

BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INTRASTATE)	ADMINISTRATIVE
SWITCHED ACCESS RATES OF ALL)	CASE NO.
KENTUCKY INCUMBENT AND COMPETITIVE)	2010-00398
LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS)	

FURTHER REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
OF
CESAR CABALLERO

ON BEHALF OF WINDSTREAM KENTUCKY EAST, LLC AND
WINDSTREAM KENTUCKY WEST, LLC

Dated September 30, 2011

1 **Q. On April 15, 2011, Windstream East and Windstream West filed comments on the**
2 **plan proposed by AT&T in this proceeding (“AT&T Plan”) which were adopted by**
3 **your Further Testimony. Do you have anything further to add regarding the AT&T**
4 **Plan?**

5 A. Yes. AT&T witness Dr. Ola A. Oyefusi’s July 8, 2011 testimony (“Oyefusi Further
6 Direct”) ¹ provided a substantial amount of detail regarding the workings of the AT&T
7 Plan. Much of this was generally along the lines that one would expect, but some detail
8 was not. One such detail is very significant and was not made clear previously and
9 therefore, was not discussed in Windstream’s April 15, 2011 Comments that I adopted in
10 my Further Testimony.

11 **Q. Please explain.**

12 A. The AT&T Plan proposes to require ILECs’ intrastate switched access rates to mirror
13 their interstate switched access rates. Dr. Oyefusi explains that this would be carried out
14 on an element-by-element basis. Dr Oyefusi also discusses that if there is no interstate
15 rate element analog to an intrastate rate element, the intrastate rate element would be
16 eliminated as part of AT&T’s proposed mirroring. Dr. Oyefusi also explains that this
17 mirroring would take place 30 days after the establishment of the Kentucky Universal
18 Fund (“KUSF”) and funding from such fund becomes available. In other words, ILECs
19 would not begin incurring intrastate switched access losses until they also have the
20 concurrent opportunity to draw from the KUSF so that ILECs incurring intrastate
21 switched access revenue losses as a result of the AT&T Plan would have an opportunity
22 to recover at least a portion of their lost revenue. Such discussion conformed with

¹ Dr. Oyefusi provided Direct and Rebuttal Testimony last year in the record that has been incorporated into this proceeding.

1 Windstream's understanding of the AT&T Plan. My Further Testimony, both directly and
2 by incorporation and reference to previous testimony, incorporated Windstream's
3 positions on such matters and critiqued AT&T's proposal.

4 **Q. What did Dr. Oyefusi clarify that was not previously addressed in your testimony?**

5 A. On pages 34-37 of his July 8, 2011 testimony, Dr. Oyefusi now recommends that the
6 AT&T Plan make an exception to the timing of intrastate switched access charge
7 reductions for the Non Traffic Sensitive Revenue Rate Requirement (NTSRR) rate
8 element. Specifically, AT&T's witness is suggesting that instead of waiting until
9 establishment of the KUSF, the Commission require mirroring of the NTSRR
10 immediately upon adoption of the AT&T Plan, which, as a practical matter, means
11 immediate complete elimination of the NTSRR revenues without any meaningful
12 opportunity to recover them.

13 **Q. What is the NTSRR and why would it be eliminated through interstate rate
14 mirroring?**

15 A. As I explained in my Direct Testimony, the NTSRR is a per-line tariffed charge applied
16 on a per-minute basis that is intended to recover for certain intrastate common line (or
17 loop) functions. It is essentially what is commonly known as a Carrier Common Line
18 Charge, or CCL. The NTSRR would be eliminated because the CCL was eliminated from
19 Windstream East and Windstream West's federal interstate switched access tariffs as part
20 of the CALLS and MAG Plans, respectively.

21 **Q. What are your concerns about AT&T's proposal to eliminate the NTSRR without
22 relief through the KUSF?**

1 A. The proposal being suggested by AT&T's witness could entail months if not years in
2 which carriers would have lost all of their NTSRR revenues, which are significant, while
3 not having any opportunity for relief from the KUSF. What is more troubling is that by
4 Dr. Oyefusi's reasoning, with which Windstream strongly disagrees, AT&T apparently
5 envisions that its plan would not include lost NTSRR revenue in the KUSF distribution
6 calculations described by Dr. Oyefusi on pp. 43-52 of his Further Direct Testimony.
7 Windstream believes that this would be extremely detrimental.

8 **Q. What appears to be the AT&T witness' rationale for his apparent proposal to**
9 **ignore lost NTSRR revenue?**

10 A. Dr. Oyefusi asserts that there is "absolutely no cost justification for the interconnection
11 functions provided to carriers." Oyefusi Further Direct Testimony at 35.

12 **Q. What is your response to this justification?**

13 A. As I explained in my Initial Rebuttal Testimony,² the NTSRR is a compensation
14 mechanism relating to previous Commission-prescribed intrastate switched access (and
15 certain other service) rate reductions, which has been reduced for Windstream by
16 millions of dollars since the NTSRR's inception. The NTSRR is essentially a revenue
17 replacement mechanism just like AT&T's proposed KUSF distributions (and federal
18 Interstate Access Support and Interstate Common Line Support, both described in my
19 Initial Direct and Rebuttal Testimony). Thus, to the extent that the NTSRR is a
20 "subsidy," such subsidy should be treated no differently than the other "subsidies" that
21 AT&T proposes to transition to the KUSF.

² Initial Direct Testimony at 17.

1 **Q. Would eliminating the NTSRR without any transition and without any sort of**
2 **compensating relief be consistent with how AT&T's NTSRR has been reduced in**
3 **the past?**

4 A. No. It is my understanding that AT&T's NTSRR was brought to zero in no less than four
5 separate orders over a period of roughly three years. In the first three of those instances,
6 AT&T voluntarily reduced its NTSRR to avoid other required rate reductions.³ In the
7 fourth of those reductions, AT&T gained pricing flexibility and other related regulatory
8 relief as well as received authority to impose retail rate increases for service then
9 classified as 'non-competitive' under AT&T's price plan.⁴ Just as AT&T's NTSRR was
10 phased out over a period of years, so should Windstream East and West's. Also, just as
11 AT&T was provided revenue streams to compensate for lost NTSRR revenue (through
12 avoiding other required rate reductions and rate rebalancing), so should Windstream East
13 and West.

14 **Q. Based on what you discuss, do you have any further specific critiques of the AT&T**
15 **Plan?**

16 A. Yes. Windstream believes that, to the extent the AT&T Plan is adopted, not only should it
17 be modified in the manner discussed in Windstream's April 15, 2011 Comments (adopted
18 by my Further Testimony), but it should also be implemented so that the NTSRR is
19 treated no differently from other intrastate rates that would be reduced or eliminated by
20 the AT&T Plan.

³ Application of BellSouth Telecommunications Inc. d/b/a South Central Bell Telephone to Modify its Method of Regulation, Order, Case No. 94-121 (Oct. 24, 1997); Application of BellSouth Telecommunications Inc. d/b/a South Central Bell Telephone to Modify its Method of Regulation, Order, Case No. 94-121 (Aug. 2, 1999); Application of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. d/b/a South Central Bell Telephone Company to Modify its Method of Regulation, Order, Case No. 94-121 (Jul. 31, 2000).

⁴ Review of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.'s Price Regulation Plan, Order, Case No. 99-424 (Aug. 3, 2000).

1 Q. Does this conclude your Further Rebuttal Testimony?

2 A. Yes, at this time.