

**COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY**  
**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**IN THE MATTER OF:**

**APPLICATION OF KENTUCKY** )  
**UTILITIES FOR AN ADJUSTMENT** ) **CASE NO. 2012-00221**  
**OF ITS ELECTRIC BASE RATES** )

**PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY AND SCHEDULES**

**OF**

**GLENN A. WATKINS**

**ON BEHALF OF THE**

**KENTUCKY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**OCTOBER 3, 2012**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2  
3 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

4 A. My name is Glenn A. Watkins. My business address is 9030 Stony Point  
5 Parkway, Suite 580, Richmond, VA 23235.  
6

7 **Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?**

8 A. I am a Principal and Senior Economist with Technical Associates, Inc., which is  
9 an economic and financial consulting firm with offices in Richmond, Virginia.  
10

11 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?**

12 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Office of Rate Intervention of the Kentucky Office  
13 of Attorney General ("OAG").  
14

15 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.**

16 A. Except for a six-month period during 1987 in which I was employed by Old  
17 Dominion Electric Cooperative as its forecasting and rate economist, I have been  
18 employed by Technical Associates continuously since 1980.

19 During my career at Technical Associates, I have conducted marginal and  
20 embedded cost of service, rate design, cost of capital, and load forecasting studies  
21 involving numerous electric, gas, water/wastewater, and telephone utilities, and have  
22 provided expert testimony in Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,  
23 Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois,  
24 Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia. I  
25 hold an M.B.A. and B.S. in economics from Virginia Commonwealth University. I am a  
26 member of several professional organizations as well as a Certified Rate of Return  
27 Analyst. A more complete description of my education and experience is provided in my  
28 Schedule GAW-1 to my testimony.  
29

30 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

1 A. Technical Associates has been retained by the OAG to evaluate the  
2 reasonableness of Kentucky Utilities ("KU" or "Company") proposed electric cost of  
3 service study (CCOSS), proposed distribution of revenues by class, and residential  
4 electric rate design. The purpose of my testimony, therefore, is to comment on KU's  
5 proposals on these issues and to present my findings and recommendations based on the  
6 results of the studies I have undertaken on behalf of the OAG.

7  
8 **II. ELECTRIC CLASS COST OF SERVICE**

9  
10 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF A CLASS COST OF SERVICE STUDY**  
11 **("CCOSS").**

12 A. First, I note that there are two general types of cost of service studies used for  
13 public utility ratemaking: marginal cost studies; and embedded, fully allocated cost  
14 studies. KU has utilized a traditional embedded cost of service concept in this case for  
15 purposes of establishing its overall retail revenue requirement, as well as for its class cost  
16 of service study ("CCOSS"). As such, I will limit my explanation to embedded class cost  
17 of service studies.

18 Embedded cost of service studies are often referred to as fully allocated cost  
19 studies. This is because the vast majority of an electric or gas utility's plant investment  
20 serves all customers, and the majority of expenses are incurred in a joint manner such that  
21 these costs cannot be specifically attributed to any individual customer or group of  
22 customers. To the extent that certain costs can be specifically attributable to a particular  
23 customer (or group of customers), these costs are often directly assigned in a CCOSS.  
24 However, the vast majority of KU's Production, Transmission, and Distribution plant and  
25 expenses are incurred jointly to serve all (or most) customers. These joint costs are then  
26 allocated to rate classes. It is generally recognized that to the extent possible, joint costs  
27 should be allocated to classes based on the concept of cost causation; i.e., costs are  
28 allocated based on specific factors that cause costs to be incurred by the utility. Although  
29 cost analysts generally strive to abide by the concept of cost causation to the greatest  
30 extent practical, some costs (particularly overhead costs), cannot be attributed to specific  
31 exogenous factors and must be subjectively assigned or allocated to rate classes. With

1 regards to those costs in which cost causation can be attributed, cost of service experts  
2 often disagree as to what is the most cost causative factor; e.g., peak demand, energy  
3 usage, number of customers, etc.  
4

5 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW CCOSS RESULTS SHOULD BE USED IN THE**  
6 **RATEMAKING PROCESS.**

7 A. Although there are certain principles used by all cost of service analysts, there are  
8 often significant disagreements on the specific factors that drive certain costs. These  
9 disagreements can and do arise as a result of the quality of data and level of detail  
10 available from financial records, as well as fundamental differences in opinions regarding  
11 the design or cost causation factors that should be considered to properly allocate costs to  
12 rate schedules or customer classes. Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, cost causation  
13 factors cannot be realistically ascribed to some costs such that subjective decisions are  
14 required. In this regard, two different cost studies conducted for the same utility and  
15 time period can, and often do, yield different results. As such, regulators should consider  
16 CCOSS results as one of many tools in assigning revenue responsibility.  
17

18 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU PROCEEDED WITH YOUR ANALYSIS OF**  
19 **LG&E's CCOSS.**

20 A. The process in which I conducted my analysis in this case was identical to how I  
21 evaluate all CCOSSs. First, I reviewed the structure and organization of the Company's  
22 CCOSS sponsored by Mr. Conroy. Once the basic structure was understood, I reviewed  
23 the accuracy and completeness of the primary drivers (allocators) used to assign costs to  
24 rate schedules and classes. Next, I reviewed Mr. Conroy's selection of allocators to  
25 specific rate base, revenue and expense accounts. Finally, I adjusted certain aspects of  
26 the Company's study to better reflect cost causation and cost incidence by rate schedule  
27 and customer class.  
28

29 **Q. DID YOU FIND THE COMPANY'S STUDY TO BE MATHEMATICALLY**  
30 **ACCURATE?**

1 A. Yes. Perhaps the most fundamental requirement of an embedded CCOSS is that  
2 the sum of the parts (classes) must equal the whole (system). This is true with respect to  
3 the allocation of financial accounts, as well as the various allocation factors.  
4 Furthermore, certain costs previously allocated are carried forward for other purposes  
5 such as for the development of composite or internal allocators and for the assignment of  
6 income taxes. In all regards, I found Mr. Conroy's CCOSS to be mathematically  
7 accurate.

8  
9 **Q. DID YOUR EXAMINATION RESULT IN ANY DIFFERENCES OF OPINION  
10 OR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES  
11 USED BY MR. CONROY AS THEY RELATE TO KU'S ELECTRIC COST  
12 ALLOCATIONS?**

13 A. Yes. There are two material differences of opinion between my electric cost  
14 allocation study and that performed by Mr. Conroy. These differences relate to the  
15 classification and ultimate allocation of generation and distribution plant. However, it is  
16 important to note two significant points as they relate to Mr. Conroy's and my electric  
17 CCOSSs.

18 With regard to generation plant, my difference of opinion is by and large purely  
19 academic in nature. That is, while I do not agree with the naming convention Mr.  
20 Conroy claims to have used to classify and allocate generation plant, his ultimate  
21 allocation of this plant to various classes is not unreasonable, and fairly reflects cost  
22 causation across classes.

23 With regard to the classification of distribution plant, I do have numerous  
24 concerns with the data utilized by Mr. Conroy as well as with the mathematical methods  
25 he employed to classify this plant between customer-related and demand-related costs.

26 With the above exceptions outlined, my ultimate electric CCOSS findings (rates  
27 of return at current rates) are not significantly different than those calculated by Mr.  
28 Conroy. A comparison of Mr. Conroy's and my class rates of return at current rates are  
29 shown below:  
30  
31

Class	Class ROR At Current Rates	
	Conroy	Watkins
Residential	3.97%	5.55%
General Service	8.72%	9.68%
All Electric Schools	7.25%	5.47%
PS-Secondary	10.51%	8.03%
PS-Primary	8.52%	7.39%
TOD-Secondary	5.83%	2.67%
TOD-Primary	5.89%	3.73%
RTS	6.06%	5.21%
FLS Transmission	-1.59%	-2.18%
Street Lighting	7.13%	8.33%
Lighting Energy	3.38%	0.01%
Traffic Signals	8.24%	7.32%
Total Company	6.02%	6.02%

**A. Generation**

**Q. YOU INDICATE THAT ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITH MR. CONROY IS THE NAMING CONVENTION HE CLAIMS TO USE TO ASSIGN GENERATION-RELATED COSTS TO INDIVIDUAL CLASSES. WHAT NAMING CONVENTION DID MR. CONROY USE WITH RESPECT TO GENERATION COST ALLOCATIONS?**

**A.** Mr. Conroy refers to his approach as a time-differentiated “Modified Base-Intermediate-Peak” approach.

**Q. ARE THERE OTHER METHODOLOGIES WHICH MAY BE USED TO ALLOCATE GENERATION-RELATED PLANT AND EXPENSES?**

**A.** Yes. There are several demand allocation methods utilized in the electric industry. The current National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”) Electric Utility Cost Allocation Manual discusses at least thirteen embedded demand allocation methods, while Dr. James Bonbright noted the existence of at least 29 demand allocation methods in his treatise, Principles of Public Utilities Rates.

1 **Q. WHY DO SO MANY GENERATION ALLOCATION METHODS EXIST FOR**  
2 **THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY?**

3 A. Utilities design and build generation facilities to meet the energy and demand  
4 requirements of their customers on a collective basis. Because of this, and the physical  
5 laws of electricity, it is impossible to determine which customers are being served by  
6 which facilities. As such, the investments in production facilities reflect joint costs; i.e.,  
7 facilities used by all customers. Because of this commonality, production-related costs  
8 are not directly known for any customer or customer group and must somehow be  
9 allocated.

10 If all customer classes used electricity at a constant rate throughout the year, there  
11 would be no disagreement as to the proper assignment of generation-related costs: all  
12 analysts would agree that energy usage in terms of kWh would be the proper approach to  
13 reflect cost causation and cost incidence. However, such is not the case in that KU  
14 experiences periods (hours) of much higher demand during certain times of the year and  
15 across various hours of the day. Moreover, all customer classes do not contribute in  
16 equal proportions to these varying demands placed on the generation system. To  
17 complicate matters, the electric utility industry is somewhat unique in that there is a  
18 distinct energy/capacity trade-off relating to generation costs. That is, utilities design  
19 their mix of production facilities (generation and power supply) to minimize the total  
20 costs of energy and capacity, while also ensuring there is enough available capacity to  
21 meet peak demands. The trade-off occurs between the level of fixed investment per unit  
22 of capacity (KW) and the variable cost of producing a unit of output (kWh). Coal and  
23 nuclear units require high capital expenditures resulting in large investments per KW,  
24 whereas smaller units with higher variable production costs generally require  
25 significantly less investment per KW. Due to varying levels of demand placed on the  
26 system over the course of each day, month, and year, there is a unique optimal mix of  
27 production facilities for each utility that minimizes the total cost of capacity and energy;  
28 i.e., its cost of service.

29 Therefore, as a result of the energy/capacity cost trade-off, and the fact that the  
30 service requirements of each utility are unique, many different allocation methodologies



1 have evolved in an attempt to equitably allocate joint production costs to individual  
2 classes.

3 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

4 A. Total production costs vary each hour of the year. Theoretically, energy and  
5 capacity costs should be allocated to classes each and every hour of the year. This would  
6 result in 8,760 hourly allocations during non-leap years. Although such an analysis is  
7 certainly possible with today's technology, the time and cost necessary for such an  
8 undertaking would likely exceed the additional benefits obtained over simpler methods.  
9 This is because the analyst does not know precise class loads each and every hour, and  
10 subjective decisions must still be made regarding the assignment of fixed investment  
11 (capacity costs) to individual hours. With this practical constraint in mind, each method  
12 has its strengths and weaknesses regarding its reasonableness in reflecting cost causation  
13 as well as the cost and effort required to produce a study.

14  
15 **Q. BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF COMMON**  
16 **PRODUCTION COST ALLOCATION METHODOLOGIES.**

17 A. A brief description of the most common fully allocated cost methodologies and  
18 attendant strengths and weaknesses are as follows:

19 **Single Coincident Peak ("1-CP")** -- The basic concept underlying the 1-CP  
20 method is that an electric utility must have enough capacity available to meet its  
21 customers' peak coincident demand. As such, advocates of the 1-CP method reason that  
22 customers (or classes) should be responsible for fixed capacity costs based on their  
23 respective contributions to this peak system load. The major advantages to the 1-CP  
24 method are that the concepts are easy to understand, the analyses required to conduct a  
25 CCOSS are relatively simple, and the data requirements are significantly less than some  
26 of the more complex methods.

27 The 1-CP method has several shortcomings, however. First, and foremost, is the  
28 fact that the 1-CP method totally ignores the capacity/energy trade-off inherent in the  
29 electric utility industry. That is, the sole criterion for assigning one hundred percent of  
30 fixed capacity costs is the classes' relative contributions to load during a single hour of  
31 the year. This method does not consider, in any way, the extent to which customers use

1 these facilities during the other 8,759 hours of the year nor does it consider the reasons  
2 that cause the current mix and level of generation facilities. This may have severe  
3 consequences because a utility's planning decisions regarding the amount and type of  
4 generation capacity to build and install is predicated not only on the maximum system  
5 load, but also on how customers demand electricity throughout the year, i.e., load  
6 duration. To illustrate, if a utility had a peak load of 15,000 MW and its actual optimal  
7 generation mix included an assortment of nuclear, coal, hydro, combined cycle and  
8 combustion turbine units, the total cost of capacity is significantly higher than if the  
9 utility only had to consider meeting 15,000 MW for 1 hour of the year. This is because  
10 the utility would install the cheapest type of plant, (i.e., peaker units) if it only had to  
11 consider one hour a year.

12 There are two other major shortcomings of the 1-CP method. First, the results  
13 produced with this method can be unstable from year to year. This is because the hour in  
14 which a utility peaks annually is largely a function of weather. Therefore, annual peak  
15 load depends on when severe weather occurs. If this occurs on a weekend or holiday,  
16 relative class contributions to the peak load will likely be significantly different than if  
17 the peak occurred during a weekday. The other major shortcoming of the 1-CP method is  
18 often referred to as the "free ride" problem. This problem can easily be seen with a  
19 summer peaking utility that peaks about 5:00 p.m. Because street lights are not on at this  
20 time of day, this class will not be assigned any capacity costs at all and enjoy a free ride  
21 on the assignment of generation costs that this class requires.

22 **Summer and Winter Coincident Peak ("S/W Peak")** -- The S/W Peak method  
23 was developed because some utilities' annual peak load occurs in the summer during  
24 some years and in the winter during others. Because customers' usage and load  
25 characteristics may vary by season, the S/W Peak attempts to recognize this  
26 characteristic. This method is essentially the same as the 1-CP method except that two  
27 hours of load are considered instead of one. This method has essentially the same  
28 strengths and weaknesses as the 1-CP method, and in my opinion, is only marginally  
29 more reasonable than the 1-CP method.

30 **Twelve Monthly Coincident Peak ("12-CP")** -- Arithmetically, the 12-CP  
31 method is essentially the same as the 1-CP method except that class contributions to each

1 monthly peak are considered. Although the 12-CP method bears little resemblance to  
2 how utilities design and build their systems, the results produced by this method better  
3 reflect the cost incidence of a utility's generation facilities.

4 Most electric utilities have distinct seasonal load patterns such that there are high  
5 system peaks during the winter and summer months, and significantly lower system  
6 peaks during the spring and autumn months. By assigning class responsibilities based on  
7 their respective contributions throughout the year, consideration is given to the fact that  
8 utilities will call on all of their resources during the highest peaks, and only use their  
9 most efficient plants during lower peak periods. Therefore, the capacity/energy trade-off  
10 is implicitly considered to a small extent under this method.

11 The major shortcoming of the 12-CP method is that accurate load data is required  
12 by class throughout the year. This generally requires a utility to maintain on-going load  
13 studies. However, once a system to record class load data is in place, the administration  
14 and maintenance of such a system is not overly cumbersome for larger utilities.

15 **Peak and Average ("P&A")** -- The various P&A methodologies rest on the  
16 premise that a utility's actual generation facilities are placed into service to meet peak  
17 load and serve consumers demands throughout the entire year. Hence, the P&A method  
18 assigns capacity costs partially on the basis of contributions to peak load and partially on  
19 the basis of consumption throughout the year. Although there is not universal agreement  
20 on how peak demands should be measured or how the weighting between peak and  
21 average demands should be performed, many P&A studies use an equal weighting of  
22 "peak" and average class loads, while some studies weight the peak and average loads  
23 based on the system coincident load factor.<sup>1</sup>

24 The major strengths of the P&A method are that an attempt is made to recognize  
25 the capacity/energy trade-off in the assignment of fixed capacity costs, and that data  
26 requirements are minimal.

27 Although the recognition of the capacity/energy trade-off is admittedly arbitrary  
28 under the P&A method, most other allocation methods also suffer to some degree of  
29 arbitrariness.

---

<sup>1</sup> It is generally agreed that the use of system coincident peak demands is an appropriate measure for assigning the "peak" portion of generation facilities under the P&A method.

1           **Average and Excess ("A&E")** -- The A&E method also considers both peak  
2 demands and energy consumption throughout the year. However, the A&E method is  
3 much different than the P&A method in both concept and application. The A&E method  
4 recognizes class load diversity within a system, such that all classes do not call on the  
5 utility's generation resources to the same degree, at the same times. Mechanically, the  
6 A&E method weights average and excess demands based on the system coincident load  
7 factor. Individual class "excess" demands represent the difference between the class non-  
8 coincident peak demand and its average annual demand. The classes' "excess" demands  
9 are then summed to determine the system excess demand. Under this method, it is  
10 important to distinguish between coincident and non-coincident demands. This is  
11 because if coincident, instead of non-coincident, demands are used when calculating class  
12 excesses, the end result will be exactly the same as that achieved under 1-CP method.

13           Although the A&E method bears virtually no resemblance to how generation  
14 systems are designed, this method can produce fair and reasonable results for many  
15 utilities. This is because no class will receive a free-ride under this method, and because  
16 recognition is given to average consumption as well as to the additional costs imposed by  
17 not maintaining a perfectly constant load.

18           A potential shortcoming of this method is that customers that only use power  
19 during off-peak periods will be overburdened with costs. Under the A&E method, off-  
20 peak customers will be assigned a higher percentage of capacity costs because their non-  
21 coincident load factor may be very low even though they call on the utility's resources  
22 only during less costly off-peak periods.

23           **Equivalent Peaker ("EP")** -- The EP method combines certain aspects of  
24 traditional embedded cost methods with those used in forward-looking marginal cost  
25 studies. The EP method often relies on planning information in order to classify  
26 individual generating units as energy- or demand-related and considers the need for a mix  
27 of base load intermediate and peaking generation resources.

28           The EP method has substantial intuitive appeal in that base load units that operate  
29 with high capacity factors are allocated largely on the basis of energy consumption with  
30 costs shared by all classes based on their usage, while peaking units that are seldom used  
31 and only called upon during peak load periods are allocated based on peak demands to

1 those classes contributing to the system peak load. However, this method requires a  
2 significant amount of data as well as subjective planning criteria.

3 **Base-Intermediate-Peak ("BIP")** -- The BIP method is an accepted allocation  
4 approach that attempts to recognize the capacity/energy trade-off that actually exists  
5 within a utility's portfolio of generation assets. A utility's base load units tend to run  
6 during all (or most) periods of the year; i.e., both peak load periods as well as to satisfy  
7 energy requirements in the most efficient manner possible during minimum demand  
8 periods (e.g., during the middle of the night). Because base load units operate regardless  
9 of peak requirements, they are most appropriately classified as energy-related. At the  
10 opposite end of the spectrum are peaking units, such as combustion turbines. These units  
11 operate with high variable costs and are only utilized to help meet peak period demands.  
12 As such, peakers are classified as peak demand-related. Intermediate plants (e.g., many  
13 combined cycle units) are not as efficient as large base load plants but more efficient than  
14 peaking units. For this reason, Intermediate plants are not called upon (dispatched)  
15 during periods of minimum (base) load but are dispatched before, and more frequently,  
16 than peaker units. Therefore, Intermediate plants can be said to serve a dual purpose:  
17 partially energy-related and partially demand-related. Intermediate plants are typically  
18 classified as partially energy-related and partially demand-related based on their  
19 respective capacity or availability factors.<sup>2</sup> In my opinion, the BIP method is an excellent  
20 cost allocation approach for many utilities as it captures the actual differences in the  
21 capacity/energy trade-off that exist across a utility's generation mix. The BIP method  
22 may not be appropriate for utilities that purchase the majority of their energy needs or for  
23 utilities with an inefficient mix of generating resources.

24  
25 **Q. MR. WATKINS, YOU HAVE DISCUSSED THE STRENGTHS AND**  
26 **WEAKNESSES OF THE MORE COMMON GENERATION ALLOCATION**  
27 **METHODOLOGIES. ARE ANY OF THESE METHODS CLEARLY INFERIOR**  
28 **IN YOUR VIEW?**

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<sup>2</sup> Capacity factor is the ratio of average utilization (output) over a year to maximum output. Availability factor is the ratio of average utilization during periods when a unit is available for dispatch (i.e., excludes outages) to peak hour output.

1 A. Yes. In my opinion the 1-CP and seasonal CP (such as 4-CP) methods do not  
2 reasonably reflect cost causation for integrated electric utilities because these methods  
3 totally ignore the cost-causation and utilization of a utility's facilities. Individual  
4 generating unit investments vary from a low of a few hundred dollars per KW of capacity  
5 for high running cost (energy cost) peakers to several thousand dollars per KW for base  
6 load nuclear and coal facilities with low running costs. If a utility were only concerned  
7 with being able to meet peak load with no regard to running costs, it would simply install  
8 inexpensive peakers. Under such an unrealistic system design, plant costs would be  
9 much lower than in reality but running costs however, would be astronomical; i.e.,  
10 variable fuel costs would be exceptionally expensive. This situation would result in a  
11 higher overall cost to serve customers than what actually exists. The 1-CP and seasonal  
12 CP methods totally ignore this very important fact.

13  
14 **Q. MR. CONROY HAS USED WHAT HE REFERS TO AS A MODIFIED BIP**  
15 **METHOD TO ALLOCATE GENERATION COSTS. DID HE CALCULATE THE**  
16 **BIP METHOD IN A REASONABLE MANNER?**

17 A. Mr. Conroy's Modified BIP method does not follow the generally accepted BIP  
18 approach, and in fact, I have never seen Mr. Conroy's method used in any other cases or  
19 for utilities other than KU and LG&E. However, I would be reluctant to say his approach  
20 is totally unreasonable.

21 Whereas Mr. Conroy's Modified BIP method does allocate a portion of  
22 generation facilities based on energy (34.35%) and a portion on peak demands (32.39%  
23 on winter peak and 33.26% on summer peak), his approach does not reflect the actual  
24 mix of supply resources utilized by KU. At this point, it should be noted that LG&E's  
25 and KU's generation resources are centrally dispatched. Both Mr. Conroy and I have  
26 recognized this combined central dispatch in our allocation studies. When I refer to KU's  
27 actual generation resources, I am referring to the joint resources of LG&E and KU and  
28 not the individual legal ownership of these plants for booking purposes.

29 The traditional BIP method is a supply-based approach that classifies generation  
30 plant between energy-related and demand-related; i.e., it considers the actual supply  
31 characteristics of a utility's generation portfolio. These supply based classifications are

1 then allocated to classes based on demand-side criteria (kWh usage and KW peak  
2 demand).

3 Mr. Conroy's approach ignores the actual supply-side characteristics of KU's and  
4 LG&E's combined generation portfolio because it only considers relative differences in  
5 system usages and demands. In fact, given KU's and LG&E's retail customers combined  
6 usages and demand profiles, Mr. Conroy's approach would classify a utility's generation  
7 investment exactly the same regardless of its actual portfolio mix of plants. Mr. Conroy's  
8 classification would be identical if the Companies' portfolio mix was comprised entirely  
9 of base load units or entirely of peaking units. In my opinion, this assumption (or result)  
10 is not consistent with the intent of the BIP method - namely, to recognize the  
11 capacity/energy tradeoff actually present in a given system's generation resources.  
12

13 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF KU'S AND LG&E'S**  
14 **COMBINED GENERATION RESOURCES.**

15 A. The Companies combined generation capacity is about 9,500 MW. The following  
16 is a summary of this generation portfolio by fuel type:

17

<u>Fuel</u>	<u>MW Capacity</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>
Coal	7,016	74%
Gas/Oil	2,487	26%
Hydro	19	<1%
<u>Total</u>	<u>9,492</u>	<u>100%</u>

18  
19  
20  
21  
22

23 As can be seen above, about 74% of the Companies' generation comes from very low  
24 running cost coal plants. Furthermore, the combined LG&E and KU peak native load is  
25 about 6,200 MW, which is lower than the capacity of the combined Companies coal  
26 plants. This is especially relevant for cost allocation purposes since these coal plants tend  
27 to be base load plants in nature. That is, they operate with low variable operating  
28 expenses per unit (KWH) and have very high availability factors in the 80% to 90%  
29 range. This actual mix of generation assets is dissimilar to most electric utilities in the  
30 United States which rely on a much higher percentage of intermediate (high variable  
31 cost) plants primarily utilizing natural gas for fuel. Indeed, Kentucky ratepayers and

1 shareholders alike are very fortunate to have an abundance of low cost electric energy  
2 resources.

3  
4 **Q. DOES MR. CONROY'S COST ALLOCATION METHODOLOGY REFLECT**  
5 **THE FACT THAT KU'S AND LG&E'S COMBINED GENERATION**  
6 **PORTFOLIO IS COMPRISED PRIMARILY OF BASE LOAD UNITS?**

7 A. No.

8  
9 **Q. DID YOU CONDUCT AN ANALYSIS OF KU'S AND LG&E'S COMBINED**  
10 **GENERATION FACILITIES UTILIZING THE INDUSTRY ACCEPTED BIP**  
11 **APPROACH?**

12 A. Yes.

13  
14 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CONDUCTED YOUR TRADITIONAL BIP**  
15 **METHOD.**

16 A. During the discovery phase of this proceeding, KU provided the order of  
17 economic dispatch for each of its generation units.<sup>3</sup> With this information, I was able to  
18 separate each generation unit into Base, Intermediate, Peak, or Hydro. Base load units  
19 are classified as 100% energy-related as they are designed and utilized to meet energy  
20 requirements throughout the year; i.e., they are low-cost units that serve energy needs and  
21 are not installed to meet short time period peak load requirements. Conversely, peak load  
22 (peaker) units are classified as 100% demand-related because of their high cost of output;  
23 i.e., they are dispatched and utilized only to meet peak load requirements. Intermediate  
24 plants operate at higher variable costs per unit than base load units yet are considerably  
25 less costly to operate than peak units, and are dispatched during periods of Intermediate  
26 demand (higher than base load but lower than peak period loads). I have followed the  
27 industry practice of classifying these units between energy and peak demand based on  
28 each facility's capacity factor. Finally, I have classified the Companies' Hydro facilities

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<sup>3</sup> Economic Order of dispatch is based on variable running costs. That is, the unit with the lowest running costs (primarily fuel) per unit of KWH output is dispatched first, followed by the next least expensive generation facility, and so forth.



1 as 100% energy-related as they are run of the river or flood control facilities and have  
2 little or no ability to reliably meet peaking requirements.

3 The results of my BIP generation classification is presented in my Schedule  
4 GAW-2. My BIP generation classification study results in the following aggregate  
5 generation classification:

6 Energy-related: 74.51%  
7 Demand-related: 25.49%

8  
9 **Q. WHAT ARE THE CLASS RATES OF RETURN ON RATE BASE AT CURRENT**  
10 **RATES UTILIZING YOUR TRADITIONAL BIP METHOD TO CLASSIFY**  
11 **GENERATION PLANT?**

12 A. Individual class rates of return utilizing the traditional BIP classification method,  
13 compared to Mr. Conroy's Modified BIP are presented below. It should be noted that the  
14 following OAG results only reflect adjustments to generation and production costs, they  
15 do not reflect my adjustments to distribution plant allocations which are explained later in  
16 my testimony:

17	Class	OAG 18 Traditional 19 BIP	Conroy Modified BIP
20	Residential	4.74%	3.97%
21	General Service	9.52%	8.72%
22	All Electric Schools	7.04%	7.25%
23	PS-Secondary	9.24%	10.51%
24	PS-Primary	8.63%	8.52%
25	TOD-Secondary	3.51%	5.83%
26	TOD-Primary	4.62%	5.89%
27	RTS	5.21%	6.06%
28	FLS Transmission	-2.18%	-1.59%
29	Street Lighting	7.05%	7.13%
30	Lighting Energy	0.06%	3.38%
31	Traffic Signals	5.76%	8.24%
	Total Company	6.02%	6.02%

1           **B.     Distribution**

2  
3       **Q.     AS WE MOVE DOWNSTREAM FROM GENERATION THROUGH**  
4       **TRANSMISSION TO THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, HOW HAS MR.**  
5       **CONROY ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION COSTS TO RATE SCHEDULES AND**  
6       **CUSTOMER CLASSES?**

7       A.           Mr. Conroy has allocated Distribution plant and expenses partially on the basis of  
8       number of customers and partially on the basis of peak demand. I concur with Mr.  
9       Conroy's selection of customer and demand allocators for Distribution plant. However,  
10      there is often controversy regarding the portion of Distribution plant that should be  
11      allocated on number of customers and the portion that should be allocated on demand.  
12      This separation between customer-related and demand-related Distribution plant is  
13      referred to as the classification of Distribution plant.

14  
15      **Q.     PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PHRASE "CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION**  
16      **PLANT."**

17      A.           In the broadest sense, an embedded CCOSS is undertaken using a three-tiered  
18      approach. First, costs are functionalized as Production, Transmission, Distribution,  
19      General, and/or customer. These functionalized costs are then classified as energy,  
20      demand, or customer-related. Finally, classified costs are then allocated to individual  
21      classes. With respect to the classification of Distribution plant, it is generally recognized  
22      that there are no energy-related costs. That is, the distribution system is designed to meet  
23      localized peak demands. However, largely as a result of differences in customer densities  
24      throughout a utility's service area, electric utility Distribution plant often is classified as  
25      partially demand-related and partially customer-related.

26  
27      **Q.     WHY IS DISTRIBUTION PLANT SOMETIMES CLASSIFIED AS PARTIALLY**  
28      **CUSTOMER-RELATED AND PARTIALLY DEMAND-RELATED?**

29      A.           Even though investment is made in distribution plant and equipment to meet the  
30      energy needs of its customers at their required power levels, there may be considerable  
31      differences in both customer densities and the mix of customers throughout a utility's

1 service area. As a hypothetical, suppose a utility serves both an urban area and a rural  
2 area. In this situation, many customers' electrical needs are served with relatively few  
3 miles of conductors, few poles, etc. in the urban area, while many more miles of  
4 conductors, more poles, etc. are required to serve the requirements of relatively few  
5 customers in the rural area. If the distribution of classes of customers (class customer  
6 mix) is relatively similar in both the rural and urban areas, there is no need to consider  
7 customer counts (number of customers) within the allocation process, because all classes  
8 use the utility's joint distribution facilities proportionately across the service area.  
9 However, if the customer mix is such that Commercial and Industrial customers are  
10 predominately clustered in the urban area, while the rural portion of the service territory  
11 consists almost entirely of Residential customers, it may be unreasonable to allocate the  
12 total Company's investment based only on demand; i.e., a large investment in many  
13 miles of line is required to serve predominately Residential customers in the rural area  
14 while the Commercial and Industrial electrical needs are met with much fewer miles of  
15 lines in the urban area. Under this circumstance, an allocation of costs based on a  
16 weighting of customers and demand can be considered equitable and appropriate.

17  
18 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE THAT ILLUSTRATES THE CONCEPTS OF**  
19 **DENSITY AND CLASS CUSTOMER MIX AS THEY RELATE TO COST**  
20 **ALLOCATIONS.**

21 A. As a starting point, it is important to understand absolute and relative class  
22 relationships of an electric utility's number of customers, energy requirements, and  
23 maximum loads (demands). In terms of simple customer counts, the number of  
24 Residential accounts make-up the overwhelming majority of any retail electric utility's  
25 number of customers. However, because Residential customers tend to be small volume  
26 users compared to Commercial and Industrial customers, the Residential class is  
27 responsible for a significantly smaller percentage of total KWH energy supplied or peak  
28 loads on the system. For example, in KU's system, the following characteristics are  
29 exhibited:

Category	Percentage of Total Jurisdictional Distribution System		
	Customers	KWH	Peak Demand
Residential	61%	33%	40%
Comm./Ind. Secondary Voltage	13%	31%	31%
Comm./Ind. Primary/Transmission Voltage	1%	35%	<1%
Lighting	25%	1%	28%
	100%		

While the table above shows the relative class differences between number of customers, energy usage, and peak demands, the following table illustrates the absolute size differences between KU's different types of customers:

Category	Average Annual KWH Per Customer (KWH)
Residential	15,314
Comm./Ind. Secondary Voltage	68,372
Comm./Ind. Primary/Transmission Voltage	13,304,133


With the above relationships explained, in order to understand the concepts of density and class customer mix, consider examples of two hypothetical electric utilities each of which are comprised of only two distribution lines: one line serving a densely populated area (urban) and another line serving a sparsely populated area (rural). Furthermore, for simplicity and explanatory purposes, assume there are only two classes of customers for each utility: Residential and Commercial/Industrial with the following characteristics:

Class	Absolute			Relative	
	Number of Customers	Peak Load	Peak Load Per Customer	Number of Customers	Peak Load
Residential	110	550	5	83%	33%
Comm./Ind.	22	1,100	50	17%	67%
Total	132	1,650	--	100%	100%


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Utility A:

For Utility A, assume all non-Residential customers are located on the urban (densely populated) distribution line such that the rural line only serves Residential customers as shown graphically below:



6



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9

1 Because the urban line is much shorter in total distance, yet, serves the majority of  
 2 customers (and loads) and many more miles of line are required to serve relatively few  
 3 Residential only customers in rural areas, it would be unfair, and inconsistent with cost  
 4 causation to allocate total system line costs only on utilization (KW) because non-  
 5 Residential customers arguably do not cause costs to be incurred for the rural portion of  
 6 the system. As such, some weighting of relative number of customers and utilization is  
 7 appropriate to allocate total system line costs.


8  
 9 Utility B:

10 For Utility B, assume that the relative mix of customers is evenly distributed  
 11 between the urban and rural lines. In other words, this utility's configuration of  
 12 customers is as follows:


13

Class	Number of Customers			
	Urban Line		Rural Line	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Residential	100	83%	10	83%
Comm./Ind.	20	17%	2	17%
Total	120	100%	12	100%

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As can be seen in the above table and charts, the relative imposition of costs across the two classes for Utility B is the same for the urban and rural lines. That is, while there are more absolute Residential customers than Commercial/Industrial on both the urban and rural lines, the proportion (mix) of customers is the same. As such, an allocation of total system lines costs based on utilization (maximum loads) is appropriate such that no consideration of customer counts is needed or desired.

10

11

12

13

14

**Q. DOES THE CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION PLANT INVESTMENT AS PARTIALLY CUSTOMER-RELATED AND PARTIALLY DEMAND-RELATED REFLECT ANY RELATIVE COST (PER MILE) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS?**

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

A. No. It is generally more expensive to install a mile of distribution circuit in an urban area than in a rural area. However, although this cost difference may be substantial, this cost difference is usually ignored due to record keeping limitations, in that all costs are simply assumed to be uniform (averaged) across the rural and urban portions of a service area.

1 Q. DO YOUR EXAMPLES DISCUSSED ABOVE IMPLY THAT IT COSTS MORE  
2 TO SERVE RURAL CUSTOMERS THAN URBAN CUSTOMERS AND THAT  
3 PERHAPS A UTILITY'S RURAL CUSTOMERS SHOULD PAY MORE PER  
4 UNIT THAN URBAN CUSTOMERS?

5 A. While it is possible that it technically costs more to serve a rural customer versus  
6 an urban customer, regulatory policy in the United States has universally been not to  
7 price discriminate based on customer densities, urban versus rural, or other geographic  
8 differences. Rather, regulatory policy has been such that classes of customers with  
9 similar usage and/or load characteristics are established for pricing purposes. In fact,  
10 during my 30 plus years practicing utility costing and pricing across the Country, I have  
11 not seen a rate structure that discriminates based on customer densities or other  
12 geographic characteristics.

13  
14 Q. IS THERE ACADEMIC SUPPORT FOR YOUR EXPLANATION AND  
15 CONCEPTS REGARDING CUSTOMER DENSITIES AND CLASS CUSTOMER  
16 MIXES?

17 A. Yes. In the well known and often referenced, treatise Principles of Public Utility  
18 Rates, Professor James Bonbright states that there:

19 is the very weak correlation between the area (or the mileage) of a  
20 distribution system and the number of customers served by this system.  
21 For it makes no allowance for the density factor (customers per linear mile  
22 or per square mile). Our casual empiricism is supported by a more  
23 systematic regression analysis in (Lessels, 1980) where no statistical  
24 association was found between distribution costs and number of  
25 customers. Thus, if the company's entire service area stays fixed, an  
26 increase in number of customers does not necessarily betoken any increase  
27 whatever in the costs of a minimum-sized distribution system.<sup>4</sup>  
28

29 Q. BEFORE WE CONTINUE, IS KU'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COMPRISED OF  
30 VARIOUS SUB-SYSTEMS?

31 A. Yes. As is the case with virtually every electric utility, KU's overall distribution  
32 system is comprised of a primary voltage system and a secondary voltage system. The

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<sup>4</sup> Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates, Second Edition, page 491.



1 primary system operates at higher voltage levels than the secondary system and generally  
 2 consists of plant and equipment between the substations and transformers. The lower  
 3 voltage secondary system can be thought of as operating downstream from the primary  
 4 system and delivers electricity to small end-users.

5  
 6 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE TYPES OF INVESTMENT (EQUIPMENT)**  
 7 **UTILIZED IN KU'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.**

8 A. For accounting purposes, KU's distribution plant is grouped into various  
 9 accounts. These accounts include: Land and Land Rights (Account 360); Structures and  
 10 Improvements (Account 361); Station Equipment (Account 362); Poles, Towers and  
 11 Fixtures (Account 364); Overhead Conductors (Account 365); Underground Conduit  
 12 (Account 366); Underground Conductors (Account 367); Line Transformers (Account  
 13 368); Meters (Account 370); Area Lighting (Account 371) and Street Lighting (Account  
 14 373).

15  
 16 **Q. WHAT RELATIVE CUSTOMER/DEMAND PERCENTAGES DID MR.**  
 17 **CONROY USE IN THIS CASE?**

18 A. The following are Mr. Conroy's customer/demand percentages used for each  
 19 distribution plant account:

20

KU Classification of Distribution Plant			
(\$000)			
Account	(1) Total Gross Plant	(2) Percent Customer	(3) Customer Allocation (1) x (2)
Overhead Lines	537,135,305	54.57%	293,114,736
Underground Lines	141,341,084	75.21%	106,302,629
Total	678,476,389	58.90%	399,417,365

21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29 As can be seen above, Mr. Conroy's classification allocates 54.57% of its Overhead lines  
 30 (poles plus conductors) based on number of customers and 75.21% of Underground lines  
 31 (conduit and conductors) on a customer count basis. On a collective basis, Mr. Conroy

1 allocates about 59% of these distribution costs (plant and expenses) based on number of  
2 customers and about 38% of its costs based on utilization and relative size (demand). In  
3 other words, about 59% of KU's investment in joint distribution lines is allocated to  
4 classes based on customer counts regardless of size, utilization, or demands placed upon  
5 the KU system.

6  
7 **Q. HAVE YOU CONDUCTED ANY ANALYSES TO DETERMINE IF A**  
8 **CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION PLANT AS PARTIALLY CUSTOMER-**  
9 **RELATED IS APPROPRIATE FOR KU?**

10 A. Yes, I have.

11  
12 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

13 A. Mr. Conroy has made an *a priori* assumption that it is appropriate to allocate a  
14 portion of its distribution plant based on customer counts and a portion based on demand  
15 levels. As indicated earlier, the only reason why it may be appropriate to allocate a  
16 portion of distribution plant expenses based on number of customers, rather than  
17 utilization, is due to the possibility that the mix of customer classes varies significantly  
18 across the urban and rural portions of a service territory. In this regard, I evaluated this  
19 assumption by conducting an analysis of the distribution, or mix, of KU's customer  
20 classes across its service area. I analyzed KU's customer densities and mix because KU  
21 is more rural than LG&E and Mr. Conroy utilized the same data and results for  
22 classifying KU's and LG&E's distribution plant; i.e., Mr. Conroy's classifications of  
23 distribution lines is the same for KU and LG&E.

24 Through discovery, the Company provided a data base of the number of  
25 customers by rate schedule for each postal zip-code within its service area. I then  
26 evaluated the mix of customers by rate class for each postal zip-code within the KU  
27 service area. In order to evaluate whether any differences exist in the distribution of  
28 customers across rural, suburban, and urban areas, I calculated the number of total KU  
29 customers per square mile for each non-Post Office Box ("P.O. Box") zip-code to serve  
30 as a measure of density for relatively small geographic areas. I was then able to readily  
31 compare KU's mix of customers by rate class throughout its service area and delineate

1 between very rural (sparsely populated) to very urban (densely populated) areas. As a  
 2 further refinement, I also evaluated the distribution of customers on a stratified basis.  
 3 That is, for each rate class I separated small geographical areas (zip codes) into five  
 4 separate strata (lowest to highest customer densities). I examined each stratum (by rate  
 5 class) to determine if any significant differences in customer mix occur within each  
 6 stratum.

7 This analysis of the distribution of the various customer classes by density  
 8 provided a basis to determine whether: (a) utilization alone (demand) is an appropriate  
 9 (and fair) method to allocate distribution costs; or, (b) whether a weighting of customers  
 10 and utilization (demand) is appropriate in order to reasonably reflect the imposition or  
 11 causation of costs.

12 If there is any basis for a customer classification of distribution plant, this analysis  
 13 should show a negative correlation between the Residential customer mix (Residential  
 14 percentage of total customers) and density across the KU service area. In other words,  
 15 the percentage of Residential customers (by zip-code) should decline as customer density  
 16 per square mile increases from the most rural areas to the most urban areas of KU's  
 17 service territory. Similarly, if Mr. Conroy's assumption is correct, we should see a  
 18 distinct positive correlation between non-Residential customer mixes and customer  
 19 densities by zip-code. A summary of the approach and data utilized for this analysis is  
 20 provided below:

Class	Customers Per Sq. Mile (Density)	Count Of Zip Codes	Percent of Total Distribution Customers <sup>5</sup>			
			Avg.	Std. Deviation	Number	% of Class
<b>Residential</b>						
Strata 1	.03 Min to 7.17 Max	67	63.5%	14.2%	12,452	3.0%
Strata 2	7.19 Min to 13.77 Max	67	65.6%	6.8%	37,435	9.1%
Strata 3	13.83 Min to 33.64 Max	67	66.0%	6.8%	79,477	19.3%
Strata 4	33.68 Min to 3994.81 Max	67	77.0%	11.1%	282,414	68.6%
Total		268			411,778	100%
<b>Non-Residential</b>						
Strata 1	.03 Min to 7.17 Max	67	18.0%	12.3%	3,529	4.1%
Strata 2	7.19 Min to 13.77 Max	67	18.0%	4.4%	10,265	11.9%
Strata 3	13.83 Min to 33.64 Max	67	18.0%	4.8%	21,672	25.1%
Strata 4	33.68 Min to 3994.81 Max	67	13.9%	7.1%	50,920	58.9%
Total		268			86,386	100%

<sup>5</sup> Excludes Lighting.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR FINDINGS AS A RESULT OF THIS ANALYSIS?**

2 A. KU's customers are dispersed in a reasonably proportional manner throughout its  
3 service area. That is, there are no distinct differences in the mix of customers (by class)  
4 across the rural and urban portions of KU's service area. The relationship of Residential  
5 customers relative to non-Residential customers is relatively constant throughout KU's  
6 service area. While the rural areas of KU's service area are comprised mainly of  
7 Residential customers, this relationship also remains true for the more dense population  
8 areas of KU's territory as well. More importantly, in the less dense portions of KU's  
9 service territory (rural areas), KU serves a proportionate number of non-Residential  
10 customers.

11 In summary, each customer class is represented in a reasonably proportional  
12 manner in both rural and urban areas within KU's service area. As a result, it cannot be  
13 said that the less populated portions of KU's service area (which require significant  
14 investment to serve few customers) are dedicated to any one class of customers. As such,  
15 KU's distribution plant and expenses should be assigned to classes based only on  
16 utilization and any consideration of customer counts is improper for the allocation of  
17 distribution plant, as such, this study indicates that KU's distribution plant should be  
18 classified as 100% demand-related.

19

20 **Q. DOES THE NARUC ELECTRIC COST ALLOCATION MANUAL INDICATE IF**  
21 **AN *A PRIORI* ASSUMPTION IS APPROPRIATE REGARDING WHETHER**  
22 **DISTRIBUTION COSTS MUST BE CLASSIFIED AS PARTIALLY CUSTOMER-**  
23 **RELATED AND PARTIALLY DEMAND-RELATED?**

24 A. No. In fact, the NARUC Manual (published in 1992) states the following:

25 To ensure that costs are properly allocated, the analyst must first  
26 classify each account as demand-related, customer-related, or a  
27 combination of both. The classification depends upon the analyst's  
28 evaluation of how the costs in these accounts were incurred. In making  
29 this determination, supporting data may be more important than theoretical  
30 considerations.

31 Allocating costs to the appropriate groups in a cost study requires a  
32 special analysis of the nature of distribution plant and expenses. (page 89)

33

1 Q. HAS NARUC PROVIDED MORE RECENT GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE  
2 CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION PLANT THAN WHAT WAS  
3 PUBLISHED IN THE 1992 NARUC ELECTRIC COST ALLOCATION  
4 MANUAL?

5 A. Yes. The 1992 NARUC Manual was written in an era when all retail utility  
6 services were bundled (generation, transmission and distribution). Subsequent to the  
7 unbundling of retail rates in the mid to late 1990's by several state jurisdictions, NARUC  
8 commissioned a study to examine the costing and pricing of electric distribution service  
9 in further detail. In December 2000, NARUC published a report entitled: Charging For  
10 Distribution Services: Issues in Rate Design. As part of the Executive Summary this  
11 report states:

12 The usefulness of cost analyses of the distribution system in designing rate  
13 structures and setting rate levels depends in large measure upon the  
14 manner in which the studies are undertaken. Cost studies (both marginal  
15 and embedded) are intended, among other things, to determine the nature  
16 and causes of costs, so that they can then be reformulated into rates that  
17 cost-causers can pay. Such studies must of necessity rely on a host of  
18 simplifying assumptions in order to produce workable results; this is  
19 especially true of embedded cost studies. Moreover, it is often the case  
20 that many of the costs (e.g., administrative and general) that distribution  
21 rates recover are not caused by provision of distribution service, but are  
22 assigned to it arbitrarily. Too great dependence on cost studies is to be  
23 captured by their underlying assumptions and methodological flaws.  
24 Utilities and commissions should be cautious before adopting a particular  
25 method on the basis of what may be a superficial appeal. More important,  
26 however, is the concern that a costing method, once adopted, becomes the  
27 predominant and unchallenged determinant of rate design. (page 67)

28  
29 With specific regard to classification and allocation of certain distribution plant (poles,  
30 wires and transformers), Chapter IV of this report is devoted to the costing of distribution  
31 services. With respect to embedded cost analyses this updated NARUC report states:

32 There are a number of methods for differentiating between the  
33 customer and demand components of embedded distribution plant. The  
34 most common method used is the basic customer method, which classifies  
35 all poles, wires, and transformers as demand-related and meters, meter-  
36 reading, and billing as customer-related. This general approach is used in  
37 more than thirty states. A variation is to treat poles, wires, and  
38 transformers as energy-related driven by kilowatt-hour sales but, though it

1 has obvious appeal, only a small number of jurisdictions have gone this  
2 route.

3 Two other approaches sometimes used are the minimum size and  
4 zero-intercept methods. The minimum size method operates, as its name  
5 implies, on the assumption that there is a minimum-size distribution  
6 system capable of serving customers minimum requirements. The costs of  
7 this hypothetical system are, so the argument goes, driven not by customer  
8 demand but rather by numbers of customers, and therefore they are  
9 considered customer costs. The demand-related cost portion then is the  
10 difference between total distribution investment and the customer-related  
11 costs. The zero-intercept approach is a variation on the minimum size.  
12 Here the idea is to identify that portion of plant that is necessary to give  
13 customers access but which is incapable of serving any level of demand.  
14 The logic is that the costs of this system, because it can serve no demand  
15 and thus is not demand-related, are necessarily customer-related.  
16 However, the distinction between customer and demand costs is not  
17 always clear, insofar as the number of customers on a system (or particular  
18 area of a system) will have impacts on the total demand on the system, to  
19 the extent that their demand is coincident with the relevant peak (system,  
20 areal, substation, etc.).

21 Any approach to classifying costs has virtues and vices. The first  
22 potential pitfall lies in the assumptions, explicit and implicit, that a method  
23 is built upon. In the basic customer method, it is the *a priori* classification  
24 of expenditures (which may or may not be reasonable). In the case of the  
25 minimum-size and zero-intercept methods, the threshold assumption is  
26 that there is some portion of the system whose costs are unrelated to  
27 demand (or to energy for that matter). From one perspective, this notion  
28 has a certain intuitive appeal these are the lowest costs that must be  
29 incurred before any or some minimal amount of power can be delivered  
30 but from another viewpoint it seems absurd, since in the absence of any  
31 demand no such system would be built at all. Moreover, firms in  
32 competitive markets do not indeed, cannot price their products according  
33 to such methods: they recover their costs through the sale of goods and  
34 services, not merely by charging for the ability to consume, or access.  
35 (pages 29 & 30)

36  
37 In summary, when all of the facts and guidelines are known, it is clear to me that:

- 38 (a) data and analysis specific to each utility is more appropriate and preferred over an *a*  
39 *priori* assumption that distribution plant must be partially customer-related; and, (b)  
40 many (if not most) state regulatory commissions endorse a method in which all  
41 distribution plant from substations through line transformers is classified and allocated  
42 based solely on demand. A copy of the entire Chapter (IV) from the 2000 NARUC  
43 Publication discussing costing studies is provided in my Schedule GAW-3.

1 **Q. WHY IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION PLANT IMPORTANT IN**  
2 **CCOSS ANALYSES?**

3 A. The classification of Distribution plant may be the single most important factor  
4 affecting class rates of return. To illustrate the importance of this issue, consider the  
5 Residential class: whereas this class may account for only 40% to 50% of peak demand,  
6 it is responsible for a much higher percentage of the number of customers. Therefore,  
7 given the level of investment associated with Distribution plant, wide variations in class  
8 rates of return can result from different customer/demand classifications.  
9

10 **Q. HOW DID MR. CONROY CLASSIFY DISTRIBUTION PLANT BETWEEN**  
11 **CUSTOMER-RELATED AND DEMAND-RELATED COMPONENTS?**

12 A. Mr. Conroy claims to have conducted a zero-intercept analysis to develop  
13 customer/demand classifications for distribution Overhead lines, underground lines, and  
14 transformers. I take exception to Mr. Conroy's reference to his proposed classifications  
15 as a "zero-intercept" derived study, and I also disagree with his approaches.  
16

17 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW AN INDUSTRY ACCEPTED ZERO-INTERCEPT**  
18 **STUDY IS CONDUCTED.**

19 A. Under accepted industry practices, which are well documented in various cost  
20 allocation manuals,<sup>6</sup> the zero-intercept method is very straight-forward. First, various  
21 types of equipment are separated by capacity size and type. Next, historical accounting  
22 costs are trended by vintage year to reflect cost differences over time. For each size and  
23 type of equipment, the total dollars and total units (feet or number of units) are  
24 considered as well as the capacity (size) of each type of equipment. Because the overall  
25 objective is to estimate the cost of a "zero-size" piece of equipment, total costs are  
26 divided by total units (feet or unit) for each type of equipment to derive an average cost  
27 per foot or per unit. A regression model is then developed based on the following general  
28 form:

29 
$$\text{cost/unit} = a + b (\text{size})$$

---

<sup>6</sup> See for example the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions ("NARUC") Electric Utility Cost Allocation Manual, 1992, pages 92 through 94.

1 The resulting intercept (a) produces the estimated cost per unit of a “zero-size” piece of  
2 equipment. This estimated zero-size cost per unit is then multiplied by the total units in  
3 the system to estimate a zero-size total cost. The ratio of total zero size costs to trended  
4 total actual costs represents the percentage of zero-size equipment and serves as the  
5 customer percentage.

6 The above industry standard is in stark contrast to Mr. Conroy’s method presented  
7 in his Conroy Exhibits C5, C6, and C7. Mr. Conroy refers to his approach as a “weighted  
8 regression analysis.” Although this “weighted regression analysis” is a clever arithmetic  
9 exercise, it violates theoretical statistical principles of linear regression and skews his  
10 results. Moreover, on page 24 of his direct testimony, Mr. Conroy states:

11 “the feet of conductor and number of transformers on KU’s system are  
12 not uniformly distributed over all sizes of wire and transformer. For this  
13 reason, it was necessary to use a weighted regression analysis in the  
14 determination of the zero intercept.”  
15

16 It is interesting that Mr. Conroy finds KU’s system to be typical of other utilities, yet, his  
17 approach varies dramatically from the industry practice that has been used by countless  
18 utilities, commissions, and analysts for decades when a classification study is found to be  
19 appropriate.

20 To understand the bias in Mr. Conroy’s “weighted regression analysis,” we must  
21 fully understand the mathematical model he derives. Using Overhead Conductors as an  
22 example, consider Mr. Conroy’s analysis presented in his Exhibit C5. Although not  
23 shown in his exhibit, Mr. Conroy’s equation for Overhead Conductors is:

$$24 \quad (\text{cost per foot} \times \text{feet}^{0.5}) = 0 + 0.8901(\text{feet}^{0.5}) + 0.0040(\text{size} \times \text{feet}^{0.5})$$

26 Notice that the equation’s true intercept is forced to zero. However, if size is set to zero,  
27 the second term  $[0.0040(\text{size} \times \text{feet}^{0.5})]$  becomes zero. If we then ask what is the cost for  
28 a foot of a zero size conductor we see that  $\text{feet}^{0.5} = 1^{0.5} = 1$ , such that the cost for one foot  
29 becomes \$0.8901. This is the zero-intercept used by Mr. Conroy.  
30

31 To illustrate the bias in Mr. Conroy’s analysis, consider the following  
32 hypothetical example of his approach for a system “not uniformly distributed over all  
33 sizes of wire”:



	Total Cost	Cost Per Foot (y)	Capacity (x)	Feet (n)	$y(n^{0.5})$	$n^{0.5}$	$x(n^{0.5})$
	\$350.00	3.50	2.00	100	35	10.00	20.00
	\$250.00	5.00	4.00	50	35.355339	7.07	28.28
	\$62,500.00	6.25	6.00	10,000	625	100.00	600.00
	\$164.00	8.20	8.00	20	36.671515	4.47	35.78
	\$\$99.50	9.95	10.00	10	31.464663	3.16	31.62

Under the statistically correct and industry accepted zero-intercept method, the following regression equation results:

$$\text{cost/feet} = 1.75 + 0.805(\text{size})$$

Therefore, a zero-size cost is estimated to be \$1.75 per foot. Using the same data, the following equation is produced using Mr. Conroy's approach:

$$\text{cost per foot} \times \text{feet}^{0.5} = 0 + 1.9815(\text{feet}^{0.5}) + 0.7120(\text{size} \times \text{feet}^{0.5})$$

Mr. Conroy's approach would result in a zero cost per foot of \$1.9815 as compared to the industry accepted cost per foot of \$1.75.

**Q. DO YOU HAVE OTHER CONCERNS REGARDING MR. CONROY'S ZERO-INTERCEPT ANALYSES USED TO CLASSIFY DISTRIBUTION PLANT?**

A. Yes. The data utilized by Mr. Conroy to conduct his statistical (zero-intercept) analyses is so questionable that no credibility can be given to any results obtained, regardless of the specific method utilized. My first concern relates to the accuracy of the data used by Mr. Conroy. To illustrate, consider Mr. Conroy's data used for Account No. 365, Overhead Conductors, as shown in Conroy Exhibit C5. Mr. Conroy's database indicates that the LGE/KU distribution systems are comprised of 97,432,621 linear feet of Overhead Conductors. Of this amount, Mr. Conroy's data includes 0.3 million linear feet of #8 wire, 15.0 million linear feet of #6 wire, and 11.5 million linear feet of #4 wire. These wire sizes are extremely small and not typically utilized to carry current throughout a primary or secondary distribution system. Indeed, these wires are smaller

1 than most residential service lines. I cannot be certain if such small wires are actually  
 2 installed within the Companies distribution system, but if they are, they are almost  
 3 certainly ground wires or individual customer service lines.<sup>7</sup> My next data concern  
 4 relates to the average cost per linear foot calculated and used by Mr. Conroy in his  
 5 analysis. For example, and again referring to Conroy Exhibit C5, consider his average  
 6 cost for small conductors. We see that his database utilizes an average cost of #1  
 7 conductor of \$6.81 per foot while his calculated average cost of much larger 1/0 and 2/0  
 8 conductors are only \$4.72 and \$1.05, respectively. In other words, as conductor sizes  
 9 increase, the average cost decreases. Finally, the database and mix of conductors used by  
 10 Mr. Conroy in this case are much different than the data used in prior LG&E/KU cases.  
 11 My Schedule GAW-4 provides the data utilized by the Company in the 2009 case. As  
 12 can be seen by comparing these two data sets, the amounts and mix of plant (conductors)  
 13 is vastly different between these two cases. For example, the following is a sample  
 14 comparison of various size conductors utilized in this case to those utilized for the same  
 15 purpose during the 2010 case:

16 Overhead Conductor Quantity  
 17 (Linear Feet)

18 Conductor Size	19 Current Case	20 2009 Case
21 #2	22 9,402,756	23 971,519
24 #1	25 115,720	26 88,940
27 1/0	28 247,264	29 39,898
2/0	648,440	713,507
3/0	2,032,233	1,954,687
Sum of All Wires in Data Base	97,430,621	4,699,122

25 **Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN THE ZERO-INTERCEPT DATA**  
 26 **UTILIZED BY MR. CONROY?**

27 A. Yes. When a zero-intercept or minimum-size study is performed for Overhead or  
 28 Underground Conductors, it is important to identify and state the various sizes of  
 29 conductors on a circuit foot, not linear foot, basis. This is because all electric distribution

<sup>7</sup> The maximum capacity of #8 wire is only 100 amps, #6 is 140 amps, and #4 wire is 180 amps: less than a modern single-family home service circuit panel.

1 systems are comprised of both single-phase and multi-phase (3-phase) circuits. While  
2 some single-phase circuits are comprised of only two wires, current practices are to  
3 generally install three-wire single-phase circuits, while virtually all three-phase circuits  
4 require four conductors. Furthermore, three-phase circuits tend to be comprised of larger  
5 size conductors. Most important is the fact that the analyst is attempting to estimate the  
6 theoretical cost per foot of zero size circuit which would be comprised of only two wires.  
7 When historical data is stated only on a linear foot basis it is impossible to estimate the  
8 cost of a zero size circuit.

9  
10 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS REGARDING ZERO-INTERCEPT**  
11 **ANALYSES OF KU'S DISTRIBUTION PLANT ACCOUNTS?**

12 A. Yes. I question why the data Mr. Conroy used for his Overhead Conductors  
13 (Account 365) and Underground Conductors (Account 367) analyses are exactly the  
14 same for LG&E and KU, and different for Line Transformers (Account 368). The data  
15 used for the analyses clearly should be different between LG&E and KU, and in fact,  
16 were different in the LG&E/KU 2008 rate case.

17  
18 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE**  
19 **CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTION PLANT IN THIS CASE?**

20 A. Based on my customer density/mix analysis of KU's distribution system, it is  
21 entirely likely that all of KU's distribution system should be classified as 100% demand-  
22 related. Furthermore, I completely disagree with the analyses performed by Mr. Conroy.  
23 In this regard, I have conducted my CCOSS utilizing a 100% demand classification of  
24 distribution plant. In this way, we can test and evaluate the sensitivity of various  
25 distribution plant classifications and their effects on class rates of return.

26  
27 **Q. WHAT ARE THE CCOSS RESULTS UTILIZING THE INDUSTRY ACCEPTED**  
28 **BIP APPROACH TO ALLOCATE GENERATION PLANT AND ALSO**  
29 **CLASSIFIES DISTRIBUTION PLANT AS 100% DEMAND-RELATED?**

30 A. The following provides a summary of my CCOSS results at current rates as well  
31 as a comparison to those obtained by Mr. Conroy:

ROR At Current Rates

Class	Watkins CCOSS	Conroy CCOSS	Average Results
Residential	5.55%	3.97%	4.76%
General Service	9.68%	8.72%	9.20%
All Electric Schools	5.47%	7.25%	6.36%
PS-Secondary	8.03%	10.51%	9.27%
PS-Primary	7.39%	8.52%	7.96%
TOD-Secondary	2.67%	5.83%	4.25%
TOD-Primary	3.73%	5.89%	4.81%
RTS	5.21%	6.06%	5.64%
FLS Transmission	-2.18%	-1.59%	-1.89%
Street Lighting	8.33%	7.13%	7.73%
Lighting Energy	0.01%	3.38%	1.70%
Traffic Signals	7.32%	8.24%	7.78%
Total Company	6.02%	6.02%	6.02%

As can be seen above, in a relative sense, my class rates of return at current rates are generally consistent with those obtained by Mr. Conroy. That is, the classes that are earning at, below, or above, the system average ROR are generally consistent across both studies. The details of my CCOSS are presented in my Schedule GAW-5.

**III. ELECTRIC CLASS REVENUE INCREASE DISTRIBUTION**

**Q. HOW DOES MR. CONROY PROPOSE TO ASSIGN KU'S PROPOSED OVERALL \$81.5 MILLION INCREASE IN SALES REVENUE ACROSS RATE CLASSES?**

A. In general, Mr. Conroy proposes to assign somewhat larger percentage increases to those classes whose ROR's at current rates are below the system average ROR and somewhat smaller percentage increases to those classes whose ROR's are greater than the system average ROR. A summary of Mr. Conroy's proposed class increases is as follows:

KU Proposed Revenue Increases		
Class	Percent Increase	Percent of System Avg.
Residential	8.03%	124%
General Service	4.97%	77%
All Electric Schools	5.81%	90%
PS-Secondary	1.96%	30%
PS-Primary	5.23%	81%
TOD-Secondary	6.59%	102%
TOD-Primary	6.62%	102%
RTS	6.50%	100%
FLS Transmission	6.25%	96%
Street Lighting	5.41%	83%
Lighting Energy	5.42%	84%
Traffic Signals	5.40%	83%
<b>Total System</b>	<b>6.49%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Q. IS MR. CONROY'S PROPOSED CLASS REVENUE DISTRIBUTION REASONABLE?**

A. In general, yes. My only exception is the Fluctuating Load ("FLS") class. While both Mr. Conroy's and my CCOSS studies indicate that this class is achieving an ROR well below the system average ROR, Mr. Conroy proposes a smaller percentage increase than the system average. Given the size and magnitude of KU's proposed increase, I recommend that the FLS class be increased at 125% of the overall system-wide percentage increase. Furthermore, because of the absolute size of the Residential class, I recommend that the additional revenue collected from the FLS class be credited to the Residential increase.

**Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZE AN OVERALL INCREASE LESS THAN THE 6.49% REQUESTED BY KU, HOW SHOULD THE FINAL INCREASE BE ASSIGNED TO INDIVIDUAL CLASSES?**

A. I recommend that any reduction in the overall increase be scaled-back in proportion to the Company's proposed class increases with the adjustment to the FLS class noted above.

1 **IV. RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN**

2  
3 **Q. DOES KU PROPOSE ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASES TO ITS ELECTRIC**  
4 **RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHARGE?**

5 A. Yes. KU proposes to significantly increase its Residential customer charge from  
6 \$8.50 to \$13.00 per month which represents a 53% increase.  
7

8 **Q. MR. WATKINS, HAVE YOU IDENTIFIED A COMMON OBJECTIVE IN KU'S**  
9 **RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN PROPOSAL?**

10 A. Yes. It is clear from the testimony of Mr. Conroy that the primary objective of  
11 KU's Residential rate design is to guarantee revenue collection and profitability  
12 associated with fixed monthly customer charges.  
13

14 **Q. WHY DOES KU DESIRE MORE RESIDENTIAL REVENUE FROM**  
15 **CUSTOMER CHARGES?**

16 A. Fixed monthly customer charges represent guaranteed revenue to KU. This  
17 guarantee of revenue obviously reduces the risk of KU's operations and provides much  
18 more assurances of net income available to shareholders.  
19

20 **Q. OTHER THAN DECOUPLING THE LINK BETWEEN PROFITABILITY AND**  
21 **VOLUMETRIC SALES, DOES MR. CONROY PROVIDE OTHER**  
22 **JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HIS PROPOSAL TO COLLECT SUBSTANTIALLY**  
23 **MORE OF ITS RESIDENTIAL RATE REVENUES FROM FIXED MONTHLY**  
24 **CHARGES?**

25 A. Yes. Mr. Conroy claims that because of the high percentage of fixed cost inherent  
26 in providing electric service, prices (rate design) should reflect the Company's  
27 relationship between fixed and variable costs.  
28  
29  
30

1 **Q. DOES KU'S PROPOSAL TO COLLECT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ITS**  
2 **ELECTRIC NON-FUEL REVENUE FROM FIXED MONTHLY CHARGES**  
3 **COMPORT WITH THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS**  
4 **OR THE ACTUAL PRACTICES OF SUCH COMPETITIVE MARKETS?**

5 A. No. The most basic tenet of competition is that prices determined through a  
6 competitive market ensure the most efficient allocation of society's resources. Because  
7 public utilities are generally afforded monopoly status under the belief that resources are  
8 better utilized without the duplication of the fixed facilities required to serve consumers,  
9 a fundamental goal of regulatory policy is that regulation should serve as a surrogate for  
10 competition to the greatest extent practical.<sup>8</sup> As such, the pricing policy for a regulated  
11 public utility should mirror those of competitive firms to the greatest extent practical.  
12

13 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY DISCUSS HOW PRICES ARE GENERALLY STRUCTURED**  
14 **IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS.**

15 A. Economic theory tells us that efficient price signals result when prices are equal to  
16 long-run marginal costs. It is well known that in the long-run all costs are variable and,  
17 hence, efficient pricing results from the incremental variability of costs even though a  
18 firm's short-run cost structure may include a high level of sunk or "fixed" costs or be  
19 reflective of excess capacity. Indeed, competitive market-based prices are generally  
20 structured based on usage, i.e. volume based pricing.  
21

22 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THIS THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICING**  
23 **SHOULD BE APPLIED TO REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITIES, SUCH AS KU.**

24 A. Due to KU's investment in system infrastructure, there is no debate that many of  
25 its short-run costs are fixed in nature. However, as discussed above, efficient competitive  
26 prices are established based on long-run costs, which are entirely variable in nature.

27 Marginal cost pricing only relates to efficiency. This pricing does not attempt to  
28 always address fairness or equity. From a perspective of fair and equitable pricing of a  
29 regulated monopoly's products and services, it is generally agreed that payments for a  
30 good or service should be in accordance with the benefits received. In this regard, those

---

<sup>8</sup> James C. Bonbright, et al Principles of Public Utility Rates at 141 (2d ed. 1988).

1 that receive more benefits should pay more in total than those who receive fewer  
2 benefits. With respect to electric and natural gas usage, the volume of consumption is  
3 the most direct, and in my opinion the best indicator of benefits received, such that  
4 volumetric pricing promotes the fairest pricing mechanism to customers and to the  
5 utility.

6 The above philosophy is, and has been, the belief of economists, regulators, and  
7 the marketplace for many years. As an illustration, consider utility industry pricing in its  
8 infancy (1800s). In the beginning, customers paid a fixed monthly fee and consumed as  
9 much of the utility commodity/service as they desired (usually water). It soon became  
10 apparent that the fixed monthly fee rate schedule was inefficient and unfair. Utilities  
11 soon began metering their commodity/service and charging only for the amount actually  
12 consumed. In this way, consumers receiving more benefits from the utility than others  
13 paid more in total for the utility service because they used more of the commodity.

14 Furthermore, virtually every capital intensive industry is faced with a high  
15 percentage of fixed costs in the short-run. This includes the manufacturing and  
16 transportation industries. Prices for competitive products and services in these industries  
17 are invariably established on a volumetric basis, including those that were once  
18 regulated; e.g., motor transportation, airline travel, and rail service.

19 Accordingly, the position of Mr. Conroy that KU's fixed costs should be  
20 recovered through fixed monthly charges, in my view, is incorrect since pricing should  
21 reflect long-run cost incidence wherein all costs are variable or volumetric in nature, and  
22 that users requiring more of KU's products and services pay more than customers who  
23 use less of these products and services.

24  
25 **Q. DOES KU'S PROPOSAL TO COLLECT A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER**  
26 **PORTION OF ITS RESIDENTIAL REVENUES AND FROM FIXED MONTHLY**  
27 **CUSTOMER CHARGES COMPORT WITH PROPER RATEMAKING**  
28 **PRINCIPLES?**

29 **A.** No. Perhaps the most highly regarded, and certainly the most commonly used  
30 reference to ratemaking principles is Dr. James Bonbright's treatise entitled Principles of



1 Public Utility Rates. With regard to the collection of revenue solely (or largely) through  
2 a fixed customer charge, Dr. Bonbright states:

3 . . . there remains a choice as to the unit of service to which the uniform  
4 rate shall be applied. Among a variety of alternatives, three receive  
5 closest consideration: a uniform charge per customer; a uniform charge  
6 per unit of energy (kilowatt-hour); and a uniform charge per unit of the  
7 customer's maximum monthly kilowatt demand.

8 **Uniformity of charge per customer (say, \$10 per month for any**  
9 **desired quantity of service) has charm in avoiding metering costs.**  
10 **Nevertheless, it is soon rejected because of its utter failure to**  
11 **recognize either cost differences or value-of-service differences**  
12 **between large and small customers. [Page 396] [Emphasis added].**  
13  
14

15 **Q. EARLIER IN YOUR TESTIMONY YOU EXPLAINED THAT VOLUMETRIC**  
16 **PRICING PREDOMINATES IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS. IS THERE ANY**  
17 **DATA OR EXPERIENCE REGARDING THE PRICING OF UTILITY**  
18 **SERVICES THAT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DEREGULATED?**

19 A. Yes. Retail electric competition for electric generation services exists in several  
20 states. Invariably, customer choice for generation supply is volumetrically priced.  
21 However, competition for electric generation alone does not necessarily provide a good  
22 apples-to-apples comparison with the bundled services provided by KU.

23 Texas has implemented total retail electric competition for most of the State's  
24 ratepayers, including distribution service. Under the Texas model, consumers select their  
25 electricity provider for all bundled electric services including generation, transmission,  
26 distribution, and metering. The customers' selected service provider supplies all services  
27 from the generator to the meter box. Electric providers compete for customers and are  
28 free to set their own prices and pricing structure.  
29

30 **Q. HOW ARE COMPETITIVE RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC RATES STRUCTURED**  
31 **IN TEXAS?**

32 A. Every competitive electric service provider in Texas has a volumetric component  
33 within their rate structure. With regard to Residential fixed monthly customer charges,  
34 there are two different pricing structures: those with traditional fixed monthly customer  
35 charges (regardless of consumption); and, those that have a minimum bill amount. The

1 following is a summary of the current rate structures regarding customer charges for the  
2 28 providers that offer competitive Residential electric service in Texas:

	<u>Number Of Providers</u>	<u>Percentage Of Providers</u>
3 4 5 6 Fixed charge waived with usage threshold	21	75%
7 8 <u>Traditional fixed monthly customer charge</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>25%</u>
9 Total	28	100%

10  
11 Of the 7 providers that utilize a traditional fixed monthly customer charge, the  
12 average customer charge is \$6.94 per month. Regarding the 21 competitive providers  
13 that waive a fixed fee with a minimum threshold of usage, the average customer charge is  
14 \$9.14 per month. The details supporting these amounts are provided in my Exhibit No.  
15 GAW-6.

16 From this data, 25% of the providers have maintained the traditional fixed  
17 monthly customer charge, and 75% of the providers waive any fixed fees once a  
18 minimum level of consumption (KWH) is achieved.<sup>9</sup>

19 When prices for a service similar to KU's operations are established based on  
20 competition and determined by the market (customers and sellers), the resulting rate  
21 structure is similar to that found for most other competitive goods and services, i.e.,  
22 predominantly based on volumetric pricing, and not fixed charge pricing.  
23

24 **Q. HAS MR. CONROY CONDUCTED AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS THAT HE**  
25 **CONTENDS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING THE**  
26 **RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHARGE FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE?**

27 **A. Yes.**

28  
29 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. CONROY'S CUSTOMER COST ANALYSIS?**

<sup>9</sup> As indicated in the notes to Exhibit No. GAW-6 customer charges are waived with minimum monthly usages ranging from of 500 KWH to 2,000 KWH.

1 A. No.

2

3 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

4 A. Mr. Conroy estimates KU's monthly electric Residential customer "cost" to be  
5 \$18.82. However, Mr. Conroy's analysis includes a significant level of distribution,  
6 administrative, general, and other overhead costs. Electric utilities are in the business of  
7 providing electric energy to customers. Administrative, general and other overhead costs  
8 are a normal cost of business for any enterprise and should be recovered based on the  
9 level of service provided (i.e., on a volumetric basis). That is, these costs are incurred in  
10 the provision of services rendered. As such, these costs should be recovered in relation to  
11 the level of services provided.

12

13 **Q. HOW ARE ADMINISTRATIVE, GENERAL AND OVERHEAD EXPENSES**  
14 **TYPICALLY RECOVERED IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS?**

15 A. As discussed previously, the pricing structures in competitive markets are  
16 predominately volumetrically priced. This volumetric pricing recovers all of a business's  
17 costs: fixed; variable; administrative; general; overhead; profit; etc.

18

19 **Q. NOTWITHSTANDING THE EFFICIENCY REASONS AS TO WHY**  
20 **REGULATION SHOULD SERVE AS A SURROGATE FOR COMPETITION,**  
21 **ARE THERE OTHER RELEVANT ASPECTS TO THE PRICING STRUCTURES**  
22 **IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS VIS A VIS THOSE OF REGULATED**  
23 **UTILITIES?**

24 A. Yes. In competitive markets, consumers, by definition, have the ability to choose  
25 various suppliers of goods and services. Such is obviously not the case with regulated  
26 monopoly utilities. Consumers and the market have a clear preference for volumetric  
27 pricing. Utility customers are not so fortunate in that the local utility is a monopolist.  
28 The only reason utilities are able to achieve pricing structures with high fixed monthly  
29 charges is due to their monopoly status. In my opinion, this is a critical consideration in  
30 establishing utility pricing structures. That is, competitive markets and consumers in the  
31 U.S. have demanded volumetric based prices for generations: a regulated utility's pricing

1 structure should not be allowed to counter the collective wisdom of markets and  
2 consumers simply because of its market power.  
3

4 **Q. HAVE YOU CONDUCTED AN ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS THAT SHOULD BE**  
5 **CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING KU'S RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER**  
6 **CHARGES FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE?**

7 A. Yes. As I discussed earlier, there is no doubt that the majority of KU's non-fuel  
8 costs are fixed in the short-run and that efficient, competitive pricing dictates volumetric  
9 pricing. However, traditional ratemaking has recognized a minimum level of fixed  
10 customer charges to reflect the direct costs of maintaining a customer's account. These  
11 direct customer costs include the Company's investment in meters and service lines as  
12 well as the operating expenses associated with meter reading, customer service,  
13 accounting and customer records and collections. I have conducted a traditional direct  
14 customer cost analysis for KU which is presented in my Schedule GAW-7. This study  
15 indicates a monthly KU customer cost of \$4.29 per month.  
16

17 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION REGARDING KU'S RESIDENTIAL**  
18 **CUSTOMER CHARGE?**

19 A. Although my customer cost analysis indicates that a reduction to KU's electric  
20 customer charge is warranted, in the interest of gradualism and rate continuity I  
21 recommend that KU's current Residential electric customer charge be maintained at the  
22 current level of \$8.50 per month.  
23

24 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

25 A. Yes.

BACKGROUND & EXPERIENCE PROFILE  
**GLENN A. WATKINS**  
VICE PRESIDENT/SENIOR ECONOMIST  
TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, INC.

**EDUCATION**

1982 - 1988	M.B.A., Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia
1980 - 1982	B.S., Economics; Virginia Commonwealth University
1976 - 1980	A.A., Economics; Richard Bland College of The College of William and Mary, Petersburg, Virginia

**POSITIONS**

Jul. 1995-Present	Vice President/Senior Economist, Technical Associates, Inc.
Mar. 1993-1995	Vice President/Senior Economist, C. W. Amos of Virginia
Apr. 1990-Mar. 1993	Principal/Senior Economist, Technical Associates, Inc.
Aug. 1987-Apr. 1990	Staff Economist, Technical Associates, Inc., Richmond, Virginia
Feb. 1987-Aug. 1987	Economist, Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, Richmond, Virginia
May 1984-Jan. 1987	Staff Economist, Technical Associates, Inc.
May 1982-May 1984	Economic Analyst, Technical Associates, Inc.
Sep. 1980-May 1982	Research Assistant, Technical Associates, Inc.

**EXPERIENCE**

**I. Public Utility Regulation**

- A. Costing Studies -- Conducted, and presented as expert testimony, numerous embedded and marginal cost of service studies. Cost studies have been conducted for electric, gas, telecommunications, water, and wastewater utilities. Analyses and issues have included the evaluation and development of alternative cost allocation methods with particular emphasis on ratemaking implications of distribution plant classification and capacity cost allocation methodologies. Distribution plant classifications have been conducted using the minimum system and zero-intercept methods. Capacity cost allocations have been evaluated using virtually every recognized method of allocating demand related costs (e.g., single and multiple coincident peaks, non-coincident peaks, probability of loss of load, average and excess, and peak and average).  
Embedded and marginal cost studies have been analyzed with respect to the seasonal and diurnal distribution of system energy and demand costs, as well as cost effective approaches to incorporating energy and demand losses for rate design purposes. Economic dispatch models have been evaluated to determine long range capacity requirements as well as system marginal energy costs for ratemaking purposes.
- B. Rate Design Studies -- Analyzed, designed and provided expert testimony relating to rate structures for all retail rate classes, employing embedded and marginal cost studies. These rate structures have included flat rates, declining block rates, inverted block rates, hours use of demand blocking, lighting rates, and interruptible rates. Economic development and special industrial rates have been developed in recognition of the competitive environment for specific customers. Assessed alternative time differentiated rates with diurnal and seasonal pricing structures. Applied Ramsey (Inverse Elasticity) Pricing to marginal costs in order to adjust for embedded revenue requirement constraints.

## GLENN A. WATKINS

- C. Forecasting and System Profile Studies -- Development of long range energy (Kwh or Mcf) and demand forecasts for rural electric cooperatives and investor owned utilities. Analysis of electric plant operating characteristics for the determination of the most efficient dispatch of generating units on a system-wide basis. Factors analyzed include system load requirements, unit generating capacities, planned and unplanned outages, marginal energy costs, long term purchased capacity and energy costs, and short term power interchange agreements.
- D. Cost of Capital Studies -- Analyzed and provided expert testimony on the costs of capital and proper capital structures for ratemaking purposes, for electric, gas, telephone, water, and wastewater utilities. Costs of capital have been applied to both actual and hypothetical capital structures. Cost of equity studies have employed comparable earnings, DCF, and CAPM analyses. Econometric analyses of adjustments required to electric utilities cost of equity due to the reduced risks of completing and placing new nuclear generating units into service.
- E. Accounting Studies -- Performed and provided expert testimony for numerous accounting studies relating to revenue requirements and cost of service. Assignments have included original cost studies, cost of reproduction new studies, depreciation studies, lead-lag studies, Weather normalization studies, merger and acquisition issues and other rate base and operating income adjustments.

### II. Transportation Regulation

- A. Oil and Products Pipelines -- Conducted cost of service studies utilizing embedded costs, I.C.C. Valuation, and trended original cost. Development of computer models for cost of service studies utilizing the "Williams" (FERC 154-B) methodology. Performed alternative tariff designs, and dismantlement and restoration studies.
- B. Railroads -- Analyses of costing studies using both embedded and marginal cost methodologies. Analyses of market dominance and cross-subsidization, including the implementation of differential pricing and inverse elasticity for various railroad commodities. Analyses of capital and operation costs required to operate "stand alone" railroads. Conducted cost of capital and revenue adequacy studies of railroads.

### III. Insurance Studies

Conducted and presented expert testimony relating to market structure, performance, and profitability by line and sub-line of business within specific geographic areas, e.g. by state. These studies have included the determination of rates of return on Statutory Surplus and GAAP Equity by line - by state using the NAIC methodology, and comparison of individual insurance company performance vis a vis industry Country-Wide performance.

Conducted and presented expert testimony relating to rate regulation of workers compensation, automobile, and professional malpractice insurance. These studies have included the determination of a proper profit and contingency factor utilizing an internal rate of return methodology, the development of a fair investment income rate, capital structure, cost of capital.

Other insurance studies have included testimony before the Virginia Legislature regarding proper regulatory structure of Credit Life and P&C insurance; the effects on competition and prices resulting from proposed insurance company mergers, maximum and minimum expense multiplier limits, determination of specific class code rate increase limits (swing limits); and investigation of the reasonableness of NCCI's administrative assigned risk plan and pool expenses.

### IV. Anti-Trust and Commercial Business Damage Litigation

Analyses of alleged claims of attempts to monopolize, predatory pricing, unfair trade practices and economic losses. Assignments have involved definitions of relevant market

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areas(geographic and product) and performance of that market, the pricing and cost allocation practices of manufacturers, and the economic performance of manufacturers' distributors.

Performed and provided expert testimony relating to market impacts involving automobile and truck dealerships, incremental profitability, the present value of damages, diminution in value of business, market and dealer performance, future sales potential, optimal inventory levels, fair allocation of products, financial performance; and business valuations.

**MEMBERSHIPS AND CERTIFICATIONS**

Member, Association of Energy Engineers (1998)

Certified Rate of Return Analyst, Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (1992)

Member, American Water Works Association

National Association of Business Economists

Richmond Association of Business Economists

National Economics Honor Society

EXPERT TESTIMONY  
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PDF	YEAR	CASE NAME	JURISDICTION	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT OF TESTIMONY
Yes	1985	SAVANNAH ELECT. & PWR CO.	GA. PSC	3523UJ	SALES FORECAST, RATE DESIGN ISSUES
Yes	1990	CENTRAL MAINE PWR CO.	ME. PUC	89-68	MARGINAL COST OF SERVICE
Yes	1990	COMMONWEALTH GAS SERVICES (Columbia Gas)	VA. SCC	PUE900034	CLASS COST OF SERVICE
No	1990	WARNER FRUEHAUF	U.S. BANKRUPTCY CT.	n/a	VALUE OF STOCK, COST OF CAPITAL
Yes	1991	W. VA. WATER	WVA PSC	91-140-W-42T	RATE DESIGN
Yes	1992	S.C. WORKERS COMPENSATION	SC DEPT OF INSUR	92-034	INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
No	1992	GRASS v. ATLAS PLUMBING, et.al.	RICHMOND CIRCUIT CT	n/a	DAMAGES, BREACH OF COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE (PROFFERED TEST)
Yes	1992	VIRGINIA NATURAL GAS	VA. SCC	PUE920031	JURISDICTIONAL & CLASS COST OF SERVICE
Yes	1992	ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY (DIRECT)	N.J. DEPT OF INSUR	INS 06174-92	COST ALLOCATIONS, PROFITABILITY
Yes	1992	ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY (REBUTTAL)	N.J. DEPT OF INSUR	INS 06174-92	COST ALLOCATIONS, PROFITABILITY
No	1993	MOUNTAIN FORD v FORD MOTOR COMPANY	FEDERAL DISTRICT CT	n/a	VEHICLE ALLOCATIONS, INVENTORY LEVELS, INCREMENTAL PROFIT, & DAMAGES
No	1993	SOUTH WEST GAS CO.	AZ. CORP COMM	U-1551-92-253	DIRECT: CLASS COST ALLOCATIONS
Yes	1993	POTOMAC EDISON CO.	AZ. CORP COMM	U-1551-92-253	SURREBUTTAL: CLASS COST ALLOCATIONS
Yes	1993	POTOMAC EDISON CO.	VA. SCC	PUE930033	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN
Yes	1995	NEW JERSEY AMERICAN WATER CO.	VA. SCC	PUE950003	JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATIONS
Yes	1995	PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS COMPANY	N.J. B.P.U.	WR95040165	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN
Yes	1995	CYCLE WORLD v. HONDA MOTOR CO.	S.C. P.S.C.	95-715-G	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN, WEATHER NORMALIZATION
Yes	1995	HOUSE BILL # 1513	VA. DMV	N/A	MARKET PERFORMANCE, FINANCIAL IMPACT OF NEW DEALER
No	1996	VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER CO.	VA. GEN'L ASSEMBLY	N/A	WATER / WASTEWATER CONNECTION FEES
Yes	1996	ELIZABETHTOWN WATER CO.	VA. SCC	PUE960003	JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATIONS
Yes	1996	ELIZABETHTOWN WATER CO.	N.J. B.P.U.	WR96110557	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN
Yes	1996	ELIZABETHTOWN WATER CO.	N.J. B.P.U.	WR96110557	SURREBUTTAL COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN
Yes	1996	SOUTH JERSEY GAS CO.	VA. SCC	GR96010032	CLASS COST OF SERVICE
Yes	1996	SOUTH JERSEY GAS CO.	N.J. B.P.U.	INS960164	COST ALLOCATIONS, INSURANCE PROFITABILITY
Yes	1996	HOUSE BILL # 1513	N.J. B.P.U.	GR96010032	REBUTTAL - CLASS COST OF SERVICE
No	1996	NISSAN v. CRUMPLER NISSAN	VA. DMV	N/A	WATER / WASTEWATER CONNECTION FEES
Yes	1997	PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN WATER CO. (DIRECT)	VA. DMV	None	MARKET DETERMINATION & PERFORMANCE
Yes	1997	PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN WATER CO. (REBUTTAL)	PA PUC	R-00973952	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN, RATE DISCOUNTS
Yes	1997	PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN WATER CO. (SURREBUTTAL)	PA PUC	R-00973952	COST ALLOCATIONS, RATE DESIGN, RATE DISCOUNTS
Yes	1997	VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER CO.	VA. SCC	PUE970523	JURISDICTIONAL/CLASS ALLOCATIONS
Yes	1998	VIRGINIA ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY	VA. SCC	PUE980296	CLASS COST OF SERVICE and TIME DIFFERENTIATED FUEL COSTS
Yes	1998	NEW JERSEY AMERICAN WATER COMPANY	N.J. B.P.U.	WR98010015	CLASS COST OF SERVICE, RATE DESIGN, REVENUES
Yes	1998	AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY	VA. SCC	PUE980296	CLASS COST OF SERVICE and TIME DIFFERENTIATED FUEL COSTS
No	1998	FREEMAN WRONGFUL DEATH	FEDERAL DISTRICT CT.	98-596	LOST INCOME, WORK EXPECTANCY
Yes	1998	EASTERN MAINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE	MAINE PUC	None	REVENUE REQUIREMENT
Yes	1998	CREDIT LIFE & A&H RATE FILING	VA. SCC	N/A	PRIMA FACIA RATES, LEVEL OF COMPETITION
Yes	1998	MILLER VOLKSWAGEN v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA	VA. DMV	None	COST ALLOCATIONS, INSURANCE PROFITABILITY
Yes	1999	COLUMBIA GAS of VIRGINIA	VA. SCC	PUE990287	VEHICLE ALLOCATIONS/CSI
Yes	1999	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA. SCC	INS990165	RATE STRUCTURE
Yes	1999	ROANOKE GAS	VA. SCC	PUE990626	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2000	PERSON-SMITH v. DOMINION REALTY	RICHMOND CIRCUIT	n/a	Rate Design/ Weather Norm
Yes	2000	CREDIT LIFE/AH RATE FILING	VA. SCC	None	LOST INCOME
Yes	2000	UNITED CITIES GAS	VA. SCC	None	PRIMA FACIA RATES, LEVEL OF COMPETITION
No	2000	VERMONT WORKERS COMPENSATION RATE CASE	VT. INSURANCE COMM.	None	Cost Allocations/ Rate Design
Yes	2001	SERRA CHEVROLET v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.	ALABAMA CIRCUIT CT.	n/a	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
No	2001	VIRGINIA POWER ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING	VA. SCC	98-2089	ECONOMIC DAMAGES
Yes	2001	AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER RESTRUCTURING	VA. SCC	PUE000584	RATE Design (UNBUNDLING)
No	2001	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA. SCC	PUE010011	RATE Design (UNBUNDLING)
Yes	2002	PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN WATER CO. (DIRECT)	PA PUC	INS010190	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2002	HAROLD MORRIS PERSONAL INJURY	FED. DIST CT (RICHMOND)	RO0016750	COST ALLOCATIONS AND RATE DESIGN
Yes	2002	PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS	S.C. PSC	2002-63-G	LOST WAGES
Yes	2002	VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER COMPANY	VA. SCC	PUE-2002-00375	REVENUE ROMT, COST OF CAPITAL
Yes	2002	ROANOKE GAS COMPANY	VA. SCC	PUE-2002-00373	JURISDICTIONAL/CLASS ALLOCATIONS
Yes	2002	SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS (ELECTRIC)	S.C. PSC	2002-223-E	WEATHER NORMALIZATION RIDER
Yes	2003	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA. SCC	INS-2003-00157	REVENUE ROMT.
Yes	2003	CREDIT LIFE/AH RATE FILING	VA. SCC	None	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2003	ROANOKE GAS	VA. SCC	PUE-2003-00425	PRIMA FACIA RATES, LEVEL OF COMPETITION
Yes	2003	SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA GAS CO.	VA. SCC	PUE-2003-00426	WEATHER NORMALIZATION ADJUSTMENT RIDER
Yes	2004	SOUTH CAROLINA PIPELINE COMPANY	S.C. PSC	2004-6-G	WEATHER NORMALIZATION ADJUSTMENT RIDER
Yes	2004	VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER COMPANY	VA. SCC	PUE-2003-00539	COST OF GAS AND INTERRUPT. SALES PROGRAM
Yes	2004	SCE&G FUEL CONTRACT	S.C. PSC	2004-126-E	JURISDICTIONAL/CLASS ALLOCATIONS
Yes	2004				GAS CONTRACT FOR COMBINED CYCLE PLANT



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PDF	YEAR	CASE NAME	JURISDICTION	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT OF TESTIMONY
Yes	2004	WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT	VA SCC	PUE-2003-00603	RATE DESIGN/ WNA RIDER
Yes	2004	ATMOS ENERGY	VA SCC	PUE-2003-00507	RATE DESIGN/ WNA RIDER
Yes	2004	SCE&G RATE CASE (ELECTRIC)	S.C. PSC	2004-178-E	COST OF CAPITAL/ REV. ROMT.
No	2004	MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION	VA GENERAL ASSEMBLY	N/A	INDUSTRY RESTRICTIONS/ PROFITABILITY
Yes	2004	ATLAS HONDA v. HONDA MOTOR CO.	VA DMV	None	NEW DEALER PROTEST
Yes	2004	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA SCC	INS-2004-00124	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2004	NATIONAL FUEL GAS DISTRIBUTION	PA PUC	R00048655	COST ALLOCATIONS/ RATE DESIGN
Yes	2005	WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT	VA SCC	PUE-2005-00010	WEATHER NORMALIZATION ADJUSTMENT RIDER
No	2005	Serra Chevrolet	US Federal Ct.	CV-01-P-2682-S	Dealer incremental profits and costs
No	2005	NEWTOWN ARTESIAN WATER	PA PUC	None	REV. ROMT./ RATE STRUCTURE
No	2005	CITY OF BETHLEHEM WATER RATE CASE	PA PUC	INS-2005-00159	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2005	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA SCC	PUE-2005-00057	Revenue Requirements/ Alt. Regulation Plan
Yes	2005	Virginia Natural Gas	VA SCC	INS-2006-00013	Market Structure
Yes	2006	Olafre Hyundai v. Hyundai Motors of America	KS DMV	R-00061398	Revenue Requirements/ Alt. Regulation Plan
Yes	2006	Virginia Credit Life & A&H Prima Facie Rates	VA SCC	INS-2006-00197	Dealer impact analysis
Yes	2006	Columbia Gas of Virginia	VA SCC	INS-2006-00197	Market Structure
Yes	2006	PPL Gas	PA PUC	PUE-2006-00059	Revenue Requirements/ Alt. Regulation Plan
Yes	2006	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA SCC	R-00072349	COST ALLOCATIONS/ RATE DESIGN
Yes	2007	Level of Private Pass. Auto Competition	Ma. Dept. of Insur	N/A	Private Pass. Auto level of competition
Yes	2007	WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT	PA PUC	R-00072349	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2007	Valley Energy	PA PUC	R-00072350	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2007	Wellboro Electric	PA PUC	R-00072348	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2007	Citizens' Electric Of Lewisburg, Pa	PA PUC	INS-2007-00224	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2007	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	GA PSC	25060-JJ	COST ALLOCATIONS/ RATE DESIGN
Yes	2007	Georgia Power	PA PUC	R-2008-2011621	COST ALLOCATIONS/ RATE DESIGN
Yes	2008	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	VA SCC	N/A	Affiliate Transactions
Yes	2008	Greenway Toll Road Investigation	VA SCC	UE-072300	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Puget Sound Energy (Electric)	Wa. UTC	UE-072301	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Puget Sound Energy (Gas)	Wa. UTC	2008-00011	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Blue Grass Electric Cooperative	Ky PSC	08-72-GA-AIR, et al	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Columbia Gas of Ohio	OH PUC	PUE-2008-00060	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Virginia Natural Gas	VA SCC	R-2008-2029325	Nett Gas Conservation/ Revenue Decoupling
Yes	2008	Equitable Natural Gas	PA PUC	2008-000252	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Discounted Rates
Yes	2008	LG&E (Natural Gas)	Ky PSC	2008-000251	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Weather Normalization
Yes	2008	LG&E (Electric)	PA PUC	R-2008-2046520	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Weather Normalization
Yes	2008	Kentucky Utilities	Pa. PUC	R-2008-2046518	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Pike County Natural Gas	Pa. PUC	R-2008-2042293	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2008	Pike County Electric	Pa. PUC	Civil Action 42736	Revenue Requirement/ Excess Rates
Yes	2008	Newtown Artesian Water	Pa. PUC	R-02008-2079675	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2009	Leesburg Water & Sewer	Pa. PUC	R-2008-2079660	Market Structure and Availability
Yes	2009	Central Penn Gas, Inc.	Pa. PUC	n/a	Water Revenue Requirement
Yes	2009	Penn Natural Gas, Inc.	Pa. PUC	CL-2008-16114	Electric rate Design
Yes	2009	Credit Life/ A&H reinsurance	Pa. PUC	UE-090134	Gas Rate design
Yes	2009	Fairfax County v. City of Falls Church Virginia	Pa. PUC	UE-090135	Workers Compensation Rates
Yes	2009	Avista Utilities (Electric)	Pa. PUC	INS-2009-00142	Rate Design
Yes	2009	Avista Utilities (Gas)	Pa. PUC	2009-00202	Rate Design/Low Income
Yes	2009	Columbia Gas of Kentucky	Pa. PUC	E-7 Sub 909	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2009	NCCI (Workers Compensation Rates)	Pa. PUC	UE-090704	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2009	Duke Energy of Kentucky (Gas)	Pa. PUC	UG-090705	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2009	Duke Energy Carolinas (Electric)	Pa. PUC	2009-212287	Rate Design
Yes	2009	PacificCorp	Pa. PUC	PUE-2009-00059	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Weather Normalization
Yes	2009	Puget Sound Energy (Electric)	Pa. PUC	2009-00548	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Weather Normalization
Yes	2009	Puget Sound Energy (Gas)	Pa. PUC	2009-00549	Cost of Capital/Rate Design/ Weather Normalization
Yes	2009	United Water of Pennsylvania	Pa. PUC	2009-2139884	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2010	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	Pa. PUC	2010-2161694	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2010	Kentucky Utilities	Pa. PUC	2010-2157140	Cost of Capital/Rate Design
Yes	2010	LG&E (Electric)	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	LG&E (Natural Gas)	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	Philadelphia Gas Works	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	PPL Electric Company	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	York Water Company	Pa. PUC		
Yes	2010	Valley Energy, Inc.	Pa. PUC		

EXPERT TESTIMONY  
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PDF	YEAR	CASE NAME	JURISDICTION	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT OF TESTIMONY
Yes	2010	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA SCC	INS-2010-00126	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2010	Columbia Gas of Virginia	VA SCC	PUE-2010-00017	Cost of Capital/Revenue Requirement/Rate Design
Yes	2010	Georgia Power Company	GA PSC	Docket No. 31958	Cost Allocations/Rate Design
Yes	2010	City of Lancaster, Bureau of Water	PA PUC	R-2010-2179103	Cost of Capital
Yes	2011	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	PA PUC	R-2010-2215623	Cost Allocations/Rate Design
Yes	2011	Owen Electric Cooperative	KY PSC	PUE-2011-00037	Rate Design
Yes	2011	Virginia Natural Gas	VA SCC	PUE-2010-00142	Pipeline Prudence/Cost Allocations/Rate Design
Yes	2011	United Water of Pennsylvania	PA PUC	2011-2223985	Cost Allocations/Rate Design
Yes	2011	PPL Electric Company (Remand)	PA PUC	2010-2161694	Negotiated Industrial Rate
Yes	2011	NCCI (WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE)	VA SCC	2011-00163	WORKERS COMPENSATION RATES
Yes	2011	Artesian Water Company	DE PSC	11-207	Cost Allocations/Rate Design
Yes	2011	Arizona-American Water Company	AZ CORP COMM	W-01303A-10-0448	Excess Capacity/Need For Facilities
Yes	2012	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	DE PSC	11-397	Cost of Capital/Revenue Requirement/Rate Design
Yes	2012	PPL Electric	PA PUC	R-2012-2290597	Cost Allocations/Rate Design

Note: Does not include Expert Reports submitted to Courts or Regulatory agencies in which cases that settled prior to testimony.  
 Testimony prior to 2003 may be incomplete.

Schedule GAW-2

Kentucky Utilities & LG&E  
Test Year Generation Statistics

Generating Unit	Fuel	Generator Nameplate (MW)	Net MWH Produced	Generation Order	Total		Capacity Factor		Net Investment	
					Gross Investment	Net Investment	Net	Gross	Energy	Demand
Ghent 2	Coal	556	3,341,264	3	\$273,472,042	\$83,388,818	68.00%	74.64%	\$83,388,818	\$0
Ghent 1	Coal	557	3,282,901	7	\$457,703,835	\$271,488,089	67.28%	72.69%	\$271,488,089	\$0
Trimble County 1	Coal	566	3,308,126	2	\$515,981,742	\$278,424,714	66.72%	72.77%	\$278,424,714	\$0
Mill Creek 4	Coal	544	3,150,384	6	\$510,585,061	\$228,578,983	66.11%	72.35%	\$228,578,983	\$0
Mill Creek 1	Coal	356	2,053,056	4	\$171,459,453	\$52,146,990	65.83%	73.35%	\$52,146,990	\$0
Trimble County 2	Coal	838	4,740,434	1	\$1,019,959,483	\$906,947,029	64.58%	69.84%	\$906,947,029	\$0
Ghent 3	Coal	557	2,940,071	8	\$778,865,366	\$477,834,135	60.28%	66.46%	\$477,834,135	\$0
Ghent 4	Coal	556	2,801,767	11	\$426,413,546	\$238,401,985	57.52%	63.51%	\$238,401,985	\$0
Cane Run 4	Coal	164	807,948	24	\$82,888,694	\$16,703,463	56.24%	61.59%	\$16,703,463	\$0
Mill Creek 2	Coal	356	1,734,022	5	\$132,002,570	\$40,056,311	55.60%	62.98%	\$40,056,311	\$0
Mill Creek 3	Coal	463	2,051,810	10	\$284,377,385	\$122,639,799	50.59%	55.30%	\$122,639,799	\$60,598,130
Green River 4	Coal	114	501,882	9	\$46,859,950	\$8,588,941	50.26%	54.36%	\$8,588,941	\$4,272,436
Cane Run 5	Coal	209	905,328	18	\$97,221,510	\$23,631,839	49.45%	53.91%	\$23,631,839	\$11,685,656
Green River 3	Coal	75	320,975	23	\$27,718,488	\$10,089,303	48.95%	53.38%	\$10,089,303	\$5,160,210
Cane Run 6	Coal	272	1,138,782	21	\$153,644,905	\$66,407,604	47.79%	52.62%	\$66,407,604	\$29,448,514
Brown 2	Coal	180	581,164	25	\$59,125,163	\$28,891,106	36.88%	41.34%	\$28,891,106	\$18,242,659
Brown 3	Coal	464	1,298,614	27	\$617,105,989	\$469,702,193	31.95%	36.04%	\$469,702,193	\$319,636,789
Brown 1	Coal	114	275,317	32	\$76,780,399	\$36,383,634	27.57%	33.21%	\$36,383,634	\$26,352,959
Trimble County 6	Gas	199	93,551	13	\$62,918,755	\$46,166,154	5.37%	5.44%	\$46,166,154	\$0
Trimble County 7	Gas	199	91,965	14	\$54,236,860	\$39,700,952	5.28%	5.35%	\$39,700,952	\$0
Trimble County 9	Gas	199	85,420	16	\$54,028,301	\$39,977,482	4.90%	4.99%	\$39,977,482	\$0
Trimble County 5	Gas	199	62,572	12	\$66,804,468	\$48,361,256	3.59%	3.68%	\$48,361,256	\$0
Trimble County 8	Gas	199	61,973	15	\$53,873,686	\$39,444,963	3.56%	3.62%	\$39,444,963	\$0
Trimble County 10	Gas	199	53,035	17	\$60,462,097	\$45,235,631	3.04%	3.09%	\$45,235,631	\$0
Brown 7	Gas, Oil	177	34,745	20	\$60,225,468	\$43,404,094	2.24%	2.38%	\$43,404,094	\$0
Paddys Run 13	Gas	178	31,743	22	\$65,720,461	\$45,252,606	2.04%	2.08%	\$45,252,606	\$0
Brown 6	Gas, Oil	177	30,756	19	\$64,812,407	\$50,236,200	1.98%	2.13%	\$50,236,200	\$0
Brown 9	Gas, Oil	126	3,807	28	\$48,713,646	\$23,411,374	0.34%	0.53%	\$23,411,374	\$0
Brown 5	Gas	123	3,196	26	\$49,685,284	\$33,734,583	0.30%	0.50%	\$33,734,583	\$0
Brown 11	Gas, Oil	126	2,890	31	\$44,740,278	\$24,255,858	0.26%	0.41%	\$24,255,858	\$0
Brown 8	Gas, Oil	126	2,436	30	\$37,227,939	\$21,396,169	0.22%	0.36%	\$21,396,169	\$0
Brown 10	Gas, Oil	126	1,568	29	\$30,167,921	\$15,175,125	0.14%	0.29%	\$15,175,125	\$0
Cane Run 11	Gas, Oil	16	198	34	\$3,557,311	\$1,294,371	0.14%	0.14%	\$1,294,371	\$0
Haefling 1-3	Gas, Oil	21	169	37	\$6,346,312	\$2,227,070	0.09%	0.16%	\$2,227,070	\$0
Paddys Run 11	Gas	16	100	33	\$1,609,957	(\$136,355)	0.07%	0.11%	(\$136,355)	\$0
Zorn 1	Gas	18	(49)	36	\$1,951,456	(\$99,370)	-0.03%	0.02%	(\$99,370)	\$0
Paddys Run 12	Gas	33	(273)	35	\$3,990,011	\$419,642	-0.09%	0.00%	\$419,642	\$0
Tyrone 3	Coal	75	(1,477)		\$28,798,957	\$6,704,422	-0.22%	0.00%	\$6,704,422	\$0
Dix Dam 1-3	Hydro	9	82,033		\$28,850,449	\$20,621,308	34.68%	34.74%	\$20,621,308	\$0
Ohio Falls 1-8	Hydro	10	185,569		\$42,551,883	\$33,455,820	24.63%	25.19%	\$33,455,820	\$0
					\$3,930,544,291	\$3,930,544,291			\$2,928,724,184	\$1,001,820,107

Total System

74.51%

25.49%

Sources: Company responses to KU OAG 1-248, KU OAG 1-250, LG&E OAG 1-291, and LG&E OAG 1-293.

**CHARGING FOR DISTRIBUTION UTILITY**  
**SERVICES:**  
**ISSUES IN RATE DESIGN**

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#### IV. THE COSTS OF DISTRIBUTION SERVICES

A first question to be answered when designing rates is what does it cost to provide the service? What are the causes and magnitudes of the relevant costs? It is helpful to observe that the costs recovered by distribution-level rates have historically extended far beyond the distribution system. Are there other costs, not directly related to distribution services, that distribution rates are expected to recover? What follow here are an overview of utility costing methodologies and a discussion of some practical considerations to keep in mind when determining rate structures.

##### A. Utility Plant Costing Methods

Utilities and regulatory commissions use a variety of methods for determining and allocating cost responsibility among customers and customer classes. There are two general types of cost study, embedded and marginal. Embedded, or fully distributed, seeks to identify and assign the historical, or accounting, costs that make up a utility's revenue requirement. Marginal, as the name connotes, aims at determining the change in total costs imposed on the system by a change in output (whether measured by kilowatt-hour, kilowatt, customer, customer group, or other relevant cost driver). Each commission around the country uses these studies in its own way to inform the rate design process; in the end, most commissions rely on embedded cost studies for ultimate allocations and price levels, constrained as they are by a legal requirement to set rates that offer the prudent utility a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on its assets used in service to public.<sup>33</sup> The allocations, however, are often structured to reflect at least relative differences in the marginal costs of providing a company's various services.

##### 1. Cost Causation

There is broad agreement in the literature that distribution investment is causally related to peak demand. Numbers of customers on the system and energy needs are also seen to drive costs, but there is less of a consensus on these points or on their implications for rate design. In addition, not all jurisdictions employ the same methods for analyzing the various cost components, and there is of course a wide range of views on their nature—marginal, embedded, fixed, variable, joint, common,<sup>34</sup> etc.—and thus on how they should be recovered in rates.

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33. NARUC, p. 32.

34. The costs of multiple products or services supplied by the same plant or process are either common or joint. Common are those that generally do not vary with changes in output. The classic example is the president's desk, which is needed to run the firm as a whole but is incremental to the provision of no particular good or service. Another example is that of an airline flight, the majority of whose costs are incurred in a single lump and do not vary with the number of passengers carried. Put another way, common costs are those for which the unit of production (the single flight), which is the basis of cost incurrence, is larger than the unit of sale (a  
(continued...)

Numbers of customers, usage, and demand, however, are only part of the story. Other factors also play an important role: geography (particularly population density), system design (e.g., aerial versus underground lines), and the utility's business practices (for example, the extent of expenditures on billing, answering customers questions/complaints, etc.). The implications of such factors on rate design is unclear, however: one can charge for services on the basis of numbers of customers, usage, and demand, but not on the basis of other such factors.<sup>35</sup>

## 2. Embedded Costs

### a. Cost Classification: Customers, Demand, and Energy

Traditionally, customer costs are those that are seen to vary with the number of customers on the system: service drops (the line from the distribution radial to the home or business), meters, and billing and collection. Some utilities and jurisdictions also include some portion of the primary and secondary distribution plant (poles, wires, and transformers) in these costs, on the ground that they also are driven more by numbers of customers than by demand or energy. Similar reasoning leads to the designation of the costs of customer service and customer premises equipment as customer-related. But, since the system and its components are sized to serve a maximum level of anticipated demand, the notion that there are any customer costs (aside from perhaps metering and billing) that are not more properly categorized as demand can be challenged (see Subsections 3 and 4, below).

Utilities classify significant portions of their embedded distribution investment as demand-related, reasoning that it is designed and installed to serve a customer or group of customers according to their contribution to some peak load (system, substation, etc.). Substations are a typical example of such costs, but so too may be a significant portion of the wires and related facilities, since they are sized, at least in part, to serve a peak demand.

There are a number of methods for differentiating between the customer and demand components of embedded distribution plant. The most common method used is the basic customer method, which classifies all poles, wires, and transformers as demand-related and meters, meter-reading, and billing as customer-related. This general approach is used in more than thirty states. A

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34. (...continued)  
single ticket to a single passenger). Kahn, Vol. I, p. 77. If services produced in common can be produced in varying proportions, it may then be possible to identify separate marginal production costs for each.

Products that are produced in fixed proportions (e.g., cotton fiber and cottonseed oil, beef and hides, mutton and wool) are characterized by joint costs. For that aspect of their production process that is joint, the products have no separately identifiable marginal costs. *Id.*, p. 79. See also Bonbright, pp. 355-360.

35. These other cost factors can have huge effects on prices. Three distribution utilities in the American south, owned by the same holding company and using the same costing methodology, recently proposed new metering, customer service rates, and delivery rates. The rates, designed as a combination of monthly per-customer and per-kW of peak demand charges, vary from company to company by ratios ranging from 1.25 to 1.9.

variation is to treat poles, wires, and transformers as energy-related driven by kilowatt-hour sales but, though it has obvious appeal, only a small number of jurisdictions have gone this route.

Two other approaches sometimes used are the minimum size and zero-intercept methods. The minimum size method operates, as its name implies, on the assumption that there is a minimum-size distribution system capable of serving customers minimum requirements. The costs of this hypothetical system are, so the argument goes, driven not by customer demand but rather by numbers of customers, and therefore they are considered customer costs. The demand-related cost portion then is the difference between total distribution investment and the customer-related costs. The zero-intercept approach is a variation on the minimum size. Here the idea is to identify that portion of plant that is necessary to give customers access but which is incapable of serving any level of demand. The logic is that the costs of this system, because it can serve no demand and thus is not demand-related, are necessarily customer-related.<sup>36</sup> However, the distinction between customer and demand costs is not always clear, insofar as the number of customers on a system (or particular area of a system) will have impacts on the total demand on the system, to the extent that their demand is coincident with the relevant peak (system, areal, substation, etc.).

Any approach to classifying costs has virtues and vices. The first potential pitfall lies in the assumptions, explicit and implicit, that a method is built upon. In the basic customer method, it is the *a priori* classification of expenditures (which may or may not be reasonable). In the case of the minimum-size and zero-intercept methods, the threshold assumption is that there is some portion of the system whose costs are unrelated to demand (or to energy for that matter). From one perspective, this notion has a certain intuitive appeal these are the lowest costs that must be incurred before any or some minimal amount of power can be delivered but from another viewpoint it seems absurd, since in the absence of any demand no such system would be built at all. Moreover, firms in competitive markets do not indeed, cannot price their products according to such methods: they recover their costs through the sale of goods and services, not merely by charging for the ability to consume, or access.

Other assumptions are of a more technical nature. What constitutes the minimum system? What are the proper types of equipment to be modeled? What cost data are applicable (historical, current installations, etc.)? Doesn't the minimum system in fact include demand costs, since such a system can serve some amount of demand? The zero-intercept method attempts to model a system that has no demand-serving capability whatsoever, but what remains is not necessarily a system whose costs are driven any more by the number of customers than it is by geographical considerations, whose causative properties are neither squarely demand- nor customer-related. Does use of an abstract minimum system place a disproportionate share of the cost burden on

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36. It is called zero-intercept because it relates installed cost to current carrying capacity or demand rating, creat[ing] a curve for various sizes of the equipment involved, using regression techniques, and extend[ing] the curve to a no-load intercept. NARUC, p. 92.

certain customers or classes, in certain cases even resulting in double-counting? The answers chosen to these and other questions will have impacts upon the respective assignments (by type and customer class) of costs.<sup>37</sup>

Historically, the investment decisions of system planners in vertically-integrated utilities were constrained by the least total cost objective: simply, that they would make that combination of investments that were expected, given their assessments of risk, to meet expected demand for service over some reasonable planning horizon. Given the inability to store electricity and the typical obligation to serve all customers *on demand*, a utility was required to have sufficient capacity available to meet peak demand. And, if its only obligation were to meet peak demand, then it would install only the most inexpensive capacity. However, it had also to serve energy needs at other times, and it is a general characteristic of electric generation technology that as capacity costs decrease variable operating costs increase. There is, therefore, a trade-off between capacity and energy costs that system planners considered when building (or purchasing) new capacity, if they hoped to minimize total costs. Put another way, significant portions of generating capacity were purchased not to meet demand, but to serve energy, when the fuel cost savings that the more expensive generation would produce were greater than the additional costs of that capacity. These incremental capacity costs were therefore correctly viewed as energy costs.

A similar kind of analysis can inform the design of distribution systems, as it also does transmission. The question is whether there is some amount of capacity in excess of the minimum needed to meet peak demand that can cost-effectively be installed. The additional capacity larger substations, conductors, transformers will reduce energy losses; if the cost of energy saved is greater than that of the additional capacity, then the investment will be cost-effective and should be made.<sup>38</sup> For the purposes of cost analysis and rate design, these kinds of distribution investments are rightly treated as energy-related.<sup>39</sup>

#### b. Cost Allocation

As a general matter, distribution facilities are designed and operated to serve localized area loads. Substations are designed to meet the maximum expected load of the distribution feeders radiating from them. The feeders are designed to meet at least the maximum expected loads at the primary

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37. Sterzinger, George, *The Customer Charge and Problems of Double Allocation of Costs*, *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, July 2, 1981, p. 31; see also Bonbright, p. 347-348.

38. Losses vary with the square of the load. We note also that there is some minimum amount of losses that cannot be avoided, and that conductors must be sized such that the losses can be absorbed while still meeting peak load. To this degree, losses impose a capacity, rather than energy, cost.

39. An unhappy consequence of separating distribution and transmission planning from that of generation in restructured markets is the potential loss of this capacity-versus-energy consideration when making new investment. Certainly, without some sort of regulatory or legislative requirement, wires-only companies have no generation cost-savings motive to guide their planning decisions.



and secondary service levels. (As noted above, some investment in distribution capacity may be seen as reducing energy losses rather than serving peak demand.) For costing purposes it is the relevant subsystem's (substation, feeder, etc.?) peak that matters, but these peaks may or may not be coincident with each other or with the overall system's peak. There can be significant variation among them. Consequently, one practice is to allocate the costs of substations and primary feeders (which usually enjoy relatively high load factors) to customer class non-coincident peaks and to allocate secondary feeders and line transformers (with lower load factors) to the individual customer's maximum demand.<sup>40</sup> In addition, costs are allocated according to voltage level; customers taking service at higher levels are typically not assigned any of the costs of the lower-voltage systems that do not serve them. Costs are then allocated among customer rate groups (or classes) which requires, among other things, information and judgments about coincidence of demand when customers of different classes share facilities, as is often the case.

### 3. Marginal Costs

For the reasons stated earlier, it is the long-run marginal cost that is most relevant to designing rates. It can be described as the cost of that lumpy, geographically dispersed set of investments that a utility must make if demand continues to grow after the distribution system has initially been built out.

#### a. Demand and Energy

As already noted, the drivers of distribution costs are typically seen to be peak demand (itself driven by both customer demand and numbers of customers) and energy needs.<sup>41</sup> For the purposes of marginal cost analysis, it is also necessary to identify investments that are not made to serve incremental demands, but are made for some other purpose—reliability, replacement of existing systems, etc. The costs of these investments are generally not included in marginal cost calculations, although, in certain cases, there may be legitimate arguments to the contrary.<sup>42</sup>

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40. Class non-coincident peak may not be the best measure of cost causation, since much of the system serves a variety of customer classes. Chernick, Paul, *From Here to Efficiency: Securing Demand-Management Resources*, Vol. 5, 1993, p. 81. Ideally, the object is to design rates that reflect the costs of customers' contributions to the relevant peak.

41. It is worth noting that, in the short run, distribution costs vary more closely with numbers of customers than with load (except in capacity-constrained areas). For rate design, with its focus on the long run, this fact need not be a distraction. It does, however, have implications for setting revenue requirements. We address this question in Chapter V, below.

42. For instance, at the time that an investment to replace existing facilities (whose loads, let us say, are not expected to change over some extended period) is being contemplated, there are costs that can potentially be avoided. In the extreme, replacement would be unnecessary if all customers served by the facility were to decide to go off-grid. Other, more likely alternatives involve combinations of end-use efficiency, distributed generation, and smaller, more efficient distribution technologies. On these bases, the marginal or, more reasonably, the larger  
(continued...)

Many of the same cost classification and assignment questions that pervade embedded cost analyses also recur in marginal cost studies, although their answers have different analytical effects. Whereas an embedded cost study strives to identify and assign total historical costs to classes of service (on the basis of any of a number of principles, including cost causation and fairness), a marginal cost analysis aims to determine the cost consequences of changes in output and thus the value of resources that must be used to serve incremental demand. Therefore, costs that are unaffected by changes in output (which describes all common and many joint costs) are excluded from the costs under examination.<sup>43</sup>

The study period for a marginal cost analysis is forward-looking and should be of sufficient duration to assure that all incremental demand is related to the investments forecast to serve that demand: a mismatch of timing and investment could result in significantly over- or understated costs. Those incremental costs are then discounted to their present value and annualized over the planning horizon. This has the effect of smoothing out the lumpiness of investment in relation to changes in demand.<sup>44</sup> This analysis relates changes in total costs to changes in demand (aggregating demand increases caused by the addition of customers with those caused by increases in demand per customer).<sup>45</sup> Since new customers create additional demand, this approach is not unreasonable.

Even so, some jurisdictions consider certain costs customer-related and treat them separately for the purpose of marginal cost analysis. Customer premises equipment that which is dedicated specifically to individual customers and unrelated to variations in demand (meters and perhaps service drops) are probably the only distribution costs that can be directly assigned to customers (except in the cases of customers who have additional facilities transformers, wires, even

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42. (...continued)

incremental costs of distribution can be calculated. If replacement of the particular component of the system is forecast for some time in the future, then its expected future costs would need to be discounted appropriately to yield a present-value incremental cost.

43. Because marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost arising from a change in output, all costs are, strictly speaking, included in the analysis. It just happens that most are netted out, to reveal those that are caused by the change in output. As a practical matter, however, an analyst may simply identify the costs that vary with output and exclude the rest. It is this second approach, however, that raises debates about the nature of costs and whether they should be included in the analysis. Are they joint or common? Do they vary with demand, energy, customers, or not at all? Resolving the issues usually requires large doses of judgment.

44. An alternative approach is to calculate the cost (savings) of advancing (deferring) by one year the planned stream of investments to meet the increment (decrement) in demand. This approach yields a cost that is equal to the value of the marginal investments for one year (which is the same as the economic carrying charge on those investments). This method is often used, for example, to determine an annual cost per kW of generating capacity.

45. For sizing much of the distribution system, demand is the critical factor. One customer contributing six kilowatts to peak demand has the same impact as two each contributing three kilowatts.

substations, dedicated solely to their needs).<sup>46</sup> Some jurisdictions also consider other facilities (line transformers, secondary level conductors) in some measure customer-related, but, to the extent that they are jointly-used to serve more than one customer, it may be difficult to establish that the addition or loss of any one customer will affect the costs of those facilities.<sup>47</sup> In any event, if some costs are deemed marginal customer costs (which means that they are avoidable only at the time of hook-up), it by no means follows that they should be recovered in recurring monthly fixed fees (see Section V.A.5., below).

Other approaches sometimes used to resolve the cost-causation question are the minimum system and zero intercept methods. Here, instead of using embedded cost data, the distribution system is modeled to determine the cost (in current dollars) of a hypothetical system that could serve all customers minimum demand or (in the case of zero-intercept) that could provide voltage but not power.<sup>48</sup> This cost would be deemed customer-related and separated from the total incremental cost previously determined, to identify the demand (or, more properly, the demand- and energy-related) portion. For the reasons stated earlier, we challenge the wisdom of these approaches.<sup>49</sup>

Other methodological difficulties may also arise. By definition, joint and common costs are not marginal, but occasionally they creep into the analysis, when, for example, they make use of what are in effect *average*, not *marginal*, investments and expenditures.<sup>50</sup> And, as with embedded costs, marginal costs are typically broken out by customer class. Here, again, the analysis requires

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46. After the meter, the customer service drop is typically seen as the least demand-related component of the system: it is sized to exceed any realistic maximum demand that the consumer might impose and it will last a very long time. However, although it is true that no investment would be made unless a customer were present, it is also true that the amount of the initial investment increases as the customer's forecasted load increases. Thus, customer investments can be seen as demand-related, as can investments farther up the system transformers, wires, and substations whose sizing depends on expected peak demand. Bouford, James D., Standardized Component Method for the Determination of Marginal and Avoided Demand Cost at the Distribution Level, Central Maine Power Company, (unpublished and undated), pp. 3-4.

47. NARUC, p. 136.

48. A handbook published by the National Economic Research Associates (NERA), which is often cited in support of the minimum system distribution cost classification, states that only the labor costs necessary to put together a minimum system and no conductor and transformer costs are customer-related. NERA, How To Quantify Marginal Costs: Topic 4, (prepared for the Electric Utility Rate Design Study, March 10, 1977), pp. 76.

49. California, for instance, has rejected the minimum system approach to marginal costs, favoring instead a method which uses the weighted average of the costs of continuing to serve existing customers and the costs of initiating service to new customers.

50. See, e.g., NARUC, p. 127, which notes that, because calculating marginal distribution and customer costs can be difficult, it is still common for analysts to use some variation of a projected embedded methodology for these elements, rather than a strictly marginal approach. This tack is justified by the sweeping assumption that projected embedded distribution costs are a reasonable approximation of marginal costs. The assumption is, however, contestable. FERC accounting requirements, which form the basis of most embedded cost analyses, include in distribution certain, and often substantial, administrative and general (A&G) costs (Accounts 920 to 935). A&G is not caused by the provision of distribution service.

reasonable assessments of the coincidence of demand, when customers of different classes share facilities.

Another dimension of cost, and perhaps most revealing, is the geographic. There are several aspects to it. First are the topographical and meteorological characteristics of the area over which the distribution system is laid. Elevations, plant life, weather, soil conditions, and so on all have effects on costs. So too demography, which is captured partly by demand and numbers of customers, but also affecting costs is the density of customers in an area (sometimes expressed as customers per mile). These influences combine in assorted ways, with themselves but also with changes in load and rates of investment, to produce variations in costs from one area of the distribution system to another. It is not unusual to see marginal distribution costs varying greatly from one place to another, even when the distances between the different areas is comparatively short. Table 1 describes the significant variations in costs for incremental distribution investments in a large mid-western utility.

	Average System Marginal Costs per kW	Area Specific High-Low Marginal Costs per kW	Annual Cost @ 15% Capital Cost Recovery Factor	Average Marginal Costs per kWh @ 20% Load Factor <sup>51</sup>	High Marginal Costs per kWh @ 20% Load Factor
Transmission	\$230	NA	\$34	\$0.02	\$0.04
Distribution Lines	\$960	\$1,575 - 0	\$140	\$0.08	\$0.135
Distribution Transformers	\$60	\$300 - 0	\$9	\$0.0015	\$0.025
Total	\$1,250	\$1,875 - 0	\$183	\$.1015	\$0.20

Table 1

Differentiating marginal costs along these lines will tell a utility where investment (whether in new facilities, end-use efficiency, or distributed generation) is needed and what the minimum value of that investment is. Whether for rate-making purposes this information is useful should distribution rates be geographically deaveraged? is a tougher question. We take it up in Chapter V, below.

51. This is estimated load factor for the incremental distribution investment alone, not for the entire distribution system altogether. Incremental investment to meet peak needs typically manifests low load factors; 20% is a conservatively high estimate.

#### 4. Key Concern in Determining Costs: Follow the Money

The occasionally technical and arcane matters taken up in embedded and marginal cost studies are, of course, important, but it is perhaps more important to bear in mind that, in rate design cases, what is fundamentally at issue is who should bear what revenue responsibilities. In the interplay between cost allocation and rate structures, the debate over money is played out. First is the question of what costs will be categorized as *distribution*, as opposed to transmission or generation in the case of vertically integrated utilities, or perhaps competitive services in other instances. This is no small matter, since significant portions of a firm's joint and common costs (typically, administrative and general) are often attributed to the distribution business, even though there is no causal relationship between them. Then there is the designation of a cost as either *customer* or *demand*, which will affect both how costs are divvied up among classes and who within each class will pay them (*i.e.*, both inter- and intra-class allocations). While there is a touch of cynicism in the observation that there is no shortage of academic arguments to justify particular outcomes, it is nevertheless largely true. Always be aware of the revenue effects of a particular rate structure. Who benefits, who loses? Fixed prices, because they recover revenues by customer rather than by usage, invariably shift a larger proportion of the system's costs to the lower-volume consumers (residential and small business). The positions that interested parties take with respect to rate design should, in part, be considered in light of their impacts on class revenue burdens and on the profitability of the utility. Here the admonition to be practical cannot be stressed enough. Seemingly small changes in a rate design can have very significant consequences for different customers.<sup>52</sup>

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52. Consider the following example (the hypothetical rates cover distribution services only). A residential customer using 500 kWh per month and paying \$0.05 per delivered kWh and a monthly customer charge of \$5.00 sees a monthly bill of \$30. If rates were revised so that residential customers paid a fixed charge of \$20 per month plus \$0.02 cents per kWh, a customer using 500 kWh would receive the same total bill of \$30. For this customer, the rateredesign is revenue neutral. However, for a customer using 300 kWh/month, the monthly bill under the original rate structure is \$20 and, under the new rates, is \$26 a 30% increase, even though there is no change in usage. For a customer using 700 kWh/month, the original bill is \$40 and the revised bill is \$34, a 15% reduction.

Consider again the customer using 500 kWh/month. If, under the original rate structure, she reduced her electricity use to 300 kWh per month (whether by load reduction, demand-side management, the installation of a rooftop solar electric system, or some combination of these options), she would reduce her bill by \$10. However, under the revised rate structure, she would only reduce her bill by \$4.

Whether the impacts of a rate design change are immediate and substantial depends, of course, on a variety of factors. The extent to which class cost allocations are altered will determine whether particular customers' total bills (all else being equal) will go up or down. Even those changes that are meant to be class revenue-neutral will affect individual customer bills: as already noted, shifts from usage-based to fixed charges recover disproportionately higher revenues from low-volume users and then, more subtly, there are the effects (both positive and negative) on bills and revenues that flow from demand responses to the changes in rate structure.

## 5. Usage Sensitivity: What s Avoidable?

### a. Peak Demand and Sizing the Wires

Distribution investment is made to serve an expected level of demand over a period of time, often determined by the useful life of the equipment. To the extent that, once a network (or component of it) is built, there is excess capacity in it, the marginal cost of using that excess capacity will be quite low (possibly very close to zero, insofar as there is little in the way of variable cost). It is this phenomenon that the short-run marginal cost of delivering a kilowatt-hour is zero that underlies the argument that there should be no per-kilowatt-hour charge for doing so.

As peak load grows, it will press up against the capacity limits of the system. At the time of constraint, the marginal cost of delivering a kilowatt-hour is, in fact, significantly greater than zero: at a minimum it is the cost of the additional investment needed to carry that marginal kilowatt-hour to end-users.<sup>53</sup> At that point, presumably, the new investment is made, and it is sized to minimize the total costs of delivery over the long term and thus, as before, there is suddenly excess capacity causing once again the marginal cost to fall to almost zero.

This non-linearity of investment with demand is a characteristic of much of the distribution system, the closer one gets to the end-user. To the extent that there are not an infinite number of equipment sizes to enable precise matching of investment and demand, excess capacity is almost necessarily built into the system, from substation facilities to feeders, transformers, customer service drops. But this has less to do with the finitude of equipment options than it does with the least total cost planning objective (optimizing total construction and operations costs over the investment horizon). The analytical key is to view the system over a time period long enough to smooth out the lumpiness of investment in relation to changes in demand.<sup>54</sup>

What emerges from such analysis is the recognition that there are costs associated with load growth, savings generated by reductions in load growth, and savings flowing from reductions in existing load. These values, not necessarily equal to each other, reflect in part the fungibility of significant portions of the system (e.g., substations and feeders). Capacity unused, or freed up, by one customer can be used by others.<sup>55</sup>

Sometimes cited as an interesting and somewhat anomalous characteristic of some distribution investment, specifically that closest to customers (such as the service drop) is its manifestation of positive marginal costs with load growth but seemingly zero marginal (or avoided) costs with load reductions. This is because, so the argument goes, load reduction makes no capacity available for

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53. And it may indeed be greater, if the value to consumers of that marginal delivery is greater than the cost of the additional investment. See Appendix A.

54. The justification for analyzing costs over the long run, and for setting prices on that basis, is discussed in Appendix A.

55. Chernick, Vol. 5, p. 68.

alternative uses, that did not already exist. This not so, however, because the inability to re-use capacity does not mean that there is no value to not using it. At the very least, future replacement costs can be deferred and the equipment installed on replacement can be down-sized, thereby reducing costs for all users.<sup>56</sup>

The differences in costs and savings associated with load growth, reduced growth rates, and reductions in existing load may leave some room for debate about their implications for rate design; but, given the declining-cost nature of the distribution system, these differences will probably have less of an impact than will the need to recover an embedded revenue requirement. The critical point here is that distribution costs vary primarily with load over the longer term.

#### b. Energy: The Costs of Throughput

As discussed earlier, to the extent that distribution investments are made to offset energy needs, there are necessarily costs associated with avoiding those investments. Losses, heat build-up, frequency of over loads, etc., are aspects of energy use that affect distribution investment and operations; thus there are marginal energy costs in distribution. Whether avoiding those costs make alternatives to distribution cost-effective is an empirical question. But, for purposes of rate design, it is sufficient to say that these marginal costs should be understood and appropriately reflected in rates. They are unquestionably volumetric in nature.

#### B. Conclusion: The Costs of Distribution Services

Cost studies are intended to provide useful information about the causes and magnitudes of costs, to inform a rate design process that is guided by the general principle that those who cause a cost should pay that cost. However, the usual drivers ascribed to distribution costs (both embedded and marginal) describe only part of the story, and the force-fitting of square costs into round drivers can lead to rate designs that will not best promote long-run dynamic efficiency. This is especially true of embedded cost studies, in which a central objective is to assign or allocate costs to particular services or classes of customers, even though many of those costs cannot be assigned unequivocally according to the principle of causation. By their very nature, many utility costs are joint or common to two or more services; consequently there can be no unshakeable assertion that any one service in fact caused a cost and, therefore, that a particular rate element should recover it. And marginal cost studies often suffer from this deficiency as well. This means that regulators should be very careful before relying upon what are essentially (though not necessarily

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<sup>56</sup> *Id.*, pp. 68-71. Also affected is the magnitude and cost of over-sizing equipment in order to serve forecast demand. See also NERA, pp. 17-18.

unreasonable) arbitrary cost assignments for the purposes of designing rates.<sup>57</sup> Too great a dependence on cost studies is to be captured by their underlying assumptions and methodological flaws. Utilities and commissions should be cautious before adopting a particular method on the basis of what may be a superficial appeal. More important, however, is the concern that a costing method, once adopted, becomes the predominant and unchallenged determinant of rate design.

Marginal cost analysis demonstrates that distribution costs vary with load in the long run. This has important implications for rate design. Embedded cost analysis, though it relies on *a priori* assumptions about causes (and allocations therefore) of historical costs, is useful in rate design at least insofar as it informs the process of reconciling marginal cost-based rates with revenue requirements.<sup>58</sup> We recognize that there are honest disagreements over approaches to both kinds of analysis.<sup>59</sup> But what is important here is for regulators to be aware of the fundamental relationships between costs and demand for electric service, in order to devise rates that best serve the objectives they seek.

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57. To ensure that [embedded distribution plant] costs are properly allocated, the analyst must first classify each account as demand-related, customer-related, or a combination of both. The classification depends upon the analyst's evaluation of how the costs in these accounts were incurred. NARUC, p. 89. Interestingly, the manual, in a table on page 34, acknowledges that there is an energy-related component to embedded distribution costs, but is otherwise silent on the question.

58. Bonbright, pp. 366-367. Bonbright expresses some skepticism as to the usefulness of most embedded cost studies for rate design, on the ground that they often ignore the relationship between cost causation and apportionment. One may suspect that the choice of [allocation] formula depends, not on principles of cost imputation but rather on types of apportionment which tend to justify whatever rate structure is advocated for non-cost reasons. *Id.*, p. 368.

59. See, e.g., Chernick, Vol. 5, pp. 58-83, and NARUC, pp. 86-104 and 137-146.



**Zero Intercept Analysis  
Account 365 – Overhead Conductor**

**October 31, 2009**

Description	Size	Cost	Quantity	Avg Cost
#12 conductor	6.53	15.15	1,515.00	0.01
#8 conductor	16.51	24.24	1,212.00	0.02
#6 conductor	26.24	3,499.99	18,421.00	0.19
#4 conductor	41.74	21,484.56	89,519.00	0.24
#2 conductor	66.36	650,917.73	971,519.00	0.67
#1 conductor	83.69	116,511.40	88,940.00	1.31
1/0 conductor	105.6	55,059.24	39,898.00	1.38
2/0 conductor	133.1	1,027,450.08	713,507.00	1.44
3/0 conductor	167.8	3,127,499.20	1,954,687.00	1.6
4/0 conductor	211.6	182,934.90	112,230.00	1.63
266 MCM Conductor	266	519,829.20	288,794.00	1.8
266.8 MCM Conductor	266.8	37,486.55	20,263.00	1.85
300 MCM Conductor	300	34,118.49	9,557.00	3.57
350 MCM Conductor	350	3,076.00	769.00	4
397 MCM Conductor	397	228,295.60	265,460.00	0.86
500 MCM Conductor	500	52,201.45	7,511.00	6.95
556 MCM Conductor	556	6,433.00	919.00	7
750 MCM Conductor	750	5,745.00	766.00	7.5
795 MCM Conductor	795	452,816.00	113,204.00	4
954 MCM Conductor	954	1,600.00	100.00	16
1000 MCM Conductor	1000	5,478.05	331.00	16.55

Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Rate Base)

Acct. No.	Account Description	Allocator	Total System	Residential Rate RS	Gen. Service OSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	PH. TOD TODP	Retail TRMS. RTS	Fluc. Load FLS	Outdoor Ling. St. and POL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic TE
<b>RATE BASE</b>														
<b>Plant-in-Service</b>														
301.00	ORGANIZATION	54	\$38,707	\$19,034	\$4,614	\$330	\$5,948	\$908	\$6,459	\$2,306	\$738	\$1,042	\$0	\$3
302.00	FRANCHISE AND CONSENTS	54	\$65,919	\$21,719	\$6,665	\$477	\$1,875	\$931	\$3,331	\$1,067	\$1,505	\$0	\$0	\$4
303.00	SOFTWARE	54	\$52,331,978	\$20,325,780	\$6,237,639	\$446,097	\$8,041,550	\$1,265,002	\$8,732,656	\$3,117,615	\$998,318	\$1,408,402	\$112	\$4,190
	Sub-total		\$52,428,604	\$20,382,533	\$6,248,918	\$446,904	\$8,056,090	\$1,267,269	\$8,748,446	\$3,123,252	\$1,000,123	\$1,410,949	\$112	\$4,196
<b>Production Plant</b>														
<b>Steam Production Generation</b>														
1	Energy	1	\$3,105,688,242	\$2,314,646,309	\$773,163,344	\$24,002,054	\$20,320,783	\$387,166,649	\$94,704,808	\$64,201,621	\$462,704,188	\$168,644,302	\$61,701,654	\$5,219
30	Demand	30	25.4900%	\$791,639,933	\$315,164,515	\$95,657,154	\$5,462,573	\$124,000,721	\$31,417,335	\$19,415,252	\$129,156,101	\$54,399,940	\$16,656,402	\$0
330	Hydro Baseload Generation	1	\$24,836,524	\$18,505,694	\$6,183,071	\$1,951,311	\$162,507	\$3,176,440	\$577,393	\$513,427	\$3,700,295	\$1,518,205	\$483,435	\$42
30	Demand	30	25.4900%	\$6,330,830	\$2,520,405	\$764,981	\$43,685	\$982,287	\$251,248	\$155,266	\$1,032,875	\$435,042	\$134,602	\$0
340	Other Production Generation	1	\$459,827,511	\$342,617,478	\$114,474,383	\$36,126,890	\$3,008,691	\$58,809,144	\$12,541,375	\$9,505,678	\$68,307,879	\$28,108,005	\$9,135,533	\$773
30	Demand	30	25.4900%	\$117,210,033	\$46,683,188	\$14,162,977	\$808,787	\$18,371,364	\$4,651,644	\$2,874,618	\$19,122,824	\$8,054,413	\$2,495,755	\$0
	Total Production Plant		\$3,590,352,277	\$1,258,168,915	\$392,865,368	\$29,807,026	\$602,628,605	\$134,243,803	\$96,665,662	\$694,224,162	\$282,360,237	\$90,817,581	\$18,652,567	\$6,033
<b>Transmission Plant</b>														
<b>KENTUCKY SYSTEM PROPERTY</b>														
51	VERMONT PROPERTY - 500 KV LINE	51	\$528,467,002	\$185,201,464	\$57,600,030	\$4,387,571	\$88,706,452	\$19,760,561	\$14,229,138	\$100,717,253	\$41,563,203	\$13,388,276	\$2,730,923	\$888
	Total Transmission Plant		\$538,001,610	\$187,831,378	\$58,620,807	\$4,449,875	\$89,896,109	\$20,041,187	\$14,431,186	\$102,147,467	\$42,163,412	\$13,568,109	\$2,785,703	\$901
<b>Distribution Plant</b>														
<b>360-362 TOTAL ACCTS 360-362</b>														
364-365	OVERHEAD LINES	19	\$456,595,009	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
28	Customer Demand	28	100.0000%	\$456,595,009	\$206,523,849	\$63,316,320	\$5,962,694	\$89,917,091	\$17,436,352	\$10,341,689	\$79,530,234	\$0	\$0	\$0
366-367	UNDERGROUND LINES	18	\$80,570,296	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
18	Customer Demand	18	100.0000%	\$80,570,296	\$55,185,169	\$12,823,643	\$752,949	\$9,801,109	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	Primary	19	\$120,139,922	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
28	Customer Demand	28	100.0000%	\$120,139,922	\$54,344,417	\$16,690,974	\$1,589,016	\$18,397,892	\$4,588,150	\$2,721,301	\$20,927,462	\$0	\$0	\$0
18	Secondary	18	\$21,201,162	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	Customer Demand	29	100.0000%	\$21,201,162	\$14,521,358	\$3,374,449	\$198,130	\$2,605,365	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
368	TRANSFORMERS - POWER POOL	18	\$5,409,429	\$2,494,298	\$1,995,953	\$388,151	\$3,041	\$26,613	\$0	\$649	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	Customer Demand	29	53.8800%	\$2,915,141	\$1,996,674	\$463,984	\$27,243	\$358,235	\$0	\$54,153	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
368	TRANSFORMERS - ALL OTHER	18	\$267,984,931	\$123,987,666	\$98,384,799	\$19,229,111	\$150,658	\$1,316,430	\$0	\$32,100	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	Customer Demand	29	53.8800%	\$144,417,065	\$98,915,696	\$22,985,813	\$1,349,613	\$17,747,100	\$0	\$2,662,767	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
369	SERVICES	27	\$64,507,618	\$40,175,956	\$26,367,088	\$125,854	\$1,447,098	\$26,815	\$0	\$26,815	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
370	METERS	28	\$68,988,753	\$42,024,614	\$15,321,350	\$356,057	\$4,495,796	\$169,046	\$1,183,972	\$1,624,029	\$59,666	\$0	\$0	\$0
371	CUSTOMER INSTALLATION	7	\$17,394,576	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
373	STREET LIGHTING	7	\$80,975,580	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
	Total Distribution Plant		\$1,346,161,065	\$690,305,552	\$201,241,216	\$12,409,914	\$148,642,100	\$29,267,733	\$21,236,405	\$127,162,675	\$1,624,029	\$59,666	\$128,012,460	\$4,737
	Total		\$5,474,814,164	\$2,141,144,814	\$690,733,007	\$44,226,940	\$1,781,904,409	\$356,744,201	\$212,141,644	\$1,021,141,644	\$484,733,462	\$168,470,533	\$310,970,033	\$10,770



Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Rate Base)

Acct. No.	Account Description	Allocator	Total System	Residential Rate RS	Gen. Service GSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Secondary PS	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	Pri. TOD TODP	Retail Trans. RTS	Flac. Load FLS	Outdoor Ling. St. and POL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic TE	
	Emission Allowance															
	Emission Allowance Sub-total	51	\$415,671	\$145,684	\$45,461	\$3,451	\$69,769	\$15,542	\$11,191	\$79,216	\$32,690	\$10,514	\$2,148	\$1	\$25	
			\$415,671	\$145,684	\$45,461	\$3,451	\$69,769	\$15,542	\$11,191	\$79,216	\$32,690	\$10,514	\$2,148	\$1	\$25	
	TOTAL OTHER RATE BASE		\$473,962,010	\$181,864,923	\$55,932,537	\$4,017,474	\$73,966,020	\$16,090,326	\$11,602,761	\$80,347,228	\$29,376,072	\$9,412,406	\$11,714,256	\$987	\$37,019	
	TOTAL RATE BASE		\$3,900,935,144	\$1,352,304,228	\$415,892,019	\$29,839,081	\$540,517,087	\$119,002,517	\$85,181,304	\$588,896,537	\$212,590,328	\$68,103,543	\$89,203,439	\$7,416	\$277,844	







Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Labor)

Acct. No.	Account Description	Allocator	Total System	Residential Rate RS	Gen. Service GSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Secondary PS	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	Pr. TOD TODP	Retail Trans. RTS	Fluc. Load FLS	Outdoor Ling. \$1. and POL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic TE
<b>Labor Expenses</b>															
<b>Steam Power Generation Operation Expenses</b>															
60	500 OPERATION SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$4,185,374	\$1,456,395	\$455,367	\$35,124	\$705,895	\$158,078	\$113,382	\$605,104	\$331,903	\$106,951	\$22,915	\$7	\$253
1	501 FUEL		\$3,036,982	\$1,014,277	\$320,095	\$29,658	\$1,171,120	\$84,223	\$84,223	\$607,000	\$249,048	\$80,944	\$21,053	\$7	\$201
51	502 STEAM EXPENSES		\$7,897,509	\$2,787,529	\$863,725	\$65,565	\$1,325,570	\$262,289	\$212,631	\$1,505,052	\$199,787	\$40,809	\$19,787	\$13	\$467
51	505 ELECTRIC EXPENSES		\$5,503,585	\$1,928,817	\$601,907	\$45,680	\$923,755	\$205,779	\$148,177	\$1,048,831	\$432,823	\$139,212	\$28,439	\$9	\$325
51	506 MISC. STEAM POWER EXPENSES		\$1,311,016	\$469,420	\$143,382	\$10,884	\$220,050	\$49,019	\$35,298	\$249,844	\$103,104	\$33,182	\$6,774	\$2	\$77
	507 RENTS														
	Total Steam Power Operation Expenses		\$21,837,158	\$7,628,237	\$2,394,477	\$183,921	\$3,698,337	\$817,286	\$593,710	\$4,215,831	\$1,737,871	\$590,035	\$119,990	\$39	\$1,323
<b>Steam Power Generation Maintenance Expenses</b>															
61	510 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$5,688,357	\$1,908,945	\$601,814	\$49,708	\$974,439	\$208,623	\$157,399	\$1,132,602	\$464,931	\$150,872	\$38,543	\$13	\$374
51	511 MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES		\$986,589	\$328,752	\$109,228	\$8,216	\$168,089	\$37,001	\$28,645	\$188,589	\$77,825	\$25,032	\$5,114	\$2	\$58
1	512 MAINTENANCE OF BOILER PLANT		\$7,837,920	\$2,616,784	\$828,460	\$68,820	\$1,345,353	\$288,904	\$217,458	\$1,497,227	\$643,022	\$208,980	\$54,357	\$18	\$520
51	513 MAINTENANCE OF ELECTRIC PLANT		\$1,658,591	\$564,399	\$208,521	\$17,189	\$338,188	\$71,883	\$54,340	\$391,829	\$160,883	\$52,224	\$13,583	\$4	\$130
1	514 MAINTENANCE OF MISC STEAM PLANT		\$182,078	\$64,176	\$20,253	\$1,687	\$32,989	\$7,031	\$5,329	\$38,406	\$15,758	\$5,122	\$1,332	\$0	\$13
	Total Steam Power Generation Maintenance Expense		\$18,868,533	\$5,593,084	\$1,763,276	\$145,637	\$2,855,046	\$611,252	\$481,168	\$3,318,453	\$1,382,219	\$442,339	\$112,828	\$37	\$1,095
	Total Steam Power Generation Expense		\$38,665,691	\$13,221,320	\$4,157,753	\$329,558	\$6,553,382	\$1,428,538	\$1,074,878	\$7,534,284	\$3,120,090	\$1,032,374	\$232,818	\$76	\$2,418
<b>Hydraulic Power Generation Operation Expenses</b>															
62	535 OPERATION SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$6,807	\$2,385	\$744	\$57	\$1,143	\$255	\$183	\$1,207	\$555	\$172	\$35	\$0	\$0
	536 WATER FOR POWER														
	537 HYDRAULIC EXPENSES														
	538 ELECTRIC EXPENSES														
	539 MISC. HYDRAULIC POWER EXPENSES														
51	540 RENTS		\$4,595	\$1,810	\$503	\$39	\$771	\$172	\$124	\$876	\$391	\$116	\$24	\$0	\$0
	Total Hydraulic Power Operation Expenses		\$11,402	\$3,996	\$1,247	\$95	\$1,914	\$426	\$307	\$2,173	\$987	\$288	\$59	\$0	\$1
<b>Hydraulic Power Generation Maintenance Expenses</b>															
63	541 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$93,176	\$31,562	\$9,828	\$808	\$15,893	\$3,431	\$2,563	\$18,383	\$7,555	\$2,448	\$600	\$0	\$6
51	542 MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES		\$19,320	\$6,770	\$2,113	\$160	\$3,243	\$722	\$520	\$3,682	\$1,519	\$469	\$100	\$0	\$1
	543 MAINT. OF RESERVOIRS, DAMS, AND WATERWAYS														
1	544 MAINTENANCE OF ELECTRIC PLANT		\$45,888	\$15,332	\$4,839	\$403	\$7,877	\$1,680	\$1,273	\$9,176	\$3,765	\$1,224	\$318	\$0	\$3
1	545 MAINTENANCE OF MISC HYDRAULIC PLANT		\$3,037	\$1,015	\$320	\$27	\$521	\$111	\$84	\$607	\$249	\$81	\$21	\$0	\$0
	Total Hydraulic Power Generation Maint. Expense		\$161,421	\$54,879	\$17,200	\$1,398	\$27,534	\$5,945	\$4,441	\$31,848	\$13,088	\$4,242	\$1,039	\$0	\$10
	Total Hydraulic Power Generation Expense		\$172,823	\$58,875	\$18,447	\$1,490	\$29,448	\$6,371	\$4,748	\$34,021	\$13,984	\$4,530	\$1,068	\$0	\$11
<b>Other Power Generation Operation Expenses</b>															
51	546 OPERATION SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$175,570	\$60,824	\$18,983	\$1,441	\$29,133	\$6,480	\$4,673	\$33,078	\$13,650	\$4,390	\$897	\$0	\$10
51	547 FUEL		\$206,772	\$72,459	\$22,814	\$1,717	\$34,708	\$7,751	\$5,597	\$39,405	\$16,261	\$5,230	\$1,068	\$0	\$12
51	548 GENERATION EXPENSE		\$19,378	\$6,440	\$2,010	\$153	\$3,085	\$687	\$495	\$3,502	\$1,445	\$465	\$95	\$0	\$1
	549 MISC OTHER POWER GENERATION														
	550 RENTS														
	Total Other Power Generation Expenses		\$398,720	\$139,724	\$43,807	\$3,310	\$68,924	\$14,908	\$10,735	\$75,985	\$31,357	\$10,088	\$2,060	\$1	\$24
<b>Other Power Generation Maintenance Expenses</b>															
51	551 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION & ENGINEERING		\$35,796	\$12,544	\$3,915	\$297	\$6,008	\$1,338	\$994	\$6,822	\$2,815	\$905	\$165	\$0	\$2
51	552 MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES		\$111,975	\$39,239	\$12,248	\$930	\$4,187	\$3,015	\$2,139	\$8,808	\$2,832	\$579	\$0	\$0	\$7
51	553 MAINTENANCE OF GENERATING & ELEC PLANT		\$648,108	\$191,372	\$59,726	\$4,534	\$91,862	\$20,419	\$14,703	\$104,073	\$42,948	\$13,814	\$2,822	\$1	\$32
51	554 MAINTENANCE OF MISC OTHER POWER GEN PLT		\$74,961	\$26,289	\$8,188	\$622	\$12,582	\$2,803	\$2,018	\$14,286	\$5,895	\$1,988	\$387	\$0	\$4
	Total Other Power Generation Maintenance Expense		\$768,638	\$269,424	\$84,085	\$6,383	\$129,047	\$28,747	\$20,700	\$146,520	\$60,465	\$19,448	\$3,073	\$1	\$45
	Total Other Power Generation Expense		\$1,167,358	\$409,148	\$127,892	\$8,693	\$195,971	\$43,855	\$31,435	\$222,505	\$91,822	\$29,533	\$8,033	\$2	\$69
	Total Production Expense		\$39,944,070	\$13,687,143	\$4,263,862	\$340,741	\$8,776,801	\$1,478,584	\$1,091,061	\$7,790,810	\$3,205,996	\$1,038,437	\$240,049	\$78	\$2,488
<b>Purchased Power</b>															
51	555 PURCHASED POWER		\$1,475,083	\$516,914	\$161,325	\$12,246	\$247,588	\$55,154	\$39,715	\$281,111	\$116,007	\$37,312	\$7,622	\$2	\$87
	556 SYSTEM CONTROL AND LOAD DISPATCH														
	557 OTHER EXPENSES														
	Total Purchased Power Labor		\$1,475,083	\$516,914	\$161,325	\$12,246	\$247,588	\$55,154	\$39,715	\$281,111	\$116,007	\$37,312	\$7,622	\$2	\$87
<b>Transmission Labor Expenses</b>															
51	560 OPERATION SUPERVISION AND ENG		\$1,045,952	\$366,533	\$114,392	\$8,683	\$175,580	\$39,108	\$28,161	\$199,330	\$82,258	\$26,457	\$5,405	\$2	\$82





Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Labor)

Acct. No.	Account Description	Allocator	Total System	Residential Rate RS	Gen. Service GSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Secondary PS	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	Pri. TOD TODP	Retail Trans. RTS	Fluc. Load FLS	Outdoor Ling. St. and POL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic TE
922	ADMIN. EXPENSES TRANSFERRED - CREDIT	96	(\$1,884,219)	(\$823,129)	(\$274,177)	(\$17,150)	(\$256,418)	(\$55,499)	(\$39,440)	(\$268,876)	(\$93,440)	(\$29,249)	(\$24,575)	(\$5)	(\$254)
923	OUTSIDE SERVICES EMPLOYED														
924	PROPERTY INSURANCE	66	\$765,438	\$347,489	\$115,746	\$7,243	\$109,093	\$23,429	\$16,650	\$113,508	\$39,446	\$12,348	\$10,374	\$2	\$107
925	INJURIES AND DAMAGES - INSURANCE	66	\$34,820,650	\$15,255,225	\$5,091,380	\$317,965	\$4,789,319	\$1,028,569	\$730,958	\$4,893,132	\$1,731,742	\$542,076	\$455,448	\$102	\$4,705
926	EMPLOYEE BENEFITS														
928	REGULATORY COMMISSION FEES														
929	REGULATORY CHARGES-CR														
930	DUPLICATE CHARGES-CR														
930	MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL EXPENSES	66	\$30,987	\$13,541	\$4,510	\$282	\$4,251	\$913	\$649	\$4,423	\$1,537	\$481	\$404	\$0	\$4
931	RENTS AND LEASES														
932	MAINTENANCE OF GENERAL PLANT	59	\$5,085,282	\$1,967,352	\$603,747	\$43,178	\$778,349	\$169,831	\$122,441	\$845,242	\$301,757	\$96,628	\$196,321	\$11	\$408
935	MAINTENANCE OF GENERAL PLANT														
	Total Administrative and General Expense		\$58,394,456	\$25,290,054	\$9,362,339	\$528,714	\$9,091,003	\$1,740,319	\$1,238,517	\$8,453,823	\$2,945,897	\$924,308	\$631,728	\$168	\$7,590
	Total Operation and Maintenance Expenses		\$135,498,602	\$59,947,875	\$19,563,385	\$1,230,931	\$18,697,102	\$4,011,674	\$2,852,868	\$19,457,912	\$6,770,048	\$2,121,355	\$1,837,480	\$390	\$17,980
	Operation and Maintenance Expenses Less Purchase Power		\$138,493,602	\$65,947,875	\$19,563,385	\$1,230,931	\$18,697,102	\$4,011,674	\$2,852,868	\$19,457,912	\$6,770,048	\$2,121,355	\$1,837,480	\$390	\$17,980

Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Revenues)

Acct. No.	Account Description	Allocator	Total System	Residential Rate RS	Gen. Service GSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Secondary PS	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	Pri. TOD TODP	Retail Trans. RTS	Fluc. Load FLS	Outdoor Lmg. St. and PDL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic IE
REVENUE			\$1,291,701,071	\$474,158,148	\$181,472,282	\$11,111,098	\$222,187,854	\$51,446,772	\$28,198,769	\$202,384,448	\$85,720,555	\$14,733,900	\$23,177,212	\$2,251	\$106,981
	Sales	74													
	Franchise Fees and HEA														
	Accrued Revenues														
	Intercompany Sales	2	\$22,834,450	\$7,635,846	\$2,444,156	\$201,985	\$3,034,468	\$899,633	\$592,438	\$4,492,594	\$1,874,628	\$608,857	\$158,359	\$51	\$1,438
	Off-System Sales	82	\$5,895,029	\$2,160,062	\$682,785	\$48,718	\$855,024	\$218,228	\$145,031	\$1,082,539	\$455,188	\$141,370	\$26,723	\$8	\$225
	Brokered Sales	2	\$294,890	\$98,608	\$31,563	\$2,009	\$50,809	\$11,616	\$7,522	\$58,017	\$24,209	\$7,863	\$2,045	\$1	\$19
	LATE PAYMENT - DIRECT	76	\$6,910,624	\$5,226,739	\$1,128,687	\$3,854	\$235,327	\$29,221	\$75,354	\$179,921	\$39,402	\$126	\$30,585	\$0	\$4
	RECONNECT CHARGES	83	\$1,659,812	\$1,505,487	\$962	\$3,314	\$83,185	\$32	\$98	\$32	\$0	\$0	\$10,081	\$0	\$0
	OTHER SERVICE CHARGES	83	\$547,025	\$496,224	\$17,845	\$1,092	\$20,830	\$880	\$32	\$42	\$0	\$0	\$54,289	\$5	\$168
	RENT FROM ELEC PROPERTY	22	\$2,153,991	\$630,149	\$255,069	\$18,324	\$333,405	\$72,878	\$52,536	\$363,472	\$131,567	\$42,149	\$54,199	\$18	\$620
	TRANSMISSION SERVICE	52	\$10,488,823	\$3,675,803	\$1,147,129	\$87,078	\$1,760,514	\$392,179	\$292,369	\$1,998,986	\$824,885	\$285,314	\$54,199	\$18	\$620
	TAX REMITTANCE COMPENSATION	85	\$17,113	\$6,282	\$2,404	\$147	\$2,944	\$682	\$334	\$2,881	\$1,136	\$195	\$307	\$0	\$1
	RETURN CHECK CHARGES	83	\$130,962	\$118,709	\$4,221	\$52	\$281	\$4,983	\$206	\$8	\$0	\$10	\$2,412	\$0	\$0
	OTHER MISC REVENUES	83	\$22,825	\$20,433	\$727	\$9	\$45	\$858	\$35	\$1	\$0	\$2	\$415	\$0	\$0
	EXCESS FACILITIES CHARGES	83	\$14,277	\$12,851	\$461	\$6	\$28	\$544	\$22	\$1	\$0	\$1	\$263	\$0	\$0
	FORFEITED REFUNDABLE ADVANCE	85	\$3,602	\$1,322	\$506	\$31	\$620	\$143	\$70	\$864	\$239	\$41	\$65	\$0	\$0
	Unbilled Revenue		\$1,342,076,920	\$485,746,733	\$187,197,042	\$11,472,511	\$229,350,647	\$53,136,237	\$28,333,984	\$210,446,101	\$89,022,911	\$15,784,061	\$23,512,840	\$2,333	\$109,519
	TOTAL REVENUE														
	ProForma Adjustments														
	Eliminate unbilled revenues	85	\$5,107,000	\$1,874,880	\$717,487	\$43,930	\$678,464	\$203,405	\$99,832	\$600,168	\$338,913	\$58,253	\$91,636	\$9	\$423
	Eliminate accrued revenues	85	\$8,438,658	\$3,097,696	\$1,185,555	\$72,589	\$1,451,548	\$336,101	\$164,630	\$1,322,174	\$580,011	\$96,256	\$151,416	\$15	\$699
	Mismatch in fuel cost recovery	2	\$9,158,061	\$3,061,789	\$980,047	\$80,991	\$1,577,825	\$380,731	\$233,544	\$1,801,421	\$751,690	\$244,137	\$83,488	\$21	\$577
	Annualize FAC roll-in to base rates	43	\$2,885,839	\$882,180	\$313,854	\$27,686	\$517,040	\$163,768	\$87,298	\$541,881	\$272,139	\$89,538	\$20,524	\$6	\$158
	Adjustment to reflect changes to FAC at	43	\$2,638,801	\$806,644	\$288,987	\$25,289	\$472,778	\$140,605	\$81,535	\$465,320	\$248,843	\$81,873	\$18,767	\$8	\$143
	Eliminate ECR revenues	49	\$14,710,734	\$5,574,888	\$2,584,231	\$124,251	\$2,755,268	\$685,500	\$219,124	\$1,637,806	\$689,254	\$170,284	\$286,236	\$11	\$1,049
	Adjustment to reflect Full Year of ECR Roll-In														
	Remove off-system ECR revenues	82	\$286,088	\$108,484	\$33,290	\$2,497	\$47,867	\$10,961	\$7,284	\$54,372	\$22,863	\$7,101	\$1,342	\$0	\$16
	To adjust Off-system sales margins	82	\$292,995	\$107,361	\$32,842	\$2,471	\$47,367	\$11,846	\$7,206	\$53,804	\$22,624	\$7,026	\$1,328	\$0	\$16
	Eliminate brokered sales revenues	2	\$294,881	\$98,608	\$31,564	\$2,009	\$50,809	\$11,618	\$7,522	\$58,017	\$24,209	\$7,863	\$2,045	\$1	\$19
	Year End Adjustment	48	\$15,401,724	\$11,425,658	\$3,105,609	\$36,894	\$527,104	\$97,298	\$70,050	\$137,311	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
	Customer rate switching adjustment	84	\$3,407,542	\$709,927	\$42,703	\$73,488	\$1,561,902	\$171,608	\$116,329	\$1,815,382	\$168,915	\$0	\$97,552	\$0	\$11,054
	Remove out of period items	69	\$8,348,788	\$3,089,911	\$83,346,954	\$20,438	\$1,563,663	\$5,386,209	\$2,518,028	\$3,315,076	\$2,949,246	\$1,094,581	\$0	\$0	\$70
	Subtotal		\$54,360,384	\$22,058,876	\$10,457,241	\$8,995	\$8,995	\$23,885	\$596	\$3,918	\$1,414	\$453	\$583	\$0	\$2
	Total Revenue After Adjustments		\$1,287,696,536	\$473,687,859	\$176,689,801	\$11,253,184	\$221,005,432	\$48,661,140	\$28,379,982	\$207,847,878	\$84,581,981	\$14,238,930	\$23,228,600	\$2,286	\$118,763







Kentucky Utilities  
Electric Cost of Service Study  
(Allocator Percentages)

Alloc.	Account Description	Total	Residential Rate RS	Gen Service GSS	All Elec. Schools AES	Secondary PS	Primary PS	Sec. TOD TODS	Pri. TOD TODP	Retail Trans. RTS	Fluc. Load FLS	Outdoor Lng. St. and POL	Lighting Energy LE	Traffic TE
72	Total Labor	0 0 0	43.5043%	14.4526%	0.9064%	13.7766%	2.9607%	2.1053%	14.3602%	4.9864%	1.5656%	1.3561%	0.0003%	0.0133%
73	Sales Revenue	0 0 0	36.7080%	14.0491%	0.8602%	17.2012%	3.9829%	1.9509%	15.6681%	6.6363%	1.1407%	1.7943%	0.0002%	0.0083%
74	Late Payment Revenue	0 0 0	75.6334%	16.3328%	0.0847%	3.2606%	0.4228%	1.0901%	2.6035%	0.5702%	0.0000%	0.0018%	0.0000%	0.0001%
75	O&M Expenses	OSSALL	37.1367%	11.9705%	0.8941%	15.9389%	3.3689%	2.5359%	17.9497%	6.8699%	2.2511%	0.9216%	0.0002%	0.0083%
76	Steam Production Plant	0 0 0	35.0430%	10.9367%	0.8302%	16.7847%	3.7390%	2.6924%	19.0573%	7.8644%	2.5295%	0.5167%	0.0002%	0.0059%
77	Hydro Production Plant	0 0 0	35.0430%	10.9367%	0.8302%	16.7847%	3.7390%	2.6924%	19.0573%	7.8644%	2.5295%	0.5167%	0.0002%	0.0059%
78	Other Production Plant	0 0 0	35.0430%	10.9367%	0.8302%	16.7847%	3.7390%	2.6924%	19.0573%	7.8644%	2.5295%	0.5167%	0.0002%	0.0059%
79	Off-System Sales	0 0 0	36.6426%	11.2431%	0.8434%	16.1669%	3.7019%	2.4602%	18.3636%	7.7115%	2.3981%	0.4533%	0.0002%	0.0059%
80	Misc. Service Revenue	0 0 0	90.7132%	3.2257%	0.0369%	0.1997%	3.8078%	0.1573%	0.0059%	0.0000%	0.0076%	1.8429%	0.0000%	0.0000%
81	Rate Switching Allocator	0 0 0	0.3700%	40.0891%	0.2446%	16.2139%	64.5149%	-30.1604%	-9.7073%	35.3254%	13.1104%	-0.0006%	-0.0000%	-0.0008%
82	Billing Determinant Rev net of CSR & HEA	0 0 0	36.7080%	14.0491%	0.8602%	17.2012%	3.9829%	1.9509%	15.6681%	6.6363%	1.1407%	1.7943%	0.0002%	0.0083%
83	Year End Rev Adjustment	0 0 0	20.8340%	-1.2532%	-2.1569%	45.8366%	-5.0361%	-3.4139%	53.2754%	-4.8964%	-0.0000%	-2.8626%	-0.0003%	-0.3247%
84	O&M less Fuel & Purchased Power	0 0 0	43.3591%	14.3682%	0.8220%	13.8787%	2.8574%	2.1369%	14.5344%	4.9575%	1.5672%	1.3091%	0.0003%	0.0111%
85	Intermediate & Peak Production Plant Allocated Amount	0 0 0	39.8116%	12.0844%	0.6900%	15.6739%	3.9686%	2.4525%	16.3150%	6.8718%	2.1293%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0039%

## Schedule GAW-6

**KENTUCKY UTILITIES**  
**Competitive Fixed Charges For Electric Residential Rates In Texas**

COMPANY	MONTHLY CHARGE
<b><u>No Waiver of Customer Charge:</u></b>	
1 Andeler	\$3.95
2 APG&E	\$8.95
3 CPL Retail	\$4.97
4 Direct Energy	\$5.00
5 Gexa	\$4.79
6 Smartcom < 500 kwh	\$12.95
Smartcom > 500 kwh	\$9.95
7 TriEagle	\$4.95
<b><u>Customer Charge Waived w/Minimum Usage:</u></b>	
8 4Change	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
9 Ambit Texas	\$9.98 <u>1/</u>
10 Amigo - Plan 1	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
Amigo - Plan 2	\$6.95 <u>4/</u>
11 APNA - Plan 1	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
APNA - Plan 2	\$12.95 <u>1/</u>
12 Bounce	\$6.95 <u>1/</u>
13 Brilliant	\$10.99 <u>1/</u>
14 Cirro	\$5.75 <u>1/</u>
15 Dynowatt	\$6.95 <u>1/</u>
16 Infinite	\$18.55 <u>1/</u>
17 Just Energy - Plan 1	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
Just Energy - Plan 2	\$14.95 <u>2/</u>
18 Pennywise	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
19 Potentia	\$9.99 <u>1/</u>
20 Southwest Power	\$7.95 <u>1/</u>
21 Spark	\$8.99 <u>1/</u>
22 Star	\$4.99 <u>3/</u>
23 Stream < 699 kwh	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
Stream 700-999 kwh	\$4.95 <u>1/</u>
24 Tara	\$6.95 <u>4/</u>
25 Texpo	\$7.95 <u>1/</u>
26 TRUE	\$9.95 <u>1/</u>
27 Veteran	\$5.00 <u>1/</u>
28 YEP	\$7.95 <u>1/</u>
<b>AVERAGE: CUST. CHARGE WAIVED W/ MINIMUM USAGE</b>	<b>\$9.14</b>
<b>AVERAGE: NO WAIVER TO CUST. CHARGE W/ MINIMUM USAGE</b>	<b>\$6.94</b>

- 1/ Waived if usage is at least 1,000 kwh.  
2/ Waived if usage is at least 2,000 kwh.  
3/ Waived if usage is at least 500 kwh.  
4/ Waived if usage is at least 800 kwh.



**Schedule GAW-7**

**Kentucky Utilities  
Residential Electric Customer Costs**

		Residential Amount			
<b>Rate Base:</b>					
	Gross Plant				
	Services	\$40,175,956			
	Meters	<u>42,024,614</u>			
	Total	82,200,571			
	Depreciation Reserve				
	Services	27,620,164	1/		
	Meters	<u>20,579,258</u>	1/		
	Total	48,199,422			
<b>Net Rate Base</b>		<b>34,001,148</b>			
<b>Operation &amp; Maintenance Expenses</b>					
	Meter Operations	4,599,330			
	Meter Maint.	0	Debt	50.00%	3.70%
	Meter Reading	3,020,141	Equity	50.00%	8.50%
	Records & Collections	8,789,944	Total	100.00%	6.10%
	Misc. Customer Accts.	<u>460,594</u>			
	Total	16,870,009			
<b>Depreciation Expense</b>					
	Services	815,572			
	Meters	<u>962,364</u>			
	Total	1,777,936			
<b>Revenue Requirement:</b>					
	Interest	629,021			
	Equity Return	1,445,049	Tax	\$89,659,334	\$232,525,670
	Income Tax @ effective rate	<u>906,876</u>			38.56%
	Revenue for Return	2,980,946			
<b>Total Customer Revenue Requirement</b>		<b>21,628,892</b>			
<b>Number of Bills</b>		<b>5,044,176</b>			
<b>Monthly Cost</b>		<b>\$4.29</b>			

1/ Calculated Per Company Response to OAG 1-273

2/ Calculated Per Mr. Spanos Depreciation rates Exhibit JJS-KU, Part III.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY  
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION


In the Matter of:

APPLICATION OF KENTUCKY UTILITIES )  
COMPANY FOR AN ADJUSTMENT OF ITS ) 2012-00221  
ELECTRIC RATES )


AFFIDAVIT OF GLENN A. WATKINS

Commonwealth of Virginia )  
)  
)

Glenn A. Watkins, being first duly sworn, states the following: The prepared Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, and the Schedules and Appendix attached thereto constitute the direct testimony of Affiant in the above-styled case. Affiant states that he would give the answers set forth in the Pre-Filed Direct Testimony if asked the questions propounded therein. Affiant further states that, to the best of his knowledge, his statements made are true and correct. Further affiant saith not.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Glenn A. Watkins

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2012.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: 10-31-14

