

**COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY**  
**BEFORE THE**  
**PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY**

**In the Matter Of:**

**The Application of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of            )**  
**Kentucky Power Company from November 1, 2013        ) Case No. 2014-00225**  
**Through April 30, 2014    )**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**  
**OF**  
**RANIE K. WOHNHAS**

**November 5, 2014**



**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF  
RANIE K. WOHNHAS, ON BEHALF OF  
KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY  
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY**

**CASE NO. 2014-00225**

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KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY  
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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1 **Q: PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

2 A. My name is Ranie K. Wohnhas. My position is Managing Director, Regulatory  
3 and Finance, Kentucky Power Company (“Kentucky Power” or “Company”). My  
4 business address is 101 A Enterprise Drive, Frankfort, Kentucky 40602.

**II. BACKGROUND**

5 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND**  
6 **BUSINESS EXPERIENCE.**

7 A. I earned a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in accounting from Franklin  
8 University, Columbus, Ohio in December 1981. I began work with Columbus  
9 Southern Power Company in 1978 working in various customer services and  
10 accounting positions. In 1983, I transferred to Kentucky Power working in  
11 accounting, rates and customer services. I became the Billing and Collections  
12 Manager in 1995 overseeing all billing and collection activity for the Company.  
13 In 1998, I transferred to Appalachian Power Company (“APCo”) working in  
14 rates. In 2001, I transferred to the American Electric Power (“AEP”) Service  
15 Corporation (“AEPSC”) working as a Senior Rate Consultant. In July 2004, I  
16 assumed the position of Manager, Business Operations Support with Kentucky  
17 Power and was promoted to Director in April 2006. I was promoted to my current

1 position as Managing Director, Regulatory and Finance effective September 1,  
2 2010.

3 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MANAGING DIRECTOR,**  
4 **REGULATORY AND FINANCE?**

5 A. I am primarily responsible for managing the regulatory and financial strategy for  
6 Kentucky Power. This includes planning and executing rate filings for both  
7 federal and state regulatory agencies and certificate of public convenience and  
8 necessity (“CPCN”) filings before this Commission. I am also responsible for  
9 managing the Company’s financial operating plans including various capital and  
10 O&M operational budgets that interface with all other AEP organizations  
11 affecting the Company’s performance. As part of the financial strategy, I work  
12 with various AEPSC departments to ensure that adequate resources such as debt,  
13 equity and cash are available to build, operate, and maintain Kentucky Power’s  
14 electric system assets providing service to our retail and wholesale customers. In  
15 my role as Managing Director, Regulatory and Finance, I report directly to  
16 Gregory G. Pauley, President and Chief Operating Officer of Kentucky Power.

17 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?**

18 A. Yes. I have testified before this Commission in various fuel review proceedings  
19 and filed testimony in the Company’s three most recent base rate case filings,  
20 Case No. 2005-00341, Case No. 2009-00459 and Case No. 2013-00197. Other  
21 cases in which I have testified include a CPCN application for construction of the  
22 Softshell – Bonnyman transmission line, Case No. 2011-00295; an environmental  
23 compliance plan, Case No. 2011-00401; a real-time pricing proceeding, Case No.

1 2012-00226; the Company's application to transfer an undivided 50% interest in  
2 the Mitchell Generating Station to Kentucky Power, Case No. 2012-00578; and  
3 the CPCN application for the conversion of Big Sandy Unit 1 to gas, Case No.  
4 2013-00430.

### **III. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

5 **Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS**  
6 **PROCEEDING?**

7 A: The purpose of my testimony is to identify and address a number of erroneous  
8 contentions advanced by KIUC and Attorney General ("KIUC/AG") Witnesses  
9 Kollen and Hayet. In particular, my testimony addresses four topics: (1) how  
10 Kentucky Power's allocation of no load costs during the review period comports  
11 with the Company's historical practices, (2) how Kentucky Power's allocation of  
12 no load costs is consistent with the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement in Case  
13 No. 2012-00578, (3) the implication of the allocation process proposed by the  
14 KIUC/AG witnesses on the Company's Commission-approved base rates, and (4)  
15 how KIUC/AG Witness Kollen misrepresents Kentucky Power's earnings during  
16 the review period.

17 **Q. ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY EXHIBITS?**

18 A. Yes, I am sponsoring Exhibit RKW-1 – a calculation of fuel costs at Mitchell and  
19 Big Sandy Unit 2.

### **IV. HISTORICAL ALLOCATION OF NO LOAD COSTS**

20 **Q. MR. KOLLEN STATES AT PAGE 3 OF HIS TESTIMONY THAT THE**  
21 **COMPANY'S ALLOCATION METHODOLOGY FORCES NATIVE**

1           **LOAD CUSTOMERS TO PAY UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE FUEL**  
2           **ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE (“FAC”) RATES TO ENHANCE THE**  
3           **PROFITABILITY OF THE COMPANY’S OFF-SYSTEMS SALES. IS**  
4           **THIS CORRECT?**

5    A.    No. The method that the Company used to allocate costs between Off-System  
6           Sales (OSS) and native load fairly allocates no load costs to the Company’s native  
7           load customers. This method, which did not change with the Company’s  
8           acquisition of its 50% undivided interest in the Mitchell generating station or the  
9           termination of the AEPSC Interchange Pool Agreement, has been used by the  
10          Company for at least the past 30 years. It is premised upon the fundamental fact  
11          that Kentucky Power’s generating units were built or acquired for the purpose of  
12          serving, and are operated to serve, native load customers first. I do not  
13          understand Mr. Kollen to contend to the contrary. In fact, the Company used this  
14          allocation methodology prior to implementing the System Sales Clause (the  
15          sharing mechanism between the Company and customers) in 1988. The  
16          allocation process has always properly allocated the no load cost to native load  
17          customers. As further detailed in the rebuttal testimony of Company Witness  
18          Pearce, this allocation methodology is also both fair and consistent with Kentucky  
19          Power’s membership in PJM Interconnection.

20    **Q.    807 KAR 5:056 SECTION 1(3)(E) PROVIDES THAT “ALL FUEL COSTS**  
21           **SHALL BE BASED ON WEIGHTED AVERAGE INVENTORY**  
22           **COSTING.” IS NOT THE COMPANY’S ALLOCATION**  
23           **METHODOLOGY CONTRARY TO THIS PROVISION?**

1 A. No. There is a difference between providing fuel costs at a weighted average  
2 inventory cost versus how those costs are allocated. The Company has always  
3 provided fuel costs for recovery through the monthly FAC filing at a weighted  
4 average inventory cost level in compliance with 807 KAR 5:056. However, 807  
5 KAR 5:056 does not address the allocation methodology of those costs.

V. **MITCHELL STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT**

6 **Q. WITNESS KOLLEN CLAIMS THE COMPANY FAILED TO DISCLOSE**  
7 **IN CASE NO. 2012-00578 THE MATERIAL FACT THAT CUSTOMERS**  
8 **WOULD FACE AN INCREASE IN FUEL COSTS DUE TO THE**  
9 **COMPANY’S ALLOCATION APPROACH. IS THIS CORRECT?**

10 A. No. The Company calculated the estimate in Paragraph 2 of the July 2,  
11 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement as an example of the potential fuel savings  
12 available to the Company’s customers due to the Mitchell transfer. These  
13 estimated savings arise from Mitchell’s ability to burn a mixture of high sulfur  
14 coal and low sulfur coal instead of only higher-cost low sulfur coal required by  
15 Big Sandy Unit 2. This is made clear by the language of Paragraph 2: “Because  
16 of the anticipated lower fuel costs of Mitchell Units 1 and 2 vis-à-vis the  
17 anticipated fuel costs of the Big Sandy Units, the transfer of the Mitchell units to  
18 Kentucky Power is expected to provide Kentucky Power customers with the  
19 benefit of reduced fuel costs of approximately \$2.50/MWh.” Mr. Kollen’s  
20 accusation is unfounded and premised upon an apples and oranges comparison.

21 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY CALCULATED THE FUEL SAVINGS**  
22 **PRODUCED THROUGH KENTUCKY POWER’S OWNERSHIP OF THE**



1           **FIFTY PERCENT UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE MITCHELL**  
2           **GENERATING STATION?**

3    A.    Yes. Please understand that, as the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement makes  
4           clear, the \$16.75 million in fuel savings was only an estimate based upon  
5           historical information. With that in mind, Exhibit RKW-1 demonstrates that from  
6           January through August of 2014 the cost difference between the high and low-  
7           sulfur coals used at Mitchell and the low-sulfur coal used at Big Sandy Unit 2 was  
8           \$9,884,747. On an annual basis those savings would equal \$14,827,121 or almost  
9           89% of the estimated amount.

10   **Q.    DID THE COMPANY WITHHOLD FROM THE COMMISSION THE**  
11           **RISK THAT DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD WHEN THE COMPANY**  
12           **OWNED AND OPERATED BOTH BIG SANDY AND MITCHELL THERE**  
13           **MIGHT BE A HIGHER LEVEL OF NO LOAD COSTS?**

14   A.    Absolutely not. The Company did not intend to modify the no load cost  
15           allocation methodology and accordingly never considered it necessary to raise the  
16           issue. More fundamentally, the higher no load costs are driven principally by the  
17           fact that the extreme cold weather experienced during the January and February  
18           2014 Polar Vortex created a seldom-seen and never-contemplated demand for the  
19           Company's generation. Had the Company's service territory experienced weather  
20           during the winter of 2014 similar to that experienced during the winter of 2013,  
21           the demand for the Company's energy would not have been nearly as high as was  
22           experienced during the winter of 2014 and the no load costs would have been  
23           lower.

1 **Q. DID THE INTERNAL CUSTOMERS OF KENTUCKY POWER**  
2 **COMPANY BENEFIT FROM THE COMPANY OWNING BOTH BIG**  
3 **SANDY UNIT 2 AND AN UNDIVIDED 50% INTEREST IN MITCHELL**  
4 **DURING THE POLAR VORTEX?**

5 A. Yes. As discussed in the testimony of Company Witness Pearce, Kentucky  
6 Power's ownership of both Big Sandy Unit 2 and Mitchell protected Kentucky  
7 Power's customers from market volatility and higher costs during the extreme  
8 cold of the Polar Vortex period. Had the Company not had both Mitchell and Big  
9 Sandy Unit 2 available to meet internal load, it would have been forced into  
10 significant market purchases to meet weather-related, increased internal demand.  
11 These market purchases would have cost Kentucky Power's customers  
12 approximately \$9.9 million more than what the Company recovered via the FAC  
13 during the review period.

14 **Q. DID THE JULY 2, 2013 STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT**  
15 **AGREEMENT IN CASE NO. 2012-00578 CHANGE THE ALLOCATION**  
16 **OF OSS MARGINS?**

17 A. Yes. Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement provides for the  
18 Company to retain all OSS revenues above \$15,290,363 effective January 1, 2014  
19 and until new base rates are set by the Commission.

20 **Q. WHY WAS PARAGRAPH 7 INCLUDED IN THE STIPULATION AND**  
21 **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?**

22 A. Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement only provided the  
23 Company with a partial recovery (\$44 million annually or approximately 40%) of

1 the estimated costs associated with Kentucky Power's fifty percent undivided  
2 interest in the Mitchell generating station. To help offset the "certainty" of this  
3 very substantial loss during the interim period the Company would own and  
4 operate both Big Sandy and its undivided interest in the Mitchell generating  
5 station, the parties to the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement agreed to, and the  
6 Commission approved, the modification of the Company's OSS clause to provide  
7 Kentucky Power with the *opportunity* to "earn back" some but not all (under most  
8 reasonably foreseeable circumstances) of these lost revenues through a change in  
9 the OSS margin allocation. The risk of less than projected OSS was thus entirely  
10 on Kentucky Power, and a warmer than normal winter would have severely  
11 limited the Company's opportunity to recover some of the lost revenues  
12 associated with only a partial recovery of the Mitchell asset. It is also important  
13 to recognize that Kentucky Power's customers continue to enjoy through lower  
14 base rates the entire benefit of the first \$15.3 million in OSS margins.

15 **Q. DID THE EXISTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE STIPULATION AND**  
16 **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AFFECT THE COMPANY'S OPERATION**  
17 **OF ITS GENERATION ASSETS?**

18 A. No. Kentucky Power operated its generation assets in the same fashion it would  
19 have if it continued after December 31, 2014 to split OSS margins with its  
20 customers. The Intervenors contention to the contrary is without basis in fact. As  
21 Company Witness Pearce describes, Kentucky Power is required by PJM to offer  
22 all of its units into the PJM Day Ahead Market and not just those required to meet  
23 its native load. It did just this and in the same manner both before and after

1 January 1, 2014 (the effective date of the elimination of OSS sharing through  
2 Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement). The only thing that  
3 would change, as stated previously, is how much the units would run based upon  
4 the impact of weather.

## VI. KENTUCKY POWER'S BASE RATES

5 **Q. HOW DOES THE CHANGE TO THE COMPANY'S ALLOCATION**  
6 **METHOD PROPOSED BY MR. KOLLEN IMPLICATE THE**  
7 **COMPANY'S BASE RATES APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION IN**  
8 **CASE NO. 2009-00459?**

9 A. The allocation method proposed by Mr. Kollen is inconsistent with the May 19,  
10 2010 Unanimous Settlement Agreement resolving Case No. 2009-00459 and  
11 establishing the Company's current base rates ("Unanimous Settlement  
12 Agreement"). Mr. Kollen's proposal would increase the cost of OSS to the  
13 Company, thereby reducing the Company's OSS margins, without the necessary  
14 corresponding increase in the amounts recoverable under base rates.

15 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW OSS MARGINS ARE RELATED TO BASE**  
16 **RATES.**

17 A. The Unanimous Settlement Agreement, signed by both KIUC and the Attorney  
18 General, established the Company's current annual revenue requirement. The  
19 Unanimous Settlement Agreement set forth the amount of the revenue  
20 requirement that the Company can recover through base rates. As part of  
21 establishing the amount recoverable through base rates, Kentucky Power's  
22 customers were "credited" with the test year amount of off-system sales margins.

1 If the Company's OSS margins exceed the margins credited against base rates, the  
2 excess was split on a 60/40 basis, with the customers receiving 60%. If the OSS  
3 margins were less than the amount credited against base rates, the customers were  
4 charged 60% of the shortage. This arrangement benefitted the Company's  
5 customers through reduced base rates.

6 **Q. HOW DID NO LOAD COSTS FACTOR INTO THE ESTABLISHMENT**  
7 **OF THE TEST YEAR OSS MARGIN CREDITED AGAINST BASE**  
8 **RATES?**

9 A. Since OSS margins are simply the profits from off-system sales, they are  
10 calculated by subtracting the costs of making the sales from the revenues received  
11 from those sales. During the test year used for establishing the OSS margins  
12 credited against base rates in Case No. 2009-00459, the costs of off-system sales  
13 included only the incremental costs associated with making those off-system  
14 sales. In that test year, no load costs were allocated to native load customers, as  
15 they had been for decades before. Thus, the OSS margins credited to (and thereby  
16 reducing) base rates in Case No. 2009-00459 were calculated without any no-load  
17 costs allocated to off-system sales.

18 **Q. HOW WOULD THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY MR. KOLLEN**  
19 **AFFECT THE AMOUNT THE COMPANY WOULD NEED TO**  
20 **RECOVER VIA BASE RATES?**

21 A. Contrary to the approach proposed by Mr. Kollen the allocation of no load costs  
22 cannot occur in a vacuum. As discussed above, the Company calculated the test  
23 year OSS margins to be credited against base rates utilizing only the incremental

1 costs incurred in making those off-system sales. Consistent with historical  
2 practice and the fact that the generation assets serve the Company's internal  
3 customers first, Kentucky Power assigned no load costs to native load in their  
4 entirety. Again, the OSS margin credit reduced base rates for the Company's  
5 customers.

6 If Mr. Kollen's no-load cost allocation method were used, the Company's  
7 test year OSS margin would have been lower. As a result the OSS margin credit  
8 against base rates would have been lower. The lower OSS margin credit would  
9 have required the amount recoverable through base rates to increase for the  
10 Company to meet its Commission approved revenue requirement. Because they  
11 are interrelated methods for the Company to meet its Commission approved  
12 revenue requirement, any decrease in the OSS margin credited against base rates  
13 must be balanced by a corresponding increase in the amount recoverable through  
14 base rates. Mr. Kollen's approach ignores this fundamental concept and must  
15 therefore be rejected.

#### **VII. KENTUCKY POWER'S NET INCOME**

16 **Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT THE CHART AT PAGE 28 (EXHIBIT LK 8) OF**  
17 **MR. KOLLEN'S TESTIMONY CORRECTLY SHOWS THE COMPANY'S**  
18 **NET INCOME FOR THE IDENTIFIED FOUR-MONTH PERIODS?**

19 A. Yes.

20 **Q. DID MR. KOLLEN CALCULATE THE COMPANY'S CORRESPONDING**  
21 **RETURN ON EQUITY ("ROE") DURING EACH TIME PERIOD?**

22 A. No.

1 **Q. WAS IT IMPORTANT THAT HE DO SO?**

2 A. Yes. Although the Company's net income during the period January to April  
3 2014 was greater than its net income during the corresponding four month period  
4 in 2013 its equity investment also increased between the two periods. This  
5 increase occurred mostly as a result of Kentucky Power's acquisition of its  
6 interest in the Mitchell generating station. The important metric for evaluating  
7 the financial performance of the Company is not net income as Mr. Kollen would  
8 have you believe, but rather the Company's return on equity. Mr. Kollen omits  
9 this from his chart and testimony.

10 **Q. DID YOU CALCULATE KENTUCKY POWER'S ROE DURING THE**  
11 **PERIODS ILLUSTRATED BY MR. KOLLEN IN LK 8?**

12 A. Yes. Before discussing those results it is important to note that Mr. Kollen's chart  
13 is misleading for two additional reasons. First, the first four-month period,  
14 January to April 2010 illustrated by Mr. Kollen occurs prior to the June 29, 2010  
15 effective date of the Company's current base rates. The comparison of the  
16 Company's net income over a period two to six months immediately *prior* to the  
17 establishment of the Company's current base rates, which were designed to  
18 increase Kentucky Power's revenues by \$63.66 million, with its net income after  
19 the establishment of those new rates, is another example of Mr. Kollen's penchant  
20 for apples and oranges comparisons.

21 Second, as discussed above, Paragraph 7 of the July 2, 2014 Stipulation  
22 and Settlement Agreement modified the Company's Tariff S.S.C. to eliminate the  
23 60%/40% sharing of O.S.S. margins above the \$15.3 million credited to

1 customers through base rates in order to allow the Company the opportunity to  
 2 earn back some of the certain losses associated with the limited recovery of the  
 3 Mitchell asset. But for that change the Company's net income for the period  
 4 January to April 2014 would have been approximately \$8.4 million lower.

5 **Q. WITH THOSE UNDERSTANDINGS, WHAT WAS THE**  
 6 **CORRESPONDING ROE DURING THE PERIODS SHOWN ON LK 8?**

7 A. The on-going ROE (eliminates any one-time, non-recurring event over the prior  
 8 twelve month period) is the twelve month rolling ROE as of April of each four  
 9 month period illustrated on LK 8 and was:

April	ROE
2010	4.42%
2011	9.87%
2012	8.89%
2013	11.55%
2014	6.44%

10 **Q. DID KENTUCKY POWER EXCEED ITS AUTHORIZED ROE LEVEL OF**  
 11 **10.50% DURING ANY OF THESE PERIODS?**

12 A. Only once, and that was in 2013 – *prior* to the Mitchell Transfer.

13 **Q. MR. KOLLEN ALSO STATES ON PAGE 27 OF HIS TESTIMONY THAT**  
 14 **THE OFF-SYSTEM SALES PROFITS WERE SIGNIFICANT**  
 15 **BEGINNING IN JANUARY 2014 THROUGH APRIL OF 2014**  
 16 **COMPARED TO DECEMBER 2013. IS THIS CORRECT?**



1 A. They did increase over the December 2013 level. However, as described above, a  
2 potential increase in off-system sales margins was anticipated by Paragraph 7 of  
3 the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and approved by the Commission as a  
4 mechanism for the Company to mitigate against the financial impacts associated  
5 with only a partial recovery of the Mitchell asset.

6 **Q. WAS THIS BECAUSE OF ANY FUEL COSTS BEING IMPROPERLY**  
7 **ALLOCATED TO NATIVE LOAD CUSTOMERS AS MR. KOLLEN**  
8 **STATES ON PAGE 29 OF HIS TESTIMONY?**

9 A. No. As described in the testimony of Company Witness Pearce, there was no  
10 change in the allocation method of no load fuel costs with the addition of the  
11 Mitchell units. The increase in off-system sales margins was primarily due to an  
12 unforeseen increase in demand arising from the Polar Vortex. Because of the  
13 Polar Vortex and the operation of Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Settlement  
14 Agreement, which allowed the Company to keep all profits from sales above the  
15 base rate level of \$15.3 million, the Company was able to obtain higher than  
16 expected off-system sales margins.

17 **Q. DID THESE OFF-SYSTEM SALES MARGINS ACHIEVED FROM**  
18 **JANUARY 2014 THROUGH APRIL 2014 DRIVE THE COMPANY'S ROE**  
19 **ABOVE THE AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF 10.50%?**

20 A. No. The on-going ROE for Kentucky Power Company as of April, 2014 was  
21 6.44%. This is only 61% of the Company's allowed ROE.

22 **Q. WHAT WAS THE COMPANY'S ROE WHEN THE STIPULATION AND**  
23 **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE**

1           **COMMISSION AND AT YEAR END 2013 WHEN THE MITCHELL**  
2           **TRANSFER CLOSED?**

3    A.     The Company's on-going ROE was 9.52% as of July 2013 and 7.44% as of  
4           December 2013.

5    **Q.     HOW DOES THE COMPANY'S ROE FOR THE PERIOD ENDED APRIL**  
6           **2014 COMPARE TO ITS ROE FOR THE PERIODS ENDED JULY 2013**  
7           **AND DECEMBER 2013?**

8    A.     At 6.44% it is 32% and 13% less than its ROE for the twelve month periods  
9           ending July 2013 and December 2013 respectively. Even with the Company  
10          retaining 100% of the OSS margins above the \$15.3 million built into base rates  
11          Kentucky Power's ROE has declined following the Mitchell Transfer.

12   **Q.     HAVE THE COMPANY'S CUSTOMERS BENEFITED FROM THE**  
13          **STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?**

14   A.     Yes. As explained by Company Witness Pearce, without the Company's interest  
15          in the Mitchell generating station during the Polar Vortex, customers would have  
16          paid approximately \$9.9 million dollars in additional costs due to exposure to the  
17          volatile market. In addition to the other benefits noted in the Commission's  
18          October 7, 2013 Order approving the Mitchell Transfer, the Company acquired a  
19          fifty percent interest in a well-maintained, low-cost, environmentally controlled  
20          baseload generation asset. The Mitchell Generating Station was acquired with the  
21          long-term in mind – its expected 25 year remaining operating life – and not  
22          simply the four months of this FAC review period, or even the interim period  
23          during which the Company anticipates operating Big Sandy Unit 2 in addition to

1 its fifty percent undivided interest in the Mitchell generating station. These  
2 benefits were obtained by the Company's customers at a very significant discount  
3 from the Company's authorized 10.50% ROE.

4 **Q. WHAT WOULD THE ROE BE IF THE COMMISSION WERE TO**  
5 **ACCEPT THE \$13.512 MILLION ADJUSTMENT WITNESS HAYET**  
6 **PROPOSED IN HIS TESTIMONY?**

7 A. From the April 2014 level of 6.44%, it would reduce the ROE to an estimated  
8 level of 5.2%. Again, this is only 50% of the Company's authorized ROE and  
9 30% below the December 2013 level immediately prior to the Mitchell Transfer.  
10 Even with the opportunity to keep 100% of the OSS margins above the \$15.3  
11 million base level, the Company only mitigated a portion of its Mitchell-related  
12 revenue shortfall.

13 **Q. DOES THE ADJUSTMENT SPONSORED BY KIUC AND THE**  
14 **ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFLICT WITH THE ALLOCATION**  
15 **METHODOLOGY IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF STIPULATION AND**  
16 **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS WELL AS THE COMMISSION'S**  
17 **ORDER APPROVING THE AGREEMENT?**

18 A. Yes. Kentucky Power allocated no load costs in January, February, March, and  
19 April 2014 in the same manner it did in January through April 2013, January  
20 through April 2004, January through April 1994 and earlier. Second, the  
21 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement explicitly provides the Company with the  
22 opportunity to recover some of the losses resulting from the partial recovery of  
23 Mitchell-related costs through Tariff ATR. Any adjustment to costs incurred

1 during the period the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement rates are in effect is  
2 contrary to the agreement.

3 **Q. IF THE COMMISSION WERE TO APPROVE THE PROPOSED**  
4 **ADJUSTMENT, DO YOU AGREE THAT THE AMOUNT SHOULD BE**  
5 **\$13,512,141?**

6 A. No. First and foremost, the Company continues to advocate that there should be  
7 no adjustment to the FAC calculations for this six-month test period or for any  
8 period of time during the effective two-year review period. Second, as described  
9 above, if the Commission nevertheless determines that a change in the allocation  
10 methodology is required, any change must coincide with the implementation of  
11 new base rates and the establishment of a new base level of OSS margins to be  
12 fair and equitable to all parties. Finally, the Company is not aware of any FAC  
13 proceeding where an adjustment (credit or charge) has ever included interest at  
14 any rate. Accordingly, the Company disagrees with both the need for and the  
15 amount of Mr. Kollen's proposed adjustment.

#### **VIII. CONCLUSION**

16 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**

17 A. Contrary to the testimony of KIUC/AG Witnesses Kollen and Hayet, Kentucky  
18 Power allocated no load costs to its native load customers in a manner that was  
19 fair, just and reasonable. The Company's allocation method during the review  
20 period was consistent for both its historical practice and with the calculation of  
21 the OSS margin credited against base rates in the Company's last base rate case.  
22 Further, and importantly, KIUC/AG Witness Kollen misses the mark with his

1 criticism of the implementation of the Commission-approved Stipulation and  
2 Settlement Agreement in Case No. 2012-00578. The Company has not reaped a  
3 windfall at the expense of its customers, instead a historically cold winter allowed  
4 the Company to mitigate the financial impacts of recovering only a portion of the  
5 Mitchell asset during this interim period.

6 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

7 A. Yes.

Kentucky Power Company  
 Mitchell Plant Fuel Savings Analysis  
 2014

	KPCo Total Net Generation (MWh)	Mitchell Generation	Big Sandy Generation Cost Cents per kWh	Total Actual Monthly Fuel Cost	Total Cost if Mitchell Generation was Generated at Big Sandy	Difference (Savings)	Cumulative Subtotal	Fuel Savings
January	1,234,094	359,030	31.18	\$ 36,263,242	\$ 36,602,770	\$ 339,528		
February	1,071,896	301,325	29.54	\$ 31,450,611	\$ 31,045,801	\$ (404,810)	\$ (65,282)	
March	1,008,980	430,697	31.38	\$ 27,468,669	\$ 29,113,109	\$ 1,644,439	\$ 1,579,157	
April	1,047,016	368,914	30.22	\$ 29,143,320	\$ 30,741,964	\$ 1,598,644	\$ 3,177,801	
May	834,160	317,266	32.61	\$ 23,945,242	\$ 26,341,422	\$ 2,396,180	\$ 5,573,981	
June	1,139,377	349,479	30.32	\$ 32,093,602	\$ 33,670,219	\$ 1,576,617	\$ 7,150,599	
July	1,100,916	432,602	29.75	\$ 30,017,879	\$ 31,851,243	\$ 1,833,364	\$ 8,983,963	
August	1,179,866	378,408	28.60	\$ 32,175,647	\$ 33,076,431	\$ 900,784	\$ 9,884,747	
<b>Total</b>				<b>\$ 242,558,212</b>	<b>\$ 252,442,959</b>	<b>\$ 9,884,747</b>		<b>4.0752%</b>