AT&T KENTUCKY’S POSITION ON APPLICATION OF COMPSOUTH FOR A DECLARATORY ORDER

AT&T Kentucky,¹ by its attorneys, respectfully submits this statement of its position in this proceeding. AT&T Kentucky wishes to fully apprise the Commission of the basis for its position at this stage of the proceeding, and because that position is predominantly legal, it is most appropriately presented in a legal document. For the reasons set forth below, AT&T Kentucky urges the Commission to deny the Application of CompSouth² for a Declaratory Order pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001.

INTRODUCTION

CompSouth seeks a declaration concerning interconnection under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“FTA”) and under a Kentucky statute, KRS 278.530. Specifically, CompSouth requests a declaration that “regardless of underlying technology, transmission media, or protocol that may be used for the exchange of voice traffic over two carriers’ networks, (a) the interconnection regimes under 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 and KRS 278.530 apply, and (b) these statutes permit (among other things) a requesting carrier to file a petition with the KPSC requesting an Order prescribing the rates, terms and conditions of proposed interconnection with an incumbent local exchange carrier.”³

¹ BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, d/b/a AT&T Kentucky

² Competitive Carriers of the South, Inc.

The Commission should issue no declaration concerning the FTA, for several reasons. First and foremost, the Commission does not have authority to issue such a declaration. The Commission can only do what the Kentucky Legislature has authorized it to do by statute, and no Kentucky statute authorizes the Commission to issue a declaration concerning federal law. 807 KAR 5:001, on which CompSouth relies, only authorizes declarations concerning Kentucky law. This is not to say that the Commission can never decide questions concerning the FTA. It can do so when it arbitrates an interconnection agreement ("ICA") under the FTA, which provides for state commission resolution of issues arising under the federal statute. But this is not an ICA arbitration. It is a proceeding on an improper application for a declaratory order that the Commission cannot lawfully issue.

Even when 807 KAR 5:001 does authorize the Commission to issue a declaration – about the applicability of KRS Chapter 278, for example – it does not require the Commission to do so. As the Commission has noted, 807 KAR 5:001 “gives the Commission discretion to issue declaratory orders but does not mandate the issuance of such orders.” ⁴ Even if it were authorized to do so (and it is not), the Commission should not entertain the federal question presented by CompSouth in this proceeding. Such matters are far better addressed in arbitrations of competing contract language proposals. In addition, the question of IP interconnection under the FTA is currently before the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), and it would be imprudent for the Commission to leapfrog the FCC on a federal question of nationwide significance, especially since there is no pressing reason for the Commission to do so.

Unlike the interconnection provisions of federal law, the interconnection provisions of KRS 278.530 are within the scope of the Commission’s declaratory order authority under 807 KAR 5:001. As Staff has noted, however, relief is available under KRS 278.530 only when the carrier requesting interconnection has no existing contract or interconnection with the carrier with which interconnection is sought. Here, all the CompSouth carriers participating in this proceeding have ICAs with AT&T Kentucky and have established interconnections between their networks and AT&T Kentucky’s pursuant to their ICAs. Indeed, CompSouth does not assert, and cannot assert, that AT&T Kentucky has denied any request for interconnection by any of its members. Consequently, none of the participating CompSouth carriers could possibly obtain relief under KRS 278.530, and none of them would be “substantially affected,” as 807 KAR 5:001 requires, by any declaration the Commission might make concerning that statute. Accordingly, the Commission should deny CompSouth’s request for a declaration with respect to the state interconnection statute as well as the FTA.

**PERTINENT FACTS**

Three CompSouth members are participating in this proceeding: Birch Communications, Inc. (“Birch”); Level 3 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”); and Windstream Communications, Inc. (“Windstream”). Each of those carriers has an existing ICA with AT&T Kentucky pursuant to which it is entitled to obtain interconnection with AT&T Kentucky’s network. None of the ICAs provides for Internet Protocol (“IP”) interconnection. By its terms, each of the ICAs will remain

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5 Application ¶ 1 lists not only these three CompSouth members but also XO Communications, LLC (“XO”) and EarthLink Business, LLC (“EarthLink”). However, XO has since withdrawn (see August 29, 2016, Notice of Withdrawal) and Earthlink is no longer a member of CompSouth (see Testimony of Joseph Gillan on behalf of CompSouth at 1 n.1).

6 AT&T Kentucky witness Scott McPhee testifies to this and the remaining facts set forth in this section.
in effect until one party or the other terminates it. None of the ICAs has been terminated, and none of the participating CompSouth members has requested negotiation of a new ICA.

All three participating CompSouth members have existing interconnections with AT&T Kentucky pursuant to their ICAs with AT&T Kentucky.

None of the participating CompSouth members has requested IP interconnection with AT&T Kentucky.

AT&T Kentucky has not refused the request of any participating CompSouth member to establish interconnection.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COMMISSION SHOULD MAKE NO DECLARATION CONCERNING THE INTERCONNECTION PROVISIONS OF THE FTA.

A. Kentucky Law Does Not Authorize The Commission To Issue A Declaratory Order Concerning the Federal Telecommunications Act.

CompSouth requests a declaratory ruling “[p]ursuant to 807 KAR 5:001, Section 19.” That rule, however, does not authorize the Commission to issue declarations concerning the FTA. Rather, it authorizes the Commission only to:

issue a declaratory order with respect to the jurisdiction of the commission, the applicability to a person, property, or state of facts of an order or administrative regulation of the commission or provision of KRS Chapter 278, or with respect to the meaning and scope of an order or administrative regulation of the commission or provision of KRS Chapter 278.

The principal question CompSouth poses is whether the interconnection regime under the FTA applies regardless of underlying technology, transmission media, or protocol that may be used for the exchange of voice traffic between two carriers' networks. Plainly, that is not a

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7 Application at 1.

8 Id.
question about the commission’s jurisdiction, the applicability of an order or administrative regulation of the commission, or a provision of KRS Chapter 278. Nor is it a question about the meaning or scope of such an order, regulation or provision. Rather, it is a question about the meaning and effect of a provision in the FTA, namely, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2). By its plain terms, 807 KAR 5:001, Section 19, does not authorize the Commission to address that question.

The Commission is a creature of statute, and “has only such powers as granted by the General Assembly.” Kentucky “common law has long adhered to the doctrine that the powers of administrative agencies are limited to those conferred expressly by statute or which exist by necessary and fair implication. But these implications are never extended beyond fair and reasonable inferences. Powers not conferred are just as plainly prohibited as those which are expressly forbidden.” CompSouth cites no Kentucky statute that either expressly or by necessary and fair implication authorizes the Commission to issue declarations concerning the meaning or application of the interconnection provisions of the FTA. Absent such a statute, and with 807 KAR 5:001, Section 19, clearly inapplicable, the Commission is prohibited from issuing a declaration on the principal question posed by the Application.

In addition to the principal question of federal law (i.e., whether FTA § 251(c)(2) applies regardless of underlying technology, transmission media, or protocol), the Application also poses a subsidiary question: whether the FTA permits a requesting carrier to petition the Commission for an order prescribing the rates, terms, and conditions of proposed interconnection with an

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9 Section 251(c)(2) is the FTA provision that requires incumbent local exchange carriers to provide interconnection to requesting carriers.


incumbent local exchange carrier. That question, like the first, asks about the FTA and so is not within the scope of 807 KAR 5:00 or of the jurisdiction the Legislature has conferred on the Commission. Beyond that, there is no dispute that a requesting carrier can ask the Commission to arbitrate open issues in compliance with the FTA. But it cannot do what CompSouth is asking – pre-determine the outcome of any such issues outside a section 252 arbitration proceeding.

B. CompSouth’s Contention That It Is Seeking A Ruling About The Commission’s Jurisdiction Is Without Merit.

CompSouth has contended that it is seeking a ruling about the Commission’s jurisdiction, which is within the scope of 807 KAR 5:001, Section 19. That contention is demonstrably wrong. CompSouth’s request is for a ruling that, “regardless of underlying technology, transmission media, or protocol that may be used for the exchange of voice traffic over two carriers’ networks, (a) the interconnection regimes under 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 and KRS 278.530 apply, and (b) these statutes permit (among other things) a requesting carrier to file a petition with the KPSC requesting an Order prescribing the rates, terms and conditions of proposed interconnection with an incumbent local exchange carrier.” Obviously, that question – as it relates to 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 – is about the meaning and scope of the FTA, not about the jurisdiction of the KPSC. By its plain terms, CompSouth’s question is one that would be answered by examining the FTA, not the Kentucky statutes that define this Commission’s jurisdiction. Indeed, as CompSouth itself has emphasized, the FTA “cannot give the PSC

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12 Application at p.1.

13 CompSouth made that contention in the Reply by Applicant Competitive Carriers of the South, Inc., filed November 2, 2015, which responded to, among other things, the demonstration that the Commission should deny CompSouth’s request for a declaratory order set forth in AT&T Kentucky’s October 14, 2015, Amended Response to CompSouth’s Request for a Declaratory Order.

14 Application at 1 (emphasis added).
authority that is not granted to it by the Kentucky General Assembly.”¹⁵ So, by definition, a question about the meaning of the FTA cannot possibly be a question about the Commission’s jurisdiction.

CompSouth’s contention that it has posed a question about the Commission’s jurisdiction is apparently based on the notion that if the interconnection regime in the FTA does not apply to interconnection in IP format, the Commission would lack jurisdiction to address IP interconnection in an ICA arbitration under the 1996 act. That notion is mistaken. If the law requires a criminal court to impose a sentence of at least five years, that does NOT mean that the court does not have jurisdiction to impose a lesser sentence; the court has jurisdiction to decide the sentence, but a rule of law limits the court’s choices when it exercises that jurisdiction.

Similarly, if the law says that summary judgment cannot be granted when there is a conflict in the evidence, that does not mean that a court lacks jurisdiction to enter summary judgment in a case where there is a conflict in the evidence; again, the court has jurisdiction to rule on the motion for summary judgment, but a legal rule governs the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction.

Similarly here, the interconnection regime in the FTA either does or does not apply to IP interconnection – and the KPSC has jurisdiction to decide whether it does in an ICA arbitration. If the interconnection regime in the FTA does not apply to IP interconnection, that means that if a State commission is presented with the question in an arbitration, it should so rule – but it does NOT mean that the State commission does not have jurisdiction to decide the question. Thus, if the KPSC ruled in an AT&T Kentucky arbitration that the FTA requires IP interconnection, and imposed terms and conditions for IP interconnection, AT&T Kentucky could argue on appeal that the Commission should be reversed because it misread the FTA’s interconnection

¹⁵ CompSouth Reply at 2.
requirement, but it would not argue that the Commission exercised jurisdiction that it does not have.

CompSouth asserts that if a CLEC files for arbitration seeking IP interconnection, “the ILECs will argue that the PSC does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an ICA for IP exchange of voice traffic.”\(^\text{16}\) That assertion is false. AT&T Kentucky might argue that the FTA does not require IP interconnection, but it would not make any argument concerning the Commission’s jurisdiction. Exhibit 1 to this Attachment corroborates this. Sprint and AT&T Michigan arbitrated an ICA in the Michigan Public Service Commission (“MPSC”), and Sprint proposed terms for IP interconnection. As pages 1-28 of Exhibit 1 show, AT&T Michigan opposed Sprint’s proposal, but it did not argue or suggest that the MPSC did not have jurisdiction. CompSouth is 100% wrong when it asserts that AT&T Kentucky would argue in an ICA arbitration that the KPSC is without jurisdiction to decide whether the FTA applies to IP interconnection.

Finally, CompSouth asserts that AT&T Kentucky is “arguing that the PSC declare that it is without jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling involving interpretation of federal statutes based on a (wrong) interpretation of those federal statutes.”\(^\text{17}\) Again, CompSouth is wrong. AT&T Kentucky’s demonstration that the Commission is without authority to issue a declaration concerning the applicability of the FTA includes no interpretation of the FTA whatsoever. It is based solely on the language of 807 KAR 5:001, Section 19, which plainly does not authorize declaratory rulings about federal law.

\(^{16}\) CompSouth Reply at 13.

\(^{17}\) CompSouth Reply at 3.

807 KAR 5:001, Section 19, begins with the words, “The commission may, upon application by a person substantially affected, issue a declaratory order . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the rule merely allows for the issuance of a declaratory order in appropriate instances; as the Commission has noted, it “does not mandate the issuance of such orders.” As demonstrated above, no declaratory order may lawfully issue on the federal questions presented in the Application. Even if that were not the case, however, there are compelling reasons for the Commission to decline to issue such an order.

First, the appropriate forum for state commission resolution of federal interconnection issues is an arbitration of an ICA. That is the forum Congress created for dealing with such matters, and it is only in the context of the competing contract language proposals that are presented in an arbitration that a state commission can properly decide them. Indeed, a Commission declaration about interconnection under federal law in this proceeding would have little if any effect, as a practical matter, because, as we explain below, the ICA pathway mandated by the FTA is the only mechanism by which a requesting carrier can actually obtain interconnection under the FTA.

Second, the question whether the interconnection provisions of the FTA extend to IP interconnection is pending before the FCC. The Commission should not anticipate the FCC’s decision on this federal question of nationwide importance, especially when, as here, there is no pressing need for it to do so. If a future ICA arbitration presents the question to the Commission in a form that the Commission must grapple with, then it may need to do so. But there is no reason for the Commission to do so now.

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1. The Commission Should Not Address IP Interconnection Outside An ICA Arbitration Under The FTA.

As the Commission has stated, 807 KAR 5:001 provides a procedure for obtaining guidance “where no other available remedy or process is readily available to address the proposed act or conduct.” Here, an appropriate remedy or process will be readily available when and if Kentucky telecommunications carriers have a ripe disagreement about interconnection under the FTA: arbitration.

In the FTA, Congress established a straightforward procedure for state commission resolution of disagreements about the interconnection and other provisions of section 251 of the FTA. The process begins with a request to negotiate. If the parties do not arrive at a complete ICA via negotiation, either party may petition the state commission to arbitrate open issues, and the State commission rules on the open issues by applying the federal statute (section 251 and pricing standards in section 252(d)) and the regulations established by the FCC to implement the statute. After the State commission resolves the open issues, the parties submit a conforming ICA for the commission to review. The State commission then approves or rejects the ICA in accordance with criteria set forth in the statute.

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21 Id. § 252(b)(1).

22 Id. § 252(c)(1).

23 Id. § 252(e)(1).

24 Id. § 252(e)(2).
the ICA, the FTA provides for federal court review of the commission’s application of federal law in the proceedings.\textsuperscript{25}

This is the one and only process Congress established for state commission resolution of disagreements about interconnection agreements under the FTA, and the courts have rejected state commission attempts to use other procedures to implement FTA requirements. In \emph{Verizon North, Inc. v. Strand},\textsuperscript{26} for example, the Michigan Public Service Commission ordered an incumbent LEC to tariff its prices for unbundled network elements required by the FTA. The ILEC challenged the order, and the federal district court reversed the MPSC, stating

\begin{quote}
Congress designed a deregulatory process that would rely in the first instance on private negotiations to set the terms for implementing new duties under the Act. In contrast to the private, party-specific negotiation and arbitration system created by Congress, the process for sale of network elements required by the MPSC’s Order is a public rule of general application. By requiring [the ILEC] to file public tariffs offering its network elements at wholesale services for sale to any party, the MPSC’s Order improperly permits an entrant to purchase [the ILEC’s] network elements and finished services from a set menu without ever entering into the process to negotiate and arbitrate an interconnection agreement. It thus evades the exclusive process required by the 1996 Act . . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that the tariff requirement in the February 25 order is inconsistent with and preempted by the FTA.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning, “[T]he MPSC order completely bypasses and ignores the detailed process for interconnection set out by Congress in the FTA, under which competing telecommunications providers can gain access to incumbents’ services and network elements by entering into private negotiation and arbitration aimed at creating interconnection agreements that are then subject to state commission approval, FCC oversight, and federal judicial review. This is

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Id.} § 252(e)(6).

\textsuperscript{26} 309 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Id.} at 940.
inconsistent with the provisions of [the FTA], and therefore preempted.”

Similarly, in *Wisconsin Bell Inc. v. Bie*, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal of a state commission order requiring tariffing of unbundled network elements, stating, “The requirement *has* to interfere with the procedures established by the federal act. It places a thumb on the negotiation scales . . . .”

In *Verizon North* and *Wisconsin Bell*, the federal courts of appeals held that state commission actions that interfered with the FTA’s negotiation and arbitration scheme were preempted. Here, AT&T Kentucky is not making a preemption argument. Rather, the point is that if Kentucky law did authorize the Commission to issue the declaration of federal law that CompSouth requests – which it plainly does not – the Commission should decline to do so because, as *Verizon North* and *Wisconsin Bell* make clear, arbitration is the only appropriate forum for state commission adjudication of the substantive requirements of the FTA.

If this Commission is presented with a question concerning IP interconnection in an arbitration, the question will be presented not in the abstract, as it is here, but in the context of proposed terms for an interconnection agreement. It is in that context, and only in that context, that Congress intended state commissions to interpret and apply the requirements of FTA section 251, and it is in that context that state commissions can most prudently do so. This is illustrated by a decision of the Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) in an arbitration in which Sprint asked the ICC to require the incumbent carrier, AT&T Illinois, to provide IP interconnection, but with the details to be determined later. The Commission rejected Sprint’s proposal, based in significant part on the recommendation of its Staff:

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28 *Id.* at 941.

29 340 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 2003).
Staff notes that Sprint proposes, with limited exceptions that the details of IP-to-IP Interconnection should be determined at a later date, but separately proposes the Commission determine that Sprint has a right to exchange traffic with AT&T in IP format. Staff explains, however, that in arbitrating disputes brought pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Act, the Commission is required by Section 252(c) to ensure that resolution and conditions of interconnection meet the requirements of Section 251 of the Act and the FCC’s Part 51 rules implementing the requirements of Section 251. Staff recommends that the Commission make no such determinations because Sprint, with one exception, has not identified the terms and conditions under which it seeks IP interconnection and, therefore, the Commission does not have a proposal before it that would allow the Commission to assess whether the terms and conditions under which Sprint seeks IP interconnection meet the requirements of Section 251 of the Act and Part 51 of the FCC’s rules implementing the requirements of Section 251.30

Consistent with its Staff’s recommendation, the ICC rejected Sprint’s proposal for IP interconnection, stating,

The Commission notes that it has not determined that any provider has the right to exchange traffic with an incumbent local exchange carrier in IP format. Indeed, the legal question of whether IP Interconnection can be compelled pursuant to Section 251 has not been decided by the FCC. Also, the Commission has not determined any rates, terms, or conditions under which IP interconnection would occur, consistent with the requirements of Section 251 of the Act or the FCC and ICC rules and regulations implementing it. While the Commission might or might not have the authority to order IP interconnection, this decision cannot be made until it is presented with an IP-to-IP interconnection proposal of sufficient detail to allow it to assess whether such a plan is technically feasible or otherwise comports with the requirements of the 1996 Act.31

That reasoning applies with even greater force here. The ICC prudently declined to decide whether the FTA requires IP interconnection because the carrier that requested IP interconnection proposed contract language that left most of the detail for future discussion. All the more clearly,


31 Id. at 34.
this Commission should decline to address that question unless and until it is presented with a concrete proposal in an arbitration rather than, as here, in the abstract.

Finally, the declaratory ruling that CompSouth seeks would have little effect, if any, even if the Commission could issue it. Assume the Commission were to issue an order stating yes, the interconnection regime under the FTA applies regardless of underlying technology, transmission media, or protocol. Then, in the next ICA negotiation between AT&T Kentucky and a participating CompSouth member, that carrier would presumably propose terms for IP interconnection. If the parties did not reach agreement, the matter would become a subject for arbitration. For all practical purposes, that arbitration would look exactly the same as it would have looked in the absence of the prior declaratory ruling. In that arbitration, AT&T Kentucky – if only to preserve the federal court review the FTA provides\(^\text{32}\) – would argue that the FTA does not require IP interconnection, and the Commission would have to decide again the same question CompSouth is asking it to decide here.

Simply put, Congress provided a specific role for state commissions in the adjudication of issues that arise under the FTA – arbitration and approval of interconnection agreements. Even if 807 KAR 5:001 allowed the Commission to issue a declaration concerning the meaning or effect of the interconnection provisions of the FTA, it would be imprudent for the Commission to do so.

2. **This Commission Should Not Get Out In Front Of The FCC.**

In WC Dkt. No. 11-119, *In the Matter of TW Telecom Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Direct IP-to-IP Interconnection Pursuant to Section 251(c)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)*, ...
Act, the FCC is considering the question whether section 251(c)(2) of the FTA requires ILECs to provide IP interconnection to requesting carriers. In its Petition initiating that proceeding, TW Telecom Inc. stated, “[S]tates currently lack the legal guidance from the FCC needed to confidently arbitrate disputes regarding IP-based interconnection agreements.” Subsequently, the FCC sought comment on whether section 251(c)(2) requires IP interconnection.

The FCC has received hundreds of pages of pleadings on IP interconnection from incumbent LECs, competing LECs, wireless carriers, state commissions and other interested parties across the country. The question is of national importance, and the FCC will decide it on a nationwide basis. Even if this Commission could lawfully entertain the federal question under 807 KAR 5:001, it would not be prudent to do so when the question is pending at the FCC, particularly, where, as here, there is no immediate controversy that requires an answer. If a carrier seeks to negotiate a new interconnection agreement with AT&T Kentucky, and if that carrier asks for IP interconnection with AT&T Kentucky, and if the parties are unable to resolve the matter between themselves, and if the question is then raised as an open issue in an arbitration, then the

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34 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd 17663 (2011), ¶¶ 1385-1395. The FCC stated, for example (at ¶ 1389), “Section 251(c)(2)(A) requires that interconnection obtained under 251(c) be ‘for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access.’ We seek comment on whether traffic exchanged via IP-to-IP interconnection would meet those criteria.” If the answer to that question is “no,” it would necessarily follow that section 251(c)(2) does not require IP interconnection. Similarly, the FCC asked (at ¶ 1392), “[T]o what extent must an incumbent LEC be using IP transmission in its own network before it could be required to provide IP-to-IP interconnection pursuant to [section 251(c)(2)], and to what extent is that occurring today?” The answers to those questions, too, could lead to a conclusion that section 251(c)(2) does not require IP interconnection – or does not require certain ILECs to provide IP interconnection. For present purposes, the point is that the IP interconnection question is open and pending at the FCC.

35 In addition to ILECs, CLECs and wireless carriers, participants in the FCC docket include the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions, the United States Telecom Association, the National Association of State Utility Advocates, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, The Competitive Carriers Association, the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Google and CompSouth participating member Earthlink.
Commission may conclude that it needs to answer the question (or, like the ICC, it may not). But it would be imprudent for the Commission to address this issue now.

II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD MAKE NO DECLARATION CONCERNING KRS 278.530 BECAUSE NO COMPSOUTH PARTICIPANT WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE DECLARATION.

The Commission has discretion to issue a declaratory order concerning its own jurisdiction, the application of its own orders or regulations, or the application of a provision in KRS Chapter 278, but only “upon application by a person substantially affected.” None of the participating CompSouth members would be substantially affected by a declaratory ruling on KRS 278.530 as it might apply to AT&T Kentucky, because all of them already have ICAs with AT&T Kentucky pursuant to which they have established interconnection with AT&T Kentucky. Accordingly, the Commission should decline to issue a declaratory order concerning KRS 278.530.

KRS 278.530(1) provides,

Whenever any telephone company desires to connect its exchange or lines with the exchange or lines of another telephone company and the latter refuses to permit this to be done upon reasonable terms, rates and conditions, the company desiring the connection may proceed as provided in subsection (2) or as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

By its plain terms, that statute comes into play only when one telephone company refuses the request of another telephone company to permit interconnection upon reasonable terms, rates and conditions. Moreover, as the KPSC Staff stated in an advisory opinion that CompSouth cites, “The Commission . . . has interpreted KRS 278.530 to apply to situations where interconnection does not already exist. . . . Therefore, Commission Staff concludes that . . . KRS 278.530 . . . only applies in the absence of an existing contract or interconnection.”

36 807 KAR 5:001(19)(1) (emphasis added).

Here, all of the participating CompSouth members have ICAs with AT&T Kentucky and have interconnected their networks with AT&T Kentucky’s network. Furthermore, none of the CompSouth members has any grievance with AT&T Kentucky under KRS 278.530, because AT&T Kentucky has not refused a request by any of them for interconnection on reasonable rates, terms and conditions.

Thus, any declaration by the Commission concerning KRS 278.530 would have no effect whatsoever on any of the participating CompSouth members, so none of them has the required “substantial interest” in the requested declaration. Consequently, CompSouth not only is not entitled to the declaration it requests under the express terms of 807 KAR 5:001, but also cannot meet the threshold requirement of standing to pursue the declaration it requests. Even with regard to declaratory rulings, a party must show a legally “recognizable interest in the subject matter of the suit.” Not only that, but the party’s interest must be determined to be “present and substantial as opposed to a mere expectancy.” *Gen. Drivers, Warehouseman & Helpers Local Union No. 89 v. Chandler*, 968 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). CompSouth fails this test.

This conclusion is bolstered by CompSouth’s Application, which fails to sufficiently allege that the participating members will be “substantially affected” by the requested declaratory order. To be sure, the Application parrots the language of 807 KAR 5:001 by reciting that the members will be “substantially affected,” but all it offers in support of the recitation is purported uncertainty that “could have the effect of slowing the transition” from TDM to IP-based voice services at some

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*App. 1977), and as described by *Lightsey v. Harding, Dahm & Co.*, 623 F.2d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission has the power to set charges between competing phone services in the absence of agreement, that since the parties had voluntarily entered into a written agreement the Commission had no statutory authority over the dispute, and that therefore the Commission was ousted of jurisdiction).
uncertain time in the future.\textsuperscript{38} That is not the present and substantial interest that Kentucky law requires.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The Commission is not authorized by 807 KAR 5:001 or any other provision of Kentucky law to issue a declaration concerning the meaning or effect of the interconnection provisions of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, and even if it were, it would not be prudent for the Commission to do so. The Commission should also deny CompSouth’s request for a declaration concerning KRS 278.530, because all the participating CompSouth members have ICAs and existing interconnections with AT&T Kentucky; no CompSouth member has requested IP interconnection with AT&T Kentucky; and no CompSouth member has made any request for interconnection that AT&T Kentucky has denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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\textsuperscript{38} Application ¶ 3 (emphasis added).