Cash Flow" 5.0% 4.0% 4.5% Earnings 5.0% 5.0% 7.0% Dividends 1.5% 2.0% 5.0% Book Value 6.0% 4.5% 4.5%											slightly above the fiscal 2014 figure. Regarding fiscal 2016, however, share net may advance to \$3.20, assuming that operating margins expand further. Meanwhile, there has been much activity in the rate-filing arena. In fact, through the first six months of this fiscal year, the Dallas-headquartered company completed seven regulatory proceedings resulting in a \$14.4 million increase in annual operating income. What's more, at the time of this writing, there were 10 rate-making initiatives in progress seeking an additional \$114.4 million of annual operating income. Of course, there are no guarantees that Atmos will receive everything it desires.													
Fiscal Year Ends QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.) ^A Full Fiscal Year Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 2012 1084.0 1225.5 576.4 552.6 3438.5 2013 1034.2 1309.0 857.9 685.2 3886.3 2014 1255.1 1964.3 942.7 778.8 4940.9 2015 1258.8 1540.1 955 776.1 4530 2016 1300 2000 1000 800 5100											Various investors should find something to like here. The equity offers a decent amount of current dividend income that's well covered by corporate profits. Future, steady increases in the payout are probable, also. Moreover, the Timeliness rank sits at 2 (Above Average). Other appealing qualities include the 1 (Highest) rank for Safety and excellent score for Price Stability.													
Fiscal Year Ends EARNINGS PER SHARE ^{A,B,E} Full Fiscal Year Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 2012 .68 1.12 .31 -- 2.10 2013 .85 1.23 .36 .08 2.50 2014 .95 1.38 .45 .23 2.96 2015 .96 1.35 .47 .22 3.00 2016 1.00 1.45 .51 .24 3.20											We anticipate more of the same during the second half. Consequently, the bottom line might be about \$3.00 a share for the year as a whole. That would be													
Cal-endar QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^C Full Year Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 2011 .34 .34 .34 .345 1.37 2012 .345 .345 .345 .35 1.39 2013 .35 .35 .35 .37 1.42 2014 .37 .37 .37 .39 1.50 2015 .39											Frederick L. Harris, III June 5, 2015													

(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Diluted shrs. Excl. nonrec. items: '06, d18g; '07, d2g; '08, 12g; '10, 5g; '11, (1g). Excludes discontinued operations: '11, 10g; '12, 27g; '13, 14g. (C) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, Sept., and Dec. (D) In millions. (E) Qtrs may not add due to change in shrs outstanding. Company's Financial Strength A Stock's Price Stability 95 Price Growth Persistence 75 Earnings Predictability 90 To subscribe call 1-800-VALUELINE

AMERICAN WATER NYSE-AWK				RECENT PRICE	51.08	P/E RATIO	19.6	(Trailing: 20.9 Median: NMF)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.03	DIV'D YLD	2.7%	VALUE LINE	
TIMELINESS 2 Lowered 7/10/15	SAFETY 3 New 7/25/08	TECHNICAL 2 Raised 7/3/15	BETA .70 (1.00 = Market)	High: 23.7	23.0	25.8	32.8	39.4	45.1	56.2	57.5		Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020	
2018-20 PROJECTIONS				Low: 16.5	16.2	19.4	25.2	31.3	37.0	41.1	48.4		128 96 80 64 48 32 24 16 12	
LEGENDS --- 0.85 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession														% TOT. RETURN 6/15
Insider Decisions A S O N D J F M A to Buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 4 0 0 3 0 0 2 5 0 to Sell 6 0 0 3 0 0 2 5 0				Institutional Decisions 3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015 to Buy 206 223 213 to Sell 189 201 222 Hlds(000) 146606 143322 147193										1 yr. 0.8 3 yr. 53.4 5 yr. 172.3
Insider Decisions Percent shares traded 21 7				MARKET CAP: \$9.2 billion (Large Cap)										VL ANTHL' INDEX
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016				© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20										
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$6034.5 mil. Due in 5 Yrs \$1294.5 mil. LT Debt \$5428.9 mil. LT Interest \$278.0 mil. (52% of Cap'l)				Revenues per sh 21.40 "Cash Flow" per sh 6.15 Earnings per sh 3.25 Div'd Decl'd per sh 1.70 Cap'l Spending per sh 6.25 Book Value per sh 34.55 Common Shs Outst'g 185.00										
Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$14.0 mil. Pension Assets 12/14 \$1428.2 mil Pfd Stock \$14.3 mil. Pfd Div'd \$.5 mil				Revenues (\$mill) 3960 Net Profit (\$mill) 600 Income Tax Rate 37.5% AFUDC % to Net Profit 6.0% Long-Term Debt Ratio 55.0% Common Equity Ratio 45.0% Total Capital (\$mill) 13300 Net Plant (\$mill) 15000 Return on Total Cap'l 6.0% Return on Shr. Equity 9.0% Return on Com Equity 9.0% Retained to Com Eq 4.5% All Div'ds to Net Prof 51%										
MARKET CAP: \$9.2 billion (Large Cap)				Business: American Water Works Company, Inc. is the largest investor-owned water and wastewater utility in the U.S., providing services to over 15 million people in over 47 states and Canada. (Regulated presence in 16 states.) Nonregulated business assists municipalities and military bases with the maintenance and upkeep as well. Regulated operations made up 88.8% of 2014 revenues.										
ANNUAL RATES Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '12-'14 to '18-'20 Revenues -- 3.0% 4.5% "Cash Flow" -- 20.5% 6.0% Earnings -- NMF 7.5% Dividends -- 21.5% 8.0% Book Value -- .5% 5.0%				Income-oriented investors may find American Water Works of interest. In the second quarter, the water utility raised its dividend almost 10%, a rate much higher than other companies in the industry. Moreover, we expect this trend to continue through late decade. Too, yields on equities in this group are currently trading in a very narrow range, meaning a premium water utility is cheap on a relative basis.										
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.) Cal-endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year 2012 618.5 745.6 831.8 681.0 2876.9 2013 636.1 724.3 829.2 712.3 2901.9 2014 679.0 754.8 846.1 731.4 3011.3 2015 698.1 755 880 766.9 3100 2016 735 840 920 830 3325				Short-term accounts should be interested, as well. Our proprietary system believes American Water's stock will outperform the broader market averages in the year ahead.										
EARNINGS PER SHARE Cal-endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year 2012 .28 .66 .87 .30 2.11 2013 .32 .57 .84 .33 2.06 2014 .39 .62 .86 .52 2.39 2015 .44 .70 1.00 .46 2.60 2016 .50 .75 1.05 .50 2.80				Controlling costs and making small acquisitions may be the twin pillars of the utility's long-term strategy. Size matters in the water utility industry. The EPA reports that there are over 50,000 water systems that serve 300 million Americans. (The figure swells to over 150,000 when the districts providing water to less than 3,300 are included.) Many of these smaller municipally-owned authorities are being faced with the task of installing expensive new pipelines and										
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID Cal-endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year 2011 .22 .23 .23 .23 .91 2012 .23 .23 .25 .50 1.21 2013 -- .28 .28 .28 .84 2014 .28 .31 .31 .31 1.21 2015 .31 .34				American Water's finances are only average. Internally generated funds will not be sufficient to accommodate both the generous dividend-paying policy and the large capital outlays required through late decade. As a result, the company will likely have to tap the capital markets to make up the difference.										
Company's Financial Strength B+ Stock's Price Stability 100 Price Growth Persistence 85 Earnings Predictability 25				James A. Flood July 17, 2015										

(A) Diluted earnings. Excludes nonrecurring losses: '08, \$4.62; '09, \$2.63; '11, \$0.07. Discontinued operations: '06, (\$0.04); '11, \$0.03; '12, (\$0.10); '13, (\$0.01). GAAP used as of 2014. Next earnings report due early Aug. Quarterly earnings may not sum due to rounding. (B) Dividends paid in March, June, September, and December. (C) Div. reinvestment available. Two payments made in 4th quarter of 2012. (D) Includes intangibles. In 2014: \$1.21 billion, \$6.73/share. (E) Pro forma numbers for '06 & '07.

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AMER. STATES WATER NYSE-AWR		RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 24.1 Median: 20.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE
TIMELINESS 2 Raised 6/5/15 SAFETY 2 Raised 7/20/12 TECHNICAL 2 Raised 7/3/15 BETA .70 (1.00 = Market) 2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 50 (+30%) 9% Low 35 (-10%) Nil Insider Decisions A S O N D J F M A to Buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 to Sell 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 Institutional Decisions 3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015 to Buy 81 99 86 to Sell 86 87 93 Hlds(000) 23032 23380 23637 Percent shares traded 24 16 8		High: 13.4 17.3 21.9 23.1 21.0 19.4 19.8 18.2 24.1 33.1 38.7 41.7 Low: 10.4 12.2 15.1 16.8 13.5 14.9 15.6 15.3 17.0 24.0 27.0 35.9	38.79	24.2	1.27	2.3%	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020 80 60 50 40 30 25 20 15 10 7.5 % TOT. RETURN 6/15 THIS STOCK VL ARITH. INDEX 1 yr. 15.2 3.2 3 yr. 105.0 64.2 5 yr. 160.3 113.9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016		© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20		Revenues per sh 15.35 "Cash Flow" per sh 3.70 Earnings per sh ^A 2.15 Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B 1.12 Cap'l Spending per sh 2.40 Book Value per sh 15.45 Common Shs Outst'g ^C 37.50 Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio 20.5 Relative P/E Ratio 1.30 Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield 2.5%			
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$326.0 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$41.6 mill. LT Debt \$325.7 mill. LT Interest \$21.5 mill. (40% of Cap'l) Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$0.4 mill. Pension Assets-12/14 \$140.6 mill. Oblig. \$185.2 mill. Pfd Stock None. Common Stock 37,779,984 shs. as of 5/1/15		236.2 268.6 301.4 318.7 361.0 398.9 419.3 466.9 472.1 465.8 470 500 22.5 23.1 28.0 26.8 29.5 41.4 42.0 54.1 62.7 61.1 61.0 62.5 47.0% 40.5% 42.6% 37.8% 38.9% 43.2% 41.7% 39.9% 36.3% 38.4% 38.5% 38.0% -- 12.2% 8.5% 6.9% 3.2% 5.8% 2.0% 2.5% 2.5% 3.5% 1.0% 50.4% 48.6% 46.9% 46.2% 45.9% 44.3% 45.4% 42.2% 39.8% 39.1% 41.0% 43.0% 49.6% 51.4% 53.1% 53.8% 54.1% 55.7% 54.6% 57.8% 60.2% 60.9% 59.0% 57.0% 532.5 551.6 589.4 577.0 665.0 677.4 749.1 787.0 818.4 832.6 890 935 713.2 750.6 776.4 825.3 866.4 855.0 896.5 917.8 981.5 1003.5 1060 1120 5.4% 6.0% 6.7% 6.4% 5.9% 7.6% 7.1% 8.3% 8.9% 8.6% 9.0% 8.5% 8.5% 8.1% 9.3% 8.8% 8.2% 11.0% 10.3% 11.9% 12.7% 12.0% 11.5% 11.5% 8.5% 8.1% 9.3% 8.8% 8.2% 11.0% 10.3% 11.9% 12.7% 12.0% 11.5% 11.5% 2.8% 2.7% 3.9% 3.1% 3.2% 5.8% 5.3% 6.6% 6.8% 5.7% 5.0% 5.0% 67% 67% 58% 64% 61% 47% 49% 45% 47% 53% 55% 56%		Revenues (\$mill) 575 Net Profit (\$mill) 80.0 Income Tax Rate 38.0% AFUDC % to Net Profit 2.0% Long-Term Debt Ratio 42.0% Common Equity Ratio 58.0% Total Capital (\$mill) 1070 Net Plant (\$mill) 1240 Return on Total Cap'l 8.5% Return on Shr. Equity 13.0% Return on Com Equity 13.0% Retained to Com Eq 6.0% All Div'ds to Net Prof 52%			
CURRENT POSITION 2013 2014 3/31/15 (\$MILL.) Cash Assets 38.2 76.0 74.7 Other 153.4 133.5 114.7 Current Assets 191.6 209.5 189.4 Acc'ts Payable 49.8 41.9 37.0 Debt Due 6.3 .3 .3 Other 44.8 57.1 59.4 Current Liab. 100.9 99.3 96.7 Fix. Chg. Cov. 531% 533% 545%		BUSINESS: American States Water Co. operates as a holding company. Through its principal subsidiary, Golden States Water Company, it supplies water to 258,191 customers in 75 communities and 10 counties. Service areas include the greater metropolitan areas of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. The company also provides electric utility services to 23,716 customers in the city of Big Bear Lake and in areas of San Bernardino County. Sold Chaparral City Water of Arizona (6/11). Has 707 employees. Blackrock, Inc., owns 9.8% of out. shares; Vanguard, 8.5%; off. & dir. 1.5% (4/15 Proxy). Chairman: Lloyd Ross. President & CEO: Robert J. Sprowls. Inc. CA. Addr: 630 East Foothill Boulevard, San Dimas, CA 91773. Tel: 909-394-3600. Internet: www.aswater.com.					
ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '12-'14 of change (per sh) 10 Yrs. 5 Yrs. to '18-'20 Revenues 6.0% 5.5% 4.0% "Cash Flow" 8.5% 9.0% 6.0% Earnings 11.0% 14.0% 6.5% Dividends 5.5% 8.5% 8.0% Book Value 6.0% 6.5% 4.0%		American States Water's main subsidiary should not be impacted by the ongoing drought in California. As is the case with two other water utilities in this group, the company's main business is located in the Golden State. Governor Jerry Brown implemented mandatory restrictions on water usage aimed at reducing demand about 25%. A decline in consumption used to have a negative impact on a utility's bottom line. This has not been the case for the last few years, as the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) changed the way companies operating under its jurisdiction calculated net income. Based on the new structure, utilities' income is more of a fixed rate charge (similar to a service fee) rather than one determined by the quantity of water sold. Earnings growth probably will not be too impressive over the next two years. One reason is that American States is close to the allowed return on equity that is set by the CPUC. All told, we expect the company's share earnings to only rise 2% in 2015, followed by a 3% gain in 2016. American States' balance sheet is strong for a water utility. Of the nine members in this industry, only one of the company's peers can match its A Financial Strength rating. Indeed, American States was the only regulated company to end last year with an equity-to-total capital ratio over the 60% level. Like the rest of the industry, the company has a large projected capital budget through late in the decade. And even though certain of its financial metrics will decline through that time, American States should remain in sound financial condition. Short-term and technical investors may find these shares of interest. Early last month, our proprietary system raised the ranking of American States' stock one notch to 2 (Above Average) for year-ahead relative price performance. On July 3rd, the Technical rank was also raised to 2. On the other hand, long-term investors may want to wait on the sidelines for now. Total return prospects for American Water shares through 2018-2020 are subpar, as they are already trading within our projected Target Price Range. <i>James A. Flood July 17, 2015</i>					
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.) Cal- Full endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Year 2012 107.6 114.3 133.5 111.5 466.9 2013 110.6 120.7 130.9 109.9 472.1 2014 102.0 115.6 138.3 109.9 465.8 2015 100.9 117.1 140 112 470 2016 105 125 150 120 500		QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^B Cal- Full endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Year 2011 .13 .14 .14 .14 .55 2012 .14 .14 .1775 .1775 .64 2013 .1775 .1775 .2025 .2025 .76 2014 .2025 .2025 .213 .213 .83 2015 .213 .213					
QUARTERLY EARNINGS PER SHARE ^A Cal- Full endar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Year 2012 .27 .40 .49 .26 1.41 2013 .35 .43 .53 .30 1.61 2014 .28 .39 .54 .36 1.57 2015 .32 .44 .54 .30 1.60 2016 .31 .46 .57 .31 1.65		MARKET CAP: \$1.5 billion (Mid Cap) 2.8% 2.7% 3.9% 3.1% 3.2% 5.8% 5.3% 6.6% 6.8% 5.7% 5.0% 5.0% 67% 67% 58% 64% 61% 47% 49% 45% 47% 53% 55% 56%					

(A) Primary earnings. Excludes nonrecurring gains/losses; '04, 7¢; '05, 13¢; '06, 3¢; '08, (14¢); '10, (23¢); '11, 10¢. Next earnings report due mid-August. Quarterly earnings may not add due to rounding. (B) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, September, and December. Div'd reinvestment plan available. (C) in millions, adjusted for splits.

Company's Financial Strength A
 Stock's Price Stability 85
 Price Growth Persistence 75
 Earnings Predictability 85

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CONNECTICUT WATER NDQ-CTWS				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 18.1 Median: 21.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																											
TIMELINESS 3 Lowered 11/21/14 SAFETY 3 New 1/18/13 TECHNICAL 3 Raised 5/29/15 BETA .70 (1.00 = Market)				High: 29.8 Low: 23.8	28.2 21.9	27.7 20.3	25.6 22.4	29.0 19.3	26.4 17.3	27.9 20.0	29.1 23.3	32.8 26.2	36.4 27.8	37.5 31.0	38.6 33.2	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price High 50 (+45%) Gain 35 Ann'l Total Return 12% 3%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Insider Decisions A S O N D J F M A to Buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 to Sell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0				Institutional Decisions 3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015 to Buy 50 36 37 to Sell 34 46 40 Hlds(000) 4299 4296 4289 Percent shares traded 12 8 8 4 4 4																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>1999</th><th>2000</th><th>2001</th><th>2002</th><th>2003</th><th>2004</th><th>2005</th><th>2006</th><th>2007</th><th>2008</th><th>2009</th><th>2010</th><th>2011</th><th>2012</th><th>2013</th><th>2014</th><th>2015</th><th>2016</th><th>© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC</th><th>18-20</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>5.87</td><td>5.70</td><td>5.93</td><td>5.77</td><td>5.91</td><td>6.04</td><td>5.81</td><td>5.68</td><td>7.05</td><td>7.24</td><td>6.93</td><td>7.65</td><td>7.93</td><td>9.47</td><td>8.29</td><td>8.45</td><td>8.65</td><td>9.00</td><td>Revenues per sh</td><td>12.50</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.65</td><td>1.73</td><td>1.78</td><td>1.78</td><td>1.89</td><td>1.91</td><td>1.62</td><td>1.52</td><td>1.90</td><td>1.95</td><td>1.93</td><td>2.04</td><td>2.11</td><td>2.64</td><td>2.63</td><td>2.97</td><td>3.20</td><td>3.35</td><td>"Cash Flow" per sh</td><td>3.60</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.03</td><td>1.09</td><td>1.13</td><td>1.12</td><td>1.15</td><td>1.16</td><td>.88</td><td>.81</td><td>1.05</td><td>1.11</td><td>1.19</td><td>1.13</td><td>1.13</td><td>1.53</td><td>1.66</td><td>1.92</td><td>2.00</td><td>2.10</td><td>Earnings per sh A</td><td>2.25</td></tr> <tr> <td>.79</td><td>.79</td><td>.80</td><td>.81</td><td>.83</td><td>.84</td><td>.85</td><td>.86</td><td>.87</td><td>.88</td><td>.80</td><td>.92</td><td>.94</td><td>.96</td><td>.98</td><td>1.01</td><td>1.05</td><td>1.09</td><td>Div'd Dec'd per sh B</td><td>1.30</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.42</td><td>1.43</td><td>1.86</td><td>1.98</td><td>1.49</td><td>1.58</td><td>1.96</td><td>1.96</td><td>2.24</td><td>2.44</td><td>3.28</td><td>3.06</td><td>2.61</td><td>2.79</td><td>3.02</td><td>4.11</td><td>4.60</td><td>4.75</td><td>Cap'l Spending per sh</td><td>2.85</td></tr> <tr> <td>8.61</td><td>8.92</td><td>9.25</td><td>10.06</td><td>10.46</td><td>10.94</td><td>11.52</td><td>11.60</td><td>11.95</td><td>12.23</td><td>12.67</td><td>13.05</td><td>13.50</td><td>20.95</td><td>17.92</td><td>18.83</td><td>20.10</td><td>21.15</td><td>Book Value per sh D</td><td>24.15</td></tr> <tr> <td>7.26</td><td>7.28</td><td>7.65</td><td>7.94</td><td>7.97</td><td>8.04</td><td>8.17</td><td>8.27</td><td>8.38</td><td>8.46</td><td>8.57</td><td>8.68</td><td>8.76</td><td>8.85</td><td>11.04</td><td>11.12</td><td>11.20</td><td>11.35</td><td>Common Shs Outst'g C</td><td>12.00</td></tr> <tr> <td>18.2</td><td>18.2</td><td>21.5</td><td>24.3</td><td>23.5</td><td>22.9</td><td>28.6</td><td>29.0</td><td>23.0</td><td>22.2</td><td>18.4</td><td>20.7</td><td>23.0</td><td>19.4</td><td>18.4</td><td>17.5</td><td>17.5</td><td>17.5</td><td>Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio</td><td>19.0</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.04</td><td>1.18</td><td>1.10</td><td>1.33</td><td>1.34</td><td>1.21</td><td>1.52</td><td>1.57</td><td>1.22</td><td>1.34</td><td>1.23</td><td>1.32</td><td>1.44</td><td>1.23</td><td>1.03</td><td>.92</td><td>.92</td><td>.92</td><td>Relative P/E Ratio</td><td>1.20</td></tr> <tr> <td>4.2%</td><td>4.0%</td><td>3.3%</td><td>3.0%</td><td>3.0%</td><td>3.1%</td><td>3.4%</td><td>3.6%</td><td>3.6%</td><td>3.6%</td><td>4.1%</td><td>3.9%</td><td>3.6%</td><td>3.2%</td><td>3.2%</td><td>3.0%</td><td>3.0%</td><td>3.0%</td><td>Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield</td><td>2.8%</td></tr> </tbody> </table>																	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20	5.87	5.70	5.93	5.77	5.91	6.04	5.81	5.68	7.05	7.24	6.93	7.65	7.93	9.47	8.29	8.45	8.65	9.00	Revenues per sh	12.50	1.65	1.73	1.78	1.78	1.89	1.91	1.62	1.52	1.90	1.95	1.93	2.04	2.11	2.64	2.63	2.97	3.20	3.35	"Cash Flow" per sh	3.60	1.03	1.09	1.13	1.12	1.15	1.16	.88	.81	1.05	1.11	1.19	1.13	1.13	1.53	1.66	1.92	2.00	2.10	Earnings per sh A	2.25	.79	.79	.80	.81	.83	.84	.85	.86	.87	.88	.80	.92	.94	.96	.98	1.01	1.05	1.09	Div'd Dec'd per sh B	1.30	1.42	1.43	1.86	1.98	1.49	1.58	1.96	1.96	2.24	2.44	3.28	3.06	2.61	2.79	3.02	4.11	4.60	4.75	Cap'l Spending per sh	2.85	8.61	8.92	9.25	10.06	10.46	10.94	11.52	11.60	11.95	12.23	12.67	13.05	13.50	20.95	17.92	18.83	20.10	21.15	Book Value per sh D	24.15	7.26	7.28	7.65	7.94	7.97	8.04	8.17	8.27	8.38	8.46	8.57	8.68	8.76	8.85	11.04	11.12	11.20	11.35	Common Shs Outst'g C	12.00	18.2	18.2	21.5	24.3	23.5	22.9	28.6	29.0	23.0	22.2	18.4	20.7	23.0	19.4	18.4	17.5	17.5	17.5	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	19.0	1.04	1.18	1.10	1.33	1.34	1.21	1.52	1.57	1.22	1.34	1.23	1.32	1.44	1.23	1.03	.92	.92	.92	Relative P/E Ratio	1.20	4.2%	4.0%	3.3%	3.0%	3.0%	3.1%	3.4%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	4.1%	3.9%	3.6%	3.2%	3.2%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	2.8%																																								
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CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$185.6 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$19.3 mill. LT Debt \$177.7 mill. LT Interest \$7.0 mill. (46% of Cap'l) Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$1 mill. Pension Assets-12/14 \$61.6 mill. Oblig. \$79.8 mill. Pfd Stock \$0.8 mill. Pfd Divd NMF Common Stock 11,152,145 shs. as of 4/30/15 MARKET CAP: \$400 million (Small Cap)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
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Equity	9.5%	7.6%	7.0%	8.7%	9.1%	9.4%	8.7%	8.3%	7.3%	9.2%	10.2%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	Return on Com Equity	9.5%	3%	NMF	1.6%	1.9%	2.3%	1.6%	1.4%	2.8%	3.8%	4.8%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	Retained to Com Eq	4.0%	95%	105%	82%	79%	76%	81%	83%	62%	59%	53%	53%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	58%
47.5	46.9	59.0	61.3	59.4	66.4	69.4	83.8	91.5	94.0	97.0	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	Revenues (\$mill)	150																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
7.2	6.7	8.8	9.4	10.2	9.8	10.2	9.8	9.9	9.9	13.6	18.3	21.3	23.0	23.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	Net Profit (\$mill)	27.0																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
--	23.5%	32.4%	27.2%	19.5%	35.2%	41.3%	35.2%	41.3%	35.2%	28.0%	14.4%	18.0%	19.5%	19.5%	19.5%	19.5%	19.5%	Income Tax Rate	30.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
--	--	--	1.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.7%	2.0%	2.4%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	2.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
44.9%	44.4%	47.8%	46.9%	50.6%	49.5%	53.2%	49.0%	46.9%	45.7%	45.5%	47.5%	47.5%	47.5%	47.5%	47.5%	47.5%	47.5%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	47.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
54.6%	55.1%	51.8%	52.7%	49.1%	50.2%	46.5%	50.8%	52.9%	54.1%	54.5%	52.5%	52.5%	52.5%	52.5%	52.5%	52.5%	52.5%	Common Equity Ratio	52.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
172.3	174.1	193.2	196.5	221.3	225.6	254.2	364.6	373.6	386.8	420	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	Total Capital (\$mill)	550																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
247.7	268.1	284.3	302.3	325.2	344.2	362.4	447.9	471.9	506.9	535	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	Net Plant (\$mill)	675																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
5.0%	4.9%	5.5%	5.9%	5.5%	5.4%	4.9%	4.8%	5.9%	6.4%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	6.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
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3%	NMF	1.6%	1.9%	2.3%	1.6%	1.4%	2.8%	3.8%	4.8%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	Retained to Com Eq	4.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
95%	105%	82%	79%	76%	81%	83%	62%	59%	53%	53%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	58%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
ANNUAL RATES Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '12-'14 to '18-'20 Revenues 4.0% 4.5% 6.0% "Cash Flow" 4.0% 7.5% 4.5% Earnings 4.0% 9.0% 4.5% Dividends 2.0% 2.0% 5.0% Book Value 6.5% 9.5% 4.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
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BUSINESS: Connecticut Water Service, Inc. is a non-operating holding company, whose income is derived from earnings of its wholly-owned subsidiary companies (regulated water utilities). In 2014, 93% of net income was derived from these activities. Provides water services to 400,000 people in 77 municipalities throughout Connecticut and Maine. Acquired The Maine Water Company, January, 2012; Biddeford and Saco Water, December, 2012. Incorporated: Connecticut. Has 265 employees. Chairman/President/Chief Executive Officer: Eric W. Thornburg. Officers and directors own 2.3% of the common stock; BlackRock, Inc. 7.0%; (4/15 proxy). Address: 93 West Main Street, Clinton, CT 06413. Telephone: (860) 669-8636. Internet: www.ctwater.com.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Connecticut Water Service should record decent bottom-line results over the next two years. Following a very successful 2014, we think the company will be able to post increases in share net of 4% in 2015, and 5% in 2016. Higher rates being permitted in Maine, an IRS tax rebate, and cost savings, will all contribute to the gains.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Dividend growth prospects have improved. The utility has only been able to increase its annual payout an average of 2% annually over both the last five- and 10 year-periods. In 2014, the trend was broken, as the dividend was hiked 3%. Moreover, when the board meets in September, the quarterly dividend could be boosted another \$0.01 a share, to around \$0.2675. This would be a 4% increase, which would put the utility closer, but still below, the industry norm.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
The company has been successful in expanding the business. Unless located in a service area experiencing strong economic growth, it can be hard for a utility to grow its customer base. Over the past several years, Connecticut Water has made two decent size acquisitions, and has																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Shares of Connecticut Water are expected to perform in line with the broader market averages in the year ahead. The dividend yield is 100 basis points above that of the typical stock in the Value Line universe. Potential total return through 2018-2020 is lower than the average equity, however.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Connecticut Water might not be big, but it is solid. With a market capitalization of only \$400 million, the utility is on the small side. Still, the balance sheet is healthy, and should remain so for the foreseeable future. This is very positive in light of the larger amounts that have to be spent to replace an aging distribution system. (The industry is in the midst of a major refurbishing program.)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
James A. Flood July 17, 2015																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				

(A) Diluted earnings. Next earnings report due mid-August. Quarterly earnings do not add in 2012 due to rounding.
 (B) Dividends historically paid in mid-March.
 (C) In millions, adjusted for split.
 (D) Includes intangibles. In 2014: \$31.7 million/\$2.85 a share.
 Company's Financial Strength B+
 Stock's Price Stability 90
 Price Growth Persistence 50
 Earnings Predictability 85
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CONSOL. WATER CO. NDQ-CWCO				RECENT PRICE	12.61	P/E RATIO	21.0	(Trailing: 23.8 Median: 28.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.11	DIV'D YLD	2.4%	VALUE LINE																																																	
TIMELINESS 4 Lowered 3/27/15	High: 15.5	22.5	31.8	37.5	29.8	21.3	15.1	11.7	9.2	16.9	14.5	13.8	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020																																																	
SAFETY 3 New 1/17/14	Low: 8.7	13.6	19.8	23.3	7.6	6.4	8.1	7.3	6.7	7.5	8.4	9.6																																																		
TECHNICAL 2 Raised 7/17/15	LEGENDS 2.00 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 2-for-1 split 8/05 Options Yes Shaded area indicates recession																																																													
BETA .85 (1.00 = Market)																																																														
2018-20 PROJECTIONS				Price	Gain	Ann'l Total Return																																																								
High	30	(+140%)	25%	19	(+50%)	12%																																																								
Low	19																																																													
Insider Decisions														% TOT. RETURN 6/15																																																
<table border="1"> <tr><th></th><th>A</th><th>S</th><th>O</th><th>N</th><th>D</th><th>J</th><th>F</th><th>M</th><th>A</th></tr> <tr><td>to Buy</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>Options</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>to Sell</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>0</td></tr> </table>					A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Options	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	to Sell	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0											THIS STOCK	VL ARITH. INDEX							
	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A																																																					
to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0																																																					
Options	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0																																																					
to Sell	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0																																																					
Institutional Decisions														1 yr.	10.0	3.2																																														
<table border="1"> <tr><th></th><th>3Q2014</th><th>4Q2014</th><th>1Q2015</th></tr> <tr><td>to Buy</td><td>32</td><td>28</td><td>21</td></tr> <tr><td>to Sell</td><td>31</td><td>28</td><td>28</td></tr> <tr><td>Hds(000)</td><td>6127</td><td>5703</td><td>6010</td></tr> </table>					3Q2014	4Q2014	1Q2015	to Buy	32	28	21	to Sell	31	28	28	Hds(000)	6127	5703	6010											3 yr.	64.1	64.2																														
	3Q2014	4Q2014	1Q2015																																																											
to Buy	32	28	21																																																											
to Sell	31	28	28																																																											
Hds(000)	6127	5703	6010																																																											
														5 yr.	27.8	113.9																																														
														© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20																																																
				1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016																																									
				1.25	1.24	1.41	1.52	1.68	2.02	1.12	2.71	3.41	4.52	3.99	3.49	3.79	4.49	4.35	4.46	4.40	4.65	Revenues per sh	5.95																																							
				.43	.46	.52	.50	.63	.77	.37	.87	1.20	.95	1.18	.86	.83	1.17	.96	.80	1.00	1.10	"Cash Flow" per sh	1.60																																							
				.31	.34	.35	.32	.42	.49	.23	.59	.79	.50	.74	.43	.42	.64	.58	.42	.60	.65	Earnings per sh ^A	1.10																																							
				.08	.17	.20	.21	.21	.23	.12	.24	.20	.33	.28	.30	.30	.30	.30	.30	.30	.30	.30	Div'd Decl'd per sh ^{B=C}	.40																																						
				.24	.30	.24	.39	.19	.24	.77	1.83	.54	.46	.18	.09	.96	.31	.29	.32	.60	.60	Cap'l Spending per sh	.60																																							
				1.96	2.30	2.45	2.64	3.89	4.20	2.54	7.49	8.21	8.36	8.53	8.69	8.83	9.20	9.44	9.58	9.85	10.20	Book Value per sh	13.65																																							
				6.38	7.73	7.84	7.99	11.37	11.51	23.46	14.13	14.40	14.53	14.54	14.55	14.57	14.59	14.69	14.72	14.75	15.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	16.00																																							
				11.7	10.4	13.9	21.6	19.3	23.1	NMF	43.0	35.4	37.8	19.0	26.9	22.4	12.4	20.0	28.3			Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	21.0																																							
				.67	.68	.71	1.18	1.10	1.22	NMF	2.32	1.88	2.27	1.27	1.71	1.41	.79	1.12	1.49			Relative P/E Ratio	1.30																																							
				2.2%	4.9%	4.2%	3.1%	2.6%	2.0%	7%	9%	7%	1.7%	2.0%	2.6%	3.2%	3.8%	2.6%	2.5%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	1.6%																																							
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15														26.2	38.2	49.2	65.7	58.0	50.7	55.2	65.5	63.8	65.6	65.0	70.0	Revenues (\$mill)	95.0																																			
Total Debt \$8.5 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$8.5 mill.														5.5	7.5	11.4	7.2	10.8	6.3	6.1	9.3	8.6	6.3	9.0	10.0	10.0	Net Profit (\$mill)	17.5																																		
LT Debt None														--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	NMF	NMF	NMF	Income Tax Rate	NMF																																		
Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$.7 mill.														--	--	--	--	--	--	4.0%	--	--	--	NMF	NMF	NMF	AFUDC % to Net Profit	NMF																																		
No Defined Benefit Pension Plan														24.5%	18.2%	15.9%	14.8%	13.8%	11.8%	5.1%	3.7%	3.7%	--	NII	NII	NII	Long-Term Debt Ratio	NII																																		
Pfd Stock NMF 36,840 shares out. Div'd NMF														75.4%	81.8%	84.1%	85.2%	86.2%	88.2%	94.9%	96.3%	99.8%	100%	100%	100%	100%	Common Equity Ratio	100%																																		
Common Stock 14,734,272 shs. as of 5/14/14														78.9	129.3	140.7	142.7	143.9	143.3	135.6	139.4	138.9	100%	145	153	153	Total Capital (\$mill)	205																																		
MARKET CAP: \$175 million (Small Cap)														44.8	63.6	65.0	65.1	61.2	56.2	64.3	61.6	58.6	56.4	60.0	65.0	65.0	Net Plant (\$mill)	100.0																																		
CURRENT POSITION														7.5%	6.5%	8.8%	5.7%	8.1%	4.9%	5.0%	7.0%	6.2%	4.4%	6.0%	6.5%	6.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	8.5%																																		
Cash Assets														9.3%	7.1%	9.6%	5.9%	8.7%	5.0%	4.7%	6.9%	6.2%	4.4%	6.0%	6.5%	6.5%	Return on Shr. Equity	8.5%																																		
Accts Receivable														9.2%	7.1%	9.6%	5.9%	8.7%	5.0%	4.7%	6.9%	6.2%	4.4%	6.0%	6.5%	6.5%	Return on Com Equity	8.5%																																		
Other														4.6%	4.2%	6.5%	2.8%	4.6%	1.5%	1.0%	3.6%	3.0%	1.2%	3.0%	3.5%	3.5%	Retained to Com Eq	5.0%																																		
Current Assets														50%	41%	33%	52%	46%	69%	79%	48%	51%	73%	50%	46%	46%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	36%																																		
Accts Payable														BUSINESS: Consolidated Water Co. Ltd. develops and operates seawater desalination plants and water distribution systems in areas where naturally occurring supplies of potable water are scarce or nonexistent. Its desalination process involves reverse osmosis tech. It provides water in the Cayman Islands, Belize, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, and Bali. At 12/31/14, it opera-																																																
Debt Due														ted 14 plants with a capacity of 26.5 million gallons per day. Inc.: Cayman Isl. Has 119 employees. Pres./CEO: Frederick McTaggart. Off./dir. own 3.3% of stock; Thomson, Horstmann, & Bryant, 6.2% (4/15 proxy). Address: Regatta Office Park Windward Three, 4th Floor, West Bay Road P.O. Box 1114 Grand Cayman, KYI-1102, Cayman Islands. Tel.: (345) 945-4277. Int.: www.cwco.com.																																																
Other														Consolidated Water is very different from the other companies in this industry. Of the nine water utilities we follow, this company's future is heavily tied to nonregulated businesses. Therefore, the upside is much higher, but so is the risk. The company is well positioned to benefit from the shortage of potable water in Bali. As a developer and operator of saltwater desalination plants, the water utility opened the Nusa Dua facility in the Indonesian island of Bali last year. Considered a high-end tourist destination, there are a large number of four- and five-star hotels. Because the industry is experiencing strong growth, the native population is also expanding. Demand for fresh-drinking water should increase at a robust pace, in management's opinion. Nusa Dua is not operating at a profit right now, due to costs associated with ramping up the project. We expect this situation to change as more customers are added and the daily output of the desalination plants rises. The groundwork has been set for a promising desalination facility in Mexico, too. Most of the required administrative work has been completed to con-																																																
Current Liab.														struct a \$600-million plant in Mexico. Consolidated would maintain a 12% stake and operate the million-gallon-per-day project. No customers have been signed up yet. Since the targeted markets of San Diego and Tijuana are so water hungry, though, we expect to see progress here in the near future. Moreover, the building and operating costs will be much lower with the plant being located south of the border. Ironically, Consolidated's regulated utilities offer some risk. With major facilities in the Bahamas and the British Virgin Islands, the government regulators and the company have not always seen eye-to-eye on rates and valuation of assets. Still, the water utility expects the next long-term contract to be renewed upon expiration in 2017. These untimely shares are only for those that can live with some risk. On the positive side, Consolidated has tapped into a market that has gained global prominence, in part to California's historic drought. Conversely, the company is very small, and its earnings prospects are not bright for the next two years. James A. Flood July 17, 2015																																																
ANNUAL RATES														<table border="1"> <tr><th></th><th>Past 10 Yrs.</th><th>Past 5 Yrs.</th><th>Est'd '12-'14 to '18-'20</th></tr> <tr><td>Revenues</td><td>10.0%</td><td>2.0%</td><td>5.0%</td></tr> <tr><td>"Cash Flow"</td><td>4.5%</td><td>-2.5%</td><td>7.0%</td></tr> <tr><td>Earnings</td><td>3.0%</td><td>-4.0%</td><td>10.5%</td></tr> <tr><td>Dividends</td><td>3.5%</td><td>2.5%</td><td>4.0%</td></tr> <tr><td>Book Value</td><td>10.0%</td><td>2.5%</td><td>6.0%</td></tr> </table>														Past 10 Yrs.	Past 5 Yrs.	Est'd '12-'14 to '18-'20	Revenues	10.0%	2.0%	5.0%	"Cash Flow"	4.5%	-2.5%	7.0%	Earnings	3.0%	-4.0%	10.5%	Dividends	3.5%	2.5%	4.0%	Book Value	10.0%	2.5%	6.0%												
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QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)														<table border="1"> <tr><th>Cal-endar</th><th>Mar.31</th><th>Jun.30</th><th>Sep.30</th><th>Dec.31</th><th>Full Year</th></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>16.7</td><td>16.2</td><td>15.8</td><td>16.8</td><td>65.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>16.6</td><td>16.6</td><td>15.4</td><td>15.2</td><td>63.8</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>16.3</td><td>16.9</td><td>17.0</td><td>15.4</td><td>65.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>14.7</td><td>17.0</td><td>17.5</td><td>15.8</td><td>65.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>17.0</td><td>18.5</td><td>18.0</td><td>16.5</td><td>70.0</td></tr> </table>													Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year	2012	16.7	16.2	15.8	16.8	65.5	2013	16.6	16.6	15.4	15.2	63.8	2014	16.3	16.9	17.0	15.4	65.6	2015	14.7	17.0	17.5	15.8	65.0	2016	17.0	18.5	18.0	16.5	70.0
Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year																																																									
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Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year																																																									
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(A) Fully diluted earnings. Next earnings report due mid-August.
(B) Dividends historically paid in late January, April, July and October. ■ Dividend reinvest-

ment plan available.
(C) In millions adjusted for stock split.

Company's Financial Strength	B+
Stock's Price Stability	30
Price Growth Persistence	10
Earnings Predictability	50

CALIFORNIA WATER NYSE-CWT				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE													
				23.70	19.0 (Trailing: 17.8 Median: 20.0)	1.00	2.9%														
TIMELINESS	3	Raised 6/20/14	High: 19.0	22.9	22.7	23.3	24.1	19.8	19.4	19.3	23.4	26.4	26.0	Target Price	Range						
SAFETY	3	Lowered 7/27/07	Low: 13.0	21.1	21.1	23.8	16.7	16.9	16.7	16.8	18.4	20.3	22.6	2018	2019						
TECHNICAL	2	Raised 7/3/15	LEGENDS 1.33 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 2-for-1 split 6/11 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession										2020								
BETA	.75	(1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS																		
Price		Gain	Ann'l Total																		
High	35	(+50%)	12%																		
Low	25	(+5%)	4%																		
Insider Decisions																					
A S O N D J F M A																					
to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Options	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
to Sell	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Institutional Decisions																					
3Q2014		4Q2014	1Q2015		Percent shares traded																
to Buy	53	81	79		18																
to Sell	53	59	67		12																
Hld's(000)	29552	29654	29379		6																
© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20																					
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Revenues per sh	16.80		
7.98	8.08	8.13	8.67	8.18	8.59	8.72	8.10	8.88	9.90	10.82	11.05	12.00	13.34	12.23	12.50	12.80	13.25	"Cash Flow" per sh	3.20		
1.37	1.26	1.10	1.32	1.26	1.42	1.52	1.36	1.56	1.86	1.93	1.93	2.07	2.32	2.21	2.47	2.60	2.65	Earnings per sh ^A	1.55		
.77	.66	.47	.63	.61	.73	.74	.67	.75	.95	.98	.91	.86	1.02	1.02	1.19	1.25	1.25	Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B	.97		
.54	.55	.56	.56	.56	.57	.57	.58	.58	.59	.59	.60	.62	.63	.64	.65	.67	.69	Cap'l Spending per sh	3.10		
1.72	1.23	2.04	2.91	2.19	1.87	2.01	2.14	1.84	2.41	2.66	2.97	2.83	3.04	2.58	2.76	2.50	2.60	Book Value per sh ^C	16.00		
6.71	6.45	6.48	6.56	7.22	7.83	7.90	9.07	9.25	9.72	10.13	10.45	10.76	11.28	12.54	13.11	13.75	14.25	Common Shs Outst'g ^D	50.00		
25.87	30.29	30.36	30.36	33.86	36.73	36.78	41.31	41.33	41.45	41.53	41.67	41.82	41.98	47.74	47.81	48.00	48.00	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	20.0		
17.8	19.6	27.1	19.8	22.1	20.1	24.9	29.2	26.1	19.8	19.7	20.3	21.3	17.9	20.1	19.7	19.7	19.7	Relative P/E Ratio	1.25		
1.01	1.27	1.39	1.08	1.26	1.06	1.33	1.58	1.39	1.19	1.31	1.29	1.34	1.14	1.13	1.04	1.04	1.04	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.2%		
4.0%	4.3%	4.4%	4.5%	4.2%	3.9%	3.1%	2.9%	3.0%	3.1%	3.1%	3.2%	3.4%	3.5%	3.1%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%	Bold figures are Value Line estimates			
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15																					
Total Debt \$534.7 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$165.8 mill.				320.7				334.7	367.1	410.3	449.4	460.4	501.8	560.0	584.1	597.5	615	635	Revenues (\$mill) ^E	840	
LT Debt \$419.0 mill. LT Interest \$20.0 mill. (40% of Cap'l)				27.2				25.6	31.2	39.8	40.6	37.7	36.1	42.6	47.3	56.7	57.5	57.5	Net Profit (\$mill)	77.5	
Pension Assets-12/14 \$306.3 mill. Oblig. \$390.6 mill.				42.4%				37.4%	39.9%	37.7%	40.3%	39.5%	40.5%	37.5%	30.3%	33.0%	28.5%	29.5%	Income Tax Rate	36.0%	
Pfd Stock None				3.3%				10.6%	8.3%	8.6%	7.6%	4.2%	7.6%	8.0%	4.3%	2.7%	2.0%	4.5%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	5.0%	
Common Stock 47,880,233 shs. as of 4/27/15				48.3%				43.5%	42.9%	41.8%	47.1%	52.4%	51.7%	47.8%	41.6%	40.1%	43.0%	43.5%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	41.5%	
MARKET CAP: \$1.1 billion (Mid Cap)				51.1%				55.9%	56.6%	58.4%	52.9%	47.6%	48.3%	52.2%	58.4%	59.9%	57.0%	56.5%	Common Equity Ratio	58.5%	
CURRENT POSITION 2013 2014 3/31/15 (\$MILL.)				588.1				670.1	674.9	690.4	794.9	914.7	931.5	908.2	1024.9	1045.9	1160	1215	Total Capital (\$mill)	1370	
Cash Assets				862.7				941.5	1010.2	1112.4	1198.1	1294.3	1381.1	1457.1	1515.8	1590.4	1660	1730	Net Plant (\$mill)	1820	
Other				6.3%				5.2%	5.9%	7.1%	6.5%	5.5%	5.5%	6.3%	6.0%	6.3%	6.5%	6.0%	Return on Total Cap'l	7.0%	
Current Assets				9.3%				6.8%	8.1%	9.9%	9.6%	8.6%	8.0%	9.0%	7.9%	9.1%	9.1%	9.1%	Return on Shr. Equity	9.5%	
Accts Payable				9.3%				6.8%	8.1%	9.9%	9.6%	8.6%	8.0%	9.0%	7.9%	9.1%	9.0%	8.5%	Return on Com Equity	9.5%	
Debt Due				2.1%				1.0%	1.8%	3.8%	3.8%	3.0%	2.3%	3.4%	3.4%	4.1%	4.0%	3.5%	Retained to Com Eq	3.5%	
Other				78%				86%	77%	61%	60%	66%	71%	62%	56%	56%	56%	55%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	63%	
Current Liab.				27.5				19.6	33.3	BUSINESS: California Water Service Group provides regulated and nonregulated water service to 477,900 customers in 85 communities in the state of California. Accounts for over 94% of total customers. Also operates in Washington, New Mexico, and Hawaii. Main service areas: San Francisco Bay area, Sacramento Valley, Salinas Valley, San Joaquin Valley & parts of Los Angeles. Acquired Rio Grande Corp; West Hawaii Utilities (8/08). Revenue breakdown, '14: residential, 68%; business, 19%; industrial, 5%; public authorities, 3%; other 5%. '14 reported depreciation rate: 4.0%. Has 1,105 employees. President, Chairman, and CEO: Peter C. Nelson, Inc.; DE. Address: 1720 North First St., San Jose, CA 95112-4598. Tel.: 408-367-8200. Internet: www.calwatergroup.com.											
ANNUAL RATES of change (per sh)				116.8				143.6	178.1	121.5	560.0	The state's historic drought should result in a sharp decline in demand by California Water's customers. In response to the lack of rainfall, Governor Brown mandated a 25% reduction in urban, potable water use. The new regulations are established to achieve water use decreases of between 8% and 36%, compared to the amount consumed in 2013. Surcharges will be assigned to those who fail to meet the new regulations. The conservation measures should not have a major impact on the company. In order to cut water usage, California established mechanisms that changed how water utilities make a profit. According to the new methodology, revenues and earnings were switched from a "quantity based" to a "fixed-rate charge" system. Basically, a water company will not be penalized if demand falls. Revenues are now constructed to be more like a service fee. We expect earnings to increase by a decent amount this year and be flat in 2016. As a result of a petition for higher rates filed in 2012, California Water was allowed to institute higher rates in the									
Past 10 Yrs.				111.4				154.6	184.4	133.7	584.1	second half of 2014. This should enable share earnings to rise 5%, to \$1.25, in 2015, and remain unchanged in 2016. A new rate case was recently filed. California water utilities are required to file rate cases every three years. California Water is seeking hikes of \$95 million in 2017, \$23 million in 2018, and \$23 million in 2019. Like most of its peers, the utility is spending to upgrade and modernize its pipeline infrastructure. A final decision by regulators (the CPUC) is expected in 2017. California regulators have generally been constructive in dealing with water utilities. One of the most important factors affecting a utility is how a state treats companies under its jurisdiction. The CPUC realizes that maintenance work on water infrastructure has been neglected in the past and more money must be spent to improve services. These shares' total return potential through late decade is slightly below average. Still, conservative investors willing to accept less of a payoff in exchange for low volatility might find this stock suitable. James A. Flood July 17, 2015									
Past 5 Yrs.				110.5				158.4	191.2	137.4	597.5										
Est'd '12-'14				122.0				160	193	140	615										
'12-'14				120				170	200	145	635										
REVENUES PER SHARE ^A				.03				.31	.56	.12	1.02										
Earnings				.01				.28	.61	.12	1.02										
Dividends				d.11				.36	.70	.24	1.19										
Book Value				.03				.35	.72	.15	1.25										
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^B				.03				.35	.72	.15	1.25										
Cal-ender				.154				.154	.154	.154	.62										
Mar.31				.1575				.1575	.1575	.1575	.63										
Jun.30				.16				.16	.16	.16	.64										
Sep.30				.1625				.1625	.1625	.1625	.65										
Dec.31				.1675				.1675													
Full Year																					

(A) Basic EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (loss); '00, (4¢); '01, 2¢; '02, 4¢; '11, 4¢. Next earnings report due mid-Aug. (B) Dividends historically paid in late Feb., May, Aug., and Nov. (C) Incl. intangible assets. in '14: \$7.3 mill., \$0.15/sh. (D) In millions, adjusted for splits. (E) Excludes non-reg. rev.

Company's Financial Strength B++
Stock Price Stability 95
Price Growth Persistence 40
Earnings Predictability 85

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LACLEDE GROUP NYSE-LG				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 16.2 Median: 14.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	3.5%	VALUE LINE									
TIMELINESS 3	Raised 2/27/15	High: 32.5	34.3	37.5	36.0	55.8	48.3	37.8	42.8	44.0	48.5	55.2	55.8	Target Price	Range				
SAFETY 2	Raised 6/20/03	Low: 26.0	26.9	29.1	28.8	31.9	29.3	30.8	32.9	36.5	37.4	44.0	49.1	2018	2020				
TECHNICAL 4	Lowered 5/22/15	LEGENDS 1.00 x Dividends p.sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession																	
BETA .70	(1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 75 (+45%) 12% Low 55 (+5%) 5%																	
Insider Decisions J A S O N D J F M to Buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 to Sell 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0																			
Institutional Decisions 2Q2014 3Q2014 4Q2014 to Buy 125 113 85 to Sell 53 67 99 Mid's(000) 32190 34204 34804 Percent shares traded 15 10 5																			
% TOT. RETURN 4/15 THIS STOCK VL ARTH. INDEX 1 yr. 13.6 9.1 3 yr. 48.1 58.8 5 yr. 86.9 84.6																			
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20
26.04	29.99	53.08	39.84	54.95	59.59	75.43	93.51	93.40	100.44	85.49	77.83	71.48	49.90	31.10	37.68	51.15	55.80	Revenues per sh ^A	60.00
2.56	2.68	3.00	2.56	3.15	2.79	2.98	3.81	3.87	4.22	4.56	4.11	4.62	4.58	3.12	3.87	5.00	5.30	"Cash Flow" per sh	6.35
1.47	1.37	1.61	1.18	1.82	1.82	1.90	2.37	2.31	2.64	2.92	2.43	2.86	2.79	2.02	2.35	3.15	3.30	Earnings per sh ^{A,B}	4.20
1.34	1.34	1.34	1.34	1.34	1.35	1.37	1.40	1.45	1.49	1.53	1.57	1.61	1.66	1.70	1.76	1.84	1.92	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C	2.20
2.58	2.77	2.51	2.80	2.67	2.45	2.84	2.97	2.72	2.57	2.36	2.56	3.02	4.83	4.00	3.96	4.20	4.40	Cap'l Spending per sh	5.55
14.96	14.99	15.26	15.07	15.65	16.96	17.31	18.85	19.79	22.12	23.32	24.02	25.56	26.67	32.00	34.93	36.20	39.80	Book Value per sh ^D	48.10
18.88	18.88	18.88	18.96	19.11	20.98	21.17	21.36	21.65	21.99	22.17	22.29	22.43	22.55	32.70	43.18	43.00	43.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^E	45.00
15.8	14.9	14.5	20.0	13.6	15.7	16.2	13.6	14.2	14.3	13.4	13.7	13.0	14.5	21.3	19.8	Bold figures are Value Line estimates		Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	15.5
.90	.97	.74	1.09	.78	.83	.86	.73	.75	.86	.89	.87	.82	.92	1.20	1.04			Relative P/E Ratio	.95
5.8%	6.6%	5.7%	5.7%	5.4%	4.7%	4.4%	4.3%	4.4%	3.9%	3.9%	4.7%	4.3%	4.1%	4.0%	3.8%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.5%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$2063.9 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$100.0 mill. LT Debt \$1736.3 mill. LT Interest \$70.0 mill. (Total interest coverage: 4.7x)				1597.0	1997.6	2021.6	2209.0	1895.2	1735.0	1603.3	1125.5	1017.0	1627.2	2200	2400	Revenues (\$mill) ^A	2700		
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$12.0 mill. Pension Assets-9/14 \$506.6 mill. Oblig. \$692.5 mill.				40.1	50.5	49.8	57.6	64.3	54.0	63.8	62.6	52.8	84.6	135	140	Net Profit (\$mill)	190		
Pfd Stock None Common Stock 43,318,933 shs. as of 4/30/15				34.1%	32.5%	33.4%	31.3%	33.6%	33.4%	31.4%	29.6%	25.0%	27.6%	29.0%	30.0%	Income Tax Rate	30.0%		
MARKET CAP: \$2.3 billion (Mid Cap)				2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.6%	3.4%	3.1%	4.0%	5.6%	5.2%	5.2%	6.2%	5.9%	Net Profit Margin	7.0%		
CURRENT POSITION (\$MILL.)				48.1%	49.5%	45.3%	44.4%	42.9%	40.5%	38.9%	36.1%	46.6%	55.1%	54.0%	53.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	51.0%		
Cash Assets 53.0 16.1 46.9 Other 422.9 588.8 790.3 Current Assets 475.9 604.9 837.2				51.8%	50.4%	54.6%	55.5%	57.1%	59.5%	61.1%	63.9%	53.4%	44.9%	46.0%	47.0%	Common Equity Ratio	49.0%		
Accts Payable 140.2 176.7 247.6 Debt Due 74.0 287.1 327.6 Other 139.0 319.0 278.5 Current Liab. 353.2 782.8 853.7 Fix. Chg. Cov. 337% 423% 477%				707.9	798.9	784.5	876.1	908.3	899.9	937.7	941.0	1959.0	3359.4	3400	3645	Total Capital (\$mill)	4400		
ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '12-'14 of change (per sh) 10 Yrs. 5 Yrs. to '18-'20				679.5	763.8	793.8	823.2	855.9	884.1	928.7	1019.3	1776.6	2759.7	2895	3045	Net Plant (\$mill)	3520		
Revenues -2.5% -15.5% 7.0% "Cash Flow" 3.0% -2.0% 8.5% Earnings 4.0% -2.0% 10.0% Dividends 2.5% 3.0% 4.5% Book Value 7.0% 7.5% 7.5%				7.6%	8.4%	8.5%	8.1%	8.7%	7.4%	8.1%	7.9%	3.3%	3.1%	4.5%	4.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	5.0%		
Fiscal Year Ends				10.9%	12.5%	11.6%	11.8%	12.4%	10.1%	11.1%	10.4%	5.0%	5.8%	8.5%	8.5%	Return on Shr. Equity	8.5%		
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)^A				10.9%	12.5%	11.6%	11.8%	12.4%	10.1%	11.1%	10.4%	5.0%	5.8%	8.5%	8.5%	Return on Com Equity	8.5%		
Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30				3.1%	5.1%	4.3%	5.2%	5.9%	3.6%	4.9%	4.3%	1.0%	1.5%	3.5%	3.5%	Retained to Com Eq	4.0%		
2012 410.9 358.2 186.9 169.5 1125.5 2013 307.0 397.6 165.3 147.1 1017.0 2014 468.6 694.5 241.8 222.3 1627.2 2015 619.6 877.4 360 343 2200 2016 675 950 400 375 2400				72%	59%	63%	56%	53%	64%	56%	59%	81%	73%	58%	58%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	52%		
Fiscal Year Ends				BUSINESS: Laclede Group, Inc., is a holding company for Laclede Gas, which distributes natural gas across Missouri, including the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City. Has roughly 1.6 million customers. Purchased SM&P Utility Resources, 1/02; divested, 3/08. Acquired Missouri Gas 9/13, Alabama Gas Co 9/14. Utility terms sold and transported in fiscal 2014: 2.0 bill. Revenue mix for regulated operations: residential, 66%; commercial and industrial, 24%; transportation, 2%; other, 8%. Has around 3,152 employees. Officers and directors own 3.2% of common shares (1/15 proxy). Chairman: William E. Nasser; CEO: Suzanne Sitherwood, Inc. Missouri. Address: 720 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. Telephone: 314-342-0500. Internet: www.thelacledegroup.com.															
2012 1.12 1.32 .38 d.03 2.79 2013 1.14 1.34 .25 d.30 2.02 2014 1.09 1.59 .33 d.35 2.35 2015 1.09 2.18 .20 d.32 3.15 2016 1.15 1.90 .30 d.25 3.30				Laclede reported solid fiscal second-quarter results (ended March 31st). Indeed, earnings per share reached \$2.18, aided by contributions from the Alagasco merger and synergies being realized through combination efforts with Missouri Gas. Too, cooler-than-usual winter weather played a role in the outstanding results. The second half of the fiscal year appears likely to be weaker than our original projections, as a warmer April and the timing of expenses, including increased maintenance costs, should hamper second-half results. Still, given the latest performance, we raised our 2015 share-net estimate by a nickel, to \$3.15.															
Fiscal Year Ends				Finances appear to be in decent shape. Although like many industry peers, Laclede's long-term debt constitutes more than 50% of total capital, this is at a fairly manageable level. Too, a good portion of the debt is fixed-rate, which means interest expenses don't fluctuate much. This, in turn, helps to add some stability to earnings.															
Cal-endar				The dividend is a top draw. The payout is well covered by earnings, and the yield is attractive. We expect the dividend to rise at a decent clip over the next few years, although the payout ratio will likely be well below historical highs.															
2011 .405 .405 .405 .405 1.62 2012 .415 .415 .415 .415 1.66 2013 .425 .425 .425 .425 1.70 2014 .44 .44 .44 .44 1.76 2015 .46 .46				This issue has moderate appeal at this time. Indeed, long-term appreciation potential is below average, and the prospects for payout growth are modest. Nonetheless, when factoring the Above-Average Safety rank and a lower-than-market Beta, Laclede shares offer reasonable total return possibilities on a risk-adjusted basis. This issue should appeal to those with an income objective, though waiting for a price dip appears to be prudent at this juncture.															
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^C				The longer-term picture is favorable for Laclede. Rates cases have been filed for an increase in infrastructure replacement, including \$5.5 million at Laclede and \$2.9 million at Missouri Gas. This should lead to decent earnings growth, as the company would benefit from increased pipeline reliability. The integration of Alagasco appears to be on the right track, and further synergies look to be achieved going forward. All told, we think Laclede can earn \$4.20 a share by 2018-2020.															
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31				John E. Seibert III June 5, 2015															
2011 .405 .405 .405 .405 1.62 2012 .415 .415 .415 .415 1.66 2013 .425 .425 .425 .425 1.70 2014 .44 .44 .44 .44 1.76 2015 .46 .46				Company's Financial Strength B++ Stock's Price Stability 100 Price Growth Persistence 40 Earnings Predictability 85															

(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Based on diluted shares outstanding. Excludes nonrecurring loss: '06, 7¢. Excludes gain from discontinued operations: '08, 94¢. Next earnings report due late July. (C) Dividends historically paid in early January, April, July, and October. (D) Dividend reinvestment plan available. (E) Incl. deferred charges. In '14: \$383.8 mill., \$8.85/sh. (F) Qlty. egs. may not sum due to rounding or change in shares outstanding.

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MIDDLESEX WATER NDQ-MSEX				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 19.5 Median: 21.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	3.5%	VALUE LINE																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
TIMELINESS 3 Lowered 4/11/14	High: 21.8	23.5	20.5	20.2	19.8	17.9	19.3	19.4	19.6	22.5	23.7	23.8	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020																																																																																																																																																																																																																											
SAFETY 2 New 10/21/11	Low: 16.7	17.1	16.5	16.9	12.0	11.6	14.7	16.5	17.5	18.6	19.1	21.2																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
TECHNICAL 2 Raised 7/17/15	LEGENDS 1.20 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 3 for 2 split 10/2 4 for 3 split 11/03 Options: No Shaded area indicates recession																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
BETA .75 (1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 30 (+35%) 11% Low 25 (+10%) 4%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
Insider Decisions	<table border="1"> <tr><th colspan="13">A S O N D J F M A</th></tr> <tr><td>to Buy</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>64</td></tr> <tr><td>Options</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>48</td></tr> <tr><td>to Sell</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>40</td></tr> </table>												A S O N D J F M A													to Buy	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	64	Options	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	to Sell	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40																																																																																																																																																																					
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Institutional Decisions	<table border="1"> <tr><th colspan="13">3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015</th></tr> <tr><td>to Buy</td><td>32</td><td>39</td><td>40</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>to Sell</td><td>40</td><td>37</td><td>38</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Hits(000)</td><td>6339</td><td>6372</td><td>6413</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>8</td></tr> </table>												3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015													to Buy	32	39	40	12	8	4	12	8	4	12	8	4	8	to Sell	40	37	38	12	8	4	12	8	4	12	8	4	8	Hits(000)	6339	6372	6413	12	8	4	12	8	4	12	8	4	8																																																																																																																																																																					
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1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
5.35	5.39	5.87	5.98	6.12	6.25	6.44	6.16	6.50	6.79	6.75	6.60	6.50	6.98	7.19	7.26	7.40	7.70	Revenues per sh	9.10																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
1.19	.99	1.18	1.20	1.15	1.28	1.33	1.33	1.49	1.53	1.40	1.55	1.46	1.56	1.72	1.84	1.95	2.00	"Cash Flow" per sh	2.25																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
.76	.51	.66	.73	.61	.73	.71	.82	.87	.89	.72	.96	.84	.90	1.03	1.13	1.15	1.20	Earnings per sh ^A	1.35																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
.60	.61	.62	.63	.65	.66	.67	.68	.69	.70	.71	.72	.73	.74	.75	.76	.77	.78	Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B	.85																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
2.33	1.32	1.25	1.59	1.87	2.54	2.18	2.31	1.66	2.12	1.49	1.90	1.50	1.36	1.26	1.40	1.80	2.00	Cap'l Spending per sh	2.00																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
6.95	6.98	7.11	7.39	7.60	8.02	8.26	9.52	10.05	10.03	10.33	11.13	11.27	11.48	11.82	12.24	12.75	13.25	Book Value per sh	14.30																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
10.00	10.11	10.17	10.36	10.48	11.36	11.58	13.17	13.25	13.40	13.52	15.57	15.70	15.82	15.96	16.12	16.25	16.25	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	17.00																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
17.6	28.7	24.6	23.5	30.0	26.4	27.4	22.7	21.6	19.8	21.0	17.8	21.7	20.8	19.7	18.5	18.5	18.5	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	20.5																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
1.00	1.87	1.26	1.28	1.71	1.39	1.46	1.23	1.15	1.19	1.40	1.13	1.36	1.32	1.11	.98	.98	.98	Relative P/E Ratio	1.30																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
4.4%	4.2%	3.8%	3.7%	3.5%	3.4%	3.5%	3.7%	3.7%	4.0%	4.7%	4.2%	4.0%	4.0%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.1%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$158.9 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$49.8 mill. LT Debt \$137.8 mill. LT Interest \$4.6 mill.													74.6	81.1	86.1	91.0	91.2	102.7	102.1	110.4	114.8	117.1	120	125	Revenues (\$mill)	155																																																																																																																																																																																																														
(41% of Cap'l)													8.5	10.0	11.8	12.2	10.0	14.3	13.4	14.4	16.6	18.4	18.6	18.6	Net Profit (\$mill)	23.0																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Pension Assets-12/14 \$51.6 mill. Oblig. \$75.0 mill.													27.6%	33.4%	32.6%	33.2%	34.1%	32.1%	32.7%	33.9%	34.1%	35.0%	34.5%	34.0%	Income Tax Rate	34.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Pfd Stock \$2.4 mill. Pfd Div'd: \$2 mill.													---	---	---	---	---	6.8%	6.1%	3.4%	1.9%	1.7%	1.0%	1.5%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	2.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Common Stock 16,141,954 shs. as of 4/30/15													55.3%	49.5%	49.0%	45.6%	46.6%	43.1%	42.3%	41.5%	40.4%	40.5%	40.5%	42.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	43.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
MARKET CAP: \$375 million (Small Cap)													41.3%	47.5%	49.6%	51.8%	52.1%	55.8%	56.6%	57.4%	58.7%	58.8%	58.5%	57.5%	Common Equity Ratio	56.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
CURRENT POSITION													231.7	264.0	268.8	259.4	267.9	310.5	312.5	316.5	321.4	335.8	350	375	Total Capital (\$mill)	430																																																																																																																																																																																																														
ANNUAL RATES													288.0	317.1	333.9	366.3	376.5	405.9	422.2	435.2	446.5	465.4	485	505	Net Plant (\$mill)	550																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. to '18-'20													5.0%	5.1%	5.6%	5.8%	5.0%	5.7%	5.2%	5.4%	5.9%	6.3%	6.5%	6.0%	Return on Total Cap'l	6.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Revenues													8.2%	7.5%	8.6%	8.6%	7.0%	8.1%	7.5%	7.8%	8.7%	9.2%	9.0%	9.0%	Return on Shr. Equity	9.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
"Cash Flow"													8.6%	7.8%	8.7%	8.9%	7.0%	8.2%	7.5%	7.8%	8.7%	9.3%	9.0%	9.0%	Return on Com Equity	9.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Earnings													.6%	1.3%	1.8%	2.0%	.1%	2.1%	1.0%	1.4%	2.4%	3.1%	3.0%	3.0%	Retained to Com Eq	3.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Dividends													94%	84%	79%	78%	98%	75%	87%	83%	73%	67%	67%	65%	All Div's to Net Prof	63%																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Book Value													BUSINESS: Middlesex Water Company engages in the ownership and operation of regulated water utility systems in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. It also operates water and wastewater systems under contract on behalf of municipal and private clients in NJ and DE. Its Middlesex System provides water services to 60,000 retail customers, primarily in Middlesex County, New Jersey, in 2014, the Middlesex System accounted for 60% of operating revenues. At 12/31/14, the company had 282 employees. Incorporated: NJ. President, CEO, and Chairman: Dennis W. Doll. Officers & directors own 3.5% of the common stock; BlackRock Institutional Trust Co., 6.6% (4/15 proxy). Add.: 1500 Ronson Road, Iselin, NJ 08830. Tel.: 732-634-1500. Internet: www.middlesexwater.com.																																																																																																																																																																																																																											
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.)													Middlesex Water has the highest dividend yield in the water utility group. The average yield for the nine member industry is about 2.6%, versus the company's 3.5%.																																																																																																																																																																																																																											
Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year	Generous yields are not necessarily a positive. The reason investors demand a premium from Middlesex is due to its subpar dividend growth prospects. Indeed, over the past 10 years, payout hikes have increased only 1.5% annually. On the positive side, the company's earnings have been rising at a faster pace, which is reflected in an improved payout ratio.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2012	23.5	27.4	32.4	27.1	110.4	We believe there are better options available for accounts seeking to own shares in a water utility. Historically, utility stocks with lower yields and better distributions prospects, outperform equities that have above-average yields and below-average dividend growth prospects.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2013	27.0	29.1	31.3	27.4	114.8	We are sticking with our previous earnings estimates. Mostly as a result of rate relief, Middlesex's first-quarter share earnings came in at a solid \$0.22, versus our \$0.21 forecast. All told, we expect the bottom line to increase a modest \$0.02 a share this year, to \$1.15 a share. For																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2014	27.1	29.2	32.7	28.1	117.1	2016, we are anticipating a rise in share earnings of \$0.05, to \$1.20. The utility has petitioned state regulators for a rate hike. Earlier this year, a request was filed in New Jersey to raise customers' bills by \$9.5 million, or 13.5%. As is the case with most water companies, Middlesex needs to allocate more funds to repair and upgrade its pipeline infrastructure. Thanks to a relatively reasonable existing price structure, the size of the proposed rate increase is not as burdensome as it may sound. If the regulators allow the request to be implemented, the average bill of a residential customer would only go up by about \$25 a quarter. Predicting when a decision will be finalized is difficult, but it could take well more than a year. A very positive ruling by mid-2016, however, would most likely cause us to up our full-year earnings estimate.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2015	28.8	30.0	33.0	28.2	120	Finances are in good shape. Based on its \$375 million market capitalization, Middlesex is a small entity. Still, using most financial metrics, the company's balance sheet compares favorably to most in this group.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2016	29.0	31.0	35.0	30.0	125	<i>James A. Flood</i> July 17, 2015																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year	Company's Financial Strength B++ Stock's Price Stability 90 Price Growth Persistence 40 Earnings Predictability 80																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
2012	.11	.24	.38	.17	.90																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2013	.20	.28	.36	.19	1.03																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2014	.20	.29	.42	.22	1.13																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2015	.22	.30	.43	.20	1.15																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2016	.22	.32	.45	.21	1.20																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Cal-endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Full Year																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2011	.183	.183	.183	.185	.73																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2012	.185	.185	.185	.1875	.74																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2013	.1875	.1875	.1875	.19	.75																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2014	.19	.19	.19	.1925	.76																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2015	.1925	.1925																																																																																																																																																																																																																																						

(A) Diluted earnings. May not sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due mid-August.
 (B) Dividends historically paid in mid-Feb., May, Aug., and November. Div'd reinvestment plan available.
 (C) In millions, adjusted for splits.

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NEW JERSEY RES. NYSE-NJR				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 18.3 Median: 16.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE			
TIMELINESS 3 Lowered 10/31/14 SAFETY 1 Raised 9/15/06 TECHNICAL 4 Lowered 5/22/15 BETA .80 (1.00 = Market) 2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 30 (Nil) 3% Low 25 (-15%) -1%				High: 14.9 Low: 12.2 16.4 17.7 18.8 15.2 20.6 12.3 21.2 15.0 22.0 16.7 25.2 19.8 25.1 19.3 23.8 19.5 32.1 21.9 33.7 28.7	29.84	17.0	0.89	3.1%	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020 32 24 16 12 8			
Insider Decisions J A S O N D J F M to Buy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 to Sell 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0				LEGENDS 1.00 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 3-for-2 split 3/02 3-for-2 split 3/08 2-for-1 split 3/15 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession								% TOT. RETURN 4/15 THIS STOCK VS. AHEH INDEX 1 yr. 26.7 9.1 3 yr. 56.7 58.8 5 yr. 92.3 84.6
Institutional Decisions 2Q2014 3Q2014 4Q2014 to Buy 117 92 107 to Sell 60 112 99 Hld's(000) 52088 50964 51530				Percent shares traded 12 8 4				1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016				© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$881.5 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$315.2 mill. LT Debt \$699.2 mill. LT Interest \$16.3 mill. Incl. \$57.9 mill. capitalized leases. (LT interest earned: 7.5x; total interest coverage: 7.5x) Pension Assets-9/14 \$268.6 mill. Pfd Stock None Common Stock 85,581,223 shs. as of 5/15/15 MARKET CAP: \$2.6 billion (Mid Cap)				3148.3 3299.6 3021.8 3816.2 2592.5 2639.3 3009.2 2248.9 3198.1 3738.2 3450 3550 74.4 78.5 65.3 113.9 101.0 101.8 106.5 112.4 113.7 176.9 135 155				Revenues per sh ^A 45.65 "Cash Flow" per sh 2.65 Earnings per sh ^B 1.85 Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C .98 Cap'l Spending per sh .95 Book Value per sh ^D 15.65 Common Shs Outst'g ^E 85.00 Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio 14.0 Relative P/E Ratio .90 Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield 3.5%				REVENUES (\$mill) ^A 3940 NET PROFIT (\$mill) 155 INCOME TAX RATE 35.0% NET PROFIT MARGIN 4.0% LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO 27.5% COMMON EQUITY RATIO 72.5% TOTAL CAPITAL (\$mill) 1830 NET PLANT (\$mill) 2080 RETURN ON TOTAL CAP' 9.5% RETURN ON SHR. EQUITY 12.0% RETURN ON COM EQUITY 12.0% RETAINED TO COM EQ 5.5% ALL DIV'DS TO NET PROF 54%
CURRENT POSITION (\$MILL) Cash Assets 3.0 2.2 103.3 Other 742.9 680.5 642.3 Current Assets 745.9 682.7 745.6 Accts Payable 332.8 330.3 329.5 Debt Due 434.2 335.5 182.3 Other 84.8 125.3 143.3 Current Liab. 851.8 791.1 655.1 Fix. Chg. Cov. 700% 700% 700%				8.5% 6.3% 3.6% 9.5% 7.2% 6.7% 6.2% 6.2% 5.2% 11.0% 5.5% 7.0% 50% 50% 64% 40% 50% 52% 55% 55% 59% 40% 59% 52%				BUSINESS: New Jersey Resources Corp. is a holding company providing retail/wholesale energy svcs. to customers in New Jersey, and in states from the Gulf Coast to New England, and Canada. New Jersey Natural Gas had about 504,300 customers at 9/30/14 in Monmouth and Ocean Counties, and other N.J. Counties. Fiscal 2014 volume: 260 bill. cu. ft. (4% interruptible, 27% residential and commercial and electric utility, 69% incentive programs). N.J. Natural Energy subsidiary provides unregulated retail/wholesale natural gas and related energy svcs. 2014 dep. rate: 3.0%. Has 968 empis. Off./dir. own about 1.4% of common (12/14 Proxy). Chrmn., CEO & Pres.: Laurence M. Downes, Inc.: NJ Addr.: 1415 Wyckoff Road, Wall, NJ 07719. Tel.: 732-938-1480. Web: www.njresources.com.				
ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '11-'13 of change (per sh) 10 Yrs. 5 Yrs. to '18-'20 Revenues 2.5% -3.5% 3.5% "Cash Flow" 5.0% 4.5% 3.5% Earnings 6.5% 5.5% 2.5% Dividends 6.5% 8.5% 3.0% Book Value 8.0% 4.5% 6.5%				New Jersey Resources posted mixed financial results for its March quarter. Indeed, revenues declined almost 36%, on a year-to-year basis. This downturn reflected a 46.1% drop in the nonutility business, and to a lesser extent a 5% fall in utility volumes. On the upside, the majority of the reduced revenues are stemming from the downturn in commodity fuel prices. This is evident in NJR's system throughput, which increased 21%, to 297.8 billion cubic feet. On the profitability front, the diminished top line weighed on both fixed- and variable-cost absorption and, consequently, operating expenses rose 740 basis points as a percentage of revenues. After excluding losses on derivative instruments, tax adjustments, and the effect of economic hedging, the company's net financial earnings declined about 36%, to \$1.16 a share. This was better than our earlier expectation. As a result, we have raised our 2015 bottom-line estimate by \$0.20, to \$1.75 a share. This would still represent an annual earnings decline of more than 15%. Nonetheless, it does fall more in line with management's recently raised guidance				range of \$1.65-\$1.75. The main detractor to this year's results will likely be lower energy services income. That said, NJR continues to benefit from the New Jersey Natural Gas division, which added 4,079 new customer accounts so far this year; about half of those came from newly constructed homes in its service territory. The company anticipates adding 15,000-17,000 new accounts in 2015 and 2016, combined. Capital expenditures augur well for New Jersey Resources' prospects. It continues to focus on updating its regulated utility infrastructure, in an effort to raise system safety, reliability, and integrity. The Southern Reliability Link is a 28-mile, 30-inch main transmission pipeline that is in the planning and approval phase. Finally, the company recently completed its 20mw Carroll Area Wind Farm, and continues to work on the 48mw Alexander Wind Farm in Kansas. All told, these projects represent about \$500 million-\$600 million in capital projects. Still, at this juncture, these shares do not stand out. NJR's dividend yield is below average for a utility. <i>Bryan J. Fong</i> June 5, 2015				
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) ^A Fiscal Year Ends Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Full Fiscal Year 2012 642.4 612.9 425.1 568.5 2248.9 2013 736.0 960.9 767.5 733.7 3198.1 2014 878.4 1579.6 688.3 591.9 3738.2 2015 824.1 1013.1 825 787.8 3450 2016 850 1060 835 805 3550				EARNINGS PER SHARE ^{A B} Fiscal Year Ends Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Full Fiscal Year 2012 .55 .90 .05 d.14 1.36 2013 .43 .82 .12 d.01 1.37 2014 .47 1.81 .05 d.23 2.10 2015 .65 1.16 .10 d.16 1.75 2016 .66 1.17 .11 d.14 1.80				QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^C Calendar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year 2011 .18 .18 .18 .18 .72 2012 .19 .19 .19 .40 .97 2013 -- .20 .20 .20 .80 2014 .21 .21 .21 .23 .86 2015 .23 .23				

(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Diluted earnings. Qly eggs may not sum to total due to change in shares outstanding. Next earnings report due late July. (C) Dividends historically paid in early Jan., April, July, and October. 1Q '13 div'd paid in 4Q '12. * Dividend reinvestment plan available. (D) Includes regulatory assets in 2014: \$377.6 million, \$4.48/share. (E) In millions, adjusted for splits.

Company's Financial Strength A+
 Stock's Price Stability 90
 Price Growth Persistence 55
 Earnings Predictability 60

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N.W. NAT'L GAS NYSE:NWN				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 20.9 Median: 18.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE											
				44.45	23.4		1.23	4.2%												
TIMELINESS	3	Raised 5/15/15		34.1	39.6	43.7	52.8	55.2	46.5	50.9	49.0	50.8	46.6	52.6	52.3		Target Price	Range		
SAFETY	1	Raised 3/18/05		27.5	32.4	32.8	39.8	37.7	37.7	41.1	39.6	41.0	40.0	40.1	43.8		2018	2019	2020	
TECHNICAL	4	Lowered 5/15/15		LEGENDS - 1.10 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate - Relative Price Strength - Options: Yes - Shaded area indicates recession																
BETA	.70	(1.00 = Market)		2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price High 60 (+35%) Price Low 50 (+10%) Gain Ann'l Total Return 11% Return 7%																
Insider Decisions				J A S O N D J F M to Buy 0 Options 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 to Sell 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 4																
Institutional Decisions				2Q2014 3Q2014 4Q2014 to Buy 84 79 79 to Sell 53 65 66 Hds(000) 16493 16110 16781 Percent shares traded 15 10 5																
				% TOT. RETURN 4/15 THIS STOCK VL ARITH' INDEX 1 yr. 9.7 9.1 3 yr. 14.1 58.8 5 yr. 18.5 84.6																
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC		18-20
18.17	21.09	25.78	25.07	23.57	25.89	33.01	37.20	39.13	39.16	38.17	30.56	31.72	27.14	28.02	27.64	28.35	29.55	Revenues per sh	31.25	
3.72	3.68	3.86	3.65	3.85	3.92	4.34	4.76	5.41	5.31	5.20	5.18	5.00	4.94	5.04	5.05	4.75	5.25	"Cash Flow" per sh	6.45	
1.70	1.79	1.88	1.62	1.76	1.86	2.11	2.35	2.76	2.57	2.83	2.73	2.39	2.22	2.24	2.16	1.90	2.30	Earnings per sh ^A	3.30	
1.23	1.24	1.25	1.26	1.27	1.30	1.32	1.39	1.44	1.52	1.60	1.68	1.75	1.79	1.83	1.85	1.87	1.91	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^B	2.10	
4.78	3.46	3.23	3.11	4.90	5.52	3.48	3.56	4.48	3.92	5.09	9.35	3.76	4.91	5.13	4.40	5.80	6.75	Cap'l Spending per sh	6.80	
17.12	17.93	18.56	18.88	19.52	20.64	21.28	22.01	22.52	23.71	24.88	26.08	26.70	27.23	27.77	28.12	28.85	29.95	Book Value per sh ^D	33.85	
25.09	25.23	25.23	25.59	25.94	27.55	27.58	27.24	26.41	26.50	26.53	26.58	26.76	26.92	27.08	27.28	27.50	27.75	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	28.00	
14.5	12.4	12.9	17.2	15.8	16.7	17.0	15.9	16.7	18.1	15.2	17.0	19.0	21.1	19.4	20.7	20.7	20.7	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	17.0	
.83	.81	.66	.94	.90	.88	.91	.86	.89	1.09	1.01	1.08	1.19	1.34	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09	Relative P/E Ratio	1.05	
5.0%	5.6%	5.1%	4.5%	4.6%	4.2%	3.7%	3.7%	3.1%	3.3%	3.7%	3.6%	3.9%	3.8%	4.2%	4.1%	4.1%	4.1%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.3%	
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15				Total Debt \$827.9 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$360.0 mill. LT Debt \$621.7 mill. LT Interest \$45.0 mill.																
(Total interest coverage: 2.5x)				910.5 1013.2 1033.2 1037.9 1012.7 812.1 848.8 730.6 758.5 754.0 780 820 58.1 65.2 74.5 68.5 75.1 72.7 63.9 59.9 60.5 58.7 78.0 82.0																
Pension Assets-12/14 \$279.2 mill.				36.0% 36.3% 37.2% 36.9% 38.3% 40.5% 40.4% 42.4% 40.8% 41.5% 40.0% 40.0% 6.4% 6.4% 7.2% 6.8% 7.4% 8.9% 7.5% 8.2% 8.0% 7.8% 6.7% 7.8%																
Pfd Stock None				47.0% 46.3% 46.3% 44.9% 47.7% 46.1% 47.3% 48.5% 47.6% 44.8% 44.5% 44.5% 53.0% 53.7% 53.7% 55.1% 52.3% 53.9% 52.7% 51.5% 52.4% 55.2% 55.5% 55.5%																
Common Stock 27,332,671 shares as of 4/24/15				1108.4 1116.5 1106.8 1140.4 1261.8 1284.8 1356.2 1424.7 1433.6 1389.0 1435 1495 1373.4 1425.1 1495.9 1549.1 1670.1 1854.2 1893.9 1973.6 2062.9 2121.6 2205 2295																
MARKET CAP \$1.2 billion (Mid Cap)				6.5% 7.1% 8.5% 7.7% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.0% 5.5% 9.9% 10.9% 12.5% 10.9% 11.4% 10.5% 8.9% 8.2% 8.1% 7.6% 6.5% 7.5% 9.9% 10.9% 12.5% 10.9% 11.4% 10.5% 8.9% 8.2% 8.1% 7.6% 6.5% 7.5% 3.7% 4.5% 6.0% 4.5% 5.0% 4.0% 2.4% 1.6% 1.5% 1.1% Nil 1.5% 63% 59% 52% 59% 56% 61% 73% 80% 81% 85% 98% 83%																
CURRENT POSITION (\$MILL.)				2013 2014 3/31/15 Cash Assets 9.5 9.5 5.2 Other 321.0 353.1 286.8 Current Assets 330.5 362.6 292.0 Accts Payable 96.1 91.4 62.9 Debt Due 248.2 274.7 206.2 Other 88.5 103.3 101.6 Current Liab. 432.8 469.4 370.7 Fix. Chg. Cov. 316% 321% 251%																
ANNUAL RATES of change (per sh)				Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '12-'14 to '18-'20 Revenues 1.0% -6.5% 2.0% "Cash Flow" 3.0% -1.0% 4.5% Earnings 2.5% -4.0% 7.0% Dividends 3.5% 3.5% 2.5% Book Value 3.5% 3.0% 3.5%																
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)				Full Year 2012 730.6 2013 758.5 2014 754.0 2015 780 2016 820																
EARNINGS PER SHARE ^A				Full Year 2012 2.22 2013 2.24 2014 2.16 2015 1.90 2016 2.30																
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^B				Full Year 2011 1.75 2012 1.79 2013 1.83 2014 1.85 2015 1.85																
BUSINESS: Northwest Natural Gas Co. distributes natural gas to 90 communities, 704,000 customers, in Oregon (89% of customers) and in southwest Washington state. Principal cities served: Portland and Eugene, OR; Vancouver, WA. Service area population: 2.5 mill. (77% in OR). Company buys gas supply from Canadian and U.S. producers; has transportation rights on Northwest Pipeline system.				Owns local underground storage. Rev. breakdown: residential, 35%; commercial, 22%; industrial, gas transportation, and other, 43%. Employs 1,092. BlackRock Inc. owns 9.2% of shares; officers and directors, 2.1% (4/15 proxy). CEO: Gregg S. Kantor. Inc.: Oregon. Address: 220 NW 2nd Ave., Portland, OR 97209. Telephone: 503-226-4211. Internet: www.nwnatural.com.																
Warmer-than-usual winter weather caused underwhelming results at Northwest Natural Gas. Too, the company had a negative outcome from Oregon regulators, which caused a pretax charge of \$15 million for disallowed environmental remediation expense recoveries. These together caused earnings to fall to \$1.04 a share. Though we think the rest of the year will show improvement, we are lowering our 2015 per-share estimate by \$0.50, to \$1.90.				will provide up to 2.5 billion cubic feet of storage and will likely cost around \$125 million, with a potential in-service date in the 2018-2019 winter season. This long-term project should allow for ample growth once completed. We are assuming it comes in on time. Construction and permitting can take longer than expected at times, though the Mist underground storage facility and related pipelines should increase revenues.																
Northwest Natural Gas continues to show signs of growth. The customer growth rate in the Portland area was 1.3%, and employment there continues to improve. We think 2016 should show a sizeable jump in earnings, assuming improvements come from more normal weather and increased returns from capital investments. We think that 2015 is the last year of declining earnings and that \$2.30 a share is likely in 2016.				The dividend is a top draw. The slide in the share price has allowed the yield to top 4.2%, which is above average for a natural gas utility. Given the payout ratio remains high when compared to historical levels, we expect dividend expansion will be somewhat muted over the coming years.																
The Mist plant expansion appears to be headed forward. Indeed, it received approval from Portland General Electric and will provide storage to the natural gas-fired plants in Port Westward. This				This issue does not stand out for Timeliness (3). Shares of Northwest Natural Gas have recently declined 10% in price, hurt by a lackluster earnings report. Also, this issue sports a decent yield and 3- to 5-year total return potential, and carries our Highest mark for Safety. This issue should appeal to conservative income-seekers, at this juncture.																
				<i>John E. Seibert III June 5, 2015</i>																
(A) Diluted earnings per share. Excludes non-recurring items: '00, \$0.11; '06, (\$0.06); '08, (\$0.03); '09, 6¢; May not sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due in early August.				(B) Dividends historically paid in mid-February, May, August, and November. (C) In millions.																
				(D) Includes intangibles. In 2014: \$368.9 million, \$13.52/share.																
				Company's Financial Strength A Stock's Price Stability 95 Price Growth Persistence 40 Earnings Predictability 100																
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PIEDMONT NAT'L GAS NYSE-PNY				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 20.9 Median: 19.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	3.6%	VALUE LINE									
TIMELINESS 4 Lowered 12/5/14	High: 24.3	25.8	28.4	28.0	35.3	32.0	30.1	34.7	34.6	35.5	41.0	41.1	Target Price Range	2018	2019	2020			
SAFETY 2 New 7/27/90	Low: 19.2	21.3	23.2	22.0	21.7	20.7	23.9	25.9	28.5	30.9	32.1	34.9							
TECHNICAL 4 Lowered 6/5/15	LEGENDS --- 1.10 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 2-for-1 split 11/04 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession																		
BETA .80 (1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 45 (+20%) 8% Low 30 (-20%) -1%																		
Insider Decisions J A S O N D J F M to Buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 to Sell 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1																			
Institutional Decisions 2Q2014 3Q2014 4Q2014 to Buy 99 107 111 to Sell 72 82 94 Hlds(000) 39611 40379 41698 Percent shares traded 15 10 5																			
% TOT. RETURN 4/15 THIS STOCK VL ARITH. INDEX 1 yr. 8.3 9.1 3 yr. 35.8 58.8 5 yr. 61.0 84.6																			
© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 18-20																			
10.97	13.01	17.06	12.57	18.14	19.95	22.96	25.80	23.37	28.52	22.36	21.48	19.83	15.54	17.07	18.87	19.25	19.55	Revenues per sh A	21.10
1.70	1.77	1.81	1.81	2.04	2.31	2.43	2.51	2.64	2.77	3.01	2.91	2.99	3.09	3.29	3.37	3.45	3.55	"Cash Flow" per sh	3.65
.93	1.01	1.01	.95	1.11	1.27	1.32	1.28	1.40	1.49	1.67	1.55	1.57	1.66	1.78	1.84	1.85	2.00	Earnings per sh AB	2.10
.68	.72	.76	.80	.82	.85	.91	.95	.99	1.03	1.07	1.11	1.15	1.19	1.23	1.27	1.31	1.35	Div'ds Decl'd per sh C	1.47
1.58	1.65	1.29	1.21	1.16	1.85	2.50	2.74	1.85	2.47	1.76	2.75	3.37	7.33	8.01	5.91	6.10	6.00	Cap'l Spending per sh	5.95
7.86	8.26	8.63	8.91	9.36	11.15	11.53	11.63	11.99	12.11	12.67	13.35	13.79	14.21	15.87	16.80	17.40	18.35	Book Value per sh D	20.40
62.59	63.83	64.93	66.18	67.31	76.67	76.70	74.61	73.23	73.26	73.27	72.28	72.32	72.25	74.88	77.88	78.00	79.00	Common Shs Outst'g E	80.00
17.7	14.3	16.7	18.4	16.7	16.6	17.9	19.2	18.7	18.2	15.4	17.1	18.9	19.2	18.5	18.9			Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	18.0
1.01	.93	.86	1.01	.95	.88	.95	1.04	.99	1.10	1.03	1.09	1.19	1.22	1.04	1.04			Relative P/E Ratio	1.13
4.1%	5.0%	4.5%	4.6%	4.4%	4.1%	3.8%	3.9%	3.8%	3.8%	4.1%	4.2%	3.9%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.9%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 1/31/15 Total Debt \$1904.4 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$175.0 mill. LT Debt \$1424.4 mill. LT Interest \$61.6 mill. (LT interest earned: 4.1x; total interest coverage: 3.4x)																			
Pension Assets-10/14 \$364.2 mill. Oblig. \$346.4 mill.																			
Pfd Stock None																			
Common Stock 78,778,900 shs. as of 2/27/15 MARKET CAP: \$2.9 billion (Mid Cap)																			
CURRENT POSITION (SMILL.)																			
Cash Assets 8.1 9.6 19.9 Other 340.0 338.4 475.6 Current Assets 348.1 348.0 495.5 Accts Payable 140.1 139.7 159.8 Debt Due 500.0 355.0 480.0 Other 76.6 127.3 143.1 Current Liab. 716.7 622.0 782.9 Fix. Chg. Cov. 325% 325% 325%																			
ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '12-'14 of change (per sh) 10 Yrs 5 Yrs to '18-'20 Revenues 1.0% -7.5% 3.5% "Cash Flow" 5.0% 3.5% 2.0% Earnings 5.0% 3.5% 3.0% Dividends 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% Book Value 5.0% 4.0% 4.5%																			
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) A Full Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Ends Jan.31 Apr.30 Jul.31 Oct.31 2012 471.8 308.4 161.2 181.4 1122.8 2013 515.9 399.4 162.9 200.0 1278.2 2014 657.7 462.2 164.2 185.8 1469.9 2015 607.3 455 210 227.7 1500 2016 620 465 225 235 1545																			
EARNINGS PER SHARE AB Full Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Ends Jan.31 Apr.30 Jul.31 Oct.31 2012 1.05 .70 d.06 d.03 1.66 2013 1.18 .74 d.03 d.11 1.78 2014 1.26 .80 d.09 d.13 1.84 2015 1.18 .82 d.05 d.10 1.85 2016 1.22 .86 d.02 d.06 2.00																			
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID C Full Year Calendar Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 2011 .28 .29 .29 .29 1.15 2012 .29 .30 .30 .60 1.49 2013 .31 .31 .31 .31 .93 2014 .31 .32 .32 .32 1.27 2015 .32 .33																			
BUSINESS: Piedmont Natural Gas Company is primarily a regulated natural gas distributor, serving over 992,551 customers in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 2014 revenue mix: residential (46%), commercial (27%), industrial (14%), other (13%). Principal suppliers: Transco and Tennessee Pipeline. Gas costs: 51.4% of revenues. '14 deprec. rate: 2.7%. Estimated plant age: 10 years. Non-regulated operations: sale of gas-powered heating equipment; natural gas brokering; propane sales. Has about 1,879 employees. Off/dir. own about 1.1% of common stock, BlackRock; 8.6% (1/15 proxy). Chrmn., CEO, & Pres.: Thomas E. Skains, Inc.: NC. Addr.: 4720 Piedmont Row Drive, Charlotte, NC 28210. Telephone: 704-364-3120. Internet: www.piedmonting.com.																			
Piedmont Natural Gas posted mixed financial results for the January quarter. Indeed, the company's revenues declined 7.7%, to \$607.3 million. This was modestly higher than our earlier call, thanks to the benefits of the higher rates in North Carolina and Tennessee, new customer additions of approximately 4,900, and a rise in overall system throughput of 2.7%. On the downside, the year-over-year decline in natural gas pricing was a key detractor to the top line. On the profitability front, cost of goods sold decreased 470 basis points as a percentage of revenues. This benefit was partially offset by a 290-basis-point rise in operating expenses. After accounting for lower income from equity investments, higher interest costs, and a steadily rising share count, first-quarter earnings fell 6.3%, to \$1.18 a share. This was lower than our earlier expectation. Consequently, we have shaved a nickel off our 2015 bottom-line estimate, to \$1.85 a share. This would represent a relatively unchanged earnings figure when compared to fiscal 2014 and falls in line with management's recently reiterated guidance range of \$1.82-\$1.92 per share. We continue to look for a low single-digit revenue increase this year, thanks to new customer accounts and rising system throughput. Alternatively, the company did file for rate reductions in North and South Carolina in an effort to pass through price reductions on wholesale natural gas to its end-use customers. The balance sheet is in decent shape and improving. Indeed, PNY's cash reserves doubled during the first quarter of 2015, to almost \$20 million. At the same time, the long-term debt load has remained constant. Although it does represent a somewhat high 50% of total capital, this figure is acceptable for a utility company, and has not proven to be problematic in the past. Finally, the board recently approved a 3% hike in the quarterly dividend, to \$0.33 a share. Despite that increase, the stock's yield is below average when compared to the rest of the industry. At this juncture, these untimely shares do not stand out. The stock's total return potential is subpar. <i>Bryan J. Fong June 5, 2015</i>																			

(A) Fiscal year ends October 31st. (B) Diluted earnings. Excl. extraordinary item: '00, 8¢. Excl. nonrecurring gains (losses): '10, 4¢. Next earnings report due mid-July. (C) Dividends historically paid early-January, April, July, October. 2013 Q1 dividend paid in Q4 of 2012. (D) Div'd reinvest. plan available; 5% discount. (E) Includes deferred charges. In 2014: \$809.5 million, \$10.30/share. (F) In millions, adjusted for stock split.

Company's Financial Strength B++
 Stock's Price Stability 95
 Price Growth Persistence 45
 Earnings Predictability 95

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SOUTH JERSEY INDS. NYSE-SJI

RECENT PRICE **26.31** P/E RATIO **15.9** (Trailing: 18.5 Median: 17.0) RELATIVE P/E RATIO **0.84** DIV'D YLD **4.0%** **VALUE LINE**

TIMELINESS 3 Raised 4/10/15 SAFETY 2 Lowered 1/4/91 TECHNICAL 3 Lowered 5/1/15 BETA .85 (1.00 = Market)	High: 13.3 Low: 9.8 16.2 12.5 17.1 12.8 20.6 15.6 20.3 12.6 20.4 16.0 27.1 18.6 29.0 21.4 29.0 22.9 31.1 25.3 30.6 25.9 30.4 25.4	LEGENDS 1.00 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 2-for-1 split 7/05 2-for-1 split 5/15 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession	2-for-1 2-for-1	Target Price 2018 2019 120 100 80 64 48 32 24 20 16 12 8
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2018-20 PROJECTIONS		Price	Gain	Ann'l Total Return
High	40	+50%	15%	
Low	30	+15%	8%	

Insider Decisions		J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M
To Buy	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Options	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
To Sell	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Institutional Decisions		2Q2014	3Q2014	4Q2014
To Buy	78	90	97	
To Sell	73	67	60	
Hlds(000)	41346	41708	42328	

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20
8.80	11.22	17.65	10.35	13.17	14.75	15.89	15.88	16.15	16.18	14.19	15.48	13.71	11.16	11.18	12.98	13.85	14.95	Revenues per sh	18.40
.92	.97	.95	1.06	1.12	1.22	1.25	1.75	1.60	1.74	1.86	2.10	2.23	2.34	2.48	2.67	2.70	2.90	"Cash Flow" per sh	4.00
.50	.54	.57	.61	.68	.79	.86	1.23	1.05	1.14	1.19	1.35	1.45	1.52	1.52	1.57	1.65	1.80	Earnings per sh ^A	2.50
.36	.37	.37	.38	.39	.41	.43	.46	.51	.56	.61	.68	.75	.83	.90	.96	1.02	1.10	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^B	1.35
1.09	1.11	1.41	1.74	1.18	1.34	1.60	1.26	.94	1.04	1.83	2.79	3.20	4.01	4.84	5.01	3.55	3.80	Cap'l Spending per sh	4.60
3.37	3.62	3.91	4.84	5.63	6.20	6.75	7.55	8.12	8.67	9.12	9.54	10.33	11.63	12.64	13.65	15.00	15.95	Book Value per sh ^C	18.40
44.61	46.00	47.44	48.83	52.92	55.52	57.96	58.65	59.22	59.46	59.59	59.75	60.43	63.31	65.43	68.33	70.00	72.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^D	76.00
13.3	13.0	13.6	13.5	13.3	14.1	16.6	11.9	17.2	15.9	15.0	16.8	18.4	16.9	18.9	18.0	18.0	18.0	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	14.0
.76	.85	.70	.74	.76	.74	.88	.64	.91	.96	1.00	1.07	1.15	1.08	1.06	.95	.95	.95	Relative P/E Ratio	.90
5.4%	5.2%	4.7%	4.6%	4.3%	3.7%	3.0%	3.2%	2.8%	3.1%	3.4%	3.0%	2.8%	3.2%	3.1%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.9%

CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15		2013	2014	3/31/15	Revenues (\$mill)	2013	2014	2015	
Total Debt	\$1281.8 mill.	921.0	931.4	956.4	1400	48.6	72.0	61.8	195
LT Debt	\$859.5 mill.	41.5%	41.3%	41.9%	Income Tax Rate	5.3%	7.7%	6.5%	25.0%
LT Interest	\$23.0 mill.	44.9%	44.7%	42.7%	Net Profit Margin	5.3%	7.7%	6.5%	13.9%
(Total interest coverage: 4.9x)		55.1%	55.3%	57.3%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	710.3	801.1	839.0	47.0%
		877.3	920.0	948.9	Common Equity Ratio	877.3	920.0	948.9	53.0%
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$7 mill.		8.3%	10.1%	8.6%	Total Capital (\$mill)	710.3	801.1	839.0	2650
Pension Assets-12/14 \$180.5 mill.		12.4%	16.3%	12.8%	Net Plant (\$mill)	877.3	920.0	948.9	2750
Pfd Stock None		12.4%	16.3%	12.8%	Return on Total Cap'l	8.3%	10.1%	8.6%	8.0%
		6.2%	10.2%	6.7%	Return on Shr. Equity	12.4%	16.3%	12.8%	14.0%
Common Stock 68,456,764 shs. as of 5/1/15, adj. for 2-for-1 split		50%	37%	48%	Return on Com Equity	12.4%	16.3%	12.8%	14.0%
		6.2%	10.2%	6.7%	Retained to Com Eq	6.2%	10.2%	6.7%	6.5%
		50%	37%	48%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	50%	37%	48%	53%

ANNUAL RATES		Past 10 Yrs.	Past 5 Yrs.	Est'd '12-'14
of change (per sh)		-1.0%	-5.5%	7.5%
Revenues		8.0%	7.5%	8.0%
"Cash Flow"		8.0%	6.5%	8.5%
Earnings		8.5%	10.0%	7.0%
Dividends		8.5%	8.0%	6.5%
Book Value		8.5%	8.0%	6.5%

Cal-endar	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)				Full Year
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	
2012	274.8	121.9	112.0	197.6	706.3
2013	255.6	122.6	128.8	224.4	731.4
2014	350.2	133.3	122.4	281.1	887.0
2015	383.0	155	145	287	970
2016	415	175	165	320	1075

Cal-endar	EARNINGS PER SHARE ^A				Full Year
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	
2012	.83	.14	.07	.49	1.52
2013	.76	.16	d.02	.62	1.52
2014	1.01	.15	d.05	.47	1.57
2015	.86	.16	.03	.60	1.65
2016	.93	.18	.04	.65	1.80

Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^B				Full Year
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	
2011	--	.183	.183	.384	.75
2012	--	.202	.202	.423	.83
2013	--	.222	.222	.458	.90
2014	--	.237	.237	.488	.96
2015	--	.251			

(A) Based on GAAP egs. through 2006, economic egs. thereafter. GAAP EPS: '07, \$1.05; '08, \$1.29; '09, \$0.97; '10, \$1.11; '11, \$1.49; '12, \$1.49; '13, \$1.28; '14, \$1.46. Excl. non-recur. gain (loss): '01, \$0.07; '08, \$0.16; '09, \$0.22; '10, \$0.24; '11, \$0.04; '12, \$0.03; '13, \$0.24; '14, \$0.11. Earnings may not sum due to rounding. Next egs. report due in August. (B) Div'ds paid early April, July, Oct., and late Dec. = Div. reinvest. plan avail. (C) Incl. reg. assets. In 2014: \$357.2 mill., \$5.23 per shr. (D) In mill., adj. for split.

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South Jersey Industries completed a 2-for-1 stock split in early May. As a result, the number of shares outstanding rose to just under 69 million. The company cited healthy operating performance and favorable growth prospects as factors supporting the decision to effect the split. Our per-share figures have been adjusted accordingly.

The company reported mixed results for the March quarter. The top line advanced roughly 9%, on a year-over-year basis. This was the result of impressive growth at the utility operation, which more than offset lower revenues from the nonutility side. Operating expenses also increased, however, and earnings per share of \$0.86 were no match for the prior-year tally.

We expect favorable comparisons in the coming quarters, and higher revenues and share earnings for full-year 2015. The utility ought to be an important performance driver going forward. South Jersey Gas should continue to experience healthy customer growth, as natural gas remains the fuel of choice within its service territory. This business will likely con-

tinue to gain from customer conversions to natural gas, given its cost effectiveness compared to alternatives. On the non-utility side, the company's wholesale and retail commodity businesses should also post solid results, driven by demand for fuel management services from four large gas-fired merchant generating facilities, and SJI's portfolio of transportation assets. The energy services business ought to benefit from the healthy performance of its energy production portfolio, too.

This stock is neutrally ranked for year-ahead relative price performance. Looking further out, we expect healthy growth in revenues and share earnings for the company from 2016 onward. On top of that, South Jersey Industries earns high marks for Safety, Financial Strength, Price Stability, and Earnings Predictability. All things considered, this good-quality stock offers solid risk-adjusted total return potential for the pull to late decade. Conservative, income-oriented investors may find something to like here. Dividend growth looks to be a strong point here.

Michael Napoli, CFA June 5, 2015

Company's Financial Strength	A
Stock's Price Stability	95
Price Growth Persistence	60
Earnings Predictability	95

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SJW CORP. NYSE-SJW				RECENT PRICE	30.82	P/E RATIO	21.3 (Trailing: 11.3 Median: 24.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.12	DIV'D YLD	2.6%	VALUE LINE														
TIMELINESS 3	Raised 5/8/15	High: 19.6	27.8	45.3	43.0	35.1	30.4	28.2	26.8	26.9	30.1	33.7	35.7	Target Price Range 2018 2019 2020												
SAFETY 3	New 4/22/11	Low: 14.6	16.1	21.2	27.7	20.0	18.2	21.6	20.9	22.6	24.5	25.5	28.6													
TECHNICAL 3	Lowered 7/10/15	LEGENDS — 1.50 x Dividends p.sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 3-for-1 split 3/04 2-for-1 split 3/06 Options: No Shaded area indicates recession																								
BETA .80	(1.00 = Market)	2018-20 PROJECTIONS Price Gain Ann'l Total High 45 (+45%) 12% Low 30 (-5%) 2%																								
Insider Decisions A S O N D J F M A to Buy 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 to Sell 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Options 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0													% TOT. RETURN 6/15 THIS STOCK VL ARITH' INDEX 1 yr. 15.7 3.2 3 yr. 38.7 64.2 5 yr. 50.5 113.9													
Institutional Decisions 3Q2014 4Q2014 1Q2015 to Buy 38 49 61 to Sell 45 47 47 Hits(950) 10784 10867 10898 Percent shares traded 15 10 5																										
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016													© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20												
6.40	6.74	7.45	7.97	8.20	9.14	9.86	10.35	11.25	12.12	11.68	11.62	12.85	14.01	13.73	15.76	14.40	14.30	Revenues per sh	17.60							
1.43	1.23	1.49	1.55	1.75	1.89	2.21	2.38	2.30	2.44	2.21	2.38	2.80	2.97	2.90	4.42	3.50	3.60	"Cash Flow" per sh	3.90							
.87	.58	.77	.78	.91	.87	1.12	1.19	1.04	1.08	.81	.84	1.11	1.18	1.12	2.54	1.45	1.45	Earnings per sh ^A	1.75							
.40	.41	.43	.46	.49	.51	.53	.57	.61	.65	.66	.68	.69	.71	.73	.75	.78	.81	Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B	1.05							
1.77	1.89	2.63	2.06	3.41	2.31	2.83	3.87	6.62	3.79	3.17	5.65	3.75	5.67	4.68	5.02	5.00	4.95	Cap'l Spending per sh	4.90							
7.88	7.90	8.17	8.40	9.11	10.11	10.72	12.48	12.90	13.99	13.66	13.75	14.20	14.71	15.92	17.75	18.30	19.05	Book Value per sh	21.30							
18.27	18.27	18.27	18.27	18.27	18.27	18.27	18.28	18.36	18.18	18.50	18.55	18.59	18.67	20.17	20.29	20.50	21.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	23.00							
15.5	33.1	18.5	17.3	15.4	19.6	19.7	23.5	33.4	26.2	28.7	29.1	21.2	20.4	24.3	11.2	11.2	11.2	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	22.0							
.88	2.15	.95	.94	.88	1.04	1.05	1.27	1.77	1.58	1.91	1.85	1.33	1.30	1.37	.59	.59	.59	Relative P/E Ratio	1.40							
3.0%	2.1%	3.0%	3.4%	3.5%	3.0%	2.4%	2.0%	1.7%	2.3%	2.8%	2.8%	2.9%	3.0%	2.7%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	2.8%							
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15 Total Debt \$396.5 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$21.2 mill. LT Debt \$384.2 mill. LT Interest \$18.1 mill. (52% of Cap'l)													180.1	189.2	206.6	220.3	216.1	215.6	239.0	261.5	276.9	319.7	295	300	Revenues (\$mill)	405
Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$5.5 mill.													20.7	22.2	19.3	20.2	15.2	15.8	20.9	22.3	23.5	51.8	29.5	30.0	Net Profit (\$mill)	40.0
Pension Assets-12/14 \$91.4 mill. Oblig. \$128.7 mill.													41.6%	40.8%	39.4%	39.5%	40.4%	38.8%	41.1%	41.1%	38.7%	32.5%	37.0%	36.0%	Income Tax Rate	38.0%
Pfd Stock None.													1.6%	2.1%	2.7%	2.3%	2.0%	---	---	---	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	1.5%
Common Stock 20,341,489 shs. as of 4/22/15													42.6%	41.8%	47.7%	46.0%	49.4%	53.7%	56.6%	55.0%	51.1%	51.6%	51.0%	50.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	53.5%
MARKET CAP: \$625 million (Small Cap)													57.4%	58.2%	52.3%	54.0%	50.6%	46.3%	43.4%	45.0%	48.9%	48.4%	49.0%	50.0%	Common Equity Ratio	46.5%
CURRENT POSITION (SMILL.)													341.2	391.8	453.2	470.9	499.6	550.7	607.9	610.2	656.2	744.5	775	805	Total Capital (\$mill)	1025
Cash Assets													484.8	541.7	645.5	684.2	718.5	785.5	756.2	831.6	898.7	963.0	1000	1055	Net Plant (\$mill)	1200
Other													7.6%	7.0%	5.7%	5.8%	4.4%	4.3%	4.9%	5.0%	5.0%	8.3%	5.0%	5.0%	Return on Total Cap'l	5.5%
Current Assets													10.6%	9.7%	8.2%	8.0%	6.0%	6.2%	7.9%	8.1%	7.3%	14.4%	7.5%	8.0%	Return on Shr. Equity	8.0%
Accts Payable													10.6%	9.7%	8.2%	8.0%	6.0%	6.2%	7.9%	8.1%	7.3%	14.4%	7.5%	8.0%	Return on Com Equity	8.0%
Debt Due													5.6%	5.2%	3.5%	3.3%	1.2%	1.2%	3.1%	3.3%	2.8%	10.2%	3.0%	3.5%	Retained to Com Eq	3.5%
Other													47%	46%	57%	59%	80%	80%	61%	59%	62%	29%	54%	56%	All Div's to Net Prof	59%
Current Liab.													BUSINESS: SJW Corporation engages in the production, purchase, storage, purification, distribution, and retail sale of water. It provides water service to approximately 229,000 connections that serve a population of approximately one million people in the San Jose area and 12,000 connections that serve approximately 36,000 residents in a service area in the region between San Antonio and Austin, Texas. The company offers nonregulated water-related services. Also owns and operates commercial real estate investments. Has about 395 employees. Officers & directors (including Nancy O. Moss) own 27.9% of outstanding shares. Chrm.: Charles J. Toeniskoetter, Inc.: CA. Address: 110 W. Taylor Street, San Jose, CA 95110. Tel.: (408) 279-7800. Int: www.sjwater.com.													
Fix. Chg. Cov.													A new pricing structure will most surely have an impact on the amount of water consumed by SJW's customers. Faced with the ongoing drought, California's governor established rules aimed at reducing water usage approximately 25%. The mandatory program, which went into effect on June 1st, also contains other restrictions and fines.													
Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. to '12-'14													Water utilities operating in the state should not be affected, however. The California Public Utility Commission had already instituted policies that changed the methodology of how water companies generate profits. Now, SJW can promote conservation and not see its net income decline.													
Revenues													SJW's bottom line should do well this year. First-quarter results were considerably above expectations as the company benefited from an unusual one-time gain and an earlier decision to extend rate relief into 2015. For the full year, we think SJW's share net will reach \$1.45. If last year's profits weren't impacted by a one-time gain, the comparison would appear better.													
"Cash Flow"													Capital spending will remain at relatively high levels out to late decade. All of the regulated utilities we cover are in the midst of extensive programs intended to replace antiquated pipes and related structures. The industry had been deferring these expenditures until the past few years because companies weren't sure that any investments made would be recouped. Once states, such as California, began working closer with water companies, more capital began to be spent on improving systems.													
Earnings													Earnings momentum should stall in 2016. This will be partially due to there not being any unforeseen one-time gains in our estimate, as has been the case in 2014 and 2015. Another factor adding some uncertainty is how much surface water will be available. Should supplies remain tight, more-expensive options, including drilling and buying on the open market, would be required.													
Dividends													Shares of SJW do not have much appeal at this juncture. Over the pull to 2018-2020, the stock's total return potential is lower than the typical stock in our universe.													
Book Value													James A. Flood													
Cal-endar													July 17, 2015													
Quarterly Revenues (\$mill.)													Quarterly Earnings per Share ^A													
2012													2012													
2013													2013													
2014													2014													
2015													2015													
2016													2016													
Cal-endar													Quarterly Dividends Paid ^B													
2011													2011													
2012													2012													
2013													2013													
2014													2014													
2015													2015													

(A) Diluted earnings. Excludes nonrecurring losses: '03, \$1.97; '04, \$3.78; '05, \$1.09; '06, \$16.36; '08, \$1.22; '10, \$0.46. Next earnings report due mid-August. Quarterly earnings may not add due to rounding. (B) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, September, and December. ■ Div'd reinvestment plan available. (C) In millions, adjusted for stock splits. Company's Financial Strength 8+ Price Stability 85 Price Growth Persistence 30 Earnings Predictability 55 To subscribe call 1-800-VALUELINE

UGI CORP. NYSE:UGI				RECENT PRICE	36.56	P/E RATIO	18.4	(Trailing: 19.4 Median: 14.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.97	DIV'D YLD	2.5%	VALUE LINE																
TIMELINESS	2	Raised 3/27/15	High: 13.8	10.0	20.0	19.3	19.8	19.2	18.3	21.7	22.4	22.4	28.8	39.7	38.6	31.5	Target Price Range	2018	2019	2020									
SAFETY	2	Raised 9/17/04	Low: 10.0	12.8	13.5	15.2	12.5	14.1	15.9	16.0	17.3	21.9	26.8	31.5															
TECHNICAL	4	Lowered 5/22/15	LEGENDS 1.30 x Dividends p.sh. divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 3-for-2 split 4/03 2-for-1 split 5/05 3-for-2 split 9/14 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession																										
BETA	.95	(1.00 = Market)																											
2018-20 PROJECTIONS			Price	35	Gain	(-5%)	Ann'l Total Return	1%													% TOT. RETURN 4/15	THIS STOCK	VL ARTH. INDEX						
Insider Decisions			J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M													1 yr.	14.6	9.1			
Institutional Decisions			202814	302814	402814													3 yr.	95.1	58.8									
			to Buy	150	154	181													5 yr.	122.1	84.6								
			to Sell	135	156	152																							
			Hlds(000)	136174	134645	133925																							
			Percent shares traded	18	12	6																							
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC		18-20									
11.27	14.50	20.09	17.76	23.62	24.63	31.10	33.01	34.24	41.27	35.25	34.01	36.31	38.56	42.10	47.92	41.55	45.60	Revenues per sh ^A	51.30										
1.08	1.16	1.32	1.36	1.59	1.63	2.09	2.05	2.26	2.48	2.82	2.87	2.75	3.05	3.75	4.05	4.15	4.30	"Cash Flow" per sh	4.95										
.30	.35	.47	.60	.76	.81	1.15	1.10	1.18	1.33	1.57	1.59	1.37	1.17	1.59	1.92	1.95	2.10	Earnings per sh ^{AB}	2.65										
.33	.34	.35	.36	.36	.40	.43	.46	.48	.50	.52	.60	.68	.71	.74	.79	.88	.92	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C	1.01										
.57	.58	.64	.76	.79	.87	1.01	1.21	1.39	1.44	1.85	2.11	2.15	2.01	2.84	2.64	2.80	2.90	Cap'l Spending per sh	3.05										
2.03	2.04	2.08	2.55	4.45	5.43	6.35	6.95	8.26	8.80	9.78	11.10	11.79	13.21	14.59	15.39	16.90	18.40	Book Value per sh ^D	23.25										
122.72	121.47	122.83	124.66	128.10	153.63	157.20	158.18	159.97	161.09	162.78	164.38	167.75	169.06	170.88	172.73	177.00	180.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^E	180.00										
15.9	13.6	12.1	11.4	12.6	13.4	13.8	14.0	15.1	13.3	10.3	10.9	15.0	16.4	15.4	15.8	15.8	15.8	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	12.0										
.91	.88	.62	.62	.72	.71	.73	.76	.80	.80	.69	.69	.94	1.04	.87	.83	.83	.83	Relative P/E Ratio	.75										
6.9%	7.0%	6.2%	5.3%	3.9%	3.7%	2.7%	3.0%	2.7%	2.9%	3.2%	3.5%	3.3%	3.7%	3.0%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.1%										
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15				4888.7	5221.0	5476.9	6648.2	5737.8	5591.4	6091.3	6519.2	7194.7	8277.3	7350	8200	Revenues (\$mill) ^A	9230												
Total Debt \$3518.6 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$1379 mill.				182.0	176.2	191.8	215.5	258.5	261.0	232.9	199.4	278.1	337.2	345	380	Net Profit (\$mill)	480												
LT Debt \$2958.2 mill. LT Interest \$237 mill.				39.5%	30.5%	23.8%	30.6%	29.4%	32.0%	29.8%	34.8%	27.6%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	Income Tax Rate	30.0%												
(Total interest coverage: 4.2x)				3.7%	3.4%	3.5%	3.2%	4.5%	4.7%	3.8%	3.1%	3.9%	4.1%	4.3%	4.6%	4.6%	Net Profit Margin	5.2%											
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$72.6 mill.				58.3%	64.1%	60.7%	58.4%	56.2%	44.0%	51.6%	60.0%	58.7%	56.4%	54.0%	52.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	46.0%												
Pension Assets-9/14 \$472 mill. Oblig. \$595 mill.				41.7%	35.9%	39.3%	41.6%	43.8%	56.0%	48.4%	40.0%	41.3%	43.6%	46.0%	48.0%	Common Equity Ratio	54.0%												
Pfd Stock None				2390.1	3064.6	3360.7	3405.0	3630.0	3256.7	4088.0	5580.7	6034.7	6092.7	6485	6860	Total Capital (\$mill)	7735												
Common Stock 172,497,596 shares as of 4/30/15				1802.7	2214.7	2397.4	2449.5	2903.6	3053.2	3204.5	4233.1	4480.2	4543.7	4610	4675	Net Plant (\$mill)	4875												
MARKET CAP: \$6.3 bill. (Mid. Cap)				9.8%	7.5%	7.4%	7.9%	8.9%	10.1%	7.4%	5.6%	6.6%	7.5%	5.5%	5.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	6.0%												
CURRENT POSITION				18.2%	16.0%	14.5%	15.2%	16.2%	14.3%	11.8%	8.9%	11.2%	12.7%	11.5%	11.5%	Return on Shr. Equity	11.5%												
(SMILL)				18.2%	16.0%	14.5%	15.2%	16.2%	14.3%	11.8%	8.9%	11.2%	12.7%	11.5%	11.5%	Return on Com Equity	11.5%												
Cash Assets				11.5%	9.4%	8.7%	9.5%	10.9%	8.9%	6.0%	3.6%	6.1%	7.6%	6.5%	6.5%	Retained to Com Eq	7.5%												
Other				37%	41%	40%	38%	33%	38%	49%	60%	45%	40%	45%	42%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	34%												
Current Assets				BUSINESS: UGI Corp. operates six business segments: AmeriGas propane (accounted for 18.7% of net income in 2014), International Propane (14.3%), Gas Utility (35.2%), Midstream & Marketing (34.9%), and Corp. & Other less than -3%. UGI Utilities distributes natural gas and electricity to over 600,000 customers mainly in Pennsylvania; 26%-owned AmeriGas Partners is the largest U.S. propane marketer, serving about 1.3 million users in 50 states. Acquired remaining 80% interest in Antargaz (3/04); Energy Transfer Partners (1/12), Wellington Management Co. holds 10.8% of stock; officers/directors, 2.4% (12/14 proxy). Has 8,400 empl's. CEO: John L. Walsh, Inc.: PA. Address: 460 N. Gulph Rd., King of Prussia, PA 19406. Telephone: 610-337-1000. Internet: www.ugicorp.com.																									
Accts Payable				UGI Corp's financial results could certainly be better this year. Indeed, the company's March-period top line declined more than 22%. This downturn reflected lower contributions from the AmeriGas Propane, UGI International, Gas Utility, and Midstream & Marketing segments. The weak revenues can largely be attributed to the year-over-year decline in propane and natural gas pricing as well as from reduced retail gallons sold at the AmeriGas Propane unit. On the profitability front, operating & administrative costs increased 340 basis points as a percentage of the top line. This was largely offset by the sharp reduction in cost of sales. On balance, UGI's bottom line remained unchanged when compared to 2014's figure, at \$1.23 a share. This was relatively in line with our earlier call. Consequently, we have left our 2015 and 2016 share-net estimates unchanged for the time being. In fiscal 2015 (ends September 30th) this would represent a modest 1.5% annual increase. This ought to be supported by the regulated gas utility division, which has added approximately 11,000 new heating custom-																									
Debt Due				ers over the first six months of fiscal 2015. A number of capital projects and an acquisition augur well for long-term prospects. The PennEast pipeline project is progressing nicely through the FERC preapproval process. That 100-plus-mile expansion will link the Northeast, PA Marcellus region with major customer markets in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Meanwhile, UGI recently announced plans for a 1,000-megawatt plant in Sunbury, PA and a 1,300-megawatt plant in Jessup, PA, know as Sunbury and Invenergy, respectively. All of those facilities are expected to be operational in late 2017. Too, the \$400 million-\$450 million (EUR) purchase of the Total LPG Distribution business in France (Totalgaz) received final regulatory approval from the French Competition Authority. This deal should help to grow UGI's geographic footprint. These shares are ranked to outpace the broader market averages. However, the dividend yield is somewhat below average for a utility, and the equity is trading above our Target Price Range, thus limiting appreciation potential. Bryan J. Fong June 5, 2015																									
Other																													
Current Liab.																													
Fix. Chg. Cov.																													
ANNUAL RATES																													
of change (per sh)																													
Revenues																													
"Cash Flow"																													
Earnings																													
Dividends																													
Book Value																													
Fiscal Year Ends																													
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) ^A																													
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Cal-endar																													
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^C																													
2011																													
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(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30. Quarterly sales and earnings may not sum to total due to rounding and/or change in share count. (B) Divided earnings. Excludes nonrecur. items: '89, '94, '01, d1g; '03, 22g; '04, d6g; '05, 3g; '06, 5g; '07, 12g. Next eqs. report due late July. (C) Dividends historically paid in early Jan., April, July, and Oct. ■ Div. reinvest. plan available. (D) Incl. intang. At 9/14: \$3,409.5 mill., \$19.73/sh. (E) In mill., adjusted for stock splits.

Company's Financial Strength B++
 Stock's Price Stability 90
 Price Growth Persistence 75
 Earnings Predictability 75

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WGL HOLDINGS NYSE-WGL				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	Trailing: 18.5 Median: 15.0	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	3.3%	VALUE LINE																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
TIMELINESS	3	Raised 3/27/15	High: 31.4	56.17	19.2	18.5	1.01	3.3%																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
SAFETY	1	Raised 4/2/93	Low: 26.7																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
TECHNICAL	4	Lowered 5/15/15	34.8																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
BETA	.80	(1.00 = Market)	33.6																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
2018-20 PROJECTIONS			35.9																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Price	Gain	Ann'l Total Return	37.1																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
High 55	(Nil)	3%	28.8																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Low 45	(-20%)	-1%	27.0																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Insider Decisions			35.5																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
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Options	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
to Sell	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
Institutional Decisions			40.0																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
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to Buy	93	99	94																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
to Sell	86	84	118																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Hrs(000)	34353	34118	31806																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>1999</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> <th>2010</th> <th>2011</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>2014</th> <th>2015</th> <th>2016</th> <th>© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC</th> <th>18-20</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>20.92</td> <td>22.19</td> <td>29.80</td> <td>32.63</td> <td>42.45</td> <td>42.93</td> <td>44.94</td> <td>53.96</td> <td>53.51</td> <td>52.65</td> <td>53.98</td> <td>53.60</td> <td>53.75</td> <td>47.07</td> <td>47.70</td> <td>53.73</td> <td>53.00</td> <td>54.00</td> <td>Revenues per sh^A</td> <td>59.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.74</td> <td>3.20</td> <td>3.24</td> <td>2.63</td> <td>4.00</td> <td>3.87</td> <td>3.97</td> <td>3.84</td> <td>3.89</td> <td>4.34</td> <td>4.44</td> <td>4.11</td> <td>4.01</td> <td>4.53</td> <td>4.29</td> <td>4.83</td> <td>5.00</td> <td>5.20</td> <td>"Cash Flow" per sh</td> <td>5.60</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.47</td> <td>1.79</td> <td>1.88</td> <td>1.14</td> <td>2.30</td> <td>1.98</td> <td>2.13</td> <td>1.94</td> <td>2.09</td> <td>2.44</td> <td>2.53</td> <td>2.27</td> <td>2.25</td> <td>2.68</td> <td>2.31</td> <td>2.68</td> <td>2.90</td> <td>3.00</td> <td>Earnings per sh^B</td> <td>3.35</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.22</td> <td>1.24</td> <td>1.26</td> <td>1.27</td> <td>1.28</td> <td>1.30</td> <td>1.32</td> <td>1.35</td> <td>1.37</td> <td>1.41</td> <td>1.47</td> <td>1.50</td> <td>1.55</td> <td>1.59</td> <td>1.66</td> <td>1.72</td> <td>1.85</td> <td>1.87</td> <td>Div'ds Decl'd per sh^C</td> <td>1.99</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.42</td> <td>2.67</td> <td>2.68</td> <td>3.34</td> <td>2.65</td> <td>2.33</td> <td>2.32</td> <td>3.27</td> <td>3.33</td> <td>2.70</td> <td>2.77</td> <td>2.57</td> <td>3.94</td> <td>4.87</td> <td>6.04</td> <td>7.63</td> <td>5.00</td> <td>5.00</td> <td>Cap'l Spending per sh</td> <td>5.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14.72</td> <td>15.31</td> <td>16.24</td> <td>15.78</td> <td>16.25</td> <td>16.95</td> <td>17.80</td> <td>18.86</td> <td>19.63</td> <td>20.99</td> <td>21.89</td> <td>22.82</td> <td>23.49</td> <td>24.64</td> <td>24.65</td> <td>24.08</td> <td>24.30</td> <td>25.40</td> <td>Book Value per sh^D</td> <td>29.20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>46.47</td> <td>46.47</td> <td>48.54</td> <td>48.56</td> <td>48.63</td> <td>48.67</td> <td>48.65</td> <td>48.89</td> <td>49.45</td> <td>49.92</td> <td>50.14</td> <td>50.54</td> <td>51.20</td> <td>51.52</td> <td>51.70</td> <td>51.76</td> <td>50.00</td> <td>50.00</td> <td>Common Shs Outst'g^E</td> <td>50.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17.3</td> <td>14.6</td> <td>14.7</td> <td>23.1</td> <td>11.1</td> <td>14.2</td> <td>14.7</td> <td>15.5</td> <td>15.6</td> <td>13.7</td> <td>12.6</td> <td>15.1</td> <td>17.0</td> <td>15.3</td> <td>18.2</td> <td>15.0</td> <td>18.0</td> <td>18.0</td> <td>Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio</td> <td>15.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>.99</td> <td>.95</td> <td>.75</td> <td>1.26</td> <td>.63</td> <td>.75</td> <td>.78</td> <td>.84</td> <td>.83</td> <td>.82</td> <td>.84</td> <td>.96</td> <td>1.07</td> <td>.97</td> <td>1.02</td> <td>1.02</td> <td>1.02</td> <td>1.02</td> <td>Relative P/E Ratio</td> <td>.95</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.8%</td> <td>4.8%</td> <td>4.6%</td> <td>4.8%</td> <td>5.0%</td> <td>4.6%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>4.5%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>4.6%</td> <td>4.4%</td> <td>4.1%</td> <td>3.9%</td> <td>3.9%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>4.2%</td> <td>Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield</td> <td>4.0%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>											1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20	20.92	22.19	29.80	32.63	42.45	42.93	44.94	53.96	53.51	52.65	53.98	53.60	53.75	47.07	47.70	53.73	53.00	54.00	Revenues per sh ^A	59.00	2.74	3.20	3.24	2.63	4.00	3.87	3.97	3.84	3.89	4.34	4.44	4.11	4.01	4.53	4.29	4.83	5.00	5.20	"Cash Flow" per sh	5.60	1.47	1.79	1.88	1.14	2.30	1.98	2.13	1.94	2.09	2.44	2.53	2.27	2.25	2.68	2.31	2.68	2.90	3.00	Earnings per sh ^B	3.35	1.22	1.24	1.26	1.27	1.28	1.30	1.32	1.35	1.37	1.41	1.47	1.50	1.55	1.59	1.66	1.72	1.85	1.87	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C	1.99	3.42	2.67	2.68	3.34	2.65	2.33	2.32	3.27	3.33	2.70	2.77	2.57	3.94	4.87	6.04	7.63	5.00	5.00	Cap'l Spending per sh	5.00	14.72	15.31	16.24	15.78	16.25	16.95	17.80	18.86	19.63	20.99	21.89	22.82	23.49	24.64	24.65	24.08	24.30	25.40	Book Value per sh ^D	29.20	46.47	46.47	48.54	48.56	48.63	48.67	48.65	48.89	49.45	49.92	50.14	50.54	51.20	51.52	51.70	51.76	50.00	50.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^E	50.00	17.3	14.6	14.7	23.1	11.1	14.2	14.7	15.5	15.6	13.7	12.6	15.1	17.0	15.3	18.2	15.0	18.0	18.0	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	15.0	.99	.95	.75	1.26	.63	.75	.78	.84	.83	.82	.84	.96	1.07	.97	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	Relative P/E Ratio	.95	4.8%	4.8%	4.6%	4.8%	5.0%	4.6%	4.2%	4.5%	4.2%	4.2%	4.6%	4.4%	4.1%	3.9%	3.9%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	4.0%
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
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4.8%	4.8%	4.6%	4.8%	5.0%	4.6%	4.2%	4.5%	4.2%	4.2%	4.6%	4.4%	4.1%	3.9%	3.9%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	4.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15				2186.3	2637.9	2646.0	2628.2	2708.9	2708.9	2751.5	2425.3	2466.1	2780.9	2650	2700	Revenues (\$mill) ^A	2950																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Total Debt \$1170.5 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$95.0 mill.				104.8	96.0	102.9	122.9	128.7	115.0	115.5	138.4	119.7	139.0	145	150	Net Profit (\$mill)	170																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
LT Debt \$950.5 mill. LT Interest \$37.7 mill.				37.4%	39.0%	39.1%	37.1%	39.1%	38.7%	42.4%	40.1%	30.2%	29.0%	39.0%	39.0%	Income Tax Rate	39.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
(LT interest earned: 6.2x; total interest coverage: 5.7x)				4.8%	3.6%	3.9%	4.7%	4.8%	4.2%	4.2%	5.7%	4.9%	5.0%	5.4%	5.5%	Net Profit Margin	5.7%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Pension Assets-9/14 \$1,244.3 mill.				39.5%	37.8%	37.9%	35.9%	33.3%	33.4%	32.3%	31.2%	28.7%	34.8%	32.5%	31.5%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	29.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Oblig. \$1,260.3 mill.				58.6%	60.4%	60.3%	62.4%	65.0%	65.0%	66.2%	67.3%	69.8%	63.8%	66.0%	67.0%	Common Equity Ratio	70.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Preferred Stock \$28.2 mill. Pfd. Div'd \$1.3 mill.				1478.1	1526.1	1625.4	1679.5	1887.7	1774.4	1818.1	1886.9	1826.8	1954.0	1845	1900	Total Capital (\$mill)	2090																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Common Stock 49,728,662 shs. as of 4/30/15				1989.7	2067.9	2150.4	2208.3	2269.1	2346.2	2489.9	2667.4	2907.5	3314.4	3850	4470	Net Plant (\$mill)	7000																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
MARKET CAP: \$2.8 billion (Mid Cap)				8.5%	7.6%	7.6%	8.5%	8.8%	7.6%	7.5%	8.3%	7.5%	8.1%	9.0%	9.0%	Return on Total Cap'l	9.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
CURRENT POSITION				11.7%	10.1%	10.2%	11.4%	11.4%	9.7%	9.4%	10.7%	9.2%	10.9%	12.0%	12.0%	Return on Shr. Equity	11.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
(\$MILL.)				12.0%	10.3%	10.4%	11.6%	11.6%	9.9%	9.5%	10.8%	9.3%	11.0%	12.0%	12.0%	Return on Com Equity	11.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
2013				4.6%	3.2%	3.5%	5.0%	5.0%	3.3%	3.4%	4.8%	2.8%	4.3%	4.5%	4.5%	Retained to Com Eq	4.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
2014				62%	69%	66%	57%	57%	67%	64%	56%	72%	62%	64%	62%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	59%																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
2015				<p>BUSINESS: WGL Holdings, Inc. is the parent of Washington Gas Light, a natural gas distributor in Washington, D.C. and adjacent areas of VA and MD to residential and comm'l users (1,117,043 meters). Hampshire Gas, a federally regulated sub., operates an underground gas-storage facility in WV. Non-regulated subs.: Wash. Gas Energy Svcs. sells and delivers natural gas and provides energy-related products in the D.C. metro area; Wash. Gas Energy Sys. designs/installs comm'l heating, ventilating, and air cond. systems. American Century owns 9.4% of common stock; Off.dir. less than 1% (1/15 proxy). Chrmn. & CEO: Terry D. McCallister, Inc. D.C. and VA. Addr.: 101 Const. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20080. Tel.: 202-624-6410. Internet: www.wglholdings.com.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
ANNUAL RATES				<p>WGL Holdings posted mixed financial results for its fiscal second quarter. On the downside, revenues declined 14.7% on a year-over-year basis, to about \$1.0 billion. This reflected a downturn in utility and nonutility volumes of 13.6% and 16.3%, respectively. The bulk of this reduction stemmed from the lower natural gas and fuel prices when compared to the prior-year figure. On balance, wider margins were sufficient enough to offset the reduced volumes, and WGL's bottom line advanced 10%, to \$2.02 a share. This was higher than our earlier expectation.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Past 10 Yrs				<p>As a result, we have added a dime to our fiscal 2015 earnings estimate, to \$2.90 a share. This would represent an annual profit increase of about 8%. WGL's regulated utility operations have added about 12,800 active customer meters over the past year. Additional benefits should stem from healthy gains at the Retail Energy Marketing division as overall economic factors aid that unit's performance this year. Alternatively, the Commercial Energy Systems and Midstream Energy Services segments have been facing a difficult operating environment of late and will likely remain a drag on overall operations for the immediate future.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Past 5 Yrs				<p>A recently announced supply agreement could provide customers with cost savings. WGL is in the process of investing \$126 million with Energy Corporation of America (ECA) to acquire natural gas reserves through some of ECA's currently producing wells in PA. The pending deal needs to be approved by the Virginia State Corporation Commission. However, assuming it goes through, the deal should help to reduce gas prices and related volatility over the next 20 years.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Est'd '12-'14				<p>Capital projects augur well for prospects. Some of the more noteworthy ones currently in the works are the Constitution Pipeline, Central Penn Line, and Mountain Valley Pipeline. These projects should widen the company's geographic reach and boost overall capacity.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
'12-'14				<p>All told, these shares offer modest appeal to conservative, income-seeking accounts. Meantime, they are ranked to mirror the broader market averages in the year ahead. And there is little 3- to 5-year appreciation potential.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Fiscal Year Ends				<p><i>Bryan J. Fong</i> June 5, 2015</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Dec.31				<p>Company's Financial Strength A Stock Price Stability 90 Price Growth Persistence 50 Earnings Predictability 80</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Jun.30				<p>(A) Fiscal years end Sept. 30th.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Sep.30				<p>(B) Based on diluted shares. Excludes non-recurring losses: '01, (13¢); '02, (34¢); '07, (4¢); '08, (14¢) discontinued operations; '06, (15¢). Qly egs. may not sum to total, due to change in shares outstanding. Next earnings report due late July. (C) Dividends historically paid early February, May, August, and November. (D) Includes deferred charges and intangibles. (E) In millions.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
Dec.31				<p>© 2015 Value Line Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Factual material is obtained from sources believed to be reliable and is provided without warranties of any kind. THE PUBLISHER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ERRORS OR OMISSIONS HEREIN. This publication is strictly for subscriber's own, non-commercial, internal use. No part of it may be reproduced, resold, stored or transmitted in any printed, electronic or other form, or used for generating or marketing any printed or electronic publication, service or product.</p>																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		

AQUA AMERICA NYSE-WTR				RECENT PRICE	P/E RATIO	TRAILING P/E RATIO	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	DIV'D YLD	VALUE LINE																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
				25.64	20.5	(Trailing: 20.7 Median: 23.6)	1.08	2.8%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
TIMELINESS 3 Lowered 5/24/13	High: 14.8	23.4	23.8	21.3	17.6	17.2	18.4	19.0	21.5	28.1	28.2	28.1	Target Price	2020																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
SAFETY 2 Raised 4/20/12	Low: 11.3	14.0	16.1	15.1	9.8	12.3	13.2	15.4	16.8	20.6	22.4	24.4	2018	2019																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
TECHNICAL 3 Raised 6/12/15	LEGENDS 1.60 x Dividends p.sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength 5-for-4 split 12/03 4-for-3 split 12/05 5-for-4 split 9/13 Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession																																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
BETA .75 (1.00 = Market)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
2018-20 PROJECTIONS																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
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Low 30	(+15%)	7%																																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
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to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
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to Sell	2	1	2	5	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
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to Buy	139	137	153																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
to Sell	126	140	133																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
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<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>1999</th><th>2000</th><th>2001</th><th>2002</th><th>2003</th><th>2004</th><th>2005</th><th>2006</th><th>2007</th><th>2008</th><th>2009</th><th>2010</th><th>2011</th><th>2012</th><th>2013</th><th>2014</th><th>2015</th><th>2016</th><th>© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC</th><th>18-20</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1.93</td><td>1.97</td><td>2.16</td><td>2.28</td><td>2.38</td><td>2.78</td><td>3.08</td><td>3.23</td><td>3.61</td><td>3.71</td><td>3.93</td><td>4.21</td><td>4.10</td><td>4.32</td><td>4.32</td><td>4.37</td><td>4.55</td><td>4.70</td><td>Revenues per sh</td><td>5.70</td></tr> <tr> <td>.58</td><td>.61</td><td>.69</td><td>.76</td><td>.77</td><td>.87</td><td>.97</td><td>1.01</td><td>1.10</td><td>1.14</td><td>1.29</td><td>1.42</td><td>1.45</td><td>1.51</td><td>1.82</td><td>1.89</td><td>2.35</td><td>2.50</td><td>"Cash Flow" per sh</td><td>3.05</td></tr> <tr> <td>.33</td><td>.37</td><td>.41</td><td>.43</td><td>.46</td><td>.51</td><td>.57</td><td>.56</td><td>.57</td><td>.58</td><td>.62</td><td>.72</td><td>.83</td><td>.87</td><td>1.16</td><td>1.20</td><td>1.25</td><td>1.30</td><td>Earnings per sh ^A</td><td>1.65</td></tr> <tr> <td>.22</td><td>.23</td><td>.24</td><td>.26</td><td>.28</td><td>.29</td><td>.32</td><td>.35</td><td>.38</td><td>.41</td><td>.44</td><td>.47</td><td>.50</td><td>.54</td><td>.58</td><td>.63</td><td>.71</td><td>.77</td><td>Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B</td><td>.98</td></tr> <tr> <td>.72</td><td>.93</td><td>.87</td><td>.96</td><td>1.06</td><td>1.23</td><td>1.47</td><td>1.64</td><td>1.43</td><td>1.58</td><td>1.66</td><td>1.89</td><td>1.90</td><td>1.98</td><td>1.73</td><td>1.84</td><td>1.95</td><td>2.00</td><td>Cap'l Spending per sh</td><td>2.00</td></tr> <tr> <td>2.74</td><td>3.08</td><td>3.32</td><td>3.49</td><td>4.27</td><td>4.71</td><td>5.04</td><td>5.57</td><td>5.85</td><td>6.26</td><td>6.50</td><td>6.81</td><td>7.21</td><td>7.90</td><td>8.63</td><td>9.27</td><td>9.65</td><td>10.05</td><td>Book Value per sh</td><td>11.40</td></tr> <tr> <td>133.50</td><td>139.78</td><td>142.47</td><td>141.49</td><td>154.31</td><td>158.97</td><td>161.21</td><td>165.41</td><td>166.75</td><td>169.21</td><td>170.61</td><td>172.46</td><td>173.60</td><td>175.43</td><td>177.93</td><td>178.59</td><td>176.50</td><td>175.00</td><td>Common Shs Outst'g ^C</td><td>170.00</td></tr> <tr> <td>21.2</td><td>18.2</td><td>23.6</td><td>23.6</td><td>24.5</td><td>25.1</td><td>31.8</td><td>34.7</td><td>32.0</td><td>24.9</td><td>23.1</td><td>21.1</td><td>21.3</td><td>21.9</td><td>21.2</td><td>20.8</td><td></td><td></td><td>Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio</td><td>21.5</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.21</td><td>1.18</td><td>1.21</td><td>1.29</td><td>1.40</td><td>1.33</td><td>1.69</td><td>1.87</td><td>1.70</td><td>1.50</td><td>1.54</td><td>1.34</td><td>1.34</td><td>1.39</td><td>1.19</td><td>1.10</td><td></td><td></td><td>Relative P/E Ratio</td><td>1.35</td></tr> <tr> <td>3.0%</td><td>3.3%</td><td>2.5%</td><td>2.5%</td><td>2.5%</td><td>2.3%</td><td>1.8%</td><td>1.8%</td><td>2.1%</td><td>2.8%</td><td>3.1%</td><td>3.1%</td><td>2.8%</td><td>2.8%</td><td>2.4%</td><td>2.5%</td><td></td><td></td><td>Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield</td><td>3.1%</td></tr> </tbody> </table>															1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20	1.93	1.97	2.16	2.28	2.38	2.78	3.08	3.23	3.61	3.71	3.93	4.21	4.10	4.32	4.32	4.37	4.55	4.70	Revenues per sh	5.70	.58	.61	.69	.76	.77	.87	.97	1.01	1.10	1.14	1.29	1.42	1.45	1.51	1.82	1.89	2.35	2.50	"Cash Flow" per sh	3.05	.33	.37	.41	.43	.46	.51	.57	.56	.57	.58	.62	.72	.83	.87	1.16	1.20	1.25	1.30	Earnings per sh ^A	1.65	.22	.23	.24	.26	.28	.29	.32	.35	.38	.41	.44	.47	.50	.54	.58	.63	.71	.77	Div'd Decl'd per sh ^B	.98	.72	.93	.87	.96	1.06	1.23	1.47	1.64	1.43	1.58	1.66	1.89	1.90	1.98	1.73	1.84	1.95	2.00	Cap'l Spending per sh	2.00	2.74	3.08	3.32	3.49	4.27	4.71	5.04	5.57	5.85	6.26	6.50	6.81	7.21	7.90	8.63	9.27	9.65	10.05	Book Value per sh	11.40	133.50	139.78	142.47	141.49	154.31	158.97	161.21	165.41	166.75	169.21	170.61	172.46	173.60	175.43	177.93	178.59	176.50	175.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	170.00	21.2	18.2	23.6	23.6	24.5	25.1	31.8	34.7	32.0	24.9	23.1	21.1	21.3	21.9	21.2	20.8			Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	21.5	1.21	1.18	1.21	1.29	1.40	1.33	1.69	1.87	1.70	1.50	1.54	1.34	1.34	1.39	1.19	1.10			Relative P/E Ratio	1.35	3.0%	3.3%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.3%	1.8%	1.8%	2.1%	2.8%	3.1%	3.1%	2.8%	2.8%	2.4%	2.5%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.1%
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC	18-20																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
1.93	1.97	2.16	2.28	2.38	2.78	3.08	3.23	3.61	3.71	3.93	4.21	4.10	4.32	4.32	4.37	4.55	4.70	Revenues per sh	5.70																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
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2.74	3.08	3.32	3.49	4.27	4.71	5.04	5.57	5.85	6.26	6.50	6.81	7.21	7.90	8.63	9.27	9.65	10.05	Book Value per sh	11.40																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
133.50	139.78	142.47	141.49	154.31	158.97	161.21	165.41	166.75	169.21	170.61	172.46	173.60	175.43	177.93	178.59	176.50	175.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^C	170.00																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
21.2	18.2	23.6	23.6	24.5	25.1	31.8	34.7	32.0	24.9	23.1	21.1	21.3	21.9	21.2	20.8			Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	21.5																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
1.21	1.18	1.21	1.29	1.40	1.33	1.69	1.87	1.70	1.50	1.54	1.34	1.34	1.39	1.19	1.10			Relative P/E Ratio	1.35																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
3.0%	3.3%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.3%	1.8%	1.8%	2.1%	2.8%	3.1%	3.1%	2.8%	2.8%	2.4%	2.5%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.1%																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 3/31/15																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
Total Debt \$1675.1 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$437.0 mill.				496.8	533.5	602.5	627.0	670.5	726.1	712.0	757.8	768.6	779.9	805	825	Revenues (\$mill)	970																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
LT Debt \$1595.0 mill. LT Interest \$70.0 mill. (49% of Cap'l)				91.2	92.0	95.0	97.9	104.4	124.0	144.8	153.1	205.0	213.9	225	230	Net Profit (\$mill)	290																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				38.4%	39.6%	38.9%	39.7%	39.4%	39.2%	32.9%	39.0%	10.0%	10.5%	18.0%	20.0%	Income Tax Rate	27.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.1%	2.4%	2.0%	2.5%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	3.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
Pension Assets-12/14 232.4 mill.				52.0%	51.6%	55.4%	54.1%	55.6%	56.6%	52.7%	52.7%	48.9%	48.5%	49.5%	50.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	50.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
Obliq. \$281.2 mill.				48.0%	48.4%	44.6%	45.9%	44.4%	43.4%	47.3%	47.3%	51.1%	51.5%	50.5%	50.0%	Common Equity Ratio	50.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
Pfd Stock None				1690.4	1904.4	2191.4	2306.6	2495.5	2706.2	2646.8	2929.7	3003.6	3216.0	3370	3505	Total Capital (\$mill)	3955																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
Common Stock 177,069,729 shares as of 4/23/15				2280.0	2506.0	2782.8	2997.4	3227.3	3469.3	3612.9	3936.2	4167.3	4402.0	4550	4700	Net Plant (\$mill)	5000																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				6.9%	6.4%	5.9%	5.7%	5.6%	5.9%	6.9%	6.6%	8.0%	7.8%	8.0%	7.5%	Return on Total Cap'l	8.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				11.2%	10.0%	9.7%	9.3%	9.4%	10.6%	11.6%	11.0%	13.4%	12.9%	13.0%	13.0%	Return on Shr. Equity	14.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				11.2%	10.0%	9.7%	9.3%	9.4%	10.6%	11.6%	11.0%	13.4%	12.9%	13.0%	13.0%	Return on Com Equity	14.5%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				4.9%	3.7%	3.2%	2.8%	2.7%	3.7%	4.6%	4.3%	6.7%	6.1%	5.5%	5.5%	Retained to Com Eq	6.0%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
				56%	63%	67%	70%	72%	65%	60%	61%	50%	52%	57%	53%	All Div'ds to Net Prof	59%																																																																																																																																																																																																																									

MARKET CAP: \$4.5 billion (Mid Cap)																																																																						
CURRENT POSITION (\$MILL)																																																																						
Cash Assets	5.1	4.1	9.3																																																																			
Receivables	95.4	97.0	95.4																																																																			
Inventory (AvgCst)	11.4	12.8	12.6																																																																			
Other	59.8	38.6	46.9																																																																			
Current Assets	171.7	152.5	164.2																																																																			
Accts Payable	65.8	60.0	34.7																																																																			
Debt Due	123.0	70.0	80.1																																																																			
Other	78.1	95.3	90.3																																																																			
Current Liab.	266.9	225.3	205.1																																																																			
BUSINESS: Aqua America, Inc. is the holding company for water and wastewater utilities that serve approximately three million residents in Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, Florida, Indiana, and five other states. Has 1,617 employees. Acquired AquaSource, 7/03; Consumers Water, 4/99; and others. Water supply revenues '14: residential, 68%; commercial, 17%; industrial & other, 15%. Officers and directors own .8% of the common stock; Vanguard Group, 6.6%; State Street Capital Corp., 6.3%; Blackrock, Inc. 6.1% (4/14 Proxy). Chairman: Nicholas DeBenedictis. CEO: Christopher Franklin. Incorporated: Pennsylvania. Address: 762 West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010. Tel.: 610-525-1400. Internet: www.aquaamerica.com.																																																																						
We expect Aqua America to raise the dividend at least 7% in the third quarter. The water utility should maintain its tradition of hiking the annual payout by more than the industry average. **We think earnings gains will be modest through 2016.** Aqua had a better-than-expected first quarter, but we are sticking with our 2015 earnings estimate of a \$0.05 gain to \$1.25, followed next year by a similar nickel increase to \$1.30. Our share-earnings forecasts could prove conservative as they don't include gains from assets sales, which have added between \$0.06 and \$0.10 a share to bottom line over the past three years. **Nonregulated operations have long-term potential.** Despite a lot of fanfare, these businesses will most likely account for only 4%-5% of revenues in 2015. Still, margins and growth prospects are higher than in the utility sector. **Aqua is on pace to make about 25 acquisitions this year.** There are over 50,000 municipal and private waters companies in the U.S. Most are small and do not have the capital required to meet new environmental standards and to update and modernize their infrastructure. As the second largest water utility in the country, Aqua can cut redundancies and reduce costs of the purchased water systems while improving the service. This strategy is responsible for the company's strong earnings record as it has made 300 acquisitions to date. **A new CEO has been selected.** There had been some concern regarding Nicholas DeBenedictis stepping down after 23 years at the helm, in which the company's market capitalization rose from \$100 million to \$4.3 billion. Chris Franklin, a 20-year veteran of Aqua, was chosen as the replacement and Wall Street seemed satisfied with the selection. **These neutrally ranked shares should appeal to patient, income-oriented investors seeking to diversify into the water utility industry.** The stock's total return potential out to 2018-2020 is close to the average of all equities in the Value Line universe. This stock appears worthwhile on a risk-adjusted basis as it has a very low Beta, solid finances, and well-defined earnings. *James A. Flood* July 17, 2015																																																																						
	Cal-endar	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)				Full Year		-----------	-------------------------------	--------	--------	--------	-----------			Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31			2012	164.0	191.7	214.6	187.5	757.8		2013	180.0	195.7	204.3	188.6	768.6		2014	182.7	195.3	210.5	191.4	779.9		2015	190.3	200	215	199.7	805		2016	190	205	220	210	825															
	Cal-endar	EARNINGS PER SHARE ^A				Full Year		-----------	---------------------------------	--------	--------	--------	-----------			Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31			2012	.15	.24	.29	.19	.87		2013	.26	.30	.36	.24	1.16		2014	.24	.31	.38	.27	1.20		2015	.27	.32	.39	.27	1.25		2016	.26	.33	.41	.30	1.30															
	Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^B				Full Year		-----------	---------------------------------------	--------	--------	--------	-----------			Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31			2011	.124	.124	.124	.132	.50		2012	.132	.132	.132	.14	.54		2013	.14	.14	.152	.152	.58		2014	.152	.152	.165	.165	.63		2015	.165	.165																		
(A) Diluted eqs. Excl. nonrec. gains (losses): '99, (.9¢); '00, 2¢; '01, 2¢; '02, 4¢; '03, 3¢; '12, 18¢. Excl. gain from disc. operations: '12, 7¢; '13, 9¢; '14, 11¢. May not sum due to rounding. (B) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, Sept. & Dec. # Div'd. reinvestment plan available (5% discount). (C) In millions, adjusted for stock splits.																																																																						
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	Company's Financial Strength	A		------------------------------	-----		Stock's Price Stability	95		Price Growth Persistence	60		Earnings Predictability	100																																																								
To subscribe call 1-800-VALUELINE																																																																						

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-29
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please provide all of Dr. Vander Weide's exhibits in their native spreadsheet format with cell formulas intact.

RESPONSE:

Please see Attachment 54 to the Company's response to Staff DR No. 1-54 for Dr. Vander Weide's Exhibit JWV-1 in Excel format.

Respondent: Dr. James Vander Weide

Case No. 2015-00343
Atmos Energy Corporation, Kentucky Division
AG RFI Set No. 1
Question No. 1-30
Page 1 of 1

REQUEST:

Please provide a copy of each article cited by Dr. Vander Weide in his Direct Testimony and Appendices.

RESPONSE:

Please see Attachment 1 for the requested information.

ATTACHMENT:

ATTACHMENT 1 - Atmos Energy Corporation, AG_1-30_Att1 - Vander Weide Articles.pdf, 262 Pages.

Respondent: Dr. James Vander Weide

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETURN AND MARKET VALUE OF COMMON STOCKS*

Rolf W. BANZ

Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201, U.S.A.

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This study examines the empirical relationship between the return and the total market value of NYSE common stocks. It is found that smaller firms have had higher risk-adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms. This 'size effect' has been in existence for at least forty years and is evidence that the capital asset pricing model is misspecified. The size effect is not linear in the market value; the main effect occurs for very small firms while there is little difference in return between average sized and large firms. It is not known whether size *per se* is responsible for the effect or whether size is just a proxy for one or more true unknown factors correlated with size.

1. Introduction

The single-period capital asset pricing model (henceforth CAPM) postulates a simple linear relationship between the expected return and the market risk of a security. While the results of direct tests have been inconclusive, recent evidence suggests the existence of additional factors which are relevant for asset pricing. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) show a significant positive relationship between dividend yield and return of common stocks for the 1936-1977 period. Basu (1977) finds that price-earnings ratios and risk-adjusted returns are related. He chooses to interpret his findings as evidence of market inefficiency but as Ball (1978) points out, market efficiency tests are often joint tests of the efficient market hypothesis and a particular equilibrium relationship. Thus, some of the anomalies that have been attributed to a lack of market efficiency might well be the result of a misspecification of the pricing model.

This study contributes another piece to the emerging puzzle. It examines the relationship between the total market value of the common stock of a firm and its return. The results show that, in the 1936-1975 period, the common stock of small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns

*This study is based on part of my dissertation and was completed while I was at the University of Chicago. I am grateful to my committee, Myron Scholes (chairman), John Gould, Roger Ibbotson, Jonathan Ingersoll, and especially Eugene Fama and Merton Miller, for their advice and comments. I wish to acknowledge the valuable comments of Bill Schwert on earlier drafts of this paper.

than the common stock of large firms. This result will henceforth be referred to as the 'size effect'. Since the results of the study are not based on a particular theoretical equilibrium model, it is not possible to determine conclusively whether market value *per se* matters or whether it is only a proxy for unknown true additional factors correlated with market value. The last section of this paper will address this question in greater detail.

The various methods currently available for the type of empirical research presented in this study are discussed in section 2. Since there is a considerable amount of confusion about their relative merit, more than one technique is used. Section 3 discusses the data. The empirical results are presented in section 4. A discussion of the relationship between the size effect and other factors, as well as some speculative comments on possible explanations of the results, constitute section 5.

2. Methodologies

The empirical tests are based on a generalized asset pricing model which allows the expected return of a common stock to be a function of risk β and an additional factor ϕ_i , the market value of the equity.¹ A simple linear relationship of the form

$$E(R_i) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_i + \gamma_2 [(\phi_i - \phi_m) / \phi_m], \quad (1)$$

is assumed, where

- $E(R_i)$ = expected return on security i ,
- γ_0 = expected return on a zero-beta portfolio,
- γ_1 = expected market risk premium,
- ϕ_i = market value of security i ,
- ϕ_m = average market value, and
- γ_2 = constant measuring the contribution of ϕ_i to the expected return of a security.

If there is no relationship between ϕ_i and the expected return, i.e., $\gamma_2 = 0$, (1) reduces to the Black (1972) version of the CAPM.

Since expectations are not observable, the parameters in (1) must be estimated from historical data. Several methods are available for this purpose. They all involve the use of pooled cross-sectional and time series regressions to estimate γ_0 , γ_1 , and γ_2 . They differ primarily in (a) the assumption concerning the residual variance of the stock returns (homoscedastic or heteroscedastic in the cross-sectional), and (b) the treatment of the

¹In the empirical tests, ϕ_i and ϕ_m are defined as the market proportion of security i and average market proportion, respectively. The two specifications are, of course, equivalent.

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errors-in-variables problem introduced by the use of estimated betas in (1). All methods use a constrained optimization procedure, described in Fama (1976, ch. 9), to generate minimum variance (m.v.) portfolios with mean returns γ_i , $i=0, \dots, 2$. This imposes certain constraints on the portfolio weights, since from (1)

$$E(R_{it}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \sum_j w_j \beta_{ij} + \gamma_2 \left[\left(\sum_j w_j \phi_j - \phi_m \sum_j w_j \right) / \phi_m \right], \quad i=0, \dots, 2. \quad (2)$$

where the w_j are the portfolio proportions of each asset j , $j=1, \dots, N$. An examination of (2) shows that γ_0 is the mean return of a standard m.v. portfolio ($\sum w_j = 1$) with zero beta and $\phi_m = \sum w_j \phi_j = \phi_m$ [to make the second and third terms of the right-hand side of (2) vanish]. Similarly, γ_1 is the mean return on a zero-investment m.v. portfolio with beta of one and $\phi_p = 0$, and γ_2 is the mean return on a m.v. zero-investment, zero-beta portfolio with $\phi_p = \phi_m$. As shown by Fama (1976, ch. 9), this constrained optimization can be performed by running a cross-sectional regression of the form

$$R_{it} = \gamma_{0i} + \gamma_{1i} \beta_{it} + \gamma_{2i} \left[(\phi_{it} - \phi_{mi}) / \phi_{mi} \right] + \epsilon_{it}, \quad i=1, \dots, N. \quad (3)$$

on a period-by-period basis, using estimated betas $\hat{\beta}_{it}$ and allowing for either homoscedastic or heteroscedastic error terms. Invoking the usual stationarity arguments the final estimates of the gammas are calculated as the averages of the T estimates.

One basic approach involves grouping individual securities into portfolios on the basis of market value and security beta, reestimating the relevant parameters (beta, residual variance) of the portfolios in a subsequent period, and finally performing either an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression [Fama and MacBeth (1973)] which assumes homoscedastic errors, or a generalized least squares (GLS) regression [Black and Scholes (1974)] which allows for heteroscedastic errors, on the portfolios in each time period.² Grouping reduces the errors-in-variables problem, but is not very efficient because it does not make use of all information. The errors-in-variables problem should not be a factor as long as the portfolios contain a reasonable number of securities.³

Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) have suggested an alternative method which avoids grouping. They allow for heteroscedastic errors in the cross-section and use the estimates of the standard errors of the security

²Black and Scholes (1974) do not take account of heteroscedasticity, even though their method was designed to do so.
³Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972, p. 116).

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betas as estimates of the measurement errors. As Theil (1971, p. 610) has pointed out, this method leads to unbiased maximum likelihood estimators for the gammas as long as the error in the standard error of beta is small and the standard assumptions of the simple errors-in-variables model are met. Thus, it is very important that the diagonal model is the correct specification of the return-generating process, since the residual variance assumes a critical position in this procedure. The Litzenberger-Ramaswamy method is superior from a theoretical viewpoint; however, preliminary work has shown that it leads to serious problems when applied to the model of this study and is not pursued any further.

Instead of estimating equation (3) with data for all securities, it is also possible to construct arbitrage portfolios containing stocks of very large and very small firms by combining long positions in small firms with short positions in large firms. A simple time series regression is run to determine the difference in risk-adjusted returns between small and large firms. This approach, long familiar in the efficient markets and option pricing literature, has the advantage that no assumptions about the exact functional relationships between market value and expected return need to be made, and it will therefore be used in this study.

3. Data

The sample includes all common stocks quoted on the NYSE for at least five years between 1926 and 1975. Monthly price and return data and the number of shares outstanding at the end of each month are available in the monthly returns file of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) of the University of Chicago. Three different market indices are used; this is in response to Roll's (1977) critique of empirical tests of the CAPM. Two of the three are pure common stock indices — the CRSP equally- and value-weighted indices. The third is more comprehensive: a value-weighted combination of the CRSP value-weighted index and return data on corporate and government bonds from Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1977) (henceforth "market index").⁵ The weights of the components of this index are derived from information on the total market value of corporate and government bonds in various issues of the *Survey of Current Business* (updated annually) and from the market value of common stocks in the CRSP monthly index file. The stock indices, made up of riskier assets, have both higher returns

⁵ If the diagonal model (or market model) is an incomplete specification of the return generating process, the estimate of the standard error of beta is likely to have an upward bias, since the residual variance estimate is too large. The error in the residual variance estimate appears to be related to the second factor. Therefore, the resulting gamma estimates are biased. No pretense is made that this index is complete; thus, the use of quotation marks. It ignores real estate, foreign assets, etc.; it should be considered a first step toward a comprehensive index. See Ibbotson and Fall (1979).

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and higher risk than the bond indices and the market index.⁶ A time series of commercial paper returns is used as the risk-free rate.⁷ While not actually constant through time, its variation is very small when compared to that of the other series, and it is not significantly correlated with any of the three indices used as market proxies.

4. Empirical results

4.1. Results for methods based on grouped data

The portfolio selection procedure used in this study is identical to the one described at length in Black and Scholes (1974). The securities are assigned to one of twenty-five portfolios containing similar numbers of securities, first to one of five on the basis of the market value of the stock, then the securities in each of those five are in turn assigned to one of five portfolios on the basis of their beta. Five years of data are used for the estimation of the security beta; the next five years' data are used for the reestimation of the portfolio betas. Stock price and number of shares outstanding at the end of the five year periods are used for the calculation of the market proportions. The portfolios are updated every year. The cross-sectional regression (3) is then performed in each month and the means of the resulting time series of the gammas could be (and have been in the past) interpreted as the final estimators. However, having used estimated parameters, it is not certain that the series have the theoretical properties, in particular, the hypothesized beta. Black and Scholes (1974, p. 17) suggest that the time series of the gammas be regressed once more on the excess return of the market index. This correction involves running the time series regression (for $\hat{\gamma}_2$)

$$\hat{\gamma}_{2t} - R_{ft} = \hat{\alpha}_2 + \beta_2 (R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + \hat{\epsilon}_{2t} \quad (4)$$

It has been shown earlier that the theoretical β_2 is zero. (4) removes the effects of a non-zero β_2 on the return estimate $\hat{\gamma}_2$ and $\hat{\alpha}_2$ is used as the final estimator for $\hat{\gamma}_2 - R_{ft}$. Similar corrections are performed for $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$. The

⁶Mean monthly returns and standard deviations for the 1926-1975 period are:

	Mean return	Standard deviation
Market index	0.0046	0.0178
CRSP value-weighted index	0.0085	0.0588
CRSP equally-weighted index	0.0120	0.0830
Government bond index	0.0027	0.0157
Corporate bond index	0.0032	0.0142

⁷I am grateful to Myron Scholes for making this series available. The mean monthly return for the 1926-1975 period is 0.0026 and the standard deviation is 0.0021.

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derivations of the β_i , $i=0, \dots, 2$, in (4) from their theoretical values also allow us to check whether the grouping procedure is an effective means to eliminate the errors-in-beta problem.

The results are essentially identical for both OLS and GLS and for all three indices. Thus, only one set of results, those for the 'market index' with GLS, is presented in table 1. For each of the gammas, three numbers are reported: the mean of that time series of returns which is relevant for the test of the hypothesis of interest (i.e., whether or not γ_0 and γ_1 are different from the risk-free rate and the risk premium, respectively), the associated t -statistic, and finally, the estimated beta of the time series of the gamma from (4). Note that the means are corrected for the deviation from the theoretical beta as discussed above.

The table shows a significantly negative estimate for γ_2 for the overall time period. Thus, shares of firms with large market values have had smaller returns, on average, than similar small firms. The CAPM appears to be misspecified. The table also shows that γ_0 is different from the risk-free rate. As both Fama (1976, ch. 9) and Roll (1977) have pointed out, if a test does not use the true market portfolio, the Sharpe-Lintner model might be wrongly rejected. The estimates for γ_0 are of the same magnitude as those reported by Fama and MacBeth (1973) and others. The choice of a market index and the econometric method does not affect the results. Thus, at least within the context of this study, the choice of a proxy for the market portfolio does not seem to affect the results and allowing for heteroscedastic disturbances does not lead to significantly more efficient estimators.

Before looking at the results in more detail, some comments on econometric problems are in order. The results in table 1 are based on the 'market index' which is likely to be superior to pure stock indices from a theoretical viewpoint since it includes more assets [Roll (1977)]. This superiority has its price. The actual betas of the time series of the gammas are reported in table 1 in the columns labeled β_i . Recall that the theoretical values of β_0 and β_1 are zero and one, respectively. The standard zero-beta portfolio with return γ_0 contains high beta stocks in short positions and low beta stocks in long positions, while the opposite is the case for the zero-investment portfolio with return γ_1 . The actual betas are all significantly different from the theoretical values. This suggests a regression effect, i.e., the past betas of high beta securities are overestimated and the betas of low beta securities are underestimated.⁹ Past beta is not completely uncorrelated with the error of the current beta and the instrumental variable approach to the error-in-variables problem is not entirely successful.⁹

⁹ There is no such effect for β_2 because that portfolio has both zero beta and zero investment; i.e., net holdings of both high and low beta securities are, on average, zero.

⁹ This result is first documented in Brenner (1976) who examines the original Fama-McBeth (1973) time series of γ_{0it} .

Table 1
 Portfolio estimators for γ_0 , γ_1 and γ_2 based on the 'market index' with generalized least squares estimation.^a
 $R_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_{it} + \gamma_2 (\phi_{it} - \phi_{mt}) \phi_{mt}$

Period	$\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f)$	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1 - (R_M - R_f)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_1 - (R_M - R_f))$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$\hat{\beta}_2$
1936-1975	0.00450	2.76	0.45	-0.00092	-1.00	0.75	-0.00052	-2.92	0.01
1936-1955	0.00377	1.66	0.43	-0.00060	-0.80	0.80	-0.00043	-2.12	0.01
1956-1975	0.00531	2.22	0.46	-0.00138	-0.82	0.73	-0.00062	-2.09	0.01
1936-1945	0.00121	0.30	0.63	-0.00098	-0.77	0.82	-0.00075	-2.32	-0.01
1946-1955	0.00650	2.89	0.03	-0.00021	-0.26	0.75	-0.00015	-0.65	0.06
1956-1965	0.00494	2.02	0.34	-0.00098	-0.56	0.96	-0.00039	-1.27	-0.01
1966-1975	0.00596	1.43	0.49	-0.00232	-0.80	0.69	-0.00080	-1.55	0.01

^a $\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f$ = mean difference between returns on zero beta portfolio and risk-free rate; $\hat{\gamma}_1 - (R_M - R_f)$ = mean difference between actual risk premium ($\hat{\gamma}_1$) and risk premium stipulated by Sharpe-Lintner model ($R_M - R_f$); $\hat{\gamma}_2$ = size premium; $\hat{\beta}_i$ = actual estimated market risk of $\hat{\gamma}_i$ (theoretical values: $\beta_0 = 0$, $\beta_1 = 1$, $\beta_2 = 0$); all $\hat{\beta}_0$, $\hat{\beta}_1$ are significantly different from the theoretical values. $t(\cdot)$ = t-statistic.

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The deviations from the theoretical betas are largest for the 'market index', smaller for the CRSP value-weighted index, and smallest for the CRSP equally-weighted index. This is due to two factors: first, even if the true covariance structure is stationary, betas with respect to a value-weighted index change whenever the weights change, since the weighted average of the betas is constrained to be equal to one. Second, the betas and their standard errors with respect to the 'market index' are much larger than for the stock indices (a typical stock beta is between two and three), which leads to larger deviations -- a kind of 'leverage' effect. Thus, the results in table 1 show that the final correction for the deviation of β_0 and β_1 from their theoretical values is of crucial importance for market proxies with changing weights.

Estimated portfolio betas and portfolio market proportions are (negatively) correlated. It is therefore possible that the errors in beta induce an error in the coefficient of the market proportion. According to Levi (1973), the probability limit of $\hat{\gamma}_1$ in the standard errors-in-the-variables model is

$$\text{plim } \hat{\gamma}_1 = \gamma_1 / (1 + (\sigma_u^2 \cdot \sigma_\beta^2) / D) < \gamma_1,$$

with

$$D = (\sigma_\beta^2 + \sigma_u^2) \cdot \sigma_\phi^2 - \sigma_{\beta\phi}^2 > 0,$$

where σ_β^2 , σ_ϕ^2 are the variances of the true factors β and ϕ , respectively, σ_u^2 is the variance of the error in beta and $\sigma_{\beta\phi}$ is the covariance of β and ϕ . Thus, the bias in $\hat{\gamma}_1$ is unambiguously towards zero for positive γ_1 . The probability limit of $\hat{\gamma}_2 - \gamma_2$ is [Levi (1973)]

$$\text{plim } (\hat{\gamma}_2 - \gamma_2) = (\sigma_u^2 \cdot \sigma_{\beta\phi} \cdot \gamma_1) / D.$$

We find that the bias in $\hat{\gamma}_2$ depends on the covariance between β and ϕ and the sign of γ_1 . If $\sigma_{\beta\phi}$ has the same sign as the covariance between β and ϕ , i.e., $\sigma_{\beta\phi} < 0$, and if $\gamma_1 > 0$, then $\text{plim } (\hat{\gamma}_2 - \gamma_2) < 0$, i.e., $\text{plim } \hat{\gamma}_2 < \gamma_2$. If the grouping procedure is not successful in removing the error in beta, then it is likely that the reported $\hat{\gamma}_2$ understates the true magnitude of the size effect. If this was a serious problem in this study, the results for the different market indices should reflect the problem. In particular, using the equally-weighted stock index should then lead to the smallest size effect since, as was pointed out earlier, the error in beta problem is apparently less serious for that kind of index. In fact, we find that there is little difference between the estimates.¹⁰

¹⁰For the overall time period, $\hat{\gamma}_2$ with the equally-weighted CRSP index is -0.00044, with the value-weighted CRSP index -0.00044 as well as opposed to the -0.00052 for the 'market index' reported in table 1. The estimated betas of $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$ which reflect the degree of the error in beta problems are 0.87 and 0.91, respectively, for the equally-weighted CRSP index and 0.13 and 0.87 for the value-weighted CRSP index.

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Thus, it does not appear that the size effect is just a proxy for the unobservable true beta even though the market proportion and the beta of securities are negatively correlated.

The correlation coefficient between the mean market values of the twenty-five portfolios and their betas is significantly negative, which might have introduced a multicollinearity problem. One of its possible consequences is coefficients that are very sensitive to addition or deletion of data. This effect does not appear to occur in this case: the results do not change significantly when five portfolios are dropped from the sample. Revising the grouping procedure — ranking on the basis of beta first, then ranking on the basis of market proportion — also does not lead to substantially different results.

4.2. A closer look at the results

An additional factor relevant for asset pricing — the market value of the equity of a firm — has been found. The results are based on a linear model. Linearity was assumed only for convenience and there is no theoretical reason (since there is no model) why the relationship should be linear. If it is nonlinear, the particular form of the relationship might give us a starting point for the discussion of possible causes of the size effect in the next section. An analysis of the residuals of the twenty-five portfolios is the easiest way to look at the linearity question. For each month t , the estimated residual return

$$\hat{\epsilon}_{it} = R_{it} - \hat{\gamma}_{0t} - \hat{\gamma}_{1t}\beta_{it} - \hat{\gamma}_{2t}[(\phi_{it} - \phi_{mt})/\phi_{mt}], \quad i = 1, \dots, 25, \quad (5)$$

is calculated for all portfolios. The mean residuals over the forty-five year sample period are plotted as a function of the mean market proportion in fig. 1. Since the distribution of the market proportions is very skewed, a logarithmic scale is used. The solid line connects the mean residual returns of each size group. The numbers identify the individual portfolios within each group according to beta, '1' being the one with the largest beta, '5' being the one with the smallest beta.

The figure shows clearly that the linear model is misspecified.¹¹ The residuals are not randomly distributed around zero. The residuals of the portfolios containing the smallest firms are all positive; the remaining ones are close to zero. As a consequence, it is impossible to use $\hat{\gamma}_2$ as a simple size premium in the cross-section. The plot also shows, however, that the misspecification is not responsible for the significance of $\hat{\gamma}_2$ since the linear model underestimates the true size effect present for very small firms. To illustrate this point, the five portfolios containing the smaller firms are

¹¹The nonlinearity cannot be eliminated by defining ϕ_{it} as the log of the market proportion.

deleted from the sample and the parameters reestimated. The results, summarized in table 2, show that the β_2 remain essentially the same. The relationship is still not linear; the new β_2 still cannot be used as a size premium.

Fig. 1 suggests that the main effect occurs for very small firms. Further support for this conclusion can be obtained from a simple test. We can regress the returns of the twenty-five portfolios in each result on beta alone and examine the residuals. The regression is misspecified and the residuals contain information about the size effect. Fig. 2 shows the plot of those residuals in the same format as fig. 1. The smallest firms have, on average, very large unexplained mean returns. There is no significant difference between the residuals of the remaining portfolios.




Fig. 1. Mean residual returns of portfolios (1936-1975) with equally-weighted CRSP index as market proxy. The residual is calculated with the three-factor model [eq. (3)]. The numbers 1, ..., 5 represent the mean residual return for the five portfolios within each size group (1: portfolio with largest beta, ..., 5: portfolio with smallest beta). + represents the mean of the mean residuals of the five portfolios with similar market values.




Fig. 2. Mean residual returns of portfolios (1936-1975) with equally-weighted CRSP index as market proxy. The residual is calculated with the two-factor model ($\epsilon_{it} = R_{it} - \hat{r}_{it} - \hat{\beta}_{it}R_{mt}$). The symbols are as defined for fig. 1.

4.3. 'Arbitrage' portfolio returns

One important empirical question still remains: How important is the size effect from a practical point of view? Fig. 2 suggests that the difference in returns between the smallest firms and the remaining ones is, on average, about 0.4 percent per month. A more dramatic result can be obtained when the securities are chosen solely on the basis of their market value.

As an illustration, consider putting equal dollar amounts into portfolios containing the smallest, largest and median-sized firms at the beginning of a year. These portfolios are to be equally weighted and contain, say, ten, twenty or fifty securities. They are to be held for five years and are rebalanced every month. They are levered or unlevered to have the same beta. We are then interested in the differences in their returns,

$$R_{1t} = R_{st} - R_{lt}, \quad R_{2t} = R_{st} - R_{mt}, \quad R_{3t} = R_{st} - R_{lt}, \quad (6)$$

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Table 2
 Portfolio estimators for γ_2 for all 25 portfolios and for 20 portfolios (portfolios containing smallest firms deleted) based on CRSP equally weighted index with generalized least-squares estimation.*

Period	Size premium γ_2 with	
	25 portfolios	20 portfolios
1936-1975	-0.00044 (-2.42)	-0.00043 (-2.54)
1936-1955	-0.00037 (-1.72)	-0.00041 (-1.88)
1956-1975	-0.00056 (-1.91)	-0.00050 (-1.91)
1936-1945	-0.00085 (-2.81)	-0.00083 (-2.48)
1946-1955	0.00003 (0.12)	-0.00003 (-0.13)
1956-1965	-0.00023 (-0.81)	-0.00017 (-0.65)
1966-1975	-0.00091 (-1.78)	-0.00085 (-1.84)

*t-statistic in parentheses.

where R_{1t} , R_{2t} and R_{3t} are the returns on the portfolios containing the smallest, median-sized and largest firms at portfolio formation time (and $R_{1t} = R_{2t} + R_{3t}$). The procedure involves (a) the calculation of the three differences in raw returns in each month and (b) running time series regressions of the differences on the excess returns of the market proxy. The intercept terms of these regressions are then interpreted as the \bar{R}_i , $i=1, 2, 3$. Thus, the differences can be interpreted as 'arbitrage' returns, since, e.g., R_{1t} is the return obtained from holding the smallest firms long and the largest firms short, representing zero net investment in a zero-beta portfolio.¹² Simple equally weighted portfolios are used rather than more sophisticated minimum variance portfolios to demonstrate that the size effect is not due to some quirk in the covariance matrix.

Table 3 shows that the results of the earlier tests are fully confirmed. \bar{R}_2 , the difference in returns between very small firms and median-size firms, is typically considerably larger than \bar{R}_3 , the difference in returns between median-sized and very large firms. The average excess return from holding very small firms long and very large firms short is, on average, 1.52 percent

¹²No *ex post* sample bias is introduced, since monthly rebalancing includes stocks delisted during the five years. Thus, the portfolio size is generally accurate only for the first month of each period.

Table 3
 Mean monthly returns on 'arbitrage' portfolios:
 $R_{1t} = \alpha + \beta(R_{mt} - R_{ft})$

Table 3
 Mean monthly returns on 'arbitrage' portfolios.^a
 $R_j - R_k = \alpha_j + \beta_j(R_m - R_k)$

	α_1^a			α_2^a			α_3^a		
	n=10	n=20	n=50	n=10	n=20	n=50	n=10	n=20	n=50
<i>Overall period</i>									
1931-1975	0.0152 (2.99)	0.0148 (3.53)	0.0101 (3.07)	0.0130 (2.90)	0.0124 (3.56)	0.0089 (3.64)	0.0021 (1.06)	0.0024 (1.41)	0.0012 (0.85)
<i>Five-year subperiods</i>									
1931-1935	0.0359 (2.25)	0.0597 (2.81)	0.0427 (2.35)	0.0462 (1.92)	0.0462 (2.55)	0.0326 (2.46)	0.0127 (1.09)	0.0134 (1.49)	0.0101 (1.42)
1936-1940	0.0201 (0.82)	0.0182 (0.97)	0.0089 (0.67)	0.0118 (0.55)	0.0145 (0.90)	0.0064 (0.65)	0.0084 (1.20)	0.0037 (0.62)	0.0025 (0.49)
1941-1945	0.0430 (2.29)	0.0408 (2.46)	0.0269 (2.17)	0.0381 (2.29)	0.0367 (2.54)	0.0228 (2.02)	0.0049 (1.25)	0.0038 (1.09)	0.0041 (1.68)
1946-1950	-0.0060 (-1.17)	-0.0046 (-0.97)	-0.0036 (-0.97)	-0.0058 (-1.03)	-0.0059 (-1.29)	-0.0029 (-0.83)	-0.0002 (-0.07)	-0.0104 (-0.50)	-0.0007 (-0.38)
1951-1955	-0.0067 (-0.89)	-0.0011 (-0.21)	0.0013 (0.32)	-0.0004 (-0.07)	0.0026 (0.72)	0.0010 (0.39)	-0.0062 (-1.29)	-0.0037 (-0.99)	0.0003 (0.11)
1956-1960	0.0039 (0.67)	0.0008 (0.15)	0.0037 (0.89)	0.0007 (0.14)	-0.0027 (-0.64)	0.0011 (0.45)	0.0031 (0.88)	0.0035 (1.16)	0.0026 (0.97)
1961-1965	0.0131 (1.38)	0.0060 (0.67)	0.0024 (0.31)	0.0096 (1.11)	0.0046 (0.72)	0.0036 (0.77)	0.0035 (0.59)	0.0014 (0.24)	-0.0012 (-0.24)
1966-1970	0.0121 (1.64)	0.0117 (2.26)	0.0077 (1.91)	0.0129 (1.93)	0.0110 (2.71)	0.0071 (2.43)	0.0008 (0.23)	0.0007 (0.22)	0.0006 (0.27)
1971-1975	0.0063 (0.60)	0.0108 (1.23)	0.0098 (1.45)	0.0033 (0.39)	0.0077 (1.18)	0.0083 (1.79)	0.0030 (0.64)	0.0031 (0.72)	0.0015 (0.43)

R, M, Size, Return and firm size

^aEqually-weighted portfolios with n securities, adjusted for differences in market risk with respect to CRSP value-weighted index, t-statistics in parentheses.

^bSmall firms held long, large firms held short.

^cSmall firms held long, median-size firms held short.

^dMedian-size firms held long, large firms held short.

per month or 19.8 percent on an annualized basis. This strategy, which suggests very large 'profit opportunities', leaves the investor with a poorly diversified portfolio. A portfolio of small firms has typically much larger residual risk with respect to a value-weighted index than a portfolio of very large firms with the same number of securities [Banz (1978, ch. 3)]. Since the fifty largest firms make up more than 25 percent of the total market value of NYSE stocks, it is not surprising that a larger part of the variation of the return of a portfolio of those large firms can be explained by its relation with the value-weighted market index. Table 3 also shows that the strategy would not have been successful in every five year subperiod. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the size effect during the past forty-five years is such that it is of more than just academic interest.

5. Conclusions

The evidence presented in this study suggests that the CAPM is misspecified. On average, small NYSE firms have had significantly larger risk adjusted returns than large NYSE firms over a forty year period. This size effect is not linear in the market proportion (or the log of the market proportion) but is most pronounced for the smallest firms in the sample. The effect is also not very stable through time. An analysis of the ten year subperiods show substantial differences in the magnitude of the coefficient of the size factor (table 1).

There is no theoretical foundation for such an effect. We do not even know whether the factor is size itself or whether size is just a proxy for one or more true but unknown factors correlated with size. It is possible, however, to offer some conjectures and even discuss some factors for which size is suspected to proxy. Recent work by Reinganum (1980) has eliminated one obvious candidate: the price-earnings (P/E) ratio.¹³ He finds that the P/E -effect, as reported by Basu (1977), disappears for both NYSE and AMEX stocks when he controls for size but that there is a significant size effect even when he controls for the P/E -ratio, i.e., the P/E -ratio effect is a proxy for the size effect and not vice versa. Stattman (1980), who found a significant negative relationship between the ratio of book value and market value of equity and its return, also reports that this relationship is just a proxy for the size effect. Naturally, a large number of possible factors remain to be tested.¹⁴ But the Reinganum results point out a potential problem with some of the existing negative evidence of the efficient market hypothesis. Basu believed to have identified a market inefficiency but his P/E -effect is

¹³The average correlation coefficient between P/E -ratio and market value is only 0.16 for individual stocks for thirty-eight quarters ending in 1978. But for the portfolios formed on the basis of P/E -ratio, it rises to 0.82. Recall that Basu (1977) used ten portfolios in his study.

¹⁴E.g., debt-equity ratios, skewness of the return distribution [Kraus and Litzenberger (1976)].

just a proxy for the size effect. Given its longevity, it is not likely that it is due to a market inefficiency but it is rather evidence of a pricing model misspecification. To the extent that tests of market efficiency use data of firms of different sizes and are based on the CAPM, their results might be at least contaminated by the size effect.

One possible explanation involving the size of the firm directly is based on a model by Klein and Bawa (1977). They find that if insufficient information is available about a subset of securities, investors will not hold these securities because of estimation risk, i.e., uncertainty about the true parameters of the return distribution. If investors differ in the amount of information available, they will limit their diversification to different subsets of all securities in the market.¹⁵ It is likely that the amount of information generated is related to the size of the firm. Therefore, many investors would not desire to hold the common stock of very small firms. I have shown elsewhere [Banz (1978, ch. 2)] that securities sought by only a subset of the investors have higher risk-adjusted returns than those considered by all investors. Thus, lack of information about small firms leads to limited diversification and therefore to higher returns for the 'undesirable' stocks of small firms.¹⁶ While this informal model is consistent with the empirical results, it is, nevertheless, just conjecture.

To summarize, the size effect exists but it is not at all clear why it exists. Until we find an answer, it should be interpreted with caution. It might be tempting to use the size effect, e.g., as the basis for a theory of mergers — large firms are able to pay a premium for the stock of small firms since they will be able to discount the same cash flows at a smaller discount rate. Naturally, this might turn out to be complete nonsense if size were to be shown to be just a proxy.

The preceding discussion suggests that the results of this study leave many questions unanswered. Further research should consider the relationship between size and other factors such as the dividend yield effect, and the tests should be expanded to include OTC stocks as well.

¹⁵Klein and Bawa (1977, p. 102).

¹⁶A similar result can be obtained with the introduction of fixed holding costs which lead to limited diversification as well. See Brennan (1975), Banz (1978, ch. 2) and Mayshar (1979).

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*The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests**

FISCHER BLACK,† MICHAEL C. JENSEN,‡

AND

MYRON SCHOLES§

I. Introduction and Summary

Considerable attention has recently been given to general equilibrium models of the pricing of capital assets. Of these, perhaps the best known is the mean-variance formulation originally developed by Sharpe [1964] and Treynor [1961], and extended and clarified by Lintner [1965a, b], Mossin [1966], Fama [1968a, b], and Long [1972]. In addition Treynor [1965], Sharpe [1966], and Jensen [1968, 1969] have developed portfolio evaluation models which are either based on this asset pricing model or bear a close relation to it. In the development of the asset pricing model it is assumed that (1) all investors are single period risk-averse utility of terminal wealth maximizers and can choose among portfolios solely on the basis of mean and variance, (2) there are no taxes or

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†University of Chicago.

‡University of Rochester.

§Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

transactions costs, (3) all investors have homogeneous views regarding the parameters of the joint probability distribution of all security returns, and (4) all investors can borrow and lend at a given riskless rate of interest. The main result of the model is a statement of the relation between the expected risk premiums on individual assets and their "systematic risk." The relationship is

$$E(\tilde{R}_j) = E(\tilde{R}_M)\beta_j \quad (1)$$

where the tildes denote random variables and

$$E(\tilde{R}_j) = \frac{E(\tilde{P}_j) - P_{t-1} + E(\tilde{D}_j)}{P_{t-1}} - r_{ft} = \text{expected excess returns on the } j\text{th asset}$$

\tilde{D}_j = dividends paid on the j th security at time t

r_{ft} = the riskless rate of interest

$E(\tilde{R}_M)$ = expected excess returns on a "market portfolio" consisting of an investment in every asset outstanding in proportion to its value

$$\beta_j = \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_M)}{\sigma^2(\tilde{R}_M)} = \text{the "systematic" risk of the } j\text{th asset.}$$

Relation 1 says that the expected excess return on any asset is directly proportional to its β . If we define α_j as

$$\alpha_j = E(\tilde{R}_j) - E(\tilde{R}_M)\beta_j$$

then (1) implies that the α on every asset is zero.

If empirically true, the relation given by (1) has wide-ranging implications for problems in capital budgeting, cost benefit analysis, portfolio selection, and for other economic problems requiring knowledge of the relation between risk and return. Evidence presented by Jensen [1968, 1969] on the relationship between the expected return and systematic risk of a large sample of mutual funds suggests that (1) might provide an adequate description of the relation between risk and return for securities. On the other hand, evidence presented by Douglas [1969], Lintner [1965], and most recently Miller and Scholes [1972] seems to indicate the model does not provide a complete description of the structure of security returns. In particular, the work done by Miller and Scholes suggests that the α 's on individual assets depend in a systematic way on their β 's: that high-beta assets tend to have negative α 's, and that low-beta stocks tend to have positive α 's.

Our main purpose is to present some additional tests of this asset pricing model which avoid some of the problems of earlier studies and which, we believe, provide additional insights into the nature of the structure of security returns. All previous direct tests of the model have been conducted using cross-sectional methods; primarily regression of \tilde{R}_j , the mean excess return over a time interval for a set of securities on estimates of the systematic risk, β_j , of each of the securities. The equation

$$\tilde{R}_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1\beta_j + \tilde{u}_j$$

was estimated, and contrary to the theory, γ_0 seemed to be significantly different from zero and γ_1 significantly different from \tilde{R}_M , the slope predicted by the model. We shall show in Section III that, because of the structure of the process which appears to be generating the data, these cross-sectional tests of significance can be misleading and therefore do not provide direct tests of the validity of (1). In Section II we provide a more powerful time series test of the validity of the model, which is free of the difficulties associated with the cross-sectional tests. These results indicate that the usual form of the asset pricing model as given by (1) does not provide an accurate description of the structure of security returns. The tests indicate that the expected excess returns on high-beta assets are lower than (1) suggests and that the expected excess returns on low-beta assets are higher than (1) suggests. In other words, that high-beta stocks have negative α 's and low-beta stocks have positive α 's.

The data indicate that the expected return on a security can be represented by a two-factor model such as

$$E(\tilde{r}_j) = E(\tilde{r}_2)(1 - \beta_j) + E(\tilde{r}_M)\beta_j \quad (2)$$

where the r 's indicate total returns and $E(\tilde{r}_2)$ is the expected return on a second factor, which we shall call the "beta factor," since its coefficient is a function of the asset's β . After we had observed this phenomenon, Black [1970] was able to show that relaxing the assumption of the existence of riskless borrowing and lending opportunities provides an asset pricing model which implies that, in equilibrium, the expected return on an asset will be given by (2). His results furnish an explicit definition of the beta factor, \tilde{r}_2 , as the return on a portfolio that has a zero covariance with the return on the market portfolio \tilde{r}_M . Although this model is entirely

consistent with our empirical results (and provides a convenient interpretation of them), there are perhaps other plausible hypotheses consistent with the data (we shall briefly discuss several in Section V). We hasten to add that we have not attempted here to supply any direct tests of these alternative hypotheses.

The evidence presented in Section II indicates the expected excess return on an asset is not strictly proportional to its β , and we believe that this evidence, coupled with that given in Section IV, is sufficiently strong to warrant rejection of the traditional form of the model given by (1). We then show in Section III how the cross-sectional tests are subject to measurement error bias, provide a solution to this problem through grouping procedures, and show how cross-sectional methods are relevant to testing the expanded two-factor form of the model. Here we find that the evidence indicates the existence of a linear relation between risk and return and is therefore consistent with a form of the two-factor model which specifies the realized returns on each asset to be a linear function of the returns on the two factors \bar{r}_Z and \bar{r}_M .

$$\bar{r}_j = \bar{r}_Z(1 - \beta_j) + \bar{r}_M\beta_j + \bar{w}_j \quad (2)$$

The fact that the α 's of high-beta securities are negative and that the α 's of low-beta securities are positive implies that the mean of the beta factor is greater than r_f . The traditional form of the capital asset pricing model as expressed by (1), could hold exactly, even if asset returns were generated by (2'), if the mean of the beta factor were equal to the risk-free rate. We show in Section IV that the mean of the beta factor has had a positive trend over the period 1931-65 and was on the order of 1.0 to 1.3% per month in the two sample intervals we examined in the period 1948-65. This seems to have been significantly different from the average risk-free rate and indeed is roughly the same size as the average market return of 1.3 and 1.2% per month over the two sample intervals in this period. This evidence seems to be sufficiently strong enough to warrant rejection of the traditional form of the model given by (1). In addition, the standard deviation of the beta factor over these two sample intervals was 2.0 and 2.2% per month, as compared with the standard deviation of the market factor of 3.6 and 3.8% per month. Thus the beta factor seems to be an important determinant of security returns.

II. Time Series Tests of the Model

A. *Specification of the Model.* Although the model of (1) which we wish to test is stated in terms of expected returns, it is possible to use realized returns to test the theory. Let us represent the returns on any security by the "market model" originally proposed by Markowitz [1959] and extended by Sharpe [1963] and Fama [1968a]

$$\bar{R}_j = E(\bar{R}_j) + \beta_j \bar{R}'_M + \bar{e}_j \quad (3)$$

where $\bar{R}'_M = \bar{R}_M - E(\bar{R}_M)$ = the "unexpected" excess market return, and \bar{R}'_M and \bar{e}_j are normally distributed random variables that satisfy:

$$E(\bar{R}'_M) = 0 \quad (4a)$$

$$E(\bar{e}_j) = 0 \quad (4b)$$

$$E(\bar{e}_j \bar{R}'_M) = 0 \quad (4c)$$

The specifications of the market model, extensively tested by Fama et al. [1969] and Blume [1968], are well satisfied by the data for a large number of securities on the New York Stock Exchange. The only assumption violated to any extent is the normality assumption¹—the estimated residuals seem to conform to the infinite variance members of the stable class of distributions rather than the normal. There are those who would explain these discrepancies from normality by certain nonstationarities in the distributions (cf. Press [1967]), which still yield finite variances. However, Wise [1963] has shown that the least-squares estimate of β_j in (3) is unbiased (although not efficient) even if the variance does not exist, and simulations by Blattberg and Sargent [1968] and Fama and Babiak [1968] also indicate that the least-squares procedures are not totally inappropriate in the presence of infinite variance stable distributions. For simplicity, therefore, we shall ignore the nonnormality issues and continue to assume normally distributed random variables where relevant.² However, because of these problems caution should be exercised in making literal interpretations of any significance tests.

Substituting from (1) for $E(\bar{R}_j)$ in (3) we obtain

$$\bar{R}_j = \bar{R}_M\beta_j + \bar{e}_j \quad (5)$$

where \bar{R}_M is the ex post excess return on the market portfolio over the holding period of interest. If assets are priced in the market such that (1) holds over each short time interval (say a

month), then we can test the traditional form of the model by adding an intercept α_j to (5) and subscripting each of the variables by t to obtain

$$\bar{R}_{jt} = \alpha_j + \beta_j \bar{R}_{mt} + \bar{e}_{jt} \quad (6)$$

which, given the assumptions of the market model, is a regression equation. If the asset pricing and the market models given by (1), (3), and (4) are valid, then the intercept α_j in (6) will be zero. Thus a direct test of the model can be obtained by estimating (6) for a security over some time period and testing to see if α_j is significantly different from zero.^{3,4}

B. An Aggregation Problem. The test just proposed is simple but inefficient, since it makes use of information on only a single security whereas data is available on a large number of securities. We would like to design a test that allows us to aggregate the data on a large number of securities in an efficient manner. If the estimates of the α_j 's were independent with normally distributed residuals, we could proceed along the lines outlined by Jensen [1968] and compare the frequency distributions of the "t" values for the intercepts with the theoretical distribution. However, the fact that the e_{jt} are not cross-sectionally independent, (that is, $E(\bar{e}_{jt}\bar{e}_{it}) \neq 0$ for $i \neq j$, cf. King [1966]); makes this procedure much more difficult.

One procedure for solving this problem which makes appropriate allowance for the effects of the nonindependence of the residuals on the standard error of estimate of the average coefficient, $\bar{\alpha}$, is to run the tests on grouped data. That is, we form portfolios (or groups) of the individual securities and estimate (6) defining \bar{R}_{Kt} to be the average return on all securities in the K th portfolio for time t . Given this definition of \bar{R}_{Kt} , $\bar{\beta}_K$ will be the average risk of the securities in the portfolio and $\bar{\alpha}_K$ will be the average intercept. Moreover, since the residual variance from this regression will incorporate the effects of any cross-sectional interdependencies in the \bar{e}_{jt} among the securities in each portfolio, the standard error of the intercept $\bar{\alpha}_K$ will appropriately incorporate the nonindependence of \bar{e}_{jt} .

In addition, we wish to group our securities such that we obtain the maximum possible dispersion of the risk coefficients, β_K . If we were to construct our portfolios by using the ranked values of the β_j , we would introduce a selection bias into the procedure. This would occur because those securities

entering the first or high-beta portfolio would tend to have positive measurement errors in their β_j , and this would introduce positive bias in $\bar{\beta}_K$, the estimated portfolio risk coefficient. This positive bias in $\bar{\beta}_K$ will, of course, introduce a negative bias in our estimate of the intercept, $\bar{\alpha}_K$, for that portfolio. On the other hand, the opposite would occur for the lowest beta portfolio; its $\bar{\beta}_K$ would be negatively biased, and therefore our estimate of the intercept for this low-risk portfolio would be positively biased. Thus even if the traditional model were true, this selection bias would tend to cause the low-risk portfolios to exhibit positive intercepts and high-risk portfolios to exhibit negative intercepts. To avoid this bias, we need to use an instrumental variable that is highly correlated with β_j , but that can be observed independently of β_j . The instrumental variable we have chosen is simply an independent estimate of the β of the security obtained from past data. Thus when we estimate the group risk parameter on sample data not used in the ranking procedures, the measurement errors in these estimates will be independent of the errors in the coefficients used in the ranking and we therefore obtain unbiased estimates of $\bar{\beta}_K$ and $\bar{\alpha}_K$.

C. The Data. The data used in the tests to be described were taken from the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices Monthly Price Relative File, which contains monthly price, dividend, and adjusted price and dividend information for all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange in the period January, 1926-March, 1966. The monthly returns on the market portfolio R_{mt} were defined as the returns that would have been earned on a portfolio consisting of an equal investment in every security listed on the NYSE at the beginning of each month. The risk-free rate was defined as the 30-day rate on U.S. Treasury Bills for the period 1948-66. For the period 1926-47 the dealer commercial paper rate⁵ was used because Treasury Bill rates were not available.

D. The Grouping Procedure

1. *The ranking procedure.* Ideally we would like to assign the individual securities to the various groups on the basis of the ranked β_j (the true coefficients), but of course these are unobservable. In addition we cannot assign them on the basis of the β_j , since this would introduce the selection bias prob-

lems discussed previously. Therefore, we must use a ranking procedure that is independent of the measurement errors in the β_j . One way to do this is to use part of the data—in our case five years of previous monthly data—to obtain estimates β_{j0} of the risk measures for each security. The ranked values of the β_{j0} are used to assign membership to the groups. We then use data from a subsequent time period to estimate the group risk coefficients β_{Kt} which then contain measurement errors for the individual securities, which are independent of the errors in β_{j0} and hence independent of the original ranking and independent among the securities in each group.

2. *The stationarity assumptions.* The group assignment procedure just described will be satisfactory as long as the coefficients β_j are stationary through time. Evidence presented by Blume [1968] indicates this assumption is not totally inappropriate, but we have used a somewhat more complicated procedure for grouping the firms which allows for any non-stationarity in the coefficients through time.

We began by estimating the coefficient β_j (call this estimate β_{j0}) in (6) for the five-year period January, 1926–December, 1930 for all securities listed on the NYSE at the beginning of January 1931 for which at least 24 monthly returns were available. These securities were then ranked from high to low on the basis of the estimates β_{j0} , and were assigned to ten portfolios⁶—the 10% with the largest β_{j0} to the first portfolio, and so on. The return in each of the next 12 months for each of the ten portfolios was calculated. Then the entire process was repeated for all securities listed as of January, 1932 (for which at least 24 months of previous monthly returns were available) using the immediately preceding five years of data (if available) to estimate new coefficients to be used for ranking and assignment to the ten portfolios. The monthly portfolio returns were again calculated for the next year. This process was then repeated for January, 1933, January, 1934, and so on, through January, 1965.

In this way we obtained 35 years of monthly returns on ten portfolios from the 1,952 securities in the data file. Since at each stage we used all listed securities for which at least 24 months of data were available in the immediately preceding five-year period, the total number of securities used in the analysis varied through time ranging from 582 to 1,094, and thus the number of securities contained in each portfolio changed from year to year.⁷ The total number of securities

from which the portfolios were formed at the beginning of each year is given in Table 1. Each of the portfolios may be thought of as a mutual fund portfolio, which has an identity of its own, even though the stocks it contains change over time.

TABLE 1
Total Number of Securities Entering
All Portfolios, by Year

Year	Number of Securities	Year	Number of Securities
1931	582	1949	893
1932	673	1950	928
1933	688	1951	943
1934	683	1952	966
1935	676	1953	994
1936	674	1954	1000
1937	666	1955	1006
1938	690	1956	994
1939	718	1957	994
1940	743	1958	1000
1941	741	1959	995
1942	757	1960	1021
1943	772	1961	1014
1944	778	1962	1034
1945	773	1963	1056
1946	791	1964	1081
1947	812	1965	1094
1948	842		

E. The Empirical Results

1. *The entire period.* Given the 35 years of monthly returns on each of the ten portfolios calculated as explained previously, we then calculated the least-squares estimates of the parameters α_K and β_K in (6) for each of the ten portfolios ($K=1, \dots, 10$) using all 35 years of monthly data (420 observations). The results are summarized in Table 2. Portfolio number 1 contains the highest-risk securities and portfolio number 10 contains the lowest-risk securities. The estimated risk coefficients range from 1.561 for portfolio 1 to 0.499 for portfolio 10. The critical intercepts, the $\hat{\alpha}_K$, are given in the second line of Table 2 and the Student "t" values are given directly below them. The correlation between the portfolio returns and the market returns, $r(\hat{R}_K, \hat{R}_M)$, and the autocorrelation of the residuals, $r(\hat{\epsilon}_t, \hat{\epsilon}_{t-1})$, are also given in Table 2. The autocorrelation appears to be quite small and the correlation between the portfolio and market returns are, as expected, quite

The Capital Asset Pricing Model

TABLE 2
Summary of Statistics for Time Series Tests, Entire Period (January, 1931-December, 1965)
(Sample Size for Each Regression = 420)

Item*	Portfolio Number										R_M
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
β	1.3614	1.3938	1.2483	1.1625	1.0572	0.9229	0.8531	0.7534	0.6291	0.4092	1.0000
$\hat{\alpha} \cdot 10^2$	-0.0829	-0.1938	-0.0640	-0.0167	-0.0543	0.0593	0.0462	0.0812	0.1968	0.2012	
$t(\hat{\alpha})$	-0.4274	-1.0935	-0.7597	-0.2468	-0.8869	0.7678	0.7050	1.1837	2.3126	1.8684	
$r(R, R_M)$	0.9625	0.9875	0.9882	0.9914	0.9915	0.9833	0.9851	0.9703	0.9590	0.8581	
$r(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\alpha}_i)$	0.6549	-0.0638	0.0366	0.0073	-0.0708	-0.1248	0.1294	0.1041	0.0444	0.0992	
$\sigma(\hat{\alpha})$	0.0393	0.0197	0.0173	0.0137	0.0124	0.0152	0.0133	0.0139	0.0172	0.0218	
R	0.0213	0.0177	0.0171	0.0163	0.0145	0.0137	0.0126	0.0115	0.0109	0.0081	0.0142
σ	0.1445	0.1248	0.1126	0.1045	0.0950	0.0836	0.0772	0.0685	0.0586	0.0405	0.0891

* R = average monthly excess returns, σ = standard deviation of the monthly excess returns, r = correlation coefficient.

high. The standard deviation of the residuals $\sigma(\hat{\alpha}_k)$, the average monthly excess return R_k , and the standard deviation of the monthly excess return, σ , are also given for each of the portfolios.

Note first that the intercepts $\hat{\alpha}$ are consistently negative for the high-risk portfolios ($\beta > 1$) and consistently positive for the low-risk portfolios ($\beta < 1$). Thus the high-risk securities earned less on average over this 35-year period than the amount predicted by the traditional form of the asset pricing model. At the same time, the low-risk securities earned more than the amount predicted by the model.

The significance tests given by the "t" values in Table 2 are somewhat inconclusive, since only 3 of the 10 coefficients have "t" values greater than 1.85 and, as we pointed out earlier, we should use some caution in interpreting these "t" values since the normality assumptions can be questioned. We shall see, however, that due to the existence of some non-stationarity in the relations and to the lack of more complete aggregation, these results vastly understate the significance of the departures from the traditional model.

2. *The subperiods.* In order to test the stationarity of the empirical relations, we divided the 35-year interval into four equal subperiods each containing 105 months. Table 3 presents a summary of the regression statistics of (6) calculated using the data for each of these periods for each of the ten portfolios. Note that the data for β in Table 3 indicate that, except for portfolios 1 and 10, the risk coefficients β_k were fairly stationary.

Note, however, in the sections for α and $t(\hat{\alpha})$ that the critical intercepts $\hat{\alpha}_k$ were most definitely nonstationary throughout this period. The positive α 's for the high-risk portfolios in the first subperiod (January, 1931-September, 1939) indicate that these securities earned more than the amount predicted by the model, and the negative α 's for the low-risk portfolios indicate they earned less than what the model predicted. In the three succeeding subperiods (October, 1939-June, 1948; July, 1948-March, 1957, and April, 1957-December, 1965) this pattern was reversed and the departures from the model seemed to become progressively larger; so much larger that six of the ten coefficients in the last subperiod seem significant. (Note that all six coefficients are those with β 's most different from unity—a point we shall return to. Thus it seems unlikely that these changes were the result of chance; they most probably reflect changes in the α_k 's).

TABLE 3
Summary of Coefficients for the Subperiods

Sub- period ¹	Portfolio Number										M _t
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
β	1.5416	1.3993	1.2620	1.1813	1.0750	0.9197	0.8589	0.7510	0.6222	0.4843	1.0000
$\hat{\beta}$	1.7187	1.3196	1.1833	1.0661	0.9697	0.9254	0.8114	0.7675	0.6647	0.5636	1.0000
$\hat{\alpha} \cdot 10^7$	1.5427	1.3598	1.1822	1.1216	1.0474	0.9851	0.9180	0.7714	0.6347	0.4858	1.0000
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.4423	1.2764	1.1818	1.0653	0.9957	0.9248	0.8601	0.7800	0.6614	0.5826	1.0000
	0.2366	0.1902	0.1978	0.1314	-0.0650	-0.0501	-0.2190	-0.3786	-0.2128	-0.0710	
	-0.2197	-0.1300	-0.1224	0.0653	-0.0865	0.0914	0.1306	0.0769	0.2685	0.1478	
	-0.4614	-0.3994	-0.1189	0.0052	-0.0070	-0.1256	0.2428	0.3032	0.2035	0.2035	
	-0.4475	-0.2536	-0.2329	-0.0654	0.0840	0.1356	0.1218	0.3257	0.3328	0.3685	
	1.3881	0.6121	1.4037	0.6484	-0.3687	-0.1892	-1.0341	-1.7601	-0.7852	-0.1978	
	-0.4266	-0.7605	-0.8719	0.5019	-0.6288	0.8988	1.1377	0.8178	1.7853	0.8377	
	-2.9030	-3.6760	-1.5160	0.0742	0.0029	-0.1010	1.9261	3.3768	3.2939	1.5879	
	-3.8761	-2.4603	-2.7886	-0.7722	1.1016	1.7937	1.6769	3.8772	3.0551	3.2439	
	0.0412	0.0326	0.0317	0.0272	0.0230	0.0197	0.0166	0.0127	0.0116	0.0099	0.9220
	0.0253	0.0183	0.0165	0.0168	0.0136	0.0147	0.0134	0.0122	0.0126	0.0098	0.8149
	0.0196	0.0112	0.0120	0.0126	0.0117	0.0109	0.0115	0.0110	0.0103	0.0075	0.8112
	0.0082	0.0082	0.0081	0.0087	0.0096	0.0085	0.0088	0.0101	0.0092	0.0092	0.0088
	0.2504	0.2243	0.2023	0.1886	0.1715	0.1484	0.1377	0.1211	0.1024	0.0850	0.1587
	0.1187	0.0841	0.0758	0.0690	0.0618	0.0596	0.0519	0.0494	0.0441	0.0392	0.0624
	0.0881	0.0505	0.0436	0.0413	0.0385	0.0364	0.0340	0.0289	0.0253	0.0203	0.0363
	0.0577	0.0503	0.0463	0.0420	0.0391	0.0365	0.0340	0.0312	0.0277	0.0265	0.0366

¹R = average monthly excess returns, σ = standard deviation of monthly excess returns.
²Subperiod 1 = January, 1931-September, 1939; 2 = October, 1939-June 1948; 3 = July, 1948-March, 1957; 4 = April, 1957-December, 1965.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model

Note that the correlation coefficients between \bar{R}_{Kt} and \bar{R}_{Mt} given in Table 2 for each of the portfolios are all greater than 0.95 except for portfolio number 10. The lowest of the 40 coefficients in the subperiods (not shown) was 0.87, and all but two were greater than 0.90. As a result, the standard deviation of the residuals from each regression is quite small and hence so is the standard error of estimate of α , and this provides the main advantage of grouping in these tests.

III. Cross-sectional Tests of the Model

A. Tests of the Two-Factor Model. Although the time series tests discussed in Section II provide a test of the traditional form of the asset pricing model, they cannot be used to test the two-factor model directly. The cross-sectional tests, however, do furnish an opportunity to test the linearity of the relation between returns and risk implied by (2) or (2') without making any explicit specification of the intercept. Recall that the traditional form of the model implies $\gamma_0 = 0$ and $\gamma_1 = R_M$. The two factor model merely requires the linearity of (2) to hold for any specific cross section and allows the intercept to be nonzero. At this level of specification we shall not specify the size or even the sign of γ_0 . We shall be able to make some statements on this point after a closer examination of the theory. However, we shall first examine the empirical evidence to motivate that discussion.

B. Measurement Errors and Bias in Cross-sectional Tests. We consider here the problems caused in cross-sectional tests of the model by measurement errors in the estimation of the security risk measures.⁸ Let β_j represent the true (and unobservable) systematic risk of firm j and $\hat{\beta}_j = \beta_j + \tilde{\epsilon}_j$ be the measured value of the systematic risk of firm j where we assume that $\tilde{\epsilon}_j$, the measurement error, is normally distributed and for all j satisfies

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_j) = 0 \tag{7a}$$

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_i \tilde{\epsilon}_j) = 0 \tag{7b}$$

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_i \tilde{\epsilon}_i) = \begin{cases} 0 & i \neq j \\ \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}) & i = j \end{cases} \tag{7c}$$

The traditional form of the asset pricing model and the assumptions of the market model imply that the mean excess

return on a security

$$\bar{R}_j = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \bar{R}_{jt}}{T} \quad (8)$$

observed over T periods can be written as

$$\bar{R}_j = E(\bar{R}_j \bar{R}_M) + \bar{\epsilon}_j = \bar{R}_M \beta_j + \bar{\epsilon}_j \quad (9)$$

where $\bar{R}_M = \sum_{t=1}^T \bar{R}_{Mt} / T$, $\bar{\epsilon}_j = \sum_{t=1}^T \epsilon_{jt} / T$. Now an obvious test of the traditional form of the asset pricing model is to fit

$$\bar{R}_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \hat{\beta}_j + \bar{\epsilon}_j^* \quad (10)$$

to a cross section of firms (where $\hat{\beta}_j$ is the estimated risk coefficient for each firm and $\bar{\epsilon}_j^* = \bar{\epsilon}_j - \gamma_1 \hat{\beta}_j$) and test to see if, as implied by the theory

$$\gamma_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_1 = \bar{R}_M$$

There are two major difficulties with this procedure; the first involves bias due to the measurement errors in $\hat{\beta}_j$, and the second involves the apparent inadequacy of (9) as a specification of the process generating the data. The two-factor asset pricing model given by (2') implies that γ_0 and γ_1 are random coefficients—that is, in addition to the theoretical values above, they involve a variable that is random through time. If the two-factor model is the true model, the usual significance tests on γ_0 and γ_1 are misleading, since the data from a given cross section cannot provide any evidence on the standard deviation of $\hat{\beta}_j$ and hence results in a serious underestimate of the sampling error of $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$. Ignoring this second difficulty for the moment, we shall first consider the measurement error problems and the cross-sectional empirical evidence. The random coefficients issue and appropriate significance tests in the context of the two-factor model are discussed in more detail in Section IV.

As long as the $\hat{\beta}_j$ contain the measurement errors $\bar{\epsilon}_j$, the least-squares estimates $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$ in (10) will be subject to the well-known errors in variables bias and will be inconsistent, (cf. Johnston [1963, Chap. VI]). That is, assuming that $\bar{\epsilon}_j$ and $\bar{\epsilon}_j^*$ are independent and are independent of the β_j in the cross-sectional sample,

$$\text{plim } \hat{\gamma}_1 = \frac{\gamma_1}{1 + \sigma^2(\bar{\epsilon})/S^2(\beta_j)} \quad (11)$$

where $S^2(\beta_j)$ is the cross-sectional sample variance of the true risk parameters β_j . Even for large samples, then, as long as the variance of the errors in the risk measure $\sigma^2(\bar{\epsilon})$ is positive, the estimated coefficient $\hat{\gamma}_1$ will be biased toward zero and $\hat{\gamma}_0$ will therefore be biased away from zero. Hence tests of the significance of the differences $\hat{\gamma}_0 - 0$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1 - \bar{R}_M$ will be misleading.

C. The Grouping Solution to the Measurement Error Problem. We show in the Appendix that by appropriate grouping of the data to be used in estimating (10) one can substantially reduce the bias introduced through the existence of measurement errors in the $\hat{\beta}_j$. In essence the procedure amounts to systematically ordering the firms into groups (in fact by the same procedure that formed the ten portfolios used in the time series tests in Section II) and then calculating the risk measures $\hat{\beta}$ for each portfolio using the time series of portfolio returns. This procedure can greatly reduce the sampling error in the estimated risk measures; indeed, for large samples and independent errors, the sampling error is virtually eliminated. We then estimate the cross-sectional parameters of (10) using the portfolio mean returns over the relevant holding period and the risk coefficients obtained from estimation of (6) from the time series of portfolio returns. If appropriate grouping procedures are employed, this procedure will yield consistent estimates of the parameters γ_0 and γ_1 and thus will yield virtually unbiased estimates for samples in which the number of securities entering each group is large. Thus, by applying the cross-sectional test to our ten portfolios rather than to the underlying individual securities, we can virtually eliminate the measurement error problem.⁹

D. The Cross-sectional Empirical Results. Given the 35 years of monthly returns on each of the ten portfolios calculated as explained in Section II, we then estimated $\hat{\beta}_K$ and \bar{R}_K ($K = 1, 2, \dots, 10$) for each portfolio, using all 35 years of monthly data. These estimates (see Table 2) were then used in estimating the cross-sectional relation given by (10) for various holding periods.

Figure 1 is a plot of \bar{R}_K versus $\hat{\beta}_K$ for the 35-year holding period January, 1931–December, 1965. The symbol \times denotes the average monthly excess return and risk of each of the ten portfolios. The symbol \square denotes the average excess

1931 -- 1965




FIGURE 1 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 35-year period 1931-65 for each of ten portfolios (denoted by x) and the market portfolio (denoted by □).

return and risk of the market portfolio (which by the definition of β is equal to unity). The line represents the least-squares estimate of the relation between \bar{R}_k and $\hat{\beta}_k$. The "intercept" and "slope" (with their respective standard errors given in parentheses) in the upper portion of the figure are the coefficients γ_0 and γ_1 of (10).

The traditional form of the asset pricing model implies that the intercept γ_0 in (10) should be equal to zero and the slope γ_1 should be equal to \bar{R}_M , the mean excess return on the market portfolio. Over this 35-year period, the average monthly excess return on the market portfolio \bar{R}_M was 0.0142, and the theoretical values of the intercept and slope in Figure 1 are

$$\gamma_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_1 = 0.0142$$

The "t" values

$$t(\hat{\gamma}_0) = \frac{\hat{\gamma}_0}{s(\hat{\gamma}_0)} = \frac{0.00359}{0.00055} = 6.52$$

$$t(\hat{\gamma}_1) = \frac{\gamma_1 - \hat{\gamma}_1}{s(\hat{\gamma}_1)} = \frac{0.0142 - 0.0108}{0.00052} = 6.53$$

seem to indicate the observed relation is significantly different from the theoretical one. However, as we shall see, because (9) is a misspecification of the process generating the data, these tests vastly overstate the significance of the results.

We also divided the 35-year interval into four equal sub-periods, and Figures 2 through 5 present the plots of the \bar{R}_k versus the $\hat{\beta}_k$ for each of these intervals. In order to obtain better estimates of the risk coefficients for each of the sub-periods, we used the coefficients previously estimated over the entire 35-year period.¹⁰ The graphs indicate that the relation between return and risk is linear but that the slope is related in a nonstationary way to the theoretical slope for each period. Note that the traditional model implies that the theoretical relationship (not drawn) always passes through the two points given by the origin (0, 0) and the average market excess returns represented by □ in each figure. In the first sub-period (see Fig. 2) the empirical slope is steeper than the theoretical slope and then becomes successively flatter in each of the following three periods. In the last subperiod (see Fig. 5) the slope $\hat{\gamma}_1$ even has the "wrong" sign.




FIGURE 2 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period January, 1931 - September, 1939. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 3 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period October, 1939 - June, 1948. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 4 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period July, 1948 - March, 1957. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 5 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period April, 1957 - December, 1965. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 2 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period January, 1931--September, 1939. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 3 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period October, 1939--June, 1948. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 4 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period July, 1948--March, 1957. Symbols as in Figure 1.




FIGURE 5 Average excess monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period April, 1957--December, 1965. Symbols as in Figure 1.

TABLE 4
 Summary of Cross-sectional Regression Coefficients and Their
t Values

	Time Period				
	Total Period 1/31-12/65	Subperiods			
		1/31-9/39	10/39-6/48	7/48-3/57	4/57-12/65
$\hat{\gamma}_0$	0.00359	-0.00801	0.00439	0.00777	0.01020
$\hat{\gamma}_1$	0.0108	0.0304	0.0107	0.0033	-0.0012
$\gamma_1 = \bar{R}_M$	0.0142	0.0220	0.0149	0.0112	0.0088
$t(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	6.52	-4.45	3.20	7.40	18.89
$t(\gamma_1 - \hat{\gamma}_1)$	6.53	-4.91	3.23	7.98	19.61

The coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_0$, $\hat{\gamma}_1$, γ_1 and the "*t*" values of $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\gamma_1 - \hat{\gamma}_1$ are summarized in Table 4 for the entire period and for each of the four subperiods. The smallest "*t*" value given there is 3.20, and all seem to be "significantly" different from their theoretical values. However, as we have already maintained, these "*t*" values are somewhat misleading because the estimated coefficients fluctuate far more in the subperiods than the estimated sampling errors indicate. This evidence suggests that the model given by (9) is misspecified. We shall now attempt to deal with this specification problem and to furnish an alternative formulation of the model.

IV. A Two-Factor Model

A. Form of the Model. As mentioned in the introduction, Black [1970] has shown under assumptions identical to that of the asset pricing model that, if riskless borrowing opportunities do not exist, the expected return on any asset *j* will be given by

$$E(\bar{r}_j) = E(\bar{r}_z)(1 - \beta_j) + E(\bar{r}_M)\beta_j \quad (12)$$

where \bar{r}_z represents the return on a "zero beta" portfolio—a portfolio whose covariance with the returns on the market portfolio \bar{r}_M is zero.¹¹

Close examination of the empirical evidence from both the cross-sectional and the time series tests indicates that the results are consistent with a model that expresses the return on a security as a linear function of the market factor \bar{r}_M , (with a coefficient of β_j) and a second factor \bar{r}_z , (with a coefficient of

$1 - \beta_j$). The function is

$$\bar{r}_j = \bar{r}_z(1 - \beta_j) + \bar{r}_M\beta_j + \bar{w}_j \quad (13)$$

Because the coefficient of the second factor is a function of the security's β , we call this factor the beta factor. For a given holding period *T*, the average value of \bar{r}_z will determine the relation between $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ for different securities or portfolios. If the data are being generated by the process given by (13) and if we estimate the single variable time series regression given by (6), then the intercept $\hat{\alpha}$ in that regression will be

$$\hat{\alpha} = (\bar{r}_z - \bar{r}_f)(1 - \hat{\beta}) = \bar{R}_z(1 - \hat{\beta}) \quad (14)$$

where $\bar{r}_z = \sum_{t=1}^T \bar{r}_{zt}/T$ is the mean return on the beta factor over the period, \bar{r}_f is the mean risk-free rate over the period, and \bar{R}_z is the difference between the two. Thus if \bar{R}_z is positive, high-beta securities will tend to have negative $\hat{\alpha}$'s, and low-beta securities will tend to have positive $\hat{\alpha}$'s. If \bar{R}_z is negative, high-beta securities will tend to have positive $\hat{\alpha}$'s, and low-beta securities will tend to have negative $\hat{\alpha}$'s.

In addition, if we estimate the cross-sectional regression given by (10), the expanded two-factor model implies that the true values of the parameters γ_0 and γ_1 will not be equal to zero and \bar{R}_M but instead will be given by

$$\gamma_0 = \bar{R}_z \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_1 = \bar{R}_M - \bar{R}_z$$

Hence if \bar{R}_z is positive, γ_0 will be positive and γ_1 will be less than \bar{R}_M . If \bar{R}_z is negative, γ_0 will be negative and γ_1 will be greater than \bar{R}_M .

Thus we can interpret Table 3 and Figures 2 through 5 as indicating that \bar{R}_z was negative in the first subperiod and became positive and successively larger in each of the following subperiods.

Examining (12), we see that the traditional form of the capital asset pricing model, as expressed in (1), is consistent with the present two-factor model if

$$E(\bar{R}_z) = 0 \quad (15)$$

and (questions of statistical efficiency aside) any test for whether α_K for a portfolio is zero is equivalent to a test for whether $E(\bar{R}_z)$ is zero. The results in Table 3 suggest that $E(\bar{R}_z)$ is not stationary through time. For example, $\hat{\alpha}_K$ for the lowest risk portfolio (number 10) is negative in the first subperiod and positive in the last subperiod, with a "*t*" value of 8. Thus it is unlikely that the true values of α_K were the same in

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$\gamma_2 = \bar{R}_M$	0.0142	0.0220	0.0149	0.0112	0.0088
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The coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_0$, $\hat{\gamma}_1$, γ_2 and the "t" values of $\hat{\gamma}_0$ and $\gamma_1 - \hat{\gamma}_1$ are summarized in Table 4 for the entire period and for each of the four subperiods. The smallest "t" value given there is 3.20, and all seem to be "significantly" different from their theoretical values. However, as we have already maintained, these "t" values are somewhat misleading because the estimated coefficients fluctuate far more in the subperiods than the estimated sampling errors indicate. This evidence suggests that the model given by (9) is misspecified. We shall now attempt to deal with this specification problem and to furnish an alternative formulation of the model.

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where \bar{r}_2 represents the return on a "zero beta" portfolio—a portfolio whose covariance with the returns on the market portfolio \bar{r}_M is zero.¹¹

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$1 - \beta_j$). The function is

$$\bar{r}_j = \bar{r}_2(1 - \beta_j) + \bar{r}_M\beta_j + \bar{w}_j \quad (13)$$

Because the coefficient of the second factor is a function of the security's β , we call this factor the beta factor. For a given holding period T , the average value of \bar{r}_{2t} will determine the relation between $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ for different securities or portfolios. If the data are being generated by the process given by (13) and if we estimate the single variable time series regression given by (6), then the intercept $\hat{\alpha}$ in that regression will be

$$\hat{\alpha} = (\bar{r}_2 - \bar{r}_f)(1 - \hat{\beta}_j) = \bar{R}_2(1 - \hat{\beta}_j) \quad (14)$$

where $\bar{r}_2 = \sum_{t=1}^T \bar{r}_{2t}/T$ is the mean return on the beta factor over the period, \bar{r}_f is the mean risk-free rate over the period, and \bar{R}_2 is the difference between the two. Thus if \bar{R}_2 is positive, high-beta securities will tend to have negative $\hat{\alpha}$'s, and low-beta securities will tend to have positive $\hat{\alpha}$'s. If \bar{R}_2 is negative, high-beta securities will tend to have positive $\hat{\alpha}$'s, and low-beta securities will tend to have negative $\hat{\alpha}$'s.

In addition, if we estimate the cross-sectional regression given by (10), the expanded two-factor model implies that the true values of the parameters γ_0 and γ_1 will not be equal to zero and \bar{R}_M but instead will be given by

$$\gamma_0 = \bar{R}_2 \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_1 = \bar{R}_M - \bar{R}_2$$

Hence if \bar{R}_2 is positive, γ_0 will be positive and γ_1 will be less than \bar{R}_M . If \bar{R}_2 is negative, γ_0 will be negative and γ_1 will be greater than \bar{R}_M .

Thus we can interpret Table 3 and Figures 2 through 5 as indicating that \bar{R}_2 was negative in the first subperiod and became positive and successively larger in each of the following subperiods.

Examining (12), we see that the traditional form of the capital asset pricing model, as expressed in (1), is consistent with the present two-factor model if

$$E(\bar{R}_2) = 0 \quad (15)$$

and (questions of statistical efficiency aside) any test for whether α_k for a portfolio is zero is equivalent to a test for whether $E(\bar{R}_2)$ is zero. The results in Table 3 suggest that $E(\bar{R}_2)$ is not stationary through time. For example, $\hat{\alpha}_k$ for the lowest risk portfolio (number 10) is negative in the first subperiod and positive in the last subperiod, with a "t" value of 8. Thus it is unlikely that the true values of α_k were the same in

the two subperiods (each of which contains 105 observations) and thus unlikely that the true values of $E(R_2)$ were the same in the two subperiods, and we shall derive formal tests of this proposition below.

The existence of a factor \bar{R}_2 with a weight proportional to $1 - \beta_j$ in most securities is also suggested by the unreasonably high "t" values¹² obtained in the cross-sectional regressions, as given in Table 4. Since γ_0 and γ_1 involve \bar{R}_2 , which is a random variable from cross section to cross section, and since no single cross-sectional run can provide any information whatsoever on the variability of \bar{R}_2 , this element is totally ignored in the usual calculation of the standard errors of γ_0 and γ_1 . It is not surprising, therefore, that each individual cross-sectional result seems so highly significant but so totally different from any other cross-sectional relationship. Of course the presence of infinite-variance stable distributions will also contribute to this type of phenomenon.

In addition, in an attempt to determine whether the linearity observed in Figures 1 through 5 was in some way due to the averaging involved in the long periods presented there, we replicated those plots for our ten portfolios for 17 separate two-year periods from 1932 to 1965. These results, which also exhibit a remarkable linearity, are presented in Figures 6a and 6b. Since the evidence seems to indicate that the all-risky asset model describes the data better than the traditional model, and since the definition of our "riskless" interest rate was somewhat arbitrary in any case, these plots were derived from calculations on the raw return data with no reference whatsoever to the "risk-free" rate defined earlier (including the recalculation of the ten portfolios and the estimation of the β_j). Figures 7 through 11 contain a replication of Figures 1 through 5 calculated on the same basis. These results indicate that the basic findings summarized previously cannot be attributed to misspecification of the riskless rate.

In summary, then, the empirical results suggest that the returns on different securities can be written as a linear function of two factors as given in (13), that the expected excess return on the beta factor \bar{R}_2 has in general been positive, and that the expected return on the beta factor has been higher in more recent subperiods than in earlier subperiods.

B. Explicit Estimation of the Beta Factor and a Crucial Test of the Model. Since the traditional form of the asset




FIGURE 6 Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for 17 non-overlapping two-year periods from 1932 to 1965.

FIGURE 6 (continued)





FIGURE 6 (continued)

1931 -- 1965

FIGURE 7 Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 35-year period 1931-65 for the ten portfolios and the market portfolio.





FIGURE 8 Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period January, 1931-September, 1939.




FIGURE 9 Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period October, 1939-June, 1948.




FIGURE 11. Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period April, 1957 - December, 1965.




FIGURE 10. Average monthly returns versus systematic risk for the 105-month period July, 1948 - March, 1957.

pricing model is consistent with the existence of the beta factor as long as the excess returns on the beta factor have a zero mean,¹³ our purpose here is to provide a procedure for explicit estimation of the time series of the factor. Given such a time series, we can then make explicit estimates of the significance of its mean excess return rather than depending mainly on an examination of the $\hat{\alpha}_j$ for high- and low-beta securities. Solving (13) for \hat{r}_{zt} plus the error term, we have an estimate \hat{r}_{zjt} , of \hat{r}_{zt}

$$\hat{r}_{zjt} = \frac{1}{(1-\beta_j)} [r_{jt} - \beta_j \bar{r}_{zt}] = \hat{r}_{zt} + \hat{u}_{jt} \quad (16)$$

where $\hat{u}_{jt} = \hat{w}_{jt}/(1-\beta_j)$. We subscript \hat{r}_{zjt} by j to denote that this is an estimate of \hat{r}_{zt} obtained from the j th asset or portfolio. Now, since we can obtain as many separate estimates of \hat{r}_{zt} as we have securities or portfolios, we can formulate a combined estimate

$$\hat{r}_{zt}^c = \sum_j h_j \hat{r}_{zjt} \quad (17)$$

which is a linear combination of the \hat{r}_{zjt} , to provide a much more efficient estimate of \hat{r}_{zt} . The problem is to find that linear combination of the \hat{r}_{zjt} which minimizes the error variance in the estimate of \hat{r}_{zt} . That is, we want to

$$\min_j E(r_{zt}^c - \hat{r}_{zt})^2 = \min_j E\left(\sum_j h_j \hat{r}_{zjt} - \hat{r}_{zt}\right)^2$$

subject to $\sum_j h_j = 1$, since we want an unbiased estimate. From the Lagrangian we obtain the first-order conditions

$$h_j \sigma^2(\hat{u}_j) - \lambda = 0 \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, N \quad (18)$$

where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier and N is the total number of securities or nonoverlapping portfolios. These conditions imply that

$$\frac{h_j}{h_i} = \frac{\sigma^2(\hat{u}_i)}{\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)} \quad \text{for all } i \text{ and } j \quad (19)$$

which implies that the optimal weights h_j are proportional to $1/\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)$. That is,

$$h_j = \frac{K}{\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)} \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, N \quad (20)$$

where $K = 1/\sum_j [1/\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)]$ is a normalizing constant. But from

the definition of \bar{u}_j we know that $\sigma^2(\bar{u}_j) = \sigma^2(\bar{w}_j)/(1 - \beta_j)^2$, so

$$h_j = \frac{K(1 - \beta_j)^2}{\sigma^2(\bar{w}_j)} \quad (21)$$

Equation (21) makes sense, for we are then weighting the estimates in proportion to $(1 - \beta_j)^2$ and inversely proportional to $\sigma^2(\bar{w}_j)$. However, since we cannot observe $\sigma^2(\bar{w}_j)$ directly,¹⁴ we are forced, for lack of explicit estimates, to assume that the $\sigma^2(\bar{w}_j)$ are all identical and to use as our weights

$$h_j = K'(1 - \beta_j)^2 \quad (22)$$

where $K' = 1/\sum_j (1 - \beta_j)^2$.

Equations (17) and (22) thus provide an unbiased and (approximately) efficient procedure for estimating \bar{r}_{Zt} utilizing all available information. However, there is a problem of bias involved in actually applying this procedure to the security data. The coefficient β_j is of course unobservable, and in general if we use our estimates $\hat{\beta}_j$ in the weighting procedure we will introduce bias into our estimate of \bar{r}_{Zt} . To understand this, recall that $\hat{\beta}_j = \beta_j + \epsilon_j$, substitute this into (13) with the necessary additions and subtractions, and solve for the estimate

$$\hat{r}_{Zt} = \frac{\bar{r}_{jt} - \hat{\beta}_j \bar{r}_{Mt}}{(1 - \hat{\beta}_j)} = \frac{\bar{r}_{jt}(1 - \beta_j) + \bar{w}_j - \epsilon_j \bar{r}_{Mt}}{(1 - \hat{\beta}_j)}$$

Substituting this into (17), using (22), rearranging terms, and taking the probability limit, we have

$$p\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{r}_{Zt} = \frac{C_t[S^2(\beta) + (1 - \bar{\beta})^2] + \sigma^2(\bar{\epsilon})\bar{r}_{Mt}}{[S^2(\beta) + (1 - \bar{\beta})^2] + \sigma^2(\bar{\epsilon})} \quad (23)$$

where $S^2(\beta)$ is the cross-sectional variance of the β_j and $\bar{\beta}$ is the mean. However, the average standard deviation of the measurement error $\sigma(\bar{\epsilon}_j)$ for our portfolios is only 0.0101 (implying an average variance on the order of 0.0001), and since $S^2(\beta)$ for our ten portfolios is 0.1144 and $\bar{\beta} = 1.007$, this bias will be negligible and we shall ignore it.

To begin, let us apply the foregoing procedures to the excess return data to obtain an estimate of $\bar{R}_{Zt} = \bar{r}_{Zt} - r_{ft}$, the excess return on the beta factor. Substituting \bar{R}_{jt} for \bar{r}_{jt} and \bar{R}_{Mt} for \bar{r}_{Mt} in (16), the \bar{R}_{Zt} were estimated for each of our ten

portfolios. These were then averaged to obtain the estimate

$$\bar{R}_{Zt} = \sum_j h_j \bar{R}_{Zjt} = K' \sum_j (1 - \beta_j)^2 \left[\frac{\bar{R}_{jt} - \hat{\beta}_j \bar{R}_{Mt}}{1 - \hat{\beta}_j} \right]$$

for each month t . The average of the \bar{R}_{Zt} for the entire period and for each of the four subperiods are given in Table 5, along with their t values. Table 5 also presents the serial correlation

TABLE 5
Estimated Mean Values and Serial Correlation of the Excess Returns on the Beta Factor over the Entire Periods and the Four Subperiods*

Period	\bar{R}_Z^e	$\sigma(R_Z^e)$	$t(\bar{R}_Z^e)$	$r(R_Z^e, R_{Z,t-1}^e)$	$t(r)$
1/31-12/65	0.00338	0.0426	1.62	0.113	2.33
1/31-9/39	-0.00849	0.0641	-1.35	0.194	1.49
10/39-6/48	0.00420	0.0455	0.946	0.208	2.19
7/48-3/57	0.00782	0.0199	4.03	-0.181	-1.87
4/57-12/65	0.00997	0.0228	4.49	0.414	4.60

*The values of $t(\bar{R}_Z^e)$ were calculated under the assumption of normal distributions.

coefficients $r(R_{Zt}^e, R_{Z,t-1}^e)$.¹⁵ Note that the mean value \bar{R}_Z^e of the beta factor over the whole period has a "t" value of only 1.64. However, as hypothesized earlier, it was negative in the first subperiod and positive and successively larger in each of the following subperiods. Moreover, in the last two subperiods its "t" values were 4.03 and 4.49, respectively. These results seem to us to be strong evidence favoring rejection of the traditional form of the asset pricing model which says that \bar{R}_Z^e should be insignificantly different from zero.

In order to be sure that the significance levels reported in Table 5 are not spurious and due only to the misapplication of normal distribution theory to a situation in which the variables may actually be distributed according to the infinite variance members of the stable class of distributions. We have performed the significance tests using the stable distribution theory outlined by Fama and Roll [1968]. Table 6 presents the standardized variates (i.e., the "t" values) for \bar{R}_Z^e for each of the sample periods given in Table 5 along with the "t" values at the 5% level of significance (two-tail) under

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TABLE 6

Normalized Variate [i.e., t Value $t(\bar{R}_Z^2, \alpha) = \bar{R}_Z^2 / \sigma(\bar{R}_Z^2, \alpha)$] of the Excess Return on the Beta Factor Under the Assumption of Infinite Variance Symmetric Stable Distributions

Period	α					
	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
1/31-12/65	1.33	1.71	2.14	2.61	3.11*	3.63*
1/31-9/39	-1.11	-1.44	-1.71	-2.00	-2.29	-2.58
10/39-6/48	0.82	1.00	1.18	1.38	1.58	1.79
7/48-3/57	2.60	3.16	3.75*	4.37*	5.09*	5.66*
4/57-12/65	3.05	3.70	4.40*	5.11*	5.86*	6.63*
t Value at the 5% level of significance (two-tail)	4.49	3.90	3.48	3.16	2.93	2.77

Note: α = characteristic exponent, $\sigma(\bar{R}_Z^2, \alpha)$ = dispersion parameter of the distribution.

[Cf. Fama and Roll (1968).]

alternative assumptions regarding the value of α , the characteristic exponent of the distribution. The smaller is α , the higher are the extreme tails of the probability distribution; $\alpha = 2$ corresponds to the normal distribution and $\alpha = 1$ to the Cauchy distribution. Evidence presented by Fama [1965] seems to indicate that α is probably in the range 1.7 to 1.9 for common stocks. We have not attempted to obtain explicit estimates of α for our data, since currently known estimation procedures are quite imprecise and require extremely large samples (up to 2,000 observations). Therefore we have simply presented the "t" values calculated according to the procedures suggested by Fama and Roll [1968] for six values of α ranging from 1.5 to 2.0. The coefficients in Table 6 that are significant at the 5% level are noted with an asterisk. Clearly, if α is greater than 1.7, the results confirm the impression gained from the normal tests given in Table 5.

Note that the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 were obtained from the excess return data; therefore, although the figures are of interest for testing the traditional form of the model, they do not give the appropriate level of the mean value of \bar{r}_Z . The estimates \bar{r}_Z^2 and \bar{r}_M obtained from the total return data used in Figures 6 through 11 appear in Table 7, along with $\sigma(\bar{r}_Z^2)$ and $\sigma(\bar{r}_M)$ and the estimated values of γ_0 and γ_1 for the cross-sectional regressions [given by (10)] for each of the var-

TABLE 7
Mean and Standard Deviation of Returns on the Zero Beta and Market Portfolios and the Cross-sectional Regression Coefficients [from (10)] for Various Sample Periods

Time Period	\bar{r}_Z^2	\bar{r}_M	$\bar{r}_M - \bar{r}_Z^2$	$\sigma(\bar{r}_Z^2)$	$\sigma(\bar{r}_M)$	γ_0	γ_1
1931-1965	0.004980	0.015860	0.010880	0.042584	0.089054	0.005190	0.010807
1/31-9/39	-0.007393	0.023677	0.030459	0.063927	0.158707	-0.006913	0.030429
10/39-6/48	0.004833	0.015487	0.010665	0.045580	0.062414	0.005021	0.010652
7/48-3/57	0.009591	0.012915	0.003324	0.019895	0.036204	0.009537	0.003327
4/57-12/65	0.012889	0.011723	-0.001167	0.022631	0.038470	0.013115	-0.001181
1931	-0.047243	-0.037573	0.009669	0.040827	0.152924	-0.045492	0.009557
1932-1933	-0.009180	0.065574	0.074754	0.059741	0.245281	-0.008286	0.074696
1934-1935	0.015549	0.031250	0.015701	0.048561	0.097739	0.015542	0.015702
1936-1937	-0.007749	-0.064538	0.005211	0.032589	0.084786	-0.007336	0.003194
1938-1939	0.001919	0.024436	0.022517	0.100490	0.147129	0.001514	0.022543
1940-1941	-0.001308	-0.003802	-0.002596	0.043461	0.073454	-0.000646	-0.002538
1942-1943	-0.008988	0.035782	0.036780	0.066532	0.066451	-0.001069	0.036784
1944-1945	0.004511	0.036117	0.031607	0.032582	0.043569	0.004451	0.031517
1946-1947	0.010153	-0.002357	-0.013010	0.033074	0.056139	0.010946	-0.013061
1948-1949	0.009721	0.008529	-0.001192	0.019590	0.051471	0.009709	-0.001191
1950-1951	0.007163	0.020253	0.013090	0.028656	0.039764	0.007215	0.013087
1952-1953	0.012258	0.003054	-0.009204	0.014559	0.026896	0.012050	-0.009191
1954-1955	0.007432	0.027266	0.019834	0.01232	0.030804	0.007392	0.019836
1956-1957	0.010463	-0.003097	-0.013569	0.017638	0.032340	0.010535	-0.013565
1958-1959	0.014592	0.025060	0.010478	0.019982	0.029261	0.014205	0.010478
1960-1961	0.026825	0.010867	-0.015958	0.023178	0.036605	0.026753	-0.015953
1962-1963	0.004300	0.002728	-0.001571	0.022631	0.052144	0.005094	-0.001620
1964-1965	0.005032	0.017711	0.012738	0.014433	0.026761	0.005519	0.012707

*Cf. eq. (10).

ious sample periods portrayed in Figures 6 through 11. (Recall that the two-factor model implies $\gamma_0 = \bar{r}_z$ and $\gamma_1 = \bar{r}_M - \bar{r}_z$.) One additional item of interest in judging the importance of the beta factor in the determination of security returns is its standard deviation relative to that of the market returns. As Table 7 reveals, $\sigma(\bar{r}_z^2)$ is roughly 50% as large as $\sigma(\bar{r}_M)$. Comparison of \bar{r}_z^2 and \bar{r}_M in Table 7 for the four 105-month subperiods indicates that the mean returns on the beta factor were approximately equal to the average market returns in the last two periods covering the interval July, 1948-December, 1965. Apparently, then, the relative magnitudes of \bar{r}_z^2 and \bar{r}_M indicate that the beta factor is economically as well as statistically significant.

V. Conclusion

The traditional form of the capital asset pricing model states that the expected excess return on a security is equal to its level of systematic risk, β , times the expected excess return on the market portfolio. That is, in capital market equilibrium, prices of assets adjust such that

$$E(\bar{R}_i) = \gamma_1 \beta_i \tag{24}$$

where $\gamma_1 = E(\bar{R}_M)$, the expected excess return on the market portfolio.

An alternative hypothesis of the pricing of capital assets arises from the relaxation of one of the assumptions of the traditional form of the capital asset pricing model. Relaxation of the assumption that riskless borrowing and lending opportunities are available leads to the formulation of the two-factor model. In equilibrium, the expected returns $E(\bar{r}_i)$ on an asset will be given by

$$E(\bar{r}_i) = E(\bar{r}_z) + [E(\bar{r}_M) - E(\bar{r}_z)] \beta_i \tag{25}$$

where $E(\bar{r}_z)$ is the expected return on a portfolio that has a zero covariance (and thus $\beta_z = 0$) with the return on the market portfolio \bar{r}_M . In the context of this model, the return on 30-day Treasury Bills (which we have used as a proxy for a "riskless" rate) simply represents the return on a particular asset in the system. Thus, subtracting r_z from both sides of (25), we can rewrite (25) in terms of "excess" returns as

$$E(\bar{R}_i) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_i \tag{26}$$

where $\gamma_0 = E(\bar{R}_z)$ and $\gamma_1 = E(\bar{R}_M) - E(\bar{R}_z)$.

The traditional form of the asset pricing model implies that $\gamma_0 = 0$ and $\gamma_1 = E(\bar{R}_M)$ and the two-factor model implies that $\gamma_0 = E(\bar{R}_z)$, which is not necessarily zero and that $\gamma_1 = E(\bar{R}_M) - E(\bar{R}_z)$. In addition, several other models arise from relaxing some of the assumptions of the traditional asset pricing model which imply $\gamma_0 \neq 0$ and $\gamma_1 \neq E(\bar{R}_M)$. These models involve explicit consideration of the problems of measuring R_M , the existence of nonmarketable assets, and the existence of differential taxes on capital gains and dividends, and we shall briefly outline them. Our main emphasis has been to test the strict traditional form of the asset pricing model; that is, is $\gamma_0 \neq 0$? We have made no attempt to provide direct tests of these other alternative hypotheses.

To test the traditional model, we used all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange at any time in the interval between 1926 and 1966. The problem we faced was to obtain efficient estimates of the mean of the beta factor and its variance. It would be possible to test the alternative hypotheses by selecting one security at random and estimating its beta from the time series and ascertaining whether its mean return was significantly different from that predicted by the traditional form of the capital asset pricing model. However, this would be a very inefficient test procedure.

To gain efficiency, we grouped the securities into ten portfolios in such a way that the portfolios had a large spread in their β 's. However, we knew that grouping the securities on the basis of their estimated β 's would not give unbiased estimates of the portfolio "Beta," since the β 's used to select the portfolios would contain measurement error. Such a procedure would introduce a selection bias into the tests. To eliminate this bias we used an instrumental variable, the previous period's estimated beta, to select a security's portfolio grouping for the next year. Using these procedures, we constructed ten portfolios whose estimated β 's were unbiased estimates of the portfolio "Beta." We found that much of the sampling variability of the β 's estimated for individual securities was eliminated by using the portfolio groupings. The β 's of the portfolios constructed in this manner ranged from 0.49 to 1.5, and the estimates of the portfolio β 's for the subperiods exhibited considerable stationarity.

The time series regressions of the portfolio excess returns on the market portfolio excess returns indicated that high-beta securities had significantly negative intercepts and low-beta securities had significantly positive intercepts, contrary

to the predictions of the traditional form of the model. There was also considerable evidence that this effect became stronger through time, being strongest in the 1947-65 period. The cross-sectional plots of the mean excess returns on the portfolios against the estimated β 's indicated that the relation between mean excess return and β was linear. However, the intercept and slope of the cross-sectional relation varied in different subperiods and were not consistent with the traditional form of the capital asset pricing model. In the two prewar 105-month subperiods examined, the slope was steeper in the first period than that predicted by the traditional form of the model, and it was flatter in the second period. In each of the two 105-month postwar periods it was considerably flatter than predicted. From the evidence of both the time series and cross-sectional runs, we were led to reject the hypothesis that γ_0 in (26) was equal to zero; we therefore concluded that the traditional form of the asset pricing model is not consistent with the data.

We also attempted to make explicit estimates of the time series of returns on the beta factor in order to obtain a more efficient estimate of its mean and variance and thereby enable ourselves to directly test whether or not the mean excess return on the beta factor was zero. We derived a minimum-variance, unbiased linear estimator of the returns on the β factor using our portfolio return data. We showed that, given the independence of the residuals the optimum estimator requires knowledge of the unobservable residual variances of each of the portfolios but that this problem could be avoided if they were equal. Under this assumption of equal residual variances, we estimated the time series of returns on the beta factor. However, if these assumptions (i.e., the independence of the residuals and equality of their variances) are not valid—and there is reason to believe they are not—more complicated procedures are necessary to obtain minimum-variance estimates. Such estimators, which use the complete covariance structure of the portfolio returns are available (although not derived here). However, we feel that a straightforward application of these procedures to the return data would result in the introduction of serious *ex post* bias in the estimates. Thus we have left a complete investigation of these problems, as well as more detailed tests of the two-factor model, to a future paper. In order to fully utilize the properties of the two-factor model in a number of applied problems (such as portfolio evaluation, see Jensen [1971] and various issues in valuation

theory), it will be necessary to have minimum-variance unbiased estimates of the time series of returns on the beta factor, and we hope to provide such estimates in the not-too-distant future.

The evidence obtained from the time series of returns on the beta factor indicated that the beta factor had a nonzero mean and that the mean was nonstationary over time. It seems to us that we have established the presence and significance of the beta factor in explaining security returns but, as mentioned earlier, we have not provided any direct tests aimed at explaining the existence of the beta factor. We have, however, suggested an economic rationale for why capital market equilibrium is consistent with the finding of this second factor. Black [1970] has shown that if riskless borrowing opportunities are not available, the equilibrium expected returns on an asset will be a linear function of two factors, one the β factor, the other the market factor.

In addition, Black and Jensen [1970] have demonstrated that if assets are omitted from the estimated market return, a model similar in some ways to the two-factor model would result. (Roll's analysis [1969] is relevant to this issue as well.) That is, it yields a model similar in structure to (26) and implies that $\gamma_0 \neq 0$. However, it is clear from Figures 6a and 6b and Table 7 that the beta factor (the intercept in the figures and γ_0 in Table 7) is highly variable and any alternative hypothesis must be consistent with this phenomenon. In other words, it is not sufficient for an alternative model to simply imply a nonzero but constant intercept in (26).

Others have provided alternative models that are similar in structure to the Black-Jensen results. For example, Mayers [1972] has developed an equilibrium model incorporating the existence of nonmarketable assets and has shown that the basic linear relation of the traditional model is unaltered, but the constant term γ_0 will be nonzero and γ_1 will not equal $E(R_M)$. The implications of his model for the structure of asset returns are virtually identical to those of the omitted assets model. Brennan [1970] has derived the equilibrium structure of security returns when the effects of a differential tax on dividends and capital gains are considered. He also concludes that the basic linearity of the traditional model is unchanged, but a nonzero constant term must be included and γ_1 will not equal $E(R_M)$. Black and Scholes [1970], however, have tested for the existence of dividend effects and have found that the differential tax on dividends and capital gains

does not affect the structure of security returns and hence cannot explain the results reported here.

There are undoubtedly other economic hypotheses that are consistent with the findings of the existence of a second factor and consistent also with capital market equilibrium. Each hypothesis must be tested directly to determine whether it can account for the presence of the β factor. The Black-Scholes investigation of dividend effects is an example of such a test.

Appendix: The Grouping Solution to the Measurement Error Problem

Consider first the estimate $\hat{\beta}_j$ of the risk parameter in more detail. We will want to test (10) over some holding period, but we must first obtain the estimates of the risk parameter $\hat{\beta}_j$ from the time series equation given by (6). For simplicity, we shall assume that the $\tilde{\epsilon}_{jt}$ are independently distributed and have constant variance for all j and t . The least-squares estimate of β_j in (6), $\hat{\beta}_j$, is thus unbiased but subject to a sampling error $\tilde{\epsilon}_j$ as in (7), and the variance of the sampling error of the estimate $\hat{\beta}_j$ is

$$\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_j|\beta_j) = \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_j) = \frac{\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_j)}{\phi} = \frac{\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})}{\phi} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

since $\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_j)$ was assumed equal for all j , and where

$$\phi = \sum_{t=1}^T (R_{Mt} - \bar{R}_M)^2 \quad (\text{A.2})$$

is the sample sum of squared deviations of the independent variable over the T observations used in the time series estimating equation. Hence using (11) we see that

$$\text{plim } \hat{\gamma} = \frac{\gamma_1}{1 + \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})/\phi S^2(\beta_j)} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Let us assume that we can order the firms on the basis of β_j or on the basis of some instrumental variable highly correlated with β_j but independent of $\tilde{\epsilon}_j$. Given the N ordered firms, we group them into M equal-size contiguous subgroups, represented by $K = 1, 2, \dots, M$ and calculate the average return

The Capital Asset Pricing Model

for each group for each month t according to

$$\bar{R}_{Kt} = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{j=1}^L \bar{R}_{Kjt} \quad K = 1, 2, \dots, M \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$L = \frac{N}{M} \quad (\text{assumed to be integer}) \quad (\text{A.5})$$

where \bar{R}_{Kjt} is the return for month t for security j in group K . We then estimate the systematic risk of the group by applying least squares to

$$\bar{R}_{Kt} = \alpha_K + \beta_K \bar{R}_{Mt} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{Kt} \quad \begin{cases} K = 1, 2, \dots, M \\ t = 1, 2, \dots, T \end{cases} \quad (\text{A.6})$$

where

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_{Kt} = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{j=1}^L \tilde{\epsilon}_{Kjt} \quad (\text{A.7})$$

and

$$\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_{Kt}) = \frac{\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})}{L} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Equation (A.8) holds, since, by assumption, the $\tilde{\epsilon}_{Kjt}$ are independently distributed with equal variance. The least-squares estimate of β_K in (A.6) is $\hat{\beta}_K = \beta_K + \tilde{\epsilon}_K$ and its variance is

$$\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_K|\beta_K) = \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_K) = \frac{\sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})}{\phi L} \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Now if we estimate the cross-sectional relation (10) using our M observations on $\bar{R}_K = \sum_{t=1}^T \bar{R}_{Kt}/T$ and $\bar{\beta}_K$ for some holding period, we have

$$\bar{R}_K = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \bar{\beta}_K + \tilde{\epsilon}_K^* \quad (\text{A.10})$$

where

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_K^* = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\tilde{\epsilon}_{Kt}^*}{T} = \tilde{\epsilon}_K - \gamma_1 \tilde{\epsilon}_K \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Now the large sample estimate of γ_1 in (A.10)

$$\text{plim } \hat{\gamma}_1 = \frac{\gamma_1}{1 + \frac{\text{plim } \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_K^*)}{\text{plim } S^2(\bar{\beta}_K)}} = \frac{\gamma_1}{1 + \frac{1}{L} \frac{\text{plim } \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})}{\phi S^2(\beta_K)}} = \gamma_1 \quad (\text{A.12})$$

since $\text{plim } \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon})/L = 0$ as long as $L \rightarrow \infty$ as $N \rightarrow \infty$, and this is

true as long as we hold the number of groups constant. Thus these grouping procedures will result in unbiased estimates of the parameters of (10) for large samples. Note that $S^2(\beta_K)$, the cross-sectional sample variance of the true group risk coefficients, is constant with increasing L so long as securities are assigned to groups on the basis of the ranked β_j . Note also, however, that if we randomly assigned securities to the M groups we would have $\text{plim } S^2(\beta_K) = \text{plim } S^2(\beta_j)/L$ and (A.12) would thus be identical to (A.3). Therefore, random grouping would be of no help in eliminating the bias. As can be seen, the grouping procedures we have already described in the time series tests accomplish these results. While we expect these procedures to substantially reduce the bias¹⁰ they cannot completely eliminate it in our case because the ε_j and therefore the $\tilde{\varepsilon}_j$ are not independent across firms. However, as discussed in Section III, we expect the remaining bias to be trivially small.

Notes

1. Note that (4c) can be valid even though R_M is a weighted average of the R_i and therefore R_M contains ε_K . This may be clarified as follows: taking the weighted sum of (3) using the weights, X_i , of each security in the market portfolio we know by the definition of R_M that $\sum_i X_i R_i = R_M$, $\sum_i X_i \beta_i = 1$, and $\sum_i X_i \varepsilon_i = 0$. Thus by the last equality we know $X_i \varepsilon_i = -\sum_{j \neq i} X_j \varepsilon_j$, and by substitution $E(\varepsilon_j X_j \varepsilon_j) = E[\varepsilon_j (-\sum_{i \neq j} X_i \varepsilon_i)] = X_j \sigma^2(\varepsilon_j)$, and this implies condition (4c) since $E(\varepsilon_j R_M) = X_j \sigma^2(\varepsilon_j) + E[\varepsilon_j \sum_{i \neq j} X_i \varepsilon_i] = 0$.
2. We could develop the model and tests under the assumption of infinite variance stable distributions, but this would unnecessarily complicate some of the analysis. We shall take explicit account of these distributional problems in some of the crucial tests of significance in Section IV.
3. Recall that the R_B and R_M are defined as excess returns. The model can be formulated with r_f omitted from (6) and therefore assumed constant (then $\alpha_i = r_f(1 - \beta_i)$) or included as a variable (as we have done), which strictly requires them to be known for all t . But experiments with estimates obtained with the inclusion of r_f as a variable in (6) yield results virtually identical to those obtained with the assumption of constant r_f [and hence the exclusion of r_f as a variable in (6)], so we shall ignore this problem here. See also Roll [1969] and Miller and Scholes [1972] for a thorough discussion of the bias introduced through misspecification of the riskless rate. Miller and Scholes conclude as we do that these problems are not serious.
4. Unbiased measurement errors in β_j cause severe difficulties with the cross-sectional tests of the model, and it is important to note that the time series form of the tests given by (6) are free of this source of bias. Unbiased measurement errors in β_K , which is estimated simultaneously with α_j in the time series formulation, cause errors in the estimate of α_j but no systematic bias. Measurement errors in R_M may cause difficulties in

- both the cross-sectional and time series forms of the tests, but we shall ignore this issue here. For an analysis of the problems associated with measurement errors in R_M , see Black and Jensen [1970], Miller and Scholes [1972], and Roll [1969].
5. Treasury Bill rates were obtained from the Salomon Brothers & Hutzler quote sheets at the end of the previous month for the following month. Dealer commercial paper rates were obtained from Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.
 6. The choice of the number of portfolios is somewhat arbitrary. As we shall see below, we wanted enough portfolios to provide a continuum of observations across the risk spectrum to enable us to estimate the suspected relation between α_K and β_K .
 7. Note that in order for the risk parameters of the groups β_K to be stationary through time, our procedures require that firms leave and enter the sample symmetrically across the entire risk spectrum.
 8. See also Miller and Scholes [1972], who provide a careful analysis (using procedures that are complementary to but much different from those suggested here) of many of these problems with cross-sectional tests and their implications for the interpretation of previous empirical work.
 9. Intuitively one can see that the measurement error problem is virtually eliminated by these procedures because the errors in β_K become extremely small. Since the correlations $r(R_M, R_M)$ are so high in Table 2, the standard errors of estimate of the coefficients β_K are all less than 0.022, and nine of them are less than 0.012. The average standard error of estimate for the ten β_K coefficients given in Table 2 for the entire period was 0.0101 and the cross-sectional variance of the β_K , $S^2(\beta_K)$ was 0.1144. Hence, assuming $S^2(\beta_K) = S^2(\beta_K)$, squaring 0.0101, and using (11), we see that our estimate of γ_1 will be greater than 99.9% of its true value.
 10. The analysis was also performed where the coefficients were reestimated for each subperiod, and the results were very similar because the β_K were quite stable over time. We report these results since this estimation procedure seemed to result in a slightly larger spread of the β_K and since the increased sample sizes tends to further reduce the bias caused by the variance of the measurement error in β_K .
 11. In fact, there is an infinite number of such zero β portfolios. Of all such portfolios, however, r_2 is the return on the one with minimum variance. (We are indebted to John Long for the proof of this point.)
 12. We say unreasonably high because the coefficients change from period to period by amounts ranging up to almost seven times their estimated standard errors.
 13. Although the traditional form of the model is consistent with the existence of the β factor if its excess return had a zero mean, clearly it would not provide as complete an explanation of the structure of asset returns as a model that explicitly incorporated such a factor. In particular, under these circumstances the traditional form would provide an adequate description of security returns over fairly lengthy periods of time, say three years or more, but it would probably not furnish an adequate description of security returns over much shorter intervals.
 14. We only observe the residual variance from the single variable regression, and, as we can see from (13), this will be equal to $(1 - \beta_j)^2 \sigma^2(\varepsilon_j) + \sigma^2(\alpha_j)$. However, there are more general procedures for estimating \tilde{r}_2 in

the situation of nonidentical $\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)$ and $\text{cov}(\hat{u}_j, \hat{u}_i) = 0$ for $j \neq i$. But we leave an investigation of the properties of these estimates and some additional tests of the two-factor model for a future paper. If the assumption of identical $\sigma^2(\hat{u}_j)$ made here is inappropriate, we still obtain an unbiased estimate of the R_p . However, the estimated variance of R_p , which is of some interest, will be greater than the true variance.

15. The serial correlation for the entire period appears significant. Indeed, the serial correlation in the last period, 0.414, seems very large and even highly significant, with a t value of 4.6. However, the coefficients in the earlier periods seem to border on significance but show an inordinately large amount of variability, thus indicating substantial nonstationarity.
16. As mentioned earlier, the choice of the number of groups is somewhat arbitrary and, for any given sample size, involves a tradeoff between the bias and the degree of sampling error in the estimates of the parameters in (10). In an unpublished study of the properties of the grouping procedures by simulation techniques, Jensen and Mendu Rao have found that, when $\sigma^2(\hat{\epsilon}_i) = 5^2(\beta_i)$, the use of ten groups with a total sample size of $N = 400$, yields estimates of the coefficient γ_i in (10) which, on the average, are biased downward by less than 0.9% of their true value and have a standard error of estimate about 50% higher than that obtained with ungrouped data. The ungrouped sample estimates were, of course, 50% of their true values on the average [as implied by (11) for these assumed variances].

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The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

EUGENE F. FAMA and KENNETH R. FRENCH*

ABSTRACT

Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β , size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between market β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.

THE ASSET-PRICING MODEL OF Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average returns and risk. The central prediction of the model is that the market portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). The efficiency of the market portfolio implies that (a) expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market β s (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return), and (b) market β s suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns.

There are several empirical contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model. The most prominent is the size effect of Banz (1981). He finds that market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by market β s. Average returns on small (low ME) stocks are too high given their β estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low.

Another contradiction of the SLB model is the positive relation between leverage and average return documented by Bhandari (1988). It is plausible that leverage is associated with risk and expected return, but in the SLB model, leverage risk should be captured by market β . Bhandari finds, however, that leverage helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns in tests that include size (ME) as well as β .

Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity, BE, to its market value, ME. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find that book-to-market equity, BE/ME, also has a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks.

*Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637. We acknowledge the helpful comments of David Booth, Nai-fu Chen, George Constantinides, Wayne Ferson, Edward George, Campbell Harvey, Josef Lakonishok, Rex Sinquefeld, René Stulz, Mark Zmijewski, and an anonymous referee. This research is supported by the National Science Foundation (Fama) and the Center for Research in Security Prices (French).

Finally, Basu (1983) shows that earnings-price ratios (E/P) help explain the cross-section of average returns on U.S. stocks in tests that also include size and market β . Ball (1978) argues that E/P is a catch-all proxy for unnamed factors in expected returns; E/P is likely to be higher (prices are lower relative to earnings) for stocks with higher risks and expected returns, whatever the unnamed sources of risk.

Ball's proxy argument for E/P might also apply to size (ME), leverage, and book-to-market equity. All these variables can be regarded as different ways to scale stock prices, to extract the information in prices about risk and expected returns (Keim (1988)). Moreover, since E/P, ME, leverage, and BE/ME are all scaled versions of price, it is reasonable to expect that some of them are redundant for describing average returns. Our goal is to evaluate the joint roles of market β , size, E/P, leverage, and book-to-market equity in the cross-section of average returns on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.

Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) find that, as predicted by the SLB model, there is a positive simple relation between average stock returns and β during the pre-1969 period. Like Reinganum (1981) and Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), we find that the relation between β and average return disappears during the more recent 1963-1990 period, even when β is used alone to explain average returns. The appendix shows that the simple relation between β and average return is also weak in the 50-year 1941-1990 period. In short, our tests do not support the most basic prediction of the SLB model, that average stock returns are positively related to market β s.

Unlike the simple relation between β and average return, the univariate relations between average return and size, leverage, E/P, and book-to-market equity are strong. In multivariate tests, the negative relation between size and average return is robust to the inclusion of other variables. The positive relation between book-to-market equity and average return also persists in competition with other variables. Moreover, although the size effect has attracted more attention, book-to-market equity has a consistently stronger role in average returns. Our bottom-line results are: (a) β does not seem to help explain the cross-section of average stock returns, and (b) the combination of size and book-to-market equity seems to absorb the roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns, at least during our 1963-1990 sample period.

If assets are priced rationally, our results suggest that stock risks are multidimensional. One dimension of risk is proxied by size, ME. Another dimension of risk is proxied by BE/ME, the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value.

It is possible that the risk captured by BE/ME is the relative distress factor of Chan and Chen (1991). They postulate that the earning prospects of firms are associated with a risk factor in returns. Firms that the market judges to have poor prospects, signaled here by low stock prices and high ratios of book-to-market equity, have higher expected stock returns (they are penalized with higher costs of capital) than firms with strong prospects. It is

also possible, however, that BE/ME just captures the unraveling (regression toward the mean) of irrational market whims about the prospects of firms.

Whatever the underlying economic causes, our main result is straightforward. Two easily measured variables, size (ME) and book-to-market equity (BE/ME), provide a simple and powerful characterization of the cross-section of average stock returns for the 1963–1990 period.

In the next section we discuss the data and our approach to estimating β . Section II examines the relations between average return and β and between average return and size. Section III examines the roles of E/P, leverage, and book-to-market equity in average returns. In sections IV and V, we summarize, interpret, and discuss applications of the results.

I. Preliminaries

A. Data

We use all nonfinancial firms in the intersection of (a) the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ return files from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and (b) the merged COMPUSTAT annual industrial files of income-statement and balance-sheet data, also maintained by CRSP. We exclude financial firms because the high leverage that is normal for these firms probably does not have the same meaning as for nonfinancial firms, where high leverage more likely indicates distress. The CRSP returns cover NYSE and AMEX stocks until 1973 when NASDAQ returns also come on line. The COMPUSTAT data are for 1962–1989. The 1962 start date reflects the fact that book value of common equity (COMPUSTAT item 60), is not generally available prior to 1962. More important, COMPUSTAT data for earlier years have a serious selection bias; the pre-1962 data are tilted toward big historically successful firms.

To ensure that the accounting variables are known before the returns they are used to explain, we match the accounting data for all fiscal yearends in calendar year $t - 1$ (1962–1989) with the returns for July of year t to June of $t + 1$. The 6-month (minimum) gap between fiscal yearend and the return tests is conservative. Earlier work (e.g., Basu (1983)) often assumes that accounting data are available within three months of fiscal yearends. Firms are indeed required to file their 10-K reports with the SEC within 90 days of their fiscal yearends, but on average 19.8% do not comply. In addition, more than 40% of the December fiscal yearend firms that do comply with the 90-day rule file on March 31, and their reports are not made public until April. (See Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski (1992).)

We use a firm's market equity at the end of December of year $t - 1$ to compute its book-to-market, leverage, and earnings-price ratios for $t - 1$, and we use its market equity for June of year t to measure its size. Thus, to be included in the return tests for July of year t , a firm must have a CRSP stock price for December of year $t - 1$ and June of year t . It must also have monthly returns for at least 24 of the 60 months preceding July of year t (for

“pre-ranking” β estimates, discussed below). And the firm must have COMPUSTAT data on total book assets (A), book equity (BE), and earnings (E), for its fiscal year ending in (any month of) calendar year $t - 1$.

Our use of December market equity in the E/P, BE/ME, and leverage ratios is objectionable for firms that do not have December fiscal yearends because the accounting variable in the numerator of a ratio is not aligned with the market value in the denominator. Using ME at fiscal yearends is also problematic; then part of the cross-sectional variation of a ratio for a given year is due to market-wide variation in the ratio during the year. For example, if there is a general fall in stock prices during the year, ratios measured early in the year will tend to be lower than ratios measured later. We can report, however, that the use of fiscal-year-end MEs, rather than December MEs, in the accounting ratios has little impact on our return tests.

Finally, the tests mix firms with different fiscal yearends. Since we match accounting data for all fiscal yearends in calendar year $t - 1$ with returns for July of t to June of $t + 1$, the gap between the accounting data and the matching returns varies across firms. We have done the tests using the smaller sample of firms with December fiscal yearends with similar results.

B. Estimating Market β s

Our asset-pricing tests use the cross-sectional regression approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Each month the cross-section of returns on stocks is regressed on variables hypothesized to explain expected returns. The time-series means of the monthly regression slopes then provide standard tests of whether different explanatory variables are on average priced.

Since size, E/P, leverage, and BE/ME are measured precisely for individual stocks, there is no reason to smear the information in these variables by using portfolios in the Fama-MacBeth (FM) regressions. Most previous tests use portfolios because estimates of market β s are more precise for portfolios. Our approach is to estimate β s for portfolios and then assign a portfolio's β to each stock in the portfolio. This allows us to use individual stocks in the FM asset-pricing tests.

B.1. β Estimation: Details

In June of each year, all NYSE stocks on CRSP are sorted by size (ME) to determine the NYSE decile breakpoints for ME. NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks that have the required CRSP-COMPUSTAT data are then allocated to 10 size portfolios based on the NYSE breakpoints. (If we used stocks from all three exchanges to determine the ME breakpoints, most portfolios would include only small stocks after 1973, when NASDAQ stocks are added to the sample.)

We form portfolios on size because of the evidence of Chan and Chen (1988) and others that size produces a wide spread of average returns and β s. Chan and Chen use only size portfolios. The problem this creates is that size and the β s of size portfolios are highly correlated (-0.988 in their data), so

asset-pricing tests lack power to separate size from β effects in average returns.

To allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, we subdivide each size decile into 10 portfolios on the basis of pre-ranking β s for individual stocks. The pre-ranking β s are estimated on 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) in the 5 years before July of year t . We set the β breakpoints for each size decile using only NYSE stocks that satisfy our COMPUSTAT-CRSP data requirements for year $t - 1$. Using NYSE stocks ensures that the β breakpoints are not dominated after 1973 by the many small stocks on NASDAQ. Setting β breakpoints with stocks that satisfy our COMPUSTAT-CRSP data requirements guarantees that there are firms in each of the 100 size- β portfolios.

After assigning firms to the size- β portfolios in June, we calculate the equal-weighted monthly returns on the portfolios for the next 12 months, from July to June. In the end, we have post-ranking monthly returns for July 1963 to December 1990 on 100 portfolios formed on size and pre-ranking β s. We then estimate β s using the full sample (330 months) of post-ranking returns on each of the 100 portfolios, with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and (after 1972) NASDAQ stocks used as the proxy for the market. We have also estimated β s using the value-weighted or the equal-weighted portfolio of NYSE stocks as the proxy for the market. These β s produce inferences on the role of β in average returns like those reported below.

We estimate β as the sum of the slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current and prior month's market return. (An additional lead and lag of the market have little effect on these sum β s.) The sum β s are meant to adjust for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson (1979)). Fowler and Rorke (1983) show that sum β s are biased when the market return is autocorrelated. The 1st- and 2nd-order autocorrelations of the monthly market returns for July 1963 to December 1990 are 0.06 and -0.05 , both about 1 standard error from 0. If the Fowler-Rorke corrections are used, they lead to trivial changes in the β s. We stick with the simpler sum β s. Appendix Table AI shows that using sum β s produces large increases in the β s of the smallest ME portfolios and small declines in the β s of the largest ME portfolios.

Chan and Chen (1988) show that full-period β estimates for portfolios can work well in tests of the SLB model, even if the true β s of the portfolios vary through time, if the variation in the β s is proportional,

$$\beta_{jt} - \beta_j = k_t(\beta_j - \beta), \quad (1)$$

where β_{jt} is the true β for portfolio j at time t , β_j is the mean of β_{jt} across t , and β is the mean of the β_j . The Appendix argues that (1) is a good approximation for the variation through time in the true β s of portfolios (j) formed on size and β . For diehard β fans, sure to be skeptical of our results on the weak role of β in average stock returns, we can also report that the results stand up to robustness checks that use 5-year pre-ranking β s, or 5-year post-ranking β s, instead of the full-period post-ranking β s.

We allocate the full-period post-ranking β of a size- β portfolio to each stock in the portfolio. These are the β s that will be used in the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for individual stocks. We judge that the precision of the full-period post-ranking portfolio β s, relative to the imprecise β estimates that would be obtained for individual stocks, more than makes up for the fact that true β s are not the same for all stocks in a portfolio. And note that assigning full-period portfolio β s to stocks does not mean that a stock's β is constant. A stock can move across portfolios with year-to-year changes in the stock's size (ME) and in the estimates of its β for the preceding 5 years.

B.2. β Estimates

Table I shows that forming portfolios on size and pre-ranking β s, rather than on size alone, magnifies the range of full-period post-ranking β s. Sorted on size alone, the post-ranking β s range from 1.44 for the smallest ME portfolio to 0.92 for the largest. This spread of β s across the 10 size deciles is smaller than the spread of post-ranking β s produced by the β sort of *any* size decile. For example, the post-ranking β s for the 10 portfolios in the smallest size decile range from 1.05 to 1.79. Across all 100 size- β portfolios, the post-ranking β s range from 0.53 to 1.79, a spread 2.4 times the spread, 0.52, obtained with size portfolios alone.

Two other facts about the β s are important. First, in each size decile the post-ranking β s closely reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking β s. We take this to be evidence that the pre-ranking β sort captures the ordering of true post-ranking β s. (The appendix gives more evidence on this important issue.) Second, the β sort is not a refined size sort. In any size decile, the average values of $\ln(\text{ME})$ are similar across the β -sorted portfolios. Thus the pre-ranking β sort achieves its goal. It produces strong variation in post-ranking β s that is unrelated to size. This is important in allowing our tests to distinguish between β and size effects in average returns.

II. β and Size

The Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model plays an important role in the way academics and practitioners think about risk and the relation between risk and expected return. We show next that when common stock portfolios are formed on size alone, there seems to be evidence for the model's central prediction: average return is positively related to β . The β s of size portfolios are, however, almost perfectly correlated with size, so tests on size portfolios are unable to disentangle β and size effects in average returns. Allowing for variation in β that is unrelated to size breaks the logjam, but at the expense of β . Thus, when we subdivide size portfolios on the basis of pre-ranking β s, we find a strong relation between average return and size, but no relation between average return and β .

A. Informal Tests

Table II shows post-ranking average returns for July 1963 to December 1990 for portfolios formed from one-dimensional sorts of stocks on size or β . The portfolios are formed at the end of June each year and their equal-weighted returns are calculated for the next 12 months. We use returns for July to June to match the returns in later tests that use the accounting data. When we sort on just size or 5-year pre-ranking β s, we form 12 portfolios. The middle 8 cover deciles of size or β . The 4 extreme portfolios (1A, 1B, 10A, and 10B) split the bottom and top deciles in half.

Table II shows that when portfolios are formed on size alone, we observe the familiar strong negative relation between size and average return (Banz (1981)), and a strong positive relation between average return and β . Average returns fall from 1.64% per month for the smallest ME portfolio to 0.90% for the largest. Post-ranking β s also decline across the 12 size portfolios, from 1.44 for portfolio 1A to 0.90 for portfolio 10B. Thus, a simple size sort seems to support the SLB prediction of a positive relation between β and average return. But the evidence is muddled by the tight relation between size and the β s of size portfolios.

The portfolios formed on the basis of the ranked market β s of stocks in Table II produce a wider range of β s (from 0.81 for portfolio 1A to 1.73 for 10B) than the portfolios formed on size. Unlike the size portfolios, the β -sorted portfolios do not support the SLB model. There is little spread in average returns across the β portfolios, and there is no obvious relation between β and average returns. For example, although the two extreme portfolios, 1A and 10B, have much different β s, they have nearly identical average returns (1.20% and 1.18% per month). These results for 1963–1990 confirm Reinganum's (1981) evidence that for β -sorted portfolios, there is no relation between average return and β during the 1964–1979 period.

The 100 portfolios formed on size and then pre-ranking β in Table I clarify the contradictory evidence on the relation between β and average return produced by portfolios formed on size or β alone. Specifically, the two-pass sort gives a clearer picture of the separate roles of size and β in average returns. Contrary to the central prediction of the SLB model, the second-pass β sort produces little variation in average returns. Although the post-ranking β s in Table I increase strongly in each size decile, average returns are flat or show a slight tendency to decline. In contrast, within the columns of the average return and β matrices of Table I, average returns and β s decrease with increasing size.

The two-pass sort on size and β in Table I says that variation in β that is tied to size is positively related to average return, but variation in β unrelated to size is not compensated in the average returns of 1963–1990. The proper inference seems to be that there is a relation between size and average return, but controlling for size, there is no relation between β and average return. The regressions that follow confirm this conclusion, and they produce another that is stronger. The regressions show that when one allows

Table I
Average Returns, Post-Ranking β s and Average Size For Portfolios Formed on
Size and then β : Stocks Sorted on ME (Down) then Pre-Ranking β (Across):
July 1963 to December 1990

Portfolios are formed yearly. The breakpoints for the size (ME, price times shares outstanding) deciles are determined in June of year t ($t = 1963-1990$) using all NYSE stocks on CRSP. All NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks that meet the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data requirements are allocated to the 10 size portfolios using the NYSE breakpoints. Each size decile is subdivided into 10 β portfolios using pre-ranking β s of individual stocks, estimated with 2 to 5 years of monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t . We use only NYSE stocks that meet the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data requirements to establish the β breakpoints. The equal-weighted monthly returns on the resulting 100 portfolios are then calculated for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$.

The post-ranking β s use the full (July 1963 to December 1990) sample of post-ranking returns for each portfolio. The pre- and post-ranking β s (here and in all other tables) are the sum of the slopes from a regression of monthly returns on the current and prior month's returns on the value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and (after 1972) NASDAQ stocks. The average return is the time-series average of the monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns, in percent. The average size of a portfolio is the time-series average of monthly averages of $\ln(\text{ME})$ for stocks in the portfolio at the end of June of each year, with ME denominated in millions of dollars.

The average number of stocks per month for the size- β portfolios in the smallest size decile varies from 70 to 177. The average number of stocks for the size- β portfolios in size deciles 2 and 3 is between 15 and 41, and the average number for the largest 7 size deciles is between 11 and 22.

The All column shows statistics for equal-weighted size-decile (ME) portfolios. The All row shows statistics for equal-weighted portfolios of the stocks in each β group.

	All	Low- β	β -2	β -3	β -4	β -5	β -6	β -7	β -8	β -9	High- β
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns (in Percent)											
All	1.25	1.34	1.29	1.36	1.31	1.33	1.28	1.24	1.21	1.25	1.14
Small-ME	1.52	1.71	1.57	1.79	1.61	1.50	1.50	1.37	1.63	1.50	1.42
ME-2	1.29	1.25	1.42	1.36	1.39	1.65	1.61	1.37	1.31	1.34	1.11
ME-3	1.24	1.12	1.31	1.17	1.70	1.29	1.10	1.31	1.36	1.26	0.76
ME-4	1.25	1.27	1.13	1.54	1.06	1.34	1.06	1.41	1.17	1.35	0.98
ME-5	1.29	1.34	1.42	1.39	1.48	1.42	1.18	1.13	1.27	1.18	1.08
ME-6	1.17	1.08	1.53	1.27	1.15	1.20	1.21	1.18	1.04	1.07	1.02
ME-7	1.07	0.95	1.21	1.26	1.09	1.18	1.11	1.24	0.62	1.32	0.76
ME-8	1.10	1.09	1.05	1.37	1.20	1.27	0.98	1.18	1.02	1.01	0.94
ME-9	0.95	0.98	0.88	1.02	1.14	1.07	1.23	0.94	0.82	0.88	0.59
Large-ME	0.89	1.01	0.93	1.10	0.94	0.93	0.89	1.03	0.71	0.74	0.56

Table I—Continued

	All	Low- β	β -2	β -3	β -4	β -5	β -6	β -7	β -8	β -9	High- β
Panel B: Post-Ranking β s											
All		0.87	0.99	1.09	1.16	1.26	1.29	1.35	1.45	1.52	1.72
Small-ME	1.44	1.05	1.18	1.28	1.32	1.40	1.40	1.49	1.61	1.64	1.79
ME-2	1.39	0.91	1.15	1.17	1.24	1.36	1.41	1.43	1.50	1.66	1.76
ME-3	1.35	0.97	1.13	1.13	1.21	1.26	1.28	1.39	1.50	1.51	1.75
ME-4	1.34	0.78	1.03	1.17	1.16	1.29	1.37	1.46	1.51	1.64	1.71
ME-5	1.25	0.66	0.85	1.12	1.15	1.16	1.26	1.30	1.43	1.59	1.68
ME-6	1.23	0.61	0.78	1.05	1.16	1.22	1.28	1.36	1.46	1.49	1.70
ME-7	1.17	0.57	0.92	1.01	1.11	1.14	1.26	1.24	1.39	1.34	1.60
ME-8	1.09	0.53	0.74	0.94	1.02	1.13	1.12	1.18	1.26	1.35	1.52
ME-9	1.03	0.58	0.74	0.80	0.95	1.06	1.15	1.14	1.21	1.22	1.42
Large-ME	0.92	0.57	0.71	0.78	0.89	0.95	0.92	1.02	1.01	1.11	1.32
Panel C: Average Size (ln(ME))											
All	4.11	3.86	4.26	4.33	4.41	4.27	4.32	4.26	4.19	4.03	3.77
Small-ME	2.24	2.12	2.27	2.30	2.30	2.28	2.29	2.30	2.32	2.25	2.15
ME-2	3.63	3.65	3.68	3.70	3.72	3.69	3.70	3.69	3.69	3.70	3.68
ME-3	4.10	4.14	4.18	4.12	4.15	4.16	4.16	4.18	4.14	4.15	4.15
ME-4	4.50	4.53	4.53	4.57	4.54	4.56	4.55	4.52	4.58	4.52	4.56
ME-5	4.89	4.91	4.91	4.93	4.95	4.93	4.92	4.93	4.92	4.92	4.95
ME-6	5.30	5.30	5.33	5.34	5.34	5.33	5.33	5.33	5.33	5.34	5.36
ME-7	5.73	5.73	5.75	5.77	5.76	5.73	5.77	5.77	5.76	5.72	5.76
ME-8	6.24	6.26	6.27	6.26	6.24	6.24	6.27	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.26
ME-9	6.82	6.82	6.84	6.82	6.82	6.81	6.81	6.81	6.81	6.80	6.83
Large-ME	7.93	7.94	8.04	8.10	8.04	8.02	8.02	7.94	7.80	7.75	7.62

Table II
Properties of Portfolios Formed on Size or Pre-Ranking β :
July 1963 to December 1990

At the end of June of each year t , 12 portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked values of size (ME) or pre-ranking β . The pre-ranking β s use 2 to 5 years (as available) of monthly returns ending in June of t . Portfolios 2-9 cover deciles of the ranking variables. The bottom and top 2 portfolios (1A, 1B, 10A, and 10B) split the bottom and top deciles in half. The breakpoints for the ME portfolios are based on ranked values of ME for all NYSE stocks on CRSP. NYSE breakpoints for pre-ranking β s are also used to form the β portfolios. NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are then allocated to the size or β portfolios using the NYSE breakpoints. We calculate each portfolio's monthly equal-weighted return for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$, and then reform the portfolios in June of $t + 1$.

BE is the book value of common equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes, A is total book assets, and E is earnings (income before extraordinary items, plus income-statement deferred taxes, minus preferred dividends). BE, A, and E are for each firm's latest fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$. The accounting ratios are measured using market equity ME in December of year $t - 1$. Firm size $\ln(\text{ME})$ is measured in June of year t , with ME denominated in millions of dollars.

The average return is the time-series average of the monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns, in percent. $\ln(\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{A}/\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{A}/\text{BE})$, E/P, and E/P dummy are the time-series averages of the monthly average values of these variables in each portfolio. Since the E/P dummy is 0 when earnings are positive, and 1 when earnings are negative, E/P dummy gives the average proportion of stocks with negative earnings in each portfolio.

β is the time-series average of the monthly portfolio β s. Stocks are assigned the post-ranking β of the size- β portfolio they are in at the end of June of year t (Table I). These individual-firm β s are averaged to compute the monthly β s for each portfolio for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$.

Firms is the average number of stocks in the portfolio each month.

	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Panel A: Portfolios Formed on Size												
Return	1.64	1.16	1.29	1.24	1.25	1.29	1.17	1.07	1.10	0.95	0.88	0.90
β	1.44	1.44	1.39	1.34	1.33	1.24	1.22	1.16	1.08	1.02	0.95	0.90
$\ln(\text{ME})$	1.98	3.18	3.63	4.10	4.50	4.89	5.30	5.73	6.24	6.82	7.39	8.44
$\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$	-0.01	-0.21	-0.23	-0.26	-0.32	-0.36	-0.36	-0.44	-0.40	-0.42	-0.51	-0.65
$\ln(\text{A}/\text{ME})$	0.73	0.50	0.46	0.43	0.37	0.32	0.32	0.24	0.29	0.27	0.17	-0.03
$\ln(\text{A}/\text{BE})$	0.75	0.71	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.68	0.67	0.69	0.70	0.68	0.62
E/P dummy	0.26	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01
E(+)/P	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09
Firms	772	189	236	170	144	140	128	125	119	114	60	64

Table II—Continued

	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Panel B: Portfolios Formed on Pre-Ranking β												
Return	1.20	1.20	1.32	1.26	1.31	1.30	1.30	1.23	1.23	1.33	1.34	1.18
β	0.81	0.79	0.92	1.04	1.13	1.19	1.26	1.32	1.41	1.52	1.63	1.73
ln(ME)	4.21	4.86	4.75	4.68	4.59	4.48	4.36	4.25	3.97	3.78	3.52	3.15
ln(BE/ME)	-0.18	-0.13	-0.22	-0.21	-0.23	-0.22	-0.22	-0.25	-0.23	-0.27	-0.31	-0.50
ln(A/ME)	0.60	0.66	0.49	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.31
ln(A/BE)	0.78	0.79	0.71	0.66	0.64	0.65	0.67	0.67	0.70	0.73	0.77	0.81
E/P dummy	0.12	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23
E(+)/P	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08
Firms	116	80	185	181	179	182	185	205	227	267	165	291

for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.

B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions

Table III shows time-series averages of the slopes from the month-by-month Fama-MacBeth (FM) regressions of the cross-section of stock returns on size, β , and the other variables (leverage, E/P, and book-to-market equity) used to explain average returns. The average slopes provide standard FM tests for determining which explanatory variables on average have non-zero expected premiums during the July 1963 to December 1990 period.

Like the average returns in Tables I and II, the regressions in Table III say that size, $\ln(\text{ME})$, helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns. The average slope from the monthly regressions of returns on size alone is -0.15% , with a t -statistic of -2.58 . This reliable negative relation persists no matter which other explanatory variables are in the regressions; the average slopes on $\ln(\text{ME})$ are always close to or more than 2 standard errors from 0. The size effect (smaller stocks have higher average returns) is thus robust in the 1963–1990 returns on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.

In contrast to the consistent explanatory power of size, the FM regressions show that market β does not help explain average stock returns for 1963–1990. In a shot straight at the heart of the SLB model, the average slope from the regressions of returns on β alone in Table III is 0.15% per month and only 0.46 standard errors from 0. In the regressions of returns on size and β , size has explanatory power (an average slope -3.41 standard errors from 0), but the average slope for β is negative and only 1.21 standard errors from 0. Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986) get similar results for NYSE stocks for 1962–1981. We can also report that β shows no power to explain average returns (the average slopes are typically less than 1 standard error from 0) in FM regressions that use various combinations of β with size, book-to-market equity, leverage, and E/P.

C. Can β Be Saved?

What explains the poor results for β ? One possibility is that other explanatory variables are correlated with true β s, and this obscures the relation between average returns and measured β s. But this line of attack cannot explain why β has no power when used alone to explain average returns. Moreover, leverage, book-to-market equity, and E/P do not seem to be good proxies for β . The averages of the monthly cross-sectional correlations between β and the values of these variables for individual stocks are all within 0.15 of 0.

Another hypothesis is that, as predicted by the SLB model, there is a positive relation between β and average return, but the relation is obscured by noise in the β estimates. However, our full-period post-ranking β s do not seem to be imprecise. Most of the standard errors of the β s (not shown) are

Table III
Average Slopes (*t*-Statistics) from Month-by-Month Regressions of
Stock Returns on β , Size, Book-to-Market Equity, Leverage, and E/P:
July 1963 to December 1990

Stocks are assigned the post-ranking β of the size- β portfolio they are in at the end of June of year t (Table I). BE is the book value of common equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes, A is total book assets, and E is earnings (income before extraordinary items, plus income-statement deferred taxes, minus preferred dividends). BE, A, and E are for each firm's latest fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$. The accounting ratios are measured using market equity ME in December of year $t - 1$. Firm size $\ln(\text{ME})$ is measured in June of year t . In the regressions, these values of the explanatory variables for individual stocks are matched with CRSP returns for the months from July of year t to June of year $t + 1$. The gap between the accounting data and the returns ensures that the accounting data are available prior to the returns. If earnings are positive, $E(+)/P$ is the ratio of total earnings to market equity and E/P dummy is 0. If earnings are negative, $E(+)/P$ is 0 and E/P dummy is 1.

The average slope is the time-series average of the monthly regression slopes for July 1963 to December 1990, and the t -statistic is the average slope divided by its time-series standard error.

On average, there are 2267 stocks in the monthly regressions. To avoid giving extreme observations heavy weight in the regressions, the smallest and largest 0.5% of the observations on $E(+)/P$, BE/ME, A/ME, and A/BE are set equal to the next largest or smallest values of the ratios (the 0.005 and 0.995 fractiles). This has no effect on inferences.

β	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{A}/\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{A}/\text{BE})$	E/P Dummy	$E(+)/P$
0.15 (0.46)						
	-0.15 (-2.58)					
-0.37 (-1.21)	-0.17 (-3.41)					
		0.50 (5.71)				
			0.50 (5.69)	-0.57 (-5.34)		
					0.57 (2.28)	4.72 (4.57)
	-0.11 (-1.99)	0.35 (4.44)				
	-0.11 (-2.06)		0.35 (4.32)	-0.50 (-4.56)		
	-0.16 (-3.06)				0.06 (0.38)	2.99 (3.04)
	-0.13 (-2.47)	0.33 (4.46)			-0.14 (-0.90)	0.87 (1.23)
	-0.13 (-2.47)		0.32 (4.28)	-0.46 (-4.45)	-0.08 (-0.56)	1.15 (1.57)

0.05 or less, only 1 is greater than 0.1, and the standard errors are small relative to the range of the β s (0.53 to 1.79).

The β -sorted portfolios in Tables I and II also provide strong evidence against the β -measurement-error story. When portfolios are formed on pre-ranking β s alone (Table II), the post-ranking β s for the portfolios almost perfectly reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking β s. Only the β for portfolio 1B is out of line, and only by 0.02. Similarly, when portfolios are formed on size and then pre-ranking β s (Table I), the post-ranking β s in each size decile closely reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking β s.

The correspondence between the ordering of the pre-ranking and post-ranking β s for the β -sorted portfolios in Tables I and II is evidence that the post-ranking β s are informative about the ordering of the true β s. The problem for the SLB model is that there is no similar ordering in the average returns on the β -sorted portfolios. Whether one looks at portfolios sorted on β alone (Table II) or on size and then β (Table I), average returns are flat (Table II) or decline slightly (Table I) as the post-ranking β s increase.

Our evidence on the robustness of the size effect and the absence of a relation between β and average return is so contrary to the SLB model that it behooves us to examine whether the results are special to 1963–1990. The appendix shows that NYSE returns for 1941–1990 behave like the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ returns for 1963–1990; there is a reliable size effect over the full 50-year period, but little relation between β and average return. Interestingly, there is a reliable simple relation between β and average return during the 1941–1965 period. These 25 years are a major part of the samples in the early studies of the SLB model of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973). Even for the 1941–1965 period, however, the relation between β and average return disappears when we control for size.

III. Book-to-Market Equity, E/P, and Leverage

Tables I to III say that there is a strong relation between the average returns on stocks and size, but there is no reliable relation between average returns and β . In this section we show that there is also a strong cross-sectional relation between average returns and book-to-market equity. If anything, this book-to-market effect is more powerful than the size effect. We also find that the combination of size and book-to-market equity absorbs the apparent roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns.

A. Average Returns

Table IV shows average returns for July 1963 to December 1990 for portfolios formed on ranked values of book-to-market equity (BE/ME) or earnings-price ratio (E/P). The BE/ME and E/P portfolios in Table IV are formed in the same general way (one-dimensional yearly sorts) as the size and β portfolios in Table II. (See the tables for details.)

The relation between average return and E/P has a familiar U-shape (e.g., Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989) for U.S. data, and Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) for Japan). Average returns decline from 1.46% per month for the negative E/P portfolio to 0.93% for the firms in portfolio 1B that have low but positive E/P. Average returns then increase monotonically, reaching 1.72% per month for the highest E/P portfolio.

The more striking evidence in Table IV is the strong positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity. Average returns rise from 0.30% for the lowest BE/ME portfolio to 1.83% for the highest, a difference of 1.53% per month. This spread is twice as large as the difference of 0.74% between the average monthly returns on the smallest and largest size portfolios in Table II. Note also that the strong relation between book-to-market equity and average return is unlikely to be a β effect in disguise; Table IV shows that post-ranking market β s vary little across portfolios formed on ranked values of BE/ME.

On average, only about 50 (out of 2317) firms per year have negative book equity, BE. The negative BE firms are mostly concentrated in the last 14 years of the sample, 1976–1989, and we do not include them in the tests. We can report, however, that average returns for negative BE firms are high, like the average returns of high BE/ME firms. Negative BE (which results from persistently negative earnings) and high BE/ME (which typically means that stock prices have fallen) are both signals of poor earning prospects. The similar average returns of negative and high BE/ME firms are thus consistent with the hypothesis that book-to-market equity captures cross-sectional variation in average returns that is related to relative distress.

B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions

B.1. BE/ME

The FM regressions in Table III confirm the importance of book-to-market equity in explaining the cross-section of average stock returns. The average slope from the monthly regressions of returns on $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ alone is 0.50%, with a t -statistic of 5.71. This book-to-market relation is stronger than the size effect, which produces a t -statistic of -2.58 in the regressions of returns on $\ln(\text{ME})$ alone. But book-to-market equity does not replace size in explaining average returns. When both $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ are included in the regressions, the average size slope is still -1.99 standard errors from 0; the book-to-market slope is an impressive 4.44 standard errors from 0.

B.2. Leverage

The FM regressions that explain returns with leverage variables provide interesting insight into the relation between book-to-market equity and average return. We use two leverage variables, the ratio of book assets to market equity, A/ME , and the ratio of book assets to book equity, A/BE . We interpret A/ME as a measure of market leverage, while A/BE is a measure

Table IV
Properties of Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Market Equity (BE/ME) and Earnings-Price Ratio (E/P):
July 1963 to December 1990

At the end of each year $t - 1$, 12 portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked values of BE/ME or E/P. Portfolios 2-9 cover deciles of the ranking variables. The bottom and top 2 portfolios (1A, 1B, 10A, and 10B) split the bottom and top deciles in half. For E/P, there are 13 portfolios; portfolio 0 is stocks with negative E/P. Since BE/ME and E/P are not strongly related to exchange listing, their portfolio breakpoints are determined on the basis of the ranked values of the variables for all stocks that satisfy the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data requirements. BE is the book value of common equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes, A is total book assets, and E is earnings (income before extraordinary items, plus income-statement deferred taxes, minus preferred dividends). BE, A, and E are for each firm's latest fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$. The accounting ratios are measured using market equity ME in December of year $t - 1$. Firm size $\ln(\text{ME})$ is measured in June of year t , with ME denominated in millions of dollars. We calculate each portfolio's monthly equal-weighted return for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$, and then reform the portfolios at the end of year t .

Return is the time-series average of the monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns (in percent). $\ln(\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{A}/\text{ME})$, $\ln(\text{A}/\text{BE})$, $\text{E}(+)/\text{P}$, and E/P dummy are the time-series averages of the monthly average values of these variables in each portfolio. Since the E/P dummy is 0 when earnings are positive, and 1 when earnings are negative, E/P dummy gives the average proportion of stocks with negative earnings in each portfolio.

β is the time-series average of the monthly portfolio β s. Stocks are assigned the post-ranking β of the size- β portfolio they are in at the end of June of year t (Table I). These individual-firm β s are averaged to compute the monthly β s for each portfolio for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$.

Firms is the average number of stocks in the portfolio each month.

Portfolio	0	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Panel A: Stocks Sorted on Book-to-Market Equity (BE/ME)													
Return	0.30	0.67	0.87	0.97	1.04	1.17	1.30	1.44	1.50	1.59	1.92	1.83	
β	1.36	1.34	1.32	1.30	1.28	1.27	1.27	1.27	1.27	1.29	1.33	1.35	
$\ln(\text{ME})$	4.53	4.67	4.69	4.56	4.47	4.38	4.23	4.06	3.85	3.51	3.06	2.65	
$\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$	-2.22	-1.51	-1.09	-0.75	-0.51	-0.32	-0.14	0.03	0.21	0.42	0.66	1.02	
$\ln(\text{A}/\text{ME})$	-1.24	-0.79	-0.40	-0.05	0.20	0.40	0.56	0.71	0.91	1.12	1.35	1.75	
$\ln(\text{A}/\text{BE})$	0.94	0.71	0.68	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.70	0.68	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.73	
E/P dummy	0.29	0.15	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.15	0.22	0.36	
$\text{E}(+)/\text{P}$	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.10	
Firms	89	93	209	222	226	230	235	237	239	239	120	117	

Table IV—Continued

Portfolio	0	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Panel B: Stocks Sorted on Earnings-Price Ratio (E/P)													
Return	1.46	1.04	0.93	0.94	1.03	1.18	1.22	1.33	1.42	1.46	1.57	1.74	1.72
β	1.47	1.40	1.35	1.31	1.28	1.26	1.25	1.26	1.24	1.23	1.24	1.28	1.31
ln(ME)	2.48	3.64	4.33	4.61	4.64	4.63	4.58	4.49	4.37	4.28	4.07	3.82	3.52
ln(BE/ME)	-0.10	-0.76	-0.91	-0.79	-0.61	-0.47	-0.33	-0.21	-0.08	0.02	0.15	0.26	0.40
ln(A/ME)	0.90	-0.05	-0.27	-0.16	0.03	0.18	0.31	0.44	0.58	0.70	0.85	1.01	1.25
ln(A/BE)	0.99	0.70	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.68	0.71	0.75	0.86
E/P dummy	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
E(+)/P	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.20	0.28
Firms	355	88	90	182	190	193	196	194	197	195	195	95	91

of book leverage. The regressions use the natural logs of the leverage ratios, $\ln(A/ME)$ and $\ln(A/BE)$, because preliminary tests indicated that logs are a good functional form for capturing leverage effects in average returns. Using logs also leads to a simple interpretation of the relation between the roles of leverage and book-to-market equity in average returns.

The FM regressions of returns on the leverage variables (Table III) pose a bit of a puzzle. The two leverage variables are related to average returns, but with opposite signs. As in Bhandari (1988), higher market leverage is associated with higher average returns; the average slopes for $\ln(A/ME)$ are always positive and more than 4 standard errors from 0. But higher book leverage is associated with lower average returns; the average slopes for $\ln(A/BE)$ are always negative and more than 4 standard errors from 0.

The puzzle of the opposite slopes on $\ln(A/ME)$ and $\ln(A/BE)$ has a simple solution. The average slopes for the two leverage variables are opposite in sign but close in absolute value, e.g., 0.50 and -0.57 . Thus it is the difference between market and book leverage that helps explain average returns. But the difference between market and book leverage is book-to-market equity, $\ln(BE/ME) = \ln(A/ME) - \ln(A/BE)$. Table III shows that the average book-to-market slopes in the FM regressions are indeed close in absolute value to the slopes for the two leverage variables.

The close links between the leverage and book-to-market results suggest that there are two equivalent ways to interpret the book-to-market effect in average returns. A high ratio of book equity to market equity (a low stock price relative to book value) says that the market judges the prospects of a firm to be poor relative to firms with low BE/ME . Thus BE/ME may capture the relative-distress effect postulated by Chan and Chen (1991). A high book-to-market ratio also says that a firm's market leverage is high relative to its book leverage; the firm has a large amount of market-imposed leverage because the market judges that its prospects are poor and discounts its stock price relative to book value. In short, our tests suggest that the relative-distress effect, captured by BE/ME , can also be interpreted as an involuntary leverage effect, which is captured by the difference between A/ME and A/BE .

B.3. E/P

Ball (1978) posits that the earnings-price ratio is a catch-all for omitted risk factors in expected returns. If current earnings proxy for expected future earnings, high-risk stocks with high expected returns will have low prices relative to their earnings. Thus, E/P should be related to expected returns, whatever the omitted sources of risk. This argument only makes sense, however, for firms with positive earnings. When current earnings are negative, they are not a proxy for the earnings forecasts embedded in the stock price, and E/P is not a proxy for expected returns. Thus, the slope for E/P in the FM regressions is based on positive values; we use a dummy variable for E/P when earnings are negative.

The U-shaped relation between average return and E/P observed in Table IV is also apparent when the E/P variables are used alone in the FM regressions in Table III. The average slope on the E/P dummy variable (0.57% per month, 2.28 standard errors from 0) confirms that firms with negative earnings have higher average returns. The average slope for stocks with positive E/P (4.72% per month, 4.57 standard errors from 0) shows that average returns increase with E/P when it is positive.

Adding size to the regressions kills the explanatory power of the E/P dummy. Thus the high average returns of negative E/P stocks are better captured by their size, which Table IV says is on average small. Adding both size and book-to-market equity to the E/P regressions kills the E/P dummy and lowers the average slope on E/P from 4.72 to 0.87 ($t = 1.23$). In contrast, the average slopes for $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ in the regressions that include E/P are similar to those in the regressions that explain average returns with only size and book-to-market equity. The results suggest that most of the relation between (positive) E/P and average return is due to the positive correlation between E/P and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$, illustrated in Table IV; firms with high E/P tend to have high book-to-market equity ratios.

IV. A Parsimonious Model for Average Returns

The results to here are easily summarized:

- (1) When we allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, there is no reliable relation between β and average return.
- (2) The opposite roles of market leverage and book leverage in average returns are captured well by book-to-market equity.
- (3) The relation between E/P and average return seems to be absorbed by the combination of size and book-to-market equity.

In a nutshell, market β seems to have no role in explaining the average returns on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for 1963–1990, while size and book-to-market equity capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns that is related to leverage and E/P.

A. Average Returns, Size and Book-to-Market Equity

The average return matrix in Table V gives a simple picture of the two-dimensional variation in average returns that results when the 10 size deciles are each subdivided into 10 portfolios based on ranked values of BE/ME for individual stocks. Within a size decile (across a row of the average return matrix), returns typically increase strongly with BE/ME: on average, the returns on the lowest and highest BE/ME portfolios in a size decile differ by 0.99% (1.63% – 0.64%) per month. Similarly, looking down the columns of the average return matrix shows that there is a negative relation between average return and size: on average, the spread of returns across the size portfolios in a BE/ME group is 0.58% per month. The average return matrix gives life to the conclusion from the regressions that,

Table V
Average Monthly Returns on Portfolios Formed on Size and
Book-to-Market Equity; Stocks Sorted by ME (Down) and then
BE/ME (Across): July 1963 to December 1990

In June of each year t , the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks that meet the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data requirements are allocated to 10 size portfolios using the NYSE size (ME) breakpoints. The NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in each size decile are then sorted into 10 BE/ME portfolios using the book-to-market ratios for year $t - 1$. BE/ME is the book value of common equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes for fiscal year $t - 1$, over market equity for December of year $t - 1$. The equal-weighted monthly portfolio returns are then calculated for July of year t to June of year $t + 1$.

Average monthly return is the time-series average of the monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns (in percent).

The All column shows average returns for equal-weighted size decile portfolios. The All row shows average returns for equal-weighted portfolios of the stocks in each BE/ME group.

	Book-to-Market Portfolios										
	All	Low	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	High
All	1.23	0.64	0.98	1.06	1.17	1.24	1.26	1.39	1.40	1.50	1.63
Small-ME	1.47	0.70	1.14	1.20	1.43	1.56	1.51	1.70	1.71	1.82	1.92
ME-2	1.22	0.43	1.05	0.96	1.19	1.33	1.19	1.58	1.28	1.43	1.79
ME-3	1.22	0.56	0.88	1.23	0.95	1.36	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.54	1.60
ME-4	1.19	0.39	0.72	1.06	1.36	1.13	1.21	1.34	1.59	1.51	1.47
ME-5	1.24	0.88	0.65	1.08	1.47	1.13	1.43	1.44	1.26	1.52	1.49
ME-6	1.15	0.70	0.98	1.14	1.23	0.94	1.27	1.19	1.19	1.24	1.50
ME-7	1.07	0.95	1.00	0.99	0.83	0.99	1.13	0.99	1.16	1.10	1.47
ME-8	1.08	0.66	1.13	0.91	0.95	0.99	1.01	1.15	1.05	1.29	1.55
ME-9	0.95	0.44	0.89	0.92	1.00	1.05	0.93	0.82	1.11	1.04	1.22
Large-ME	0.89	0.93	0.88	0.84	0.71	0.79	0.83	0.81	0.96	0.97	1.18

controlling for size, book-to-market equity captures strong variation in average returns, and controlling for book-to-market equity leaves a size effect in average returns.

B. The Interaction between Size and Book-to-Market Equity

The average of the monthly correlations between the cross-sections of $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ for individual stocks is -0.26 . The negative correlation is also apparent in the average values of $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ for the portfolios sorted on ME or BE/ME in Tables II and IV. Thus, firms with low market equity are more likely to have poor prospects, resulting in low stock prices and high book-to-market equity. Conversely, large stocks are more likely to be firms with stronger prospects, higher stock prices, lower book-to-market equity, and lower average stock returns.

The correlation between size and book-to-market equity affects the regressions in Table III. Including $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ moves the average slope on $\ln(\text{ME})$ from -0.15 ($t = -2.58$) in the univariate regressions to -0.11 ($t = -1.99$) in the bivariate regressions. Similarly, including $\ln(\text{ME})$ in the regressions

The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

lowers the average slope on $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ from 0.50 to 0.35 (still a healthy 4.44 standard errors from 0). Thus, part of the size effect in the simple regressions is due to the fact that small ME stocks are more likely to have high book-to-market ratios, and part of the simple book-to-market effect is due to the fact that high BE/ME stocks tend to be small (they have low ME).

We should not, however, exaggerate the links between size and book-to-market equity. The correlation (-0.26) between $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ is not extreme, and the average slopes in the bivariate regressions in Table III show that $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ are both needed to explain the cross-section of average returns. Finally, the 10×10 average return matrix in Table V provides concrete evidence that, (a) controlling for size, book-to-market equity captures substantial variation in the cross-section of average returns, and (b) within BE/ME groups average returns are related to size.

C. Subperiod Averages of the FM Slopes

The message from the average FM slopes for 1963–1990 (Table III) is that size on average has a negative premium in the cross-section of stock returns, book-to-market equity has a positive premium, and the average premium for market β is essentially 0. Table VI shows the average FM slopes for two roughly equal subperiods (July 1963–December 1976 and January 1977–December 1990) from two regressions: (a) the cross-section of stock returns on size, $\ln(\text{ME})$, and book-to-market equity, $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$, and (b) returns on β , $\ln(\text{ME})$, and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$. For perspective, average returns on the value-weighted and equal-weighted (VW and EW) portfolios of NYSE stocks are also shown.

In FM regressions, the intercept is the return on a standard portfolio (the weights on stocks sum to 1) in which the weighted averages of the explanatory variables are 0 (Fama (1976), chapter 9). In our tests, the intercept is weighted toward small stocks (ME is in millions of dollars so $\ln(\text{ME}) = 0$ implies $\text{ME} = \$1$ million) and toward stocks with relatively high book-to-market ratios (Table IV says that $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ is negative for the typical firm, so $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME}) = 0$ is toward the high end of the sample ratios). Thus it is not surprising that the average intercepts are always large relative to their standard errors and relative to the returns on the NYSE VW and EW portfolios.

Like the overall period, the subperiods do not offer much hope that the average premium for β is economically important. The average FM slope for β is only slightly positive for 1963–1976 (0.10% per month, $t = 0.25$), and it is negative for 1977–1990 (-0.44% per month, $t = -1.17$). There is a hint that the size effect is weaker in the 1977–1990 period, but inferences about the average size slopes for the subperiods lack power.

Unlike the size effect, the relation between book-to-market equity and average return is so strong that it shows up reliably in both the 1963–1976 and the 1977–1990 subperiods. The average slopes for $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ are all more than 2.95 standard errors from 0, and the average slopes for the

Table VI
Subperiod Average Monthly Returns on the NYSE
Equal-Weighted and Value-Weighted Portfolios and Subperiod
Means of the Intercepts and Slopes from the Monthly FM
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Returns on (a) Size (ln(ME)) and
Book-to-Market Equity (ln(BE/ME)), and (b) β , ln(ME), and
ln(BE/ME)

Mean is the time-series mean of a monthly return, Std is its time-series standard deviation, and $t(\text{Mn})$ is Mean divided by its time-series standard error.

Variable	7/63-12/90 (330 Mos.)			7/63-12/76 (162 Mos.)			1/77-12/90 (168 Mos.)		
	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$
NYSE Value-Weighted (VW) and Equal-Weighted (EW) Portfolio Returns									
VW	0.81	4.47	3.27	0.56	4.26	1.67	1.04	4.66	2.89
EW	0.97	5.49	3.19	0.77	5.70	1.72	1.15	5.28	2.82
$R_{it} = a + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + b_{3t}\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$									
a	1.77	8.51	3.77	1.86	10.10	2.33	1.69	6.67	3.27
b_2	-0.11	1.02	-1.99	-0.16	1.25	-1.62	-0.07	0.73	-1.16
b_3	0.35	1.45	4.43	0.36	1.53	2.96	0.35	1.37	3.30
$R_{it} = a + b_{1t}\beta_{it} + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + b_{3t}\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$									
a	2.07	5.75	6.55	1.73	6.22	3.54	2.40	5.25	5.92
b_1	-0.17	5.12	-0.62	0.10	5.33	0.25	-0.44	4.91	-1.17
b_2	-0.12	0.89	-2.52	-0.15	1.03	-1.91	-0.09	0.74	-1.64
b_3	0.33	1.24	4.80	0.34	1.36	3.17	0.31	1.10	3.67

subperiods (0.36 and 0.35) are close to the average slope (0.35) for the overall period. The subperiod results thus support the conclusion that, among the variables considered here, book-to-market equity is consistently the most powerful for explaining the cross-section of average stock returns.

Finally, Roll (1983) and Keim (1983) show that the size effect is stronger in January. We have examined the monthly slopes from the FM regressions in Table VI for evidence of a January seasonal in the relation between book-to-market equity and average return. The average January slopes for ln(BE/ME) are about twice those for February to December. Unlike the size effect, however, the strong relation between book-to-market equity and average return is not special to January. The average monthly February-to-December slopes for ln(BE/ME) are about 4 standard errors from 0, and they are close to (within 0.05 of) the average slopes for the whole year. Thus, there is a January seasonal in the book-to-market equity effect, but the positive relation between BE/ME and average return is strong throughout the year.

D. β and the Market Factor: Caveats

Some caveats about the negative evidence on the role of β in average returns are in order. The average premiums for β , size, and book-to-market

equity depend on the definitions of the variables used in the regressions. For example, suppose we replace book-to-market equity ($\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$) with book equity ($\ln(\text{BE})$). As long as size ($\ln(\text{ME})$) is also in the regression, this change will not affect the intercept, the fitted values or the R^2 . But the change, in variables increases the average slope (and the t -statistic) on $\ln(\text{ME})$. In other words, it increases the risk premium associated with size. Other redefinitions of the β , size, and book-to-market variables will produce different regression slopes and perhaps different inferences about average premiums, including possible resuscitation of a role for β . And, of course, at the moment, we have no theoretical basis for choosing among different versions of the variables.

Moreover, the tests here are restricted to stocks. It is possible that including other assets will change the inferences about the average premiums for β , size, and book-to-market equity. For example, the large average intercepts for the FM regressions in Table VI suggest that the regressions will not do a good job on Treasury bills, which have low average returns and are likely to have small loadings on the underlying market, size, and book-to-market factors in returns. Extending the tests to bills and other bonds may well change our inferences about average risk premiums, including the revival of a role for market β .

We emphasize, however, that different approaches to the tests are not likely to revive the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model. Resuscitation of the SLB model requires that a better proxy for the market portfolio (a) overturns our evidence that the simple relation between β and average stock returns is flat and (b) leaves β as the only variable relevant for explaining average returns. Such results seem unlikely, given Stambaugh's (1982) evidence that tests of the SLB model do not seem to be sensitive to the choice of a market proxy. Thus, if there is a role for β in average returns, it is likely to be found in a multi-factor model that transforms the flat simple relation between average return and β into a positively sloped conditional relation.

V. Conclusions and Implications

The Sharpe-Lintner-Black model has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average return and risk. Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) find that, as predicted by the model, there is a positive simple relation between average return and market β during the early years (1926-1968) of the CRSP NYSE returns file. Like Reinganum (1981) and Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), we find that this simple relation between β and average return disappears during the more recent 1963-1990 period. The appendix that follows shows that the relation between β and average return is also weak in the last half century (1941-1990) of returns on NYSE stocks. In short, our tests do not support the central prediction of the SLB model, that average stock returns are positively related to market β .

Banz (1981) documents a strong negative relation between average return and firm size. Bhandari (1988) finds that average return is positively related to leverage, and Basu (1983) finds a positive relation between average return

and E/P. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) document a positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity for U.S. stocks, and Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1992) find that BE/ME is also a powerful variable for explaining average returns on Japanese stocks.

Variables like size, E/P, leverage, and book-to-market equity are all scaled versions of a firm's stock price. They can be regarded as different ways of extracting information from stock prices about the cross-section of expected stock returns (Ball (1978), Keim (1988)). Since all these variables are scaled versions of price, it is reasonable to expect that some of them are redundant for explaining average returns. Our main result is that for the 1963–1990 period, size and book-to-market equity capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with size, E/P, book-to-market equity, and leverage.

A. Rational Asset-Pricing Stories

Are our results consistent with asset-pricing theory? Since the FM intercept is constrained to be the same for all stocks, FM regressions always impose a linear factor structure on returns and expected returns that is consistent with the multifactor asset-pricing models of Merton (1973) and Ross (1976). Thus our tests impose a rational asset-pricing framework on the relation between average return and size and book-to-market equity.

Even if our results are consistent with asset-pricing theory, they are not economically satisfying. What is the economic explanation for the roles of size and book-to-market equity in average returns? We suggest several paths of inquiry.

- (a) The intercepts and slopes in the monthly FM regressions of returns on $\ln(\text{ME})$ and $\ln(\text{BE}/\text{ME})$ are returns on portfolios that mimic the underlying common risk factors in returns proxied by size and book-to-market equity (Fama (1976), chapter 9). Examining the relations between the returns on these portfolios and economic variables that measure variation in business conditions might help expose the nature of the economic risks captured by size and book-to-market equity.
- (b) Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985) argue that the relation between size and average return proxies for a more fundamental relation between expected returns and economic risk factors. Their most powerful factor in explaining the size effect is the difference between the monthly returns on low- and high-grade corporate bonds, which in principle captures a kind of default risk in returns that is priced. It would be interesting to test whether loadings on this or other economic factors, such as those of Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), can explain the roles of size and book-to-market equity in our tests.
- (c) In a similar vein, Chan and Chen (1991) argue that the relation between size and average return is a relative-prospects effect. The earning prospects of distressed firms are more sensitive to economic

conditions. This results in a distress factor in returns that is priced in expected returns. Chan and Chen construct two mimicking portfolios for the distress factor, based on dividend changes and leverage. It would be interesting to check whether loadings on their distress factors absorb the size and book-to-market equity effects in average returns that are documented here.

- (d) In fact, if stock prices are rational, BE/ME, the ratio of the book value of a stock to the market's assessment of its value, should be a direct indicator of the relative prospects of firms. For example, we expect that high BE/ME firms have low earnings on assets relative to low BE/ME firms. Our work (in progress) suggests that there is indeed a clean separation between high and low BE/ME firms on various measures of economic fundamentals. Low BE/ME firms are persistently strong performers, while the economic performance of high BE/ME firms is persistently weak.

B. Irrational Asset-Pricing Stories

The discussion above assumes that the asset-pricing effects captured by size and book-to-market equity are rational. For BE/ME, our most powerful expected-return variable, there is an obvious alternative. The cross-section of book-to-market ratios might result from market overreaction to the relative prospects of firms. If overreaction tends to be corrected, BE/ME will predict the cross-section of stock returns.

Simple tests do not confirm that the size and book-to-market effects in average returns are due to market overreaction, at least of the type posited by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). One overreaction measure used by DeBondt and Thaler is a stock's most recent 3-year return. Their overreaction story predicts that 3-year losers have strong post-ranking returns relative to 3-year winners. In FM regressions (not shown) for individual stocks, the 3-year lagged return shows no power even when used alone to explain average returns. The univariate average slope for the lagged return is negative, -6 basis points per month, but less than 0.5 standard errors from 0.

C. Applications

Our main result is that two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, seem to describe the cross-section of average stock returns. Prescriptions for using this evidence depend on (a) whether it will persist, and (b) whether it results from rational or irrational asset-pricing.

It is possible that, by chance, size and book-to-market equity happen to describe the cross-section of average returns in our sample, but they were and are unrelated to expected returns. We put little weight on this possibility, especially for book-to-market equity. First, although BE/ME has long been touted as a measure of the return prospects of stocks, there is no evidence that its explanatory power deteriorates through time. The 1963-1990 relation between BE/ME and average return is strong, and remarkably similar

for the 1963–1976 and 1977–1990 subperiods. Second, our preliminary work on economic fundamentals suggests that high-BE/ME firms tend to be persistently poor earners relative to low-BE/ME firms. Similarly, small firms have a long period of poor earnings during the 1980s not shared with big firms. The systematic patterns in fundamentals give us some hope that size and book-to-market equity proxy for risk factors in returns, related to relative earning prospects, that are rationally priced in expected returns.

If our results are more than chance, they have practical implications for portfolio formation and performance evaluation by investors whose primary concern is long-term average returns. If asset-pricing is rational, size and BE/ME must proxy for risk. Our results then imply that the performance of managed portfolios (e.g., pension funds and mutual funds) can be evaluated by comparing their average returns with the average returns of benchmark portfolios with similar size and BE/ME characteristics. Likewise, the expected returns for different portfolio strategies can be estimated from the historical average returns of portfolios with matching size and BE/ME properties.

If asset-pricing is irrational and size and BE/ME do not proxy for risk, our results might still be used to evaluate portfolio performance and measure the expected returns from alternative investment strategies. If stock prices are irrational, however, the likely persistence of the results is more suspect.

Appendix **Size Versus β : 1941–1990**

Our results on the absence of a relation between β and average stock returns for 1963–1990 are so contrary to the tests of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), and (more recently) Chan and Chen (1988), that further tests are appropriate. We examine the roles of size and β in the average returns on NYSE stocks for the half-century 1941–1990, the longest available period that avoids the high volatility of returns in the Great Depression. We do not include the accounting variables in the tests because of the strong selection bias (toward successful firms) in the COMPUSTAT data prior to 1962.

We first replicate the results of Chan and Chen (1988). Like them, we find that when portfolios are formed on size alone, there are strong relations between average return and either size or β ; average return increases with β and decreases with size. For size portfolios, however, size ($\ln(\text{ME})$) and β are almost perfectly correlated (-0.98), so it is difficult to distinguish between the roles of size and β in average returns.

One way to generate strong variation in β that is unrelated to size is to form portfolios on size and then on β . As in Tables I to III, we find that the resulting independent variation in β just about washes out the positive simple relation between average return and β observed when portfolios are formed on size alone. The results for NYSE stocks for 1941–1990 are thus much like those for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for 1963–1990.

The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

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This appendix also has methodological goals. For example, the FM regressions in Table III use returns on individual stocks as the dependent variable. Since we allocate portfolio β s to individual stocks but use firm-specific values of other variables like size, β may be at a disadvantage in the regressions for individual stocks. This appendix shows, however, that regressions for portfolios, which put β and size on equal footing, produce results comparable to those for individual stocks.

A. Size Portfolios

Table AI shows average monthly returns and market β s for 12 portfolios of NYSE stocks formed on the basis of size (ME) at the end of each year from 1940 to 1989. For these size portfolios, there is a strong positive relation between average return and β . Average returns fall from 1.96% per month for the smallest ME portfolio (1A) to 0.93% for the largest (10B) and β falls from 1.60 to 0.95. (Note also that, as claimed earlier, estimating β as the sum of the slopes in the regression of a portfolio's return on the current and prior month's NYSE value-weighted return produces much larger β s for the smallest ME portfolios and slightly smaller β s for the largest ME portfolios.)

The FM regressions in Table AI confirm the positive simple relation between average return and β for size portfolios. In the regressions of the size-portfolio returns on β alone, the average premium for a unit of β is 1.45% per month. In the regressions of individual stock returns on β (where stocks are assigned the β of their size portfolio), the premium for a unit of β is 1.39%. Both estimates are about 3 standard errors from 0. Moreover, the β s of size portfolios do not leave a residual size effect; the average residuals from the simple regressions of returns on β in Table AI show no relation to size. These positive SLB results for 1941-1990 are like those obtained by Chan and Chen (1988) in tests on size portfolios for 1954-1983.

There is, however, evidence in Table AI that all is not well with the β s of the size portfolios. They do a fine job on the relation between size and average return, but they do a lousy job on their main task, the relation between β and average return. When the residuals from the regressions of returns on β are grouped using the pre-ranking β s of individual stocks, the average residuals are strongly positive for low- β stocks (0.51% per month for group 1A) and negative for high- β stocks (-1.05% for 10B). Thus the market lines estimated with size-portfolio β s exaggerate the tradeoff of average return for β ; they underestimate average returns on low- β stocks and overestimate average returns on high- β stocks. This pattern in the β -sorted average residuals for individual stocks suggests that (a) there is variation in β across stocks that is lost in the size portfolios, and (b) this variation in β is not rewarded as well as the variation in β that is related to size.

B. Two-Pass Size- β Portfolios

Like Table I, Table AII shows that subdividing size deciles using the (pre-ranking) β s of individual stocks results in strong variation in β that is

Table AI
Average Returns, Post-Ranking β s and Fama-MacBeth Regression Slopes for
Size Portfolios of NYSE Stocks: 1941-1990

At the end of each year $t - 1$, stocks are assigned to 12 portfolios using ranked values of ME. Included are all NYSE stocks that have a CRSP price and shares for December of year $t - 1$ and returns for at least 24 of the 60 months ending in December of year $t - 1$ (for pre-ranking β estimates). The middle 8 portfolios cover size deciles 2 to 9. The 4 extreme portfolios (1A, 1B, 10A, and 10B) split the smallest and largest deciles in half. We compute equal-weighted returns on the portfolios for the 12 months of year t using all surviving stocks. Average Return is the time-series average of the monthly portfolio returns for 1941-1990, in percent. Average firms is the average number of stocks in the portfolios each month. The simple β s are estimated by regressing the 1941-1990 sample of post-ranking monthly returns for a size portfolio on the current month's value-weighted NYSE portfolio return. The sum β s are the sum of the slopes from a regression of the post-ranking monthly returns on the current and prior month's VW NYSE returns.

The independent variables in the Fama-MacBeth regressions are defined for each firm at the end of December of each year $t - 1$. Stocks are assigned the post-ranking (sum) β of the size portfolio they are in at the end of year $t - 1$. ME is price times shares outstanding at the end of year $t - 1$. In the individual-stock regressions, these values of the explanatory variables are matched with CRSP returns for each of the 12 months of year t . The portfolio regressions match the equal-weighted portfolio returns with the equal-weighted averages of β and $\ln(\text{ME})$ for the surviving stocks in each month of year t . Slope is the average of the (600) monthly FM regression slopes and SE is the standard error of the average slope. The residuals from the monthly regressions for year t are grouped into 12 portfolios on the basis of size (ME) or pre-ranking β (estimated with 24 to 60 months of data, as available) at the end of year $t - 1$. The average residuals are the time-series averages of the monthly equal-weighted portfolio residuals, in percent. The average residuals for regressions (1) and (2) (not shown) are quite similar to those for regressions (4) and (5) (shown).

	Portfolios Formed on Size											
	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Ave. return	1.96	1.59	1.44	1.36	1.28	1.24	1.23	1.17	1.15	1.13	0.97	0.93
Ave. firms	57	56	110	107	107	108	111	113	115	118	59	59
Simple β	1.29	1.24	1.21	1.19	1.16	1.13	1.13	1.12	1.09	1.05	1.00	0.98
Standard error	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Sum β	1.60	1.44	1.37	1.32	1.26	1.23	1.19	1.17	1.12	1.06	0.99	0.95
Standard error	0.10	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table AI—Continued

	Portfolio Regressions				Individual Stock Regressions							
	(1) β	(2) $\ln(\text{ME})$	(3) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$		(4) β	(5) $\ln(\text{ME})$	(6) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$					
Slope	1.45	-0.137	3.05	0.149	1.39	-0.133	0.71	-0.060				
SE	0.47	0.044	1.51	0.115	0.46	0.043	0.81	0.062				
Average Residuals for Stocks Grouped on Size												
	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Regression (4)	0.17	0.00	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	0.00	-0.03	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.04
Standard error	0.11	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.06
Regression (5)	0.30	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.13
Standard error	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07
Regression (6)	0.20	0.02	-0.05	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.09	0.00	0.06
Standard error	0.10	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05
Average Residuals for Stocks Grouped on Pre-Ranking β												
	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Regression (4)	0.51	0.61	0.38	0.32	0.16	0.12	0.03	-0.10	-0.27	-0.31	-0.66	-1.05
Standard error	0.21	0.19	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.18	0.23
Regression (5)	-0.10	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.11	-0.33
Standard error	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.13
Regression (6)	0.09	0.25	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.14	0.09	0.01	-0.11	-0.12	-0.38	-0.70
Standard error	0.41	0.37	0.24	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.16	0.21	0.34	0.43

Table AII

**Properties of Portfolios Formed on Size and Pre-Ranking β : NYSE Stocks
Sorted by ME (Down) then Pre-Ranking β (Across): 1941-1990**

At the end of year $t - 1$, the NYSE stocks on CRSP are assigned to 10 size (ME) portfolios. Each size decile is subdivided into 10 β portfolios using pre-ranking β s of individual stocks, estimated with 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in December of year $t - 1$. The equal-weighted monthly returns on the resulting 100 portfolios are then calculated for year t . The average returns are the time-series averages of the monthly returns, in percent. The post-ranking β s use the full 1941-1990 sample of post-ranking returns for each portfolio. The pre- and post-ranking β s are the sum of the slopes from a regression of monthly returns on the current and prior month's NYSE value-weighted market return. The average size for a portfolio is the time-series average of each month's average value of $\ln(\text{ME})$ for stocks in the portfolio. ME is denominated in millions of dollars. There are, on average, about 10 stocks in each size- β portfolio each month. The All column shows parameter values for equal-weighted size-decile (ME) portfolios. The All rows show parameter values for equal-weighted portfolios of the stocks in each β group.

	All	Low- β	β -2	β -3	β -4	β -5	β -6	β -7	β -8	β -9	High- β
Panel A: Average Monthly Return (in Percent)											
All		1.22	1.30	1.32	1.35	1.36	1.34	1.29	1.34	1.14	1.10
Small-ME	1.78	1.74	1.76	2.08	1.91	1.92	1.72	1.77	1.91	1.56	1.46
ME-2	1.44	1.41	1.35	1.33	1.61	1.72	1.59	1.40	1.62	1.24	1.11
ME-3	1.36	1.21	1.40	1.22	1.47	1.34	1.51	1.33	1.57	1.33	1.21
ME-4	1.28	1.26	1.29	1.19	1.27	1.51	1.30	1.19	1.56	1.18	1.00
ME-5	1.24	1.22	1.30	1.28	1.33	1.21	1.37	1.41	1.31	0.92	1.06
ME-6	1.23	1.21	1.32	1.37	1.09	1.34	1.10	1.40	1.21	1.22	1.08
ME-7	1.17	1.08	1.23	1.37	1.27	1.19	1.34	1.10	1.11	0.87	1.17
ME-8	1.15	1.06	1.18	1.26	1.25	1.26	1.17	1.16	1.05	1.08	1.04
ME-9	1.13	0.99	1.13	1.00	1.24	1.28	1.31	1.15	1.11	1.09	1.05
Large-ME	0.95	0.99	1.01	1.12	1.01	0.89	0.95	0.95	1.00	0.90	0.68

Table AII—Continued

	All	Low- β	β -2	β -3	β -4	β -5	β -6	β -7	β -8	β -9	High- β
Panel B: Post-Ranking β											
All		0.76	0.95	1.05	1.14	1.22	1.26	1.34	1.38	1.49	1.69
Small-ME	1.52	1.17	1.40	1.31	1.50	1.46	1.50	1.69	1.60	1.75	1.92
ME-2	1.37	0.86	1.09	1.12	1.24	1.39	1.42	1.48	1.60	1.69	1.91
ME-3	1.32	0.88	0.96	1.18	1.19	1.33	1.40	1.43	1.56	1.64	1.74
ME-4	1.26	0.69	0.95	1.06	1.15	1.24	1.29	1.46	1.43	1.64	1.83
ME-5	1.23	0.70	0.95	1.04	1.10	1.22	1.32	1.34	1.41	1.56	1.72
ME-6	1.19	0.68	0.86	1.04	1.13	1.20	1.20	1.35	1.36	1.48	1.70
ME-7	1.17	0.67	0.88	0.95	1.14	1.18	1.26	1.27	1.32	1.44	1.68
ME-8	1.12	0.64	0.83	0.99	1.06	1.14	1.14	1.21	1.26	1.39	1.58
ME-9	1.06	0.68	0.81	0.94	0.96	1.06	1.11	1.18	1.22	1.25	1.46
Large-ME	0.97	0.65	0.73	0.90	0.91	0.97	1.01	1.01	1.07	1.12	1.38
Panel C: Average Size (ln(ME))											
All		4.39	4.39	4.40	4.40	4.39	4.40	4.38	4.37	4.37	4.34
Small-ME	1.93	2.04	1.99	2.00	1.96	1.92	1.92	1.91	1.90	1.87	1.80
ME-2	2.80	2.81	2.79	2.81	2.83	2.80	2.79	2.80	2.80	2.79	2.79
ME-3	3.27	3.28	3.27	3.28	3.27	3.27	3.28	3.29	3.27	3.27	3.26
ME-4	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.68	3.68	3.67	3.68	3.66	3.67	3.67
ME-5	4.06	4.07	4.06	4.05	4.06	4.07	4.06	4.05	4.05	4.06	4.06
ME-6	4.45	4.45	4.44	4.46	4.45	4.45	4.45	4.45	4.44	4.45	4.45
ME-7	4.87	4.86	4.87	4.86	4.87	4.87	4.88	4.87	4.87	4.85	4.87
ME-8	5.36	5.38	5.38	5.38	5.35	5.36	5.37	5.37	5.36	5.35	5.34
ME-9	5.98	5.96	5.98	5.99	6.00	5.98	5.98	5.97	5.95	5.96	5.96
Large-ME	7.12	7.10	7.12	7.16	7.17	7.20	7.29	7.14	7.09	7.04	6.83

independent of size. The β sort of a size decile always produces portfolios with similar average $\ln(\text{ME})$ but much different (post-ranking) β s. Table AII also shows, however, that investors are not compensated for the variation in β that is independent of size. Despite the wide range of β s in each size decile, average returns show no tendency to increase with β . AII

The FM regressions in Table AIII formalize the roles of size and β in NYSE average returns for 1941–1990. The regressions of returns on β alone show that using the β s of the portfolios formed on size and β , rather than size alone, causes the average slope on β to fall from about 1.4% per month (Table AI) to about 0.23% (about 1 standard error from 0). Thus, allowing for variation in β that is unrelated to size flattens the relation between average return and β , to the point where it is indistinguishable from no relation at all.

The flatter market lines in Table AIII succeed, however, in erasing the negative relation between β and average residuals observed in the regressions of returns on β alone in Table AI. Thus, forming portfolios on size and β (Table AIII) produces a better description of the simple relation between average return and β than forming portfolios on size alone (Table AI). This improved description of the relation between average return and β is evidence that the β estimates for the two-pass size- β portfolios capture variation in true β s that is missed when portfolios are formed on size alone.

Unfortunately, the flatter market lines in Table AIII have a cost, the emergence of a residual size effect. Grouped on the basis of ME for individual stocks, the average residuals from the univariate regressions of returns on the β s of the 100 size- β portfolios are strongly positive for small stocks and negative for large stocks (0.60% per month for the smallest ME group, 1A, and -0.27% for the largest, 10B). Thus, when we allow for variation in β that is independent of size, the resulting β s leave a large size effect in average returns. This residual size effect is much like that observed by Banz (1981) with the β s of portfolios formed on size and β .

The correlation between size and β is -0.98 for portfolios formed on size alone. The independent variation in β obtained with the second-pass sort on β lowers the correlation to -0.50 . The lower correlation means that bivariate regressions of returns on β and $\ln(\text{ME})$ are more likely to distinguish true size effects from true β effects in average returns.

The bivariate regressions (Table AIII) that use the β s of the size- β portfolios are more bad news for β . The average slopes for $\ln(\text{ME})$ are close to the values in the univariate size regressions, and almost 4 standard errors from 0, but the average slopes for β are negative and less than 1 standard error from 0. The message from the bivariate regressions is that there is a strong relation between size and average return. But like the regressions in Table AIII that explain average returns with β alone, the bivariate regressions say that there is no reliable relation between β and average returns when the tests use β s that are not close substitutes for size. These uncomfortable SLB results for NYSE stocks for 1941–1990 are much like those for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for 1963–1990 in Table III.

C. Subperiod Diagnostics

Our results for 1941-1990 seem to contradict the evidence in Black, Jensen, and Scholes (BJS) (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (FM) (1973) that there is a reliable positive relation between average return and β . The β s in BJS and FM are from portfolios formed on β alone, and the market proxy is the NYSE equal-weighted portfolio. We use the β s of portfolios formed on size and β , and our market is the value-weighted NYSE portfolio. We can report, however, that our inference that there isn't much relation between β and average return is unchanged when (a) the market proxy is the NYSE EW portfolio, (b) portfolios are formed on just (pre-ranking) β s, or (c) the order of forming the size- β portfolios is changed from size then β to β then size.

A more important difference between our results and the earlier studies is the sample periods. The tests in BJS and FM end in the 1960s. Table AIV shows that when we split the 50-year 1941-1990 period in half, the univariate FM regressions of returns on β produce an average slope for 1941-1965 (0.50% per month, $t = 1.82$) more like that of the earlier studies. In contrast, the average slope on β for 1966-1990 is close to 0 (-0.02 , $t = 0.06$).

But Table AIV also shows that drawing a distinction between the results for 1941-1965 and 1966-1990 is misleading. The stronger tradeoff of average return for β in the simple regressions for 1941-1965 is due to the first 10 years, 1941-1950. This is the only period in Table AIV that produces an average premium for β (1.26% per month) that is both positive and more than 2 standard errors from 0. Conversely, the weak relation between β and average return for 1966-1990 is largely due to 1981-1990. The strong negative average slope in the univariate regressions of returns on β for 1981-1990 (-1.01 , $t = -2.10$) offsets a positive slope for 1971-1980 (0.82, $t = 1.27$).

The subperiod variation in the average slopes from the FM regressions of returns on β alone seems moot, however, given the evidence in Table AIV that adding size always kills any positive tradeoff of average return for β in the subperiods. Adding size to the regressions for 1941-1965 causes the average slope for β to drop from 0.50 ($t = 1.82$) to 0.07 ($t = 0.28$). In contrast, the average slope on size in the bivariate regressions (-0.16 , $t = -2.97$) is close to its value (-0.17 , $t = -2.88$) in the regressions of returns on $\ln(\text{ME})$ alone. Similar comments hold for 1941-1950. In short, any evidence of a positive average premium for β in the subperiods seems to be a size effect in disguise.

D. Can the SLB Model Be Saved?

Before concluding that β has no explanatory power, it is appropriate to consider other explanations for our results. One possibility is that the variation in β produced by the β sorts of size deciles is just sampling error. If so, it is not surprising that the variation in β within a size decile is unrelated to average return, or that size dominates β in bivariate tests. The standard errors of the β s suggest, however, that this explanation cannot save the SLB

Table AIII
Average Slopes, Their Standard Errors (SE), and Average Residuals from
Monthly FM Regressions for Individual NYSE Stocks and for Portfolios Formed
on Size and Pre-Ranking β : 1941-1990

Stocks are assigned the post-ranking β of the size- β portfolio they are in at the end of year $t - 1$ (Table AII). $\ln(\text{ME})$ is the natural log of price times shares outstanding at the end of year $t - 1$. In the individual-stock regressions, these values of the explanatory variables are matched with CRSP returns for each of the 12 months in year t . The portfolio regressions match the equal-weighted portfolio returns for the size- β portfolios (Table AII) with the equal-weighted averages of β and $\ln(\text{ME})$ for the surviving stocks in each month of year t . Slope is the time-series average of the monthly regression slopes from 1941-1990 (600 months); SE is the time-series standard error of the average slope.

The residuals from the monthly regressions in year t are grouped into 12 portfolios on the basis of size or pre-ranking β (estimated with 24 to 60 months of returns, as available) as of the end of year $t - 1$. The average residuals are the time-series averages of the monthly equal-weighted averages of the residuals in percent. The average residuals (not shown) from the FM regressions (1) to (3) that use the returns on the 100 size- β portfolios as the dependent variable are always within 0.01 of those from the regressions for individual stock returns. This is not surprising given that the correlation between the time-series of 1941-1990 monthly FM slopes on β or $\ln(\text{ME})$ for the comparable portfolio and individual stock regressions is always greater than 0.99.

	Portfolio Regressions			Individual Stock Regressions				
	(1) β	(2) $\ln(\text{ME})$	(3) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$	(4) β	(5) $\ln(\text{ME})$	(6) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$		
Slope	0.22	-0.128	-0.13	-0.143	0.24	-0.133	-0.14	-0.147
SE	0.24	0.043	0.21	0.039	0.23	0.043	0.21	0.039

	Average Residuals for Stocks Grouped on Size											
	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Regression (4)	0.60	0.26	0.13	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.09	-0.10	-0.11	-0.25	-0.27
Standard error	0.21	0.10	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08
Regression (5)	0.30	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.13
Standard error	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07
Regression (6)	0.31	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.09	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.13
Standard error	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07

Table AIII—Continued

	Portfolio Regressions						Individual Stock Regressions					
	(1) β	(2) $\ln(\text{ME})$		(3) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$		(4) β	(5) $\ln(\text{ME})$		(6) β and $\ln(\text{ME})$			
Average Residuals for Stocks Grouped on Pre-Ranking β												
	1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B
Regression (4)	-0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.11	-0.32
Standard error	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07
Regression (5)	-0.10	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.11	-0.33
Standard error	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.13
Regression (6)	-0.17	-0.07	-0.02	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.23
Standard error	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07

Table AIV
**Subperiod Average Returns on the NYSE Value-Weighted and
 Equal-Weighted Portfolios and Average Values of the
 Intercepts and Slopes for the FM Cross-Sectional Regressions
 of Individual Stock Returns on β and Size ($\ln(\text{ME})$)**

Mean is the average VW or EW return or an average slope from the monthly cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns on β and/or $\ln(\text{ME})$. Std is the standard deviation of the time-series of returns or slopes, and $t(\text{Mn})$ is Mean over its time-series standard error. The average slopes (not shown) from the FM regressions that use the returns on the 100 size- β portfolios of Table AII as the dependent variable are quite close to those for individual stock returns. (The correlation between the 1941-1990 month-by-month slopes on β or $\ln(\text{ME})$ for the comparable portfolio and individual stock regressions is always greater than 0.99.)

Variable	1941-1990 (600 Mos.)			1941-1965 (300 Mos.)			1966-1990 (300 Mos.)		
	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$	Mean	Std	$t(\text{Mn})$
NYSE Value-Weighted (VW) and Equal-Weighted (EW) Portfolio Returns									
VW	0.93	4.15	5.49	1.10	3.58	5.30	0.76	4.64	2.85
EW	1.12	5.10	5.37	1.33	4.42	5.18	0.91	5.70	2.77
$R_{it} = a + b_{1t}\beta_{it} + e_{it}$									
a	0.98	3.93	6.11	0.84	3.18	4.56	1.13	4.57	4.26
b_1	0.24	5.52	1.07	0.50	4.75	1.82	-0.02	6.19	-0.06
$R_{it} = a + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$									
a	1.70	8.24	5.04	1.88	6.43	5.06	1.51	9.72	2.69
b_2	-0.13	1.06	-3.07	-0.17	1.01	-2.88	-0.10	1.11	-1.54
$R_{it} = a + b_{1t}\beta_{it} + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$									
a	1.97	6.16	7.84	1.80	4.77	6.52	2.14	7.29	5.09
b_1	-0.14	5.05	-0.66	0.07	4.15	0.28	-0.34	5.80	-1.01
b_2	-0.15	0.96	-3.75	-0.16	0.94	-2.97	-0.13	0.99	-2.34

Table AIV—Continued

Panel B:										
Return	1941-1950		1951-1960		1961-1970		1971-1980		1981-1990	
	Mean	t(Mn)	Mean	t(Mn)	Mean	t(Mn)	Mean	t(Mn)	Mean	t(Mn)
NYSE Value-Weighted (VW) and Equal-Weighted (EW) Portfolio Returns										
VW	1.05	2.88	1.18	3.95	0.66	1.84	0.72	1.67	1.04	2.40
EW	1.59	3.16	1.13	3.76	0.88	1.96	1.04	1.82	0.95	2.01
$R_{it} = a + b_{1t}\beta_{it} + e_{it}$										
a	0.24	0.66	1.41	6.36	0.64	1.94	0.27	0.62	2.35	5.99
b ₁	1.26	2.20	-0.19	-0.63	0.32	0.72	0.82	1.27	-1.01	-2.10
$R_{it} = a + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$										
a	2.63	3.47	1.08	2.73	1.78	2.50	2.18	2.03	0.82	1.20
b ₂	-0.37	-2.90	0.03	0.53	-0.17	-2.19	-0.20	-1.57	0.04	0.57
$R_{it} = a + b_{1t}\beta_{it} + b_{2t}\ln(\text{ME}_{it}) + e_{it}$										
a	2.14	3.93	1.38	4.03	2.01	4.16	1.50	2.12	2.84	4.25
b ₁	0.34	0.75	-0.17	-0.53	-0.11	-0.27	0.41	0.75	-1.14	-2.16
b ₂	-0.34	-2.92	0.01	0.20	-0.18	-2.89	-0.16	-1.50	-0.07	-0.84

model. The standard errors for portfolios formed on size and β are only slightly larger (0.02 to 0.11) than those for portfolios formed on size alone (0.01 to 0.10, Table AD). And the range of the post-ranking β s within a size decile is always large relative to the standard errors of the β s.

Another possibility is that the proportionality condition (1) for the variation through time in true β s, that justifies the use of full-period post-ranking β s in the FM tests, does not work well for portfolios formed on size and β . If this is a problem, post-ranking β s for the size- β portfolios should not be highly correlated across subperiods. The correlation between the half-period (1941-1965 and 1966-1990) β s of the size- β portfolios is 0.91, which we take to be good evidence that the full-period β estimates for these portfolios are informative about true β s. We can also report that using 5-year β s (pre- or post-ranking) in the FM regressions does not change our negative conclusions about the role of β in average returns, as long as portfolios are formed on β as well as size, or on β alone.

Any attempt to salvage the simple positive relation between β and average return predicted by the SLB model runs into three damaging facts, clear in Table AII. (a) Forming portfolios on size and pre-ranking β s produces a wide range of post-ranking β s in every size decile. (b) The post-ranking β s closely reproduce (in deciles 2 to 10 they exactly reproduce) the ordering of the pre-ranking β s used to form the β -sorted portfolios. It seems safe to conclude that the increasing pattern of the post-ranking β s in every size decile captures the ordering of the true β s. (c) Contrary to the SLB model, the β sorts do not produce a similar ordering of average returns. Within the rows (size deciles) of the average return matrix in Table AII, the high- β portfolios have average returns that are close to or less than the low- β portfolios.

But the most damaging evidence against the SLB model comes from the univariate regressions of returns on β in Table AIII. They say that when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between β and average return for 1941-1990 is weak, perhaps nonexistent, even when β is the only explanatory variable. We are forced to conclude that the SLB model does not describe the last 50 years of average stock returns.

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The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) marks the birth of asset pricing theory (resulting in a Nobel Prize for Sharpe in 1990). Four decades later, the CAPM is still widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. It is the centerpiece of MBA investment courses. Indeed, it is often the only asset pricing model taught in these courses.¹

The attraction of the CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, the empirical record of the model is poor—poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in applications. The CAPM's empirical problems may reflect theoretical failings, the result of many simplifying assumptions. But they may also be caused by difficulties in implementing valid tests of the model. For example, the CAPM says that the risk of a stock should be measured relative to a comprehensive "market portfolio" that in principle can include not just traded financial assets, but also consumer durables, real estate and human capital. Even if we take a narrow view of the model and limit its purview to traded financial assets, is it

¹ Although every asset pricing model is a capital asset pricing model, the finance profession reserves the acronym CAPM for the specific model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) discussed here. Thus, throughout the paper we refer to the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model as the CAPM.

■ *Eugene F. Fama is Robert R. McCormick Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Kenneth R. French is Carl E. and Catherine M. Heidt Professor of Finance, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. Their e-mail addresses are <eugene.fama@gsb.uchicago.edu> and <kfrench@dartmouth.edu>, respectively.*

legitimate to limit further the market portfolio to U.S. common stocks (a typical choice), or should the market be expanded to include bonds, and other financial assets, perhaps around the world? In the end, we argue that whether the model's problems reflect weaknesses in the theory or in its empirical implementation, the failure of the CAPM in empirical tests implies that most applications of the model are invalid.

We begin by outlining the logic of the CAPM, focusing on its predictions about risk and expected return. We then review the history of empirical work and what it says about shortcomings of the CAPM that pose challenges to be explained by alternative models.

The Logic of the CAPM


The CAPM builds on the model of portfolio choice developed by Harry Markowitz (1959). In Markowitz's model, an investor selects a portfolio at time $t - 1$ that produces a stochastic return at t . The model assumes investors are risk averse and, when choosing among portfolios, they care only about the mean and variance of their one-period investment return. As a result, investors choose "mean-variance-efficient" portfolios, in the sense that the portfolios 1) minimize the variance of portfolio return, given expected return, and 2) maximize expected return, given variance. Thus, the Markowitz approach is often called a "mean-variance model."

The portfolio model provides an algebraic condition on asset weights in mean-variance-efficient portfolios. The CAPM turns this algebraic statement into a testable prediction about the relation between risk and expected return by identifying a portfolio that must be efficient if asset prices are to clear the market of all assets.

Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) add two key assumptions to the Markowitz model to identify a portfolio that must be mean-variance-efficient. The first assumption is *complete agreement*: given market clearing asset prices at $t - 1$, investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns from $t - 1$ to t . And this distribution is the true one—that is, it is the distribution from which the returns we use to test the model are drawn. The second assumption is that there is *borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate*, which is the same for all investors and does not depend on the amount borrowed or lent.

Figure 1 describes portfolio opportunities and tells the CAPM story. The horizontal axis shows portfolio risk, measured by the standard deviation of portfolio return; the vertical axis shows expected return. The curve *abc*, which is called the minimum variance frontier, traces combinations of expected return and risk for portfolios of risky assets that minimize return variance at different levels of expected return. (These portfolios do not include risk-free borrowing and lending.) The tradeoff between risk and expected return for minimum variance portfolios is apparent. For example, an investor who wants a high expected return, perhaps at point *a*, must accept high volatility. At point *T*, the investor can have an interme-

Figure 1
 Investment Opportunities



diates expected return with lower volatility. If there is no risk-free borrowing or lending, only portfolios above b along abc are mean-variance-efficient, since these portfolios also maximize expected return, given their return variances.

Adding risk-free borrowing and lending turns the efficient set into a straight line. Consider a portfolio that invests the proportion x of portfolio funds in a risk-free security and $1 - x$ in some portfolio g . If all funds are invested in the risk-free security—that is, they are loaned at the risk-free rate of interest—the result is the point R_f in Figure 1, a portfolio with zero variance and a risk-free rate of return. Combinations of risk-free lending and positive investment in g plot on the straight line between R_f and g . Points to the right of g on the line represent borrowing at the risk-free rate, with the proceeds from the borrowing used to increase investment in portfolio g . In short, portfolios that combine risk-free lending or borrowing with some risky portfolio g plot along a straight line from R_f through g in Figure 1.²

² Formally, the return, expected return and standard deviation of return on portfolios of the risk-free asset f and a risky portfolio g vary with x , the proportion of portfolio funds invested in f , as

$$R_p = xR_f + (1 - x)R_g,$$

$$E(R_p) = xR_f + (1 - x)E(R_g),$$

$$\sigma(R_p) = (1 - x)\sigma(R_g), \quad x \leq 1.0,$$

which together imply that the portfolios plot along the line from R_f through g in Figure 1.

To obtain the mean-variance-efficient portfolios available with risk-free borrowing and lending, one swings a line from R_f in Figure 1 up and to the left as far as possible, to the tangency portfolio T . We can then see that all efficient portfolios are combinations of the risk-free asset (either risk-free borrowing or lending) and a single risky tangency portfolio, T . This key result is Tobin's (1958) "separation theorem."

The punch line of the CAPM is now straightforward. With complete agreement about distributions of returns, all investors see the same opportunity set (Figure 1), and they combine the same risky tangency portfolio T with risk-free lending or borrowing. Since all investors hold the same portfolio T of risky assets, it must be the value-weight market portfolio of risky assets. Specifically, each risky asset's weight in the tangency portfolio, which we now call M (for the "market"), must be the total market value of all outstanding units of the asset divided by the total market value of all risky assets. In addition, the risk-free rate must be set (along with the prices of risky assets) to clear the market for risk-free borrowing and lending.

In short, the CAPM assumptions imply that the market portfolio M must be on the minimum variance frontier if the asset market is to clear. This means that the algebraic relation that holds for any minimum variance portfolio must hold for the market portfolio. Specifically, if there are N risky assets,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Minimum Variance Condition for } M) \quad E(R_i) &= E(R_{ZM}) \\ &+ [E(R_M) - E(R_{ZM})]\beta_{iM}, \quad i = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned}$$

In this equation, $E(R_i)$ is the expected return on asset i , and β_{iM} , the market beta of asset i , is the covariance of its return with the market return divided by the variance of the market return,

$$\text{(Market Beta)} \quad \beta_{iM} = \frac{\text{cov}(R_i, R_M)}{\sigma^2(R_M)}.$$

The first term on the right-hand side of the minimum variance condition, $E(R_{ZM})$, is the expected return on assets that have market betas equal to zero, which means their returns are uncorrelated with the market return. The second term is a risk premium—the market beta of asset i , β_{iM} , times the premium per unit of beta, which is the expected market return, $E(R_M)$, minus $E(R_{ZM})$.

Since the market beta of asset i is also the slope in the regression of its return on the market return, a common (and correct) interpretation of beta is that it measures the sensitivity of the asset's return to variation in the market return. But there is another interpretation of beta more in line with the spirit of the portfolio model that underlies the CAPM. The risk of the market portfolio, as measured by the variance of its return (the denominator of β_{iM}), is a weighted average of the covariance risks of the assets in M (the numerators of β_{iM} for different assets).

Thus, β_{iM} is the covariance risk of asset i in M measured relative to the average covariance risk of assets, which is just the variance of the market return.³ In economic terms, β_{iM} is proportional to the risk each dollar invested in asset i contributes to the market portfolio.

The last step in the development of the Sharpe-Lintner model is to use the assumption of risk-free borrowing and lending to nail down $E(R_{ZM})$, the expected return on zero-beta assets. A risky asset's return is uncorrelated with the market return—its beta is zero—when the average of the asset's covariances with the returns on other assets just offsets the variance of the asset's return. Such a risky asset is riskless in the market portfolio in the sense that it contributes nothing to the variance of the market return.

When there is risk-free borrowing and lending, the expected return on assets that are uncorrelated with the market return, $E(R_{ZM})$, must equal the risk-free rate, R_f . The relation between expected return and beta then becomes the familiar Sharpe-Lintner CAPM equation,

$$\text{(Sharpe-Lintner CAPM)} \quad E(R_i) = R_f + [E(R_M) - R_f]\beta_{iM}, \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

In words, the expected return on any asset i is the risk-free interest rate, R_f , plus a risk premium, which is the asset's market beta, β_{iM} , times the premium per unit of beta risk, $E(R_M) - R_f$.

Unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending is an unrealistic assumption. Fischer Black (1972) develops a version of the CAPM without risk-free borrowing or lending. He shows that the CAPM's key result—that the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient—can be obtained by instead allowing unrestricted short sales of risky assets. In brief, back in Figure 1, if there is no risk-free asset, investors select portfolios from along the mean-variance-efficient frontier from a to b . Market clearing prices imply that when one weights the efficient portfolios chosen by investors by their (positive) shares of aggregate invested wealth, the resulting portfolio is the market portfolio. The market portfolio is thus a portfolio of the efficient portfolios chosen by investors. With unrestricted short selling of risky assets, portfolios made up of efficient portfolios are themselves efficient. Thus, the market portfolio is efficient, which means that the minimum variance condition for M given above holds, and it is the expected return-risk relation of the Black CAPM.

The relations between expected return and market beta of the Black and Sharpe-Lintner versions of the CAPM differ only in terms of what each says about $E(R_{ZM})$, the expected return on assets uncorrelated with the market. The Black version says only that $E(R_{ZM})$ must be less than the expected market return, so the

³ Formally, if x_{iM} is the weight of asset i in the market portfolio, then the variance of the portfolio's return is

$$\sigma^2(R_M) = \text{Cov}(R_M, R_M) = \text{Cov}\left(\sum_{i=1}^N x_{iM}R_i, R_M\right) = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{iM}\text{Cov}(R_i, R_M).$$

premium for beta is positive. In contrast, in the Sharpe-Lintner version of the model, $E(R_{ZM})$ must be the risk-free interest rate, R_f , and the premium per unit of beta risk is $E(R_M) - R_f$.

The assumption that short selling is unrestricted is as unrealistic as unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending. If there is no risk-free asset and short sales of risky assets are not allowed, mean-variance investors still choose efficient portfolios—points above b on the abc curve in Figure 1. But when there is no short selling of risky assets and no risk-free asset, the algebra of portfolio efficiency says that portfolios made up of efficient portfolios are not typically efficient. This means that the market portfolio, which is a portfolio of the efficient portfolios chosen by investors, is not typically efficient. And the CAPM relation between expected return and market beta is lost. This does not rule out predictions about expected return and betas with respect to other efficient portfolios—if theory can specify portfolios that must be efficient if the market is to clear. But so far this has proven impossible.

In short, the familiar CAPM equation relating expected asset returns to their market betas is just an application to the market portfolio of the relation between expected return and portfolio beta that holds in any mean-variance-efficient portfolio. The efficiency of the market portfolio is based on many unrealistic assumptions, including complete agreement and either unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending or unrestricted short selling of risky assets. But all interesting models involve unrealistic simplifications, which is why they must be tested against data.

Early Empirical Tests

Tests of the CAPM are based on three implications of the relation between expected return and market beta implied by the model. First, expected returns on all assets are linearly related to their betas, and no other variable has marginal explanatory power. Second, the beta premium is positive, meaning that the expected return on the market portfolio exceeds the expected return on assets whose returns are uncorrelated with the market return. Third, in the Sharpe-Lintner version of the model, assets uncorrelated with the market have expected returns equal to the risk-free interest rate, and the beta premium is the expected market return minus the risk-free rate. Most tests of these predictions use either cross-section or time-series regressions. Both approaches date to early tests of the model.

Tests on Risk Premiums

The early cross-section regression tests focus on the Sharpe-Lintner model's predictions about the intercept and slope in the relation between expected return and market beta. The approach is to regress a cross-section of average asset returns on estimates of asset betas. The model predicts that the intercept in these regressions is the risk-free interest rate, R_f , and the coefficient on beta is the expected return on the market in excess of the risk-free rate, $E(R_M) - R_f$.

Two problems in these tests quickly became apparent. First, estimates of beta

for individual assets are imprecise, creating a measurement error problem when they are used to explain average returns. Second, the regression residuals have common sources of variation, such as industry effects in average returns. Positive correlation in the residuals produces downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares estimates of the standard errors of the cross-section regression slopes.

To improve the precision of estimated betas, researchers such as Blume (1970), Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) work with portfolios, rather than individual securities. Since expected returns and market betas combine in the same way in portfolios, if the CAPM explains security returns it also explains portfolio returns.⁴ Estimates of beta for diversified portfolios are more precise than estimates for individual securities. Thus, using portfolios in cross-section regressions of average returns on betas reduces the critical errors in variables problem. Grouping, however, shrinks the range of betas and reduces statistical power. To mitigate this problem, researchers sort securities on beta when forming portfolios; the first portfolio contains securities with the lowest betas, and so on, up to the last portfolio with the highest beta assets. This sorting procedure is now standard in empirical tests.

Fama and MacBeth (1973) propose a method for addressing the inference problem caused by correlation of the residuals in cross-section regressions. Instead of estimating a single cross-section regression of average monthly returns on betas, they estimate month-by-month cross-section regressions of monthly returns on betas. The times-series means of the monthly slopes and intercepts, along with the standard errors of the means, are then used to test whether the average premium for beta is positive and whether the average return on assets uncorrelated with the market is equal to the average risk-free interest rate. In this approach, the standard errors of the average intercept and slope are determined by the month-to-month variation in the regression coefficients, which fully captures the effects of residual correlation on variation in the regression coefficients, but sidesteps the problem of actually estimating the correlations. The residual correlations are, in effect, captured via repeated sampling of the regression coefficients. This approach also becomes standard in the literature.

Jensen (1968) was the first to note that the Sharpe-Lintner version of the

⁴ Formally, if x_{ip} , $i = 1, \dots, N$, are the weights for assets in some portfolio p , the expected return and market beta for the portfolio are related to the expected returns and betas of assets as

$$E(R_p) = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} E(R_i), \text{ and } \beta_{pM} = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} \beta_{iM}.$$

Thus, the CAPM relation between expected return and beta,

$$E(R_i) = E(R_f) + [E(R_M) - E(R_f)]\beta_{iM},$$

holds when asset i is a portfolio, as well as when i is an individual security.

relation between expected return and market beta also implies a time-series regression test. The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM says that the expected value of an asset's excess return (the asset's return minus the risk-free interest rate, $R_{it} - R_{ft}$) is completely explained by its expected CAPM risk premium (its beta times the expected value of $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$). This implies that "Jensen's alpha," the intercept term in the time-series regression,

$$\text{(Time-Series Regression)} \quad R_{it} - R_{ft} = \alpha_i + \beta_{iM}(R_{Mt} - R_{ft}) + \varepsilon_{it},$$

is zero for each asset.

The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too "flat." Recall that, in cross-section regressions, the Sharpe-Lintner model predicts that the intercept is the risk-free rate and the coefficient on beta is the expected market return in excess of the risk-free rate, $E(R_M) - R_f$. The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate (typically proxied as the return on a one-month Treasury bill), and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return (proxied as the average return on a portfolio of U.S. common stocks minus the Treasury bill rate). This is true in the early tests, such as Douglas (1968), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend (1973) and Fama and MacBeth (1973), as well as in more recent cross-section regression tests, like Fama and French (1992).


The evidence that the relation between beta and average return is too flat is confirmed in time-series tests, such as Friend and Blume (1970), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Stambaugh (1982). The intercepts in time-series regressions of excess asset returns on the excess market return are positive for assets with low betas and negative for assets with high betas.

Figure 2 provides an updated example of the evidence. In December of each year, we estimate a preranking beta for every NYSE (1928–2003), AMEX (1963–2003) and NASDAQ (1972–2003) stock in the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago) database, using two to five years (as available) of prior monthly returns.⁵ We then form ten value-weight portfolios based on these preranking betas and compute their returns for the next twelve months. We repeat this process for each year from 1928 to 2003. The result is 912 monthly returns on ten beta-sorted portfolios. Figure 2 plots each portfolio's average return against its postranking beta, estimated by regressing its monthly returns for 1928–2003 on the return on the CRSP value-weight portfolio of U.S. common stocks.

The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts that the portfolios plot along a straight

⁵ To be included in the sample for year t , a security must have market equity data (price times shares outstanding) for December of $t - 1$, and CRSP must classify it as ordinary common equity. Thus, we exclude securities such as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).

Figure 2
Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



line, with an intercept equal to the risk-free rate, R_f , and a slope equal to the expected excess return on the market, $E(R_M) - R_f$. We use the average one-month Treasury bill rate and the average excess CRSP market return for 1928–2003 to estimate the predicted line in Figure 2. Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts. The returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return is 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.

Although the observed premium per unit of beta is lower than the Sharpe-Lintner model predicts, the relation between average return and beta in Figure 2 is roughly linear. This is consistent with the Black version of the CAPM, which predicts only that the beta premium is positive. Even this less restrictive model, however, eventually succumbs to the data.

Testing Whether Market Betas Explain Expected Returns

The Sharpe-Lintner and Black versions of the CAPM share the prediction that the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient. This implies that differences in expected return across securities and portfolios are entirely explained by differences in market beta; other variables should add nothing to the explanation of expected return. This prediction plays a prominent role in tests of the CAPM. In the early work, the weapon of choice is cross-section regressions.

In the framework of Fama and MacBeth (1973), one simply adds predetermined explanatory variables to the month-by-month cross-section regressions of

returns on beta. If all differences in expected return are explained by beta, the average slopes on the additional variables should not be reliably different from zero. Clearly, the trick in the cross-section regression approach is to choose specific additional variables likely to expose any problems of the CAPM prediction that, because the market portfolio is efficient, market betas suffice to explain expected asset returns.

For example, in Fama and MacBeth (1973) the additional variables are squared market betas (to test the prediction that the relation between expected return and beta is linear) and residual variances from regressions of returns on the market return (to test the prediction that market beta is the only measure of risk needed to explain expected returns). These variables do not add to the explanation of average returns provided by beta. Thus, the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) are consistent with the hypothesis that their market proxy—an equal-weight portfolio of NYSE stocks—is on the minimum variance frontier.

The hypothesis that market betas completely explain expected returns can also be tested using time-series regressions. In the time-series regression described above (the excess return on asset i regressed on the excess market return), the intercept is the difference between the asset's average excess return and the excess return predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner model, that is, beta times the average excess market return. If the model holds, there is no way to group assets into portfolios whose intercepts are reliably different from zero. For example, the intercepts for a portfolio of stocks with high ratios of earnings to price and a portfolio of stocks with low earning-price ratios should both be zero. Thus, to test the hypothesis that market betas suffice to explain expected returns, one estimates the time-series regression for a set of assets (or portfolios) and then jointly tests the vector of regression intercepts against zero. The trick in this approach is to choose the left-hand-side assets (or portfolios) in a way likely to expose any shortcoming of the CAPM prediction that market betas suffice to explain expected asset returns.

In early applications, researchers use a variety of tests to determine whether the intercepts in a set of time-series regressions are all zero. The tests have the same asymptotic properties, but there is controversy about which has the best small sample properties. Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) settle the debate by providing an F -test on the intercepts that has exact small-sample properties. They also show that the test has a simple economic interpretation. In effect, the test constructs a candidate for the tangency portfolio T in Figure 1 by optimally combining the market proxy and the left-hand-side assets of the time-series regressions. The estimator then tests whether the efficient set provided by the combination of this tangency portfolio and the risk-free asset is reliably superior to the one obtained by combining the risk-free asset with the market proxy alone. In other words, the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken statistic tests whether the market proxy is the tangency portfolio in the set of portfolios that can be constructed by combining the market portfolio with the specific assets used as dependent variables in the time-series regressions.

Enlightened by this insight of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989), one can see

a similar interpretation of the cross-section regression test of whether market betas suffice to explain expected returns. In this case, the test is whether the additional explanatory variables in a cross-section regression identify patterns in the returns on the left-hand-side assets that are not explained by the assets' market betas. This amounts to testing whether the market proxy is on the minimum variance frontier that can be constructed using the market proxy and the left-hand-side assets included in the tests.

An important lesson from this discussion is that time-series and cross-section regressions do not, strictly speaking, test the CAPM. What is literally tested is whether a specific proxy for the market portfolio (typically a portfolio of U.S. common stocks) is efficient in the set of portfolios that can be constructed from it and the left-hand-side assets used in the test. One might conclude from this that the CAPM has never been tested, and prospects for testing it are not good because 1) the set of left-hand-side assets does not include all marketable assets, and 2) data for the true market portfolio of all assets are likely beyond reach (Roll, 1977; more on this later). But this criticism can be leveled at tests of any economic model when the tests are less than exhaustive or when they use proxies for the variables called for by the model.

The bottom line from the early cross-section regression tests of the CAPM, such as Fama and MacBeth (1973), and the early time-series regression tests, like Gibbons (1982) and Stambaugh (1982), is that standard market proxies seem to be on the minimum variance frontier. That is, the central predictions of the Black version of the CAPM, that market betas suffice to explain expected returns and that the risk premium for beta is positive, seem to hold. But the more specific prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM that the premium per unit of beta is the expected market return minus the risk-free interest rate is consistently rejected.

The success of the Black version of the CAPM in early tests produced a consensus that the model is a good description of expected returns. These early results, coupled with the model's simplicity and intuitive appeal, pushed the CAPM to the forefront of finance.

Recent Tests

Starting in the late 1970s, empirical work appears that challenges even the Black version of the CAPM. Specifically, evidence mounts that much of the variation in expected return is unrelated to market beta.

The first blow is Basu's (1977) evidence that when common stocks are sorted on earnings-price ratios, future returns on high E/P stocks are higher than predicted by the CAPM. Banz (1981) documents a size effect: when stocks are sorted on market capitalization (price times shares outstanding), average returns on small stocks are higher than predicted by the CAPM. Bhandari (1988) finds that high debt-equity ratios (book value of debt over the market value of equity, a measure of leverage) are associated with returns that are too high relative to their market betas.

Finally, Statman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) document that stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios (B/M, the ratio of the book value of a common stock to its market value) have high average returns that are not captured by their betas.

There is a theme in the contradictions of the CAPM summarized above. Ratios involving stock prices have information about expected returns missed by market betas. On reflection, this is not surprising. A stock's price depends not only on the expected cash flows it will provide, but also on the expected returns that discount expected cash flows back to the present. Thus, in principle, the cross-section of prices has information about the cross-section of expected returns. (A high expected return implies a high discount rate and a low price.) The cross-section of stock prices is, however, arbitrarily affected by differences in scale (or units). But with a judicious choice of scaling variable X , the ratio X/P can reveal differences in the cross-section of expected stock returns. Such ratios are thus prime candidates to expose shortcomings of asset pricing models—in the case of the CAPM, shortcomings of the prediction that market betas suffice to explain expected returns (Ball, 1978). The contradictions of the CAPM summarized above suggest that earnings-price, debt-equity and book-to-market ratios indeed play this role.

Fama and French (1992) update and synthesize the evidence on the empirical failures of the CAPM. Using the cross-section regression approach, they confirm that size, earnings-price, debt-equity and book-to-market ratios add to the explanation of expected stock returns provided by market beta. Fama and French (1996) reach the same conclusion using the time-series regression approach applied to portfolios of stocks sorted on price ratios. They also find that different price ratios have much the same information about expected returns. This is not surprising given that price is the common driving force in the price ratios, and the numerators are just scaling variables used to extract the information in price about expected returns.

Fama and French (1992) also confirm the evidence (Reinganum, 1981; Stambaugh, 1982; Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986) that the relation between average return and beta for common stocks is even flatter after the sample periods used in the early empirical work on the CAPM. The estimate of the beta premium is, however, clouded by statistical uncertainty (a large standard error). Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) try to resuscitate the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM by arguing that the weak relation between average return and beta is just a chance result. But the strong evidence that other variables capture variation in expected return missed by beta makes this argument irrelevant. If betas do not suffice to explain expected returns, the market portfolio is not efficient, and the CAPM is dead in its tracks. Evidence on the size of the market premium can neither save the model nor further doom it.

The synthesis of the evidence on the empirical problems of the CAPM provided by Fama and French (1992) serves as a catalyst, marking the point when it is generally acknowledged that the CAPM has potentially fatal problems. Research then turns to explanations.

One possibility is that the CAPM's problems are spurious, the result of data dredging—publication-hungry researchers scouring the data and unearthing contradictions that occur in specific samples as a result of chance. A standard response to this concern is to test for similar findings in other samples. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) find a strong relation between book-to-market equity (B/M) and average return for Japanese stocks. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) observe a similar B/M effect in four European stock markets and in Japan. Fama and French (1998) find that the price ratios that produce problems for the CAPM in U.S. data show up in the same way in the stock returns of twelve non-U.S. major markets, and they are present in emerging market returns. This evidence suggests that the contradictions of the CAPM associated with price ratios are not sample specific.

Explanations: Irrational Pricing or Risk

Among those who conclude that the empirical failures of the CAPM are fatal, two stories emerge. On one side are the behavioralists. Their view is based on evidence that stocks with high ratios of book value to market price are typically firms that have fallen on bad times, while low B/M is associated with growth firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Fama and French, 1995). The behavioralists argue that sorting firms on book-to-market ratios exposes investor overreaction to good and bad times. Investors overextrapolate past performance, resulting in stock prices that are too high for growth (low B/M) firms and too low for distressed (high B/M, so-called value) firms. When the overreaction is eventually corrected, the result is high returns for value stocks and low returns for growth stocks. Proponents of this view include DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Haugen (1995).

The second story for explaining the empirical contradictions of the CAPM is that they point to the need for a more complicated asset pricing model. The CAPM is based on many unrealistic assumptions. For example, the assumption that investors care only about the mean and variance of one-period portfolio returns is extreme. It is reasonable that investors also care about how their portfolio return covaries with labor income and future investment opportunities, so a portfolio's return variance misses important dimensions of risk. If so, market beta is not a complete description of an asset's risk, and we should not be surprised to find that differences in expected return are not completely explained by differences in beta. In this view, the search should turn to asset pricing models that do a better job explaining average returns.

Merton's (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) is a natural extension of the CAPM. The ICAPM begins with a different assumption about investor objectives. In the CAPM, investors care only about the wealth their portfolio produces at the end of the current period. In the ICAPM, investors are concerned not only with their end-of-period payoff, but also with the opportunities

they will have to consume or invest the payoff. Thus, when choosing a portfolio at time $t - 1$, ICAPM investors consider how their wealth at t might vary with future *state variables*, including labor income, the prices of consumption goods and the nature of portfolio opportunities at t , and expectations about the labor income, consumption and investment opportunities to be available after t .

Like CAPM investors, ICAPM investors prefer high expected return and low return variance. But ICAPM investors are also concerned with the covariances of portfolio returns with state variables. As a result, optimal portfolios are “multifactor efficient,” which means they have the largest possible expected returns, given their return variances and the covariances of their returns with the relevant state variables.

Fama (1996) shows that the ICAPM generalizes the logic of the CAPM. That is, if there is risk-free borrowing and lending or if short sales of risky assets are allowed, market clearing prices imply that the market portfolio is multifactor efficient. Moreover, multifactor efficiency implies a relation between expected return and beta risks, but it requires additional betas, along with a market beta, to explain expected returns.

An ideal implementation of the ICAPM would specify the state variables that affect expected returns. Fama and French (1993) take a more indirect approach, perhaps more in the spirit of Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory. They argue that though size and book-to-market equity are not themselves state variables, the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns that are not captured by the market return and are priced separately from market betas. In support of this claim, they show that the returns on the stocks of small firms covary more with one another than with returns on the stocks of large firms, and returns on high book-to-market (value) stocks covary more with one another than with returns on low book-to-market (growth) stocks. Fama and French (1995) show that there are similar size and book-to-market patterns in the covariation of fundamentals like earnings and sales.

Based on this evidence, Fama and French (1993, 1996) propose a three-factor model for expected returns,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Three-Factor Model)} \quad E(R_{it}) - R_{ft} &= \beta_{iM}[E(R_{Mt}) - R_{ft}] \\ &+ \beta_{iS}E(SMB_t) + \beta_{iH}E(HML_t). \end{aligned}$$

In this equation, SMB_t (small minus big) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small and big stocks, HML_t (high minus low) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low B/M stocks, and the betas are slopes in the multiple regression of $R_{it} - R_{ft}$ on $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$, SMB_t and HML_t .

For perspective, the average value of the market premium $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$ for 1927–2003 is 8.3 percent per year, which is 3.5 standard errors from zero. The

average values of SMB_t and HML_t are 3.6 percent and 5.0 percent per year, and they are 2.1 and 3.1 standard errors from zero. All three premiums are volatile, with annual standard deviations of 21.0 percent ($R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$), 14.6 percent (SMB_t) and 14.2 percent (HML_t) per year. Although the average values of the premiums are large, high volatility implies substantial uncertainty about the true expected premiums.

One implication of the expected return equation of the three-factor model is that the intercept α_i in the time-series regression,

$$R_{it} - R_{ft} = \alpha_i + \beta_{iM}(R_{Mt} - R_{ft}) + \beta_{iS}SMB_t + \beta_{iH}HML_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

is zero for all assets i . Using this criterion, Fama and French (1993, 1996) find that the model captures much of the variation in average return for portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and other price ratios that cause problems for the CAPM. Fama and French (1998) show that an international version of the model performs better than an international CAPM in describing average returns on portfolios formed on scaled price variables for stocks in 13 major markets.

The three-factor model is now widely used in empirical research that requires a model of expected returns. Estimates of α_i from the time-series regression above are used to calibrate how rapidly stock prices respond to new information (for example, Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). They are also used to measure the special information of portfolio managers, for example, in Carhart's (1997) study of mutual fund performance. Among practitioners like Ibbotson Associates, the model is offered as an alternative to the CAPM for estimating the cost of equity capital.

From a theoretical perspective, the main shortcoming of the three-factor model is its empirical motivation. The small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) explanatory returns are not motivated by predictions about state variables of concern to investors. Instead they are brute force constructs meant to capture the patterns uncovered by previous work on how average stock returns vary with size and the book-to-market equity ratio.

But this concern is not fatal. The ICAPM does not require that the additional portfolios used along with the market portfolio to explain expected returns "mimic" the relevant state variables. In both the ICAPM and the arbitrage pricing theory, it suffices that the additional portfolios are well diversified (in the terminology of Fama, 1996, they are multifactor minimum variance) and that they are sufficiently different from the market portfolio to capture covariation in returns and variation in expected returns missed by the market portfolio. Thus, adding diversified portfolios that capture covariation in returns and variation in average returns left unexplained by the market is in the spirit of both the ICAPM and the Ross's arbitrage pricing theory.

The behavioralists are not impressed by the evidence for a risk-based explanation of the failures of the CAPM. They typically concede that the three-factor model captures covariation in returns missed by the market return and that it picks

up much of the size and value effects in average returns left unexplained by the CAPM. But their view is that the average return premium associated with the model's book-to-market factor—which does the heavy lifting in the improvements to the CAPM—is itself the result of investor overreaction that happens to be correlated across firms in a way that just looks like a risk story. In short, in the behavioral view, the market tries to set CAPM prices, and violations of the CAPM are due to mispricing.

The conflict between the behavioral irrational pricing story and the rational risk story for the empirical failures of the CAPM leaves us at a timeworn impasse. Fama (1970) emphasizes that the hypothesis that prices properly reflect available information must be tested in the context of a model of expected returns, like the CAPM. Intuitively, to test whether prices are rational, one must take a stand on what the market is trying to do in setting prices—that is, what is risk and what is the relation between expected return and risk? When tests reject the CAPM, one cannot say whether the problem is its assumption that prices are rational (the behavioral view) or violations of other assumptions that are also necessary to produce the CAPM (our position).

Fortunately, for some applications, the way one uses the three-factor model does not depend on one's view about whether its average return premiums are the rational result of underlying state variable risks, the result of irrational investor behavior or sample specific results of chance. For example, when measuring the response of stock prices to new information or when evaluating the performance of managed portfolios, one wants to account for known patterns in returns and average returns for the period examined, whatever their source. Similarly, when estimating the cost of equity capital, one might be unconcerned with whether expected return premiums are rational or irrational since they are in either case part of the opportunity cost of equity capital (Stein, 1996). But the cost of capital is forward looking, so if the premiums are sample specific they are irrelevant.

The three-factor model is hardly a panacea. Its most serious problem is the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Stocks that do well relative to the market over the last three to twelve months tend to continue to do well for the next few months, and stocks that do poorly continue to do poorly. This momentum effect is distinct from the value effect captured by book-to-market equity and other price ratios. Moreover, the momentum effect is left unexplained by the three-factor model, as well as by the CAPM. Following Carhart (1997), one response is to add a momentum factor (the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of short-term winners and losers) to the three-factor model. This step is again legitimate in applications where the goal is to abstract from known patterns in average returns to uncover information-specific or manager-specific effects. But since the momentum effect is short-lived, it is largely irrelevant for estimates of the cost of equity capital.

Another strand of research points to problems in both the three-factor model and the CAPM. Frankel and Lee (1998), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Piotroski (2000) and others show that in portfolios formed on price ratios like

book-to-market equity, stocks with higher expected cash flows have higher average returns that are not captured by the three-factor model or the CAPM. The authors interpret their results as evidence that stock prices are irrational, in the sense that they do not reflect available information about expected profitability.

In truth, however, one can't tell whether the problem is bad pricing or a bad asset pricing model. A stock's price can always be expressed as the present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the expected return on the stock (Campbell and Shiller, 1989; Vuolteenaho, 2002). It follows that if two stocks have the same price, the one with higher expected cash flows must have a higher expected return. This holds true whether pricing is rational or irrational. Thus, when one observes a positive relation between expected cash flows and expected returns that is left unexplained by the CAPM or the three-factor model, one can't tell whether it is the result of irrational pricing or a misspecified asset pricing model.

The Market Proxy Problem

Roll (1977) argues that the CAPM has never been tested and probably never will be. The problem is that the market portfolio at the heart of the model is theoretically and empirically elusive. It is not theoretically clear which assets (for example, human capital) can legitimately be excluded from the market portfolio, and data availability substantially limits the assets that are included. As a result, tests of the CAPM are forced to use proxies for the market portfolio, in effect testing whether the proxies are on the minimum variance frontier. Roll argues that because the tests use proxies, not the true market portfolio, we learn nothing about the CAPM.

We are more pragmatic. The relation between expected return and market beta of the CAPM is just the minimum variance condition that holds in any efficient portfolio, applied to the market portfolio. Thus, if we can find a market proxy that is on the minimum variance frontier, it can be used to describe differences in expected returns, and we would be happy to use it for this purpose. The strong rejections of the CAPM described above, however, say that researchers have not uncovered a reasonable market proxy that is close to the minimum variance frontier. If researchers are constrained to reasonable proxies, we doubt they ever will.

Our pessimism is fueled by several empirical results. Stambaugh (1982) tests the CAPM using a range of market portfolios that include, in addition to U.S. common stocks, corporate and government bonds, preferred stocks, real estate and other consumer durables. He finds that tests of the CAPM are not sensitive to expanding the market proxy beyond common stocks, basically because the volatility of expanded market returns is dominated by the volatility of stock returns.

One need not be convinced by Stambaugh's (1982) results since his market proxies are limited to U.S. assets. If international capital markets are open and asset prices conform to an international version of the CAPM, the market portfolio

should include international assets. Fama and French (1998) find, however, that betas for a global stock market portfolio cannot explain the high average returns observed around the world on stocks with high book-to-market or high earnings-price ratios.


A major problem for the CAPM is that portfolios formed by sorting stocks on price ratios produce a wide range of average returns, but the average returns are not positively related to market betas (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Fama and French, 1996, 1998). The problem is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows average returns and betas (calculated with respect to the CRSP value-weight portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks) for July 1963 to December 2003 for ten portfolios of U.S. stocks formed annually on sorted values of the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M).⁶

Average returns on the B/M portfolios increase almost monotonically, from 10.1 percent per year for the lowest B/M group (portfolio 1) to an impressive 16.7 percent for the highest (portfolio 10). But the positive relation between beta and average return predicted by the CAPM is notably absent. For example, the portfolio with the lowest book-to-market ratio has the highest beta but the lowest average return. The estimated beta for the portfolio with the highest book-to-market ratio and the highest average return is only 0.98. With an average annualized value of the riskfree interest rate, R_f , of 5.8 percent and an average annualized market premium, $R_M - R_f$, of 11.3 percent, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts an average return of 11.8 percent for the lowest B/M portfolio and 11.2 percent for the highest, far from the observed values, 10.1 and 16.7 percent. For the Sharpe-Lintner model to “work” on these portfolios, their market betas must change dramatically, from 1.09 to 0.78 for the lowest B/M portfolio and from 0.98 to 1.98 for the highest. We judge it unlikely that alternative proxies for the market portfolio will produce betas and a market premium that can explain the average returns on these portfolios.

It is always possible that researchers will redeem the CAPM by finding a reasonable proxy for the market portfolio that is on the minimum variance frontier. We emphasize, however, that this possibility cannot be used to justify the way the CAPM is currently applied. The problem is that applications typically use the same

⁶ Stock return data are from CRSP, and book equity data are from Compustat and the Moody's Industrials, Transportation, Utilities and Financials manuals. Stocks are allocated to ten portfolios at the end of June of each year t (1963 to 2003) using the ratio of book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$, divided by market equity at the end of December of $t - 1$. Book equity is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stockholders' equity is the value reported by Moody's or Compustat, if it is available. If not, we measure stockholders' equity as the book value of common equity plus the par value of preferred stock or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order). The portfolios for year t include NYSE (1963–2003), AMEX (1963–2003) and NASDAQ (1972–2003) stocks with positive book equity in $t - 1$ and market equity (from CRSP) for December of $t - 1$ and June of t . The portfolios exclude securities CRSP does not classify as ordinary common equity. The breakpoints for year t use only securities that are on the NYSE in June of year t .

Figure 3
Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on B/M, 1963–2003



market proxies, like the value-weight portfolio of U.S. stocks, that lead to rejections of the model in empirical tests. The contradictions of the CAPM observed when such proxies are used in tests of the model show up as bad estimates of expected returns in applications; for example, estimates of the cost of equity capital that are too low (relative to historical average returns) for small stocks and for stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios. In short, if a market proxy does not work in tests of the CAPM, it does not work in applications.

Conclusions

The version of the CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) has never been an empirical success. In the early empirical work, the Black (1972) version of the model, which can accommodate a flatter tradeoff of average return for market beta, has some success. But in the late 1970s, research begins to uncover variables like size, various price ratios and momentum that add to the explanation of average returns provided by beta. The problems are serious enough to invalidate most applications of the CAPM.

For example, finance textbooks often recommend using the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM risk-return relation to estimate the cost of equity capital. The prescription is to estimate a stock's market beta and combine it with the risk-free interest rate and the average market risk premium to produce an estimate of the cost of equity. The typical market portfolio in these exercises includes just U.S. common stocks. But empirical work, old and new, tells us that the relation between beta and average return is flatter than predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. As a

result, CAPM estimates of the cost of equity for high beta stocks are too high (relative to historical average returns) and estimates for low beta stocks are too low (Friend and Blume, 1970). Similarly, if the high average returns on value stocks (with high book-to-market ratios) imply high expected returns, CAPM cost of equity estimates for such stocks are too low.⁷

The CAPM is also often used to measure the performance of mutual funds and other managed portfolios. The approach, dating to Jensen (1968), is to estimate the CAPM time-series regression for a portfolio and use the intercept (Jensen's alpha) to measure abnormal performance. The problem is that, because of the empirical failings of the CAPM, even passively managed stock portfolios produce abnormal returns if their investment strategies involve tilts toward CAPM problems (Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka, 1993). For example, funds that concentrate on low beta stocks, small stocks or value stocks will tend to produce positive abnormal returns relative to the predictions of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, even when the fund managers have no special talent for picking winners.

The CAPM, like Markowitz's (1952, 1959) portfolio model on which it is built, is nevertheless a theoretical tour de force. We continue to teach the CAPM as an introduction to the fundamental concepts of portfolio theory and asset pricing, to be built on by more complicated models like Merton's (1973) ICAPM. But we also warn students that despite its seductive simplicity, the CAPM's empirical problems probably invalidate its use in applications.

■ *We gratefully acknowledge the comments of John Cochrane, George Constantinides, Richard Leftwich, Andrei Shleifer, René Stulz and Timothy Taylor.*

⁷ The problems are compounded by the large standard errors of estimates of the market premium and of betas for individual stocks, which probably suffice to make CAPM estimates of the cost of equity rather meaningless, even if the CAPM holds (Fama and French, 1997; Pastor and Stambaugh, 1999). For example, using the U.S. Treasury bill rate as the risk-free interest rate and the CRSP value-weight portfolio of publicly traded U.S. common stocks, the average value of the equity premium $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$ for 1927–2003 is 8.3 percent per year, with a standard error of 2.4 percent. The two standard error range thus runs from 3.5 percent to 13.1 percent, which is sufficient to make most projects appear either profitable or unprofitable. This problem is, however, hardly special to the CAPM. For example, expected returns in all versions of Merton's (1973) ICAPM include a market beta and the expected market premium. Also, as noted earlier the expected values of the size and book-to-market premiums in the Fama-French three-factor model are also estimated with substantial error.

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Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests

Eugene F. Fama and James D. MacBeth

University of Chicago

This paper tests the relationship between average return and risk for New York Stock Exchange common stocks. The theoretical basis of the tests is the "two-parameter" portfolio model and models of market equilibrium derived from the two-parameter portfolio model. We cannot reject the hypothesis of these models that the pricing of common stocks reflects the attempts of risk-averse investors to hold portfolios that are "efficient" in terms of expected value and dispersion of return. Moreover, the observed "fair game" properties of the coefficients and residuals of the risk-return regressions are consistent with an "efficient capital market"—that is, a market where prices of securities fully reflect available information.

I. Theoretical Background

In the two-parameter portfolio model of Tobin (1958), Markowitz (1959), and Fama (1965*b*), the capital market is assumed to be perfect in the sense that investors are price takers and there are neither transactions costs nor information costs. Distributions of one-period percentage returns on all assets and portfolios are assumed to be normal or to conform to some other two-parameter member of the symmetric stable class. Investors are assumed to be risk averse and to behave as if they choose among portfolios on the basis of maximum expected utility. A perfect capital market, investor risk aversion, and two-parameter return distributions imply the important "efficient set theorem": The optimal portfolio for any investor must be efficient in the sense that no other portfolio with the same or higher expected return has lower dispersion of return.¹

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¹ Although the choice of dispersion parameter is arbitrary, the standard deviation

In the portfolio model the investor looks at individual assets only in terms of their contributions to the expected value and dispersion, or risk, of his portfolio return. With normal return distributions the risk of portfolio p is measured by the standard deviation, $\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)$, of its return, \tilde{R}_p ,² and the risk of an asset for an investor who holds p is the contribution of the asset to $\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)$. If x_{ip} is the proportion of portfolio funds invested in asset i , $\sigma_{ij} = \text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_j)$ is the covariance between the returns on assets i and j , and N is the number of assets, then

$$\sigma(\tilde{R}_p) = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} \left[\frac{\sum_{j=1}^N x_{jp} \sigma_{ij}}{\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)} \right] = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_p)}{\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)}.$$

Thus, the contribution of asset i to $\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)$ —that is, the risk of asset i in the portfolio p —is proportional to

$$\sum_{j=1}^N x_{jp} \sigma_{ij} / \sigma(\tilde{R}_p) = \text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_p) / \sigma(\tilde{R}_p).$$

Note that since the weights x_{jp} vary from portfolio to portfolio, the risk of an asset is different for different portfolios.

For an individual investor the relationship between the risk of an asset and its expected return is implied by the fact that the investor's optimal portfolio is efficient. Thus, if he chooses the portfolio m , the fact that m is efficient means that the weights x_{im} , $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, maximize expected portfolio return

$$E(\tilde{R}_m) = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{im} E(\tilde{R}_i),$$

subject to the constraints

is common when return distributions are assumed to be normal, whereas an interfractile range is usually suggested when returns are generated from some other symmetric stable distribution.

It is well known that the mean-standard deviation version of the two-parameter portfolio model can be derived from the assumption that investors have quadratic utility functions. But the problems with this approach are also well known. In any case, the empirical evidence of Fama (1965a), Blume (1970), Roll (1970), K. Miller (1971), and Officer (1971) provides support for the "distribution" approach to the model. For a discussion of the issues and a detailed treatment of the two-parameter model, see Fama and Miller (1972, chaps. 6-8).

We also concentrate on the special case of the two-parameter model obtained with the assumption of normally distributed returns. As shown in Fama (1971) or Fama and Miller (1972, chap. 7), the important testable implications of the general symmetric stable model are the same as those of the normal model.

² Tildes (\sim) are used to denote random variables. And the one-period percentage return is most often referred to just as the return.

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$$\sigma(\tilde{R}_p) = \sigma(\tilde{R}_m) \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i=1}^N x_{im} = 1.$$

Lagrangian methods can then be used to show that the weights x_{jm} must be chosen in such a way that for any asset i in m

$$E(\tilde{R}_i) - E(\tilde{R}_m) = S_m \left[\frac{\sum_{j=1}^N x_{jm} \sigma_{ij}}{\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)} - \sigma(\tilde{R}_m) \right], \quad (1)$$

where S_m is the rate of change of $E(\tilde{R}_p)$ with respect to a change in $\sigma(\tilde{R}_p)$ at the point on the efficient set corresponding to portfolio m . If there are nonnegativity constraints on the weights (that is, if short selling is prohibited), then (1) only holds for assets i such that $x_{im} > 0$.

Although equation (1) is just a condition on the weights x_{jm} that is required for portfolio efficiency, it can be interpreted as the relationship between the risk of asset i in portfolio m and the expected return on the asset. The equation says that the difference between the expected return on the asset and the expected return on the portfolio is proportional to the difference between the risk of the asset and the risk of the portfolio. The proportionality factor is S_m , the slope of the efficient set at the point corresponding to the portfolio m . And the risk of the asset is its contribution to total portfolio risk, $\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)$.

II. Testable Implications

Suppose now that we posit a market of risk-averse investors who make portfolio decisions period by period according to the two-parameter model.³ We are concerned with determining what this implies for observable properties of security and portfolio returns. We consider two categories of implications. First, there are conditions on expected returns that are implied by the fact that in a two-parameter world investors hold efficient portfolios. Second, there are conditions on the behavior of returns through time that are implied by the assumption of the two-parameter model that the capital market is perfect or frictionless in the sense that there are neither transactions costs nor information costs.

A. Expected Returns

The implications of the two-parameter model for expected returns derive from the efficiency condition or expected return-risk relationship of equation (1). First, it is convenient to rewrite (1) as

³ A multiperiod version of the two-parameter model is in Fama (1970a) or Fama and Miller (1972, chap. 8).

$$E(\tilde{R}_i) = [E(\tilde{R}_m) - S_m \sigma(\tilde{R}_m)] + S_m \sigma(\tilde{R}_m) \beta_i, \quad (2)$$

where

$$\beta_i \equiv \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m)}{\sigma^2(\tilde{R}_m)} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N x_{jm} \sigma_{ij}}{\sigma^2(\tilde{R}_m)} = \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m) / \sigma(\tilde{R}_m)}{\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)}. \quad (3)$$

The parameter β_i can be interpreted as the risk of asset i in the portfolio m , measured relative to $\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)$, the total risk of m . The intercept in (2),

$$E(\tilde{R}_0) \equiv E(\tilde{R}_m) - S_m \sigma(\tilde{R}_m), \quad (4)$$

is the expected return on a security whose return is uncorrelated with \tilde{R}_m —that is, a zero- β security. Since $\beta = 0$ implies that a security contributes nothing to $\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)$, it is appropriate to say that it is riskless in this portfolio. It is well to note from (3), however, that since $x_{im} \sigma_{ii} = x_{im} \sigma^2(\tilde{R}_i)$ is just one of the N terms in β_i , $\beta_i = 0$ does not imply that security i has zero variance of return.

From (4), it follows that

$$S_m = \frac{E(\tilde{R}_m) - E(\tilde{R}_0)}{\sigma(\tilde{R}_m)}, \quad (5)$$

so that (2) can be rewritten

$$E(\tilde{R}_i) = E(\tilde{R}_0) + [E(\tilde{R}_m) - E(\tilde{R}_0)] \beta_i. \quad (6)$$

In words, the expected return on security i is $E(\tilde{R}_0)$, the expected return on a security that is riskless in the portfolio m , plus a risk premium that is β_i times the difference between $E(\tilde{R}_m)$ and $E(\tilde{R}_0)$.

Equation (6) has three testable implications: (C1) The relationship between the expected return on a security and its risk in any efficient portfolio m is linear. (C2) β_i is a complete measure of the risk of security i in the efficient portfolio m ; no other measure of the risk of i appears in (6). (C3) In a market of risk-averse investors, higher risk should be associated with higher expected return; that is, $E(\tilde{R}_m) - E(\tilde{R}_0) > 0$.

The importance of condition C3 is obvious. The importance of C1 and C2 should become clear as the discussion proceeds. At this point suffice it to say that if C1 and C2 do not hold, market returns do not reflect the attempts of investors to hold efficient portfolios: Some assets are systematically underpriced or overpriced relative to what is implied by the expected return-risk or efficiency equation (6).

B. Market Equilibrium and the Efficiency of the Market Portfolio

To test conditions C1–C3 we must identify some efficient portfolio m . This in turn requires specification of the characteristic of market equi-

librium when investors make portfolio decisions according to the two-parameter model.

Assume again that the capital market is perfect. In addition, suppose that from the information available without cost all investors derive the same and correct assessment of the distribution of the future value of any asset or portfolio—an assumption usually called “homogeneous expectations.” Finally, assume that short selling of all assets is allowed. Then Black (1972) has shown that in a market equilibrium, the so-called market portfolio, defined by the weights

$$x_{im} \equiv \frac{\text{total market value of all units of asset } i}{\text{total market value of all assets}},$$

is always efficient.

Since it contains all assets in positive amounts, the market portfolio is a convenient reference point for testing the expected return-risk conditions C1–C3 of the two-parameter model. And the homogeneous-expectations assumption implies a correspondence between ex ante assessments of return distributions and distributions of ex post returns that is also required for meaningful tests of these three hypotheses.

C. A Stochastic Model for Returns

Equation (6) is in terms of expected returns. But its implications must be tested with data on period-by-period security and portfolio returns. We wish to choose a model of period-by-period returns that allows us to use observed average returns to test the expected-return conditions C1–C3, but one that is nevertheless as general as possible. We suggest the following stochastic generalization of (6):

$$\tilde{R}_{it} = \tilde{\gamma}_{0t} + \tilde{\gamma}_{1t}\beta_i + \tilde{\gamma}_{2t}\beta_i^2 + \tilde{\gamma}_{3t}s_i + \tilde{\eta}_{it}. \quad (7)$$

The subscript t refers to period t , so that \tilde{R}_{it} is the one-period percentage return on security i from $t - 1$ to t . Equation (7) allows $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}$ to vary stochastically from period to period. The hypothesis of condition C3 is that the expected value of the risk premium $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}$, which is the slope $[E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})]$ in (6), is positive—that is, $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}) = E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t}) > 0$.

The variable β_i^2 is included in (7) to test linearity. The hypothesis of condition C1 is $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = 0$, although $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ is also allowed to vary stochastically from period to period. Similar statements apply to the term involving s_i in (7), which is meant to be some measure of the risk of security i that is not deterministically related to β_i . The hypothesis of condition C2 is $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = 0$, but $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$ can vary stochastically through time.

The disturbance $\tilde{\eta}_{it}$ is assumed to have zero mean and to be independent of all other variables in (7). If all portfolio return distributions are to be

normal (or symmetric stable), then the variables $\tilde{\eta}_{it}$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$ must have a multivariate normal (or symmetric stable) distribution.

D. Capital Market Efficiency: The Behavior of Returns through Time

C1–C3 are conditions on expected returns and risk that are implied by the two-parameter model. But the model, and especially the underlying assumption of a perfect market, implies a capital market that is efficient in the sense that prices at every point in time fully reflect available information. This use of the word efficient is, of course, not to be confused with portfolio efficiency. The terminology, if a bit unfortunate, is at least standard.

Market efficiency in combination with condition C1 requires that scrutiny of the time series of the stochastic nonlinearity coefficient $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ does not lead to nonzero estimates of expected future values of $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$. Formally, $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ must be a fair game. In practical terms, although nonlinearities are observed ex post, because $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ is a fair game, it is always appropriate for the investor to act ex ante under the presumption that the two-parameter model, as summarized by (6), is valid. That is, in his portfolio decisions he always assumes that there is a linear relationship between the risk of a security and its expected return. Likewise, market efficiency in the two-parameter model requires that the non- β risk coefficient $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$ and the time series of return disturbances $\tilde{\eta}_{it}$ are fair games. And the fair-game hypothesis also applies to the time series of $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t} - [E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})]$, the difference between the risk premium for period t and its expected value.

In the terminology of Fama (1970b), these are “weak-form” propositions about capital market efficiency for a market where expected returns are generated by the two-parameter model. The propositions are weak since they are only concerned with whether prices fully reflect any information in the time series of past returns. “Strong-form” tests would be concerned with the speed-of-adjustment of prices to all available information.

E. Market Equilibrium with Riskless Borrowing and Lending

We have as yet presented no hypothesis about $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$ in (7). In the general two-parameter model, given $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = E(\tilde{\eta}_{it}) = 0$, then, from (6), $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t})$ is just $E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$, the expected return on any zero- β security. And market efficiency requires that $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t} - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$ be a fair game.

But if we add to the model as presented thus far the assumption that there is unrestricted riskless borrowing and lending at the known rate R_{ft} , then one has the market setting of the original two-parameter “capital asset pricing model” of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In this world, since $\beta_f = 0$, $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$. And market efficiency requires that $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t} - R_{ft}$ be a fair game.

It is well to emphasize that to refute the proposition that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$ is only to refute a specific two-parameter model of market equilibrium. Our view is that tests of conditions C1–C3 are more fundamental. We regard C1–C3 as the general expected return implications of the two-parameter model in the sense that they are the implications of the fact that in the two-parameter portfolio model investors hold efficient portfolios, and they are consistent with any two-parameter model of market equilibrium in which the market portfolio is efficient.

F. The Hypotheses

To summarize, given the stochastic generalization of (2) and (6) that is provided by (7), the testable implications of the two-parameter model for expected returns are:

C1 (linearity)— $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = 0$.

C2 (no systematic effects of non- β risk)— $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = 0$.

C3 (positive expected return-risk tradeoff)— $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}) = E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t}) > 0$.

Sharpe-Lintner (S-L) Hypothesis— $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$.

Finally, capital market efficiency in a two-parameter world requires

ME (market efficiency)—the stochastic coefficients $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t} - [E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})]$, $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t} - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$, and the disturbances $\tilde{\eta}_{it}$ are fair games.⁴

III. Previous Work⁵

The earliest tests of the two-parameter model were done by Douglas (1969), whose results seem to refute condition C2. In annual and quarterly return data, there seem to be measures of risk, in addition to β , that contribute systematically to observed average returns. These results, if valid, are inconsistent with the hypothesis that investors attempt to hold efficient portfolios. Assuming that the market portfolio is efficient, premiums are paid for risks that do not contribute to the risk of an efficient portfolio.

Miller and Scholes (1972) take issue both with Douglas's statistical techniques and with his use of annual and quarterly data. Using different methods and simulations, they show that Douglas's negative results could be expected even if condition C2 holds. Condition C2 is tested below with extensive monthly data, and this avoids almost all of the problems discussed by Miller and Scholes.

⁴ If $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$ are fair games, then $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = 0$. Thus, C1 and C2 are implied by ME. Keeping the expected return conditions separate, however, better emphasizes the economic basis of the various hypotheses.

⁵ A comprehensive survey of empirical and theoretical work on the two-parameter model is in Jensen (1972).

Much of the available empirical work on the two-parameter model is concerned with testing the S-L hypothesis that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$. The tests of Friend and Blume (1970) and those of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) indicate that, at least in the period since 1940, on average $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$ is systematically greater than R_{ft} . The results below support this conclusion.

In the empirical literature to date, the importance of the linearity condition C1 has been largely overlooked. Assuming that the market portfolio m is efficient, if $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t})$ in (7) is positive, the prices of high- β securities are on average too low—their expected returns are too high—relative to those of low- β securities, while the reverse holds if $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t})$ is negative. In short, if the process of price formation in the capital market reflects the attempts of investors to hold efficient portfolios, then the linear relationship of (6) between expected return and risk must hold.

Finally, the previous empirical work on the two-parameter model has not been concerned with tests of market efficiency.

IV. Methodology

The data for this study are monthly percentage returns (including dividends and capital gains, with the appropriate adjustments for capital changes such as splits and stock dividends) for all common stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange during the period January 1926 through June 1968. The data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago.

A. General Approach

Testing the two-parameter model immediately presents an unavoidable “errors-in-the-variables” problem: The efficiency condition or expected return-risk equation (6) is in terms of true values of the relative risk measure β_i , but in empirical tests estimates, $\hat{\beta}_i$, must be used. In this paper

$$\hat{\beta}_i \equiv \frac{\widehat{\text{cov}}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m)}{\hat{\sigma}^2(\tilde{R}_m)},$$

where $\widehat{\text{cov}}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m)$ and $\hat{\sigma}^2(\tilde{R}_m)$ are estimates of $\text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m)$ and $\sigma^2(\tilde{R}_m)$ obtained from monthly returns, and where the proxy chosen for \tilde{R}_{mt} is “Fisher’s Arithmetic Index,” an equally weighted average of the returns on all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange in month t . The properties of this index are analyzed in Fisher (1966).

Blume (1970) shows that for any portfolio p , defined by the weights x_{ip} , $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$,

$$\hat{\beta}_p \equiv \frac{\widehat{\text{cov}}(\tilde{R}_p, \tilde{R}_m)}{\hat{\sigma}^2(\tilde{R}_m)} = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} \frac{\widehat{\text{cov}}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m)}{\hat{\sigma}^2(\tilde{R}_m)} = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{ip} \hat{\beta}_i.$$

If the errors in the $\hat{\beta}_i$ are substantially less than perfectly positively correlated, the $\hat{\beta}$'s of portfolios can be much more precise estimates of true β 's than the $\hat{\beta}$'s for individual securities.

To reduce the loss of information in the risk-return tests caused by using portfolios rather than individual securities, a wide range of values of portfolio $\hat{\beta}_p$'s is obtained by forming portfolios on the basis of ranked values of $\hat{\beta}_i$ for individual securities. But such a procedure, naïvely executed could result in a serious regression phenomenon. In a cross section of $\hat{\beta}_i$, high observed $\hat{\beta}_i$ tend to be above the corresponding true β_i and low observed $\hat{\beta}_i$ tend to be below the true β_i . Forming portfolios on the basis of ranked $\hat{\beta}_i$ thus causes bunching of positive and negative sampling errors within portfolios. The result is that a large portfolio $\hat{\beta}_p$ would tend to overstate the true β_p , while a low $\hat{\beta}_p$ would tend to be an underestimate.

The regression phenomenon can be avoided to a large extent by forming portfolios from ranked $\hat{\beta}_i$ computed from data for one time period but then using a subsequent period to obtain the $\hat{\beta}_p$ for these portfolios that are used to test the two-parameter model. With fresh data, within a portfolio errors in the individual security $\hat{\beta}_i$ are to a large extent random across securities, so that in a portfolio $\hat{\beta}_p$ the effects of the regression phenomenon are, it is hoped, minimized.⁶

B. Details

The specifics of the approach are as follows. Let N be the total number of securities to be allocated to portfolios and let $\text{int}(N/20)$ be the largest integer equal to or less than $N/20$. Using the first 4 years (1926–29) of monthly return data, 20 portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked $\hat{\beta}_i$ for individual securities. The middle 18 portfolios each has $\text{int}(N/20)$ securities. If N is even, the first and last portfolios each has $\text{int}(N/20) + \frac{1}{2} [N - 20 \text{int}(N/20)]$ securities. The last (highest $\hat{\beta}$) portfolio gets an additional security if N is odd.

The following 5 years (1930–34) of data are then used to recompute the $\hat{\beta}_i$, and these are averaged across securities within portfolios to obtain 20 initial portfolio $\hat{\beta}_{pt}$ for the risk-return tests. The subscript t is added to indicate that each month t of the following four years (1935–38) these $\hat{\beta}_{pt}$ are recomputed as simple averages of individual security $\hat{\beta}_i$, thus adjusting the portfolio $\hat{\beta}_{pt}$ month by month to allow for delisting of securities. The component $\hat{\beta}_i$ for securities are themselves updated yearly—that

⁶The errors-in-the-variables problem and the technique of using portfolios to solve it were first pointed out by Blume (1970). The portfolio approach is also used by Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972). The regression phenomenon that arises in risk-return tests was first recognized by Blume (1970) and then by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), who offer a solution to the problem that is similar in spirit to ours.

is, they are recomputed from monthly returns for 1930 through 1935, 1936, or 1937.

As a measure of the non- β risk of security i we use $s(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$, the standard deviation of the least-squares residuals $\hat{\epsilon}_{it}$ from the so-called market model

$$\tilde{R}_{it} = a_i + \beta^i \tilde{R}_{mt} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{it}. \quad (8)$$

The standard deviation $s(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ is a measure of non- β risk in the following sense. One view of risk, antithetic to that of portfolio theory, says that the risk of a security is measured by the total dispersion of its return distribution. Given a market dominated by risk averters, this model would predict that a security's expected return is related to its total return dispersion rather than just to the contribution of the security to the dispersion in the return on an efficient portfolio.⁷ If $B_i \equiv \text{cov}(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_m) / \sigma^2(\tilde{R}_m)$, then in (8) $\text{cov}(\tilde{\epsilon}_i, \tilde{R}_m) = 0$, and

$$\sigma^2(\tilde{R}_i) = \beta_i^2 \sigma^2(\tilde{R}_m) + \sigma^2(\tilde{\epsilon}_i) + 2\beta_i \text{cov}(\tilde{R}_m, \tilde{\epsilon}_i). \quad (9)$$

Thus, from (9), one can say that $s(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ is an estimate of that part of the dispersion of the distribution of the return on security i that is not directly related to β_i .

The month-by-month returns on the 20 portfolios, with equal weighting of individual securities each month, are also computed for the 4-year period 1935–38. For each month t of this period, the following cross-sectional regression—the empirical analog of equation (7)—is run:

$$R_{pt} = \hat{\gamma}_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}_{1t} \hat{\beta}_{p,t-1} + \hat{\gamma}_{2t} \hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}^2 + \hat{\gamma}_{3t} \bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i) + \hat{\eta}_{pt}, \quad (10)$$

$$p = 1, 2, \dots, 20.$$

The independent variable $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ is the average of the $\hat{\beta}_i$ for securities in portfolio p discussed above; $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}^2$ is the average of the squared values of these $\hat{\beta}_i$ (and is thus somewhat mislabeled); and $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ is likewise the average of $s(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ for securities in portfolio p . The $s(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ are computed from data for the same period as the component $\hat{\beta}_i$ of $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$, and like these $\hat{\beta}_i$, they are updated annually.

The regression equation (10) is (7) averaged across the securities in a portfolio, with estimates $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$, $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}^2$, and $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ used as explanatory variables, and with least-squares estimates of the stochastic coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$. The results from (10)—the time series of month-by-month values of the regression coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$ for the 4-year period 1935–38—are the inputs for our tests of the two-parameter model for this period. To get results for other periods, the steps described

⁷ For those accustomed to the portfolio viewpoint, this alternative model may seem so naïve that it should be classified as a straw man. But it is the model of risk and return implied by the “liquidity preference” and “market segmentation” theories of the term structure of interest rates and by the Keynesian “normal backwardation” theory of commodity futures markets. For a discussion of the issues with respect to these markets, see Roll (1970) and K. Miller (1971).

above are repeated. That is, 7 years of data are used to form portfolios; the next 5 years are used to compute initial values of the independent variables in (10); and then the risk-return regressions of (10) are fit month by month for the following 4-year period.

The nine different portfolio formation periods (all except the first 7 years in length), initial 5-year estimation periods, and testing periods (all but the last 4 years in length) are shown in table 1. The choice of 4-year testing periods is a balance of computation costs against the desire to reform portfolios frequently. The choice of 7-year portfolio formation periods and 5–8-year periods for estimating the independent variables $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ and $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ in the risk-return regressions reflects a desire to balance the statistical power obtained with a large sample from a stationary process against potential problems caused by any nonconstancy of the β_i . The choices here are in line with the results of Gonedes (1973). His results also led us to require that to be included in a portfolio a security available in the first month of a testing period must also have data for all 5 years of the preceding estimation period and for at least 4 years of the portfolio formation period. The total number of securities available in the first month of each testing period and the number of securities meeting the data requirement are shown in table 1.

C. Some Observations on the Approach

Table 2 shows the values of the 20 portfolios $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ and their standard errors $s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$ for four of the nine 5-year estimation periods. Also shown are: $r(R_p, R_m)^2$, the coefficient of determination between R_{pt} and R_{mt} ; $s(R_p)$, the sample standard deviation of R_p ; and $s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$, the standard deviation of the portfolio residuals from the market model of (8), not to be confused with $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$, the average for individual securities, which is also shown. The $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ and $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ are the independent variables in the risk return regressions of (10) for the first month of the 4-year testing periods following the four estimation periods shown.

Under the assumptions that for a given security the disturbances $\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}$ in (8) are serially independent, independent of \tilde{R}_{mt} , and identically distributed through time, the standard error of $\hat{\beta}_i$ is

$$\sigma(\hat{\beta}_i) = \frac{\sigma(\tilde{\epsilon}_i)}{\sqrt{n} \sigma(\tilde{R}_m)},$$

where n is the number of months used to compute $\hat{\beta}_i$. Likewise,

$$\sigma(\tilde{\beta}_{p,t-1}) = \frac{\sigma(\tilde{\epsilon}_p)}{\sqrt{n} \sigma(\tilde{R}_m)}.$$

Thus, the fact that in table 2, $s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$ is generally on the order of one-third to one-seventh $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ implies that $s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$ is one-third to one-seventh

TABLE 1
 PORTFOLIO FORMATION, ESTIMATION, AND TESTING PERIODS

	PERIODS				
	1	2	3	4	5
Portfolio formation period ...	1926-29	1927-33	1931-37	1935-41	1939-45
Initial estimation period	1930-34	1934-38	1938-42	1942-46	1946-50
Testing period	1935-38	1939-42	1943-46	1947-50	1951-54
No. of securities available	710	779	804	908	1,011
No. of securities meeting data requirement	435	576	607	704	751

$s(\hat{\beta}_i)$. Estimates of β for portfolios are indeed more precise than those for individual securities.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that if the disturbances $\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}$ in (8) were independent from security to security, the relative increase in the precision of the $\hat{\beta}$ obtained by using portfolios rather than individual securities would be about the same for all portfolios. We argue in the Appendix, however, that the results from (10) imply that the $\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}$ in (8) are interdependent, and the interdependence is strongest among high- β securities and among low- β securities. This is evident in table 2: The ratios $s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ are always highest at the extremes of the $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ range and lowest for $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ close to 1.0. But it is important to emphasize that since these ratios are generally less than .33, interdependence among the $\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}$ of different securities does not destroy the value of using portfolios to reduce the dispersion of the errors in estimated β 's.

Finally, all the tests of the two-parameter model are predictive in the sense that the explanatory variables $\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$ and $\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ in (10) are computed from data for a period prior to the month of the returns, the R_{pt} , on which the regression is run. Although we are interested in testing the two-parameter model as a positive theory—that is, examining the extent to which it is helpful in describing actual return data—the model was initially developed by Markowitz (1959) as a normative theory—that is, as a model to help people make better decisions. As a normative theory the model only has content if there is some relationship between future returns and estimates of risk that can be made on the basis of current information.

Now that the predictive nature of the tests has been emphasized, to simplify the notation, the explanatory variables in (10) are henceforth referred to as $\hat{\beta}_p$, $\hat{\beta}_p^2$, and $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$.

V. Results

The major tests of the implications of the two-parameter model are in table 3. Results are presented for 10 periods: the overall period 1935-

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	PERIODS			
	6	7	8	9
Portfolio formation period ...	1943-49	1947-53	1951-57	1955-61
Initial estimation period	1950-54	1954-58	1958-62	1962-66
Testing period	1955-58	1959-62	1963-66	1967-68
No. of securities available	1,053	1,065	1,162	1,261
No. of securities meeting data requirement	802	856	858	845

6/68; three long subperiods, 1935-45, 1946-55, and 1956-6/68; and six subperiods which, except for the first and last, cover 5 years each. This choice of subperiods reflects the desire to keep separate the pre- and post-World War II periods. Results are presented for four different versions of the risk-return regression equation (10): Panel D is based on (10) itself, but in panels A-C, one or more of the variables in (10) is suppressed. For each period and model, the table shows: $\bar{\hat{\gamma}}_j$, the average of the month-by-month regression coefficient estimates, $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$; $s(\hat{\gamma}_j)$, the standard deviation of the monthly estimates; and \bar{r}^2 and $s(r^2)$, the mean and standard deviation of the month-by-month coefficients of determination, r_t^2 , which are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The table also shows the first-order serial correlations of the various monthly $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ computed either about the sample mean of $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ [in which case the serial correlations are labeled $\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_j)$] or about an assumed mean of zero [in which case they are labeled $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_j)$]. Finally, t -statistics for testing the hypothesis that $\hat{\gamma}_j = 0$ are presented. These t -statistics are

$$t(\bar{\hat{\gamma}}_j) = \frac{\bar{\hat{\gamma}}_j}{s(\hat{\gamma}_j)/\sqrt{n}},$$

where n is the number of months in the period, which is also the number of estimates $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ used to compute $\bar{\hat{\gamma}}_j$ and $s(\hat{\gamma}_j)$.

In interpreting these t -statistics one should keep in mind the evidence of Fama (1965a) and Blume (1970) which suggests that distributions of common stock returns are "thick-tailed" relative to the normal distribution and probably conform better to nonnormal symmetric stable distributions than to the normal. From Fama and Babiak (1968), this evidence means that when one interprets large t -statistics under the assumption that the underlying variables are normal, the probability or significance levels obtained are likely to be overestimates. But it is important to note that, with the exception of condition C3 (positive expected return-risk tradeoff), upward-biased probability levels lead to biases toward rejection of the hypotheses of the two-parameter model. Thus, if these hypotheses cannot

TABLE 2
 SAMPLE STATISTICS FOR FOUR SELECTED ESTIMATION PERIODS

Statistic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1934-38										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$322	.508	.651	.674	.695	.792	.921	.942	.970	1.005
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$027	.027	.025	.023	.028	.026	.032	.029	.034	.027
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$709	.861	.921	.936	.912	.941	.932	.946	.933	.958
$s(R_p)$040	.058	.072	.074	.077	.087	.101	.103	.106	.109
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$022	.022	.020	.019	.023	.021	.026	.024	.028	.022
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$085	.075	.083	.078	.090	.095	.109	.106	.111	.097
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.259	.293	.241	.244	.256	.221	.238	.226	.252	.227
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1942-46										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$467	.537	.593	.628	.707	.721	.770	.792	.805	.894
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$045	.041	.044	.037	.027	.032	.035	.035	.028	.040
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$645	.745	.753	.829	.919	.898	.889	.898	.934	.896
$s(R_p)$035	.037	.041	.041	.044	.046	.049	.050	.050	.057
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$021	.019	.020	.017	.013	.015	.016	.016	.013	.018
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$055	.055	.063	.058	.058	.063	.064	.064	.062	.069
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.382	.345	.317	.293	.224	.238	.250	.250	.210	.261
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1950-54										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$418	.590	.694	.751	.777	.784	.929	.950	.996	1.014
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$042	.047	.045	.037	.038	.035	.050	.038	.035	.029
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$629	.723	.798	.872	.878	.895	.856	.913	.933	.954
$s(R_p)$019	.025	.028	.029	.030	.030	.036	.036	.037	.038
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$012	.013	.013	.010	.010	.010	.014	.011	.010	.008
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$040	.044	.046	.048	.051	.051	.052	.053	.054	.057
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.300	.295	.283	.208	.196	.196	.269	.208	.185	.140
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1958-62										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$626	.635	.719	.801	.817	.860	.920	.950	.975	.995
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$043	.048	.039	.046	.047	.033	.037	.038	.032	.037
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$783	.745	.851	.835	.838	.920	.913	.915	.939	.925
$s(R_p)$030	.031	.033	.037	.038	.038	.041	.042	.043	.044
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$014	.016	.013	.015	.015	.011	.012	.012	.011	.012
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$049	.052	.056	.059	.064	.061	.070	.069	.068	.064
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.286	.308	.232	.254	.234	.180	.171	.174	.162	.188

be rejected when t -statistics are interpreted under the assumption of normality, the hypotheses are on even firmer ground when one takes into account the thick tails of empirical return distributions.

Further justification for using t -statistics to test hypotheses on monthly common stock returns is in the work of Officer (1971). Under the assumption that distributions of monthly returns are symmetric stable, he estimates that in the post-World War II period the characteristic exponent

RISK, RETURN, AND EQUILIBRIUM

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Statistic	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1934-38										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$	1.046	1.122	1.181	1.192	1.196	1.295	1.335	1.396	1.445	1.458
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$028	.031	.035	.028	.029	.032	.032	.053	.039	.053
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$959	.956	.951	.969	.966	.966	.967	.922	.958	.927
$s(R_p)$113	.122	.128	.128	.129	.140	.144	.154	.156	.160
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$023	.026	.029	.023	.024	.026	.026	.043	.032	.043
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$094	.124	.120	.122	.132	.125	.129	.158	.145	.170
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.245	.210	.242	.188	.182	.208	.202	.272	.221	.253
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1942-46										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$949	.952	1.010	1.038	1.254	1.312	1.316	1.473	1.631	1.661
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$031	.036	.040	.030	.034	.039	.041	.084	.083	.077
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$942	.923	.917	.954	.958	.951	.945	.839	.867	.887
$s(R_p)$059	.060	.063	.064	.077	.081	.081	.097	.105	.106
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$014	.016	.018	.014	.016	.018	.019	.039	.038	.036
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$073	.074	.085	.077	.096	.083	.086	.134	.117	.122
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.192	.216	.212	.182	.167	.217	.221	.291	.325	.295
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1950-54										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$	1.117	1.123	1.131	1.134	1.186	1.235	1.295	1.324	1.478	1.527
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$039	.027	.044	.033	.037	.049	.045	.046	.058	.086
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$934	.968	.919	.952	.944	.915	.933	.934	.917	.841
$s(R_p)$042	.041	.043	.042	.044	.047	.049	.050	.056	.060
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$011	.007	.012	.009	.010	.014	.013	.013	.016	.024
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$066	.057	.066	.060	.064	.064	.065	.068	.076	.088
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.167	.123	.182	.150	.156	.219	.200	.192	.210	.273
Portfolios for Estimation Period 1958-62										
$\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1}$	1.013	1.019	1.037	1.048	1.069	1.081	1.092	1.098	1.269	1.388
$s(\hat{\beta}_{p,t-1})$038	.031	.036	.033	.036	.038	.045	.045	.048	.065
$r(R_p, R_m)^2$922	.948	.934	.945	.936	.931	.907	.910	.922	.886
$s(R_p)$045	.045	.046	.046	.047	.048	.049	.049	.056	.063
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)$013	.010	.012	.011	.012	.013	.015	.015	.016	.021
$\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$069	.066	.067	.062	.070	.072	.076	.068	.070	.078
$s(\hat{\epsilon}_p)/\bar{s}_{p,t-1}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$..	.188	.152	.179	.177	.171	.180	.197	.220	.228	.269

for these distributions is about 1.8 (as compared with a value of 2.0 for a normal distribution). From Fama and Roll (1968), for values of the characteristic exponent so close to 2.0 stable nonnormal distributions differ noticeably from the normal only in their extreme tails—that is, beyond the .05 and .95 fractiles. Thus, as long as one is not concerned with precise estimates of probability levels (always a somewhat meaningless activity), interpreting *t*-statistics in the usual way does not lead to serious errors.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY RESULTS FOR THE REGRESSION

$$R_p = \hat{\gamma}_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}_{1t}\hat{\beta}_p + \hat{\gamma}_{2t}\hat{\beta}_p^2 + \hat{\gamma}_{3t}\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_t) + \hat{\eta}_{pt}$$

PERIOD	STATISTIC																			
	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$\hat{\gamma}_3$	$\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f)$	$\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f)$	F^2	$s(r^2)$
Panel A:																				
1935-6/68 ..	.0061	.00850048	.038	.06615	.02	3.24	2.57	2.55	.29	.30
1935-450039	.01630037	.052	.09810	-.0386	1.9282	.29	.29
1946-550087	.00270078	.026	.04118	.07	3.71	.70	3.31	.31	.32
1956-6/68 ..	.0060	.00620034	.030	.04427	.15	2.45	1.73	1.39	.28	.29
1935-400024	.01090023	.064	.11607	-.0932	.7931	.23	.30
1941-450056	.02290054	.034	.06923	.15	1.27	2.55	1.22	.37	.28
1946-500050	.00290044	.031	.04720	.04	1.27	.48	1.10	.39	.33
1951-550123	.00240111	.019	.03520	.08	5.06	.53	4.56	.24	.29
1956-600148	-.00590128	.020	.03437	.18	5.68	-1.37	4.89	.22	.31
1961-6/68 ..	.0001	.0143	-.0029	.034	.04822	.0903	2.81	-.80	.32	.27
Panel B:																				
1935-6/68 ..	.0049	.0105	-.00080036	.052	.118	.05603	-.11	-.11	...	1.92	1.79	-.29	...	1.42	.32	.31
1935-450074	.0079	.00400073	.061	.139	.074	...	-.10	-.31	-.21	...	1.39	.65	.61	...	1.36	.32	.30
1946-55	-.0002	.0217	-.0087	...	-.0012	.036	.095	.03404	.00	.00	...	-.07	2.51	-2.83	...	-.38	.36	.32
1956-6/68 ..	.0069	.0040	.00130043	.054	.116	.05317	.07	.03	...	1.56	.42	.2997	.30	.30
1935-400013	.0141	-.00170012	.069	.160	.075	...	-.13	-.36	-.3516	.75	-.1914	.24	.30
1941-450148	.0004	.01080146	.050	.111	.073	...	-.04	-.19	-.04	...	2.28	.03	1.15	...	2.24	.39	.29
1946-50	-.0008	.0152	-.0051	...	-.0015	.037	.104	.03214	.04	.00	...	-.18	1.14	-1.24	...	-.32	.44	.32
1951-550004	.0281	-.0122	...	-.0008	.030	.085	.035	...	-.17	-.14	-.0110	2.55	-2.72	...	-.20	.28	.29
1956-600128	-.0015	-.00200108	.030	.072	.02935	.11	.26	...	3.38	-.16	-.54	...	2.84	.25	.31
1961-6/68 ..	.0029	.0077	.0034	...	-.0000	.066	.138	.06414	.06	-.0142	.53	.51	...	-.01	.34	.30

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TABLE 3 (Continued)

PERIOD	STATISTIC																			
	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$\hat{\gamma}_3$	$\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$s(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f)$	$\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f)$	\bar{r}^2	$s(r^2)$
Panel C:																				
1935-6/68 ..	.0054	.00720198	.0041	.052	.065868	.04	-.12	...	-.04	2.10	2.2046	1.59	.32	.31
1935-450017	.01040841	.0015	.073	.083921	-.00	-.26	...	-.08	.26	1.41	...	1.05	.24	.32	.31
1946-550110	.0075	...	-.1052	.0100	.032	.056609	.08	.02	...	-.20	3.78	1.47	...	-1.89	3.46	.34	.32
1956-6/68 ..	.0042	.00410633	.0016	.040	.052984	.12	.0803	1.28	.9679	.50	.30	.29
1935-400036	.0119	...	-.0170	.0035	.082	.105744	-.03	-.26	...	-.18	.37	.97	...	-.19	.36	.25	.30
1941-45	-.0006	.00852053	-.0009	.061	.052	...	1.091	.07	-.29	...	-.02	-.08	1.25	...	1.46	-.11	.41	.30
1946-500069	.0081	...	-.0920	.0062	.034	.066504	.14	.06	...	-.02	1.56	.95	...	-1.41	1.40	.42	.33
1951-550150	.0069	...	-.1185	.0138	.029	.043702	.06	-.18	...	-.32	4.05	1.24	...	-1.31	3.72	.27	.29
1956-600127	-.00810728	.0107	.037	.045	...	1.164	.15	.1521	2.68	-1.4048	2.26	.26	.30
1961-6/68 ..	-.0014	.01220570	-.0044	.042	.055850	.10	.00	...	-.19	-.32	2.1264	-.98	.33	.27
Panel D:																				
1935-6/68 ..	.0020	.0114	-.0026	.0516	.0008	.075	.123	.060	.929	-.09	-.09	-.12	-.10	.55	1.85	-.86	1.11	.20	.34	.31
1935-450011	.0118	-.0009	.0817	.0010	.103	.146	.079	1.003	-.20	-.23	-.24	-.15	.13	.94	-.14	.94	.11	.34	.31
1946-550017	.0209	-.0076	-.0378	.0008	.042	.096	.038	.619	-.10	-.00	-.01	-.20	.44	2.39	-2.16	-.67	.20	.36	.32
1956-6/68 ..	.0031	.0034	-.0000	.0966	.0005	.065	.122	.055	1.061	.12	.03	.01	-.05	.59	.34	-.00	1.11	.10	.32	.29
1935-400009	.0156	-.0029	.0025	.0008	.112	.171	.085	.826	-.16	-.23	-.26	-.12	.07	.78	-.29	.03	.06	.26	.30
1941-450015	.0073	.0014	.1767	.0012	.092	.109	.072	1.181	-.28	-.21	-.22	-.18	.12	.52	.15	1.16	.10	.43	.31
1946-500011	.0141	-.0040	-.0313	.0004	.047	.106	.042	.590	-.10	.03	-.01	-.12	.18	1.03	-.73	-.41	.07	.44	.33
1951-550023	.0277	-.0112	-.0443	.0011	.037	.085	.034	.651	-.11	-.13	-.01	-.28	.48	2.53	-2.54	-.53	.23	.29	.30
1956-600103	-.0047	-.0020	.0979	.0083	.049	.078	.032	1.286	-.16	.19	-.01	.02	1.63	-.47	-.49	.59	1.31	.28	.36
1961-6/68 ..	-.0017	.0088	.0013	.0957	-.0046	.073	.144	.066	.887	.20	.00	.01	-.15	-.21	.58	.19	1.02	-.60	.35	.29

Inferences based on approximate normality are on even safer ground if one assumes, again in line with the results of Officer (1971), that although they are well approximated by stable nonnormal distributions with $\alpha \cong 1.8$, distributions of monthly returns in fact have finite variances and converge—but very slowly—toward the normal as one takes sums or averages of individual returns. Then the distributions of the means of month-by-month regression coefficients from the risk-return model are likely to be close to normal since each mean is based on coefficients for many months.

A. Tests of the Major Hypotheses of the Two-Parameter Model

Consider first condition C2 of the two-parameter model, which says that no measure of risk, in addition to β , systematically affects expected returns. This hypothesis is not rejected by the results in panels C and D of table 3. The values of $t(\hat{\gamma}_3)$ are small, and the signs of the $t(\hat{\gamma}_3)$ are randomly positive and negative.

Likewise, the results in panels B and D of table 3 do not reject condition C1 of the two-parameter model, which says that the relationship between expected return and β is linear. In panel B, the value of $t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$ for the overall period 1935–6/68 is only $-.29$. In the 5-year subperiods, $t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$ for 1951–55 is approximately -2.7 , but for subperiods that do not cover 1951–55, the values of $t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$ are much closer to zero.

So far, then, the two-parameter model seems to be standing up well to the data. All is for naught, however, if the critical condition C3 is rejected. That is, we are not happy with the model unless there is on average a positive tradeoff between risk and return. This seems to be the case. For the overall period 1935–6/68, $t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ is large for all models. Except for the period 1956–60, the values of $t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ are also systematically positive in the subperiods, but not so systematically large.

The small t -statistics for subperiods reflect the substantial month-to-month variability of the parameters of the risk-return regressions. For example, in the one-variable regressions summarized in panel A, for the period 1935–40, $\bar{\gamma}_1 = .0109$. In other words, for this period the average incremental return per unit of β was almost 1.1 percent per month, so that on average, bearing risk had substantial rewards. Nevertheless, because of the variability of $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ —in this period $s(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ is 11.6 percent per month (!)— $t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ is only .79. It takes the statistical power of the large sample for the overall period before values of $\bar{\gamma}_1$ that are large in practical terms also yield large t -values.

But at least with the sample of the overall period $t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ achieves values supportive of the conclusion that on average there is a statistically observable positive relationship between return and risk. This is not the case with respect to $t(\hat{\gamma}_2)$ and $t(\hat{\gamma}_3)$. Even, or indeed especially, for the overall period, these t -statistics are close to zero.

The behavior through time of $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$ is also consistent with hypothesis ME that the capital market is efficient. The serial correlations $\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$, $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_2)$, and $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_3)$, are always low in terms of explanatory power and generally low in terms of statistical significance. The proportion of the variance of $\tilde{\gamma}_{jt}$ explained by first-order serial correlation is estimated by $\rho(\hat{\gamma}_j)^2$ which in all cases is small. As for statistical significance, under the hypothesis that the true serial correlation is zero, the standard deviation of the sample coefficient can be approximated by $\sigma(\hat{\rho}) = 1/\sqrt{n}$. For the overall period, $\sigma(\hat{\rho})$ is approximately .05, while for the 10- and 5-year subperiods $\sigma(\hat{\rho})$ is approximately .09 and .13, respectively. Thus, the values of $\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$, $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_2)$, and $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_3)$ in table 3 are generally statistically close to zero. The exceptions involve primarily periods that include the 1935-40 subperiod, and the results for these periods are not independent.⁸

To conserve space, the serial correlations of the portfolio residuals, $\hat{\eta}_{pt}$, are not shown. In these serial correlations, negative values predominate. But like the serial correlations of the $\hat{\gamma}$'s, those of the $\hat{\eta}$'s are close to zero. Higher-order serial correlations of the $\hat{\gamma}$'s and $\hat{\eta}$'s have been computed, and these also are never systematically large.

In short, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the pricing of securities is in line with the implications of the two-parameter model for expected returns. And given a two-parameter pricing model, the behavior of returns through time is consistent with an efficient capital market.

B. *The Behavior of the Market*

Some perspective on the behavior of the market during different periods and on the interpretation of the coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ in the risk-return regressions can be obtained from table 4. For the various periods of table 3, table 4 shows the sample means (and with some exceptions), the standard

⁸The serial correlations of $\hat{\gamma}_2$ and $\hat{\gamma}_3$ about means that are assumed to be zero provide a test of the fair game property of an efficient market, given that expected returns are generated by the two-parameter model—that is, given $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = 0$. Likewise, $\rho_0(\hat{\gamma}_{0t} - R_{ft})$ provides a test of market efficiency with respect to the behavior of $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ through time, given the validity of the Sharpe-Lintner hypothesis (about which we have as yet said nothing). But, at least for $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$, computing the serial correlations about sample means produces essentially the same results.

To test the market efficiency hypothesis on $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t} - [E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})]$, the sample mean of the $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ is used to estimate $E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$, thus implicitly assuming that the expected risk premium is constant. That this is a reasonable approximation [in the sense that the $\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ are small], probably reflects the fact that variation in $E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$ is trivial relative to the month-by-month variation in $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$.

Finally, it is well to note that in terms of the implications of the serial correlations for making good portfolio decisions—and thus for judging whether market efficiency is a workable representation of reality—the fact that the serial correlations are low in terms of explanatory power is more important than whether or not they are low in terms of statistical significance.

TABLE 4
 THE BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKET

PERIOD	STATISTIC*								
	\bar{R}_m	$\overline{R_m - R_f}$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	\bar{R}_f	$\frac{\overline{R_m - R_f}}{s(R_m)}$	$\frac{\hat{\gamma}_1}{s(R_m)}$	$s(R_m)$	$s(R_m)$
1935-6/680143	.0130	.0085	.0061	.0013	.2136	.1388	.061	.066
1935-450197	.0195	.0163	.0039	.0002	.2207	.1844	.089	.098
1946-550112	.0103	.0027	.0087	.0009	.2378	.0614	.043	.041
1956-6/680121	.0095	.0062	.0060	.0026	.2387	.1560	.040	.044
1935-400132	.0132	.0109	.0024	.0001	.1221	.1009	.108	.116
1941-450274	.0272	.0229	.0056	.0002	.4715	.3963	.058	.069
1946-500077	.0070	.0029	.0050	.0007	.1351	.0564	.052	.047
1951-550148	.0136	.0024	.0123	.0012	.4174	.0735	.033	.035
1956-600090	.0070	-.0059	.0148	.0020	.2080	-.1755	.034	.034
1961-6/680141	.0111	.0143	.0001	.0030	.2567	.3294	.043	.048

* Since $s(R_f)$ is so small relative to $s(R_m)$, $s(R_m - R_f)$, which is not shown, is essentially the same as $s(R_m)$. The standard deviations of $(R_m - R_f)/s(R_m)$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1/s(R_m)$, also not shown, can be obtained directly from $s(R_m - R_f)$, $s(\hat{\gamma}_1)$ and $s(R_m)$. Finally, the t -statistics for $(\overline{R_m - R_f})/s(R_m)$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1/s(R_m)$ are identical with those for $\overline{R_m - R_f}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$.

deviations, t -statistics for sample means, and first-order serial correlations for the month-by-month values of the following variables and coefficients: the market return R_{mt} ; the riskless rate of interest R_{ft} , taken to be the yield on 1-month Treasury bills; $R_{mt} - R_{ft}$; $(R_{mt} - R_{ft})/s(R_m)$; $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$, repeated from panel A of table 3; and $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}/s(R_m)$. The t -statistics on sample means are computed in the same way as those in table 3.

If the two-parameter model is valid, then in equation (7), $E(\check{\gamma}_{0t}) = E(\check{R}_{0t})$, where $E(\check{R}_{0t})$ is the expected return on any zero- β security or portfolio. Likewise, the expected risk premium per unit of β is $E(\check{R}_{mt}) - E(\check{R}_{0t}) = E(\check{\gamma}_{1t})$. In fact, for the one-variable regressions of panel A, table 3, that is,

$$R_{pt} = \hat{\gamma}_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}_{1t} \hat{\beta}_p + \hat{\eta}_{pt}, \quad (11)$$

we have, period by period,

$$\hat{\gamma}_{1t} = R_{mt} - \hat{\gamma}_{0t}. \quad (12)$$

This condition is obtained by averaging (11) over p and making use of the least-squares constraint

$$\sum_p \hat{\eta}_{pt} = 0.^9$$

Moreover, the least-squares estimate $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ can always be interpreted as the return for month t on a zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio, where the weights given to each

⁹ There is some degree of approximation in (12). The averages over p of R_{pt} and $\hat{\beta}_p$ are R_{mt} and 1.0, respectively, only if every security in the market is in some portfolio. With our methodology (see table 1) this is never true. But the degree of approximation turns out to be small: The average of the R_{pt} is always close to R_{mt} and the average $\hat{\beta}_p$ is always close to 1.0.

TABLE 4 (Continued)

STATISTIC*										
$s(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$s(R_f)$	$t(\bar{R}_m)$	$t(\bar{R}_m - R_f)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$t(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$\rho_M(R_m)$	$\rho_M(R_m - R_f)$	$\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$\rho_M(R_f)$
.038	.0012	4.71	4.28	2.57	3.24	-.01	-.01	.02	.14	.98
.052	.0001	2.56	2.54	1.92	.86	-.07	-.07	-.03	.10	.88
.026	.0004	2.84	2.60	.70	3.71	.09	.09	.07	.10	.94
.030	.0009	3.72	2.92	1.73	2.45	.14	.14	.15	.25	.92
.064	.0001	1.04	1.04	.79	.32	-.13	-.13	-.09	.07	.72
.034	.0001	3.68	3.65	2.55	1.27	.14	.14	.15	.21	.83
.031	.0003	1.15	1.05	.48	1.27	.09	.09	.04	.18	.97
.019	.0004	3.51	3.22	.53	5.06	-.02	-.01	.08	-.07	.89
.020	.0007	2.07	1.60	-1.37	5.68	.12	.13	.18	.13	.80
.034	.0008	3.08	2.44	2.81	.03	.13	.13	.09	.21	.93

of the 20 portfolios to form this zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio are the least-squares weights that are applied to the R_{pt} in computing $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$.¹⁰

In the Sharpe-Lintner two-parameter model of market equilibrium $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = E(\tilde{R}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$ and $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}) = E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t}) = E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - R_{ft}$. In the period 1935-40 and in the most recent period 1961-6/68, $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ is close to $\bar{R}_m - \bar{R}_f$ and the t -statistics for the two averages are similar. In other periods, and especially in the period 1951-60, $\hat{\gamma}_1$ is substantially less than $\bar{R}_m - \bar{R}_f$. This is a consequence of the fact that for these periods $\hat{\gamma}_0$ is noticeably greater than \bar{R}_f . In economic terms, the tradeoff of average return for risk between common stocks and short-term bonds has been more consistently large through time than the tradeoff of average return for risk among common stocks. Testing whether the differences between $\bar{R}_m - \bar{R}_f$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$ are statistically large, however, is equivalent to testing the S-L hypothesis $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$, which we prefer to take up after examining further the stochastic process generating monthly returns.

Finally, although the differences between values of $\bar{R}_m - \bar{R}_f$ for different periods or between values of $\hat{\gamma}_1$ are never statistically large, there is a hint in table 4 that average-risk premiums declined from the pre- to the post-World War II periods. These are average risk premiums per unit of $\hat{\beta}$, however, which are not of prime interest to the investor. In making his portfolio decision, the investor is more concerned with the tradeoff of expected portfolio return for dispersion of return—that is, the slope of the efficient set of portfolios. In the Sharpe-Lintner model this slope is

¹⁰ That $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ is the return on a zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio can be shown to follow from the unbiasedness of the least-squares coefficients in the cross-sectional risk-return regressions. If one makes the Gauss-Markov assumptions that the underlying disturbances $\tilde{\eta}_{pt}$ of (11) have zero means, are uncorrelated across p , and have the same variance for all p , then it follows almost directly from the Gauss-Markov Theorem that the least-squares estimate $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ is also the return for month t on the minimum variance zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio that can be constructed from the 20 portfolio $\hat{\beta}_p$.

always $[E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - R_{jt}]/\sigma(\tilde{R}_{mt})$, and in the more general model of Black (1972), it is $[E(\tilde{R}_{mt}) - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})]/\sigma(\tilde{R}_{mt})$ at the point on the efficient set corresponding to the market portfolio m . In table 4, especially for the three long subperiods, dividing $\overline{R_m - R_f}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_1$, by $s(R_m)$ seems to yield estimated risk premiums that are more constant through time. This results from the fact that any declines in $\hat{\gamma}_1$ or $\overline{R_m - R_f}$ are matched by a quite noticeable downward shift in $s(R_m)$ from the early to the later periods (cf. Blume [1970] or Officer [1971]).

C. Errors and True Variation in the Coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$

Each cross-sectional regression coefficient $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ in (10) has two components: the true $\tilde{\gamma}_{jt}$ and the estimation error, $\tilde{\phi}_{jt} = \hat{\gamma}_{jt} - \tilde{\gamma}_{jt}$. A natural question is: To what extent is the variation in $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ through time due to variation in $\tilde{\gamma}_{jt}$ and to what extent is it due to $\tilde{\phi}_{jt}$? In addition to providing important information about the precision of the coefficient estimates used to test the two-parameter model, the answer to this question can be used to test hypotheses about the stochastic process generating returns. For example, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = 0$, does including the term involving $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ in (10) help in explaining the month-by-month behavior of returns? That is, can we reject the hypothesis that for all t , $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t} = 0$? Likewise, can we reject the hypothesis that month-by-month $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t} = 0$? And is the variation through time in $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ due entirely to $\tilde{\phi}_{0t}$ and to variation in R_{jt} ?

The answers to these questions are in table 5. For the models and time periods of table 3, table 5 shows for each $\hat{\gamma}_j$: $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_j)$, the sample variance of the month-by-month $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$; $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_j)$, the average of the month-by-month values of $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$, where $s(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$ is the standard error of $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ from the cross-sectional risk-return regression of (10) for month t ; $s^2(\tilde{\gamma}_j) \equiv s^2(\hat{\gamma}_j) - s^2(\tilde{\phi}_j)$; and the F -statistic $F = s^2(\hat{\gamma}_j)/s^2(\tilde{\phi}_j)$, which is relevant for testing the hypothesis, $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_j) = s^2(\tilde{\phi}_j)$. The numerator of F has $n - 1$ df, where n is the number of months in the sample period; and the denominator has $n(20 - K)$ df, where K is the number of coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_j$ in the model.¹¹

¹¹ The standard error of $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$, $s(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$, is proportional to the standard error of the risk-return residuals, $\hat{\eta}_{pjt}$, for month t , which has $20 - K$ df. And n values of $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$ are averaged to get $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_j)$, so that the latter has $n(20 - K)$ df. Note that if the underlying return disturbances $\tilde{\eta}_{pjt}$ of (10) are independent across p and have identical normal distributions for all p , then $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$ is the sample mean of a normal distribution and $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$ is proportional to the sample variance of the same normal distribution. If the process is also assumed to be stationary through time, it then follows that $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_{jt})$ and $s^2(\tilde{\phi}_{jt})$ are independent, as required by the F -test. Finally, in the F -statistics of table 5, the values of n are 60 or larger, so that, since K is from 2 to 4, $n(20 - K) \geq 960$. From Mood and Graybill (1963), some upper percentage points of the F -distribution are:

One clear-cut result in table 5 is that there is a substantial decline in the reliability of the coefficients $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ —that is, a substantial increase in $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_{0t})$ and $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_{1t})$ —when $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and/or $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_j)$ are included in the risk-return regressions. The variable $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ is obviously collinear with $\hat{\beta}_p$, and, as can be seen from table 2, $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ likewise increases with $\hat{\beta}_p$. From panels B and C of table 5, the collinearity with $\hat{\beta}_p$ is stronger for $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ than for $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_j)$.

In spite of the loss in precision that arises from multicollinearity, however, the F -statistics for $\hat{\gamma}_2$ (the coefficient of $\hat{\beta}_p^2$) and $\hat{\gamma}_3$ [the coefficient of $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_j)$] are generally large for the models of panels B and C of table 5, and for the model of panel D which includes both variables. From the F -statistics in panel D, it seems that, except for the period 1935–45, the variation through time of $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ is statistically more noticeable than that of $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$, but there are periods (1941–45, 1956–60) when the values of F for both $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}$ are large.

The F -statistics for $\hat{\gamma}_{1t} = \tilde{\gamma}_{1t} + \hat{\phi}_{1t}$ also indicate that $\tilde{\gamma}_{1t}$ has substantial variation through time. This is not surprising, however, since $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ is always directly related to \tilde{R}_{mt} . For example, from equation (12), for the one-variable model of panel A, $\hat{\gamma}_{1t} = \tilde{R}_{mt} - \hat{\gamma}_{0t}$.

Finally, the F -statistics for $\hat{\gamma}_{0t} = \tilde{\gamma}_{0t} + \hat{\phi}_{0t}$ are also in general large. And the month-by-month variation in $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$ cannot be accounted for by variation in R_{ft} . The variance of R_{ft} is so small relative to $s^2(\hat{\gamma}_{0t})$, $s^2(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t})$, and $s^2(\hat{\phi}_{0t})$ that doing the F -tests in terms of $\hat{\gamma}_{0t} - R_{ft}$ produces results almost identical with those for $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$.

Rejection of the hypothesis that $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t} - R_{ft} = 0$ does not imply rejection of the S-L hypothesis—to be tested next—that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$. Likewise, to find that month-by-month $\tilde{\gamma}_{2t} \neq 0$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{3t} \neq 0$ does not imply rejection of hypotheses C1 and C2 of the two-parameter model. These hypotheses, which we are unable to reject on the basis of the results in table 3, say that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{2t}) = 0$ and $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{3t}) = 0$.

What we have found in table 5 is that there are variables in addition to $\hat{\beta}_p$ that systematically affect period-by-period returns. Some of these omitted variables are apparently related to $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$. But the latter are almost surely proxies, since there is no economic rationale for their presence in our stochastic risk-return model.

n	$F_{.90}$	$F_{.95}$	$F_{.975}$	$F_{.99}$	$F_{.995}$
60 (120)	1.35	1.47	1.58	1.73	1.83
60 (∞)	1.29	1.39	1.48	1.60	1.69
120 (120)	1.26	1.35	1.43	1.53	1.61
120 (∞)	1.19	1.25	1.31	1.38	1.43

TABLE 5
 COMPONENTS OF THE VARIANCES OF THE $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$

PERIOD	$s^2(\tilde{\gamma}_0)$	$s^2(\hat{\gamma}_0)$	$s^2(\tilde{\phi}_0)$	F	$s^2(\tilde{\gamma}_1)$	$s^2(\hat{\gamma}_1)$	$s^2(\tilde{\phi}_1)$	F
Panel A:								
1935-6/6800105	.00142	.00037	3.84	.00401	.00436	.00035	12.46
1935-4500182	.00273	.00091	3.00	.00863	.00950	.00087	10.92
1946-5500057	.00066	.00009	7.33	.00163	.00171	.00008	21.38
1956-6/6800077	.00090	.00013	6.92	.00181	.00193	.00012	16.08
1935-4000265	.00404	.00139	2.91	.01212	.01347	.00135	9.98
1941-4500086	.00118	.00032	3.69	.00452	.00481	.00029	16.59
1946-5000086	.00094	.00008	11.75	.00216	.00224	.00008	28.00
1951-5500027	.00036	.00009	4.00	.00113	.00121	.00008	15.12
1956-6000032	.00041	.00009	4.56	.00104	.00112	.00008	21.50
1961-6/6800100	.00114	.00014	8.14	.00217	.00231	.00014	16.50
Panel B:								
1935-6/6800092	.00267	.00175	1.52	.00564	.01403	.00839	1.67
1935-4500057	.00377	.00320	1.18	.00372	.01941	.01569	1.24
1946-5500053	.00112	.00059	1.90	.00651	.00897	.00245	3.66
1956-6/6800155	.00294	.00139	2.12	.00667	.01338	.00671	1.99
1935-4000018	.00476	.00458	1.04	.00374	.02555	.02181	1.17
1941-4500101	.00254	.00153	1.66	.00389	.01225	.00836	1.46
1946-5000084	.00136	.00052	2.62	.00862	.01071	.00209	5.12
1951-5500024	.00090	.00066	1.36	.00447	.00729	.00282	2.58
1956-6000037	.00087	.00050	1.74	.00289	.00517	.00228	2.27
1961-6/6800232	.00431	.00199	2.16	.00928	.01894	.00966	1.96
Panel C:								
1935-6/6800192	.00266	.00075	3.55	.00285	.00428	.00142	3.01
1935-4500394	.00533	.00139	3.83	.00433	.00717	.00283	2.52
1946-5500083	.00101	.00018	5.61	.00261	.00310	.00050	6.20
1956-6/6800100	.00164	.00063	2.60	.00178	.00270	.00092	2.93
1935-4000473	.00669	.00196	3.41	.00732	.01094	.00362	3.02
1941-4500307	.00377	.00070	5.38	.00085	.00274	.00189	1.45
1946-5000103	.00117	.00014	8.36	.00386	.00439	.00053	8.28
1951-5500061	.00083	.00022	3.77	.00140	.00188	.00047	4.00
1956-6000079	.00134	.00055	2.44	.00106	.00204	.00098	2.08
1961-6/6800109	.00177	.00068	2.60	.00212	.00300	.00088	3.41
Panel D:								
1935-6/6800150	.00566	.00406	1.39	.00608	.01521	.00913	1.66
1935-4500233	.01065	.00832	1.28	.00402	.02118	.01716	1.23
1946-5500013	.00176	.00163	1.08	.00647	.00916	.00269	3.41
1956-6/6800194	.00420	.00226	1.86	.00763	.01485	.00722	2.06
1935-4000157	.01263	.01106	1.14	.00457	.02910	.02453	1.19
1941-4500340	.00843	.00503	1.68	.00365	.01196	.00832	1.44
1946-5000023	.00220	.00197	1.12	.00858	.01119	.00261	4.29
1951-5500006	.00136	.00130	1.05	.00442	.00719	.00277	2.60
1956-6000092	.00239	.00147	1.62	.00328	.00602	.00274	2.20
1961-6/6800260	.00539	.00279	1.93	.01060	.02081	.01021	2.04

D. Tests of the S-L Hypothesis

In the Sharpe-Lintner two-parameter model of market equilibrium one has, in addition to conditions C1-C3, the hypothesis that $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) = R_{ft}$. The work of Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) suggests that the S-L hypothesis is not upheld by the data. At least in the post-World War II period, estimates of $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{0t})$ seem to be significantly greater than R_{ft} .

Each of the four models of table 3 can be used to test the S-L hypothe-

TABLE 5 (Continued)

PERIOD	$s^2(\hat{\gamma}_2)$	$s^2(\hat{\eta}_2)$	$s^2(\hat{\phi}_2)$	F	$s^2(\hat{\gamma}_3)$	$s^2(\hat{\eta}_3)$	$s^2(\hat{\phi}_3)$	F
Panel A:								
1935-6/68
1935-45
1946-55
1956-6/68
1935-40
1941-45
1946-50
1951-55
1956-60
1961-6/68
Panel B:								
1935-6/6800121	.00318	.00197	1.61
1935-4500171	.00548	.00377	1.45
1946-5500063	.00112	.00049	2.29
1956-6/6800122	.00278	.00156	1.78
1935-4000041	.00566	.00524	1.08
1941-4500327	.00527	.00201	2.62
1946-5000066	.00103	.00037	2.78
1951-5500058	.00120	.00062	1.94
1956-6000033	.00083	.00050	1.66
1961-6/6800182	.00410	.00227	1.81
Panel C:								
1935-6/68341	.753	.412	1.83
1935-45535	.847	.313	2.71
1946-55165	.370	.206	1.80
1956-6/68304	.968	.664	1.46
1935-40270	.553	.282	1.96
1941-45840	1.189	.349	3.41
1946-50118	.254	.136	1.87
1951-55217	.493	.276	1.79
1956-60622	1.355	.734	1.85
1961-6/68105	.722	.617	1.17
Panel D:								
1935-6/6800061	.00362	.00301	1.21	.276	.864	.588	1.47
1935-4500624	.00644	.97	.392	1.001	.613	1.63
1946-5500061	.00148	.00087	1.70	.028	.383	.355	1.08
1956-6/6800134	.00304	.00169	1.80	.374	1.125	.751	1.50
1935-4000723	.00886	.82	.120	.682	.562	1.21
1941-4500162	.00515	.00353	1.46	.720	1.395	.675	2.07
1946-5000083	.00180	.00096	1.87	.023	.348	.325	1.07
1951-5500039	.00116	.00077	1.51	.038	.424	.386	1.10
1956-6000037	.00103	.00066	1.56	.712	1.654	.941	1.76
1961-6/6800202	.00440	.00238	1.85	.163	.787	.624	1.26

sis.¹² The most efficient tests, however, are provided by the one-variable

¹² The least-squares intercepts $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ in the four cross-sectional risk-return regressions can always be interpreted as returns for month t on zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolios ($n = 10$). For the three-variable model of panel D, table 3, the unbiasedness of the least-squares coefficients can be shown to imply that in computing $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, negative and positive weights are assigned to the 20 portfolios in such a way that the resulting portfolio has not only zero- $\hat{\beta}$ but also zero averages of the 20 $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and of the 20 $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_t)$. Analogous statements apply to the two-variable models of panels B and C.

Black, Jensen, and Scholes test the S-L hypothesis with a time series of monthly returns on a "minimum variance zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio" which they derive directly. It turns

model of panel A, since the values of $s(\hat{\gamma}_0)$ for this model [which are nearly identical with the values of $s(\hat{\gamma}_0 - \bar{R}_f)$] are substantially smaller than those for other models. Except for the most recent period 1961-6/68, the values of $\hat{\gamma}_0 - \bar{R}_f$ in panel A are all positive and generally greater than 0.4 percent per month. The value of $t(\hat{\gamma}_0 - \bar{R}_f)$ for the overall period 1935-6/68 is 2.55, and the t -statistics for the subperiods 1946-55, 1951-55, and 1956-60 are likewise large. Thus, the results in panel A, table 3, support the negative conclusions of Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) with respect to the S-L hypothesis.

The S-L hypothesis seems to do somewhat better in the two-variable quadratic model of panel B, table 3 and especially in the three-variable model of panel D. The values of $t(\hat{\gamma}_0 - \bar{R}_f)$ are substantially closer to zero for these models than for the model of panel A. This is due to values of $\hat{\gamma}_0 - \bar{R}_f$ that are closer to zero, but it also reflects the fact that $s(\hat{\gamma}_0)$ is substantially higher for the models of panels B and D than for the model of panel A.

But the effects of $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ on tests of the S-L hypothesis are in fact not at all so clear-cut. Consider the model

$$\tilde{R}_{it} = \tilde{\gamma}'_{0t} + \tilde{\gamma}'_{1t}\beta_i + \tilde{\gamma}'_{2t}(1 - \beta_i)^2 + \tilde{\gamma}'_{3t}s_i + \tilde{\eta}_{it}. \quad (13)$$

Equations (7) and (13) are equivalent representations of the stochastic process generating returns, with $\tilde{\gamma}'_{1t} = \hat{\gamma}'_{1t} - 2\hat{\gamma}'_{2t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}'_{0t} = \hat{\gamma}'_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}'_{2t}$. Moreover, if the steps used to obtain the regression equation (10) from the stochastic model (7) are applied to (13), we get the regression equation,

$$R_{pt} = \hat{\gamma}'_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}'_{1t}\hat{\beta}_p + \hat{\gamma}'_{2t}(1 - \hat{\beta}_p)^2 + \hat{\gamma}'_{3t}\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i) + \hat{\eta}_{pt}, \quad (14)$$

where, just as $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ in (10) is the average of $\hat{\beta}_i^2$ for securities i in portfolio p , $(1 - \hat{\beta}_p)^2$ is the average of $(1 - \hat{\beta}_i)^2$. The values of the estimates $\hat{\gamma}'_{2t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}'_{3t}$ are identical in (10) and (14); in addition, $\hat{\gamma}'_{1t} = \hat{\gamma}'_{0t} - 2\hat{\gamma}'_{2t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}'_{0t} = \hat{\gamma}'_{0t} + \hat{\gamma}'_{2t}$. But although the regression equations (10) and (14) are statistically indistinguishable, tests of the hypothesis $E(\tilde{\gamma}'_{0t}) =$

out, however, that this portfolio is constructed under what amounts to the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov Theorem on the underlying disturbances of the one-variable risk-return regression (11). With these assumptions the least-squares estimate $\hat{\gamma}'_{0t}$, obtained from the cross-sectional risk-return regression of (11) for month t , is precisely the return for month t on the minimum variance zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolio that can be constructed from the 20 portfolio $\hat{\beta}_p$. Thus, the tests of the S-L hypothesis in panel A of table 3 are conceptually the same as those of Black, Jensen, and Scholes.

If one makes the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov Theorem on the underlying disturbances of the models of panels B-D of table 3, the regression intercepts for these models can likewise be interpreted as returns on minimum-variance zero- $\hat{\beta}$ portfolios. These portfolios then differ in terms of whether or not they also constrain the averages of the 20 $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and of the 20 $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ to be zero. Given the collinearity of $\hat{\beta}_p$, $\hat{\beta}_p^2$, and $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$, however, the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov Theorem cannot apply to all four of the models.

R_{jt} from (10) do not yield the same results as tests of the hypothesis $E(\tilde{\gamma}'_{0t}) = R_{jt}$ from (14). In panel D of table 3, $\hat{\gamma}_0 - R_f$ is never statistically very different from zero, whereas in tests (not shown) from (14), the results are similar to those of panel A, table 3. That is, $\hat{\gamma}'_0 - R_f$ is systematically positive for all periods but 1961-6/68 and statistically very different from zero for the overall period 1935-6/68 and for the 1946-55, 1951-55, and 1956-60 subperiods.

Thus, tests of the S-L hypothesis from our three-variable models are ambiguous. Perhaps the ambiguity could be resolved and more efficient tests of the hypothesis could be obtained if the omitted variables for which $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_t)$, $\hat{\beta}_p^2$, or $(1 - \hat{\beta}_p)^2$ are almost surely proxies were identified. As indicated above, however, at the moment the most efficient tests of the S-L hypothesis are provided by the one-variable model of panel A, table 3, and the results for that model support the negative conclusions of others.

Given that the S-L hypothesis is not supported by the data, tests of the market efficiency hypothesis that $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t} - E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$ is a fair game are difficult since we no longer have a specific hypothesis about $E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$. And using the mean of the $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ as an estimate of $E(\tilde{R}_{0t})$ does not work as well in this case as it does for the market efficiency tests on γ_{1t} . One should note, however, that although the serial correlations $\rho_M(\hat{\gamma}_0)$ in table 4 are often large relative to estimates of their standard errors, they are small in terms of the proportion of the time series variance of $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ that they explain, and the latter is the more important criterion for judging whether market efficiency is a workable representation of reality (see n. 8).

VI. Conclusions

In sum our results support the important testable implications of the two-parameter model. Given that the market portfolio is efficient—or, more specifically, given that our proxy for the market portfolio is at least approximately efficient—we cannot reject the hypothesis that average returns on New York Stock Exchange common stocks reflect the attempts of risk-averse investors to hold efficient portfolios. Specifically, on average there seems to be a positive tradeoff between return and risk, with risk measured from the portfolio viewpoint. In addition, although there are “stochastic nonlinearities” from period to period, we cannot reject the hypothesis that on average their effects are zero and unpredictably different from zero from one period to the next. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that in making a portfolio decision, an investor should assume that the relationship between a security’s portfolio risk and its expected return is linear, as implied by the two-parameter model. We also cannot reject the hypothesis of the two-parameter model that no measure of risk, in addition to portfolio risk, systematically affects average returns. Finally, the observed fair game properties of the coefficients and residuals of the

risk-return regressions are consistent with an efficient capital market—that is, a market where prices of securities fully reflect available information.

Appendix

Some Related Issues

A1. Market Models and Tests of Market Efficiency

The time series of regression coefficients from (10) are, of course, the inputs for the tests of the two-parameter model. But these coefficients can also be useful in tests of capital market efficiency—that is, tests of the speed of price adjustment to different types of new information. Since the work of Fama et al. (1969), such tests have commonly been based on the “one-factor market model”:

$$R_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\beta}_i R_{mt} + \hat{\epsilon}_{it}. \quad (15)$$

In this regression equation, the term involving R_{mt} is assumed to capture the effects of market-wide factors. The effects on returns of events specific to company i , like a stock split or a change in earnings, are then studied through the residuals $\hat{\epsilon}_{it}$.

But given that there is period-to-period variation in $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$ in (10) that is above and beyond pure sampling error, then these coefficients can be interpreted as market factors, (in addition to R_{mt}) that influence the returns on all securities. To see this, substitute (12) into (11) to obtain the “two-factor market model”:

$$R_{pt} = \hat{\gamma}_{0t}(1 - \hat{\beta}_p) + \hat{\beta}_p R_{mt} + \hat{\eta}_{pt}. \quad 16$$

In like fashion, from equation (10) itself we easily obtain the “four-factor market model”:

$$R_{pt} = \hat{\gamma}_{0t}(1 - \hat{\beta}_p) + \hat{\beta}_p R_{mt} + \hat{\gamma}_{2t}(\hat{\beta}_p^2 - \hat{\beta}_p \bar{\beta}_p^2) + \hat{\gamma}_{3t} [\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i) - \hat{\beta}_p \bar{s}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)] + \hat{\eta}_{pt}, \quad (17)$$

where $\bar{\beta}_p^2$ and $\bar{s}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ are the averages over p of the $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ and the $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$.

Comparing equations (15–17) it is clear that the residuals $\hat{\epsilon}_{it}$ from the one-factor market model contain variation in the market factors $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, $\hat{\gamma}_{2t}$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{3t}$. Thus, if one is interested in the effect on a security's return of an event specific to the given company, this effect can probably be studied more precisely from the residuals of the two- or even the four-factor market models of (16) and (17) than from the one-factor model of (15). This has in fact already been done in a study of changes in accounting techniques by Ball (1972), in a study of insider trading by Jaffe (1972), and in a study of mergers by Mandelker (1972).

Ball, Jaffe, and Mandelker use the two-factor rather than the four-factor market model, and there is probably some basis for this. First, one can see from table 5 that because of the collinearity of $\hat{\beta}_p$, $\hat{\beta}_p^2$, and $\bar{s}_p(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$, the coefficient estimates $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{1t}$ have much smaller standard errors in the two-factor model. Second, we have computed residual variances for each of our 20 portfolios for various time periods from the time series of $\hat{\epsilon}_{pt}$ and $\hat{\eta}_{pt}$ from (15), (16), and (17). The decline in residual variance that is obtained in

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going from (15) to (16) is as predicted: That is, the decline is noticeable over more or less the entire range of $\hat{\beta}_p$ and it is proportional to $(1 - \hat{\beta}_p)^2$. On the other hand, in going from the two- to the four-factor model, reductions in residual variance are generally noticeable only in the portfolios with the lowest and highest $\hat{\beta}_p$, and the reductions for these two portfolios are generally small. Moreover, including $\bar{\varepsilon}_p(\hat{\varepsilon}_i)$ as an explanatory variable in addition to $\hat{\beta}_p$ and $\hat{\beta}_p^2$ never results in a noticeable reduction in residual variances.

A2. *Multifactor Models and Errors in the $\hat{\beta}$*

If the return-generating process is a multifactor market model, then the usual estimates of β_i from the one-factor model of (15) are not most efficient. For example, if the return-generating process is the population analog of (16), more efficient estimates of β_i could in principle be obtained from a constrained regression applied to

$$\tilde{R}_{it} - \tilde{\gamma}_{0t} = \beta_i(\tilde{R}_{mt} - \tilde{\gamma}_{0t}) + \tilde{\eta}_{it}.$$

But this approach requires the time series of the true $\tilde{\gamma}_{0t}$. All we have are estimates $\hat{\gamma}_{0t}$, themselves obtained from estimates of $\hat{\beta}_p$ from the one-factor model of (15).

It can also be shown that with a multifactor return-generating process the errors in the $\hat{\beta}$ computed from the one-factor market model of (8) and (15) are correlated across securities and portfolios. This results from the fact that if the true process is a multifactor model, the disturbances of the one-factor model are correlated across securities and portfolios. Moreover, the interdependence of the errors in the $\hat{\beta}$ is higher the farther the true β 's are from 1.0. This was already noted in the discussion of table 2 where we found that the relative reduction in the standard errors of the $\hat{\beta}$'s obtained by using portfolios rather than individual securities is lower the farther $\hat{\beta}_p$ is from 1.0.

Interdependence of the errors in the $\hat{\beta}_p$ also complicates the formal analysis of the effects of errors-in-the-variables on properties of the estimated coefficients (the $\hat{\gamma}_{jt}$) in the risk-return regressions of (10). This topic is considered in detail in an appendix to an earlier version of this paper that can be made available to the reader on request.

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Investor growth expectations: Analysts vs. history

Analysts' growth forecasts dominate past trends in predicting stock prices.

James H. Vander Weide and Willard T. Carleton

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For the purposes of implementing the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) cost of equity model, the analyst must know which growth estimate is embodied in the firm's stock price. A study by Cragg and Malkiel (1982) suggests that the stock valuation process embodies analysts' forecasts rather than historically based growth figures such as the ten-year historical growth in dividends per share or the five-year growth in book value per share. The Cragg and Malkiel study is based on data for the 1960s, however, a decade that was considerably more stable than the recent past.

As the issue of which growth rate to use in implementing the DCF model is so important to applications of the model, we decided to investigate whether the Cragg and Malkiel conclusions continue to hold in more recent periods. This paper describes the results of our study.

STATISTICAL MODEL

The DCF model suggests that the firm's stock price is equal to the present value of the stream of dividends that investors expect to receive from owning the firm's shares. Under the assumption that investors expect dividends to grow at a constant rate, g , in perpetuity, the stock price is given by the following simple expression:

$$P_s = \frac{D(1+g)}{k-g} \quad (1)$$

where:

- P_s = current price per share of the firm's stock;
- D = current annual dividend per share;
- g = expected constant dividend growth rate; and
- k = required return on the firm's stock.

Dividing both sides of Equation (1) by the firm's current earnings, E , we obtain:

$$\frac{P_s}{E} = \frac{D}{E} \cdot \frac{(1+g)}{k-g} \quad (2)$$

Thus, the firm's price/earnings (P/E) ratio is a non-linear function of the firm's dividend payout ratio (D/E), the expected growth in dividends (g), and the required rate of return.

To investigate what growth expectation is embodied in the firm's current stock price, it is more convenient to work with a linear approximation to Equation (2). Thus, we will assume that:

$$P/E = a_0(D/E) + a_1g + a_2k. \quad (3)$$

(Cragg and Malkiel found this assumption to be reasonable throughout their investigation.)

Furthermore, we will assume that the required

JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE is Research Professor at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University in Durham (NC 27706). WILLARD T. CARLETON is Karl Eller Professor of Finance at the University of Arizona in Tucson (AZ 85721). Financial support for this project was provided by BellSouth and Pacific Telesis. The authors wish to thank Paul Blalock at BellSouth, Mohan Gyani at Pacific Telesis, Bill Keck at Southern Bell, and John Carlson, their programmer, for help with this project.

rate of return, k , in Equation (3) depends on the values of the risk variables B , Cov , Rsq , and Sa , where B is the firm's Value Line beta; Cov is the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio; Rsq is a measure of the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS; and Sa is the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' five-year EPS growth forecast for the firm. Finally, as the linear form of the P/E equation is only an approximation to the true P/E equation, and B , Cov , Rsq , and Sa are only proxies for k , we will add an error term, e , that represents the degree of approximation to the true relationship.

With these assumptions, the final form of our P/E equation is as follows:

$$P/E = a_0(D/E) + a_1g + a_2B + a_3Cov + a_4Rsq + a_5Sa + e. \quad (4)$$

The purpose of our study is to use more recent data to determine which of the popular approaches for estimating future growth in the Discounted Cash Flow model is embodied in the market price of the firm's shares.

We estimated Equation (4) to determine which estimate of future growth, g , when combined with the payout ratio, D/E , and risk variables B , Cov , Rsq , and Sa , provides the best predictor of the firm's P/E ratio. To paraphrase Cragg and Malkiel, we would expect that growth estimates found in the best-fitting equation more closely approximate the expectation used by investors than those found in poorer-fitting equations.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Our data sets include both historically based measures of future growth and the consensus analysts' forecasts of five-year earnings growth supplied by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System of Lynch, Jones & Ryan (IBES). The data also include the firm's dividend payout ratio and various measures of the firm's risk. We include the latter items in the regression, along with earnings growth, to account for other variables that may affect the firm's stock price.

The data include:

Earnings Per Share. Because our goal is to determine which earnings variable is embodied in the firm's market price, we need to define this variable with care. Financial analysts who study a firm's financial results in detail generally prefer to "normalize" the firm's reported earnings for the effect of extraordinary items, such as write-offs of discontinued operations, or mergers and acquisitions. They also attempt, to the extent possible, to state earnings for different firms using a common set of accounting conventions.

We have defined "earnings" as the consensus analyst estimate (as reported by IBES) of the firm's earnings for the forthcoming year.¹ This definition approximates the normalized earnings that investors most likely have in mind when they make stock purchase and sell decisions. It implicitly incorporates the analysts' adjustments for differences in accounting treatment among firms and the effects of the business cycle on each firm's results of operations. Although we thought at first that this earnings estimate might be highly correlated with the analysts' five-year earnings growth forecasts, that was not the case. Thus, we avoided a potential spurious correlation problem. **Price/Earnings Ratio.** Corresponding to our definition of "earnings," the price/earnings ratio (P/E) is calculated as the closing stock price for the year divided by the consensus analyst earnings forecast for the forthcoming fiscal year.

Dividends. Dividends per share represent the common dividends declared per share during the calendar year, after adjustment for all stock splits and stock dividends). The firm's dividend payout ratio is then defined as common dividends per share divided by the consensus analyst estimate of the earnings per share for the forthcoming calendar year (D/E). Although this definition has the deficiency that it is obviously biased downward — it divides this year's dividend by next year's earnings — it has the advantage that it implicitly uses a "normalized" figure for earnings. We believe that this advantage outweighs the deficiency, especially when one considers the flaws of the apparent alternatives. Furthermore, we have verified that the results are insensitive to reasonable alternative definitions (see footnote 1).

Growth. In comparing historically based and consensus analysts' forecasts, we calculated forty-one different historical growth measures. These included the following: 1) the past growth rate in EPS as determined by a log-linear least squares regression for the latest year,² two years, three years, . . . , and ten years; 2) the past growth rate in DPS for the latest year, two years, three years, . . . , and ten years; 3) the past growth rate in book value per share (computed as the ratio of common equity to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, . . . , and ten years; 4) the past growth rate in cash flow per share (computed as the ratio of pretax income, depreciation, and deferred taxes to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, . . . , and ten years; and 5) plowback growth (computed as the firm's retention ratio for the current year times the firm's latest annual return on common equity).

We also used the five-year forecast of earnings

per share growth compiled by IBES and reported in mid-January of each year. This number represents the consensus (i.e., mean) forecast produced by analysts from the research departments of leading Wall Street and regional brokerage firms over the preceding three months. IBES selects the contributing brokers "because of the superior quality of their research, professional reputation, and client demand" (IBES *Monthly Summary Book*).

Risk Variables. Although many risk factors could potentially affect the firm's stock price, most of these factors are highly correlated with one another. As shown above in Equation (4), we decided to restrict our attention to four risk measures that have intuitive appeal and are followed by many financial analysts: 1) B, the firm's beta as published by Value Line; 2) Cov, the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio (obtained from Standard & Poor's Compustat); 3) Rsq, the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS (measured by the R^2 from a log-linear least squares regression); and 4) Sa, the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' five-year EPS growth forecast (mean forecast) as computed by IBES.

After careful analysis of the data used in our study, we felt that we could obtain more meaningful results by imposing six restrictions on the companies included in our study:

1. Because of the need to calculate ten-year historical growth rates, and because we studied three different time periods, 1981, 1982, and 1983, our study requires data for the thirteen-year period 1971-1983. We included only companies with at least a thirteen-year operating history in our study.
2. As our historical growth rate calculations were based on log-linear regressions, and the logarithm of a negative number is not defined, we excluded all companies that experienced negative EPS during any of the years 1971-1983.
3. For similar reasons, we also eliminated companies that did not pay a dividend during any one of the years 1971-1983.
4. To insure comparability of time periods covered by each consensus earnings figure in the P/E ratios, we eliminated all companies that did not have a December 31 fiscal year-end.
5. To eliminate distortions caused by highly unusual events that distort current earnings but not expected future earnings, and thus the firm's price/earnings ratio, we eliminated any firm with a price/earnings ratio greater than 50.
6. As the evaluation of analysts' forecasts is a major part of this study, we eliminated all firms that IBES did not follow.

Our final sample consisted of approximately

sixty-five utility firms.³

RESULTS

To keep the number of calculations in our study to a reasonable level, we performed the study in two stages. In Stage 1, all forty-one historically oriented approaches for estimating future growth were correlated with each firm's P/E ratio. In Stage 2, the historical growth rate with the highest correlation to the P/E ratio was compared to the consensus analyst growth rate in the multiple regression model described by Equation (4) above. We performed our regressions for each of three recent time periods, because we felt the results of our study might vary over time.

First-Stage Correlation Study

Table 1 gives the results of our first-stage correlation study for each group of companies in each of the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. The values in this table measure the correlation between the historically oriented growth rates for the various time periods and the firm's end-of-year P/E ratio.

The four variables for which historical growth rates were calculated are shown in the left-hand column: EPS indicates historical earnings per share growth, DPS indicates historical dividend per share growth, BVPS indicates historical book value per share growth, and CFPS indicates historical cash flow per share growth. The term "plowback" refers to the product of the firm's retention ratio in the current year and its return on book equity for that year. In all, we calculated forty-one historically oriented growth rates for each group of firms in each study period.

The goal of the first-stage correlation analysis was to determine which historically oriented growth rate is most highly correlated with each group's year-end P/E ratio. Eight-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with P/E in 1981 and 1982, and ten-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with year-end P/E in 1983. In all cases, the plowback estimate of future growth performed poorly, indicating that — contrary to generally held views — plowback is not a factor in investor expectations of future growth.

Second-Stage Regression Study

In the second stage of our regression study, we ran the regression in Equation (4) using two different measures of future growth, g_1 the best historically oriented growth rate (g_h) from the first-stage correlation study, and g_2 the consensus analysts' forecast (g_c) of five-year EPS growth. The regression results, which are shown in Table 2, support at least

TABLE 1
Correlation Coefficients of All Historically Based Growth Estimates by Group and by Year with P/E

Historical Growth Rate Period in Years

Current Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1981										
EPS	-0.02	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
DPS	0.05	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.23
BVPS	0.01	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
CFPS	-0.05	0.04	0.13	0.22	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.31	-0.57	-0.54
Plowback	0.19									
1982										
EPS	-0.10	-0.13	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00
DPS	-0.19	-0.10	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.13	0.13
BVPS	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.09
CFPS	-0.02	-0.08	0.00	0.10	0.16	0.19	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.07
Plowback	0.04									
1983										
EPS	-0.06	-0.25	-0.25	-0.24	-0.16	-0.11	-0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02
DPS	0.03	-0.10	-0.03	0.08	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.24
BVPS	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.15	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.21
CFPS	-0.08	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.20	0.29	0.35	0.38	0.40	0.42
Plowback	-0.08									

two general conclusions regarding the pricing of equity securities.

First, we found overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. In every case, the R^2 in the regression containing the consensus analysts' forecast is higher than the R^2 in the regression containing the historical growth measure. The regression

coefficients in the equation containing the consensus analysts' forecast also are considerably more significant than they are in the alternative regression. These results are consistent with those found by Cragg and Malkiel for data covering the period 1961-1968. Our results also are consistent with the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than historically oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy-and-sell decisions.

TABLE 2
Regression Results
Model I

Part A: *Historical*

$$P/E = a_0 + a_1D/E + a_2g_h + a_3B + a_4Cov + a_5Rsq + a_6Sa$$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	\hat{a}_4	\hat{a}_5	\hat{a}_6	R^2	F Ratio
1981	-6.42* (5.50)	10.31* (14.79)	7.67* (2.20)	3.24 (2.86)	0.54* (2.50)	1.42* (2.85)	57.43 (4.07)	0.83	46.49
1982	-2.90* (2.75)	9.32* (18.52)	8.49* (4.18)	2.85 (2.83)	0.45* (2.60)	-0.42 (0.05)	3.63 (0.26)	0.86	65.53
1983	-5.96* (3.70)	10.20* (12.20)	19.78* (4.83)	4.85 (2.95)	0.44* (1.89)	0.33 (0.50)	32.49 (1.29)	0.82	45.26

Part B: *Analysis*

$$P/E = a_0 + a_1D/E + a_2g_a + a_3B + a_4Cov + a_5Rsq + a_6Sa$$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	\hat{a}_4	\hat{a}_5	\hat{a}_6	R^2	F Ratio
1981	-4.97* (6.23)	10.62* (21.57)	54.85* (8.56)	-0.61 (0.68)	0.33* (2.28)	0.63* (1.74)	4.34 (0.37)	0.91	103.10
1982	-2.16* (2.59)	9.47* (22.46)	50.71* (9.31)	-1.07 (1.14)	0.36* (2.53)	-0.31 (1.09)	119.05* (1.60)	0.90	97.62
1983	-8.47* (7.07)	11.96* (16.48)	79.05* (7.84)	2.16 (1.55)	0.56* (3.08)	0.20 (0.38)	-34.43 (1.44)	0.87	69.81

Notes:

* Coefficient is significant at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign. T-statistic in parentheses.

Second, there is some evidence that investors tend to view risk in traditional terms. The interest coverage variable is statistically significant in all but one of our samples, and the stability of the operating income variable is statistically significant in six of the twelve samples we studied. On the other hand, the beta is never statistically significant, and the standard deviation of the analysts' five-year growth forecasts is statistically significant in only two of our twelve samples. This evidence is far from conclusive, however, because, as we demonstrate later, a significant degree of cross-correlation among our four risk variables makes any general inference about risk extremely hazardous.

Possible Misspecification of Risk

The stock valuation theory says nothing about which risk variables are most important to investors. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility that the risk variables of our study are only proxies for the "true" risk variables used by investors. The inclusion of proxy variables may increase the variance of the parameters of most concern, which in this case are the coefficients of the growth variables.⁴

To allow for the possibility that the use of risk proxies has caused us to draw incorrect conclusions concerning the relative importance of analysts' growth forecasts and historical growth extrapolations, we have also estimated Equation (4) with the risk variables excluded. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3.

Again, there is overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' growth forecast is superior to the historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. The R² and t-statistics are higher in every case.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between growth expectations and share prices is important in several major areas of finance. The data base of analysts' growth forecasts collected by Lynch, Jones & Ryan provides a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that investors rely more heavily on analysts' growth forecasts than on historical growth extrapolations in making security buy-and-sell decisions. With the help of this data base, our studies affirm the superiority of analysts' forecasts over simple historical growth extrapolations in the stock price formation process. Indirectly, this finding lends support to the use of valuation models whose input includes expected growth rates.

⁴ We also tried several other definitions of "earnings," including the firm's most recent primary earnings per share prior to any extraordinary items or discontinued operations. As our results were insensitive to reasonable alternative

TABLE 3
 Regression Results
 Model II

Part A: Historical

$P/E = a_0 + a_1 D/E + a_2 E_h$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	R ²	F Ratio
1981	-1.05 (1.61)	9.59 (12.13)	21.20 (7.05)	0.73	82.95
1982	0.54 (1.38)	8.92 (17.73)	12.18 (6.95)	0.83	167.97
1983	-0.75 (1.13)	8.92 (12.38)	12.18 (7.94)	0.77	107.82

Part B: Analysis

$P/E + a_0 + a_1 D/E + a_2 E_a$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	R ²	F Ratio
1981	3.96 (8.31)	10.07 (8.31)	60.53 (20.91)	0.90 (15.79)	274.16
1982	-1.75 (4.00)	9.19 (4.00)	44.92 (21.35)	0.88 (11.06)	246.36
1983	-4.97 (6.93)	10.95 (6.93)	82.02 (15.93)	0.83 (11.02)	168.28

Notes:

* Coefficient is significant at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign. T-statistic in parentheses.

definitions of "earnings" we report only the results for the IBES consensus.

² For the latest year, we actually employed a point-to-point growth calculation because there were only two available observations.

³ We use the word "approximately," because the set of available firms varied each year. In any case, the number varied only from zero to three firms on either side of the figures cited here.

⁴ See Maddala (1977).

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Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

Narasimhan Jegadeesh; Sheridan Titman

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Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

NARASIMHAN JEGADEESH and SHERIDAN TITMAN*

ABSTRACT

This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.

A POPULAR VIEW HELD by many journalists, psychologists, and economists is that individuals tend to overreact to information.¹ A direct extension of this view, suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), is that stock prices also overreact to information, suggesting that contrarian strategies (buying past losers and selling past winners) achieve abnormal returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that over 3- to 5-year holding periods stocks that performed poorly over the previous 3 to 5 years achieve higher returns than stocks that performed well over the same period. However, the interpretation of the De Bondt and Thaler results are still being debated. Some have argued that the De Bondt and Thaler results can be explained by the systematic risk of their contrarian portfolios and the size effect.² In addition, since the long-term losers outperform the long-term winners only in Januaries, it is unclear whether their results can be attributed to overreaction.

*Jegadeesh is from the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. Titman is from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. We would like to thank Kent Daniel, Ravi Jagannathan, Richard Roll, Hans Stoll, René Stulz, and two referees. We also thank participants of the Johnson Symposium held at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and seminar participants at Harvard, SMU, UBC, UCLA, Penn State, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, and York University for helpful comments, and Juan Siu and Kwan Ho Kim for excellent research assistance.

¹See for example, the academic papers by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Shiller (1981).

²See for example, Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989), and Zarowin (1990). For an alternate view, see the recent paper by Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992).

More recent papers by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) provide evidence of shorter-term return reversals. These papers show that contrarian strategies that select stocks based on their returns in the previous week or month generate significant abnormal returns. However, since these strategies are transaction intensive and are based on short-term price movements, their apparent success may reflect the presence of short-term price pressure or a lack of liquidity in the market rather than overreaction. Jegadeesh and Titman (1991) provide evidence on the relation between short-term return reversals and bid-ask spreads that supports this interpretation. In addition, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) argue that a large part of the abnormal returns documented by Jegadeesh and Lehmann is attributable to a delayed stock price reaction to common factors rather than to overreaction.

Although contrarian strategies have received a lot of attention in the recent academic literature, the early literature on market efficiency focused on relative strength strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers. Most notably, Levy (1967) claims that a trading rule that buys stocks with current prices that are substantially higher than their average prices over the past 27 weeks realizes significant abnormal returns. Jensen and Bennington (1970), however, point out that Levy had come up with his trading rule after examining 68 different trading rules in his dissertation and because of this express skepticism about his conclusions. Jensen and Bennington analyze the profitability of Levy's trading rule over a long time period that was, for the most part, outside Levy's original sample period. They find that in their sample period Levy's trading rule does not outperform a buy and hold strategy and hence attribute Levy's result to a selection bias.

Although the current academic debate has focused on contrarian rather than relative strength trading rules, a number of practitioners still use relative strength as one of their stock selection criteria. For example, a majority of the mutual funds examined by Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1991) show a tendency to buy stocks that have increased in price over the previous quarter. In addition, the Value Line rankings are known to be based in large part on past relative strength. The success of many of the mutual funds in the Grinblatt and Titman sample and the predictive power of Value Line rankings (see Copeland and Mayers (1982) and Stickel (1985)) provide suggestive evidence that the relative strength strategies may generate abnormal returns.

How can we reconcile the success of Value Line rankings and the mutual funds that use relative strength rules with the current academic literature that suggests that the opposite strategy generates abnormal returns? One possibility is that the abnormal returns realized by these practitioners are either spurious or are unrelated to their tendencies to buy past winners. A second possibility is that the discrepancy is due to the difference between the time horizons used in the trading rules examined in the recent academic papers and those used in practice. For instance, the above cited evidence favoring contrarian strategies focuses on trading strategies based on either

very short-term return reversals (1 week or 1 month), or very long-term return reversals (3 to 5 years). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that practitioners who use relative strength rules base their selections on price movements over the past 3 to 12 months.³ This paper provides an analysis of relative strength trading strategies over 3- to 12-month horizons. Our analysis of NYSE and AMEX stocks documents significant profits in the 1965 to 1989 sample period for each of the relative strength strategies examined. We provide a decomposition of these profits into different sources and develop tests that allow us to evaluate their relative importance. The results of these tests indicate that the profits are not due to the systematic risk of the trading strategies. In addition, the evidence indicates that the profits cannot be attributed to a lead-lag effect resulting from delayed stock price reactions to information about a common factor similar to that proposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1990). The evidence is, however, consistent with delayed price reactions to firm-specific information.

Further tests suggest that part of the predictable price changes that occur during these 3- to 12-month holding periods may not be permanent. The stocks included in the relative strength portfolios experience negative abnormal returns starting around 12 months after the formation date and continuing up to the thirty-first month. For example, the portfolio formed on the basis of returns realized in the past 6 months generates an average cumulative return of 9.5% over the next 12 months but loses more than half of this return in the following 24 months.

Our analysis of stock returns around earnings announcement dates suggests a similar bias in market expectations. We find that past winners realize consistently higher returns around their earnings announcements in the 7 months following the portfolio formation date than do past losers. However, in each of the following 13 months past losers realize higher returns than past winners around earnings announcements.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the trading strategies that we examine and Section II documents their excess returns. Section III provides a decomposition of the profits from relative strength strategies and evaluates the relative importance of the different components. Section IV documents these returns in subsamples stratified on the basis of ex ante beta and firm size and Section V measures these profits across calendar months and over 5-year subperiods. The longer term performance of the stocks included in the relative strength portfolios is examined in Section VI and Section VII back tests the strategy over the 1927 to 1964

³For instance, one of the inputs used by Value Line to assign a timeliness rank for each stock is a price momentum factor computed based on the stock's past 3- to 12-month returns. Value Line reports that the price momentum factor is computed by "dividing the stock's latest 10-week average relative price by its 52-week average relative price." These timeliness ranks, according to Value Line, are "designed to discriminate among stocks on the basis of relative price performance over the next 6 to 12 months" (see Bernard (1984), pp. 52-53).

period. Section VIII examines the returns of past winners and past losers around earnings announcement dates and Section IX concludes the paper.

I. Trading Strategies

If stock prices either overreact or underreact to information, then profitable trading strategies that select stocks based on their past returns will exist. This study investigates the efficiency of the stock market by examining the profitability of a number of these strategies. The strategies we consider select stocks based on their returns over the past 1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters. We also consider holding periods that vary from 1 to 4 quarters. This gives a total of 16 strategies. In addition, we examine a second set of 16 strategies that skip a week between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. By skipping a week, we avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged reaction effects that underlie the evidence documented in Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990).

To increase the power of our tests, the strategies we examine include portfolios with overlapping holding periods. Therefore, in any given month t , the strategies hold a series of portfolios that are selected in the current month as well as in the previous $K - 1$ months, where K is the holding period. Specifically, a strategy that selects stocks on the basis of returns over the past J months and holds them for K months (we will refer to this as a J -month/ K -month strategy) is constructed as follows: At the beginning of each month t the securities are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their returns in the past J months. Based on these rankings, ten decile portfolios are formed that equally weight the stocks contained in the top decile, the second decile, and so on. The top decile portfolio is called the "losers" decile and the bottom decile is called the "winners" decile. In each month t , the strategy buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio, holding this position for K months. In addition, the strategy closes out the position initiated in month $t - K$. Hence, under this trading strategy we revise the weights on $\frac{1}{K}$ of the securities in the entire portfolio in any given month and carry over the rest from the previous month.

The profits of the above strategies were calculated for both a series of buy and hold portfolios and a series of portfolios that were rebalanced monthly to maintain equal weights. Since the returns for these two strategies were very similar (the buy and hold strategies yielded slightly higher returns) we present only the rebalanced returns which are also used in the event study presented in Section VI.

II. The Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios

This section documents the returns of the portfolio strategies described in the last section over the 1965 to 1989 period using data from the CRSP daily

returns file.⁴ All stocks with available returns data in the J months preceding the portfolio formation date are included in the sample from which the buy and sell portfolios are constructed.

Table I reports the average returns of the different buy and sell portfolios as well as the zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio, for the 32 strategies described above. The returns of all the zero-cost portfolios (i.e., the returns per dollar long in this portfolio) are positive. All these returns are statistically significant except for the 3-month/3-month strategy that does not skip a week. Many of the individual t -statistics are sufficiently large to be significant even after considering the fact that we have conducted 32 separate tests. The probability of obtaining a single t -statistic as large as 4.28 (obtained with the 12-month/3-month strategy that skips a week) with 32 observations is less than 0.0006, as given by the Bonferroni inequality.⁵

The most successful zero-cost strategy selects stocks based on their returns over the previous 12 months and then holds the portfolio for 3 months. This strategy yields 1.31% per month (shown in Panel A) when there is no time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period and it yields 1.49% per month (shown in Panel B) when there is a 1-week lag between the formation period and the holding period.⁶ The 6-month formation period produces returns of about 1% per month regardless of the holding period. These holding period returns are slightly higher when there is a 1-week lag between the formation period and the holding period (Panel B) than when the formation and holding periods are contiguous (Panel A).

Having established that the relative strength strategies are on average quite profitable, we now examine one specific strategy in detail, the 6-month/6-month strategy that does not skip a week between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. The results for this strategy are representative of the results for the other strategies.

III. Sources of Relative Strength Profits

This section presents two simple return-generating models that allow us to decompose the excess returns documented in the last section and identify the important sources of relative strength profits. The first model allows for factor-mimicking portfolio returns to be serially correlated but requires indi-

⁴The latest version of the CRSP daily returns file at the time this study was initiated covers the July 1962 to December 1989 period. Monthly returns were obtained by compounding the daily returns recorded in this data set. Since the 12-month/12-month strategy considered here requires lagged returns data over 23 months the first full calendar year for which we could examine portfolio returns is 1965.

⁵The Bonferroni inequality provides a bound for the probability of observing a t -statistic of a certain magnitude with N tests that are not necessarily independent.

⁶De Bondt and Thaler (1985) report 1-year holding period returns in their tables that are consistent with our findings here. However, they do not examine strategies based on 1-year horizons in any detail and based on their analysis of longer horizon strategies conclude that the market overreacts.

Table I
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on J -month lagged returns and held for K months. The values of J and K for the different strategies are indicated in the first column and row, respectively. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J -month lagged returns and an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and an equally weighted portfolio of the stocks in the highest return decile is the *buy* portfolio. The average monthly returns of these portfolios are presented in this table. The relative strength portfolios in Panel A are formed immediately after the lagged returns are measured for the purpose of portfolio formation. The relative strength portfolios in Panel B are formed 1 week after the lagged returns used for forming these portfolios are measured. The t -statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

J		Panel A				Panel B				
		$K =$	3	6	9	12	$K =$	3	6	9
3	Sell		0.0108 (2.16)	0.0091 (1.87)	0.0092 (1.92)	0.0087 (1.87)	0.0083 (1.67)	0.0079 (1.64)	0.0084 (1.77)	0.0083 (1.79)
3	Buy		0.0140 (3.57)	0.0149 (3.78)	0.0152 (3.83)	0.0156 (3.89)	0.0156 (3.95)	0.0158 (3.98)	0.0158 (3.96)	0.0160 (3.98)
3	Buy-sell		0.0032 (1.10)	0.0058 (2.29)	0.0061 (2.69)	0.0069 (3.53)	0.0073 (2.61)	0.0078 (3.16)	0.0074 (3.36)	0.0077 (4.00)
6	Sell		0.0087 (1.67)	0.0079 (1.56)	0.0072 (1.48)	0.0080 (1.66)	0.0066 (1.28)	0.0068 (1.35)	0.0067 (1.38)	0.0076 (1.58)
6	Buy		0.0171 (4.28)	0.0174 (4.33)	0.0174 (4.31)	0.0166 (4.13)	0.0179 (4.47)	0.0178 (4.41)	0.0175 (4.32)	0.0166 (4.13)
6	Buy-sell		0.0084 (2.44)	0.0095 (3.07)	0.0102 (3.76)	0.0086 (3.36)	0.0114 (3.37)	0.0110 (3.61)	0.0108 (4.01)	0.0090 (3.54)
9	Sell		0.0077 (1.47)	0.0065 (1.29)	0.0071 (1.43)	0.0082 (1.66)	0.0058 (1.13)	0.0058 (1.15)	0.0066 (1.34)	0.0078 (1.59)
9	Buy		0.0186 (4.56)	0.0186 (4.53)	0.0176 (4.30)	0.0164 (4.03)	0.0193 (4.72)	0.0188 (4.56)	0.0176 (4.30)	0.0164 (4.04)
9	Buy-sell		0.0109 (3.03)	0.0121 (3.78)	0.0105 (3.47)	0.0082 (2.89)	0.0135 (3.85)	0.0130 (4.09)	0.0109 (3.67)	0.0085 (3.04)
12	Sell		0.0060 (1.17)	0.0065 (1.29)	0.0075 (1.48)	0.0087 (1.74)	0.0048 (0.93)	0.0058 (1.15)	0.0070 (1.40)	0.0085 (1.71)
12	Buy		0.0192 (4.63)	0.0179 (4.36)	0.0168 (4.10)	0.0155 (3.81)	0.0196 (4.73)	0.0179 (4.36)	0.0167 (4.09)	0.0154 (3.79)
12	Buy-sell		0.0131 (3.74)	0.0114 (3.40)	0.0093 (2.95)	0.0068 (2.25)	0.0149 (4.28)	0.0121 (3.65)	0.0096 (3.09)	0.0069 (2.31)

vidual stocks to react instantaneously to factor realizations. This model is used to decompose relative strength profits into two components relating to systematic risk, which would exist in an efficient market, and a third component relating to firm-specific returns, which would contribute to relative strength profits only if the market were inefficient. The second return-generating model relaxes the assumption that stocks react instantaneously to the common factor. This model enables us to evaluate the possibility that the relative strength profits arise because of a lead-lag relationship in stock prices similar to that proposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) as a partial explanation for short horizon contrarian profits.

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A. A Simple One-Factor Model

Consider the following one-factor model describing stock returns:⁷

$$\begin{aligned}
 r_{it} &= \mu_i + b_i f_t + e_{it}, \\
 E(f_t) &= 0 \\
 E(e_{it}) &= 0 \\
 \text{Cov}(e_{it}, f_t) &= 0, \quad \forall i \\
 \text{Cov}(e_{it}, e_{jt-1}) &= 0, \quad \forall i \neq j
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where μ_i is the unconditional expected return on security i , r_{it} is the return on security i , f_t is the unconditional unexpected return on a factor-mimicking portfolio, e_{it} is the firm-specific component of return at time t , and b_i is the factor sensitivity of security i . For the 6-month/6-month strategy that we consider in the rest of this paper the length of a period is 6 months.

The superior performance of the relative strength strategies documented in the last section implies that stocks that generate higher than average returns in one period also generate higher than average returns in the period that follows. In other words, these results imply that:

$$E(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t | r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1} > 0) > 0$$

and

$$E(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t | r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1} < 0) < 0,$$

where a bar above a variable denotes its cross-sectional average.

Therefore,

$$E\{(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t)(r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1})\} > 0. \tag{2}$$

The above cross-sectional covariance equals the expected profits from the zero-cost contrarian trading strategy examined by Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) that weights stocks by their past returns less the past equally weighted index returns. This weighted relative strength strategy (WRSS) is closely related to our strategy. The WRSS yields a profit of 4.5% per dollar long semiannually (t -statistic = 2.99) and the correlation between the returns of this strategy and that of the trading strategy examined in the last section is 0.95. The equally weighted decile portfolios are used in most of our empirical tests since they provide relatively more information than the WRSS. However, as the following analysis demonstrates, the closely related WRSS provides a tractable framework for analytically examining the sources of relative strength profits and evaluating the relative importance of each of these sources.

⁷Our analysis in this subsection is similar to that in Jegadeesh (1987) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990).

Given the one-factor model defined in (1), the WRSS profits given in expression (2) can be decomposed into the following three terms:

$$E\{(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t)(r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1})\} = \sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_b^2 \text{Cov}(f_t, f_{t-1}) + \overline{\text{Cov}}_i(e_{it}, e_{it-1}), \quad (3)$$

where σ_μ^2 and σ_b^2 are the cross-sectional variances of expected returns and factor sensitivities respectively.

The above decomposition suggests three potential sources of the relative strength profits. The first term in this expression is the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns. Intuitively, since realized returns contain a component related to expected returns, securities that experience relatively high returns in one period can be expected to have higher than average returns in the following period. The second term is related to the potential to time the factor. If the factor portfolio returns exhibit positive serial correlation, the relative strength strategy will tend to pick stocks with high b 's when the conditional expectation of the factor portfolio return is high. As the above expression demonstrates, the extent to which relative strength strategies generate profits because of the serial correlation of the factor portfolio return is a function of the cross-sectional variance of the b 's. The last term in the above expression is the average serial covariance of the idiosyncratic components of security returns.

To assess whether the existence of relative strength profits imply market inefficiency, it is important to identify the sources of the profits. If the profits are due to either the first or the second term in expression (3) they may be attributed to compensation for bearing systematic risk and need not be an indication of market inefficiency. However, if the superior performance of the relative strength strategies is due to the third term, then the results would suggest market inefficiency.

B. The Average Size and Beta of Relative Strength Portfolios

This subsection considers the possibility that relative strength strategies systematically pick high-risk stocks and benefit from the first term in expression (3). Table II reports estimates of the two most common indicators of systematic risk, the post-ranking betas of the ten 6-month/6-month relative strength portfolios and the average capitalizations of the stocks in these portfolios. The betas of the extreme past returns portfolios are higher than the average beta for the full sample. In addition, since the beta of the portfolio of past losers is higher than the beta of the portfolio of past winners, the beta of the zero-cost winners minus losers portfolio is negative. The average capitalizations of the stocks in the different portfolios show that the highest and the lowest past returns portfolios consist of smaller than average stocks, with the stocks in the losers portfolios being smaller than the stocks in the winners portfolio. This evidence suggests that the observed relative strength profits are not due to the first source of profits in expression (3).

Table II
Betas and Market Capitalization of Relative Strength
Portfolios

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. The equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is portfolio P1, the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the next decile is portfolio P2, and so on. The betas with respect to the value-weighted index and the average market capitalizations of the stocks included in these portfolios are reported here. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

	Beta	Average Market Capitalization
P1	1.36	208.24
P2	1.19	480.07
P3	1.14	545.31
P4	1.11	618.85
P5	1.09	692.89
P6	1.08	702.51
P7	1.09	738.09
P8	1.12	758.87
P9	1.17	680.18
P10	1.28	495.13
P10-P1	-0.08	—

Additional evidence relating to the extent to which the dispersion in expected returns explains these profits is given in the next section.

C. The Serial Covariance of 6-Month Returns

This subsection examines the serial covariance of 6-month returns in order to assess the potential contribution of the second and third source of profits from our decomposition. Given the model expressed in (1), the serial covariance of an equally weighted portfolio of a large number of stocks is:⁸

$$\text{cov}(\bar{r}_t, \bar{r}_{t-1}) = \bar{b}_i^2 \text{Cov}(f_t, f_{t-1}). \quad (4)$$

If the source of relative strength profits is the serial covariance of factor-related returns then, from the above expression, the in-sample serial covariance of the equally weighted index returns is required to be positive. However, we find that the serial covariance of 6-month returns of the equally weighted index is negative (-0.0028) which, from the decomposition in expression (3), reduces the relative strength profits. This result indicates that the serial covariance of factor portfolio returns is unlikely to be the source of relative strength profits.

⁸The contribution of the serial covariances of e_{it} to the serial covariance of the equally weighted index becomes arbitrarily small as the number of stocks in the index becomes arbitrarily large.

The estimates of the serial covariance of market model residuals for individual stocks are on average positive (0.0012). This evidence suggests that the relative strength profits may arise from stocks underreacting to firm-specific information. However, this evidence is also potentially consistent with an alternative model in which some stocks react with a lag to factor realizations, and we address this possibility in the next subsection.

D. Lead-Lag Effects and Relative Strength Profits

This subsection examines whether the relative strength profits can arise from a lead-lag relationship in stock prices similar to that considered in Lo and MacKinlay (1990). In contrast to the model previously presented, the model in this subsection assumes that stocks can either overreact or underreact to the common factor but that the factor-mimicking portfolio returns are serially uncorrelated.

Consider the following return generating process:

$$r_{it} = \mu_i + b_{1i}f_t + b_{2i}f_{t-1} + e_{it}, \quad (5)$$

where b_{1i} and b_{2i} are sensitivities to the contemporaneous and lagged factor realizations. $b_{2i} > 0$ implies that stock i partly reacts to the factor with a lag as in Lo and MacKinlay and $b_{2i} < 0$ implies that the stock overreacts to contemporaneous factor realizations and this overreaction gets corrected in the subsequent period.

Given this model, the WRSS profits and the serial covariance of the equally weighted index are given by:

$$E\{(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t)(r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1})\} = \sigma_\mu^2 + \delta\sigma_f^2 \quad (6)$$

and

$$\text{cov}(\bar{r}_t, \bar{r}_{t-1}) = \bar{b}_1\bar{b}_2\sigma_f^2, \quad (7)$$

where \bar{b}_1 and \bar{b}_2 are cross-sectional averages of b_{1i} and b_{2i} , and,

$$\delta \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (b_{1i} - \bar{b}_1)(b_{2i} - \bar{b}_2).$$

From expression (6), when $\delta < 0$ the lead-lag relation has a negative effect on the profitability of the WRSS, or equivalently, a positive effect on contrarian profits as in Lo and MacKinlay. However, when $\delta > 0$, the lead-lag relation will generate positive relative strength profits. In addition, if \bar{b}_2 is positive (negative) then the equally weighted index returns will be positively (negatively) serially correlated. This parameter, however, does not affect the profitability of the WRSS.

If the lead-lag effect is an important source of relative strength profits, then the profit in any period will depend on the magnitude of factor portfolio

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return in the previous period. Formally, consider the expected WRSS profits conditional on the past factor portfolio return:

$$E\{(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t)(r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1})|f_{t-1}\} = \sigma_\mu^2 + \delta f_{t-1}^2. \quad (8)$$

In contrast, under model (1), the conditional expectation of the WRSS profits given in expression (3), assuming that the factor portfolio returns are normally distributed, is:

$$E\{(r_{it} - \bar{r}_t)(r_{it-1} - \bar{r}_{t-1})|f_{t-1}\} = \sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_b^2 \rho f_{t-1}^2,$$

where ρ is the first order serial correlation of the factor portfolio returns.

Expression (8) implies that if the relative strength profits come entirely from the lead-lag effect in stock returns, then the magnitude of the profits should be positively related to the squared factor portfolio return in the previous period. Intuitively, if inefficient stock price reactions to factor realizations are important for the profitability of relative strength strategies, then large factor realizations should result in large WRSS profits. Alternatively, if the lead-lag effect does not contribute to the profits, then the observed negative serial covariance of the market index implies a negative relation between the magnitude of the WRSS profits and squared lagged factor portfolio returns.

To examine which of these predictions best explains the time-series variation in relative strength profits we estimate the following regression using the value-weighted index as a proxy for the factor portfolio:

$$r_{pt,6} = \alpha_i + \theta r_{mt,-6}^2 + u_{it},$$

where $r_{pt,6}$ is the 6-month return of the relative strength portfolio formed in month t based on 6-month lagged returns and $r_{mt,-6}$ is the demeaned return on the value-weighted index in the months $t - 6$ through $t - 1$. The estimates of θ and the corresponding autocorrelation-consistent t -statistic over the 1965 to 1989 sample period are -2.29 and -1.74 respectively. The estimates (t -statistic) of θ in the first and second half of this sample period are -2.55 (-2.65) and -1.83 (-2.52) respectively.⁹ This reliably negative relation between the relative strength profits and lagged squared market returns is consistent with the model presented in the last subsection which assumed no lead-lag relationship and is inconsistent with the lead-lag model. This evidence indicates that the lead-lag effect is not an important source of relative strength profits and that the profitability of these strategies is therefore related to market underreaction to the firm-specific information.

⁹When this regression is fitted with the WRSS profits as the dependent variable, the estimate (t -statistic) of θ over 1965-1989 is -1.77 (-3.56) and the corresponding statistics in the two equal subperiods are -1.94 (-2.52) and -1.51 (-2.53).

IV. Profitability of Relative Strength Strategies Within Size- and Beta-Based Subsamples

In this section we examine the profitability of the 6-month/6-month strategy within subsamples stratified on the basis of firm size and ex ante estimates of betas. Specifically, we implement this strategy on three size-based subsamples (small, medium, and large), and three beta-based subsamples (low-beta, medium-beta, and high-beta stocks).

Measuring relative strength profits on size- and beta-based subsamples allows us to examine whether the profitability of the strategy is confined to any particular subsample of stocks. This analysis also provides additional evidence about the source of the observed relative strength profits. Since extant empirical evidence indicates that size and beta are related to both risk and expected returns,¹⁰ the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns should be less within these subsamples than in the full sample. Therefore, if the relative strength strategy profits are related to differences in expected returns, they will be less when they are implemented on stocks within each subsample rather than on all the stocks in the sample. The profits need not be reduced in these subsamples, however, if the profits of the strategies are due to serial covariances in idiosyncratic returns. In fact, if the profits are not factor-related, the strategies are likely to generate higher returns when they are implemented within the small-firm subsample that consists of less actively traded stocks and to generate lower returns when they are implemented within the large-firm subsample.

Table III presents the average returns of the 6-month/6-month strategy for each of the subsamples. The results in Panel A indicate that the observed abnormal returns are of approximately the same magnitude when the strategies are implemented on the various subsamples of stocks as when they are implemented on the entire sample. They do, however, appear to be somewhat related to firm size and beta; for the zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio, the subsample with the largest firms generates lower abnormal returns than the other two subsamples and the returns in the subsamples segmented by beta are monotonically increasing in beta.¹¹ These findings indicate that the relative strength profits are not primarily due to the cross-sectional differences in the systematic risk of the stocks in the sample. This evidence suggests that the profits are due to the serial correlation in the firm-specific component of returns. Furthermore, these results indicate that the profitabil-

¹⁰ See Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Banz (1981).

¹¹ One thing that is interesting to note here is that the average returns of low beta stocks are higher than the returns of the medium and high beta stocks. The average returns of stocks in the low, medium and high beta groups are 1.48%, 1.39%, and 1.16% respectively. These results, obtained with daily betas, should be contrasted with earlier findings of positive relations between monthly betas and average returns (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973)). The difference between our results using daily betas and the earlier results using monthly betas is due to the lower correlation between firm size and daily betas. Jegadeesh (1992) and Fama and French (1992) document that there is no reliable relation between monthly betas and average returns after controlling for firm size.

ity of the relative strength strategies is not confined to any particular subsample of stocks.

As a further test Panel B of Table III presents the risk-adjusted returns of the relative strength strategies implemented within the size- and beta-based subsamples. The risk-adjusted returns are estimated as the intercepts from the following market model regression:

$$r_{pt} - r_{ft} = \alpha_p + \beta_p(r_{mt} - r_{ft}) + e_{it}, \quad (9)$$

where r_{pt} is the return on the portfolio p , r_{mt} is the return on the value-weighted index, and r_{ft} is the interest rate on 1-month Treasury Bill. Consistent with the negative betas of the zero-cost strategies, the abnormal returns of the relative strength strategies estimated from these regressions slightly exceed the raw returns given in Table III (Panel A). With the exception of the F -statistics becoming somewhat more significant, the findings in Table III (Panel B) are virtually the same as those reported in Table III (Panel A).

An additional implication of the results in Table III (Panel B) is that the abnormal performance of the zero-cost portfolio is due to the buy side of the transaction rather than the sell side. The portfolio of past winners achieves significant positive abnormal return when the value-weighted index is used as the benchmark, while the abnormal return of the portfolio of past losers is not statistically significant with this benchmark. However, in unreported regressions that used the equally weighted index as the benchmark, the positive and the negative abnormal returns of the winners and losers portfolios were both statistically significant. The magnitude and statistical significance of the abnormal returns of the zero-cost, winners minus losers, portfolio (0.0115 with a t -statistic of 3.84) was slightly higher when the equally weighted index was used in place of the value-weighted index as the benchmark.

From a practical investment perspective, it is important to assess whether the relative strength strategies will be profitable after accounting for transaction costs. On average, the relative strength trading rule results in a turnover of 84.8% semiannually.¹² The risk-adjusted return of the relative strength trading rule after considering a 0.5% one-way transaction cost¹³ is 9.29% per year, which is reliably different from zero. The risk-adjusted returns after transaction costs are also significantly positive in each of the three size-based subsamples.

¹²The average turnovers for the buy and sell sides of the zero-cost portfolio are 86.6% and 83.1% respectively. These percentages are significantly less than the 90% turnover that would be expected if the transition probabilities are equal across the return decile portfolios.

¹³Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) estimate one way transaction costs of 23 basis points for institutional investors, suggesting that the assumed transaction cost of 0.5% per trade is conservative.

V. Subperiod Analysis

A. Seasonal Patterns in Relative Strength Portfolio Returns

This section tests for possible seasonal effects in the performance of the relative strength portfolios. Based on earlier papers, e.g., Roll (1983), we have reason to expect that the relative strength strategies will not be successful in the month of January. Table IV reports the average returns of the zero-cost portfolio in each calendar month and the results here support this conjecture.

Table III
Returns of Size-Based and Beta-Based Relative Strength Portfolios

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is portfolio P1, the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the next decile is portfolio P2, and so on. Average monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength portfolios formed using size-based and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. The subsample S1 contains the smallest firms, S2 contains the medium-sized firms, and S3 contains the largest firms. The subsamples β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 contain the firms with the smallest, medium, and the largest Scholes-Williams betas estimated from the returns data in the calendar year prior to portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

Panel A: Average Monthly Returns							
	All	S1	S2	S3	β_1	β_2	β_3
P1	0.0079 (1.56)	0.0083 (1.35)	0.0047 (0.99)	0.0082 (2.22)	0.0129 (2.92)	0.0097 (2.01)	0.0052 (0.95)
P2	0.0112 (2.78)	0.0117 (2.29)	0.0102 (2.54)	0.0098 (3.08)	0.0140 (4.38)	0.0128 (3.37)	0.0086 (1.83)
P3	0.0125 (3.40)	0.0152 (3.23)	0.0125 (3.34)	0.0105 (3.53)	0.0132 (4.59)	0.0133 (3.77)	0.0102 (2.28)
P4	0.0124 (3.59)	0.0163 (3.59)	0.0130 (3.58)	0.0105 (3.66)	0.0134 (5.02)	0.0128 (3.82)	0.0110 (2.50)
P5	0.0128 (3.87)	0.0164 (3.74)	0.0134 (3.83)	0.0109 (3.85)	0.0135 (5.14)	0.0135 (4.15)	0.0121 (2.86)
P6	0.0134 (4.14)	0.0174 (4.08)	0.0146 (4.22)	0.0102 (3.66)	0.0135 (5.23)	0.0142 (4.38)	0.0122 (2.92)
P7	0.0136 (4.19)	0.0175 (4.13)	0.0143 (4.12)	0.0109 (3.90)	0.0136 (5.09)	0.0142 (4.43)	0.0126 (3.01)
P8	0.0143 (4.30)	0.0174 (4.11)	0.0148 (4.16)	0.0111 (3.86)	0.0143 (5.12)	0.0146 (4.44)	0.0132 (3.15)
P9	0.0153 (4.36)	0.0183 (4.28)	0.0154 (4.11)	0.0126 (4.17)	0.0165 (5.34)	0.0156 (4.56)	0.0141 (3.28)
P10	0.0174 (4.33)	0.0182 (3.99)	0.0173 (4.11)	0.0157 (4.41)	0.0191 (5.17)	0.0176 (4.53)	0.0160 (3.50)
P10-P1	0.0095 (3.07)	0.0099 (2.77)	0.0126 (4.57)	0.0075 (3.03)	0.0062 (2.05)	0.0079 (2.64)	0.0108 (3.35)
F-Statistics ^a	2.83	2.65	4.51	4.38	2.51	1.99	1.69
p-Value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.09)

Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers

Table III—Continued

Panel B: Excess Returns Using the CRSP Value-Weighted Index as the Market Proxy							
	All	S1	S2	S3	β_1	β_2	β_3
P1	-0.0030 (-0.89)	-0.0029 (-0.60)	-0.0062 (-2.11)	-0.0020 (-1.17)	0.0031 (0.94)	-0.0009 (-0.28)	-0.0062 (-1.71)
P2	0.0011 (0.43)	0.0012 (0.31)	-0.0001 (-0.03)	0.0000 (0.03)	0.0051 (2.36)	0.0029 (1.26)	-0.0024 (-0.87)
P3	0.0026 (1.24)	0.0051 (1.46)	0.0024 (1.18)	0.0009 (0.93)	0.0045 (2.45)	0.0035 (1.83)	-0.0007 (-0.29)
P4	0.0026 (1.48)	0.0062 (1.90)	0.0030 (1.57)	0.0011 (1.24)	0.0048 (2.98)	0.0031 (1.83)	0.0000 (0.01)
P5	0.0031 (1.96)	0.0064 (2.06)	0.0036 (1.98)	0.0014 (1.84)	0.0049 (3.21)	0.0038 (2.55)	0.0012 (0.58)
P6	0.0037 (2.55)	0.0075 (2.51)	0.0048 (2.74)	0.0008 (1.13)	0.0048 (3.46)	0.0045 (3.12)	0.0013 (0.69)
P7	0.0039 (2.70)	0.0075 (2.57)	0.0044 (2.61)	0.0015 (2.15)	0.0049 (3.29)	0.0045 (3.25)	0.0017 (0.90)
P8	0.0045 (3.01)	0.0074 (2.56)	0.0048 (2.76)	0.0016 (2.12)	0.0054 (3.53)	0.0049 (3.29)	0.0023 (1.19)
P9	0.0053 (3.20)	0.0082 (2.89)	0.0052 (2.76)	0.0029 (3.23)	0.0074 (4.10)	0.0057 (3.60)	0.0031 (1.54)
P10	0.0070 (3.24)	0.0077 (2.56)	0.0067 (2.91)	0.0056 (3.50)	0.0094 (4.10)	0.0074 (3.47)	0.0048 (2.02)
P10-P1	0.0100 (3.23)	0.0106 (2.97)	0.0129 (4.69)	0.0076 (3.08)	0.0063 (2.09)	0.0083 (2.76)	0.0111 (3.42)
F-Statistics ^b	5.2910	5.4401	8.3713	4.7386	3.6045	4.0171	2.5872

^aThe *F*-statistics are computed under the hypothesis that the returns on portfolios P1 through P10 are jointly equal.

^bThe *F*-statistics are computed under the hypothesis that the abnormal returns on portfolios P1 through P10 are jointly equal to zero. All *F*-statistics are significant at the 1 percent level.

The relative strength strategy loses about 7% on average in each January but achieves positive abnormal returns in each of the other months.¹⁴ The relative strength strategy realizes positive returns in 67% of the months, and 71% of the months when January is excluded (see Table V). The average return in non-January months is 1.66% per month.¹⁵ Consistent with earlier papers, we find the magnitude of the negative January performance of the relative strength strategy to be inversely related to firm size. The negative

¹⁴It is possible that at least part of the negative January returns of the relative strength strategy is due to a tendency of past winners to trade at the ask prices and past losers to sell at the bid prices at the close of the last trading day in the year. See Keim (1989) for a discussion of bid-ask spread biases and the January effect.

¹⁵If we were to use our priors about the performance of relative strength strategies in January and reverse the buy and sell portfolios in that calendar month (taking a long position in the past losers and a short position in the past winners in January only), then the abnormal returns would be even larger. Such a strategy generates close to 25% per year in abnormal returns, and loses money (about -0.7%) only in 1 year out of the 25 years in the sample period.

Table IV
Returns on Size-Based Relative Strength Portfolios (P10-P1)
by Calendar Months

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest past return decile is the *buy* portfolio. This table reports the average monthly returns of the zero-cost, buy minus sell, portfolio in each calendar month. The average returns of the zero-cost portfolios formed using size-based subsamples of securities are also reported. The subsample S1 contains the smallest firms, S2 contains the medium-sized firms, and S3 contains the largest firms. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

	All	S1	S2	S3
Jan.	-0.0686 (-3.52)	-0.0797 (-3.36)	-0.0347 (-2.14)	-0.0161 (-1.28)
Feb.	0.0063 (0.85)	0.0089 (0.81)	0.0149 (2.44)	0.0099 (1.35)
Mar.	0.0105 (1.37)	0.0196 (2.08)	0.0103 (1.49)	0.0108 (1.49)
Apr.	0.0333 (7.39)	0.0323 (5.35)	0.0368 (7.29)	0.0215 (4.91)
May	0.0102 (1.32)	0.0046 (0.56)	0.0091 (1.18)	0.0079 (1.19)
June	0.0238 (3.86)	0.0237 (3.50)	0.0231 (3.23)	0.0185 (2.59)
July	0.0075 (0.96)	0.0112 (1.44)	0.0084 (0.96)	0.0035 (0.41)
Aug.	0.0027 (0.35)	0.0079 (0.97)	-0.0011 (-0.14)	-0.0058 (-0.71)
Sept.	0.0116 (1.10)	0.0126 (1.20)	0.0137 (1.27)	0.0053 (0.60)
Oct.	0.0137 (1.30)	0.0160 (1.40)	0.0151 (1.44)	0.0025 (0.22)
Nov.	0.0372 (5.31)	0.0352 (5.01)	0.0331 (4.12)	0.0248 (2.78)
Dec.	0.0264 (2.61)	0.0265 (2.13)	0.0224 (2.86)	0.0070 (0.99)
Feb.-Dec.	0.0166 (6.67)	0.0181 (6.47)	0.0169 (6.83)	0.0096 (4.00)
<i>F</i> -Statistics ^a	7.90	7.14	4.11	1.81
<i>p</i> -Value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.51)
<i>F</i> -Statistics ^b	2.04	1.23	1.91	1.28
<i>p</i> -Value	(0.03)	(0.27)	(0.04)	(0.24)

^aThe *F*-statistics are computed under the hypothesis that the returns on the zero-cost portfolio are jointly equal in all calendar months.

^bThe *F*-statistics are computed under the hypothesis that the returns on the zero-cost portfolios are jointly equal in the calendar months February through December.

Table V
Proportion of Positive Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios
by Calendar Months

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest past return decile is the *buy* portfolio. This table reports the proportion of months when the average return of the zero-cost, buy minus sell, portfolio is positive. This proportion for the zero-cost portfolio formed within each size-based subsample of securities is also reported. The subsample S1 contains the smallest firms, S2 contains the medium-sized firms, and S3 contains the largest firms. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

	All	S1	S2	S3
Jan.	0.24	0.16	0.20	0.44
Feb.	0.60	0.60	0.76	0.60
Mar.	0.80	0.76	0.72	0.72
Apr.	0.96	0.92	0.96	0.80
May	0.68	0.68	0.72	0.56
June	0.76	0.64	0.76	0.72
July	0.56	0.68	0.56	0.52
Aug.	0.52	0.60	0.48	0.48
Sept.	0.80	0.72	0.80	0.68
Oct.	0.64	0.60	0.64	0.56
Nov.	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.68
Dec.	0.68	0.76	0.68	0.44
Feb.-Dec.	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.61
All	0.67	0.66	0.68	0.60

average relative strength return in January is not statistically significant for the subsample of large firms.

The findings in Table IV suggest that there is also a seasonal pattern outside January. For example, the returns are fairly low in August and are particularly high in April, November, and December. The *F*-statistics reported in this table indicate that these monthly differences outside January are statistically significant for the whole sample as well as for the sample of medium-size firms.

One of the interesting findings documented in this table is that the relative strength strategy produces positive returns in 96% (24 out of 25) of the Aprils. The large (3.33%) and consistently positive April returns may be related to the fact that corporations must transfer money to their pension funds prior to April 15 if the funds are to qualify for a tax deduction in the previous year. If these pension fund assets are primarily invested by portfolio managers who follow relative strength rules, then the winners portfolio may benefit from additional price pressure in this month. Similarly, the larger than average returns in November and December may in part be due to price pressure arising from portfolio managers selling their losers in these months for tax or window dressing reasons.

Table VI
Returns of Size-Based Relative Strength Portfolios: Subperiod Analysis

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest past return decile is the *buy* portfolio. This table reports the average monthly returns of the zero-cost, buy minus sell, portfolio within 5-year subperiods. The average returns of the zero-cost portfolios formed using size-based subsamples of securities within subperiods are also reported. The subsample S1 contains the smallest firms, S2 contains the medium-sized firms, and S3 contains the largest firms. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989.

Sample	Months	65-69	70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89
All	All	0.0123 (1.94)	0.0109 (1.23)	-0.0044 (-0.51)	0.0127 (2.67)	0.0162 (3.42)
	Jan.	-0.0524 (-1.28)	-0.1070 (-2.54)	-0.1017 (-1.31)	-0.0253 (-1.38)	-0.0569 (-2.76)
	Feb.-Dec.	0.0182 (3.36)	0.0217 (2.88)	0.0044 (0.78)	0.0161 (3.44)	0.0229 (6.09)
S1	All	0.0082 (1.14)	0.0128 (1.63)	-0.0064 (-0.58)	0.0153 (2.61)	0.0197 (2.89)
	Jan.	-0.0838 (-1.60)	-0.0853 (-2.29)	-0.1107 (-1.09)	-0.0124 (-0.62)	-0.1064 (-4.45)
	Feb.-Dec.	0.0165 (3.19)	0.0217 (3.18)	0.0031 (0.41)	0.0179 (2.94)	0.0311 (6.59)
S2	All	0.0177 (3.08)	0.0115 (1.57)	0.0018 (0.24)	0.0172 (3.38)	0.0146 (3.40)
	Jan.	-0.0264 (-1.05)	-0.0465 (-1.81)	-0.0795 (-1.16)	-0.0100 (-0.46)	-0.0112 (-0.48)
	Feb.-Dec.	0.0217 (3.86)	0.0168 (2.29)	0.0092 (1.87)	0.0197 (3.83)	0.0170 (4.08)
S3	All	0.0129 (2.71)	0.0115 (1.62)	0.0018 (0.35)	0.0076 (1.41)	0.0035 (0.73)
	Jan.	-0.0073 (-0.32)	-0.0154 (-0.48)	-0.0335 (-0.77)	-0.0094 (-0.33)	-0.0147 (-0.78)
	Feb.-Dec.	0.0148 (3.08)	0.0139 (1.95)	0.0050 (1.21)	0.0092 (1.70)	0.0052 (1.04)

B. Portfolio Returns Over 5-Year Subperiods

This section documents the returns of the 6-month/6-month zero-cost strategy in each of the five 5-year subperiods in the 1965 to 1989 sample period. The evidence in Table VI indicates that the returns of the strategy, when implemented on the entire sample of stocks, produces average returns that are positive in all but one time period (1975 to 1979). An analysis of this strategy applied to size-based subsamples indicates that the negative returns

in the 1975 to 1979 time period is due primarily to the January returns of the small firms. The strategy yields positive profits in each of the 5-year time periods when it is implemented on the subsamples of large- and medium-size firms. In addition, the returns are positive in each of the 5-year periods as well as in each size-based subsample when the month of January is excluded.

VI. Performance of Relative Strength Portfolios in Event Time

In this section we examine the returns of the relative strength portfolio in event time. We track the average portfolio returns in each of the 36 months following the portfolio formation date.

This event study analysis provides both additional insights about the riskiness of the strategy and about whether the profits are due to overreaction or underreaction. Significant positive returns in months beyond the holding period would indicate that the zero-cost portfolio systematically selects stocks that have higher than average unconditional returns either because of their risk or for other reasons such as differential tax exposures. Significant negative returns of the zero-cost portfolio in the months following the holding period would suggest that the price changes during the holding period are at least partially temporary.

Table VII presents the average monthly and cumulative returns of the zero-cost portfolio in event time in the 36 months after the formation date.¹⁶ With the exception of month 1, the average return in each month is positive in the first year. The average return is negative in each month in year 2 as well as in the first half of year 3 and virtually zero thereafter. The cumulative returns reach a maximum of 9.5% at the end of 12 months but decline to about 4% by the end of month 36.

The negative returns beyond month 12 indicate that the relative strength strategy does not tend to pick stocks that have high unconditional expected returns. The observed pattern of initially positive and then negative returns of the zero-cost portfolio also suggests that the observed price changes in the first 12 months after the formation period may not be permanent. Unfortunately, estimates of expected returns over 2-year periods are not very precise. As a result, the negative returns for the zero-cost portfolio in years 2 and 3 are not statistically significant (t -statistic of -1.27). Similarly, since the abnormal return over the entire 36-month period is not statistically different from zero, we cannot rule out the possibility that the positive returns over the first 12 months is entirely temporary.¹⁷

¹⁶Since overlapping returns are used to calculate the cumulative returns in event time, the autocorrelation-consistent Newey-West standard errors are used to compute the t -statistics for the cumulative returns (see Newey and West (1987)).

¹⁷Another reason why we find this evidence hard to interpret is that the entire negative return over this holding period occurs in Januarys. The returns beyond the first year are close to zero in non-January months.

Table VII

Performance of Relative Strength Portfolios in Event Time

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. The equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest past return decile is the *buy* portfolio. This table reports the average returns of the zero-cost, buy minus sell, portfolio in each month following the formation period. t is the month after portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1965 to December 1989. Autocorrelation-consistent estimates of standard errors are used to compute the t -statistics for cumulative returns.

t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return
1	-0.0025 (-0.59)	-0.0025 (-0.59)	13	-0.0036 (-1.12)	0.0915 (3.35)	25	-0.0035 (-1.36)	0.0521 (1.41)
2	0.0124 (3.29)	0.0099 (1.37)	14	-0.0039 (-1.34)	0.0876 (3.07)	26	-0.0030 (-1.14)	0.0492 (1.22)
3	0.0116 (3.18)	0.0216 (2.20)	15	-0.0034 (-1.21)	0.0842 (2.89)	27	-0.0024 (-0.98)	0.0467 (1.10)
4	0.0110 (3.19)	0.0326 (2.67)	16	-0.0038 (-1.41)	0.0804 (2.76)	28	-0.0032 (-1.33)	0.0435 (0.98)
5	0.0093 (2.82)	0.0419 (2.79)	17	-0.0047 (-1.74)	0.0757 (2.70)	29	-0.0032 (-1.38)	0.0403 (0.87)
6	0.0091 (2.94)	0.0510 (2.92)	18	-0.0056 (-2.19)	0.0701 (2.68)	30	-0.0030 (-1.31)	0.0373 (0.77)
7	0.0134 (4.98)	0.0644 (3.32)	19	-0.0026 (-1.14)	0.0675 (2.75)	31	-0.0001 (-0.06)	0.0372 (0.74)
8	0.0115 (4.16)	0.0759 (3.60)	20	-0.0032 (-1.35)	0.0642 (2.73)	32	0.0008 (0.41)	0.0380 (0.73)
9	0.0085 (3.07)	0.0844 (3.73)	21	-0.0032 (-1.32)	0.0611 (2.55)	33	0.0013 (0.62)	0.0394 (0.73)
10	0.0048 (1.69)	0.0892 (3.74)	22	-0.0034 (-1.39)	0.0577 (2.21)	34	0.0008 (0.36)	0.0402 (0.71)
11	0.0045 (1.55)	0.0938 (3.77)	23	-0.0011 (-0.45)	0.0566 (1.93)	35	0.0010 (0.45)	0.0412 (0.71)
12	0.0013 (0.43)	0.0951 (3.67)	24	-0.0010 (-0.40)	0.0556 (1.69)	36	-0.0005 (-0.24)	0.0406 (0.67)

One possible explanation of the inverted U shape in the cumulative returns is that the risk of the strategy changes over event time. Perhaps, the strategy picks stocks that are initially very risky and the risk then diminishes with time. To assess this possibility we estimate the betas in each event month with respect to the value-weighted index and the equally weighted index. The beta of the zero-cost portfolio with respect to the value-weighted (equally weighted) index is initially -0.20 (-0.41) and then it steadily increases to 0.02 (-0.08). Although these results indicate that the risk of the zero-cost portfolio does change over time, the direction of change in risk goes counter to what would be required to explain the change in average returns.

VII. Back-Testing the Strategy

This section examines the extent to which the relative strength profits reported in the previous sections existed prior to 1965. Specifically, we replicate the test in Table VII, which tracks the performance of the 6-month relative strength portfolio in event time for both the 1927 to 1940 time period and the 1941 to 1964 time period. As Fama and French (1988) and others have noted, the market was extremely volatile and experienced a significant degree of mean reversion in the 1927 to 1940 period. In contrast, the market's volatility in the 1941 to 1964 period was similar to the volatility in the 1965 to 1989 period and the market index did not exhibit mean reversion in the post-1940 period.

Table VIII (Panel A) reports the returns of the 6-month relative strength strategy in the 36 event months over the 1927 to 1940 time period. The returns in this time period are significantly lower than the returns in the 1965 to 1989 period, but the patterns of returns across event months is somewhat similar. The month 1 returns are strongly negative on average (about -5%). The returns in months 2 through 10 are statistically insignificant, but the returns in the later months are substantially lower. The cumulative excess return equals -40.81% in month 36.

These negative cumulative returns are likely to be due to two factors: First, because of the greater volatility in this period, many of the firms in the loser's decile were close to bankruptcy and thus had very high betas over the holding periods. The beta of the zero-cost 6-month/6-month strategy is about -0.5 in this period and it is substantially higher following periods of market declines. The second factor relates to the market's mean reversion in this time period. As the decomposition in Subsection III.A and the regression results in Subsection III.B indicate, negative serial correlation in the market and large market movements will reduce the profits from relative strength strategies. This is because the relative strength strategy tends to select high- (low-) beta stocks following a market increase (decrease) and hence tends to perform poorly during market reversals. For example, following a 40% decline in the equally weighted index over the previous 6 months, the index rebounded with a 43% increase in July 1932. In this month the 6-month/6-month relative strength portfolio experienced a negative 40% return. In the following month the equally weighted index increased an additional 66% and the 6-month/6-month strategy lost 68%. In the 1930s there were four other months in which the 6-month/6-month strategy lost over 40%. Each occurred when the market increased substantially.

Panel B of Table VIII reports the returns in the 36 event months for the 1941 to 1964 period. The relative strength strategy returns over this time period are very similar to the returns in the more recent time period reported earlier. As in the 1965 to 1989 time period, the average return is slightly negative in month 1, significantly positive in month 2 through month 8, and negative in month 12 and beyond. In contrast to the findings for the 1965 to

1989 period, the positive cumulative return over the first 12 months dissipates almost entirely by month 24.

VIII. Stock Returns Around Earnings Announcement Dates

This section examines the returns of past winners and losers around their quarterly earnings announcement dates. By analyzing stock returns within a short window around the dissemination of important firm-specific information we have a sharp test that directly assesses the potential biases in market expectations. Consider, for example, the possibility that stock prices system-

Table VIII
Back-Testing the Strategy: Performance of Relative Strength
Portfolios Prior to 1965

The relative strength portfolios are formed based on 6-month lagged returns. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. The equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest past return decile is the *sell* portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest past return decile is the *buy* portfolio. This table reports the average returns of the zero-cost, buy minus sell, portfolio in each month following the formation period. t is the month after portfolio formation. Autocorrelation consistent estimates of standard errors are used to compute the t -statistics for cumulative returns.

Panel A: 1927-1940								
t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	t	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return
1	-0.0495 (-3.72)	-0.0495 (-3.72)	13	-0.0245 (-2.60)	-0.1257 (-1.50)	25	-0.0118 (-1.41)	-0.3359 (-2.48)
2	-0.0143 (-1.32)	-0.0639 (-2.21)	14	-0.0166 (-2.08)	-0.1423 (-1.69)	26	-0.0067 (-1.01)	-0.3427 (-2.53)
3	-0.0088 (-0.87)	-0.0726 (-1.78)	15	-0.0164 (-1.87)	-0.1587 (-1.83)	27	-0.0135 (-1.82)	-0.3562 (-2.52)
4	-0.0048 (-0.45)	-0.0775 (-1.60)	16	-0.0200 (-2.20)	-0.1787 (-2.01)	28	-0.0082 (-1.06)	-0.3644 (-2.47)
5	0.0061 (0.60)	-0.0713 (-1.40)	17	-0.0131 (-1.80)	-0.1919 (-2.12)	29	-0.0125 (-1.37)	-0.3769 (-2.39)
6	0.0057 (0.55)	-0.0656 (-1.22)	18	-0.0166 (-2.11)	-0.2085 (-2.07)	30	-0.0107 (-1.20)	-0.3876 (-2.29)
7	0.0092 (0.83)	-0.0564 (-1.05)	19	-0.0161 (-1.90)	-0.2245 (-2.01)	31	-0.0018 (-0.20)	-0.3894 (-2.18)
8	0.0054 (0.52)	-0.0511 (-0.92)	20	-0.0224 (-2.28)	-0.2469 (-2.03)	32	-0.0022 (-0.26)	-0.3916 (-2.07)
9	-0.0029 (-0.34)	-0.0539 (-0.94)	21	-0.0178 (-1.92)	-0.2647 (-2.04)	33	0.0008 (0.11)	-0.3908 (-1.99)
10	-0.0065 (-0.68)	-0.0604 (-0.90)	22	-0.0213 (-2.08)	-0.2860 (-2.14)	34	-0.0025 (-0.41)	-0.3933 (-1.97)
11	-0.0183 (-1.74)	-0.0787 (-1.04)	23	-0.0183 (-1.74)	-0.3043 (-2.23)	35	-0.0050 (-0.89)	-0.3983 (-1.97)
12	-0.0225 (-2.35)	-0.1012 (-1.27)	24	-0.0198 (-1.94)	-0.3241 (-2.41)	36	-0.0098 (-1.47)	-0.4081 (-2.01)

Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers

Table VIII—Continued

Panel B: 1941-1964								
<i>t</i>	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	<i>t</i>	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return	<i>t</i>	Monthly Return	Cumulative Return
1	-0.0035 (-1.04)	-0.0035 (-1.04)	13	-0.0068 (-2.14)	0.0515 (2.57)	25	-0.0035 (-1.32)	0.0014 (0.04)
2	0.0069 (2.32)	0.0034 (0.59)	14	-0.0085 (-3.07)	0.0429 (1.90)	26	-0.0027 (-1.08)	-0.0013 (-0.03)
3	0.0109 (4.15)	0.0143 (2.20)	15	-0.0059 (-2.40)	0.0371 (1.54)	27	-0.0015 (-0.69)	-0.0028 (-0.07)
4	0.0098 (3.81)	0.0241 (3.15)	16	-0.0063 (-2.80)	0.0308 (1.21)	28	-0.0003 (-0.14)	-0.0030 (-0.08)
5	0.0075 (3.09)	0.0316 (3.40)	17	-0.0080 (-3.70)	0.0228 (0.86)	29	-0.0009 (-0.51)	-0.0039 (-0.11)
6	0.0049 (1.97)	0.0365 (3.42)	18	-0.0074 (-3.63)	0.0153 (0.56)	30	-0.0001 (-0.03)	-0.0040 (-0.12)
7	0.0079 (3.24)	0.0444 (3.82)	19	-0.0033 (-1.61)	0.0120 (0.43)	31	0.0017 (0.98)	-0.0023 (-0.08)
8	0.0062 (2.52)	0.0507 (4.00)	20	-0.0012 (-0.61)	0.0108 (0.38)	32	0.0011 (0.69)	-0.0012 (-0.05)
9	0.0039 (1.63)	0.0546 (3.91)	21	-0.0016 (-0.81)	0.0092 (0.31)	33	-0.0005 (-0.32)	-0.0017 (-0.10)
10	0.0022 (0.96)	0.0568 (3.73)	22	-0.0021 (-1.04)	0.0071 (0.22)	34	-0.0006 (-0.37)	-0.0023 (-0.17)
11	0.0024 (1.00)	0.0592 (3.70)	23	-0.0008 (-0.35)	0.0063 (0.19)	35	-0.0004 (-0.24)	-0.0027 (-0.20)
12	-0.0009 (-0.34)	0.0583 (3.40)	24	-0.0014 (-0.60)	0.0050 (0.14)	36	-0.0004 (-0.28)	-0.0030 (-0.20)

atically underreact to information about future earnings. In this case, the stock returns for past winners, which presumably had favorable information revealed in the past, should realize positive returns around the time when their earnings are actually announced. Similarly, past losers should realize negative returns around the time their earnings are announced.¹⁸ The quarterly earnings announcement dates used in this analysis are obtained from the COMPUSTAT quarterly industrial database. The sample period for this part of the study is 1980 to 1989, the period covered by the 1990 COMPUSTAT quarterly file. On average, there are 429.2 available quarterly earnings announcements per month with matched stock return data.

Our tests again separate firms into deciles based on their prior 6-month returns. The 3-day returns (days -2 to 0) of the individual stocks in these groups are then calculated around each of their quarterly earnings announcements that occur within 36 months of the date at which the stocks are ranked according to their past returns. Table IX reports the differences between the

¹⁸ Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) use a similar approach to evaluate the evidence of long horizon overreaction documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). See also Bernard and Thomas (1990).

Table IX
Quarterly Earnings Announcement Date Returns

The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. The stocks in the lowest past return decile are called the *losers* group and the stocks in the highest past return decile is called the *winners* group. The differences between the 3-day returns (returns on days -2 to 0) around quarterly earnings announcements for stocks in the winners group and the losers group are reported here ($r_t^w - r_t^l$). t is the month after the ranking date. The sample period is January 1980 to December 1989.

t	$r_t^w - r_t^l$	t	$r_t^w - r_t^l$	t	$r_t^w - r_t^l$
1	0.0055 (2.75)	13	-0.0055 (-2.56)	25	-0.0002 (-0.11)
2	0.0082 (4.41)	14	-0.0080 (-3.89)	26	-0.0021 (-1.02)
3	0.0082 (4.36)	15	-0.0071 (-4.04)	27	-0.0032 (-1.68)
4	0.0090 (4.88)	16	-0.0097 (-5.75)	28	-0.0028 (-1.31)
5	0.0059 (3.16)	17	-0.0062 (-2.90)	29	-0.0015 (-0.62)
6	0.0058 (3.14)	18	-0.0060 (-2.96)	30	-0.0021 (-1.10)
7	0.0013 (0.62)	19	-0.0031 (-1.63)	31	-0.0027 (-1.52)
8	0.0000 (-0.02)	20	-0.0017 (-0.82)	32	-0.0021 (-1.13)
9	-0.0020 (-1.07)	21	0.0006 (0.27)	33	-0.0020 (-1.05)
10	-0.0031 (-1.60)	22	-0.0005 (-0.29)	34	-0.0017 (-0.91)
11	-0.0039 (-2.23)	23	-0.0001 (-0.05)	35	-0.0022 (-1.29)
12	-0.0053 (-2.75)	24	0.0012 (0.63)	36	-0.0059 (-2.91)

average announcement period returns for the winners and losers deciles in each of the 36 months following the ranking date. The pattern of announcement date returns presented in this table is consistent with the pattern of the zero-cost portfolio returns reported in Table VII. For the first 6 months the announcement date returns of the past winners exceed the announcement date returns of the past losers by over 0.7% on average, and is statistically significant in each of these 6 months. Since there are on average 2 quarterly earnings announcements per firm within a 6-month period, the returns around the earnings announcements represents about 25% of the zero-cost portfolio returns over this holding period.

The negative announcement period returns in later months are consistent with the negative relative strength portfolio returns beyond month 12 documented earlier (see Table VII). From months 8 through 20 the differences in

announcement date returns are negative and are generally statistically significant. The announcement period returns are especially significant in months 11 through 18 where they average about -0.7% . In the later months the differences between the announcement period returns of the winners and losers are generally negative but are close to zero.

The predictability of stock returns around quarterly earnings announcements documented in Table IX is similar to the recent findings of Bernard and Thomas (1990). Bernard and Thomas find that average returns around quarterly earnings announcement dates are significantly positive following a favorable earnings surprise in the previous quarter. This is consistent with the positive announcement returns we see in the first 7 months in Table IX. Bernard and Thomas also find that the average return around earnings announcement dates is significantly negative 4 quarters after a positive earnings surprise. The significant negative returns around earnings announcement dates in months 11 through 18 are consistent with this finding.

IX. Conclusions

Trading strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers realize significant abnormal returns over the 1965 to 1989 period. For example, the strategy we examine in most detail, which selects stocks based on their past 6-month returns and holds them for 6 months, realizes a compounded excess return of 12.01% per year on average. Additional evidence indicates that the profitability of the relative strength strategies are not due to their systematic risk. The results of our tests also indicate that the relative strength profits cannot be attributed to lead-lag effects that result from delayed stock price reactions to common factors. The evidence is, however, consistent with delayed price reactions to firm-specific information.

The returns of the zero-cost winners minus losers portfolio were examined in each of the 36 months following the portfolio formation date. With the exception of the first month, this portfolio realizes positive returns in each of the 12 months after the formation date. However, the longer-term performances of these past winners and losers reveal that half of their excess returns in the year following the portfolio formation date dissipate within the following 2 years.

The returns of the stocks in the winners and losers portfolios around their earnings announcements in the 36 months following the formation period were also examined and a similar pattern was found. Specifically, stocks in the winners portfolio realize significantly higher returns than the stocks in the losers portfolio around the quarterly earnings announcements that are made in the first few months following the formation date. However, the announcement date returns in the 8 to 20 months following the formation date are significantly higher for the stocks in the losers portfolio than for the stocks in the winners portfolio.

The evidence of initial positive and later negative relative strength returns suggests that common interpretations of return reversals as evidence of overreaction and return persistence (i.e., past winners achieving positive returns in the future) as evidence of underreaction are probably overly simplistic. A more sophisticated model of investor behavior is needed to explain the observed pattern of returns. One interpretation of our results is that transactions by investors who buy past winners and sell past losers move prices away from their long-run values temporarily and thereby cause prices to overreact. This interpretation is consistent with the analysis of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) who explore the implications of what they call "positive feedback traders" on market price. Alternatively, it is possible that the market underreacts to information about the short-term prospects of firms but overreacts to information about their long-term prospects. This is plausible given that the nature of the information available about a firm's short-term prospects, such as earnings forecasts, is different from the nature of the more ambiguous information that is used by investors to assess a firm's longer-term prospects.

The evidence in this paper does not allow us to distinguish between these two hypotheses about investor behavior. In addition, there are probably other explanations for these results. Given that our results suggest that investor expectations are systematically biased, further research that attempts to identify explanations for these empirical regularities would be of interest.

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THE COSTS OF RAISING CAPITAL

Inmoo Lee, Scott Lochhead, Jay Ritter
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Quanshui Zhao
City University of Hong Kong

Abstract

We report the average costs of raising external debt and equity capital for U.S. corporations from 1990 to 1994. For initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity, the direct costs average 11.0 percent of the proceeds. For seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), the direct costs average 7.1 percent. For convertible bonds, the direct costs average 3.8 percent. For straight debt issues, the direct costs average 2.2 percent, although they are strongly related to the credit rating of the issue. All classes of securities exhibit economies of scale, although they are less pronounced for straight debt issues. IPOs also incur a substantial indirect cost due to short-run underpricing. Most large equity offers include an international tranche, although debt issues do not.

I. Introduction

In this article we present the average costs of raising external capital for U.S. corporations from 1990 to 1994. Specifically, we report the average spreads on public equity offerings and debt offerings, along with the other direct costs of raising capital, as a percentage of the proceeds. We find substantial economies of scale for initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We also find substantial economies of scale for both straight bond offerings and convertible bond offerings. Spreads on bond offerings are highly sensitive to the credit rating of the offering. This article is descriptive in nature; no theories are tested. Its purpose is to provide benchmark numbers for use by issuers of securities. We do not address why firms issue the securities they do. This much broader corporate finance question would have to address taxes, corporate control, debt capacity, long-run performance patterns, investment-financing interactions, etc.

We would like to thank Charles Calomiris and Tim Loughran for useful comments on an earlier draft.

II. Data and Terminology

Securities Data Company's (SDC) New Issues database is the primary source of information. After downloading SDC's data, we identified outliers and checked suspicious numbers in other publicly available sources. The New Issues database includes publicly placed firm commitment offerings only. In all of our tables, we exclude ADRs and unit offerings.¹ We restrict our sample to securities offered by domestic operating companies, and so exclude closed-end fund and real estate investment trust (REIT) offerings. We also exclude rights offerings and shelf registrations.²

We use security offerings from January 1990 to December 1994, a five-year period of relatively low inflation. Consequently, we do not make any inflation adjustments; all proceeds are the nominal proceeds. Proceeds reflect the gross proceeds raised in the U.S. and do not include money raised from the exercise of overallotment options or an international tranche, if any. In the case of equity offerings, the proceeds include the amount raised from both primary and secondary components. Primary shares are those being sold by the company, thereby increasing the number of shares outstanding. Secondary shares are those being sold by existing shareholders (managers, venture capitalists, etc.), which neither increase the number of shares outstanding nor provide capital for the company. Many IPOs include both primary and secondary components, with the fraction that is primary generally higher for younger companies. A few IPOs, sometimes involving spin-offs from parent companies, are pure secondaries. All of our SEOs involve primary shares; we exclude "registered secondaries," in which the entire issue is composed of shares being sold by existing shareholders, from our SEO sample.

For our sample of bond offerings, we exclude issues with a maturity date of one year or less. Our sample includes both zero-coupon, original-issue discount bonds, and coupon bonds. We include serial, floating-rate, and reset bonds, as

¹ADRs are American Depositary Receipts (also called American Depositary Shares) that are traded in the United States for foreign issuers. Unit offerings are bundles of securities (frequently, a share plus a warrant to buy a share at some exercise price), commonly issued in small IPOs by young, speculative companies taken public by less-prestigious investment bankers.

²Rights offerings give existing shareholders the right to buy the securities offered. While they are common in many countries, rights offerings have been rare in the United States during the last twenty years. See Smith (1977), Hansen and Pinkerton (1982), and Hansen (1988) for a discussion of rights offerings. Shelf registrations are offerings whereby a company meeting certain qualifications is permitted to issue securities without issuing a prospectus (taking the securities "off the shelf" and selling them). In our sample period, shelf equity offerings are practically nonexistent, although there are many bond offerings (typically smaller issues) using shelf registrations that we exclude.

well as traditional coupon bonds.³ We exclude mortgage-backed bonds. For zero-coupon and original-issue discount bonds that are sold for less than their par value, our percentage spreads and costs are based upon the offer price, and not the face value. Our convertible bond sample includes only issues that are convertible into shares of the issuing company. Exchangeable bonds, where the bond is convertible into shares of a different company, are not in our sample. None of our convertible bonds has a maturity date of less than five years.

We refer to new equity issues by publicly traded companies as seasoned equity offerings, reserving the use of “secondary” to identify the source of shares. Among practitioners, the term “secondary offering” is frequently used to refer to an SEO. Seasoning refers to whether the security being offered is already publicly traded; IPOs are unseasoned new issues. For that matter, the term “new issues” is sometimes used to refer to any security offering, and sometimes used to refer to equity IPOs alone. Although a new bond issue is an unseasoned new issue, and therefore a debt initial public offering, we use the term IPO to refer to unseasoned equity offerings exclusively.

Gross spreads are the commissions paid to investment bankers when securities are issued. Since buyers do not pay commissions on new security issues, these spreads implicitly reflect both the buyer and seller commissions. Other direct costs include the legal, auditing, and printing costs associated with putting together a prospectus.

III. Evidence

Average Spreads and Total Direct Costs

In Table 1 we report the average investment banker commissions (gross spreads) and other direct expenses for four classes of securities: IPOs, SEOs, convertible bonds, and straight bonds. In addition to reporting the average direct costs for each class, we also classify issues by proceeds categories. By going across a row, a reader can see how the expenses vary by security type, holding proceeds constant. By going down a column, a reader can see the magnitude of the economies of scale for a given type of security. Also reported is the number of observations in each category.

In Table 1 the median IPO is \$24.4 million, the median SEO is \$33.8 million, the median convertible bond is \$75 million, and the median straight

³Serial bonds have the individual bonds maturing on different dates, with the coupons varying depending upon the maturity date. Reset and floating-rate bonds have the interest rate changing periodically, with the new interest rate determined either by an auction (reset) or a formula (floaters).

TABLE 1. Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds for Equity (IPOs and SEOs) and Straight and Convertible Bonds Offered by Domestic Operating Companies, 1990-94.

Proceeds ^a (\$ millions)	Equity								Bonds							
	IPOs				SEOs				Convertible Bonds				Straight Bonds			
	N ^b	GS ^c	E ^d	TDC ^e	N	GS	E	TDC	N	GS	E	TDC	N	GS	E	TDC
2-9.99	337	9.05	7.91	16.96	167	7.72	5.56	13.28	4	6.07	2.68	8.75	32	2.07	2.32	4.39
10-19.99	389	7.24	4.39	11.63	310	6.23	2.49	8.72	14	5.48	3.18	8.66	78	1.36	1.40	2.76
20-39.99	533	7.01	2.69	9.70	425	5.60	1.33	6.93	18	4.16	1.95	6.11	89	1.54	0.88	2.42
40-59.99	215	6.96	1.76	8.72	261	5.05	0.82	5.87	28	3.26	1.04	4.30	90	0.72	0.60	1.32
60-79.99	79	6.74	1.46	8.20	143	4.57	0.61	5.18	47	2.64	0.59	3.23	92	1.76	0.58	2.34
80-99.99	51	6.47	1.44	7.91	71	4.25	0.48	4.73	13	2.43	0.61	3.04	112	1.55	0.61	2.16
100-199.99	106	6.03	1.03	7.06	152	3.85	0.37	4.22	57	2.34	0.42	2.76	409	1.77	0.54	2.31
200-499.99	47	5.67	0.86	6.53	55	3.26	0.21	3.47	27	1.99	0.19	2.18	170	1.79	0.40	2.19
500-up	10	5.21	0.51	5.72	9	3.03	0.12	3.15	3	2.00	0.09	2.09	20	1.39	0.25	1.64
Total	1767	7.31	3.69	11.00	1593	5.44	1.67	7.11	211	2.92	0.87	3.79	1092	1.62	0.62	2.24

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

^aTotal proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of overallotment options (SDC variable: PROCDS).

^bNumber of issues.

^cGross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession) (SDC variable: GPCTP).

^dOther direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds (including registration fee and printing, legal, and auditing costs) (SDC variables: EXPTH/(PROCDS)*10).

^eTotal direct costs as a percentage of total proceeds (total direct costs are the sum of gross spreads and other direct expenses).

**Total direct costs
 (%)**




Figure I. Total Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds. The total direct costs for initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), convertible bonds, and straight bonds are composed of underwriter spreads and other direct expenses. Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. The numbers plotted are reported in Table 1 for issues from 1990 to 1994.

bond is \$100 million. For both IPOs and SEOs, substantial economies of scale exist in both the gross spreads and the other expenses.

For SEOs, the lack of any diseconomies, even for offerings over \$500 million, is inconsistent with the findings of Hansen and Torregrosa (1992), who report diseconomies of scale for offers over \$100 million. Hansen and Torregrosa use a sample of SEOs from 1978–86, in contrast to our 1990–94 sample period. Our conjecture is that while diseconomies of scale may have existed for very large issues before the mid 1980s, a structural change has probably occurred since then, possibly because of the market’s greater experience with absorbing large numbers of big offerings. While they are not in our sample, the large number of multibillion dollar privatizations that have occurred around the world in the last decade have made megaofferings routine events.

In all of our tables, we report the averages based upon the number of observations for which we have data. For the gross spreads, SDC reports numbers for our entire sample. For the other direct expenses, however, many observations are missing. Consequently, the averages for the expenses are based upon a

TABLE 2. Direct Costs of Raising Capital, 1990-94: Utility versus Nonutility Companies.

Proceeds ^a (\$ millions)	Equity						Bonds					
	IPOs			SEOs			Convertible			Straight		
	N ^b	GS ^c	TDC ^d	N	GS	TDC	N	GS	TDC	N	GS	TDC
Panel A. Nonutility Offerings Only												
2-9.99	332	9.04	16.97	154	7.91	13.76	4	6.07	8.75	29	2.07	4.53
10-19.99	388	7.24	11.64	278	6.42	9.01	12	5.54	8.65	47	1.70	3.28
20-39.99	528	7.01	9.70	399	5.70	7.07	16	4.20	6.23	63	1.59	2.52
40-59.99	214	6.96	8.71	240	5.17	6.02	28	3.26	4.30	76	0.73	1.37
60-79.99	78	6.74	8.21	131	4.68	5.31	47	2.64	3.23	84	1.84	2.44
80-99.99	47	6.46	7.88	60	4.35	4.84	12	2.54	3.19	104	1.61	2.25
100-199.99	101	6.01	7.01	137	3.97	4.36	55	2.34	2.77	381	1.83	2.38
200-499.99	44	5.65	6.49	50	3.27	3.48	26	1.97	2.16	154	1.87	2.27
500-up	10	5.21	5.72	8	3.12	3.25	3	2.00	2.09	19	1.28	1.53
Total	1742	7.31	11.01	1457	5.57	7.32	203	2.90	3.75	957	1.70	2.34
Panel B. Utility Offerings Only												
2-9.99	5	9.40	16.54	13	5.41	7.68	0	—	—	3	2.00	3.28
10-19.99	1	7.00	8.77	32	4.59	6.21	2	5.13	8.72	31	0.86	1.35
20-39.99	5	7.00	9.86	26	4.17	4.96	2	3.88	5.18	26	1.40	2.06
40-59.99	1	6.98	11.55	21	3.69	4.12	0	—	—	14	0.63	1.10
60-79.99	1	6.50	7.55	12	3.39	3.72	0	—	—	8	0.87	1.13
80-99.99	4	6.57	8.24	11	3.68	4.11	1	1.13	1.34	8	0.71	0.98
100-199.99	5	6.45	7.96	15	2.83	2.98	2	2.50	2.74	28	1.06	1.42
200-499.99	3	5.88	7.00	5	3.19	3.48	1	2.50	2.65	16	1.00	1.40
500-up	0	—	—	1	2.25	2.31	0	—	—	1	3.50	na ^e
Total	25	7.15	10.14	136	4.01	4.92	8	3.33	4.66	135	1.04	1.47

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

^aTotal proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of overallotment options (SDC variable: PROCDS).

^bNumber of issues.

^cGross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession) (SDC variable: GPCTP).

^dOther direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds (including registration fee and printing, legal, and auditing costs) (SDC variables: EXPTH/(PROCDS)*10).

^eNot available because of missing data on other direct expenses.

The Costs of Raising Capital

65

more limited number of observations.⁴ For computing the average total direct costs in Table 1 (and other tables), we add the average gross spread and the average other expenses. In Figure I we show the average total direct costs for the four classes of securities, categorized by their gross proceeds.

The Appendix table reports the interquartile ranges for both the gross spreads and the total direct costs. (We report the interquartile range of the offerings for which we have complete data.) The largest variability of spreads occurs for bonds. As we document below, this can largely be explained based on differences in the credit quality of the issues.

Utility versus Nonutility Offerings

In Table 2 we report the direct costs of raising capital after categorizing offerings into utility and nonutility offerings. During the early 1990s, utilities were relatively minor issuers, representing roughly 10 percent of SEOs and straight bond offerings, and less than 5 percent of IPOs and convertibles. Spreads and direct costs are lower for utilities than for nonutilities. This pattern, previously documented by Bhagat and Frost (1986), may be partly due to the use of competitive bidding, rather than negotiated deals, for choosing an investment banker. Alternatively, it may be partly due to the relative noncomplexity of typical utility offerings.

Debt Offerings and Credit Quality

In Table 3 we report the costs of raising debt capital after categorizing issues by whether they are investment grade or noninvestment grade.⁵ Following industry practice, we classify offerings as investment grade issues if they have a Standard & Poor's credit rating of BBB- or higher.⁶

Inspection of Table 3 discloses that for both convertibles and straight bonds, spreads are lower for investment-grade issues. For straight bonds, this difference is especially pronounced. Note that for issues raising less than \$60

⁴If the offerings with missing expense information have systematically higher or lower expenses than those for which SDC reports information, our procedure would result in biased estimates of average expenses. To check this, for a sample of bond offerings in 1994 that are missing expense information, we used the Securities and Exchange Commission's Edgar electronic database (<http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar>) to find the expense information. The expenses for these issues are representative of those for which SDC reports information, suggesting our numbers do not have important biases.

⁵Following the practice of SDC, we report as separate offerings two bond issues by the same company on the same day if they have different maturity dates, provided they are not explicitly serial bonds. For example, on September 22, 1994, Southern Pacific Transport issued two bonds, one with proceeds of \$8.1 million with a coupon rate of 7.61 percent, and the other with proceeds of \$8.8 million and a coupon rate of 7.77 percent. We treat these as two distinct offerings.

⁶The highest credit rating is AAA, followed by AA, A, BBB, BB, B, C, and D, in order of their perceived default probabilities. These ratings are further partitioned by pluses and minuses.

TABLE 3. Average Gross Spreads and Total Direct Costs for Domestic Debt Issues, 1990-94.

Proceeds ^c (\$ millions)	Convertible Bonds						Straight Bonds					
	Investment Grade ^a			Noninvestment Grade ^b			Investment Grade			Noninvestment Grade		
	N ^d	GS ^e	TDC ^f	N	GS	TDC	N	GS	TDC	N	GS	TDC
2-9.99	0	—	—	0	—	—	14	0.58	2.19	0	—	—
10-19.99	0	—	—	1	4.00	5.67	56	0.50	1.19	2	5.13	7.41
20-39.99	1	1.75	2.75	9	3.29	4.92	64	0.86	1.48	9	3.11	4.42
40-59.99	3	1.92	2.43	19	3.37	4.58	78	0.47	0.94	9	2.48	3.35
60-79.99	4	1.31	1.76	41	2.76	3.37	49	0.61	0.98	43	3.07	3.84
80-99.99	2	1.07	1.34	10	2.83	3.48	65	0.66	0.94	47	2.78	3.75
100-199.99	20	2.03	2.33	37	2.51	3.00	181	0.57	0.81	222	2.75	3.44
200-499.99	17	1.71	1.87	10	2.46	2.70	60	0.50	0.93	105	2.56	2.96
500-up	3	2.00	2.09	0	—	—	11	0.39	0.57	9	2.60	2.90
Total	50	1.81	2.09	127	2.81	3.53	578	0.58	0.94	446	2.75	3.42

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

^aFirms with a BBB- or higher Standard & Poor's credit rating.

^bFirms with a BB+ or lower Standard & Poor's credit rating.

^cTotal proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of overallotment options (SDC variable: PROCDS).

^dNumber of issues.

^eGross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession) (SDC variable: GPCTP).

^fOther direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds (including registration fee and printing, legal, and auditing costs) (SDC variables: EXPTH/(PROCDS)*10).

million, very few noninvestment-grade issues exist. This reflects that smaller issues with lower credit quality are commonly placed privately, and thus do not appear in our sample.

This correlation of credit quality and issue size also explains why in Tables 1 and 2 straight bond issues do not appear to display large economies of scale: as the issue size increases, the credit quality of public issuers decreases, masking some of the economies of scale. Still, in Table 3, where we hold credit quality constant, the economies of scale for debt issues are more modest than those for equity issues in Tables 1 and 2. The correlation between issue size and credit quality also explains why the average spread is so low for bonds with \$40-\$59.9 million in proceeds. The average spread of only seventy-two basis points in Table 1 reflects that for this issue size, economies of scale are largely realized, while, at the same time, very few noninvestment-grade issuers exist. For smaller offerings, the lack of economies of scale keeps the average spread high. For larger offerings, the high proportion of noninvestment-grade issues pushes

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TABLE 4. Direct and Indirect Costs, in Percent, of Equity IPOs, 1990-94.

Proceeds* (\$ millions)	Gross Spreads ^b	Other Expenses ^c	Total Direct Costs ^d	Average Initial Return ^e	Average Direct and Indirect Costs ^f
2-9.99	9.05	7.91	16.96	16.36	25.16
10-19.99	7.24	4.39	11.63	9.65	18.15
20-39.99	7.01	2.69	9.70	12.48	18.18
40-59.99	6.96	1.76	8.72	13.65	17.95
60-79.99	6.74	1.46	8.20	11.31	16.35
80-99.99	6.47	1.44	7.91	8.91	14.14
100-199.99	6.03	1.03	7.06	7.16	12.78
200-499.99	5.67	0.86	6.53	5.70	11.10
500-up	5.21	0.51	5.72	7.53	10.36
Total	7.31	3.69	11.00	12.05	18.69

Notes: There are 1,767 domestic operating company IPOs in the sample. The first four columns express costs as a percentage of the offer price, and the last column expresses costs as a percentage of the market price.

*Total proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of overallotment options (SDC variable: PROCDS).

^bGross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession) (SDC variable: GPCTP).

^cOther direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds (including registration fee and printing, legal, and auditing costs) (SDC variables: EXPTH/(PROCDS)*10).

^dTotal direct costs as a percentage of total proceeds (the average total direct costs are the sum of average gross spreads and average other direct expenses).

^eInitial return = $100 * \{[\text{closing price one day after the offering date (SDC variable: PR1DAY)/offering price (SDC variable: P)] - 1\}$. If PR1DAY is missing, PR2DAY is used.

^fTotal direct and indirect costs = $(d + e)/(1 + e/100)$, computed for each issue individually (excluding firms with other expenses or initial returns missing), and then averaged, where d is the percentage of total direct costs, and e is the percentage initial return.

the average spread up. In other words, the average spread of only seventy-two basis points for this category is not a typographical error.

Although not reported in any table, the average maturity of bond offerings is about ten years for all of the proceeds categories and investment grades.

Initial Public Offerings

In Table 4 we report not only the direct costs for IPOs, but also the indirect costs of short-run underpricing.⁷ Inspection of the table reveals that, consistent with previous findings, IPOs are underpriced on average. With average direct costs of 11.0 percent and average initial returns of 12.0 percent, a typical

⁷We compute the average initial return only for those offerings for which SDC reports the market price at the end of the first day of trading or, if this is missing, at the end of the second day of trading. In computing the average direct and indirect cost, we compute this number for each individual firm for which we have the gross spread, other expenses, and the initial return, and then compute the average.

issuer with an offer price of \$10.00 receives net proceeds of \$8.90 on a share that trades at \$11.20. Taking the difference between the market price and the amount realized of \$8.90, the total direct and indirect costs amount to \$2.30, which is 20.5 percent of the market value of \$11.20. In Table 4 the average direct and indirect cost as a percentage of market value is 18.7 percent, since the average that is reported is the average of this percentage for each firm. (The average ratio of costs to market value is different from the ratio of the averages.) This number is less than the 21.2 percent that Ritter (1987) reports for firm commitment offerings from 1977 to 1982 for several reasons. First, our 1990–94 sample period reveals less underpricing than in 1977–1982. Second, we exclude offerings of less than \$2 million, whereas he includes them. Third, spreads have experienced some downward movement the past fifteen years.⁸ Still, the direct and indirect costs of going public are substantial.⁹

Note that we may be understating the extent of the economies of scale. This is because we are not including the value of any warrants granted to underwriters as part of their compensation. These warrants are common among small, speculative offerings underwritten by less-prestigious underwriters. Their inclusion would boost the average costs of the smallest offerings, but not the larger offerings. For evidence on the quantitative effect of this omission, see Barry, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens (1991) and Dunbar (1995).

While the average gross spread on IPOs is 7.31 percent, we find a large “bunching” at exactly 7.00 percent. Most issues with proceeds of \$20–\$60 million have a spread of exactly 7 percent, as shown in the Appendix table.

For IPOs, we include the indirect cost of underpricing in Table 4, but we do not include this as a cost for other security offerings. This is because of the lack of economically important underpricing effects for other offerings. Smith (1977) documents underpricing of 0.5 percent for SEOs. We suspect that much of this represents the practice of pricing the offering at the bid price, rather than the mean of the bid and the ask price, and the tendency to round down to the nearest eighth or integer. For example, if a stock traded at \$30.125 bid and \$30.375 ask, it would be common to set a \$30.00 offer price. Depending upon which price had been the most recent transaction price, this would be measured as underpricing of either 0.4 percent or 1.2 percent. Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) report excess returns of 1.5 percent for SEOs during the month after issuing. Since companies typically issue after a large stock price run-up, it is not clear how much of this 1.5 percent is due to momentum effects, and how

⁸Calomiris and Raff (1995) report that for convertible bonds, the average spread in 1963–65 was 3.7 percent and in 1971–72 it was 3.2 percent. Our 1990–94 sample has an average spread of 2.9 percent.

⁹Beatty and Welch (1996) report the average direct and indirect costs for a sample of 980 IPOs from 1992 to 1994. Whereas we aggregate auditing, legal, printing, and other direct expenses, they report audit expenses and legal expenses separately. For all proceeds classes, legal expenses are slightly higher than auditor expenses.

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TABLE 5. Number of Issues Containing an International Tranche for Domestic Operating Companies That Are Issuing, 1990-94.

Proceeds (\$ millions)	Equity				Bonds			
	IPOs		SEOs		Convertible		Straight	
	Int'l Tranche?		Int'l Tranche?		Int'l Tranche?		Int'l Tranche?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
2-9.99	2	335	4	163	0	4	1	31
10-19.99	12	377	12	298	1	13	0	78
20-39.99	45	488	36	389	3	15	0	89
40-59.99	40	175	42	219	0	28	4	86
60-79.99	33	46	45	98	1	46	8	84
80-99.99	25	26	30	41	9	4	2	110
100-199.99	81	25	72	80	22	35	14	395
200-499.99	39	8	48	7	14	13	13	157
500-up	10	0	8	1	2	1	2	18
Total	287	1480	297	1296	52	159	44	1048

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm-commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

*If (TOTDOLAMT/PROCDS) > 1.05, the issue is treated as having an international tranche. TOTDOLAMT is the total proceeds raised globally, and PROCDS is the total proceeds raised in the United States.

much is due to issue effects. Kang and Lee (1996) document that convertible bonds are underpriced by about 1 percent on average. Straight bonds, especially those with high credit ratings, seem to be underpriced very little.

International Tranches

In Table 5 we report the frequency with which domestic operating companies include an international tranche in their offerings. Recall that we are excluding Eurobonds from our debt offerings and ADRs from our equity offerings. Inspection of the table reveals that equity offerings and convertibles that raise less than \$60 million in domestic trading rarely include an international tranche. Straight debt offerings, no matter what their size, rarely include an international tranche. Now, foreign investors can always participate in a domestic offering regardless of whether it is explicitly marketed overseas. Thus, the existence/nonexistence of an international tranche largely reflects the degree to which

the selling efforts are expanded to find international buyers. Domestic operating companies issuing debt with foreign buyers in mind frequently issue Eurobonds.¹⁰

Overallotment Options

The Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) permit firm commitment offerings to include an overallotment option, where more securities can be sold if demand is strong.¹¹ Since August 1983, the size of this overallotment option has been limited to 15 percent of the issue size. Investment bankers typically have thirty days to exercise this option. In practice, investment bankers typically presell at least 115 percent of the offering, and then stand ready to buy back the incremental 15 percent if demand is weak when some of the buyers immediately sell their securities (a practice known as "flipping").¹²

The NASD Rules of Fair Practice require that investment bankers sell securities at or below the stated offer price. Normally, all of the securities are sold at the offer price, but occasionally, if demand is weak, the investment banker winds up selling some of the securities below the offer price. In this arrangement the underwriter writes a put option to the issuing firm, with the value of this put included in the gross spread. The overallotment option can be viewed as a call option that the issuing firm has written, where investors hold this call.

On securities sold through the exercise of overallotment options, investment bankers collect the same gross spread as on the rest of the issue. However, since the direct expenses do not change, these fixed costs are spread over a larger issue size. Thus, the total direct cost numbers that we report would be lower if overallotment options were included in the gross proceeds. On the other hand, since overallotment options are generally exercised only if the issue is underpriced, the value of this call option is a cost to the issuing firm that we do not include in our total cost calculations.

In Table 6 we report the frequency with which overallotment options are used and the frequency with which they are exercised. Inspection of the table reveals that in recent years, essentially all IPOs have included an overallotment option. The vast majority of SEOs and convertibles include an overallotment option, but straight bond issues rarely do.

¹⁰The relative yields on Eurobonds versus domestic bonds also play a role in the decision of what to issue (see Kim and Stulz (1988)).

¹¹Overallotment options are sometimes called Green Shoe options. The Green Shoe Company was apparently the first company to use one.

¹²See Schultz and Zaman (1994) for evidence on the exercise of overallotment options on IPOs. With IPOs, if the underwriter expects aftermarket demand to be weak, 135 percent of the issue may be presold, with the underwriter's taking a naked short position equal to the amount exceeding 115 percent of the offering. This allows the underwriter to support, or stabilize, the price by buying back the increment in open market purchases. These shares are then treated as if they were never issued. If the underwriter expects the price to jump, typically only 115 percent of the issue size will be presold, to avoid losing money on a naked short position.

TABLE 6. Number of Issues Containing an Overallotment Option, for Domestic Operating Companies That Are Issuing, 1990-94.

Proceeds (\$ millions)	Equity								Bonds							
	IPOs Overallotment Option?				SEOs Overallotment Option?				Convertible Overallotment Option?				Straight Overallotment Option?			
	Yes		No ^d		Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
	Sold?				Sold?				Sold?				Sold?			
	Yes ^a	No ^b	?		Yes	No	?		Yes	No	?		Yes	No	?	
2-9.99	159	115	51	12	100	41	21	5	0	0	4	0	1	0	4	27
10-19.99	198	151	40	0	209	58	38	5	1	2	8	3	2	1	4	71
20-39.99	306	164	60	3	269	100	49	7	4	2	8	4	6	0	9	74
40-59.99	123	67	25	0	173	50	33	5	6	6	13	3	1	0	1	88
60-79.99	45	27	7	0	81	37	21	4	21	6	16	4	3	0	0	89
80-99.99	25	17	9	0	44	9	15	53	10	0	3	0	0	1	1	10
100-199.99	54	34	16	2	96	24	28	4	23	2	28	4	4	1	3	401
200-499.99	21	17	8	1	35	4	14	2	7	2	15	3	3	1	1	165
500-up	6	0	3	1	6	2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	19
Total	937	592	219	19	1013	325	220	35	72	20	98	21	20	4	24	1044

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

^aIf OVERAMT > 0 and OVERC = Yes, where OVERAMT is the amount that can be raised through the overallotment option and OVERC is "Yes" if any overallotment option is exercised.

^bIf OVERAMT > 0 and OVERC = No.

^cIf OVERAMT > 0 and OVERC = Missing.

^dIf OVERAMT = "-"; this may include offerings with missing data on OVERAMT.

APPENDIX. Interquartile Range of Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds for Equity (IPOs and SEOs) and Straight and Convertible Bonds Offered by Domestic Operating Companies, 1990-94.

Proceeds ^a (\$ millions)	Equity				Bonds			
	IPOs		SEOs		Convertible Bonds		Straight Bonds	
	GS ^b	TDC ^c	GS	TDC	GS	TDC	GS	TDC
2-9.99	8.00-10.00	14.34-19.23	6.50-10.00	10.03-16.16	5.45-6.69	7.38-10.04	0.64-3.38	3.47-6.21
10-19.99	7.00-7.14	9.94-12.44	5.74-6.94	7.42-9.63	4.25-6.00	6.65-9.70	0.35-2.90	1.55-5.68
20-39.99	7.00-7.00	8.82-10.09	5.22-6.00	6.19-7.57	3.00-5.00	4.56-6.50	0.57-3.00	1.10-4.55
40-59.99	7.00-7.00	8.23-9.00	4.73-5.48	5.26-6.31	2.88-3.50	3.63-4.65	0.15-0.71	0.91-2.88
60-79.99	6.55-7.00	7.69-8.51	4.24-5.00	4.51-5.70	2.50-3.00	2.83-3.54	0.65-3.00	0.94-3.64
80-99.99	6.21-6.85	7.26-8.44	3.87-4.75	4.22-5.38	2.25-3.00	2.56-3.66	0.63-2.76	0.94-3.70
100-199.99	5.72-6.47	6.43-7.49	3.15-4.47	3.38-4.89	2.15-2.75	2.36-3.19	0.65-2.75	1.01-3.55
200-499.99	5.29-5.86	5.92-6.78	2.79-3.58	2.92-3.79	1.25-2.50	1.40-2.69	0.65-2.63	1.43-3.16
500-up	5.00-5.37	5.33-5.95	2.75-3.00	2.82-3.17	1.00-2.50	1.11-2.60	0.29-2.75	1.05-3.18
Total	7.00-7.05	8.57-12.04	4.51-6.08	5.12-8.20	2.25-3.00	2.66-3.96	0.60-2.75	1.02-3.60

Notes: Closed-end funds (SIC 6726), REITs (SIC 6798), ADRs, and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies (SIC 6011, 6019, 6111, and 999B). Only firm commitment offerings and nonshelf-registered offerings are included. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are from Securities Data Co. (SDC).

^aTotal proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of overallotment options (SDC variable: PROCDS).

^bGross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession) (SDC variable: GPCTP).

^cTotal direct costs as a percentage of total proceeds (total direct costs are the sum of gross spreads and other direct expenses).

The frequency with which overallotment options are exercised varies across security type. In Table 6 we use the SDC classification where an overallotment option is considered to be exercised as long as at least part of it is exercised. In practice, most overallotment options are for 15 percent of the issue size. Most commonly, either all or none of the additional shares are sold, but sometimes only part of the overallotment option is exercised. On securities sold as part of an overallotment option, the spread is the same as on the rest of the issue.

IV. Conclusions

Firms have many choices for financing their activities: internal versus external, private versus public, and debt versus equity. This article focuses on public external financing and documents the cost of this financing from 1990 to 1994. We report the direct costs of raising capital for IPOs, SEOs, convertible bonds, and straight bonds. These are, respectively, 11.0 percent, 7.1 percent, 3.8 percent, and 2.2 percent of the proceeds. We find substantial economies of scale for all types of securities, although for straight bond offerings, these are largely exhausted for proceeds over \$40 million. Spreads on bonds are sensitive to credit quality, with gross spreads more than 200 basis points higher on noninvestment-grade issues. Except for bonds, most large issues include an international tranche.

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THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL TAXES AND DIVIDENDS ON CAPITAL ASSET PRICES

Theory and Empirical Evidence

Robert H. LITZENBERGER*

Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA

Krishna RAMASWAMY*

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ 07974, USA

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This paper derives an after tax version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The model accounts for a progressive tax scheme and for wealth and income related constraints on borrowing. The equilibrium relationship indicates that before-tax expected rates of return are linearly related to systematic risk and to dividend yield. The sample estimates of the variances of observed betas are used to arrive at maximum likelihood estimators of the coefficients. The results indicate that, unlike prior studies, there is a strong positive relationship between dividend yield and expected return for NYSE stocks. Evidence is also presented for a clientele effect.

1. Introduction

The effect of dividend policy on the prices of equity securities has been an issue of interest in financial theory. The traditional view was that investors prefer a current, certain return in the form of dividends to the uncertain prospect of future dividends. Consequently, they bid up the price of high yield securities relative to low yield securities [see Cottle, Dodd and Graham (1962) and Gordon (1963)]. In their now classic paper Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that in a world without taxes and transactions costs the dividend policy of a corporation, given its investment policy, has no effect on the price of its shares. In a world where capital gains receive preferential treatment relative to dividends, the Miller-Modigliani 'irrelevance proposition' would seem to break down. They argue, however, that since tax rates vary across investors each corporation would attract to itself a clientele of investors that most desired its dividend policy. Black and Scholes (1974) assert that corporations would adjust their payout policies until in equilib-

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rium the spectrum of policies offered would be such that any one firm is unable to affect the price of its shares by (marginal) changes in its payout policy.

In the absence of taxes, capital asset pricing theory suggests that individuals choose mean-variance efficient portfolios. Under personal income taxes, individuals would be expected to choose portfolios that are mean-variance efficient in after-tax rates of return. However, the tax laws in the United States are such that some economic units (for example, corporations) would seem to prefer dividends relative to capital gains. Other units (for example, non-profit organizations) pay no taxes and would be indifferent to the level of yield for a given level of expected return. The resulting effect of dividend yield on common stock prices seems to be an empirical issue.

Brennan (1973) first proposed an extended form of the single period Capital Asset Pricing Model that accounted for the taxation of dividends. Under the assumption of proportional individual tax rates (not a function of income), certain dividends, and unlimited borrowing at the riskless rate of interest (among others) he derived the following equilibrium relationship:

$$E(R_i) - r_f = b\beta_i + \tau(d_i - r_f) \quad (1)$$

where R_i is the before tax total return to security i , β_i is its systematic risk, $b = [E(R_m) - r_f - \tau(d_m - r_f)]$ is the after-tax excess rate of return on the market portfolio, r_f is the return on a riskless asset, d_i is the dividend yield on security i , and the subscript m denotes the market portfolio. τ is a positive coefficient that accounts for the taxation of dividends and interest as ordinary income and taxation of capital gains at a preferential rate.

In empirical tests [of the form (1)] to date, the evidence has been inconsistent. Black and Scholes (1974, p. 1) conclude that

...it is not possible to demonstrate that the expected returns on high yield common stocks differ from the expected returns on low yield common stocks either before or after taxes.

Alternatively, stated in terms of the Brennan model, their tests were not sufficiently powerful either to reject the hypothesis that $\tau=0$ or to reject the hypothesis that $\tau=0.5$. Rosenberg and Marathe (1978) attribute the lack of power in the Black-Scholes tests to (a) the loss in efficiency from grouping stocks into portfolios and (b) the inefficiency of their estimating procedures, which are equivalent to Ordinary Least Squares. Using an instrumental variables approach to the problem of errors in variables and a more complete specification of the variance-covariance matrix (of disturbances in the regression), Rosenberg and Marathe find that the dividend term is statistically significant. Both the Rosenberg and Marathe and the Black and Scholes studies use an average dividend yield from the prior twelve month

period as a surrogate for the expected dividend yield. Since most dividends are paid quarterly, their proxy understates the expected dividend yield in ex-dividend months and overstates it in those months that a stock does not go ex-dividend, thereby reducing the efficiency of the estimated coefficient on the dividend yield term. Both studies (Rosenberg and Marathe in using instrumental variables, and Black-Scholes in grouping) sacrifice efficiency to achieve consistency.

The present paper derives an after-tax version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model that accounts for a progressive tax scheme and both wealth and income related constraints on borrowing. Alternative econometric procedures are used to test the implications of this model. Unlike prior tests of the CAPM, the tests here use the variance of the observed betas to arrive at maximum likelihood estimators of the coefficients. Consistent estimators are obtained without loss of efficiency. Also, for ex-dividend months the expected dividend yield based on prior information is used, and for other months the expected dividend yield is set equal to zero. While the estimate of the coefficient of dividend yield is of the same order of magnitude as that found in Black and Scholes, and lower than that found by Rosenberg and Marathe, the t -value is substantially larger, indicating a substantial increase in efficiency. Furthermore, the tests are consistent with the existence of a clientele effect, indicating that the aversion for dividends relative to capital gains is lower for high yield stocks and higher for low yield stocks. This is consistent with the Elton and Gruber (1970) empirical results on the ex-dividend behavior of common stocks.

2. Theory

This section derives a version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model that accounts for the tax treatment of dividend and interest income under a progressive taxation scheme. Two types of constraints on individual borrowing are imposed. The first constrains the maximum interest on riskless borrowing to be equal to the individual's dividend income, and the second is a margin requirement that restricts the fraction of security holdings that may be financed through borrowing. In previous published work, Brennan (1973) derives an after-tax version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model with unlimited borrowing and with constant tax rates which may vary across individuals.¹ Under his model when interest on borrowing exceeds dividend income the investor would pay a negative tax. The theoretical model

¹Brennan (1970) also derives a model with a progressive tax scheme. However, he neither considers constraints on borrowing nor the limiting of interest deduction on margin borrowing to dividend income. Consideration of the limit on the interest tax deduction to dividend income combined with a positive capital gains tax would result in a preference for dividends by those individuals whose interest payments exceed their dividend income.

developed here may be viewed as an extension of the Brennan analysis to account for constraints on borrowing along with a progressive tax scheme. Special cases of the model are examined, where the income related constraint and/or the margin constraint on individual borrowing are removed.

The following assumptions are made:

- (A.1) Individuals' Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are monotone increasing strictly concave functions of after-tax end of period wealth.
- (A.2) Security rates of return have a multivariate normal distribution.
- (A.3) There are no transactions costs, and no restrictions on the short sale of securities, and individuals are price takers.
- (A.4) Individuals have homogeneous expectations.
- (A.5) All assets are marketable.
- (A.6) A riskless asset, paying a constant rate r_f , exists.
- (A.7) Dividends on securities are paid at the end of the period and are known with certainty at the beginning of the period.
- (A.8) Income taxes are progressive and the marginal tax rate is a continuous function of taxable income.
- (A.9) There are no taxes on capital gains.
- (A.10) Constraints on individuals' borrowing are of the form:
 - (i) A constraint that the interest on borrowing cannot exceed dividend income, called the income constraint on borrowing, and/or
 - (ii) a margin constraint that the individual's net worth be at least a given fraction of the market value of his holdings of risky securities.

Assumptions (A.1) through (A.6) are standard assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) taken together imply that preferences can be described over the mean and the variance of after-tax end of period wealth. Under these conditions individuals prefer more mean return and are averse to the variance of return. The individual's marginal rate of substitution between the mean and variance of after-tax end of period wealth, at the optimum, can be written as the ratio of his global risk tolerance to his initial period wealth. That is, if $u_k(W_k^1)$ is the k th individual's utility function in terms of after-tax end of period wealth, $f^k(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$ is his objective function in terms of the mean and variance of the after-tax portfolio return, and W^k is his initial wealth,

$$f^k_1 - 2f^k_2 = \theta^k W^k \quad (2)$$

where $\theta^k = -E(u^k) / E(u^{k'})$ is the individual's global risk tolerance at the optimum [see Gonzalez-Gaverra (1973) and Rubinstein (1973)]. (A.7) implies

that dividends are announced at the beginning of the period and paid at its end. Since firms display relatively stable dividend policies this may be a reasonable approximation for a monthly holding period.

Assumption (A.8) closely resembles the tax treatment of ordinary dividends in the U.S. The \$100 dividend exclusion is ignored, since the small magnitude of the exclusion implies that for the majority of stockholders the marginal tax rate applicable to ordinary income is the same as that applied to dividends. Assumption (A.9) abstracts from the effects of capital gains taxes. Since capital gains are taxed only upon realization, their treatment in a single period model is not possible. It is, however, straightforward to model a capital gains tax on an accrual basis [see Brennan (1973)]. Since most capital gains go unrealized for long periods, this would tend to overstate the effect of the actual tax. Noting that the ratio of realizations to accruals is small, and that capital gains are exempt from tax when transferred by inheritance, Bailey (1969) has argued that the effective tax is rather small.

Under assumption (A.8), the k th individual's average tax rate, t^k , is a non-decreasing function of his taxable end of period income Y^k_1 ,

$$t^k = g(Y^k_1) \\ g(0) = 0, \quad g'(Y^k_1) = 0 \quad \text{for } Y^k_1 \leq 0, \\ > 0 \quad \text{for } Y^k_1 > 0. \quad (3)$$

The k th individual's marginal tax rate, written T^k , is the first derivative of taxes paid with respect to taxable income. This is equal to the average tax rate plus the product of taxable income and the derivative of the average tax rate,

$$T^k = d(t^k Y^k_1) / dY^k_1 = t^k + Y^k_1 g'(Y^k_1) \quad (4)$$

The margin constraint in assumption (A.10-ii) resembles institutional margin restrictions. By (A.10-i), borrowing is constrained up to a point where interest paid equal dividends received. This constraint incorporates the casual empirical observation that loan applications require information on income (which this constraint accounts for) in addition to information on wealth (which the margin constraint accounts for). One or both of the constraints may be binding, for a given individual. This formulation allows the analysis of an equilibrium with both constraints, with only one of them imposed or with no borrowing constraints.

The following notation is employed:

R_i = the total before tax rate of return on security i , equal to the ratio of the value of the security at the end of the period plus dividends over its current value, less one.

- d_i = the dividend yield on security i , equal to the dollar dividend divided by the current price,
- X_i^k = the fraction of the k th individual's wealth invested in the i th risky asset, $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ (a negative value is a short sale),
- X_f^k = the fraction of the k th individual's wealth invested in the safe asset (a negative value indicates borrowing),
- R_i^k = the before-tax rate of return on the k th individual's portfolio,
- W^k = the k th individual's initial wealth, and
- $f^k(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$ = the k th individual's expected utility function defined over the mean and variance of after-tax portfolio return, μ_k and σ_k^2 , respectively.

The k th individual's ordinary income is then

$$Y_i^k = W^k \left(\sum_i X_i^k d_i + X_f^k r_f \right) \quad (5)$$

The mean after-tax return on the individual's portfolio is

$$\mu_k = \sum_i X_i^k E(R_i) + X_f^k r_f - t^k \left(\sum_i X_i^k d_i + X_f^k r_f \right) \quad (6)$$

and under assumption (A.7) the variance of after-tax return is

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_k^2 &= \sum_i \sum_j X_i^k X_j^k \text{cov}(R_i - d_i, R_j - d_j) \\ &= \sum_i \sum_j X_i^k X_j^k \text{cov}(R_i, R_j) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

By assumption (A.10-4) the income constraint on borrowing is

$$W^k \left\{ \sum_i X_i^k d_i + X_f^k r_f \right\} \geq 0 \quad (8)$$

and the margin constraint on borrowing is

$$W^k \left\{ (1-x) \sum_i X_i^k + X_f^k \right\} \geq 0 \quad (9)$$

where x ; $0 < x < 1$, is the margin requirement on the individual. As pointed out earlier, one or both of these constraints may be binding. The k th individual's optimization problem is stated in terms of the

following Lagrangian:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}^k &= f^k(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2) + \lambda_1^k \left[1 - \sum_i X_i^k - X_f^k \right] \\ &+ \lambda_2^k \left[\sum_i X_i^k d_i + X_f^k r_f - S_2^k \right] + \lambda_3^k \left[(1-x) \sum_i X_i^k + X_f^k - S_3^k \right] \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where

- λ_1^k = the Lagrange multiplier on the k th individual's budget,
- λ_2^k, S_2^k = the Lagrange multiplier and non-negative slack variable for the income related constraint on the k th individual's borrowing, respectively (when the constraint is binding $\lambda_2^k > 0$ and $S_2^k = 0$, and when it is not binding $\lambda_2^k = 0$ and $S_2^k \geq 0$), and
- λ_3^k, S_3^k = the Lagrange multiplier and non-negative slack variables for the margin constraint on the k th individual's borrowing, respectively, again if the constraint is binding (not binding) $\lambda_3^k > (=) 0$ and $S_3^k = (\geq) 0$.

The stationary points satisfy the following first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^k}{\partial X_i^k} &= f_1^k \{ E(R_i) - [t^k + Y_i^k g'(Y_i^k)] d_i \} - \lambda_1^k + \lambda_2^k d_i \\ &+ \lambda_3^k (1-x) + 2f_2^k \sum_j X_j^k \text{cov}(R_i, R_j) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^k}{\partial X_f^k} = f_1^k \{ r_f - [t^k + Y_f^k g'(Y_f^k)] r_f \} - \lambda_1^k + \lambda_2^k r_f + \lambda_3^k = 0 \quad (12)$$

where $f_1^k \equiv \partial f^k(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2) / \partial \mu_k$, $f_2^k \equiv \partial f^k(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2) / \partial \sigma_k^2$. The other first order conditions are the constraints and specify the signs of the Lagrangian multipliers and are omitted here. The progressive nature of the tax scheme [assumption (A.8)] ensures that the mean variance efficient frontier in after-tax terms is concave, and this together with risk aversion from assumption (A.8) is sufficient to guarantee the second order conditions for a maximum.

Recall the following relationships: (i) the marginal tax rate, $T^k = [t^k + Y_i^k g'(Y_i^k)]$, (ii) the covariance $\sum_i X_i^k \text{cov}(R_i, R_j) = \text{cov}(R_k, R_k)$, and (iii) the global risk tolerance $\theta^k = W^k (f_1^k / -2f_2^k)$. Subtracting relation (12) from relation (11) and re-arranging terms yields

$$\begin{aligned} [E(R_i) - r_f] &= x(\lambda_3^k / f_1^k) + (W^k / \theta^k) \text{cov}(R_i, R_k) \\ &+ [T^k - (\lambda_2^k / f_1^k)] (d_i - r_f) \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Relation (13) must be satisfied for the individual's portfolio optimum.

Market equilibrium requires that relation (13) holds for all individuals, and that markets clear. For markets to clear all assets have to be held which implies the conservation relation (14) that requires the value weighted average of all individuals' portfolios be equal to the market portfolio,

$$\sum_i (W^i/W^m) R_m^i = R_m \quad (14)$$

or

$$\sum_i W^i R_m^i = W^m R_m$$

where

$$\sum_i W^i \equiv W^m.$$

Multiplying both sides of relation (13) by θ^k , summing over all individuals, using the conservation relation (14) and re-arranging terms yields

$$E(R_m) - r_f = a + b\beta_1 + c(d_1 - r_f) \quad (15)$$

where

$$\beta_1 \equiv \text{cov}(R_m, R_m) / \text{var}(R_m),$$

$$a \equiv \sum_i (\theta^i / \theta^m) (\lambda_1^i / f_1^i),$$

$$b \equiv \text{var}(R_m) / (W^m \theta^m),$$

$$c \equiv \sum_i (\theta^i / \theta^m) (T^i - (\lambda_1^i / f_1^i)),$$

$$\theta^m \equiv \sum_i \theta^i.$$

The term 'a', the intercept of the implied security market plane, is the fractional margin requirement α times the weighted average of the ratios of individual shadow prices on the margin constraint and the expected marginal utility of mean return. The weights, (θ^i / θ^m) , are proportional to individuals' global risk tolerances. When $\alpha > 0$ and the constraint is binding for some individuals, $\lambda_1^i > 0$ for some k , a is positive. In the absence of margin requirements ($\alpha = 0$) or when the margin constraint is not binding for all individuals, $\lambda_1^i = 0$ for all k , $a = 0$.

Interpreting eq. (15), 'a' is the excess return on a zero beta portfolio (relative to the market) whose dividend yield is equal to the riskless rate, i.e.,

$a = E(R_m) - r_f$. The term 'b', the coefficient on beta is equal to the product of the variance of the rate of return on the market portfolio and global market relative risk aversion, i.e., $b = \text{var}(R_m) / (W^m \theta^m)$. Since relation (15) also holds for the market portfolio, b may be alternatively expressed as $b = [E(R_m) - r_f - c(d_1 - r_f) - a]$. If 'c' is interpreted as a tax rate, b may be viewed as the expected after-tax rate of return on a hedge portfolio which is long the market portfolio and short a portfolio having a zero beta and a dividend yield equal to the riskless rate of interest; i.e., $b = [E(R_m) - E(R_h) - c(d_1 - d_h)]$. The term 'c' is a weighted average of individual's marginal tax rates $(\sum_i (\theta^i / \theta^m) T^i)$, less the weighted average of the individual's ratios of the shadow price on the income related borrowing constraint and the expected marginal utility of mean portfolio return $(\sum_i (\theta^i / \theta^m) (\lambda_1^i / f_1^i))$. For the cases where the income related margin constraint is either non-existent or non-binding for all individuals, c is simply the weighted average of marginal tax rates, and is positive. Otherwise, the sign of 'c' depends on the magnitudes of these two terms. Define B as the set of indices of those individuals k for whom the income related constraint is binding; and define N (or B) as the set of indices for which the constraint is non-binding. Now for $k \in B$, $\lambda_1^k > 0$, $T^k = 0$ and $T^k = r^k = 0$. And for $k \in N$, $\lambda_1^k = 0$, $T^k \geq 0$ and $T^k \geq r^k \geq 0$. Hence

$$c = \sum_{k \in N} \frac{\theta^k}{\theta^m} T^k - \sum_{k \in B} \frac{\theta^k \lambda_1^k}{\theta^m f_1^k} \quad (16)$$

The individuals in N may be viewed as a clientele that prefers capital gains to dividends. The individuals in B may be viewed as a clientele that shows a preference for dividends; in the context of this model, these individuals wish to borrow more than the income related constraint allows them, and increased dividends serve to increase their debt capacity without additional tax obligations. To this point corporate dividend policies have been treated as exogenous in this model.

Now consider supply adjustments by value maximizing firms. If $c > 0$ ($c < 0$) firms could increase their market values by decreasing (increasing) cash dividends and increasing (decreasing) share repurchases or decreasing (increasing) external equity flotations. Value maximizing firms (in absence of any restrictions, the IRS may impose) would adjust the supply of dividends until an equilibrium was obtained where

$$\sum_{k \in N} (\theta^k / \theta^m) T^k = \sum_{k \in B} (\theta^k / \theta^m) (\lambda_1^k / f_1^k) \quad (17)$$

When condition (17) is satisfied an individual firm's dividend decision does

not affect its market value, $c=0$ and dividend yield has no effect on the before tax rate of return on any security.²

Under unrestricted supply effects, $c=0$ and the equilibrium relationship (15) reduces to the before tax zero beta version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model:

$$E(\bar{R}_i) = (a + r_f)(1 - \beta_i) + E(\bar{R}_m)\beta_i \quad (18)$$

Note that this obtains in the presence of taxes. Long (1975) has studied conditions under which the before tax and after-tax mean variance efficient frontiers are identical for any individual. He does not, however, study the equilibrium as is done here: for even though the before tax and after-tax individual mean variance frontiers are not identical, (18) demonstrates that prices are found as if there is no tax effect.

In the case where there are no margin constraints, $a=0$, and relation (18) reduces to the before tax traditional Sharpe-Lintner version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model,

$$E(\bar{R}_i) = r_f + [E(\bar{R}_m) - r_f]\beta_i \quad (19)$$

Return now to the case where the income related borrowing constraint is absent. Then, in (16), $c = \sum T^i (\theta^i / \theta^m) \equiv T^m$, the 'market' marginal tax bracket: and the relation reduces to an after-tax version of the Black (1972), Lintner (1965), Vasicek (1971) zero beta model,

$$E(\bar{R}_i) - T^m d_i = [r_f(1 - T^m) + a](1 - \beta_i) + [E(\bar{R}_m) - T^m d_m]\beta_i \quad (20)$$

When there is no margin constraint or when it is non-binding for all individuals, $a=0$, and relation (20) reduced to an after-tax version of the Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) model,

$$E(\bar{R}_i) - T^m d_i = [r_f(1 - T^m)] + [E(\bar{R}_m) - T^m d_m - r_f(1 - T^m)]\beta_i \quad (21)$$

However, in none of these cases is T^m a weighted average of individual

²Note, however, that this equilibrium, where dividends do not affect before tax returns, may not exist. For example, the income constraint may be binding for no one even when dividends are zero. If all individuals had the same endowments and had the same utility functions this constraint would be non-binding for all individuals.

This argument is in the spirit of the 'supply effect' alluded to in Black and Scholes (1974). Unlike the recent argument in Miller and Scholes (1977) for a zero dividend effect, the present argument does not depend on an artificial segmentation of accumulators and non-accumulators, and the existence of tax-sheltered lending opportunities with zero administrative costs. The major problem with the argument here is that with the existence of two distinct clienteles, one preferring higher dividends and the other preferring lower dividends, shareholders would agree on the direction in which firms should change their dividend. Thus the assertion of value maximizing behavior by firms does not have a strong theoretical basis.

average tax rates. It is only when taxes are simply proportional to income that $T^m = \tau^i$, and relation (21) is identical to the equilibrium implied by Brennan (1973), who assumes a constant tax rate that may differ across investors.

3. Empirical tests

From the theory, the equilibrium specification to be tested is

$$E(\bar{R}_i) - r_f = a + b\beta_i + c(d_i - r_f) \quad (22)$$

The hypotheses are $a > 0$, $b > 0$, and in the absence of the income related constraint on borrowing $c > 0$.

In obtaining econometric estimates of a , b and c , two problems arise. The first is that expectations are not directly observed. The usual procedure is to assume that expectations are rational and that the parameters a , b and c are constant over time; the realized returns are used on the left-hand side

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{R}_i - r_{ft} &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_i + \gamma_2 (d_{it} - r_{ft}) + \bar{\epsilon}_{it}, & i=1, 2, \dots, N_s \\ & & i=1, 2, \dots, T, \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

where \bar{R}_i is the return of security i in period t , β_i and d_{it} are the systematic risk and the dividend yield of security i in period t respectively. The disturbance term $\bar{\epsilon}_{it}$ is $\bar{R}_i - E(\bar{R}_i)$, the deviation of the realized return from its expected value. The coefficients γ_0 , γ_1 and γ_2 correspond to a , b and c . The variance of the column vector of disturbance terms, $\bar{\epsilon} \equiv \{\bar{\epsilon}_{it} : i=1, 2, \dots, N_s, t=1, \dots, T\}$, is not proportional to the identity matrix, since contemporaneous covariances between security returns are non-zero, and return variances differ across securities. (Note that in order to conserve space $\{\cdot\}$ is used to denote a column vector.) This means that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are inefficient, for either a cross-sectional regression in month t , or a pooled time series and cross-sectional regression. The computed variance of the OLS estimator (based on the assumption that the variance of $\bar{\epsilon}$ is proportional to the identity matrix) is not equal to the true variance of the estimator.

The second problem is that the true population β_i 's are unobservable. The usual procedure uses an estimate from past data, and this estimate has an associated measurement error. This means that the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. The method used in tackling these problems is discussed in this section.

To fix matters, assume that data exist for rates of return, true betas and for dividend yields in periods t , $i=1, 2, \dots, N_s$, securities in each period t , $t=1, \dots, T$. Define the vector of realized excess returns as

$$\bar{R} \equiv \{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n, \dots, R_T\},$$

where

$$R_t \equiv \{(R_{1t} - r_{ft}), (R_{2t} - r_{ft}), (R_{3t} - r_{ft}), \dots, (R_{N_t} - r_{ft})\},$$

and the matrices X of explanatory variables as

$$X \equiv \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n, \dots, X_T\},$$

where

$$X_t \equiv \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \beta_{1t} & (d_{1t} - r_{ft}) \\ 1 & \beta_{2t} & (d_{2t} - r_{ft}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & \beta_{N_t} & (d_{N_t} - r_{ft}) \end{bmatrix}$$

By defining the vector of regression coefficients as $F' = \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2\}$ one can write the pooled time series and cross-sectional regression as

$$\bar{R} = XF + \bar{\epsilon}, \quad (24)$$

where

$$\bar{\epsilon} \equiv \{\bar{\epsilon}_1, \bar{\epsilon}_2, \dots, \bar{\epsilon}_n, \dots, \bar{\epsilon}_T\},$$

and

$$\bar{\epsilon}_t \equiv \{\bar{\epsilon}_{1t}, \bar{\epsilon}_{2t}, \dots, \bar{\epsilon}_{nt}, \dots, \bar{\epsilon}_{N_t}\}.$$

It is assumed that

$$E(\bar{\epsilon}) = 0,$$

and that

$$E(\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\epsilon}') = V,$$

some symmetric positive definite matrix of order $(N_t \times N_t)$. It is also assumed that security returns are serially uncorrelated, so that

$$E(\bar{\epsilon}_t \bar{\epsilon}_s') = 0 \text{ for } t \neq s.$$

This means that the variance-covariance matrix $V = E(\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\epsilon}')$ is block diagonal, with the off-diagonal blocks being zero. The matrices V_t appears along the diagonal of V .

It is well known that the estimator for F which is linear in R , unbiased and has minimum variance is unique, and is given by the Aitken or Generalized Least Squares estimator (GLS),

$$\hat{F} = (X'V^{-1}X)^{-1}X'V^{-1}\bar{R}. \quad (25)$$

From the block diagonal nature of V , it follows that V^{-1} is also block diagonal. The matrices V_t^{-1} , $t=1, 2, \dots, T$, appear along the diagonal of V^{-1} , with the off-diagonal blocks being zero. Assuming that F is an intertemporal constant, F can be estimated by efficiently pooling T independent GLS estimates of F , namely $\hat{F}_1, \hat{F}_2, \dots, \hat{F}_T$, obtained by using cross-sectional data in periods 1, 2, ..., t , ..., T .

$$\hat{F}_t = (X_t'V_t^{-1}X_t)^{-1}X_t'V_t^{-1}\bar{R}_t, \quad t=1, 2, \dots, T. \quad (26)$$

That is, the monthly estimators $\hat{\gamma}_k$ for γ_k , $k=0, 1$ or 2 , are serially uncorrelated, and the pooled GLS estimator $\hat{\gamma}_k$ is found as the weighted mean of the monthly estimates, where the weights are inversely proportional to the variances of these estimates,

$$\hat{\gamma}_k = \sum_{t=1}^T Z_{kt} \hat{\gamma}_{kt}, \quad (27)$$

$$\text{var}(\hat{\gamma}_k) = \sum_{t=1}^T Z_{kt}^2 \text{var}(\hat{\gamma}_{kt}), \quad (28)$$

$$Z_{kt} = [\text{var}(\hat{\gamma}_{kt})]^{-1} / \sum [\text{var}(\hat{\gamma}_{kt})]^{-1}. \quad (29)$$

For some of the results presented in section 2 each $\hat{\gamma}_k$ is assumed to be drawn from a stationary distribution, and the estimates of $\hat{\gamma}_k$ and its variance are

$$\hat{\gamma}_k = \sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{\gamma}_{kt}/T), \quad (30)$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2(\hat{\gamma}_k) = \left[\sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{\gamma}_{kt} - \hat{\gamma}_k)^2 / (T-1) \right], \quad k=0, 1, 2. \quad (31)$$

A useful portfolio interpretation can be given to each of the GLS estimators \hat{F}_t in (26). Choose any matrix numbers of order $N_t \times N_t$, say W_t^{-1} ,

such that $(X; W_t^{-1} X_t)^{-1}$ exists. Construct an estimator, using cross-sectional data in period t , as

$$(X; W_t^{-1} X_t)^{-1} X; W_t^{-1} R_t \quad (32)$$

This estimator is linear in R_t and unbiased for Γ . This estimator is a linear combination of realized security excess returns in period t . From the fact that

$$(X; W_t^{-1} X_t)^{-1} X; W_t^{-1} X_t = I, \quad (33)$$

where I is the identity matrix, it follows that the estimator for γ_0 in (32) is the realized excess return on a zero beta portfolio having a dividend yield equal to the riskless rate. Similarly, the estimator for γ_1 is the realized excess return on a hedge portfolio that has a beta of one and dividend yield equal to zero; and that for γ_2 is the realized excess return on a hedge portfolio having a zero beta and a dividend yield equal to unity. This interpretation³ can be given to any estimator of the form (32). When W_t^{-1} (or, equivalently, the portfolio weights discussed above) is chosen so as to minimize the variance of the portfolio return, the resulting estimator is the GLS estimator. This is because portfolio estimates as in (32) are linear and unbiased by construction, and by the Gauss-Markov theorem the GLS estimator is the unique minimum variance estimator among linear unbiased estimators [see Amemiya (1972)].

It is not possible to specify the elements of the variance-covariance matrix V_t a priori. The task of estimating these elements is greatly simplified by assuming that the Sharpe single index model is a correct description of the return generating process. The process that generates returns at the beginning of period t is assumed to be as follows:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \beta_{it} R_{mt} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{it}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N_t \quad (34)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cov}(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{jt}) &= 0, & i \neq j, \\ &= s_{it}, & i = j, \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

$$\alpha_{it} = E(R_{it} | R_{mt} = 0).$$

With this specification the element in the i th row and the j th column of V_t , written as $V_t(i, j)$, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V_t(i, j) &= \beta_{it} \beta_{jt} \sigma_{mm} & i \neq j, \\ &= \beta_{it}^2 \sigma_{mm} + s_{it} & i = j, \end{aligned} \quad i, j = 1, 2, \dots, N_t \quad (36)$$

³For a similar interpretation, see Rosenberg and Marathe (1978).

where

$$\sigma_{mm} \equiv \text{var}(R_{mt}).$$

Under these conditions the GLS estimator of Γ obtained by using data in period t reduces to

$$\hat{\Gamma}_t = (X; \Omega_t^{-1} X_t)^{-1} X; \Omega_t^{-1} R_t \quad (37)$$

where Ω_t is a diagonal matrix of order $(N_t \times N_t)$, whose element in the i th row and j th column is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega_t(i, j) &= 0, & i \neq j, \\ &= s_{it}, & i = j, \end{aligned} \quad i, j = 1, 2, \dots, N_t \quad (38)$$

In appendix A it is shown that this estimator is the GLS estimator for Γ . That is, under the assumptions of the single index model, the estimator minimizes the 'residual risk' of three portfolio returns, subject to the constraint that the expected returns on these portfolios are γ_0 , γ_1 and γ_2 respectively. This estimator can be constructed as a heteroscedastic transformation on R_t and X_t . Define the matrix P_t , of order $(N_t \times N_t)$ whose elements are given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_t(i, j) &= \phi / s_{it} \equiv \phi / \sqrt{s_{it}}, & i = j, \\ &= 0, & i \neq j, \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

where ϕ is a positive scalar. Then $\hat{\Gamma}_t$ can also be arrived at from the OLS regression on the transformed variables,

$$R_t^* = X_t^* \Gamma + \tilde{\epsilon}_t^* \quad (40)$$

where

$$R_t^* = P_t R_t \quad \text{and} \quad X_t^* = P_t X_t.$$

This is equivalent to deflating the variables in the i th rows of R_t and X_t by a factor proportional to the residual standard error s_{it} . Note that Black and Scholes (1974), who used the portfolio approach, assumed in addition to the single index model that the 'residual' risks of all securities were equal; that is, they assumed that $s_{it} = s^2$ for all i . Therefore, the Black-Scholes estimator reduces to OLS on the untransformed variables.

Errors in variables. Since true population β_{it} variables are unobserved,

estimates of this variable, β_{it} are obtained from historical data. The estimated beta is assumed equal to the true beta plus a measurement error $\tilde{\beta}_{it}$.

$$\beta_{it} = \beta_{it} + \tilde{\beta}_{it} \quad (41)$$

The presence of measurement error causes misspecification in OLS and GLS estimators, and the resulting estimates of Γ are biased and inconsistent [see, for example, Johnston (1972), for a discussion of the bias in the coefficients of a variable without error, here dividend yield; see Fisher (1977)]. The estimates β_{it} are obtained from a regression of R_{mt} on the return of the market portfolio R_{mt} from data prior to period t ,

$$R_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \beta_{it} R_{mt} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{it} \quad t = t-60, t-59, \dots, t-1. \quad (42)$$

Since the single index model is assumed, $cov(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{jt}) = 0$ and hence $cov(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{jt}) = 0$. If the joint probability distribution between security rates of return and market return is stationary, the variance of the measurement error $var(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it})$ is proportional to the variance of the residual risk term $var(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it})$, for each i . Since month t is not used in this time series regression, $cov(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{jt}) = 0$. Note that this time series regression yields a measured beta, β_{it} , its variance $var(\tilde{\beta}_{it})$ and the variance of the residual risk term $var(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}) = s_{it}$.

Consistent with prior empirical studies, the assumption $E(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}) = 0$ has been made. However, it is recognized that if the 'market return' used in (42) is not the true market return, then the estimate of β_{it} may be biased, as has been observed by Sharpe (1977), Mayers (1972) and Roll (1977).

Because of errors in variables, most previous empirical tests have grouped stocks into portfolios. Since errors in measurement in betas for different securities, are less than perfectly correlated, grouping risky assets into portfolios would reduce the asymptotic bias in OLS estimators. However, grouping results in a reduction of efficiency caused by the loss of information. The efficiency of the OLS estimator of the coefficient of a single independent variable is proportional to the cross sectional variation in that independent variable (beta). For the two independent variables case (dividend yield and beta), Stohle (1976) has shown that the efficiency of the OLS estimator of the coefficient of a given independent variable, using grouped data, is proportional to the cross-sectional variation in that variable unexplained by the variation in the other independent variable. Since the within group variation in dividend yield unexplained by beta is eliminated, the efficiency of the estimate of the dividend yield coefficient using grouped data is lower than that using all the data.⁴ For this reason the present study

⁴The variance of the OLS estimator of the second independent variable (dividend yield) is equal to the variance of the error term divided by the portion of its variation that is unexplained by the first independent variable (beta). Therefore, unless the independent variables are

does not use the grouping approach to errors in variables. Instead, use is made of the measurement error in beta to arrive at a consistent estimator for Γ .

In constructing the GLS estimator $\hat{\Gamma}_t$ in (37), each variable has been deflated by a factor proportional to the residual standard deviation. The factor of proportionality was an arbitrary positive scalar. The structure of our problem is such that the standard error of measurement in β_{it} , $s_{it} = (var(\tilde{\beta}_{it}))^{1/2}$, is proportional to the standard deviation of residual risk, $s_{it} = (var(\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}))^{1/2}$. That is, if the time series regression model satisfies the OLS assumptions,

$$s_{it} = s_{it} / \left(\sum_{t=t-60}^{t-1} (R_{mt} - \bar{R}_m)^2 \right)^{1/2} \quad (43)$$

where \bar{R}_m is the sample mean of the market return in the prior 60 month period.⁵ Assume that s_{it} is known and let

$$\phi = s_{it} / s_{it} \quad (44)$$

in the definition of P in (39). Thus each variable in the rows of R_t and X_t is now deflated by the standard deviation of the measurement error in β_{it} . If β_{it} is used in place of β_{it} (unobserved), the measurement error in the deflated independent variable, $\beta_{it}^* = \beta_{it} / s_{it}$ will now have unit variance.

Call the matrix of regressors used X_t^* , which is simply X_t^* with β_{it} replacing β_{it} . Then

$$X_t^* = X_t^* + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \tilde{\beta}_{1t}/s_{1t} & 0 \\ 0 & \tilde{\beta}_{2t}/s_{2t} & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & \tilde{\beta}_{N_t}/s_{N_t} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (45)$$

where $var(\tilde{\beta}_{it}/s_{it}) = 1$. Then the computed overall estimator

uncorrelated sequential grouping procedures as used by Black and Scholes (1974) are inefficient relative to grouping procedures that maximize the between group variation in dividend yield that is unexplained by the between group variation in beta.

⁵In the actual estimation, risk premiums were used. That is, $R_{mt} - r_{ft}$ was regressed on $R_{it} - r_{ft}$ to estimate β_{it} , as explained in section 4 below. Thus in the computation in (43), $(R_{mt} - r_{ft} - \bar{R}_m - r_{ft})^2$ is used in place of $(R_{mt} - R_m)^2$.

$$\hat{f} = \sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{f}_t / T) \quad (46)$$

where

$$\hat{f}_t = (\hat{X}_t^* \hat{X}_t^*)^{-1} \hat{X}_t^* \hat{R}_t^* \quad (47)$$

is inconsistent. This is because

$$\text{plim}_{N_t} \hat{f}_t = \left(\Sigma_{X_t^* X_t^*} + \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \right)^{-1} \frac{X_t^* \hat{R}_t^*}{N_t} \quad (48)$$

where

$$\Sigma_{X_t^* X_t^*} = \text{plim}_{N_t} \frac{X_t^* X_t^*}{N_t}$$

This says that each cross sectional estimator is biased even in large samples. Hence the overall estimator, being an arithmetic mean of the cross-sectional estimators, is inconsistent.

Consider the following estimator in each cross sectional month:

$$\hat{f}_t = \left(\frac{\hat{X}_t^* \hat{X}_t^*}{N_t} - \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \right)^{-1} \frac{\hat{X}_t^* \hat{R}_t^*}{N_t} \quad (49)$$

Then

$$\text{plim}_{N_t} \hat{f}_t = \frac{X_t^* R_t^*}{X_t^* X_t^*} \quad (50)$$

and

$$E(\text{plim}_{N_t} \hat{f}_t) = \frac{X_t^* E(R_t^*)}{X_t^* X_t^*} = \Gamma \quad (51)$$

Thus each cross-sectional estimator is unbiased, in large samples, for Γ . Note that a portfolio interpretation can also be given to (47). Since

$$\text{plim}_{N_t} \left(\frac{\hat{X}_t^* \hat{X}_t^*}{N_t} - \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \right)^{-1} \frac{\hat{X}_t^* \hat{X}_t^*}{N_t} = I \quad (52)$$

it follows that the estimator for γ_0 in (47) is the realized excess return on a normal portfolio that has, in probability limit, a zero beta and a dividend yield equal to the riskless rate. Similarly the estimator for γ_1 (or γ_2) is the realized excess return on a hedge portfolio that has, in probability limit, a beta of one (or zero) and a dividend yield equal to zero (or unity).

The overall estimator,

$$\hat{f} = \sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{f}_t / T) \quad (53)$$

combines T independent estimates, and is consistent,

$$\text{plim}_{T} \left[\text{plim}_{N_t} \sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{f}_t / T) \right] = \Gamma \quad (54)$$

It is shown in appendix B that, if \bar{e}_{it} and \bar{e}_{it} are jointly normal and independent, then \hat{f}_t is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for Γ , using data in period t .

4. Data and results

Data on security rates of return (R_{it}) were obtained from the monthly return tapes supplied by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The same service provides the monthly return on a value weighted index of all the securities on the tape, and this index was used as the market return (R_{mt}) for the time series regressions. From January 1931 until December 1951, the monthly return on high grade commercial paper was used as the return on the riskless asset (r_{ft}); from January 1952 until December 1977 the return on a Treasury Bill (with one month to maturity) was used for r_{ft} . Estimates of each security's beta, β_{it} , and its associated standard error were obtained from regressions of the security excess return on the market excess return for 60 months prior to t .

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \alpha_{it} + \beta_{it}(R_{mt} - r_{ft}) + \bar{e}_{it}, \quad t = t - 60, t - 59, \dots, t - 1 \quad (55)$$

This was repeated for all securities on the CRSP tapes from $t=1$ (January 1936) to $t=T=504$ (December 1977). January 1936 was chosen as the initial month for (subsequent) cross-sectional regressions because that was when dividends first became taxable.

To conduct the cross-sectional regression, the dividend yield variable (d_{it}) was computed from the CRSP monthly master file. This is

$$d_{it} = 0,$$

if in month t , security i did not go ex-dividend; or if it did, it was a non-recurring dividend not announced prior to month t ;

$$d_{it} = \bar{D}_i / P_{i,t-1},$$

if in month t , security i went ex-dividend, and the dollar taxable dividend D_{it} per share was announced prior to month t ; and

$$d_{it} = \bar{D}_i / P_{i,t-1},$$

if in month t security i went ex-dividend and this was a recurring dividend not previously announced. Here \bar{D}_i was the previous (going back at most 12 months), recurring, taxable dividend per share, adjusted for any changes in the number of shares outstanding in the interim; where $P_{i,t-1}$ is the closing price in month $t-1$.

This construction assumes that the investor knows at the end of each month whether or not the subsequent month is an ex-dividend month for a recurring dividend. However, the surrogate for the dividend is based only on information that would have been available ex ante to the investor.

The cross-sectional regressions in each month provide a sequence of estimates $\{\hat{\gamma}_{0t}, \hat{\gamma}_{1t}, \hat{\gamma}_{2t}\}$, $t=1, 2, \dots, 504$. Three such sequences are available: the first uses OLS, the second uses GLS and the third uses maximum likelihood estimation. The econometric procedures developed in section 3 apply equally well to the single variable regression, excess returns on beta alone. This corresponds to a test of the two-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model, as in Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973).

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_{it} + \tilde{u}_{it}, \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, \quad t=1, 2, \dots, 504, \quad (56)$$

where \tilde{u}_{it} is the deviation of R_{it} from its expected value. These cross sectional regressions provide three sequences $\{\hat{\gamma}_{0t}, \hat{\gamma}_{1t}\}$, $t=1, 2, \dots, 504$, the first using OLS, the second using GLS and the third using maximum likelihood estimation.

The estimated coefficients were shown to be realized excess rates of return on portfolios (with certain characteristics)⁹ in month t . It is assumed that the excess rates of return on these portfolios are stationary and serially uncorrelated. Under these conditions the most efficient estimators of the

⁹See section 3, and also appendix A.

expected excess return on these portfolios would be the unweighted means of the monthly realized excess returns. The sample variance of the mean is computed as the time series sample variance of the respective portfolio returns divided by the number of months.

$$\bar{\gamma}_k = \sum_{t=1}^{504} \hat{\gamma}_{kt} / 504, \quad k=0, 1, 2, \quad (57)$$

$$\text{var}(\bar{\gamma}_k) = \sum_{t=1}^{504} (\hat{\gamma}_{kt} - \bar{\gamma}_k)^2 / (504 \cdot 503). \quad (58)$$

A similar computation is made for $\bar{\gamma}_0$ and $\bar{\gamma}_1$.

The three sets of estimators of γ_0 , γ_1 and γ_2 (and of $\bar{\gamma}_0$ and $\bar{\gamma}_1$) and their respective t -statistics for the overall period January 1936 to December 1977 are provided in Panel A (Panel B) of table 1.

Table 1

Pooled time series and cross section estimates of the after-tax and the before-tax CAPM: 1936-1977.^a

Procedure	Panel A: After-tax model			Panel B: Before-tax model	
	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$
OLS	0.00616 (4.37)	0.00268 (1.51)	0.227 (6.33)	0.00681 (4.84)	0.00228 (1.26)
GLS	0.00446 (3.53)	0.00344 (1.87)	0.234 (8.24)	0.00516 (4.09)	0.00302 (1.63)
MLE	0.00363 (2.63)	0.00421 (1.86)	0.226 (8.62)	0.00443 (3.22)	0.00369 (1.62)

^aNotes: The after-tax version corresponds to the regression

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_{it} + \gamma_2 (\beta_{it} - r_{ft}) + \tilde{u}_{it}, \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, \quad t=1, 2, \dots, T.$$

The before-tax version corresponds to the regression

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_{it} + \tilde{u}_{it}, \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, \quad t=1, 2, \dots, T.$$

Each regression above is performed across securities in a given month. This gives estimates $\{\hat{\gamma}_{0t}, \hat{\gamma}_{1t}, \hat{\gamma}_{2t}\}$, $t=1, 2, \dots, T$ and $\{\bar{\gamma}_0, \bar{\gamma}_1\}$, $t=1, 2, \dots, T$. The reported coefficients are arithmetic averages of this time series; for example,

$$\bar{\gamma}_1 = \sum_{t=1}^T \hat{\gamma}_{1t} / T,$$

where $T=504$, $\hat{\gamma}$ -statistics are in parentheses under each coefficient, and they refer to $\hat{\gamma}_j$, where $j=1, 2, 3$.

The OLS and GLS estimators are biased and inconsistent due to measurement error in beta. The maximum likelihood estimators are consistent: consistency is a large sample property and for this study the monthly cross sectional regressions have between 600 and 1200 firms, and there were 504 months.⁷ In Panel A, table 1, the MLE estimator of γ_1 is about 60 percent greater than the corresponding GLS estimator. Consistent with prior studies, the MLE estimator of γ_1 is significantly positive, indicating that investors are risk averse. Also consistent with prior studies, the MLE estimator of γ_0 is significantly positive. In Panel B, tests of the two factor model are presented. Note that in both panels, the GLS procedure results in an increase in the efficiency of the estimator of γ_1 , which is $\hat{\gamma}_1$ ($\hat{\gamma}_1$) in Panel A (Panel B). Consistent with prior tests of the traditional version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the null hypothesis that $\gamma_0 = 0$ is rejected. Consistent with investor risk aversion $\hat{\gamma}_1$ is significantly positive at the 0.1 level. Explanations for a positive intercept ($\gamma_0 > 0$) include, in addition to margin constraints on borrowing, misspecification of the market portfolio [see Mayers (1972), Sharpe (1977) and Roll (1977)], or beta serving as a surrogate for systematic skewness [see Kraus and Litzemberger (1976)].

The coefficient of the excess dividend yield variable, γ_2 (Panel A) is highly significant under all the estimating procedures. The standard errors of the GLS and maximum likelihood estimators of γ_2 are about 25 percent smaller than that of the OLS estimator. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that for every dollar of taxable return investors require between 23 and 24 cents of additional before tax return.

While the finding of a significant dividend coefficient contrasts with the Black-Scholes (1974) finding of an insignificant dividend effect, the magnitude of the coefficient in table 1 is consistent with their study. The dividend yield (independent) variable they used was $(d_t - d_m)/d_m$, where d_m was the average dividend yield on stocks. Since the coefficient they found was 0.0009, and the average annual yield in their period of study (1936-1966) was 0.048, their estimate of γ_2 can be approximated by $0.0009/(0.048/12)$, or 0.225.

It has been assumed that the variance of the estimator of Γ is constant over time. If, due to the quarterly patterns in the incidence of dividend payments, the variances of the estimators are not constant, the equally weighted estimators in (50) are inefficient relative to an estimator that accounts for any seasonal pattern in the variance. Since dividends are usually paid once every quarter, it is possible to compute three independent estimates of Γ by averaging the coefficients obtained in only the first, only the second and only the third month of each quarter. These three estimates of Γ may be weighted by the inverse of their variances to obtain a more efficient estimator. This is provided in table 2. As can be seen from this table,

⁷Consistency here is with respect to the overall estimator so one takes probability limits with respect to t and with respect to N_t . See section 3.

the overall estimator for γ_2 is very close to the MLE estimate in table 1. The estimate of the standard error of $\hat{\gamma}_2$ is approximately the same for the first two months, but about 30 percent less for the third month.

Table 2

Pooled time series and cross section estimates of the after-tax CAPM: 1936-1977
(based on quarterly dividend patterns).^a

Month of quarter	γ_0	γ_1	γ_2
First	0.00748 (0.00234)	0.00776 (0.00379)	0.28932 (0.05418)
Second	0.00212 (0.00232)	0.00071 (0.00335)	0.23531 (0.05034)
Third	0.00134 (0.00248)	0.00399 (0.00453)	0.18940 (0.03534)
Overall estimate	0.00373 (0.00137)	0.00383 (0.00219)	0.22535 (0.02552)

^aNotes: The after-tax version corresponds to the regression

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(\beta_{it} + \gamma_2)(d_{it} - r_{ft}), \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N_t$$

This regression is performed across securities in a given month t . Maximum likelihood estimation is used. The reported coefficients are arithmetic averages of the coefficients obtained over time (see note to table 1). The first three rows use the estimates from only the first, only the second and only the third months of each quarter. There are 168 months' estimates in each row. Standard errors are in parentheses under each coefficient. The 'overall estimates' use the estimates in each row above, weighted inversely by their variances.

It may be inappropriate to treat γ_2 as an intertemporal constant: in the absence of income related constraints on borrowing, γ_2 is a weighted average of individuals' marginal tax rates, which may have changed over time. Assume that investors have utility functions that display decreasing absolute risk aversion and non-decreasing relative risk aversion. Assume in addition that the distribution of wealth is independent of individual utility functions. Under these conditions the weight of the marginal tax rates of individuals in the higher tax brackets would be greater than that of individuals in lower tax brackets. Holland (1962) has shown that from 1936 to 1960 there was no pronounced upward trend in the marginal tax rates of individuals with taxable income in excess of \$25,000. To examine empirically whether there is evidence of an upward trend in γ_2 over time, the maximum likelihood results are presented for six subperiods in table 3. The estimators of γ_2 for the subperiods were consistently positive and, except for the 1/1955 to 12/1961 period, significantly different from zero. There does not appear to be a trend to the estimate.

Table 3
 Pooled time series and cross section estimates of the after-tax CAPM (for 6 subperiods).^a

Period	$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$
1/36-12/40	-0.00287 (-0.52)	0.00728 (0.65)	0.335 (2.64)
1/41-12/47	0.00454 (1.44)	0.00703 (1.59)	0.408 (7.35)
1/48-12/54	0.00528 (2.77)	0.00617 (1.45)	0.158 (4.37)
1/55-12/61	0.01355 (5.62)	-0.00316 (-0.78)	0.018 (0.32)
1/62-12/68	-0.00164 (-0.47)	0.01063 (1.95)	0.171 (2.33)
1/69-12/77	0.00164 (0.47)	-0.00045 (-0.09)	0.329 (6.00)

^aNotes: The after-tax version corresponds to the regression
 $R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \bar{R}_{it} + \gamma_2 (\delta_{it} - r_{ft}) + \epsilon_{it} \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, t=1, 2, \dots, T$
 Maximum likelihood estimation is used for the cross sectional regression. The reported coefficients are arithmetic averages of the coefficients estimated in the months in the period (see note to table 1). *t*-statistics are in parentheses under each coefficient.

It is possible that the positive coefficient on dividend yield is not a tax effect and that in non-ex-dividend months the effect completely reverses itself. If dividends are paid quarterly there would be twice as many non-ex-dividend months as ex-dividend months. Thus, a complete reversal would require a negative effect on returns in each non-ex-dividend month that is half the absolute size of the effect in an ex-dividend month. It is also possible that a stock's dividend yield is a proxy for the covariance of its return with classes of assets not included in the value weighted index of NYSE stocks used to calculate betas in the present study. If the coefficient on dividend yield is entirely due to the effects of omitted assets, the effect in non-ex-dividend months should be positive and the same size as the effect in ex-dividend months.

In order to test whether there is a reversal effect or a re-inforcing effect in non-ex-dividend months the following cross-sectional regression was estimated:

$$R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \bar{R}_{it} + \gamma_2 (\delta_{it} d_{it}^0 - r_{ft}) + \gamma_3 (1 - \delta_{it}) d_{it}^0 + \epsilon_{it} \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t \quad (59)$$

where

$$d_{it}^0 = D_{it} / P_{it-1}$$

if a dividend was announced prior to month *t*, to go ex-dividend in month *t*,

$$d_{it}^0 = \hat{D}_{it} / P_{it-1}$$

otherwise; and

$$\delta_{it} = 1,$$

if month *t* was an ex-dividend month for a recurring dividend;

$$\delta_{it} = 0,$$

otherwise.

The variable $(1 - \delta_{it}) d_{it}^0$ is intended to pick up the effect of a dividend payment in subsequent, non-ex-dividend months. The variable $\delta_{it} d_{it}^0$ is identical to d_{it} , the variable used earlier. If dividends are paid quarterly, and γ_3 is negative and has an absolute value half the size of γ_2 , then one can conclude that there is a complete reversal over the course of the quarter so that there is no net tax effect. On the other hand, if there is no reversal, γ_3 should not be significantly negative.

The MLE estimates of the coefficients in (52) are presented in table 4. The estimated value of $\hat{\gamma}_3$ is positive and significantly different from zero: this rejects the hypothesis that there is complete reversal.

The significant positive $\hat{\gamma}_3$ is evidence of a re-inforcing effect in non-ex-dividend months. If the coefficient on dividend yield is entirely attributable

Table 4
 Pooled time series and cross section test of the reversal effect of dividend yield: 1936-1977.^a

$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$\hat{\gamma}_3$
0.00184 (1.29)	0.00493 (2.17)	0.32784 (7.31)	0.10321 (2.87)

^aNotes: The regression performed in each month is
 $R_{it} - r_{ft} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \bar{R}_{it} + \gamma_2 (\delta_{it} d_{it}^0 - r_{ft}) + \gamma_3 (1 - \delta_{it}) d_{it}^0 + \epsilon_{it} \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, t=1, 2, \dots, T$

Maximum likelihood estimation is used for the cross-sectional regression. The reported coefficients are arithmetic averages of the coefficients in each month (see note to table 1). *t*-statistics are in parentheses under each coefficient.

to the effect of omitted assets γ_3 should be the same order of magnitude as γ_2 . If the effect in ex-dividend months exceeds the combined effect in the subsequent two non-ex-dividend months γ_2 should be more than twice as large as γ_3 . $\hat{\gamma}_2 - 2\hat{\gamma}_3$ is 0.1214 and has a *t*-value of 2.79. Thus, the effect in an ex-dividend month is more than twice the size of the effect in a non-ex-dividend month. This evidence suggests that the coefficient on dividend yield in ex-dividend months is not solely attributable to the effects of missing assets and that the effect in an ex-dividend month exceeds the combined effect in the subsequent two non-ex-dividend months. If the effect in non-ex-dividend months is asserted to be entirely due to the effect of missing assets, the difference $\hat{\gamma}_2 - \hat{\gamma}_3 = 0.225$ is an estimate of the tax effect. However, further theoretical work on the combined effects of transaction costs and personal taxes in a multi-period valuation framework is required to be able to understand the cause of a significant yield effect in non-ex-dividend months. For the present it seems reasonable to conclude that 0.225 is a lower bound estimate of the tax effect.⁸

The empirical evidence presented by Elton and Gruber (1970) on the ex-dividend behavior of common stocks suggests that the coefficient on the excess dividend yield term may be a decreasing function of yield. The theoretical rationale for this effect is that investors in low (high) tax brackets invest in high (low) dividend yield stocks: a possible explanation is that institutional restrictions on short sales results in a segmentation of security holdings according to investors' tax brackets. To provide a simple test of this 'clientele' effect, the coefficient c in (22) is hypothesized to be a linear decreasing function of the i th security's dividend yield. That is c , which is now dependent on i , is written c_i and given by

$$c_i = k - hd_i \quad (60)$$

where $k, h > 0$, and the hypothesized relationship is

$$E(\tilde{R}_i) - r_f = a + b\beta_i + (k - hd_i)(d_i - r_f) \quad (61)$$

The econometric model is

⁸It might be argued that the persistent dividend effect is due to the fact that the dividend variable used incorporates knowledge of the ex-dividend month, which the investor may not have. To test whether this introduces spurious correlations between yields and returns, the variable $(d_i/3)$ was used in the cross-sectional regression (23). The variable does not incorporate knowledge of the ex-dividend month except when it was announced. It is divided by 3 so as to distribute the yield over the three months of every quarter. The overall estimate (1936-1977) of γ_2 is 0.39, with a *t*-value of 3.57; one cannot attribute the earlier results due to knowledge of ex-dividend months. This is consistent with the Rosenberg and Marathe (1978) study. Note that this estimate is lower than the total effect in table 4, which is $\hat{\gamma}_2 + 2\hat{\gamma}_3 = 0.52$. The lower estimate is attributable to constraining the coefficient on yield to be the same in non-ex-dividend months and ex-dividend months.

$$\tilde{R}_i - r_{f,t} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_i + \gamma_2 (d_i - r_{f,t}) + \gamma_3 d_i (d_i - r_{f,t}) + \epsilon_{it} \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t \quad (62)$$

where the estimate of k is γ_2 and that for $-h$ is γ_4 . The maximum likelihood approach is used in each cross sectional regression, and the pooled estimates presented in table 5.

Table 5
Pooled time series and cross section test of the clientele effect: 1936-1977.^a

$\hat{\gamma}_0$	$\hat{\gamma}_1$	$\hat{\gamma}_2$	$\hat{\gamma}_4$
0.00365	0.00425	0.336	-6.92
(2.65)	(1.88)	(6.60)	(-1.70)

^aNote: This corresponds to the following cross-sectional regression in each month:

$$\tilde{R}_i - r_{f,t} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \beta_i + \gamma_2 (d_i - r_{f,t}) + \gamma_4 d_i (d_i - r_{f,t}) + \epsilon_{it} \quad i=1, 2, \dots, N_t$$

$t=1, 2, \dots, T$

Maximum likelihood estimation is used for the cross-sectional regression. The reported coefficients are arithmetic averages of the coefficients in each month (see note in table 1). *t*-statistics are in parentheses under each coefficient.

Consistent with the existence of a clientele effect, the maximum likelihood estimate of γ_2 is significantly positive and that of γ_4 is significantly negative, both at the 0.05 level. The magnitude of $\hat{\gamma}_4$ suggests that for every percentage point in yield the implied tax rate for ex-dividend months declines by 0.069. For example, if the annual yield was 4 percent, the implied tax rate would be approximately $0.336 - 6.92(0.04/4) = 0.268$, assuming quarterly payments. The empirical evidence supporting a clientele effect suggests the need for further research that rigorously derives an equilibrium model that incorporates institutional restrictions on short sales, along with personal taxes.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, an after-tax version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is derived. The model extends the Brennan after-tax version of the CAPM to incorporate wealth and income related constraints on borrowing along with a progressive tax scheme. The wealth related constraint on borrowing causes the expected return on a zero-beta portfolio (having a dividend yield equal to the riskless rate) to exceed the riskless rate of interest. The income related constraint tends to offset the effect that personal taxes have on the

equilibrium structure of share prices. The equilibrium relationship indicates that the before tax expected return on a security is linearly related to its systematic risk and to its dividend yield. Unrestricted supply adjustments in corporate dividends would result in the before tax version of the CAPM; in a world where dividends and interest are taxed as ordinary income. If income related constraints are non-binding and/or corporate supply adjustments are restricted, the before tax return on a security would be an increasing linear function of its dividend yield.

Unlike prior tests of the CAPM that used grouping or instrumental variables to correct for measurement error in beta, this paper uses the sample estimate of the variance of observed betas to arrive at maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients in the relations tested. Unlike prior studies of the effect of dividend yields on asset prices, which used average monthly yields as a surrogate for the expected yield in both ex-dividend and non-ex-dividend months, the expected dividend yield based on prior information is used for ex-dividend months and is set to zero for other months.

The results indicate that there is a strong positive relationship between before tax expected returns and dividend yields of common stocks. The coefficient of the dividend yield variable was positive, less than unity, and significantly different from zero. The data indicates that for every dollar increase in return in the form of dividends, investors require an additional 23 cents in before tax return. There was no noticeable trend in the coefficient over time. A test was constructed to determine whether the effect of dividend yield reverses itself in non-ex-dividend months, and this hypothesis was rejected. Indeed, the data indicates that the effect of a dividend payment on before tax expected returns is positive in both the ex-dividend month and in the subsequent non-ex-dividend months. However, the combined effect in the subsequent non-ex-dividend months is significantly less than the effect in the ex-dividend month.

Evidence is also presented for a clientele effect: that is, that stockholders in higher tax brackets choose stocks with low yields, and vice versa. Further work is needed to derive a model that implies the existence of such clienteles and to test its implications.

Appendix A

In this appendix it is shown that the estimator for Γ , given by

$$f_t = (X_t' \Omega_t^{-1} X_t)^{-1} X_t' \Omega_t^{-1} R_t$$

using data in period t , is the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator for Γ under the assumption of the single index model. It was shown in section 3 of the paper that each estimated coefficient corresponds to the realized excess

return of a specific portfolio. Suppose portfolio weights $\{h_{it}, i=1, 2, \dots, N_t\}$ are chosen in each period, for investment in assets $i=1, 2, \dots, N_t$. Using eq. (23) from the text the excess return on such a portfolio is given by

$$\sum_i h_{it} (R_{it} - r_{ft}) = \gamma_0 \left(\sum_i h_{it} \right) + \gamma_1 \left(\sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} \right) + \gamma_2 \left[\sum_i h_{it} (d_{it} - r_{ft}) \right] + \sum_i h_{it} \epsilon_{it}$$

The expected excess return on this portfolio is

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_0 & \text{ if } \sum_i h_{it} = 1, \quad \sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} = 0, \quad \sum_i h_{it} (d_{it} - r_{ft}) = 0 \\ \gamma_1 & \text{ if } \sum_i h_{it} = 0, \quad \sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} = 1, \quad \sum_i h_{it} (d_{it} - r_{ft}) = 0 \\ \gamma_2 & \text{ if } \sum_i h_{it} = 0, \quad \sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} = 0, \quad \sum_i h_{it} (d_{it} - r_{ft}) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Under the assumption of the single index model, the variance of the return on such a portfolio is, from eq. (36) in the text,

$$\text{var} \left(\sum_i h_{it} (R_{it} - r_{ft}) \right) = \left(\sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} \right)^2 \sigma_{m^2} + \sum_i h_{it}^2 s_{it}$$

Suppose one wishes to minimize the variance of the excess return on such a portfolio subject to the condition that the expected excess return on the portfolio is, in turn, γ_0 , γ_1 or γ_2 . This condition enforces $\sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it}$ to be either zero or unity. Hence minimizing

$$\left(\sum_i h_{it} \beta_{it} \right)^2 \sigma_{m^2} + \sum_i h_{it}^2 s_{it}$$

subject to the unbiasedness condition, is equivalent to minimizing

$$\sum_i h_{it}^2 s_{it}$$

the 'residual risk' of the portfolio subject to the unbiasedness condition. Thus, one is using the residual risk of the portfolio as the minimand and enforcing the unbiasedness condition. By construction, Ω_t is the diagonal matrix of the residual variances s_{it} and by construction, f_t is linear and unbiased for Γ . The variance of the estimator has been minimized under the

single index model. But by the Gauss-Markov theorem, the GLS estimator [using the full matrix V_t in (36) as the variance-covariance matrix] is the unique minimum variance estimator among linear and unbiased estimators. Hence $\hat{\Gamma}_t$ is the GLS estimator for Γ_t under the assumption of the single index model.

Appendix B

In this section, it is shown that under certain conditions, $\hat{\Gamma}_t$ in (49) is the maximum likelihood estimator for Γ in period t .

First, note that there are no errors in the measurement of β ; then if security returns are multivariate normal, then the GLS estimator in (37) is also the maximum likelihood estimator [see Johnston (1972)].

Suppose now there are errors in the measurement of β . Then one can use the transformation P defined in (39), with $\phi = s_u/s_e$, to write the model as

$$R_u^* = \gamma_0 \beta_u^* + \gamma_1 \beta_u^* + \gamma_2 d_u^* + \tilde{\epsilon}_u^* \quad (\text{B.1})$$

and the observed beta as

$$\beta_u^* = \beta_u^* + \tilde{\epsilon}_u^* \quad (\text{B.2})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} R_u^* &= (R_u - r_{ft})/s_e, & \beta_u^* &= 1/s_e, & \beta_u^* &= \beta_u/s_e \\ \tilde{\beta}_u^* &= \beta_u/s_e, & d_u^* &= (d_u - r_{ft})/s_e, & \tilde{\epsilon}_u^* &= \tilde{\epsilon}_u/s_e \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_u^* = \tilde{\epsilon}_u/s_e$$

Define the variable

$$m_{i,j} = \sum_{t=1}^{N_t} x_{it} y_{jt} / N_t \quad (\text{B.3})$$

as the raw co-moment for a given sequence $\{(x_{it}, y_{jt}), i=1, 2, \dots, N_t\}$. Then from (B.1) and (B.2),

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = \gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

$$\begin{aligned} m_{R^*, \beta^*} &= \gamma_0 [m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*}] + \gamma_1 [m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*}] \\ &+ \gamma_2 [m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*}] + m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = \gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = m_{R^*, \beta^*} + 2m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.9})$$

In these six equations, take expectations and use the fact that

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_u^*) = E(\tilde{\epsilon}_u^*) = 0,$$

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_u^* \tilde{\epsilon}_u^*) = 0, \quad (\text{B.10})$$

$$E(\tilde{\epsilon}_u^* \tilde{\epsilon}_u^*) = E[s_u^2/s_e^2] = 1.$$

The left-hand side of each of (B.4) through (B.9), after taking expectations, corresponds to the population co-moments of the subscripted variables.

If β_u and $\tilde{\epsilon}_u$ are independently normally distributed, then the corresponding sample moment is a maximum likelihood estimator of the population parameter. Replace these expected values by their maximum likelihood estimates. There are now six equations for the six unknown parameters γ_0 , γ_1 , γ_2 , m_{R^*, β^*} , m_{R^*, β^*} , and m_{R^*, β^*} . They can be solved for the coefficients of interest from the following 'normal' equations, which are in terms of observed sample estimates.

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = \gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.11})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = \gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1 (m_{R^*, \beta^*} - 1) + \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.12})$$

$$m_{R^*, \beta^*} = \gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} \quad (\text{B.13})$$

and are themselves maximum likelihood [see Mood et al. (1974, p. 285)].

The solution to this set gives estimates $\hat{\gamma}_k$, $k=0, 1, 2$, which are embodied in (49). They are functions of maximum likelihood estimates. Note that in addition to (B.4) through (B.9), one could write an equation for m_{R^*, β^*} .

$$\begin{aligned} m_{R^*, \beta^*} &= \gamma_0^2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_1^2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + \gamma_2^2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + 2\gamma_0 \gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} \\ &+ 2\gamma_0 \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + 2\gamma_1 \gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + 2\gamma_0 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + 2\gamma_1 m_{R^*, \beta^*} \\ &+ 2\gamma_2 m_{R^*, \beta^*} + m_{R^*, \beta^*} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.14})$$

If we take expectations, using (B.10) and the fact that

$$E(m_{p,t}) = E\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \frac{E_i^2}{\sigma_i^2 N_t}\right) \\ = \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \frac{E(E_i^2)}{\sigma_i^2} = \frac{1}{N_t} \cdot N_t \phi^2 = \phi^2$$

we have

$$E(m_{p,t}) = \gamma_0^2 m_{p,t} + \gamma_1^2 m_{p,t} + \gamma_2^2 m_{p,t} + 2\gamma_0\gamma_1 m_{p,t} \\ + 2\gamma_0\gamma_2 m_{p,t} + 2\gamma_1\gamma_2 m_{p,t} + \phi^2 \quad (B.15)$$

where ϕ^2 is assumed known.

By writing down the likelihood function and maximizing it for an analogous case, Johnston (1963) demonstrates a maximum likelihood estimator over the parameter space $(\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \beta_i, \text{ for } i=1, 2, \dots, N_t, \phi)$. This has the undesirable characteristic that the parameter space grows with the sample size.⁹ It turns out in our problem that ϕ is assumed known. If this ϕ satisfies (B.15), when in (B.15) we use the sample co-moment estimates for the population parameters, then Johnston's M.L. procedure coincides with the solution to (B.11) through (B.13). Whereas our estimators are linear in the returns and can be interpreted as portfolios, the expanded parameter space estimator in Johnston is non-linear and has no such analog to theory. Thus conditional on ϕ^2 coinciding with the residual variation in the sample, using our estimates, the estimator in (49) is a maximum likelihood estimator over the parameter space $(\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)$.

⁹See Kendall and Stuart (1973, especially pp. 62 and 402).

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Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices

By BURTON G. MALKIEL AND JOHN G. CRAGG*

This paper presents the results of an empirical study of year-end common-stock prices from 1961 through 1965. The ratios of market prices to earnings are related to such factors as earnings growth, dividend payout, and various proxy variables designed to measure the risk or quality of the returns stream.

Several previous empirical studies¹ have tried to explain share prices on the basis of such variables, but these investigations were forced to rely on published accounting data and untested hypotheses about the formation of expectations. V. Whitbeck and M. Kisor were able to increase the explanatory ability of their regression by substituting the estimates of security analysts of one firm for fabricated expectations variables based on simple extrapolations of past performance. Our study tries to determine whether the goodness of fit can be improved still further by substituting the estimates from several securities firms for the expectations of a single predictor and by using a wider variety of such expectational variables. The most impor-

tant of the expectational variables employed are forecasts of short-term and long-term earnings growth, estimates of the "normal earning power" of each company, and estimates of the "instability" of the earnings stream. The data used are described in Section II.

It is found in Section III that an extremely close fit to the empirical structures of share prices is obtained with the use of such expectations data. These results are also contrasted with those obtained when only historic data are used. Section III then examines further the stability and predictive power of the model over time. Section IV discusses the usefulness of the model for security selection.

I. Specification of a Valuation Model

In the typical valuation model, the price of a share is taken to be the present value of the returns expected therefrom. In the simplest model, the price is the sum of the present values of a stream of dividends that is assumed to grow at a constant rate, g , over time. See, for example, J. B. Williams for one of the earliest statements of the problem and M. J. Gordon for a more recent treatment. Letting P stand for the (ex dividend) price of a share, D the (annual) dividend per share in the year just past, and r the appropriate rate of discount, we have

$$(1) \quad P = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} D \frac{(1+g)^i}{(1+r)^i},$$

provided $g < r$. Dividing both sides of (1) by earnings per share, E , and summing the

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¹ Cross-sectional empirical studies have been undertaken by F. D. Arditti, H. Benishay, R. S. Bower and D. H. Bower, G. R. Fisher, I. Friend and M. Puckett, M. J. Gordon, F. C. Jen, M. Kisor, Jr. and A. Feinstein, Kisor and S. Levine, and R. Ortner.

progression we obtain an expression for the price-earnings multiple

$$(2) \quad \frac{P}{E} = \frac{D}{E} \frac{(1+g)}{(r-g)}$$

The price-earnings ratio is seen to depend on the dividend payout ratio and the expected long-term growth rate of the dividend stream.

The specific model of security price-earnings ratios presented in equations (1) and (2) has several drawbacks. It is inapplicable in cases where no dividends are currently paid, it leads to an infinite value for the shares when $g > r$, and it requires projecting growth rates from now till Kingdom come.² Such difficulties have led several writers to formulate a finite-horizon model of share prices. See, for example, Charles Holt and Malkiel. P. F. Wendt presents a useful survey of a number of alternative models. The basic idea of the finite-horizon approach is that both dividends and earnings are assumed to grow at some rate g for N periods,³ and then grow at a normal rate such as the growth rate for economy as a whole. This approach can be illustrated by the following very simple model.⁴

$$(3) \quad \frac{P_0}{E_0} = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{D_0}{E_0} \frac{(1+g)^i}{(1+r)^i} + (m_a)_0 \frac{(1+g)^N}{(1+r)^N},$$

where $(m_a)_0$ is the average current price-

² Moreover, since the growth rate estimates collected were specifically made for only the next five years, it would seem that this model is not consistent with the data.

³ In some models, the growth rate is assumed to decline in stages to the final "mature" growth rate of the economy. In other models, the initial and terminal growth rates are estimated on the basis of such factors as the retention rate and the rate of return on equity.

⁴ The rationale for this approach and the derivation of equation (3) is contained in Malkiel. It is assumed that after N periods, the price-earnings ratios for all stocks revert to the same average condition.

earnings ratio for the market as a whole. The model in (3) appears to be highly non-linear in the growth rate and payout ratio. Fortunately, however, a linear approximation to the true expression seems to work reasonably well for N as small as five, the period for which we have growth-rate estimates.⁵

The preceding model has abstracted entirely from the existence of risk. There are several possible ways in which risk can be represented in a valuation model. The theoretical justification for the alternatives rests on the assumptions employed.

A common way in which risk is introduced into empirical valuation models is to incorporate a term representing the (expected) variance of the future returns stream from each security. Such a procedure has been justified in two ways. First, it has been argued (e.g., see L. G. Peck) that the horizon, N , over which extraordinary growth can be forecast is itself a function of the variance or "dependability" of the returns stream. By this reasoning, investors would project extraordinary earnings growth over only a very limited horizon for companies where the anticipated variance of the earnings stream is large. Since it can easily be shown that $\partial(P/E)/\partial N > 0$ for a growth stock according to the finite-horizon model (see Malkiel, pp. 1028-29), it follows that price-earnings multiples should be negatively related to the variance term.

⁵ The closeness of the proposed linear approximation was examined by fitting a regression of the form

$$(3') \quad \frac{D_{j0}}{E_{j0}} \sum_{i=1}^5 \frac{(1+g_i)^i}{(1+r)^i} + (m_a)_0 \frac{(1+g)^5}{(1+r)^5} = A + Bg_j + C \frac{D_0}{E_0}$$

Values of the parameters $(m_a)_0$ and r were chosen to be consistent with experience during the 1961-65 period. The coefficient of determination, 0.97, was so high that it seemed safe to substitute the right-hand side of (3') for the right-hand side of (3). It should be noted, however, that this argument assumed that the horizon N is the same for all companies.

A second justification for the inclusion of a variance term in the model rests on recent theoretical work by William Sharpe, John Lintner, and Jan Mossin, extending the Markowitz portfolio selection model. In these models the market establishes "prices" for the expected return and "risk" of each security, where risk consists of the sum of the variance of that security's return and its covariances with all other returns multiplied by the number of shares. If we assume that the returns from different securities are uncorrelated with each other, however, it turns out that the price of a security should simply be a linear function of the expected return and the variance associated with the security. This suggests not only that a variance term should be included in the model but also provides some justification for the linear specification employed in this study.

The second risk measure employed in this study, an index of the conformance between the returns of each individual security and that of a market index, rests on more realistic assumptions. In Sharpe's simplification of the Markowitz model, covariances are assumed to arise because all returns depend on one or a few common factors, such as a market or industry return. For example, the returns from each security, R_i , might first be related to the returns from some index of security prices

$$(4) \quad R_i = \alpha_i + \beta_i(\text{Return to Index}) + \mu_i$$

The total risk of an asset (i.e., the scatter of the R_i around their mean), can then be decomposed into a systematic component (due to underlying relationship between R_i and the return from the market index) and a nonsystematic component, μ_i , uncorrelated with the market index. We would expect investors to prefer those securities with low or negative β_i 's. Other things being equal, a stock whose movements are not highly correlated with the market will tend to reduce the variability

and thus, the risk of the stock portfolio. Of course, it should be emphasized that the covariances and variances that are being valued in the market are those perceived by investors and not some "true" set.

The final risk variable employed was a leverage variable measuring the "financial risk" of a company. As Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller have shown, leverage can be expected to decrease the price-earnings multiple by increasing the riskiness of the returns of common stock relative to their expected values. With a fully adequate measure for the risk associated with the stock, leverage should play no part. Otherwise, it may serve as a useful proxy for the expected variability of the returns stream. Indeed, if other risk measures apply to the instability of the operating earnings stream before fixed charges, and thus serve as estimates of the "business risk" of the firm, a leverage term may capture the additional financial risk of the firm.

Before ending this discussion of the general model underlying the study,⁶ it is worth emphasizing that the model is cast entirely in terms of expectational variables. The critical dependence of share prices on expectational variables has proved to be a major obstacle for empirical investigators. Since only historical data have been available to most researchers, it has been difficult to isolate the true effect of the various variables influencing stock prices. A simple illustration should make this clear. The model described above indicates that we should expect that a *ceteris paribus* increase in the dividend-payout ratio should increase the price-earnings multiple of the shares.⁷ Suppose, however, that the past

⁶ In a forthcoming publication, the authors will present a thorough and integrated model of share valuation.

⁷ We must be careful, however, not to interpret a positive dividend coefficient as indicating that an individual firm can increase the price-earnings ratio of its shares by raising the dividend-payout ratio. A higher dividend (lower retention rate) may lower the future

growth rate of earnings is a very imperfect substitute for the relevant expected growth rate security purchasers anticipate.⁸ The dividend payout could actually serve as an alternative proxy for expected growth.

For example, investors may take a low dividend payout ratio as a signal that the firm has many profitable investment opportunities available and that a high rate of earnings growth can be expected. In such a case, the coefficient of the payout ratio will be biased downward.⁹ Without the proper expectational variables, it will be impossible to untangle the true influence of the many factors influencing the structure of price-earnings multiples. The following section will discuss the actual data employed in the study and indicate how they were collected.

II. *A Description of the Data Employed*

The principal data used in the study consist of a small number of forecasts of the long-term growth rates of earnings for 178 corporations, as of the five year-end periods from 1961 through 1965. In addition, data were collected on security ana-

growth rate per share by an amount sufficient to keep the price of the shares constant. Thus, the standard dividend model of share valuation is in no way inconsistent with the result of Miller and Modigliani that dividend policy cannot effect the value of the enterprise.

⁸ It may be argued that one should not put so much reliance on either past or expected growth rates to explain security prices since there is considerable evidence that earnings growth is "higgledy piggledy." I. M. D. Little and Cragg and Malkiel have shown that both historic growth rates and even the forecasts of security analysts are little related to the growth that is actually achieved. This may be true and yet security analysts may continue to estimate the worth of shares and their anticipated future returns on the basis of the anticipated growth rate of the security's earnings. As is well known from work on the term structure of interest rates, expectations need not be correct to be an important determinant of the yield curve. Surely it is an empirical question whether or not the market actually does value shares consistently with the model presented here.

⁹ For a full discussion of the pitfalls involved in isolating the effect of dividend policy on share prices, see Friend and Puckett.

lysts' estimates of "normal" earnings for the preceding year, their forecasts of next year's earnings, and their expectations about the future variability of the earnings stream. Certain historical financial data were also used to provide a contrast with the expectations data. These included past growth rates of various financial variables, past dividend-payout ratios, and a number of calculated risk proxies.¹⁰

The expectations data were collected from 17 investment firms, most of which were members of The Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance.¹¹ Of the participating firms, four were brokerage houses doing a considerable amount of investment advisory and institutional business, five were banks heavily engaged in trust management, five were mutual-fund management companies, two were pension-fund managers, and the remaining participant was an insurance company. The sample of 178 corporations was selected on the basis of data availability. Companies were included in the sample only when several investment firms made estimates of future earnings growth. Since there tended to be considerable overlap in the coverage of the security analysts for the leading industrial and utility companies, our sample tends to contain the "blue-chip" group of companies in which investment interest is centered. A detailed description of the data used in the study follows:

(a) *Normalized Earnings*

It is well known that the market does not necessarily capitalize the reported accounting earnings for a firm during the preceding year. If, for example, reported earnings are affected unfavorably by such

¹⁰ All historical data were taken from the *COMPU-STAT* tapes made available by Standard Statistics Corporation.

¹¹ The Institute is a consortium of 30 investment firms, organized to promote quantitative research in finance.

nonrecurring factors as strikes or flood damage, or by a cyclical contraction, it is likely that investors apply an appropriate price-earnings multiple to the amount they consider to represent the normal earning power of the company. Indeed, one of the first jobs of a security analyst is to adjust the firm's accounting earnings to arrive at an indication of true earning power (see B. Graham, D. L. Dodd, and S. Cottle ch. 34). Thus, the price-earnings ratios that are relevant for valuation may be the ratios of prices to normalized earnings rather than ratios of prices to reported earnings for the preceding accounting period. These normalized earnings are estimated to be the earnings that would obtain at a normal level of economic activity if the company were experiencing normal operations—that is, operations not affected by such nonrecurring items as strikes, natural disasters, and so forth. The normalized-earnings figures used in the present study were averages of estimates supplied by two of the participating firms.

(b) *Future Long-term and Short-term Growth Rates*

As was mentioned above, several theoretical models of stock valuation have all focused on the expected growth rates of earnings and dividends as a central explanatory variable. Most previous empirical studies, however, were forced to rely on past growth rates as a proxy for future growth rates. One of the major purposes of the present study was to ascertain whether the estimates of future growth rates from several securities firms can enable us to obtain a more satisfactory explanation for the structure of share prices.

In order to contrast the use of historical and expected growth rates, we first tried to find those historical growth rates that showed the closest correlation with market price-earnings multiples. Forty alternative

growth rates were tried. These growth rates differed with respect to the period covered, the method of calculation, and the financial data upon which the growth rate was estimated. From the forty candidate growth rates, the following three were either clearly superior or, at least, no worse than any of the others. These were 1) the ten-year growth rate of earnings per share calculated as the geometric mean of first ratios, 2) the ten-year growth rate of cash earnings per share (i.e., earnings plus noncash charges) calculated as the geometric mean of first ratios, and 3) the ten-year growth rate of cash earnings plus taxes calculated from a regression of the logarithms of the earnings on time. The growth rate of cash earnings was slightly better than the other two in most of the five years studied, and was used in the regressions reported in this paper.

The expected growth rates were estimated by nine securities firms.¹² Each growth rate figure was reported as an average annual rate of growth of earnings per share expected to occur over the next five years. The figures used in the study were averages of the nine predictors.

In addition to these expectations of long-term growth rates, we also collected estimates of the following year's earnings from eleven securities firms.¹³ We found, somewhat to our surprise, that the implicit forecasts of short-term (one-year) growth were not highly correlated with the long-term anticipations and we were able to use both sets of data in some of the empirical work presented later.

Obviously these expected growth rates are not the expectations of a wide cross-section of the buyers and sellers in the market. These expectations were formed,

¹² It should be noted that not all firms provided growth-rate estimates for each of the companies used in the sample during each of the five years, 1961-65.

¹³ Three of these eleven firms also supplied long-term forecasts.

however, by professional security analysts for securities firms or for large institutional investors who are important participants in the market. Moreover, in many cases, these expectations were made to be provided to other investors whose own expectations may be influenced by their advisors. Finally, we should note that these expectations are not limited to published information. The security analysts involved frequently visit the companies they follow and discuss the company's prospects with its executives. Insofar as other security analysts follow the same sort of procedures as our participating firms, the growth-rate estimates of other institutional investors and securities firms may resemble those we have collected. Consequently, these predictions may well serve as acceptable proxies for market expectations and they surely seem worthy of detailed analysis.

(c) *Dividend Payout*

The measurement of the dividend-payout ratio also presents problems. If we simply take the ratio of dividends to earnings, short-run disturbances to reported earnings that do not produce equi-proportional changes in dividends can make calculated payouts differ considerably from target or normal payout ratios. For this reason we chose two alternative methods of calculating the dividend payout. The first method was simply to divide the dividend by normalized rather than reported earnings. The second method, used in the regressions where only historic data were employed, was to average the actual payout ratios over the preceding seven years.

(d) *Risk Variables*

Several types of expectational risk variables were introduced to serve as proxies for the anticipated variance of individual security returns. We included such vari-

ables as the standard deviation of the forecasts of security firms, various types of subjective quality ratings, and an index of the expected instability of future earnings. These risk proxies all turned out to be highly correlated with each other and only the one most useful in explaining earnings multiples, the instability index, has been included in the regressions reported in this paper. This variable was collected from one of our participating firms and represented a measure of the past variability of earnings (around trend) adjusted by the security analyst to indicate anticipated future variability.

In order to contrast the use of expectations data with historical data, a number of risk proxies were calculated on the basis of the financial records of each company. These included statistics measuring the variance of past earnings and of other financial data, a leverage variable, and the conformance between returns of each individual security and that of a market index. The index of market conformance was obtained by estimating the slope, β_i , of a regression of the annual returns of each security on the annual returns from the Standard and Poor's Composite Index. Ten years of data were employed in obtaining the estimate. The most useful historic risk proxies for our present purposes were the semideviation of earnings around trend, the index of market conformance, and the leverage variable. In Table 1 we summarize the variables employed in the regressions.

Before turning to the regression results, a problem concerning the timing of the availability of the expectations and historical data should be mentioned. Our study tries to explain differences among price-earnings multiples for a cross-section of securities as of December 31 in each of five years. While normal earnings per share (and expected growth rates) were estimated and, therefore, available at the

end of each year, actual earnings per share for the 12 months to December 31 are not generally known until some time after the close of the year. Thus, the actual P/E ratios and the historic growth rates calculated to the end of the year, which we employed in the regressions estimated from historic data, were not available to investors on the dates for which equations were estimated, although rather close estimates of the earnings necessary for the calculations are usually well known by that time. In order to test whether our results might be strongly influenced by, in effect, assuming perfect foresight by the market regarding current-year's earnings, we performed an alternative set of runs using the most recent publicly available 12-months' earnings to calculate P/E ratios and historic growth rates. Since the regression results from the alternative set of runs

were almost identical to those reported here, it seems safe to conclude that our assumptions regarding the timing of the availability of historic data had little influence on the results.

III. Regression Results

In this section we first present a comparison of the regression results for equations including comparable historic and expectational variables. Then, the results for the most satisfactory expectational equations are shown and the stability of the coefficients over time is examined.

(a) Comparison of Regressions Using Historical and Expectational Variables

In Table 2 the results of regressions using only three variables calculated from readily available historical data are compared with regressions employing comparable expectations data.¹⁴ In panel A of Table 2, the price-earnings multiple is regressed on the historic ten-year growth rate of cash earnings (calculated as the geometric mean of first ratios), the dividend-payout ratio (averaged over the preceding seven years), and an instability index of earnings (calculated as the semi-deviation from a regression of earnings over the past ten years). It will be noted that generally about half of the variance in price-earnings multiples is explained by the regressions. The growth-rate variable is highly significant in each of the years covered. The calculated payout and risk

TABLE 1—VARIABLES USED IN VALUATION STUDY

P	End-of-year market price per share
D	Total dividends paid per share (adjusted to number of shares outstanding at year end)
E	Reported earnings per share (adjusted to exclude nonrecurring items)
$\overline{D/E}$	Average dividend-payout ratio over past 7 years
\overline{NE}	Average "normalized" earnings estimates of security analysts
\bar{g}_p	Average predicted future long-term growth rate of earnings per share, measured as an annual percentage rate of growth
g_H	Historic (10-year) growth rate of (cash) earnings per share measured as an annual percentage rate of growth
I_p	Predicted instability index of the future earnings stream
β	The slope of a regression of the annual returns from a company's shares on the annual returns from the market index
$I_{H,1}$	Calculated instability index of the historic earnings stream (semideviation of earnings around trend)
$I_{H,2}$	Calculated instability index of the historic operating earnings streams (semideviation of earnings plus financial fixed charges around trend)
\bar{E}_{t+1}	Average predicted earnings per share for the next year
$\frac{F}{E+F}$	Leverage variable (the ratio of fixed charges to earnings plus fixed charges)

¹⁴ It will be noted that the sample size for each regression was usually less than the total sample of 178 companies. Companies had to be dropped from the sample whenever historic or expectational data were unavailable or could not be computed. In addition whenever a company's calculated historic growth rate was negative, the firm was dropped from the sample. This was done to make the regressions based on historic data as comparable as possible to those based on expectations data, where no negative growth rates were projected.

TABLE 2—COMPARISON OF REGRESSIONS USING HISTORICAL
AND EXPECTATIONAL VARIABLES

A. REGRESSION RESULTS: HISTORIC VARIABLES						
$P/E = a_0 + a_1g_H + a_2D/\bar{E} + a_3I_{H,1}$						
Year	a_0	a_1	a_2	a_3	R^2	F
1961	13.65	+1.87	-.26	-.65	.50	51.27
		(.17)	(6.14)	(1.37)		
		10.72	-.04	-.47		
1962	8.92	+1.06	+6.90	-.77	.45	44.78
		(.10)	(3.28)	(.68)		
		10.90	2.10	-1.14		
1963	9.39	+1.33	+5.22	-.96	.49	51.31
		(.12)	(3.73)	(.81)		
		11.29	1.40	-1.19		
1964	10.88	+.95	+4.85	-.69	.36	32.16
		(.11)	(3.52)	(.71)		
		8.65	1.38	-.96		
1965	5.74	+1.52	+6.64	+.35	.65	98.65
		(.10)	(3.55)	(.77)		
		15.23	1.87	.46		
B. REGRESSION RESULTS: COMPARABLE EXPECTATIONS VARIABLES						
$P/E = a_0 + a_1\hat{g}_p + a_2D/\bar{N}\bar{E} + a_3I_p$						
Year	a_0	a_1	a_2	a_3	R^2	F
1961	4.73	+3.28	+2.05	-.82	.70	89.34
		(.23)	(4.33)	(.75)		
		14.47	.47	-1.09		
1962	11.06	+1.75	+.78	-1.61	.70	133.33
		(.13)	(2.47)	(.39)		
		13.99	.31	-4.11		
1963	2.94	+2.55	7.62	-.27	.75	174.51
		(.13)	(2.58)	(.39)		
		19.67	2.95	-.69		
1964	6.71	+2.05	+5.33	-.89	.75	168.46
		(.11)	(2.17)	(.36)		
		18.24	2.44	-2.48		
1965	.96	+2.74	+5.01	-.35	.85	317.52
		(.10)	(2.05)	(.30)		
		26.50	2.44	-1.14		

Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are standard errors and numbers below parentheses are t -values. Numbers below the F -values are degrees of freedom.

measures usually have their expected signs but are not significant.¹⁵

In panel B of Table 2, the average growth rates and other expectational variables collected from the participating firms are used to explain price-earnings multiples. All coefficients have their expected signs. Moreover, the fits are very close for cross-sectional empirical work and are much better than those obtained with the historical data. About three quarters of the variability of price-earnings ratios is explained by the regressions. We should also mention that better fits were obtained by using the average growth rates of all predictors than by employing forecasts of a single analyst. This suggests that our survey was useful in getting closer to what might be considered the expectations of a "representative" investor.

(b) *Regression Results Employing a Covariance Risk Measure*

In Table 3 we present regression results employing a covariance risk measure. It will be noted that β , the index of market conformance, has the right sign in all cases except for the 1961 regression employing expectations data. Although it is significant in only two of the five years, the general consistency of the signs would suggest that market values do tend to reflect measures of past covariance with the market. It is also interesting that β had a particularly strong influence on

¹⁵ As noted above, the positive sign on the dividend coefficient should not be interpreted as evidence that dividend policy can affect the value of the shares. This coefficient indicates only that a *ceteris paribus* change in dividend payout will increase the price of the shares. What the famous "dividend-irrelevancy" theorem of Modigliani and Miller says is that an increase in dividend payout (holding the firm's investment constant) will tend to reduce the growth rate of earnings per share since new shares will now have to be sold to make up for the extra funds paid out in dividends. A positive dividend coefficient is thus in no way inconsistent with the dividend-irrelevancy theorem.

price-earnings ratios at the end of 1962, following a large decline in stock prices. It would appear that investors particularly favor securities that tend to move relatively independently of the market during periods when the memory of sharply falling stock prices is clearly in mind.

Comparing Tables 2 and 3, the *t*-values associated with β tend to be slightly higher than those associated with either of the two previous risk variables.¹⁶ When a variable measuring expected short-term growth is introduced, however, the predicted instability index tends to be somewhat superior, being "significant" in four out of the five years (see Table 5). The variables β and I_p cannot be used together in the same regression, because the two variables are highly correlated, and both become insignificant.¹⁷

(c) *Regression Results Employing a Combination of Expectations and Historic Data*

In Table 4, we present regression results involving a combination of expectations and historic data. The price-normalized earnings ratio is employed as the dependent variable. Independent expectational variables include anticipations of short- and long-term growth, and the dividend payout expressed as a percent of normalized earnings. Historic variables were an instability index and a leverage variable. In these regressions, the instability index was calculated from a time-series of earnings plus fixed charges. This measure should represent the instability of operating earnings and may serve as an acceptable proxy for business risk. We also included a leverage variable, which should indicate the additional financial risk borne

¹⁶ While it should be noted that these comparisons are based on regressions using somewhat different numbers of observations, the conclusions presented hold also for comparisons based on the smaller sample of companies for which all data were available.

¹⁷ Correlation coefficients between β and I_p during the period studied are approximately 0.60.

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TABLE 3—REGRESSION RESULTS EMPLOYING A COVARIANCE RISK MEASURE

A. HISTORIC VARIABLES AND COVARIANCE MEASURE						
$P/E = a_0 + a_1 g_H + a_2 \bar{D}/\bar{E} + a_3 \beta$						
Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	R^2	F
1961	15.52	1.82	-1.75	-1.53	.49	52.60
		(0.17)	(6.14)	(1.34)		
		10.54	-0.29	-1.15		
1962	12.42	1.02	4.28	-2.87	.54	65.86
		(0.09)	(2.94)	(0.60)		
		11.38	1.46	-4.76		
1963	9.20	1.28	6.84	-1.21	.48	51.69
		(0.11)	(3.67)	(0.88)		
		11.19	1.87	-1.38		
1964	14.37	0.96	3.29	-3.54	.44	44.76
		(0.10)	(3.18)	(0.72)		
		9.36	1.03	-4.92		
1965	7.47	1.52	5.58	-0.95	.64	99.49
		(0.10)	(3.34)	(0.79)		
		15.30	1.67	-1.20		
B. COMPARABLE EXPECTATIONS VARIABLES AND COVARIANCE MEASURE						
$P/E = a_0 + a_1 \bar{g}_p + a_2 D/\bar{N}E + a_3 \beta$						
Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	R^2	F
1961	3.63	3.29	3.24	0.97	.74	132.82
		(0.19)	(4.47)	(1.09)		
		17.20	0.73	0.89		
1962	9.79	1.87	2.25	-2.65	.72	148.29
		(0.11)	(2.23)	(0.47)		
		16.88	1.01	-5.69		
1963	3.47	2.57	7.17	-0.84	.75	176.82
		(0.12)	(2.47)	(0.61)		
		21.38	2.90	-1.37		
1964	6.16	2.10	5.87	-1.41	.76	184.63
		(0.10)	(2.04)	(0.53)		
		21.40	2.88	-2.67		
1965	0.25	2.86	5.01	-0.47	.86	352.19
		(0.10)	(2.00)	(0.49)		
		29.14	2.50	-0.96		

Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are standard errors and numbers below parentheses are t-values. Numbers below the F-values are degrees of freedom.

by the shareholders. The specific measure employed was the ratio of fixed charges per share to earnings plus fixed charges per share.¹⁸ In addition, a dummy variable

¹⁸ For a discussion of the problems involved in using

was included that took the value unity for utility companies and zero for industrials. This variable was introduced to account

the debt-equity ratio itself, see A. Barges and R. Wipperfurth.

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TABLE 4—REGRESSION RESULTS EMPLOYING A COMBINATION OF EXPECTATIONS AND HISTORIC DATA

$$P/\overline{NE} = a_0 + a_1 \bar{g}_p + a_2 \bar{E}_{t+1}/\overline{NE} + a_3 D/\overline{NE} + a_4 F/(E+F) + a_5 Dum + a_6 I_{H,2}$$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	\hat{a}_4	\hat{a}_5	\hat{a}_6	R ²	F
1961	-41.19	+2.88	+44.88	+5.53	-12.34	+1.79	-4.93	.85	102.98
		(.20) 14.07	(5.24) 8.57	(4.53) 1.22	(4.06) -3.04	(1.69) 1.05	(9.21) -.54		(6;106)
1962	-1.41	+1.68	+9.89	+2.60	-7.53	+4.46	-7.69	.78	74.04
		(.13) 13.16	(2.72) 3.63	(2.50) 1.04	(2.07) -3.65	(.92) 4.87	(4.75) -1.62		(6;129)
1963	-12.94	+2.41	+15.29	+8.96	-6.20	+.71	-5.70	.81	90.72
		(.14) 17.12	(2.99) 5.11	(2.79) 3.21	(2.33) -2.66	(1.04) .69	(5.33) -1.07		(6;129)
1964	-10.91	+1.89	+14.31	+7.70	-3.39	+3.62	+4.59	.80	83.42
		(.12) 15.65	(2.02) 7.09	(2.45) 3.14	(2.21) -1.53	(.94) 3.86	(5.28) (.87)		(6;128)
1965	-15.55	+2.64	+20.05	-2.04	-7.81	+2.64	-17.59	.84	118.41
		(.14) 18.69	(1.99) 10.09	(3.01) -.68	(2.61) -2.99	(1.12) 2.37	(6.33) -2.78		(6;128)

Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are standard errors and numbers below parentheses are *t*-values. Numbers below the *F*-values are degrees of freedom.

for differences in risk between the two classes of companies not captured by our other risk variables.

As can be seen from the table, the combination of historical and expectational variables works remarkably well in accounting for the structure of share prices. Most significant were the coefficients of the short- and long-term growth rates. It should be noted that while the coefficient of the "operating-risk" variable (the semi-deviation of earnings plus fixed charges around trend) usually was not statistically significant and had the "wrong" sign in 1964, the coefficient of the financial-risk variable (our measure of leverage) always had the "correct" sign and was significant in all but one year. This provides support for the Modigliani-Miller proposition that the required rate of return on equity should be an increasing function of leverage.

(d) Regression Results Employing Expectations Data Alone

In Table 5 we present additional regres-

sion results for the equations employing only expectations variables. The price-normalized earnings ratio is the dependent variable. Independent variables include expectations of short- and long-term growth, the dividend-payout ratio, and the expected instability index.¹⁹

We find that the long-term growth variable contributes most to an explanation of the structure of earnings multiples. The growth coefficient has a *t*-value over 13 in every year. The coefficient of short-term growth ($\bar{E}_{t+1}/\overline{NE}$) is also positive and highly significant. The coefficients of the payout ratio and the risk proxy are positive and negative, respectively, as ex-

¹⁹ Fortunately, the correlations between the independent variables tended to be relatively low in all years. A sample correlation matrix (for the 1964 data) is presented below

	\bar{g}_p	$\bar{E}_{t+1}/\overline{NE}$	I_p	D/\overline{NE}
\bar{g}_p	1.00			
$\bar{E}_{t+1}/\overline{NE}$.28	1.00		
I_p	-.32	.09	1.00	
D/\overline{NE}	-.34	-.07	-.37	1.00

TABLE 5—REGRESSION RESULTS: EMPLOYING EXPECTATIONS DATA

$$P/\overline{NE} = a_0 + a_1 \bar{g}_p + a_2 \bar{E}_{t+1}/\overline{NE} + a_3 D/\overline{NE} + a_4 I_p$$

$$R_{t+1} = a + b \left[\frac{P/\overline{NE} - \hat{P}/\overline{NE}}{\hat{P}/\overline{NE}} \right]$$

Year	\hat{a}_0	\hat{a}_1	\hat{a}_2	\hat{a}_3	\hat{a}_4	R^2	F	\hat{b}	R^2	F
1961	-27.96	+2.91 (.21) 13.56	+31.78 (5.76) 5.51	+4.57 (3.96) 1.15	-.58 (.70) -.83	.77	80.39 (4,96)	-.25 (.08) -3.08	.09	9.47 (1,99)
1962	+3.42	+1.61 (.12) 13.05	+6.88 (2.87) 2.40	+3.21 (2.32) 1.39	-2.20 (.41) -5.44	.79	129.14 (4,138)	.21 (.11) 1.93	.03	3.73 (1,141)
1963	-11.33	+2.29 (.14) 16.30	+15.11 (2.82) 5.35	+8.11 (2.70) 3.01	-1.14 (.39) -2.88	.80	139.82 (4,137)	-.20 (.08) -2.55	.04	6.48 (1,140)
1964	-9.29	+1.87 (.14) 13.05	+15.20 (1.94) 7.83	+7.03 (2.40) 2.92	-1.13 (.41) -2.75	.78	120.00 (4,134)	-.00 (.15) -.00	.00	.00 (1,137)
1965	-11.15	+2.42 (.12) 19.59	+13.78 (1.85) 7.46	+4.22 (2.34) 1.81	-.81 (.38) -2.14	.83	162.21 (4,136)	-.01 (.10) -.11	.00	.01 (1,139)

Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are standard errors and numbers below parentheses are *t*-values. Numbers below the *F*-values are degrees of freedom.

pected, and are usually significant. While Tables 4 and 5 are not comparable because of different degrees of freedom, the regressions in Table 5 tend to produce slightly better fits adjusted for degrees of freedom.

It might be argued that the expectations data used as independent variables in the valuation equation may strongly reflect the P/\overline{NE} ratio and, thus, we are in effect including the same variable on both sides of the valuation equation. The growth rates that we have collected are "supposedly" independent of market prices. The security analysts who have furnished the data claim that these estimates are ones that they use to calculate an "intrinsic" value of the shares, which is then compared with actual market prices in arriving at purchase or sale recommendations. In point of fact, however, the forecasted growth rates may still be strongly influenced by the market earnings multiples themselves.

Even if the anticipations data are strongly influenced by current market prices, however, this should not interfere with the basic purpose of this paper, which is to gain an understanding of the structure of share prices. The point is that the anticipations we have collected may simply be the security analysts' estimates of what the "average opinion" will continue to believe the reasonable expectations will be. The point is, of course, the familiar one about the Keynes beauty contest where the rational contestant would not pick those girls that he himself found prettiest, nor even those he deemed most likely to catch the fancy of the other contestants, but rather those that he anticipated the other contestants would believe the average opinion would consider prettiest.

Thus, if the P/\overline{NE} ratio rises, and the security analyst believes that such a rise will continue to be justified by the average opinion, he may simply adjust his antici-

pated growth rate to a level that would justify the earnings multiple. In any case, what our valuation equation will measure is the relationship between growth rates and price-earnings multiples that security analysts believe the average opinion will continue to justify. Even in this event, our empirical results should still be useful in explaining and describing the structure of share prices at any given time.

(e) *Changes in the Valuation Relationship Over Time*

It is of some interest to examine whether the coefficients of the valuation equations are the same in each year or whether they change. This is of considerable importance to those who wish to use valuation equations in connection with assigned values of the independent variables to estimate the intrinsic worth of a security. Constancy of the relationship is also important if a firm is to seek to follow policies that will maximize the value of its shares. On the other hand, there is nothing in the theory of valuation to indicate that the equation need be constant over time.

An inspection of Table 5 indicates that the coefficients of our equation change considerably from year to year and in a manner that is consistent with the changing standards of value in vogue at the time. At the end of 1961 "growth stocks" were in high favor, and it is not surprising to find that the coefficient of the growth rate (2.91) is highest in this year. During 1962, however, there was a conspicuous change in the structure of share prices that was popularly called "the revaluation of growth stocks." This revaluation is reflected in the decline of the growth-rate coefficient for 1962 to 1.61, its lowest value for any of the five years. A similar set of observations can be made for the coefficient of the short-term growth rate (\bar{E}_{t+1}/NE). On the other hand, the risk index has its most negative influence on

earnings multiples in 1962, whereas the coefficient was smallest in 1961, and, while negative, it was not significantly different from zero.

In actually testing whether the coefficients of the valuation equation were the same over time, it had to be recognized that the residuals in different years might not be independent. Indeed, it is shown in the bottom panel of Table 6, which we will discuss below, that the residuals are fairly highly correlated. As a result, Arnold Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression version of Aitken's generalized least-squares model is appropriate, although it had to be modified to take account of the fact that we did not have observations for all corporations in all years.²⁰ Using this procedure, the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in each year was rejected beyond the .0001 level.

IV. *Use of the Valuation Model for Security Selection*

One of the most intriguing questions concerning empirical valuation models is whether they can be used to aid investors in security selection. The empirical valuation equation shows us, at a moment in time, the average way in which variables such as growth, payout, and risk influence market price-earnings multiples. Given the values of these variables applicable to any specific company, we can compute an estimated normal price-earnings ratio based on the empirical valuation equation. It has been suggested that securities may be selected by comparing the actual market price-earnings ratio with the normal

²⁰ In using this procedure, the covariance matrix of the disturbances was estimated from the single-equation regression residuals. This procedure also produced more efficient estimates of the coefficients of the individual equations. Since these differed but little from those shown in Table 5, and had the same implications, we shall not present them here. The test reported is an *F*-test (asymptotically), which uses the vectors of independent and dependent variables, following transformation, in the usual way.

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TABLE 6—ANALYSIS OF LACK OF FORECASTING SUCCESS

Description	Coefficient of Determination Residuals against 1964 Return	F-Value (and Degrees of Freedom)
1963 Valuation equation with 1963 predictions	.04	6.48 (1; 140)
1964 Valuation equation with 1963 data. (Assume that next year's valuation relationship is known.)	.08	12.15 (1; 140)
1963 Valuation equation with realized growth rates. (Assumes perfect foresight regarding future long-term growth and next year's earnings.)	.12	18.140 (1; 14)
1963 Valuation equation with 1964 predictions. (Assumes perfect foresight regarding market expectations next year.)	.24	41.75 (1; 140)

Correlations of Residuals over Years	
Description	Coefficient of Determination
1962 vs. 1961	.46
1963 vs. 1962	.24
1964 vs. 1963	.13
1965 vs. 1964	.35

multiple predicted by the valuation equation. If the actual earnings multiple is greater (less) than the normal earnings multiple, we designate the security as "overpriced" ("underpriced") and recommend sale (purchase). Such a procedure was employed by Whitbeck and Kisor, who claimed that an underpriced group of securities selected by the above procedure consistently outperformed an overpriced group during the early 1960's.

Of course, even on a priori grounds, it is possible to think of many reasons why such a procedure would prove fruitless. For example, if high P/E (high growth rate) stocks tended to be overpriced during one particular period, the estimated growth-rate coefficient will be larger (by assumption) than that which is warranted. However, the recommended procedure will not indicate that high P/E stocks are overpriced because normal market-de-

termined earnings multiples for these securities will themselves be higher than is warranted. Nevertheless, in view of the positive results reported by Whitbeck and Kisor, it would seem desirable to attempt to replicate their experiment with our data.

The results of some of our experiments are shown in the right-hand columns of Table 5. We measured the degree of over- or underpricing as the ratio of the residual from the prediction equation to the predicted earnings multiple, i.e., $[(P/\overline{NE} - \hat{P}/\overline{NE})/(\hat{P}/\overline{NE})]$. A percentage measure was chosen in view of the considerable variance in actual earnings multiples. If the model is useful in measuring underpricing, then underpriced securities, according to this criterion, ought to "outperform" overpriced issues over some subsequent period. We picked one year as the appropriate horizon and measured

subsequent returns, in the normal manner, as

$$(5) \quad R_{t+1} = \frac{P_{t+1} - P_t + D_{t+1}}{P_t}$$

If the empirical valuation model is successful in selecting securities for purchase, the percentage residual (degree of overvaluation) from the valuation equation ought to be negatively related to these subsequent returns. As the table indicates, in only three of the five years for which this experiment was performed was the relationship negative, and the degree of association was extremely low. In the other two years, there was either a positive or zero relationship. Supplementary tests conducted by industry and other groupings produced similar results. It should also be noted that the residuals from the equations employing historical data and from equations combining historical and expectational data were no more successful in predicting subsequent performance. Moreover, these results were unaltered when the subsequent returns were measured over alternative time periods such as one quarter ahead or two or more years ahead.

In Table 6 some statistics are presented which may be helpful in interpreting the reason for our predictive failures. We note that using the 1963 valuation equation as an example, the percentage degree of under- or overpricing is not highly correlated with subsequent returns. The coefficient of determination is only .04. It is possible, however, to isolate four reasons for our lack of forecasting success.

1) The first reason is that the valuation relationship changes over time. We might be unable to select truly underpriced securities because by the next year (the end of the horizon period) the norms of valuation have been significantly altered. Thus, what was cheap on the basis of 1963's relationship may no longer repre-

sent good value on the basis of the 1964 relationship. To test how important this factor might be, we performed the following experiment: We assumed that investors knew at the end of 1963 exactly what the market valuation relationship would be in 1964, i.e., we assumed perfect foresight regarding next year's valuation equation. Then, on the basis of the 1964 valuation equation, we utilized the 1963 data to calculate warranted P/\overline{NE} multiples, which could then be compared with actual multiples to determine whether each security was appropriately priced. Correlating the percentage residuals with subsequent returns, we found that the coefficient of determination doubled, 8 percent of the variance in subsequent returns was explained.

2) A second reason for lack of success might be the quality of the expectations data employed. As was indicated in our 1968 article several of the growth-rate forecasts used in the present study were in fact shown to be rather poor predictors of realized earnings growth. To determine how much better off we would be with more accurate forecasts, we assumed perfect foresight regarding the future long-term growth rate of the company and regarding the next year's anticipated earnings. Thus, the 1963 empirical valuation equation was used to determine normal value, but in place of the variable $\tilde{E}_{04}/\overline{NE}_{63}$ we substituted the variable $E_{\text{actual } 04}/\overline{NE}_{63}$, and in place of \tilde{g}_p we substituted the realized long-term growth rate through the end of 1966. Using these realized data to determine warranted price-earnings multiples, the percentage residuals therefrom were correlated with future returns. As expected, an even greater improvement in forecasting future returns was found. The R^2 rises to .12.

3) As a further experiment, perfect foresight was assumed not regarding the

actual rate of growth of earnings but rather regarding what the market expectations of growth would be next year. Calculating the degree of overpricing as before, we find a much greater improvement in prediction of future returns, 24 percent of the variability of future returns is explained, compared with 4 percent in the original experiment. We conclude that if one wants to explain returns over a one-year horizon it is far more important to know what the market will think the growth rate of earnings will be next year rather than to know the realized long-term growth rate. Of course this observation brings us back to Keynes' newspaper contest again. What matters is not one's personal criteria of beauty but what the average opinion will expect the average opinion to think is beautiful at the close of the contest.

4) A final source of error is that the valuation model does not capture all the significant determinants of value for each individual company. Despite our success in accounting for approximately 80 percent of the variance in market price-earnings multiples, there are likely to be special features applicable to many individual companies that cannot be captured quantitatively. For example, it turned out that the stock of Reynolds Tobacco always appeared to be underpriced. The reason for this is, of course, not difficult to conjecture. There is a risk of government sanctions against the tobacco industry, which weighs heavily in the minds of investors, but which is not related to the instability measure of Reynolds' earnings we have employed.

To indicate how important this problem of omitted variables might be, the residuals from our valuation equations from year to year were correlated. If certain factors specific to individual companies are consistently missing, the residuals from the valuation equations can be expected to be

positively correlated over time. As the bottom half of Table 6 indicates, the residuals are significantly correlated over time. Thus, despite our success with expectations data in estimating a valuation equation which has far more explanatory ability than those based on historic information, it is clear that certain systematic valuation factors are still missing from the analysis.²¹ Consequently, it cannot be said that all deviations of actual from predicted price-earnings ratios are simply manifestations of temporary over- or underpricing.

V. Concluding Comments

We have demonstrated that it is possible to explain, for several successive years, a large percentage of the variability in market price-earnings ratios with the variables included in this study and the specification suggested by the very simple model in Section I. The analysis was not successful, however, in isolating underpriced securities that might be expected to have above-average future returns. Needless to say, there are many additional factors that should be considered in a full valuation study. While it does not seem likely that this further work will provide direct answers to the problem of security selection, it may well shed further light on the logic of market valuations.

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²¹ It would be possible, of course, to incorporate some sort of firm-effect variable to capture the systematic portion of the under- or overpricing. Such a procedure was attempted. As a firm effect we utilized the difference between the last year's actual $P/\bar{N}E$ multiple and $\hat{P}/\bar{N}E$, the predicted earnings multiple. As might be expected, this procedure served to improve the goodness of fit substantially, but it did not affect the magnitude of the other regression coefficients. Unfortunately, however, it was not successful in improving the forecasts of future returns.

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The Effects of New Equity Sales Upon Utility Share Prices

By RICHARD H. PETTWAY*

Public knowledge of a forthcoming sale of new equity by a utility company often precipitates a decline in the market price of that equity and continues to impact share prices after the sale has taken place. Such price changes are part of the real cost of selling the new issue. The market pressure costs of new equity capital have been the subject of much speculation in utility rate cases, but have received little detailed study. The author of this article has made such a study and here presents a quantitative analysis of price-return movements encountered by utility stocks in the market, after first defining market pressure as it applies particularly to the regulated utility environment. He concludes that investors clearly view a new sale of equity shares with disfavor and regulators, as well as company managements, should be concerned with the resultant decline in utility stock prices.

WHEN a public utility decides to sell a new issue of equity capital and publicly discloses this information, share prices are thought to decline. Often these selling firms ask for an adjustment to their costs of equity capital for the effects of this market pressure upon share prices. The subsequent argument and debate about the magnitude of an adjustment for market pressure at rate hearings is well known.

The electric utility industry has been one of the largest issuers of new equity shares during the past twenty-five years. Therefore, it is surprising that there has not been much more research to determine the magnitude of market pressure of these numerous new equity sales in this industry. The objective of this article is to report on the results of an analysis of 368 equity sales by 73 different electric utilities from January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1980. The analysis will measure two ef-

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Richard H. Pettway is a professor of finance, in the Graduate School of Business at the University of Florida. For the past ten years he has been associated with the Public Utility Research Center at the University of Florida. He has written books, monographs, and articles and has made appearances as an expert witness before public utility commissions specializing in the financial and economic problems and solutions. **Dr. Pettway** received his BBA, MBA, and PhD degrees in finance and statistics from the University of Texas-Austin.

fects of new common equity sales upon share prices: market pressure and sales effect. Specifically, this article will determine the magnitude of market pressure defined as the effect of the sale upon share prices which reduces the funds received by the issuing company at the sale date, and will determine the size of the sales effect defined as the total effect of the sale upon share prices from before the announcement until after the sale.

There have been studies into the size of market pressure defined as a temporary price decline in share values when a large block of shares is said to be "overhanging" the market. However, most of this research concentrates upon the price effects of new issues of industrial companies sold in the primary markets or of large blocks of existing stock sold in the secondary market [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9]** This literature defines market pressure as the amount of recovery in market prices after the issue has been sold. A review of this literature indicates either no market pressure existing in large block trades of outstanding shares, or only a small amount of pressure associated with primary market sales of new issues.

Under utility regulation, the concern is with a different definition of market pressure. Market pressure in the public utility industry is generally defined as the decline in prices while the issue is still overhanging, before it is sold. The main question is how much did the utility's stock decline in the secondary market associated with the sales announcement to the date of sale. This decline is a real cost of selling the new issue as the firm will receive only the reduced price at the sales date. An

**Numbers in brackets refer to the list of references at the end of the article.

article by Bowyer and Yawitz (BY) [3] measured the decline in share prices between the announcement date and the sales date of 278 new equity issues of public utilities from 1973 through 1976. But that research had some obvious problems which are corrected by this study.

The first problem with BY is their definition of the announcement date (AD). They defined this critical AD as the initial Securities and Exchange Commission filing date of the issue prospectus. This may not be the true AD as often public utilities make prior announcements of their new issues to state public service commissions, to investors in the *Irving Trust Calendar*, to underwriters, or to financial analysts much earlier than the SEC filing date. This study redefines the critical announcement date through a detailed questionnaire survey of electric utility companies. Further, an analysis of price changes prior to the established announcement date for each issue will be made to determine the actual impact of new equity sales upon share prices. It is very important to measure the complete decline in market prices associated with the information about the forthcoming sale of new equity shares.

Another problem with the BY study concerns its authors' use of the Dow-Jones utility index to measure differential declines in share prices and returns. The use of this index is flawed for at least four reasons. First, the number of companies included is small, 15 firms, and only 11 are electric companies; whereas four are gas transmission and distribution companies. The inclusion of the gas companies raises serious questions concerning the similarities of risks between electric utilities tested and the companies which make up their comparison index. Second, their index does not capture the dividend portion of the return and thus only measures the changes in prices without adjusting for dividends paid. In the electric power industry, the dividend yields tend to be a high portion of the total return and the omission of dividends could impart a bias to the index. Third, if there is evidence of market pressure in new sales of equity shares by utilities as BY found, then it is certain that this market pressure is contained also in share prices of Dow-Jones utility index firms when they sold new equity shares. The effect of using an index which contains market pressure to measure the size of market pressure of a particular firm which sold new equity naturally will understate the true amount of market pressure which is present. Fourth, if utilities are impacted differently from unregulated firms, there may be an additional "industrial effect" which will not be observed by looking only at other utilities rather than a broadly based comparison index of share prices and returns.

Finally, there are some technical problems with the way that BY measured the decline in stock returns or market pressure. These problems concern the use of average residual returns versus a more correct measure (geometric residual returns) and the way BY handled underwriting costs.

Data

A questionnaire survey was conducted of the 93 New

York Stock Exchange-listed, investor-owned electric utilities from which 79 usable company replies were obtained for a response rate of over 78 per cent. Each company provided all identifiable costs and critical dates for each new equity capital sale made by the firm from January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1980. The survey results contain data on 368 actual equity sales over the eight-year survey period. The data represent more than five new equity sales per company on average over the study period. The size of these equity sales ranged from \$4.7 million to \$198 million with a mode sale value in a range between \$30 and \$49.9 million per issue. The frequency of the issues over the eight years of the survey shows that 1975 was the most popular year followed by 1976 and 1980. Yet, the individual year variation was not dramatic as the range over the eight years was from a low of 37 issues in 1974 to a high of 64 issues in 1975. Eighty-two per cent of the sales were through negotiated underwriting, 16 per cent through competitive bidding, and 2 per cent through rights offerings. See [7] for a thorough review of the data and details on the flotation costs of these issues.

Data on realized share returns including dividends for each company were obtained on a daily basis for a period which began sixty-five trading days before the announcement date and ended thirty trading days after the sale date (SD). Thus, company returns were obtained from a fixed period prior to the AD through a fixed period after the SD for each issue. It is best to think of these data sets as 368 separate arrays of returns. Because the interim time period between the AD and the subsequent SD varied for each issue, the number of return observations in each array is different. Each collected array of returns is unique to the particular announcement and issue dates and is not impacted by other equity sales of the same company.

Methodology

In order to control for risk, to adjust for movements in general prices and returns, and to reduce estimating bias, a two-stage regression process was used to measure the effects of new equity sales upon share returns and prices. First, during the estimating period, the market regression model (1) was applied to a firm's daily equity returns over a uniform estimating period which began sixty-five trading days prior to the AD and ended fifteen days before the AD for each issue. The market regression model asserts that:

$$\bar{R}_{i,t} = \hat{a}_i + \hat{B}_i \bar{R}_{m,t} + \hat{e}_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where $\bar{R}_{i,t}$ is the daily return including dividends of the issuing company for equity issue i — i.e., one to 368 — at time t ; where daily returns of the issuing company concerning issue i are defined as $(P_{i,t} + D_{i,t} - P_{i,t-1}) / (P_{i,t-1})$; P is the price and D is the dividend per share; $\bar{R}_{m,t}$ is the daily return at time t on a market portfolio for comparison; \hat{a}_i and \hat{B}_i are the estimated parameters of the market model; and $\hat{e}_{i,t}$ is the error term of the model.

In order to make comparisons, an electric utility portfolio index of returns was created over the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1980, containing an equal investment in each of 73 electric companies which sold equity during the period. It is a daily returns index including dividends and provides the average return for each day on a portfolio consisting of an equal dollar investment in each of the 73 electric utilities.

Thus, the first stage uses an estimating period of fifty trading days, approximately two and one-half months, to determine the parameters of the market regression model. The second stage then applies these estimated parameters to the returns series during the subsequent test period after the estimating period in each array in order to calculate the expected returns for each company on each issue i using:

$$\hat{R}_{i,t} = \hat{a}_i + \hat{b}_i R_{m,t} \quad (2)$$

where $\hat{R}_{i,t}$ is the expected return for the issuing company associated with issue i at time t . Then residual returns during the test period are obtained by comparing the actual versus the predicted returns using:

$$\hat{R}_{i,t} - \hat{R}_{i,t} = \hat{u}_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

where $\hat{u}_{i,t}$ is the daily residual return of the issuing company for issue i at time t .

In order to display these residual returns properly, a decision must be made of how to combine the individual company residuals centered on a common date during the test period. The method of combining residuals used by Bowyer and Yawitz is called cumulative average residual or CAR. This method would find the average residual return of all issues on a specific day relative to the common AD or SD and would accumulate these averages over the period in an additive way. A different way of combining residual returns, average geometric residual return (AGRR), was chosen for this study. It is a theoretically better measure of residual returns over time than CAR. AGRR does not use the average residual returns on a specific date but takes the individual issue residual ($\hat{u}_{i,t}$) from (3) and converts it into a price relative for each t and then forms a geometric return series by multiplying successive price relatives from fourteen days prior to AD to the end of the residual data for each company using formula (4). Thus, a geometric return series which precisely measures the change in investment worth for each individual issue is created. At any point in time relative to the common dates, AD and SD, the AGRR was determined as the numeric average of the geometric returns up to that point in time of all issues using formula (5).

$$GRR_{i,T} = \prod_{t=1}^T (1 + \hat{u}_{i,t}) \quad (4)$$

$$AGRR_T = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N GRR_{i,T} \quad (5)$$

where i is the issue number, t is time, T is the specific point in time ($T=1, 2, 3, \dots$ total number of observations in the test period which was from fourteen days before the AD until thirty trading days after the SD), and N is the number of issues. For further details concerning the specifics of the methodology employed see [8].

In observing the pattern of these residuals over the test period, it is important to be able to use common definitions to describe their movements. "Market pressure" is defined as the decline of share prices and average geometric residual returns from fourteen days before the AD until the SD. "Sales effect" is defined as the change in share prices and AGRRs from fourteen days before the AD until thirty trading days after the SD. This sales effect would be the net change over the entire test period from before the announcement until well after the sale.

Price-Return Movements

Because the number of days between the AD and the SD are not identical for each issue, arrays of residual returns had to be centered on two separate common dates. The first common date is the AD and then data are centered on the common SD. To begin measuring any price effects of these new equity sales, the study first observed movements in residual returns when the data are centered on the common AD.


Common Announcement Date

Figure 1 illustrates the AGRRs derived from the use of the electric utility market index of returns for comparison.* The derived residuals are accumulated for 128 days starting fourteen days before the announcement date. All issues are centered on the AD. The trend of the AGRRs are clearly downward and below one during the entire span of 128 days. The downward trend is most noticeable immediately before and around the AD and is then followed by a period of relative stability. During this initial decline, share prices had fallen between one per cent and 1.4 per cent. The downward trend resumes again beginning about sixty-seven days after the AD. The latter downward trend may be associated with the SD, but since these data are centered on the AD, the SD did not occur at a common point in time in the data. Further, because SD is not a common point in the data, the amount of market pressure cannot be measured from the data in this format.

Panel 1 of the accompanying table contains statistical summaries of changes in AGRRs over the entire period shown in Figure 1. It is clear from the data that the change over the 128-day period centered on the AD was a negative 3.019 per cent, indicating a sales effect of this

*If there were no effects of new equity sales upon electric utilities which sold new shares, then the AGRRs shown on Figure 1 would be very close to one over time. A detrimental effect and a relative decline in share prices would be represented as a decline in AGRRs below one. A favorable effect would be represented as an increase in AGRRs. Also notice that the x-axis displays time with negative numbers as days before the AD and positive numbers as days after the AD. The AD, or centering date, is designated as zero.

FIGURE 1
 AGRR CENTERED ON ANNOUNCEMENT DATE
 (UTILITY INDEX)



magnitude. Thus, comparing the returns over the same time period of an electric utility which sold new equity shares with returns of a portfolio of electric companies which also sold equity during the eight-year study period, there appears to have been a substantial and significant decline or sales effect of -3 per cent. There appear to be two periods of rapid declines; one just before and around the AD and another which appears to begin about sixty-seven days after the AD. Measuring the initial decline during a period from fourteen days before the AD to fourteen days after the AD, the specific decline was -1.2 per cent. This first major decline which begins before the AD suggests that the market was either anticipating the new equity sale or obtaining infor-

mation about the new equity sale just prior to the public announcement.

Because of the decline in these residuals, it is clear that the market considered the potential new equity sale as detrimental to the future prospects of the current equity holders of the selling firm. Since the decline begins before the AD, this article measures more precisely the total decline in share prices than did the work of Bowyer and Yawitz.

Common Sales Date

Figure 2 shows the AGRRs using the electric utility returns index for comparison with all issues centered on the SD. This plot is clearly one whose trend is also downward across the entire time period, although it appears not to begin its major decline until eighty-five to ninety days prior to the SD.

In Panel 2 of the table are found the summary statistics describing the magnitudes of the AGRRs shown on Figure 2. The changes or sales effect during the period from fourteen days before the AD to after the SD over 147 days was -2.041 per cent.

Panel 3 of the table contains the magnitudes of AGRRs shown on Figure 2 but stopping at the SD. This decline in relative share prices and returns, called market pressure, is caused by the equity sale and is the discount required to sell the new issue. These costs of new equity issues were 1.893 per cent on average. Thus, market prices of shares of electric utilities which sold new equity declined by about 1.9 per cent from before the AD until the SD over 104 days. This is the decline in price that the firm did not receive when it sold new equity shares at the SD and is the market pressure of the new equity issue.


EFFECTS OF NEW EQUITY SALES OF UTILITIES UPON SHARE PRICES
 CHANGES IN THE AVERAGE GEOMETRIC RESIDUAL RETURNS

368 New Equity Issues of 73 Electric Utilities from
 January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1980

Using the Utility Index

Measurements	<i>Using the Utility Index</i>		
	<i>Panel 1</i> Centered on AD (Sales Effect)	<i>Panel 2</i> Centered on SD (Sales Effect)	<i>Panel 3</i> Centered and Ending on SD (Market Pressure)
Change over the Period	-3.019%	-2.041%	-1.893%
Length of Period (Days)	128	147	104
Change from -14 AD to +14 AD Length of Period (Days)	-1.170%		
	29		

FIGURE 2
 AGRR CENTERED ON SALE DATE
 (UTILITY INDEX)



Summary and Conclusions

When electric utilities sold new equity shares between January 1, 1973, and December 31, 1980, the share prices of these companies were depressed downward because of the sale. This downward movement or market pressure measured from before the announcement date to the sales date of the new issue was -1.9 per cent when compared with returns of other electric utilities which sold new equity regularly. Further, a sales effect ranging from -3 per cent to -2 per cent was found over the period from before the announcement date until after the sales date depending upon whether the data were centered on the AD or on the SD.

These averages are conservative and the minimum estimated average declines as they were derived from using a return index of comparison (electric utility) which itself contains the effects of market pressure. Further, the use of another index of return for comparison which was composed of regulated and unregulated firms would substantially raise these average costs. (In fact, if the comparison were to be made against the return of all equities listed on the New York and American stock exchanges over the same time period, the average estimate for market pressure would rise to -3 per cent and the

average estimates for sales effect would rise to -4.4 per cent centered on the AD to -3.6 per cent centered on the SD. See [8] for details.)

The sizeable sales effect over the entire period from before the announcement date to after the sales date using the portfolio of electric companies for comparison provides direct evidence that share prices of electric utilities which sell new equity continue to decline after the sale has taken place. This condition may be explained as the impact of other factors than market pressure alone upon share prices. Perhaps some of these factors are due to the investors' perceptions of increased dilution problems caused by regulatory lag and regulatory risk associated with these public utilities not being allowed a rate of return on new equity equal to the investors' required rate of return over the eight-year survey period.

Even though the exact causes are not known precisely, it is definitely clear that investors view the new sale of equity shares with disfavor and that the new equity sale results in a substantial decline in equity prices. Public utility regulators should be concerned with these impacts of new equity sales upon share prices and returns and attempt to make proper adjustments in the allowed rate of return to offset or eliminate these effects in the future.

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Utilities Raise Their Capital Appropriations

The nation's investor-owned utilities appropriated \$7.2 billion (seasonally adjusted) for new plant and equipment in the final quarter of 1983, up 25 per cent over the unusually low figure recorded in the third quarter, the Conference Board reported in April. Both the gas and electric utilities shared in this fourth-quarter gain. (Capital appropriations are authorizations to spend money in the future for new plant and equipment. Appropriations are the first step in the capital investment process, preceding the ordering of equipment, the letting of construction contracts, and finally the actual expenditures. Appropriations are considered to be a leading indicator for capital spending.)

Electric utility appropriations rose to \$5.8 billion in the fourth quarter, their first quarterly increase since the third quarter of 1982. Cancellations of previously approved projects were widespread, however, amounting to \$2.7 billion in the final quarter of 1983.

Gas utility appropriations climbed to \$1.4 billion in the fourth quarter, a 68 per cent jump over the third quarter. It was the highest quarterly total recorded last year. For the full year, however, the gas utilities appropriated only \$4.4 billion, down by a third from 1982, and canceled a record \$1.3 billion worth of earlier-approved projects.

Actual capital spending by the investor-owned utilities fell to \$8.3 billion in the fourth quarter, an 8 per cent dip from the third quarter. The electric utilities accounted for all of the fourth-quarter decline. For 1983 as a whole, the electric utilities spent a record \$32.2 billion on new plant and equipment, up 3 per cent over 1982. Gas utility expenditures amounted to \$3.5 billion in 1983, down 30 per cent from 1982.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR RAISING CAPITAL

Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings

Clifford W SMITH, Jr *

*Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester,
Rochester, NY 14627 U S A*

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This paper provides an analysis of the choice of method for raising additional equity capital by listed firms. Examination of expenses reported to the SEC indicates that rights offerings involve significantly lower costs, yet underwriters are employed in over 90 percent of the offerings. The underwriting industry, finance textbooks, and corporate proxy statements offer several justifications for the use of underwriters. However, estimates of the magnitudes of these arguments indicate that they are insufficient to justify the additional costs of the use of underwriters. The use of underwriters thus appears to be inconsistent with rational, wealth-maximizing behavior by the owners of the firm. The paper concludes with an examination of alternate explanations of the observed choice of financing method.

1. Introduction and summary

In this paper I examine an apparent paradox. Based on a comparison of costs, simple finance theory suggests that listed firms should use rights offerings to raise additional equity capital, rather than employing underwriters. Yet the majority of firms choose underwritten offerings, rather than rights offerings.

In an underwritten offering, underwriters contract to purchase shares from the issuing firm at a price usually set within 24 hours of the offering, and then resell the shares to the public. In a rights offering the shareholder receives a right from the firm giving him the option to purchase new shares for each share owned. In section 2, I show that with the proper specification of the subscription price, the proceeds of a rights offering are identical to the proceeds of an underwritten offering.

Not identical, however, are costs. In section 3, I examine the out-of-pocket costs of underwritten and rights offerings reported to the Securities and Exchange

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Commission for issues registered under the Securities Act of 1933 between January 1971 and December 1975. Rights offerings are significantly less expensive. I also examine additional out-of-pocket expenses associated with both types of offerings. These include extras (options sold to underwriters), unreported expenses such as employee compensation, and the costs of rights offerings imposed directly on the owners of the firm. With these costs considered, I find rights offerings still are less expensive than underwritten offerings.

It has been suggested that selling efforts by underwriters raise stock prices while rights offerings lower them. In section 4 I study price behavior around the date of the offering. I find no empirical support for the hypothesis that abnormal positive returns are associated with underwritten offerings. Moreover, underwriters appear to set the offer price below the market value of the stock by at least 0.5 percent. While stock prices fall when rights are issued, the fall equals the market value of the rights received by the shareholder. Examination of the total rate of return to shareholders around the offer date indicates no abnormal returns; thus the wealth of the firm's owners is not reduced by a rights offering.

Section 5 provides an examination of other benefits presumed to accrue from the use of underwriters. Finance texts, corporate proxy statements, and the underwriting industry itself claim the existence of advantages in timing, insurance, distribution of ownership and from future consulting advice. My estimates of the magnitudes of the costs and benefits associated with these arguments are not sufficient to outweigh the lower costs of rights offerings as a means of raising capital. I can find no differential legal liability associated with the use of rights offerings which might explain the observed use of underwriters. Furthermore, there is no apparent difference in the sets of firms employing the alternative methods which could attribute the reported cost differences to selection bias.

In section 6, I offer a two-part hypothesis which is consistent with the observed frequency of employment of underwriters, with their higher costs, by the majority of listed firms. First, since managers' and directors' interests are different from those of shareholders in general, their financing decisions are not always in the best interests of the owners; benefits flow to management from the use of underwriters although not to shareholders. Second, I hypothesize that the cost to shareholders of monitoring their directors and managers is greater than the cost imposed by the choice of the more expensive financing method.

In section 7 I briefly present my conclusions.

A detailed description of the institutional arrangements for rights offerings and underwritten offerings is not easily available; I have provided one in Appendix 1. The reader unfamiliar with this institutional material will find it valuable to read this appendix before the body of the paper.

Appendix 2 presents a Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing analysis of rights issues and underwriting contracts, given here since general equilibrium analyses of these contracts have not been published.

2. Comparison of proceeds from rights and underwritten offerings

In a firm commitment underwritten offering, the underwriting syndicate purchases the new shares from the firm at an agreed upon price, and offers the shares for sale to the public at the offer price. If the shares cannot be sold at the offer price, the underwriting syndicate breaks and the shares are sold for whatever price they will bring. The underwriters bear the risk associated with adverse price movements, the proceeds to the firm are guaranteed. Of course the difference between the offer price and the proceeds to the firm are expected to compensate the underwriter for bearing this risk.

In a rights offering, each shareholder receives one right for each share owned. This right is an option issued by the firm to purchase new shares. The right states the relevant terms of the option, specifying the number of rights required to purchase each new share, the subscription price for each new share, and the expiration date of the option. Since issuing rights is costly, it is in the firm's interest to insure the success of the offering. A lower subscription price for the rights provides this insurance, a lower subscription price raises the market value of the right and reduces the probability that at the expiration date of the rights offering the stock price will be below the subscription price. There is a corresponding fall in the market value of the stock, but this fall is like a stock split. It does not affect the wealth of the owners of the firm.¹

If the shareholder does not exercise his rights, or does not sell his rights to someone who will exercise the rights, his wealth is reduced by the market value of the rights. Thus the firm can make the probability of failure of the rights offering arbitrarily small by setting the subscription price low enough.

Thus, since rights offerings and underwritten offerings can be specified so that the amount of capital raised by each is essentially equivalent, the decision as to which method to employ depends on the costs, the firm should employ that method which has lower net costs.

3. Out-of-pocket expenses of rights and underwritten issues

"Expenses involved in a preemptive common stock rights offering are significantly greater than expenses involved in a direct offering of common stock

¹The adjustment for the 'split effect' of a rights offering can be calculated as follows. The ex-rights price of the shares, P_x , equals the with-rights price, P_w , minus the value of the right, R .

$$P_x = P_w - R.$$

Ignoring the 'option value' of the right, the market value of a right is the difference between the ex-rights price and the subscription price, P_s , divided by the number of rights required to purchase one share, n .

$$R = (P_x - P_s)/n$$

Substituting the second expression into the first and simplifying yields

$$P_x = (nP_w + P_s)/(n+1)$$

to the public due to additional printing and mailing costs, expenses associated with the handling of rights and the processing of subscriptions, higher underwriters' commissions and the longer time required for the consummation of financing." ²

3.1. Reported out-of-pocket expenses

To examine the out-of-pocket expenses referred to in the quotation above (from Commonwealth Edison's 1976 proxy statement) I obtained a tape from the Securities and Exchange Commission covering the reported costs of all issues registered under the Securities Act of 1933 between January, 1971 and December, 1975. The tape contains data covering the following costs: (1) compensation received by investment bankers for underwriting services, (2) legal fees, (3) accounting fees, (4) engineering fees, (5) trustee's fees, (6) listing fees, (7) printing and engraving expenses, (8) Securities and Exchange Commission registration fees, (9) Federal Revenue Stamps, and (10) state taxes.

To restrict my analysis to equity issues by listed firms, I established the following criteria for inclusion: (1) the offering is of common stock and contains no other classes of securities; (2) the company's stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or a regional stock exchange prior to the offering; and (3) any associated secondary distribution is less than 10 percent of the gross proceeds of the issue. Table 1 is based on the issues meeting these criteria.

The data summarized in table 1 contradict Commonwealth Edison's Proxy Statement. My information, consistent with findings of previous SEC studies,³ indicates that costs are *highest* for underwritten public offerings, and *lowest* for pure rights offerings. Furthermore, the difference in costs is striking. For a \$15 million issue, the reported cost difference between an underwritten public offering and a pure rights offering is 4.83 percent, or \$720,000; and for a \$100 million issue the cost difference is 3.82 percent, or \$3,820,000.⁴ Yet underwriters were employed in over 93 percent of the issues examined.

3.2. Extras

Systematic understatement of the costs of underwriting presented in table 1 occurs because extras are omitted. Extras refer to the warrants which are associated with some underwritten issues and are used as partial payment to the underwriter. The warrants are options which are usually convertible into the

²Commonwealth Edison Proxy Statement, 1976.

³See SEC (1940, 1941, 1944, 1949, 1951, 1957, 1970, 1974).

⁴One empirical regularity in the data presented in table 1 should be noted. To a first approximation, the differences in costs among financing methods are explained by the differences in underwriter compensation. Compare 'Other Expenses' for Underwriting and Rights with Standby Underwriting with 'Total Costs' for Rights.

Table I

Costs of flotation as a percentage of proceeds for 578 common stock issues registered under the Securities Act of 1933 during 1971-1975. The issues are subdivided by size of issue and method of financing: underwriting, rights with standby underwriting, and pure rights offering.^a

Size of issue (\$ millions)	Underwriting			Rights with standby underwriting			Rights			
	Number	Compensa- tion as a percent of proceeds	Other expenses as a percent of proceeds	Total cost as a percent of proceeds	Number	Compensa- tion as a percent of proceeds	Other expenses as a percent of proceeds	Total cost as a percent of proceeds	Number	Total cost as a percent of proceeds
Under 0.50	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	3	8.99
0.50 to 0.99	6	6.96	6.78	13.74	2	3.43	4.80	8.24	2	4.59
1.00 to 1.99	18	10.40	4.89	15.29	5	6.36	4.15	10.51	5	4.90
2.00 to 4.99	61	6.59	2.87	9.47	9	5.20	2.85	8.06	7	2.85
5.00 to 9.99	66	5.50	1.53	7.03	4	3.92	2.18	6.10	6	1.39
10.00 to 19.99	91	4.84	0.71	5.55	10	4.14	1.21	5.35	3	0.72
20.00 to 49.99	156	4.30	0.37	4.67	12	3.84	0.90	4.74	1	0.52
50.00 to 99.99	70	3.97	0.21	4.18	9	3.96	0.74	4.70	2	0.21
100.00 to 500.00	16	3.81	0.14	3.95	5	3.50	0.50	4.00	9	0.13
Total/Average	484	5.02	1.15	6.17	56	4.32	1.73	6.05	38	2.45

^aIssues are included only if the company's stock was listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or regional exchanges prior to the offering, any associated secondary distribution represents less than ten percent of the total proceeds of the issue, and the offering contains no other types of securities. The costs reported are (1) compensation received by investment bankers for underwriting services rendered, (2) legal fees, (3) accounting fees, (4) engineering fees, (5) trustees' fees, (6) listing fees, (7) printing and engraving expenses, (8) Securities and Exchange Commission registration fees, (9) Federal Revenue Stamps, and (10) state taxes.

stock of the firm at prices ranging from well below to considerably above the offering price. When the underwriters acquire these warrants at a price below their market value, this represents a form of compensation to the underwriter, and it is not included in table 1.

Although extras have historically been most often associated with new issues, their use in the compensation of underwriters of seasoned firms is not unusual. For the years 1971-1972, the SEC (1974) reported that of the 1,599 issues which were underwritten, 530, or 33.1 percent, included extras. However, since extras were included primarily with the smaller offerings, the total dollar volume of issues with extra compensation was only 7 percent of the gross proceeds from all underwritten offerings.

The average exercise price of the warrants granted as a percentage of the offering price was 11.72 percent. A lower bound on the value of the option is the difference between the subscription price of the offering and the exercise price of the extras, here that is 88.28 percent of the subscription price.⁵ Since these warrants are typically purchased by the managing investment banker at a minimal price, usually one to ten cents, the options appear to be significantly underpriced. The SEC also found that the average ratio of shares granted the underwriters through extras to the number of shares offered in the underwriting was 7.99 percent. To assess the impact on the figures reported in table 1, assume that the value of the warrant is 80 percent of the offering price, that the underwriter pays 5 percent of the offering price for the extras, and that the ratio of warrants received as extras to shares offered through the underwriting is 0.07, then the compensation represented by the extras would be 4.95 percent of the total proceeds. These numbers suggest that for the issues employing extras, the figures in table 1 understate the underwriters' compensation on the order of 50 to 100 percent.

3.3 Unreported out-of-pocket expenses

Such items as the opportunity cost of the time of the firm's employees and postage expenses⁶ are not included in the summary of costs reported in table 1. However, unreported employee expenses are unlikely to explain the deviations reported in table 1. For a \$15 million issue, the \$720,000 difference would not be explained if 20 employees with an average salary of \$30 thousand worked

⁵This is a conservative estimate of the value. Merton (1973) has demonstrated that the lower bound on the value of an option is the difference between the stock price and the discounted exercise price.

⁶Although postage expenses are not reported to the SEC, estimates were obtained from summaries of expenses reported to the New York State Public Utilities Commission for a sample of firms. For the sample, the maximum postage expense as a percentage of total proceeds was one-tenth of one percent. Even if this were understated by a factor of ten, it would be of insufficient magnitude to explain even the smallest reported difference in costs. Moreover, the marginal postage expense could be reduced to zero by mailing the rights with other required mailings, such as dividend checks or quarterly reports.

full time on a rights offering for a year. For a \$300 million issue the difference in reported costs of underwriting versus a rights issue exceeds \$11 million, it would require over 350 man-years to explain this difference.

It should be noted that expenses allocated to raising capital do *not* reduce the tax liability of the firm.⁷ These expenses are deducted from the capital account without affecting the income statement. Thus, the use of internal resources can lower the tax liability of the firm if it is more expensive for the Internal Revenue Service to monitor the allocation of internal resources between capital raising activities and other activities. In the above examples, if the firm's marginal tax rate is 50 percent, and if they were able to deduct all their wages for tax purposes, the required number of man-years to explain the reported cost differential would be doubled.

There are strong reasons to believe that table 1 also omits significant unreported costs of the issuing firm's employees' time for underwritten offerings. There are important parameters (e.g., the offering price and the fee structure) which must be negotiated between the underwriter and the representatives of the firm, these parameters have wealth implications for the owners of the firm as well as the underwriter. Such negotiation can be lengthy and usually directly involves top management. These unreported costs of underwriting must be significantly greater than the costs of setting a subscription price for a rights issue, since the subscription price has no wealth implications for the owners of the firm as long as it is low enough to ensure that the rights will be exercised.

Moreover, with an underwritten issue the firm has the same tax incentives to substitute internal for external resources if it is more expensive for the IRS to monitor the allocation of costs of internally acquired resources to capital raising activities than of those which are externally acquired. Thus, it is not clear that rights offerings employ fewer unreported internal resources than do underwritten offerings.

3.4 Costs imposed directly on shareholders

If a shareholder chooses to sell his rights, he incurs transactions costs and tax liabilities. These costs, although not borne by the firm, are relevant because they affect the wealth of the owners.⁸

⁷If the firm sells bonds rather than stock, the costs of selling the issue can be amortized over the life of the issue. In no case, however, may these costs be expensed either for tax or reporting purposes.

⁸There is a limited benefit from issuing rights to the owners of the firm under Regulation T, the Federal Reserve regulation restricting margin credit. For an owner who wishes to borrow to acquire additional stock, Reg T provides for the establishment of a 'Special Subscription Account' which lowers the effective margin requirement by permitting a customer to purchase on an installment basis a margin security acquired through the exercise of subscription rights expiring within 90 days. Under this provision, 75 percent of the market value of the acquired stock can be borrowed initially. Quarterly installments are required over a 12 month period to bring the position up to proper margin.

To determine the impact of the selling costs, let us assume generally extreme values for the relevant parameters. For small dollar transactions (less than \$1,000), the brokerage fee can be as much as 10 percent. And for rights, the bid-ask spread can be as high as 10 percent, this represents another selling cost. If half the bid-ask spread is taken as an implicit selling cost, the total cost can be as much as 15 percent of the value of the rights. To make the figures comparable to those in table 1, calculate transactions costs as a fraction of the proceeds of the offering to the firm. The 15 percent must be multiplied by the ratio of the value of the rights to the total proceeds. For the offerings in the sample, this ratio was approximately 10 percent. If all individuals sold their rights, transactions costs would be 1.50 percent of the proceeds, a figure less than the difference in transactions costs for any reported issue size.⁹ But rights offerings are generally 50 percent subscribed by existing shareholders who do not bear these transactions costs.¹⁰ Therefore this cost appears to be less than one percent.

Selling rights also has tax consequences for the shareholder. For tax purposes, the cost basis of the stock must be allocated between the stock and the rights when the rights are received, based on the market values of the rights and stock at that time.¹¹ The acquisition date of the rights for tax purposes is the date on which the stock issuing the rights is acquired. If the stock has risen in value since it was acquired, a relevant cost of employing a rights offering is the difference between the shareholder tax liability incurred now and the present value of the taxes which would have been paid had the rights issue not occurred.¹²

To determine the impact of this cost, again postulate generally extreme values for the relevant parameters. Assume (1) that the marginal tax rate for the average shareholder is 50 percent (note this would be an unattainably high rate if the capital gain were long term), (2) that in the absence of the rights offering the taxes could have been postponed forever, (3) that the allocated cash basis for the rights is 50 percent of the current rights price, (4) that the ratio of the value of the rights to the proceeds of the issue is 10 percent, and (5) that only 20 percent of the current stockholders subscribe to the rights offering. In this

⁹Note that since the expenses associated with raising equity capital are not tax deductible, these figures are comparable without further adjustment.

¹⁰ Estimates vary but ballpark figures on how investors react [to rights offerings] are as follows: 50% exercise their rights, 40% sell out for cash, and 10% do nothing. [Vanishing Rights' (May 2, 1977) *Barron's* p. 25.]

¹¹If the fair market value of the rights is less than fifteen percent of the fair market value of the stock, the shareholder can choose to set the basis of the rights at zero, leaving unaffected the basis of the stock. The shareholder might choose this alternative if the cost of the book-keeping exceeded the present value of the tax saving, or if he anticipated being in a higher tax bracket when his remaining holdings were sold.

¹²See Bailey (1969) for a discussion of the effective rate of capital gains tax, discounted to reflect the liability deferral.

case, the cost would be 2 percent of the capital raised by the firm. This is less than any reported cost differential in table 1.¹⁵

One other argument involving shareholder-borne costs has been offered by Weston and Brigham (1975). They argue that in a rights offering some stockholders may neither exercise nor sell, and by allowing their rights to expire unexercised they incur a loss.¹⁶ However, if an oversubscription privilege is employed with the offering, current owners in the aggregate receive full market value for the shares sold. Admittedly, the oversubscription privilege affects the distribution of wealth among the owners, but it does not impose costs on owners as a whole.

4. Security price behavior associated with rights and underwritten offering

4.1 Rights offerings lower the stock price

"A rights offering, under market conditions then existing, could well have a long-term depressing effect on the market price of the stock."¹⁷

Given the investment policy of the firm, a rights offering will lower the price of the stock in both the short run and in the long run as AT&T's Proxy Statement suggests. But this is irrelevant to the choice of financing methods because the drop in price is *not* a reduction in the wealth of the owners and thus cannot be considered a cost of a rights issue.

The fall in the stock price when rights are issued can be illustrated by the following argument. Rights give the shareholders the option to purchase new shares at less than market prices. Other things equal, the total market value of the firm after a rights offering, V , will then be the previous value, V' , plus the subscription payments, S .

$$V = V' + S \quad (1)$$

The per share price before the offering is V'/n , where n is the number of old shares. If m new shares are sold, the per share price after the offering, $(V' + S)/(n + m)$, must be less than the price per share before the offering.¹⁸

¹⁵If taxes were important, firms would avoid rights offerings when share prices had risen. However, the evidence presented in table 2 shows that, on average, firms have had abnormal positive price changes during the 12 months before an offering.

¹⁶Stockbrokers holding securities for safekeeping do not allow the warrants to expire unexercised. If no instructions are received, the broker will sell the rights immediately before expiration.

¹⁷American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Notice of 1976 Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement.

¹⁸Also note that arbitrage profits must not be available. When a stock trades ex rights, a right is issued for each share outstanding. At the ex rights date, the expected change in the stock price must equal the expected value of the right, or profit opportunities would exist. If the sum of the ex rights value of the stock plus the value of the right at the ex rights date were

The fall in the stock price on the ex rights day is similar to the expected fall in the stock price at the ex dividend date. The two cases differ only in what is distributed – in the latter instance cash, in the former rights. Thus, the fall in the stock price simply reflects the fact that the shareholders have been given a valuable asset, the right.

The argument that the fall in the stock price is a relevant cost of a rights offering also appears in two related forms: (1) if an underwriter is used, the firm can raise a greater amount of capital with the same number of shares; (2) a rights offering lowers the earnings per share of the firm.¹⁹ Both statements are true but if the fall in the stock price equals the market value of the rights, then the impact of the additional shares issued through the rights offering is the same as that of a stock split and the wealth of the owners of the firm is unaffected.

To examine whether, after correcting for the expected normal fall in the stock price, there were also abnormal price changes,²⁰ I studied the 853 rights offerings on the CRSP master file between 1926 and 1975. Following Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1967), I estimated the regression,

$$R_{jt} = \alpha_j + \beta_j R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{jt}, \quad (2)$$

where R_{jt} is the return to security j in month t , adjusted for capital structure changes (including rights offerings) and R_{mt} is the return to the market portfolio in month t . I estimated (2) for each of the 853 offerings, using data from the CRSP monthly return file, excluding the 25 months around the date of the offering. Setting $t = 0$ for the month of the rights offering, I used the estimated α_j and β_j to calculate the ε_{jt} for each security for the 25 months around the offering. I then calculated the average residual over all firms for each month in the interval -12 to $+12$. The average residuals were then cumulated from month -12 to the event month. The results are presented in table 2 and figure 1.

In the months subsequent to 'event month minus two' the average residuals

systematically different from the value of the stock immediately before the ex rights date, then profits could be made by taking an appropriate position in the stock upon the announcement of the rights issue.

¹⁹Thus, if the amendment [to remove the preemptive right from the corporate charter] is adopted, the company will be able to obtain the amount of capital needed through the issuance of fewer shares. Over a period of time this will result in slightly less dilution, higher equity value per share and better earnings per share.' [Commonwealth Edison Proxy Statement, 1976.]

²⁰E.g., Commonwealth Edison suggests, 'Selling pressures often unduly depress both stock and rights values during the two or three week offering period which is a practical necessity when stock is sold with preemptive rights. Because the majority of stockholders do not exercise their rights but offer them for sale, the market value of the rights is driven far too low. Outsiders are then able to benefit by selling large amounts of stock during the offering period while buying rights for almost nothing and then exercising their rights to purchase stock at a discount to cover their sales. As a result, rights offerings tend to cost the company more than the rights themselves are worth to the stockholders who get them.'

are all insignificantly different from zero²¹ and there is no significant sign pattern in the time series of average residuals. The cumulative average residuals in table 2 are also at approximately the same level three months before the

Table 2
 Summary of average residual and cumulative average residual analysis of 853 rights offerings between 1926 and 1975 for the 25 event months [-12 to +12] surrounding the offer date.

Event month	Average residual	Cumulative average
-12	0.00721	0.00721
-11	0.01004	0.01725
-10	0.00255	0.01980
-9	0.00629	0.02609
-8	0.00388	0.02997
-7	0.01062 ^a	0.04059
-6	0.00750	0.04809
-5	0.00622	0.05431
-4	0.01334 ^a	0.06765
-3	0.00662	0.07427
-2	0.01624 ^a	0.09051
-1	-0.00649	0.08401
0	-0.00739	0.07663
+1	0.00779	0.08441
+2	0.00412	0.08853
+3	0.00405	0.09258
+4	-0.00110	0.09149
+5	-0.00047	0.09102
+6	0.00053	0.09155
+7	-0.00338	0.08817
+8	-0.00387	0.08430
+9	0.00256	0.08686
+10	-0.00264	0.08422
+11	-0.00013	0.08408
+12	-0.00476	0.07933

^aGreater than 2σ . (Computation of the standard deviation is described in footnote 21.)

offering, on the date of the offering and 12 months after the offering. The significant positive residuals prior to the offer date are to be expected because of selection bias; firms which raise capital tend to have been doing well.

²¹As an estimate of the dispersion of an average residual, the approximation

$$\sigma^2 = (\sigma_M^2/r^2)(1-r^2)/N$$

was employed where σ_M^2 is the variance of the market return, r^2 is the squared correlation coefficient between the return to an asset and the market return, and N is the number of securities in the sample. If σ_M is 0.089 [from Black Jensen Scholes (1972)], $r^2 = 0.25$, and $N = 853$ then $\sigma^2 = 0.000028$ and $\sigma = 0.00528$.

The results presented in table 2 are consistent with previous studies of this question. Nelson (1965) examined all the rights offerings by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange between January 1, 1946 and December 31, 1957. He found after the price series is adjusted for the 'split effect' in the rights offerings and general market movements are removed, prices six months after a rights offering are not significantly different from prices six months before the offering.²² Scholes (1972) found that the price of shares generally rose in value before the issue, fell 0.3 percent during the month of the issue, but experienced no abnormal gains or losses after the issue.




Fig 1 Plot of average residuals for 853 rights offerings between 1926 and 1975 for the 25 event months [-12 to +12] surrounding the offer date

4.2 Underwriters increase the stock price

Some argue that underwriters cause an increase in the stock price (1) by increasing 'public confidence' through external certification of the legal, accounting, and engineering analyses and (2) by the selling efforts of the underwriting syndicate.²³

To examine the behavior of stock prices around the offer date of underwritten offerings and rights offerings, I obtained the returns for those securities which were included both in the sample of 578 firms covered in table 1 and on the CRSP daily return file. There were 344 underwritten offerings and 52 rights offerings in this sample. I set the offer date equal to day zero for all offerings and formed a portfolio of underwritten offerings and a portfolio of rights offerings. I weighted securities in the portfolio of underwritten offerings so that

²²The 'split effect' adjustment used by Nelson is derived in footnote 1

²³See e.g. Bingham (1977, pp. 473-474)

the two portfolios had equal betas. Then I calculated the difference in the portfolio returns for the 130 days before and 130 days after the offerings. The difference in average returns between two portfolios with equal risk will measure abnormal returns from either underwritten offerings or rights offerings. Table 3 presents the results for the period 20 days before the offering to 20 days after the offering; and figure 2 graphically presents the results for the period 40 days before to 40 days after the offering.

The average difference in returns to the two portfolios over the 260 days around the offer date is +0.00006, with a sample standard deviation of 0.00265. Therefore rights offerings have marginally higher returns during the 40 days around the offer date, but there is no obvious abnormal price behavior around the offer date for either underwritten offerings or rights offerings.




Fig. 2. Differences in daily returns between a portfolio of 52 rights offerings and a portfolio of 344 underwritten offerings for the 81 event days [-40 to +40] surrounding the offer date. (Portfolio weights are adjusted so that the two portfolios have the same beta.)

That underwriters are unable to generate abnormal positive price behavior should not be surprising. The firm always has the option of disclosing more information than is required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The firm will expend resources on certification by external legal, accounting, and engineering firms until the net increase in the value of the firm is zero. Since the firm can contract for external certification of any disclosure, the benefit of whatever 'expert' valuation by the investment banker associated with an underwriting is limited to the difference in costs between certification through the underwriting process and independent certification.

But if underwriters are employed they influence the firm's decision about the

Table 3

Differences in daily returns between a portfolio of 52 rights offerings and a portfolio of 344 underwritten offerings between January 1971 and December 1975 for the 41 event days [-20 to +20] surrounding the offer date (Portfolio weights are adjusted so that the two portfolios have the same beta)

Event day	Rights average return	Underwritten average return	Difference (rights-und)	Cumulative difference
-20	-0 000361	-0 003007	0 002646	0 002646
-19	-0 001642	-0 001523	-0 000120	0 002526
-18	0 000072	-0 001361	0 001433	0 003959
-17	-0 001325	0 000175	-0 001500	0 002458
-16	-0 001134	-0 000231	-0 000902	0 001556
-15	-0 002865	-0 001229	-0 001636	-0 000080
-14	-0 002245	0 000732	-0 002977	-0 003057
-13	-0 004471	0 000949	-0 005420	-0 008477
-12	0 001722	0 001110	0 000611	-0 007866
-11	-0 002834	-0 000264	-0 002570	-0 010436
-10	-0 001226	-0 000125	-0 001102	-0 011538
-9	0 001961	0 000960	0 001000	-0 010537
-8	-0 004966	0 001151	-0 006117	-0 016654
-7	0 001031	0 001327	-0 000296	-0 016950
-6	0 002433	-0 001257	0 003690	-0 013260
-5	-0 002373	0 002069	-0 004442	-0 017702
-4	0 002180	0 001384	0 000797	-0 016905
-3	0 001978	-0 001284	0 003262	-0 013642
-2	-0 000570	-0 000557	-0 000013	-0 013656
-1	0 004425	-0 000803	0 005228	-0 008428
0	0 001413	0 000583	0 000829	-0 007598
1	-0 000000	0 000054	-0 000054	-0 007653
2	0 003127	-0 000605	0 003732	-0 003921
3	-0 001182	-0 000700	-0 000482	-0 004403
4	0 003059	-0 001195	0 004254	-0 000149
5	0 005288	0 000710	0 004577	0 004428
6	0 000311	0 000477	-0 000166	0 004262
7	-0 002551	0 000206	-0 002757	0 001505
8	0 004396	0 001072	0 003324	0 004829
9	0 000851	0 000221	0 000630	0 005458
10	0 001601	0 000720	0 000881	0 006339
11	0 004703	0 000768	0 003934	0 010273
12	0 002369	0 000099	0 002271	0 012544
13	0 004764	-0 000502	0 005267	0 017811
14	-0 000734	-0 000495	-0 000239	0 017572
15	0 002944	-0 000527	0 003471	0 021043
16	-0 001089	-0 000790	-0 000299	0 020744
17	-0 001809	0 003065	-0 004874	0 015870
18	0 001228	-0 002196	0 003424	0 019294
19	0 000169	0 000458	-0 000289	0 019004
20	-0 000823	0 000711	-0 001534	0 017471

level of disclosure. The underwriters will request that level of disclosure for which the marginal private costs and benefits to the underwriter are equal. Given the legal liability of underwriters under the 1933 Act, the incentives of the firm and underwriter can differ. Any divergence from the level of disclosure which maximizes the market value of the firm imposes a cost on the shareholders, and underwriters do ask for 'comfort letters' from accountants, frequently requiring expensive auditing procedures not produced without underwriters. Thus, I conclude that the disclosure incentives of the underwriters lead to an over-investment in information production. However, the costs of this over-investment should be reflected in the figures in table 1.

4.3 Do underwriters underprice the securities?

In Ibbotson's (1975) study of unseasoned new issues he found that the offer price on average is set 11.4 percent below the market value of the shares. If seasoned new issues are also underpriced, the difference between market value and offer price would represent another cost of employing underwriters.

There are reasons to believe that underwriters underprice the seasoned new issues. For a firm commitment underwriting agreement the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers²⁴ require that once the offer price is set, the underwriter cannot sell the shares at a higher price. If the offer price is set above the market value of the shares excess supply results. If the offer price presents a binding constraint to the underwriter, the limit order placed with the specialist by the managing underwriter results in the purchase of additional shares at the offer price. If continued this purchasing would cause the underwriting syndicate to break. Since very few underwriting syndicates break,²⁵ the implication must be either that the offer price is generally set below the market value of the shares, or that the offer price constraint can be circumvented.

There are two ways in which the offer price could be circumvented. First, for hot issues (i.e., underpriced issues for which there is significant excess demand) the underwriters allocate the shares to preferred customers. One way to achieve preferred customer status is to purchase issues for which there is an excess supply. Second, underwriters employ 'swaps'. In a swap, the underwriter buys another security from a customer while selling the underwritten security at the offer price. Through this tie-in sale, the underwriter can shift the profit or loss. These two tying arrangements allow the underwriter to minimize the impact of the regulation.

²⁴Although the rules of fair practice were established by the NASD, and not Congress or the SEC, there is little difference in the impact. These rules are a response to the SEC's regulatory position. If the SEC found them unsatisfactory the SEC could establish superseding regulation.

²⁵See *History of Corporate Finance for the Decade* (1972).

To see if seasoned new issues are underpriced I calculated the return from the closing price the day prior to the offer date to the offer price, and the return from the offer price to the close on the offer date. For the 328 firms with the requisite data, the average return from the close to the offer price is -0.0054 and the average return from the offer price to the close on the offer date is $+0.0082$. For the 260 days around the offer date the average daily return is 0.0005 with a sample standard deviation in the time series of average returns of 0.0013 . Therefore, both figures, although much smaller than the 11.4 percent found by Ibbotson, are significantly different from the average daily return.²⁶ Thus the underpricing imposes an additional cost on the owners of the firm of between 0.5 and 0.8 percent of the proceeds of the issue, a cost which is not reflected in table 1.

5. Miscellaneous arguments favoring underwritten offerings

5.1 Insurance

It is frequently argued that employing an underwriter provides an 'insurance policy', reducing uncertainty of the offering's success.²⁷ In effect, the firm

²⁶One difference between Ibbotson's unseasoned issues and the seasoned issues examined here is that the unseasoned shares trade on the OTC market. One hypothesis which has been suggested to explain the differences in the results is that the underpricing is a method of compensating the underwriter for maintaining a secondary market in the security. Although the argument can explain why underwriter's compensation (including underpricing costs) for unseasoned issues is higher than for seasoned issues, it does not explain the differential underpricing.

²⁷Another type of 'insurance' might be relevant. If material errors are found in the registration statement of a public issue, parties who allege damage can bring suit. The suit typically names as co-defendants the firm, the board of directors of the firm, the firm's accountants, and the firm's underwriter. If the underwriter assumes a large share of the liability for the error, sheltering the firm from suit, then the underwriter will receive a normal compensation for bearing that risk.

Direct evidence on the hypothesis that underwriters reduce the firm's liability in case of a suit is expensive to obtain, economic studies of securities fraud suits have not been published. However indirect evidence suggests that this factor cannot be of a sufficiently large magnitude to make this an important factor in the choice of underwritten issues over rights issues. First, damage must be demonstrated - i.e. in addition to finding a material misstatement in the registration statement, the share price must have fallen after the offering. Second, the underwriters explicitly seek to limit their liability as much as is legally feasible. '[Issuer-Underwriter Indemnification] agreements are universally used in today's underwriting. These agreements, although varying in specific language, provide essentially for indemnification of the 'passively' guilty party by the party whose omissions or misstatements were the source of the liability' (See 'The Expanding Liability of Security Underwriters', *Duke Law Journal*, Dec 1969, pp 1191-1246). Thus underwriters' contracts seek to minimize their exposure in this area. Third, if the courts imposed a significant share of the responsibility for material errors on the underwriter, it would be expected that accounting firms would recognize this by offering lower rates for securities work to firms employing underwriters. This does not seem to be the case. At least when this issue was raised with several partners of eight big accounting firms, this effect was denied. The judicial procedure tends to make the liability of each of the groups of defendants in this type of suit virtually independent.

purchases an option to sell the shares to the underwriter at the offer price (See Appendix 2) Note four things about this option First, in an underwritten issue, the offer price is not set generally until within 24 hours of the offering when the final agreement is signed, and hence the net proceeds are not determined until that time Second, as shown in section 4.3, the offer price on average is set below the market value of the stock Thus, the firm purchases a one-day option to sell shares at a discount of $\frac{1}{2}$ percent below their market value Third, subject to certain conditions specified in the letter of intent, the underwriter has the option of backing out of the tentative agreement until the date the final agreement is signed Thus, the 'insurance policy' is of limited value because its effective duration is short Fourth, as argued above, the subscription price for a rights offering can be set low enough so that the probability of failure of the rights offering becomes arbitrarily close to zero So an alternate source of 'self-insurance' is available through the rights offering For these reasons, the possible value of the 'insurance policy' associated with underwritten issues must be small

5.2 Timing

Commonwealth Edison claims that the proceeds of an underwritten issue are available to the firm sooner than in a rights issue ²⁸ But timing benefits provided by underwriters must be small First, the settlement date for an underwritten issue is generally seven days after the offer date, while the settlement date for a rights offering is generally seven days after the expiration of the offering Since the offering generally lasts about 18 days, any reasonable estimate of the cost in terms of the lost interest which would be imposed on the firm by waiting that short period of time would have to be small Second, since it is not expected that the rights will be exercised prior to their expiration,²⁹ the owners of the firm have the use of the funds during the period of the offering Thus, the time period which entails an opportunity cost of the funds is reduced to a seven-to ten-day period both for rights and underwritten offerings Third, if the services provided by the underwriter and transfer agents are competitively supplied, the fees charged will reflect the opportunity cost of the funds at their disposal This would imply that the timing cost is impounded in the figures in table 1 And fourth, unless there is an unforeseen urgency associated with obtaining the funds, the firm can simply initiate the rights procedure at an earlier date

Moreover, under certain circumstances, the registration procedure with the SEC is simpler when a rights issue is employed It is my belief that with a rights offering, the SEC is more likely to presume a regular dialogue between the firm and its owners and thus impose less restrictive disclosure requirements There-

²⁸Commonwealth Edison Proxy Statement, 1976

²⁹See Merton (1973) or Smith (1976)

fore, the time until the registration becomes effective can be expected to be shorter with a rights offering than with an underwritten offering. This shorter registration time reduces the total time from the point where the decision is made to raise additional capital to the receipt of the proceeds.

5 3 Distribution of ownership

Weston and Brigham (1975) argue that underwriters provide a wider distribution of the securities sold, 'lessening any possible control problem' Since change in control may result in a change in management, this is likely to be a relevant issue for the current management. Yet it is not clear that possible control problems should be a concern of the owners I know of no reason to believe that one group of owners is any better (i e , will price the firm any higher) than another group

Furthermore, it is not obvious that underwriters will achieve a wider distribution of ownership than will a rights offering For most rights offerings of listed firms, the consensus among investment bankers is that the subscription rate of the current owners of the firm ranges from 20 to 50 percent It is difficult to estimate what percentage of an underwritten issue is purchased by the current owners of the firm, but there is no reason to believe it is zero Further, underwritten issues seem to attract more institutional interest, resulting in large block purchases and therefore more concentration of ownership

These factors preclude any general conclusions about the effect of financing method on ownership distribution With this uncertainty it is not clear that management, even if concerned with control issues, should prefer the use of an underwriter

5 4 Consulting advice

Van Horne (1974) suggests that 'advice from investment bankers may be of a continuing nature, with the company consulting a certain investment banker or group of bankers regularly' It is more expensive for the firm to compensate the investment banker for future consulting services by including in the underwriting fee a payment for the present value of the expected advice Costs incurred in raising capital are not tax deductible, they directly reduce the capital account and do not enter the income statement Thus, compared to separate billing for services rendered, paying for future consulting through a higher underwriting fee doubles its cost for a firm with a marginal tax rate of 50 percent

5 5 Expected legal costs

If there were a law, regulation, or merely an unresolved judicial principle which might impose additional liability on a firm using rights offerings, then the

expected legal costs of using rights could explain the observed use of underwriters. But I can find no differential legal liability associated with the use of rights offerings.

5.6 Selection bias

If the firms which employ rights offerings were systematically different from the firms which employ underwritten offerings, then the observed cost differences could be attributable to selection bias. It could be that if the firms which employed underwriters had used rights, their expenses would have been greater.

There is a significant difference in the betas of the firms in the two groups. I calculated the betas for those firms in the sample which were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and included on the daily CRSP tape. The average beta for the 344 underwritten offerings is 0.731 with a standard deviation of 0.560, and the average beta for the 52 rights offerings is 0.493 with a standard deviation of 0.330. But I can find no other systematic difference between the two populations.

Examination of the data shows similar distributions of firms across industries, 80.8 percent of the firms employing rights and 73.2 percent of the firms employing underwritten offerings were utilities (electric, gas, or telephone companies). I attempted to predict the choice of underwritten versus rights offering based on the following variables: (1) the percentage of the firm which is sold through the offering, (2) the market value of the firm, and (3) the variance of the returns on the stock. The r^2 for the regression is 0.016. None of the t statistics for the variables appears to be significant.

Although differences exist between the two sets of firms, the nature and magnitude of the differences seem insufficient to account for the observed cost differences.

6. A monitoring cost hypothesis

6.1 Why not monitor the choice of financing method?

My examination of alternative financing methods suggests that rights offerings are significantly less expensive than underwritten offerings. Yet underwriters are employed in over 90 percent of the offerings studied. One hypothesis consistent with the evidence is: (1) managers and members of the board of directors receive benefits from the use of underwriters which do not accrue to the other owners of the firm, and (2) the expenses which would be imposed on the owners of the firm by monitoring the managers and directors in the choice of financing method are greater than the costs without monitoring.

Managers or members of the board of directors may recommend that offerings be underwritten because their welfare increases as a by-product of the use of

underwriters in several ways³⁰ First, firms frequently include an investment banker as a member of the board of directors It is in his interest to lobby for the use of underwriters, particularly the use of his investment banking firm as managing underwriter Second, there is the possibility of 'bribery' This may be simply consumption for the managers and directors through 'wining and dining' by the underwriters But there is a more important possibility In an underwritten issue, if the offer price is set below the market value of the shares, the issue will be oversubscribed To handle this excess demand, underwriters ration the shares In the rationing process the underwriters presumably favor their preferred customers, and preferred customer status could be given to key management people or members of the board of directors of firms employing the underwriter This form of payment would be virtually impossible to detect, since the shares the officer of Company A would favorably acquire are those of Company B and would therefore call for no disclosure³¹

Further possible benefits to managers include the reduction of possible control problems, if underwritten offerings produce a wider distribution of ownership than rights offerings Finally, managers whose compensation is a function of reported profits will prefer an underwriter's fee which includes a payment for future consulting advice, the manager's compensation will be higher because payment through underwriting does not affect reported profits while separate billing for consulting does

Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the costs which the managers and directors can impose on the other owners of the firm are limited by the costs of monitoring their activities Thus the cost to shareholders of monitoring the method of raising capital must be greater than the costs imposed by the financing method chosen Given the dispersion of ownership in modern corporations, the benefit to any single shareholder from voting his shares is small Thus the costs that he would rationally incur in voting are small,³² and the resources the shareholder would rationally devote to deciding whether a 'yes' or 'no' vote is more in his interest are few Moreover, voting procedures in most corporations ensure that management has a disproportionate voice in the outcome Management is often assigned votes by proxy, and in many firms management has the

³⁰Certain management compensation plans, such as stock option plans, make managers' compensation a function of the price of the firm's shares If the compensation plan were not adjusted to reflect the effect of the rights offering on the share price, management could be expected to provide a strong lobby in favor of employing underwriters In fact, however, employee stock option plans have general clauses calling for adjustment of the terms of the plan to reflect relevant capital structure changes Furthermore, most plans include specific reference to rights issues Thus, agency costs resulting from compensation plans do not seem to offer an explanation of the observed behavior

³¹This argument is similar to that of Manne (1966), especially Chapter V

³²See Downs (1957) Basically, if a person owns 100 shares in a firm, his vote only matters if the vote is tied or his 'side' would have lost by 100 votes or less The probability is low that out of 50 million votes, the issue will split that way Thus the expected benefit (benefit times probability) of voting is very small

power to vote unreturned proxies. They are also permitted to vote proxies on specific questions when the stockholder does not specify a choice. These factors raise the cost of monitoring management.

6.2 *The preemptive right as a monitoring tool*

There appears to be a low cost method of monitoring the use of underwriters: the preemptive right. The preemptive right is a provision which can be included in a firm's charter requiring the firm to offer any new common stock first to its existing shareholders. But the inclusion of the preemptive right does not solve the problem: firms can still employ underwriters through a standby under-




Fig. 3. Plot of average residuals from 89 firms which removed the preemptive right from their corporate charter for the 81 event months [-40 to +40] surrounding the month of removal.

writing agreement. Since the figures in table I suggest a negligible difference in costs between a firm commitment underwritten offering and a rights offering with a standby underwriting agreement, what becomes important is not a requirement to use rights, but a prohibition against using underwriters.

To test the hypothesis that the impact of removing the preemptive right from the corporate charter is negligible, I collected a sample of 89 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange which have removed the preemptive right. The results of this study are presented in table 4 and figure 3. The average residual in the month of removal is 0.277 percent, and the mean average residual for the six prior months is 0.309 percent. There is no apparent impact.

I believe the results in table 4 provide a plausible explanation for why the intellectual level of the argument involving the preemptive right is so low on both sides of the question. For example, the above quotes from Commonwealth

Table 4

Summary of residual analysis of 89 firms which removed the preemptive right from their corporate charter for the 81 event months [-40 to +40] surrounding the month of removal

Event month	Average residual	Cumulative average residual	Event month	Average residual	Cumulative average residual
-40	-0 00995	-0 00995	1	0 00363	0 11718
-39	-0 00382	-0 01376	2	0 00028	0 11745
-38	0 01999	0 00623	3	0 00293	0 12038
-37	-0 00258	0 00365	4	0 00276	0 12315
-36	-0 00160	0 00205	5	0 00101	0 12415
-35	-0 00414	-0 00209	6	0 00336	0 12751
-34	0 00842	0 00633	7	-0 00017	0 12734
-33	-0 00238	0 00395	8	-0 00537	0 12196
-32	0 00483	0 00878	9	0 00963	0 13159
-31	0 00375	0 01254	10	0 00002	0 13162
-30	-0 00419	0 00834	11	0 00406	0 13568
-29	-0 00632	0 00202	12	-0 00446	0 13122
-28	0 00082	0 00284	13	-0 00855	0 12266
-27	0 01337	0 01621	14	0 00210	0 12476
-26	0 01839	0 03460	15	-0 00696	0 11780
-25	0 01440	0 04900	16	0 00903	0 12683
-24	-0 00397	0 04503	17	0 00752	0 13435
-23	0 00800	0 05303	18	-0 00096	0 13339
-22	-0 00102	0 05201	19	-0 00942	0 12397
-21	-0 00007	0 05195	20	0 00701	0 13097
-20	-0 00072	0 05123	21	-0 00021	0 13077
-19	0 00602	0 05725	22	0 01591	0 14668
-18	-0 00067	0 05658	23	0 00090	0 14758
-17	-0 01032	0 04626	24	-0 01043	0 13715
-16	0 01575	0 06201	25	-0 00281	0 13434
-15	0 01608	0 07809	26	-0 01389	0 12046
-14	0 00828	0 08637	27	0 01069	0 13115
-13	-0 00943	0 07694	28	-0 00566	0 12548
-12	0 01496	0 09190	29	0 00901	0 13449
-11	-0 00183	0 09007	30	-0 00592	0 12857
-10	-0 00833	0 08174	31	-0 00624	0 12233
- 9	0 01103	0 09277	32	-0 00240	0 11993
- 8	0 00138	0 09415	33	-0 00071	0 11922
- 7	-0 00185	0 09230	34	0 02059	0 13981
- 6	-0 00170	0 09060	35	0 00183	0 14165
- 5	0 00508	0 09568	36	-0 00263	0 13901
- 4	0 00998	0 10566	37	-0 01103	0 12799
- 3	0 00816	0 11382	38	0 00971	0 13770
- 2	0 00477	0 11859	39	-0 01524	0 12246
- 1	-0 00782	0 11078	40	0 00300	0 12546
0	0 00277	0 11355			

Edison's Proxy Statement are demonstrably false, and the quote from AT&T's Proxy Statement is irrelevant. The primary lobbying effort in favor of the preemptive right is from Lewis D. Gilbert, John J. Gilbert and Wilma Soss who regularly introduce proposals to reincorporate the preemptive right into the corporate charter of corporations which have removed it. However, their reason for the use of rights is so that shareholders can maintain their proportionate interest in the firm. For large firms this 'benefit' has negligible value.³³

6.3 Other considerations

It should be emphasized that the monitoring cost hypothesis is consistent with both observed institutional arrangements and rational, wealth-maximizing behavior by the stockholders. Rational behavior implies that actions will be taken if the benefits exceed the costs. I have pointed out certain costs associated with the voting mechanism within corporations: inclusion of an investment banker on the board of directors, and certain management compensation plans. These practices, while costly, would still be in the stockholders' best interests if there are offsetting benefits.

Furthermore, the monitoring cost hypothesis does not imply that there are rents which accrue to the underwriting industry. There are two available 'technologies' with which additional equity capital can be raised. If the underwriting industry is competitive, the underwriting fees reported in table 1 would reflect a normal return to the resources required in employing that technology.

However, the monitoring cost hypothesis does present some problems. I do not observe the costs of monitoring management. Hence the hypothesis is not directly tested. Furthermore, while the incentives set up through the voting mechanism suggest that it is plausible that monitoring costs are large enough to explain the observed use of underwriters, competition in the market for management should reduce the required monitoring expenditures. If the use of rights offerings is in the best interests of stockholders, then it will pay potential managers to incur bonding costs to guarantee not to use underwriters.

7. Conclusions

In my examination of the choice of method for raising additional equity capital by listed firms I demonstrate that properly constructed rights offerings provide proceeds which are equivalent to those of an underwritten offering. Furthermore, estimates of expenses from reports filed with the Securities and

³³For a firm with 50 million shares outstanding, a ten percent increase in the number of outstanding shares would change the percentage ownership for someone with 100 shares only in the sixth decimal place. With so many inexpensive alternate ways for a stockholder to maintain his proportionate interest in the firm the proportionate interest argument lacks importance.

Exchange Commission indicate that rights offerings involve lower out-of-pocket costs than underwritten offerings. Yet underwriters are employed in over 90 percent of the issues. Examination of the arguments to justify the use of underwriters advanced by the underwriting industry, finance textbooks, corporate officers, and securities lawyers suggest that none of the arguments are capable of explaining the observed choice of financing method in terms of rational, wealth-maximizing behavior by the stockholders of the firm.

The one hypothesis I find which is consistent with the available evidence relates to the costs of monitoring management. Although direct expenses imposed on shareholders are higher per dollar raised through the use of underwriters, I hypothesize that management derives benefits from their use. From the shareholders' standpoint, the firm's use of underwriters is optimal because the cost of monitoring management exceeds the savings in out-of-pocket expenses from using rights. If this hypothesis is correct, then the present value of the stream of differences in costs reported in this paper provides a lower bound on the costs of getting shareholders together to monitor and control management on the method of raising capital. Thus, the present value of the differences in costs establishes a lower bound on the expected costs of control mechanisms such as proxy fights, tender offers, and takeover bids.

The monitoring cost hypothesis does present some problems. I do not observe directly the costs of monitoring management. While it is possible that the monitoring costs are large enough to explain the observed choice of underwriters, consideration of competition in the market for management reduces the plausibility of this hypothesis. But if the monitoring cost hypothesis is rejected, then the observed choice of financing method cannot be explained in terms of rational, wealth-maximizing behavior by the owners of the firm, unless it can be shown that I have either ignored or misestimated a relevant cost of using rights or benefit from using underwriters.

Appendix 1: A description of the institutional arrangements for rights and underwritten offerings

A description of the procedures followed in the various types of offerings specified in sufficient detail to answer the questions addressed in this study is not available. This appendix provides that information. Some of this material comes from written sources.³⁴ However, much of the material comes from conversations with underwriters, corporate financial officers, and SEC officials.

Underwritten offerings

The firm typically selects an underwriter in one of two ways – either by competitive bidding or by negotiated underwriting. In competitive bidding, the firm

³⁴See Weston and Brigham (1975), SEC (1974), and Pessin (1976)

files appropriate papers with the SEC, then specifies the terms of the issue and has potential underwriters submit sealed bids. Government regulation requires the use of this procedure by electric utility holding companies, the primary users of competitive bidding. In a negotiated underwriting bid, the important variables in the underwriting contract are determined by direct negotiation between firm and underwriter.

Negotiated underwriting begins with a series of pre-underwriting conferences, when decisions as to the amount of capital, type of security, and other terms of the offering are discussed. Several general forms of the underwriting agreement can be employed.³⁵ The first is a 'firm commitment' underwriting agreement, under which the underwriter agrees to purchase the whole issue from the firm at a particular price for resale to the public. Almost all large underwriters employ this form. In the second form, a 'best efforts' underwriting, the underwriter acts only as a marketing agent for the firm. The underwriter does not agree to purchase the issue at a predetermined price, but sells the security for whatever price it will bring. The underwriters take a predetermined spread and the firm takes the residual. A variant of this agreement employs a fixed price but no guarantee on the quantity to be sold. The third possibility is an 'all-or-nothing' commitment which requires the underwriter to sell the entire issue at a given price, usually within thirty days, otherwise the underwriting agreement is voided.

If the corporation and underwriter agree to proceed,³⁶ the underwriter will begin his underwriting investigation, in which he assesses the prospects for the offering. This investigation includes an audit of the firm's financial records by a public accounting firm, which aids in preparing the registration statements required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. A legal opinion of the offering will be obtained from lawyers who typically participate in writing the registration statement. Reports may also be obtained from the underwriter's engineering staff when applicable.

Before a company can raise capital through a public offering of new stock it must comply with the Federal Law that governs such a sale – the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Securities and Exchange Commission, established to administer both laws, requires full disclosure of all pertinent facts about the company before it makes a public offering of new stock. The firm must file a lengthy registration statement with the SEC setting forth data about its financial condition. For underwritten issues,

³⁵The underwriter may make a 'standby commitment' during a rights offering under which he will purchase and distribute to the public any amount of the rights issue not purchased by the present security holders. This form will be discussed further below.

³⁶Agreements are usually subject to conditions, most allow the underwriters to void their obligation in the event of specified adverse developments. For example, a negative finding in the lawyer's or auditor's reports may allow voiding the contract.

the firm usually files the form S-1 or S-7 registration statement Form S-7 is less expensive, but requires certain conditions to qualify ³⁷

The SEC has 20 days to examine the registration statement for material omissions or misrepresentations. If any error is found, a deficiency letter is sent to the corporation and the offering is delayed until the deficiency is corrected. If no deficiency letter is sent, a registration statement automatically becomes effective 20 days after filing, except when the SEC notifies the firm that the commission's workload is such that it requires more time to review the registration statement ³⁸. The firm will typically amend the registration statement to include the offer price and the offer date after the SEC has examined the rest of the statement. This procedure allows the firm and underwriter to postpone the effective date of the registration statement until they agree the offering should proceed.

In addition to the registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933, firms must qualify their securities under the state securities laws, the so-called 'Blue Sky Laws', in those states where the securities are to be sold. Some states are satisfied with SEC approval, others require a registration statement be filed with state securities commissioners.

The underwriter usually does not handle the purchase and distribution of the issue alone, except for the smallest of security issues. The investment banker usually forms a syndicate of other investment bankers and security dealers to assist the underwriting ³⁹. During the waiting period between the filing and the offer date, no written sales literature other than the so-called 'red herring'

³⁷For example, the majority of the board of directors have been members for the last three years, there have been no defaults on preferred stock or bond payments for the past 10 years, net income after taxes was at least \$500,000 for the past five years, and earnings exceeded any dividend payments made over the past five years.

³⁸In 1960 and 1961, delays of four to six months occurred for this reason.

³⁹Prior to the passage of the Securities Act in 1933 most new issues were purchased by an originating house. The originating house would resell the issue at a small increase in price to a so-called banking group, generally a few large houses. The banking group would then sell the issue to an underwriting group, which in turn sold it to a selling syndicate - each sale occurred at a fractional increase in price. The selling syndicate members, however, were liable for their proportional interest of any securities remaining unsold. Late in the 1920s it became frequent practice to make the final group a so-called selling group, the members of which had no liability except for securities which they had purchased from the underwriting syndicate.

The Securities Act, as amended shortly after its passage, contained a provision limiting an underwriter's liability for misstatements and omissions in the registration statement to an amount not 'in excess of the total price at which securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public'. This Act changed the method of wholesaling securities, the use of the joint syndicate in handling registered securities disappeared. Because of the provisions of the Act, it was to the advantage of the manager of the offering to have his fellow participants purchase direct from the company, since then the manager's liability under the Act became limited to the amount which the firm itself underwrote. Liability for transfer taxes that would have been payable on the sale by the manager to the underwriters was thus avoided. At the present time, underwriters of securities registered under the Act contract to buy directly from the issuer even though the manager of the offering signs the agreement with the issuer on behalf of each of the underwriting firms.

prospectus⁴⁰ and 'tombstone' advertisements⁴¹ are permitted by the SEC. However, oral selling efforts are permitted, and underwriters can and do note interest from their clients to buy at various prices. These do not represent legal commitments, but are used to help the underwriter decide on the offer price for the issue. Underwriters typically attempt to obtain indications of interest for approximately 10 percent more shares than will be available through the offering.⁴²

Before the effective date of the registration, the corporation's officers meet with the members of the underwriting group. Given the personal liability provisions of the 1933 Act, this meeting is often identified as a due diligence meeting. An investment banker who is dissatisfied with any of the terms or conditions discussed at this session can still withdraw from the group with no legal or financial liability. Discussed at this meeting are (1) the information in the firm's registration statement, (2) the material in the prospectus, (3) the specific provisions of the formal underwriting agreement. As a rule, all the provisions of the formal underwriting agreement are set except the final sales price.

The 'Rules of Fair Practice' of the National Association of Security Dealers require that new issues must be offered at a fixed price and that a maximum offering price be announced two weeks in advance of the offering. However, the actual offering price need not be established until immediately before the offering date. In fact, the binding underwriting agreement which specifies the offer price is not normally signed until within 24 hours of the effective date of the registration.

Once the underwriter files the final offering price with the SEC, the underwriters are precluded from selling the shares above this price. The SEC permits the managing underwriter to place a standing order with the specialist to buy the stock at the public offer price. If the underwriter buys more than 10 percent of the shares to be issued through this order, the syndicate usually breaks, permitting the stock to be sold below the offer price. The syndicate can also be broken if the managing underwriter feels that the issue cannot be sold at the offer price.⁴³ On the other hand, if all the indications of interest become orders

⁴⁰The red herring prospectus derives its name from the required disclaimer on the front printed in red.

A registration statement relating to these securities has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission but has not yet become effective. Information contained herein is subject to completion or amendment. These securities may not be sold nor may offers to buy be accepted prior to the time the registration statement becomes effective. This prospectus shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state.

⁴¹The very limited notice of the offering permitted is often presented in a form resembling the inscription on a tombstone - hence the name.

⁴²This procedure is like 'over-booking' on airplane flights.

⁴³Syndicates break infrequently, my impression is that this occurs less than five percent of the time. See *History of Corporate Finance For the Decade* (1972).

for shares, the issue is oversold. In that case the managing underwriter typically sells additional shares short and covers these short sales in the aftermarket.

The final settlement with the underwriter usually takes place seven to ten days after the registration statement becomes effective. At that time, the firm receives the proceeds of the sale, net of the underwriting compensation.

Rights offering

Offering of stock to existing shareholders on a pro rata basis is called a rights offering. Each stockholder owning shares of common stock at the issue date receives an instrument (formally called a warrant) giving the owner the option to buy new shares.⁴⁴ One warrant or right is issued for each share of stock held.⁴⁵ This instrument states the relevant terms of the option: (1) the number of rights required to purchase one new share, (2) the exercise price (or subscription price) for the rights offering, (3) the expiration date of the rights offering.

Before the offering, the firm must file a registration statement for these securities. For rights offerings, the firm typically files either a form S-1 or S-16 registration. S-16 is simpler, but has usage requirements similar to those of form S-7.

After the SEC approves the registration statement, the firm establishes a holder of record date. The stock exchange establishes the date five business days earlier as the ex rights date.⁴⁶ All individuals who hold the stock on the ex rights date will appear in the company's records on the holder of record date and will receive the rights. However, the rights can be traded on a 'when issued' basis. Usually trading begins after the formal announcement of the rights offering. To ensure that there is adequate time for the stockholders to exercise or sell their rights, the New York Stock Exchange requires that the minimum period during which rights may be exercised is 14 days. Rights trade on the exchange where the stock is listed.

Issuing rights is costly in terms of management's time, postage and other expenses, so it is in the best interest of the firm to ensure the success of the offering. Therefore, the firm has an incentive to set the subscription price of the rights low enough to ensure that the rights will be exercised. But some of

⁴⁴In the 1880s it was customary to require a stockholder to appear in person in the office of the corporation to subscribe to the issue. After the 1880s, it became customary to send out a printed slip of paper so the stockholders could sign and subscribe for the stock without actually having to appear. Later, it became the practice to make these slips of paper transferable, so that they could be sold. Around 1910 the engraved form of warrant was first issued.

⁴⁵The Uniform Practice Code of the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc., provides that subscription rights issued to security holders shall be traded in the market on the basis of one right accruing on each share of outstanding stock, except when otherwise designated by the National Uniform Practice Committee. Thus, the price quotation will be based on a single right even though several rights may be necessary to purchase one new share.

⁴⁶This procedure is comparable to that used in setting the ex dividend date.

the warrants of most offerings do expire unexercised. These unexercised rights can be offered through an over-subscription privilege to subscribing shareholders on a pro rata basis. Shares not distributed through the rights offering or through the over-subscription privilege can be sold by the firm either to investment bankers or directly to the public.

Rights offerings with a standby underwriting agreement

A formal commitment with an underwriter to take the shares not distributed through a rights offering is called a standby underwriting agreement. Several types of fee schedules are generally employed in standby underwriting agreements. A single fee may be negotiated, the firm paying the underwriter to exercise any unexercised rights at the subscription price. A two fee agreement employs both a 'standby fee', based on the total number of shares to be distributed through the offering, and a 'take-up fee', based on the number of warrants handled. The 'take-up' fee may be a flat fee or a proportioned fee.⁴⁷ These agreements generally include a profit sharing arrangement on unsubscribed shares (e.g., if the underwriter sells the shares for more than the subscription price, this difference in prices is split between the underwriter and the firm according to an agreed formula).

Underwriters are prohibited from trading in the rights until 24 hours after the rights offering is made.⁴⁸ After that time, they can sell shares of the stock short and purchase and exercise rights to cover their short position in the stock, thus hedging the risk that they bear.

Appendix 2: A contingent claims analysis of rights and underwriting contracts

The derivation of general equilibrium pricing implications of rights and underwriting contracts has not been presented. Black and Scholes (1973) suggest the approach I employ to value rights, but they do not carry out the analysis or present the solution. Ederington (1975) provides a model of under-

⁴⁷A proportioned fee involves more than one price for the shares handled by the underwriter. For example, there may be one price for the first 15% of the issue, a higher price for from 15% to 30% of the issue, and a still higher price for any of the issue over 30% which is unexercised through the rights offering and must be purchased by the underwriter.

⁴⁸Through the late 1940s underwriters were prohibited from trading in the rights during the offering. This arrangement increased the underwriter's risk because the 14-day time period allowed large adverse price movements in the stock. The NYSE instituted a study in 1947 after the failure of three rights offerings. They found that on 43 rights offerings which had been successful the total underwriting profit was approximately \$2.4 million, while on the three unsuccessful offerings, their losses were in excess of \$3 million. Underwriters were reportedly refusing to sign standby agreements unless the offering period were as short as five days. Since this violated NYSE rules, no NYSE listed firms used rights issues with standby underwriting agreements. In response to this impasse, the NYSE now allows underwriters to trade in the rights 24 hours after the rights offering is made.

writer behavior, but his model assumes underwriters maximize expected profits, and thus does not represent a general equilibrium solution in a market where the agents are risk averse. The option pricing framework employed here will yield a solution which is consistent with general equilibrium, no matter what the risk preferences of the agents in the market.

I employ the contingent claims pricing techniques to derive a specification of the equilibrium value of these contracts. For valuing both contracts I assume

- (1) There are homogeneous expectations about the dynamics of firm asset values and of security prices. The distribution of firm values at the end of any finite time interval is log normal. The variance rate, σ^2 , is constant.
- (2) Capital markets are perfect. There are no transactions costs or taxes and all traders have free and costless access to all available information. Borrowing and perfect short sales of assets are allowed. Traders are price takers in the capital markets.
- (3) There is a known constant instantaneously riskless rate of interest, r , which is the same for borrowers and lenders.
- (4) Trading takes place continuously, price changes are continuous and assets are infinitely divisible.
- (5) The firm pays no dividends.

Rights offerings

To derive the equilibrium value of the rights offering I make the following assumptions about the specification of the rights offering.

The total proceeds to the firm if the rights are exercised is X (the exercise price per share times the total number of shares sold through the rights issue). The rights expire after T time periods. If the rights are exercised, the shares sold through the offering will be a fraction, γ , of the total number of shares outstanding ($\gamma \equiv Q_R / (Q_S + Q_R)$, where Q_R is the number of shares sold through the rights offering and Q_S is the existing number of shares). Any assets acquired with the proceeds of the rights offering are acquired at competitive prices.⁴⁹

Given the above assumption, Merton (1974) has demonstrated that any contingent claim, whose value can be written solely as a function of asset value and time must satisfy the partial differential equation

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial V^2} \sigma^2 V^2 + rV \frac{\partial f}{\partial V} - rf, \quad (A1)$$

⁴⁹This last assumption is necessary to avoid the problem of the dependence of the dynamic behavior of the stock price on the probability of the rights being exercised.

where $f(V, t)$ is the function representing the value of the contingent claim [e.g., $R = R(V, t)$]. To solve this equation, normally two boundary conditions are required, one in the time dimension and one in the firm value dimension.

To derive the appropriate boundary condition in the time dimension, note that when the time to expiration is zero, R^* , the value of the rights at the expiration date will be either zero (in which case the rights will not be exercised) or, if the rights are valuable and are exercised, their value is their claim on the total assets of the firm, $\gamma(V^* + X)$ (where V^* is the value of the firm's assets and X is the proceeds from the exercise of the rights) minus the payment the right-holders must make, X :

$$R^* = \text{Max}[0, \gamma(V^* + X) - X], \quad (\text{A2})$$

where:

V^* is the value of the firm's assets at the expiration date of the issue.

X is the proceeds to the firm of the exercise of the rights.

γ is the fraction of new shares issued through the rights offering to the total shares of the firm (both old and new).

The most natural boundary condition in the firm value dimension is that when the value of the firm is zero, the value of the rights issue, R , is zero. However, the first assumption, that the distribution of firm values is log normal, insures that V can never be zero; therefore, this boundary condition will never be binding.

This equation can be solved by noting that no assumptions about risk preferences have been made, thus the solution must be the same for any preference structure which permits equilibrium. Therefore choose that structure which is mathematically simplest.⁵⁰ Assume that the market is composed of risk-neutral investors. In that case, the equilibrium rate of return on all assets will be equal. Specifically, the expected rate of return on the firm, and the rights will equal the riskless rate. Then the current rights price must be the discounted terminal price:

$$R = e^{-rT} \int_{((1-\gamma)/\gamma)X}^{\infty} [\gamma V^* - (1-\gamma)X] L'(V^*) dV^*, \quad (\text{A3})$$

where $L'(V^*)$ is the log normal density function.

Eq. (A3) can be solved to yield:⁵¹

⁵⁰See Cox and Ross (1976) or Smith (1976). For a mathematical derivation of this solution technique, see Friedman (1975), especially page 148.

⁵¹See Smith (1976, p. 16) for a theorem which can be employed to immediately solve (A3) to yield (A4).

$$\begin{aligned}
 R &= \gamma V N \left\{ \frac{\ln(\gamma V / (1-\gamma) X) + (r + \sigma^2 / 2) T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right\} \\
 &\quad - e^{-rT} (1-\gamma) X N \left\{ \frac{\ln(\gamma V / (1-\gamma) X) + (r - \sigma^2 / 2) T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right\} \\
 &= R(V, T, X, \gamma, \sigma^2, r)
 \end{aligned} \tag{A4}$$

where $\partial R / \partial V, \partial R / \partial T, \partial R / \partial \gamma, \partial R / \partial \sigma^2, \partial R / \partial r > 0$ and $\partial R / \partial X < 0$

The indicated partial effects have intuitive interpretations. Increasing the value of the firm, decreasing the exercise price (holding the proportion of the firm's shares offered through the rights offering constant), or increasing the proportion of the firm's shares offered through the rights offering (holding the total proceeds of the issue constant) increase the expected payoff to the rights and thus increases the current market value of the rights offering. An increase in the time to expiration of the riskless rate lowers the present value of the exercise payment, and thus increases the value of the rights. Finally, an increase in the variance rate gives a higher probability of a large increase in the value of the firm and increases the value of the rights.

Underwriting agreements

To analyze the appropriate compensation to the underwriter for the risk he bears in the distribution of the securities make the following assumptions about the underwriting contract:

Underwriters submit a bid, B , today which specifies that on the offer date, T time periods from now, the underwriter will pay B dollars and receive shares of stock representing fraction γ of the total shares of the firm. He can sell the securities at the offer price and receive a total payment of Ω , or (if the share price is below the offer price) at the market price, $\gamma(V^* + B)$. If his bid is accepted, he will be notified immediately.

Again, (A1) can be employed where $f(V, t)$ is the function representing the value of the underwriting contract (i.e., $U - U(V, t)$). The boundary condition for this problem is

$$U^* = \text{Min}[\gamma(V^* + B) - B, \Omega - B] \tag{A5}$$

This assumes that at the offer date the underwriter will pay the firm B dollars. The shares which the underwriter receives represent a claim to a fraction γ of the total assets of the firm, $V^* + B$. If the offer price is greater than the value of the shares, $\gamma(V^* + B)$, then the underwriter will be unable to sell the shares at the offer price, hence he will receive $\gamma(V^* + B)$. If, at the offer date the offer price is less than the value of the shares, the underwriter receives the offer price. Therefore, the boundary condition is that at the offer date the underwriting contract is worth the minimum of the market value of the shares minus the bid, B , or the proceeds of the sale at the offer price minus the bid.

Again, the above solution technique can be employed to solve (A1) subject to (A5). In a risk-neutral world, the expected value of the underwriting contract can be expressed as ⁵²

$$U = \int_0^{(\Omega/\gamma)-B} [\gamma(V^* + B) - B]L'(V^*)dV^* + \int_{(\Omega/\gamma)-B}^{\infty} [\Omega - B]L'(V^*)dV^* \quad (A6)$$

Note that this can be rewritten as

$$U = \int_0^{\infty} [\gamma(V^* + B) - B]L'(V^*)dV^* - \int_{(\Omega/\gamma)-B}^{\infty} \gamma \left[V^* - \left(\frac{\Omega}{\gamma} - B \right) \right] L'(V^*)dV^* \quad (A7)$$

Eq (A7) can be solved for the risk-neutral case to yield

$$U = e^{rT} \gamma V - (1 - \gamma)B - e^{rT} \gamma N \left\{ \frac{\ln(\gamma V / (\Omega - \gamma B)) + (r + \sigma^2/2)T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right\} + (\Omega - B\gamma)N \left\{ \frac{\ln(\gamma V / (\Omega - \gamma B)) + (r - \sigma^2/2)T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right\} \quad (A8)$$

Examination of (A8) reveals that the underwriting contract is equivalent to a portfolio consisting of a long position in the firm, a cash payment, and writing a call on γ of the firm with an exercise price equal to $(\Omega - \gamma B)$

$$U = e^{rT} \gamma V - (1 - \gamma)B - e^{rT} C(\gamma V, T, \Omega - \gamma B) = e^{rT} \gamma V - (1 - \gamma)B - e^{rT} \gamma C \left(V, T, \frac{\Omega}{\gamma} - B \right), \quad (A9)$$

where $C()$ is the Black-Scholes call option function

If the process of preparing and submitting a bid is costless, then in a competitive equilibrium, the value of the underwriting contract must be zero ⁵³

⁵²Since the contract calls for the payment only at t^* , to find the current value of the underwriting contract does not require discounting

⁵³If this were not the case, arbitrage profits could be earned by acquiring an underwriting contract and establishing the above hedge

Therefore the bid which would represent a normal compensation for the risk he bears is implicitly defined by the equation ⁵⁴

$$B - e^{rT} \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} \left[V - C \left(V, T, \frac{\Omega}{\gamma} - B \right) \right] = 0 \quad (A10)$$

The firm generally receives less than the market value of the stock⁵⁵ given the specification of the underwriting contract, if the equilibrium stock price at the offer date is above the offer price then the initial purchaser of the issue receives 'rents', he obtains the shares for less than the market value of the shares. Therefore, if the offer price in the underwriting agreement represents a binding constraint to the underwriter, then in a perfect market underwriting must be a more expensive method of raising additional capital than is a rights issue. Therefore, under these conditions, underwriting would not be employed.

The above analysis implicitly assumes that the terms of the underwriting contract represent a binding constraint to the underwriter, i.e., if the security price is above the offer price, then the offer price presents a constraint to the underwriter and a pure profit opportunity to the potential investor. However, in a market without transactions costs, this could not be the case. If the security price is above the offer price there will be excess demand for the issue. To the extent that the underwriter can, through the rationing process, extract those profits, they will accrue to the underwriter rather than to the initial purchaser. In this situation competition among underwriters would ensure that the profits were in fact garnered by the firm. In that case the offer price presents no effective constraint and the competitive bid becomes simply

$$B = e^{rT} \left(\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} \right) V \quad (A11)$$

Therefore, if through tie-in sales or other means the offer price in an underwriting agreement can be circumvented, then underwriting is no more expensive a method of raising additional capital than a rights offering.

⁵⁴This equation implicitly defines the bid because B appears twice in the equation. The explicit solution for equilibrium bid can be found by standard numerical analysis techniques.

⁵⁵A sufficient condition for the bid to be less than the market value of the shares is that $(1-\gamma)$ be less than e^{rT} . Since T is generally a matter of days, this condition should be met.

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