# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY 

CASE NO. 2007-00143 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 1 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

1. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 2, lines 12-14, please provide a list of the articles and books authored by Dr. James H. Vander Weide.

## Response:

A list of Dr. Vander Weide’s articles and books is shown below.
"The Lock-Box Location Problem: a Practical Reformulation," Journal of Bank Research, Summer, 1974, pp. 92C96 (with S. Maier). Reprinted in Management Science in Banking, edited by K. J. Cohen and S. E. Gibson, Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1978.
"A Finite Horizon Dynamic Programming Approach to the Telephone Cable Layout Problem," Conference Record, 1976 International Conference on Communications (with S. Maier and C. Lam).
"A Note on the Optimal Investment Policy of the Regulated Firm," Atlantic Economic Journal, Fall, 1976 (with D. Peterson).
"A Unified Location Model for Cash Disbursements and Lock-Box Collections," Journal of Bank Research, Summer, 1976 (with S. Maier). Reprinted in Management Science in Banking, edited by K. J. Cohen and S. E. Gibson, Warren Gorham and Lamont, 1978. Also reprinted in Readings on the Management of Working Capital, edited by K. V. Smith, West Publishing Company, 1979.
"Capital Budgeting in the Decentralized Firm,' Management Science, Vol 23, No. 4, December 1976, pp. 433-443 (with S. Maier).
"A Monte Carlo Investigation of Characteristics of Optimal Geometric Mean Portfolios," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June, 1977, pp. 215-233 (with S. Maier and D. Peterson).
"A Strategy which Maximizes the Geometric Mean Return on Portfolio Investments," Management Science, June, 1977, Vol 23, No. 10, pp. 1117-1123 (with S. Maier and D. Peterson).
"A Decision Analysis Approach to the Computer Lease-Purchase Decision," Computers and Operations Research, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1977, pp. 167-172 (with S. Maier).
"A Practical Approach to Short-run Financial Planning," Financial Management, Winter, 1978 (with S. Maier). Reprinted in Readings on the Management of Working Capital, edited by K. V. Smith, West Publishing Company, 1979.
"Effectiveness of Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry,' Journal of Economics and Business, May, 1979 (with F. Tapon).
"On the Decentralized Capital Budgeting Problem Under Uncertainty," Management Science, September 1979 (with B. Obel).
"Expectations Data and the Predictive Value of Interim Reporting: A Comment," Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1980 (with L. D. Brown, J. S. Hughes, and M. S. Rozeff).
"Deregulation and Oligopolistic Price-Quality Rivalry," American Economic Review, March 1981 (with J. Zalkind).
"Incentive Considerations in the Reporting of Leveraged Leases," Journal of Bank Research, April 1982 (with J. S. Hughes).
"Forecasting Disbursement Float," Financial Management, Spring 1981 (with S. Maier and D. Robinson).
"Recent Developments in Management Science in Banking," Management Science, October 1981 (with K. Cohen and S. Maier).
"General Telephone's Experience with a Short-run Financial Planning Model," Cash Management Forum, June 1980, Vol. 6, No. 1 (with J. Austin and S. Maier).
"An Empirical Bayes Estimate of Market Risk," Management Science, July 1982 (with S. Maier and D. Peterson).
"The Bond Scheduling Problem of the Multi-subsidiary Holding Company," Management Science, July 1982 (with K. Baker).
"A Decision-Support System for Managing a Short-term Financial Instrument Portfolio," Journal of Cash Management, March 1982 (with S. Maier).
"Deregulation and Locational Rents in Banking: a Comment," Journal of Bank Research, Summer 1983.
"What Lockbox and Disbursement Models Really Do," Journal of Finance, May 1983 (with S. Maier).
"Financial Management in the Short Run," Handbook of Modern Finance, edited by Dennis Logue, published by Warren, Gorham, \& Lamont, Inc., New York, 1984.
"Measuring Investors' Growth Expectations: the Analysts versus Historical Growth Extrapolation," The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988 (with W. Carleton).
"Entry Auctions and Strategic Behavior under Cross-Market Price Constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (2002) 611-629 (with J. Anton and N. Vettas).

Managing Corporate Liquidity: an Introduction to Working Capital Management, John Wiley and Sons, 1984 (with S. Maier).

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#1_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

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## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 2 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

2. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 5, lines 9-10, please indicate how equity investors define and measure "comparable risk."

## Response:

Each equity investor has his own definition of comparable risk. Whatever the definition and measurement, however, an investor will demand the same expected return on investments of comparable risk. For the purposes of my testimony, I have defined investments of comparable risk as being investments in publicly-traded water companies and publicly-traded natural gas distribution companies.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#2_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

3. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 16 , lines $1-17$, and Appendix 1, please provide copies of all theoretical and empirical studies known to Dr. Vander Weide that compare and contrast the quarterly and annual DCF models.

## Response:

My use of the quarterly DCF model is based on the theoretical discussion contained in Appendix 1 of my direct testimony. Although I did not rely on any other studies that compare quarterly and annual DCF models, I am aware of several articles that discuss the use of quarterly versus annual DCF models. Please see the attached articles.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#3_061807.pdf

# Estimation Biases in Discounted Cash Flow Analyses of Equity Capital Cost In Rate Regulation 

Charles M. Linke and J. Kenton Zumwalt

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## I. Introduction

The discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation models commonly found in public utility rate regulation testimony generate biased estimates of a utility's cost of equity capital. These biases typically range in magnitude from 50 to over 200 basis points. Such biases are not trivial. A 100 basis point bias could alter a utility's request for increased total revenues by ten to fifteen percent. ${ }^{\text {. This paper examines three of the most com- }}$ mon sources of estimation biases in DCF equity cost estimates.

Section II illustrates the DCF implementation problem that arises when quarterly dividend payments are forced, unadjusted, into an annual DCF framework. ${ }^{2} \mathrm{~A}$ simple solution to eliminate this systematic underesti-

[^0]mation of equity capital cost is proposed. Section III demonstrates that a regulatory body's rate-year/ratebase practices generally require that the market-determined DCF equity cost estimate be adjusted to a regulatory allowed rate of return in order to estimate a utility's required quantity of earnings and revenues. An adjustment procedure is developed that avoids misstating a utility's required earnings and revenues. Section IV considers the practice of some rate of return analysts of converting a DCF market determined annual rate of return to a continuously compounded rate of return. It is shown that the frequency of compounding is irrelevant if the lower continuously compounded rate of return is implemented employing a rate base

[^1]construct that is consistent with continuous compounding

## II. The Quarterly Dividend Problem

The DCF model envisions the value of an asset as being determined by the cash flows expected from the asset and investors' required return which is determined by the time value of money and the required risk premium. Thus, for common stock the value or price today is the present value of all future dividends expected, including any liquidating dividend or sale price. That is,

$$
\begin{gather*}
P_{0}=\frac{D_{1}}{(1+k)}+\frac{D_{2}}{(1+k)^{2}}+\frac{D_{3}}{(1+k)^{3}}+\ldots+ \\
\frac{D_{x}}{(1+k)^{x}}=\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{D_{1}}{(1+k)^{1}} \tag{1}
\end{gather*}
$$

where $D_{1}$ is the dividend paid at the end of period $t, k$ is the required rate of return of investors or the market cost of equity capital, and $P_{0}$ is the current price of the stock If dividends are expected to grow at a constant rate g for the indefinite future and $\mathrm{g}<\mathrm{k}$, Equation (1) can be rewritten as,

$$
\begin{gathered}
P_{0}=\frac{D_{0}(1+g)}{(1+k)}+\frac{D_{0}(1+g)^{2}}{(1+k)^{2}}+\frac{D_{0}(1+g)^{3}}{(1+k)^{3}} \\
+\ldots+\frac{D_{0}(1+g)^{x}}{(1+k)^{x}}
\end{gathered}
$$

This formula reduces to the familiar Gordon Model,

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{0}=\frac{D_{1}}{k-g} \text { or } k=\frac{D_{1}}{P_{0}}+g \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

These equations describe a generalized DCF model that may be used to analyze any periodic (annual, quarterly, monthly, etc.) cash flow.

Problems arise when using the annual version of the model unless recognition is given to the fact that the quarterly dividends have an opportunity cost. Most firms pay dividends quarterly, and the price of the stock reflects both the timing and amount of the dividends. The typical application of the annual DCF model ignores the time value of quarterly dividends ${ }^{3}$ Quarterly versions of Equations (1) and (2) resolve the time value of quarterly dividends problem, but create a new problem related to the size of the dividends.

[^2]
## Problems with the Annual Growth Model

DCF analyses of stock values should give recognition to the fact that firms commonly pay dividends quarterly and that firms change their quarterly dividend rate only periodically. It is shown below that failure to adjust the quarterly dividend for the time value of money will cause the annual DCF model's estimate of the cost of equity capital to be understated.

Consider, for example, a firm that paid a $\$ 9432^{4}$ annual dividend per share (quarterly dividends of $\$ .2358$ per share) during the fiscal year just ended Dividends are expected to increase 6.0 percent per annum or to $\$ .25$ per share each quarter in the next fiscal year. The share price is $\$ 8.00$ The time configuration of the expected dividends is presented in Exhibit I. The implied annual dividends associated with the Equations (1) and (2) annual models are also shown The typical cost of equity capital estimate using the annual mode of Equations (1) or (2) is 18.5 percent,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\$ 800= & \frac{4(\$ 25)}{(1+185)}+\frac{4 \mid(\$ .25)(1+06)]}{(1+185)^{2}} \\
& +\ldots+\frac{4\left[(\$ 25)(1+06)^{x}\right]}{(1+.185)^{x}} \\
\text { or } \quad k= & \frac{\$ 1.00}{\$ 8.00}+06=185=18.5 \%
\end{aligned}
$$

This formulation is correct only if the entire annual dividend is paid at year end as shown in the second row of Exhibit 1 . But the present value of four quarterly dividends is greater than the present value of one yearend dividend. Indeed, the cost of equity capital is 19.375 percent when the timing and amount of dividends embodied in the market price of the stock are considered. That is, 19375 percent is the iterative solution ${ }^{5}$ to

[^3]Exhibit 1. Expected Dividends Versus the Dividends Implied by the Annual and Quarterly Growth Models (annual growth rate $=6 \%$; quarterly growth rate $=1.46738 \%$ )

|  | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{t}_{0} \\ \text { Fiscal } \\ \text { Year End } \end{gathered}$ | Fiscal Ycar ! = |  |  |  | Fiscal Year $1=2$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Dividend an End of |  |  |  | Dividend at End of |  |  |  |
| Annual Model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Expected Quarterly Dividends | \$ 2358** | \$ 250 | \$ 250 | \$ 250 | \$ 250 | \$ 265 | \$ 265 | \$ 265 | \$ 265 |
| Implied Annual Dividends $\dagger$ | \$9432 |  |  |  | \$100 |  |  |  | \$1.06 |
| Quarterly Model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Implied Quarterly Dividend $\ddagger$ if analysis date is |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $4_{4} . \mathrm{Q}_{4}$ | \$ 2358* | \$ 239 | \$ 243 | \$ 246 | \$250 |  |  |  |  |
| 1. $Q_{1}$ |  | \$250* | \$ 254 | \$ 257 | \$ 261 | \$265 |  |  |  |
| 1. $Q_{2}$ |  |  | \$ 250 * | \$ 254 | \$. 257 | \$ 261 | \$. 265 |  |  |
| 1. $\mathrm{Q}_{3}$ |  |  |  | \$250* | \$.254 | \$ 257 | \$ 261 | \$. 265 |  |

*Actual dividend in quarter preceding anulysis
tTotal manal dividend ( $4 \times$ Quarterly Dividend)
łlmplied four quarterly dividends are underlined

$$
\begin{align*}
& \$ 8.00= \\
& \sum_{=1}^{4} \frac{\$ 25}{(1+.19375)^{250}} \\
&+ \sum^{4}=1(1+.19375)^{1+250}+\ldots  \tag{1a}\\
&= \sum_{1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{Q}^{4} \frac{\$ 25(1+06)^{1}}{(1+19375)^{1+250}}
\end{align*}
$$

The same equity cost estimate is obtained from the reduced form Equation (2) DCF annual model if the $D_{1}$ measure is adjusted for the time value of dividends. As shown later, the $D_{1}$ value called for in the reduced form annual model is $\$ 106998 \mid \$ 1.06998=\sum_{\mathrm{Q}=1}^{4} \$ 25$ $\left.(1+, 19375)^{1-250}\right]$ with a 19.375 percent opportunity cost to shareholders. The cost of equity after adjusting for the time value of dividends is

$$
k=\frac{1.06998}{\$ 8.00}+.06=.19375 \text { or } 19.375 \%
$$

Hence, the customary use of the annual DCF growth model understates the cost of equity capital for this firm by 88 basis points $119.375 \%-1850 \%=$ $0.875 \%$ ] because the time value of money associated with the quarterly dividends and embodied in the market price of the stock is ignored.

## Problems with the Quarterly Growth Model

As indicated above, one method of considering the liming of the quarterly dividends is to use the Equation (1) model in a quarterly mode. This formulation eliminates the time value of money problem associated with
the unadjusted annual growth model Unfortunately, common usage of a quarterly DCF model introduces a dividend bias since quarterly DCF models typically are formulated as

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{0}=\sum_{Q=1}^{\infty} \frac{D_{Q-1}\left(1+g_{4}\right)^{0}}{\left(1+k_{4}\right)^{0}}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Q=$ number of quarters,
$g_{4}=$ quarterly dividend growth rate, and
$\mathrm{k}_{4}=$ quarterly cost of equity rate.
This reduces to

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{0}=\frac{D_{1}}{k_{4}-g_{4}}=\frac{D_{0}\left(1+g_{4}\right)}{k_{4}-g_{4}} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

These formulations assume dividends are increased quarterly rather than periodically (typically annually). Thus, the quarterly dividend model correctly handles the time value of dividends but the quarterly dividend growth may cause the cost of equity capital to be understated or overstated

The data in Exhibit 1 indicate clearly the reason for the bias in the quarterly model's equity cost estimates. The bottom four rows of Exhibit I present the implied quarterly dividends associated with a six percent annual dividend growth rate. The dividend stream denoted $t_{10}, Q_{4}$ assumes the analysis occurs at $t=0$ or fiscal year end; stream $t_{1}, Q_{1}$ assumes the analysis is made after the first quarterly dividend, etc. The top row of Exhibit 1 shows the quarterly dividends actually expected. The discrepancies between the expected quarterly dividends (top row) and the dividends implied by the quarterly growth model (bottom four rows) depend upon
when the DCF analysis is made relative to the fiscal year dividend policy change For example, if the analysis is made immediately following the fiscal yearend, $t_{0}, Q_{4}$, the implied quarterly dividend is less than the actual dividend in three of the four quarters. However, if the analysis is made at the end of the first quarter, the implied quarterly dividend will be greater than the expected dividend in three of the four quarters. Similar discrepancies occur if the analysis is performed at the end of $Q_{2}$ or $Q_{3}$

## A Proposed Solution

Investors are fully aware of the quarterly payment schedule of dividends. Thus, the price, $P_{0}$, reflects the timing of the dividends as well as the amount of the dividends. If ( $D_{1-101}$ ), ( $D_{1-102}$ ), ( $D_{t-103}$ ), and ( $D_{1-1.010}$ ) represent the quarterly dividend payments at the end of the quarters in the year preceding the $\left(t_{0}\right)$ date of analysis, ${ }^{6}$ and dividends are expected to grow at an annual rate $g$, then $P_{0}$ can be written as

$$
\begin{align*}
P_{0}= & \frac{\left(D_{1-1.01}\right)(1+g)}{(1+k)^{25}}+\frac{\left(D_{1-1.02}\right)(1+g)}{(1+k)^{5 n}} \\
+ & \frac{\left(D_{1-1.03}\right)(1+g)}{(1+k)^{75}}+\frac{\left(D_{1-1.04}\right)(1+g)}{(1+k)} \\
& +\sum_{t=1 Q}^{\infty} \sum_{=1}^{4} \frac{D_{1.0}(1+g)}{(1+k)^{2+250}} \tag{5}
\end{align*}
$$

This equation can be simplified to the $\left[k=\left(D_{1} / P_{0}\right)+\right.$ g] annual model,

$+g$.
Equation (6) shows that the DCF model expressed in an annual mode must include a time value of money adjustment to dividends when applied to the real world where dividends are paid quarterly rather than once a year. ${ }^{7}$ Applying the Equation (6) annual model to the

[^4]firm discussed earlier shows that investors' required rate of return is correctly assessed as 19.375 percent,

when quarterly dividends are adjusted to reflect the time value of money. This adjustment raises the estimate of the example firm's cost of equity some 88 basis points or from $18.50 \%$ to 19.375 percent. Thus, the time value of money adjustment to dividends is not trivial.

## III. Market Required Rate of Return Vs. Allowed Return on Equity Rate Base

It is common practice in rate regulation to determine a utility's required quantity of earnings as the product of the DCF cost of equity measure and an equity rate base. The appropriateness of this procedure revolves around the rate year/rate base practices of regulatory agencies. This section demonstrates that a regulatory body's rate year/rate base practices may require that the market determined DCF equity cost estimate $\left[k_{\text {nokl }}\right]$ be adjusted to a regulatory allowed return $\left[k_{\text {tep }}\right]$ in order to estimate a utility's required quantity of earnings

A review of the example firm discussed earlier will make clear why the ( $k_{\text {mix }}$ ) estimate may need to be adjusted before using it to estimate the required quantity of earnings. Recall that the example firm had the following characteristics

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{P}_{0}=\$ 8.00 \stackrel{\mathrm{t}_{0}}{\stackrel{\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{O} 1}}{\longmapsto}=\$ .25 \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{Q2}}=\$ .25} \\
& \mathrm{t}_{1} \\
& \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{Q} 3}=\$ .25 \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{Q4}}=\$ .25 \\
& \mathrm{P}_{1}=\$ 8.48
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{gathered}
k_{m k 1}=19375 \text { or }\left[\$ 8.00=\left(\sum_{i=1}^{4} \frac{D_{0_{1}}}{1(1+19375)^{1 / 4}}\right)\right. \\
\left.+\frac{\$ 8.48}{(1+19375)}\right]
\end{gathered}
$$

For expository convenience, the $t=0$ share price $\left(P_{v}\right)$ is assumed to be equal to book value per share ( $B V_{0}$ ), or
$P_{0}=B V_{0}=\$ 800 .{ }^{*}$ Were a regulatory body to estimate the quantity of required eamings as
Required Earnings $=\left(k_{\text {mak }}\right)\left(B V_{0}\right)=(.19375)(\$ 8.00)=\$ 1.55$ then equity investors will realize the 19.375 percent required market return only if the utility (1) retains all earnings and the share price increases in line with book value $\{\$ 8.00=(\$ 8.00+\$ 1.55) /(1+.19375)]$, or (2) retains no earnings and pays out only a year-end $\$ 1.55$ annual dividend $\left[\$ 8.00=\frac{\$ 155}{(1+.19375)}+\right.$ $\$ 8.00$
$\overline{(1+.19 .375)}$
of the before-tax dividend irrelevance proposition.
But if the utility pays quarterly dividends, then the $\left[\mathrm{k}_{\text {mix }} \| B V_{0}\right]$ product will overestimate the earnings requirement and, therefore, overestimate required revenues. ${ }^{9}$ Consider the example firm once again. Assuming non-seasonal earnings and a share price equal to book value, the $\$ 1.55$ earnings requirement estimate will allow equity investors to achieve a 20.29 percent return $\left[\$ 8.00=\sum_{\mathrm{t}=1}^{4} \frac{\$ .25}{(1+.2029)^{1 / 4}}+\frac{\$ 8.55}{(1+2029)}\right]$ which exceeds the market required return of 19.375 percent by over 90 basis points. The source of this anomaly is well known in the finance literature It revolves around the reinvestment assumptions inherent in yield or internal rate of return analyses.

The confounding elements of the reinvestment problem can be easily handled, however, by explicitly introducing reinvestment assumptions. For example, the discrepancy between the realized and required returns disappears in the example above if the utility's aftertax earnings requirement is calculated as follows:

Step 1: Estimate the $n$ period compounded equivalent of the annual market determined rate of return by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left.k_{\text {nik } 1 n}=11+k_{\text {mit annuat }}\right]^{\frac{1}{n}-1} \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $n=$ number of compounding periods (if quarterly, $n=4$ ).

[^5]Step 2: Use the rate of return from Step 1 and the beginning of each future period's equity rate base to calculate the eamings requirement for the year,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Earnings Requirement } \\
& \text { in Year Beginning at } \\
& \text { Time of Analyses }
\end{aligned}=\sum_{t=0}^{n-1}\left[k_{m k 1 . n}\right]\left[\left(B V_{n}\right)\right] \text {, (9) }
$$

where $\left(B V_{n}\right)_{1}=$ the equity book value at the beginning of each compounding period in the year following the analysis date.
Step 3: The regulatory allowed rate of return can be calculated by relating the equity eamings requirement (in year t) calculated in Step 2 to the (beginning of year $t$ ) rate base construct mandated by a regulatory commission.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{rg}}=\frac{\text { Equity Earnings Requirement }}{\text { Equity Rate Base Measure }} \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Exhibit 2 shows that the appropriate annual aftertax eamings requirement for the example utility emerges as the product of the beginning of quarter equity rate bases and the annual DCF equity capital cost (19 375 percent) restated in its quarterly compounded equivalent ( 4.52697 percent). The resulting $\$ 1.48$ earnings requirement will provide equity investors the 19.375 required market retum $[\$ 8.00=$ $\left.\left(\sum_{t=1}^{4} \frac{\$ 25}{(1+.19375)^{1 / 4}}\right)+\frac{\$ 8.48}{(1+.19375)}\right)$

Assuming the appropriate $n$ in Equations (8) and (9) is four, the $\$ 1.48$ earnings requirement can be used to calculate $k_{\text {reg }}$ for rate base measures other than a beginning of the year rate base $\left(B V_{0}\right)$. For example, $k_{\text {rcg }}$ is 17.720522 (\$1.48/\$8 .3519) percent if a year end rate base is used, and 18.24413 percent if a mid-test year rate base is employed ( $\$ 1.48 / \$ 8$. 1122 ). And, of course, $\mathrm{k}_{\text {rgg }}$ will be greater for an expanding utility than $k_{\text {mat }}$ if a historical rate base test year is employed.
It is worth noting that $k_{\text {rgg }}$ is 18.50 percent ( $\$ 1.48 /$ $\$ 800)$ when a beginning of the year rate base $\left(B V_{0}\right)$ is used to estimate a utility's required quantity of earnings. This was the same rate obtained using the traditional annual DCF model uncorrected for the receipt of dividends received quarterly rather than a single yearend dividend payment. This fact should not be interpreted to mean that there really is no problem with the traditional annual growth DCF model. Rather, this equality is a unique happenstance that will occur if and

Exhibit 2. Required Earnings for Example Firm

| Quarter | Book Value Beginning of Quarter | $\begin{gathered} \text { Earnings } \\ \text { in Quarter }: \\ (.0452697)\left(B V_{O_{1}}\right) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Dividends in Quanter 1 ( $\$ .25 /$ quarter) | Retained Earnings in Quarter 1 $\left(\mathrm{RE}_{\mathrm{t}}=\mathrm{EPS}_{1}=\mathrm{DPS}_{1}\right)$ | Book Value End of Quanter t $\left(B V_{0 . t-1}+R E_{1}\right)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | \$80000 | \$ 3622 | \$ 2500 | \$. 1122 | \$8 1122 |
| 2 | 81122 | 3672 | 2500 | . 1172 | 8.2294 |
| 3 | 8.2294 | 3725 | 2500 | 1225 | 83519 |
| 4 | 8.3519 | 3781 | 2500 | 1281 | 8.4800 |
|  |  | \$1.4800 |  |  |  |

only if: (1) the $n$ variable in Equations (8) and (9) is equal to the frequency with which dividends are paid each year; (2) demand-revenues-earnings are non-seasonal; (3) the analysis occurs immediately following an ex-dividend date; and (4) the next $n$ dividends are equal ${ }^{10}$ If any of these conditions are not met, then only a market determined equity cost measure [ $k_{\text {makt }}$ ] estimated via Equations (6) or (7) and converted to a regulatory allowed return on equity $\left[k_{\text {ret }}\right]$ via Equations (8), (9) and (10) will correctly estimate a utility's level of required earnings. Unless the $\left[\mathrm{k}_{\text {mix1 }}\right]$ estimate is converted to a regulatory allowed return [ $k_{\text {reg }}$ ], the allowed return on equity may be misstated by 100 to 200 basis points. ${ }^{11}$

## IV. The Irrelevance of the Frequency of Compounding

In recent years, some rate of return analysts have begun to argue that a DCF market determined annual rate of return should be converted to a continuously compounded rate. Such an adjustment causes the rate of return recommended to be $100-175$ basis points lower, and leads to an understatement of the needed allowed return given the rate base constructs generally employed by regulatory commissions. However, use of a continuously compounded rate will not alter the estimate of a utility's required earnings and revenues if it is implemented employing a rate based construct

[^6]consistent with continuous compounding.
The logic of why the frequency of compounding is irrelevant can be easily shown using the example firm. Recall that the beginning $\$ 8.00$ price ( $P_{0}={B V_{0}}_{0}=$ $\$ 800$ ) emerges from investors' expectations that a $\$ 25$ dividend will be received at the end of each quarter and that the price at the end of the year will be $\left.\$ 848 \mid \mathrm{P}_{1}=\mathrm{BV}=\$ 8.48=\$ 8.00(1+\mathrm{g})\right]$. This dividend-price configuration will provide investors with their required 19.375 percent annual holding period return. Whatever rate base-required return combination is used, the utility's required quantity of earnings is $\$ 148$ during the year $[4(\$ 25$ quarterly dividend) + ( $\$ .48$ increment to retained earnings)]. As shown in Exhibit 2, this means a utility must earn 4.52697 percent on its beginning of the quarter equity rate bases. Alternatively, using Equation (8), the allowed return can be stated on a monthly compounded basis or 1.48677 percent and used in conjunction with the beginning of the month equity rate bases. And, of course, the continuously compounded equivalent of shareholders' required 19.375 percent return or 17.70996 percent can be used but it must be applied to a rate base which increases continuously. That is,
$$
\ln (1.19375)=.1770996128=r_{c}
$$
where $r_{c}$ refers to the continuous compound rate. That the continuous compound rate of return generates the same $\$ 1.48$ required quantity of eamings when the proper rate base measure is used, is shown in Exhibit 3. And shareholders realize their required 19.375 percent annual return since,
\[

$$
\begin{aligned}
\$ 8.00 & =\frac{\$ 25}{e^{23_{r_{\mathrm{r}}}}}+\frac{\$ 25}{\mathrm{e}^{3 \mathrm{fr}_{\mathrm{c}}}}+\frac{\$ 25}{\mathrm{e}^{73_{\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{c}}}}}+\frac{\$ 25}{\mathrm{e}^{r_{\mathrm{c}}}}+\frac{\$ 848}{\mathrm{e}^{r_{\mathrm{c}}}} \\
& =\frac{\$ 25}{(1+19375)^{25}}+\frac{\$ 25}{(1+19375)^{50}} \\
& +\frac{\$ .25}{(1+.19375)^{75}}+\frac{\$ .25}{(1+.19375)} \\
& +\frac{\$ 25}{(1+.19375)}
\end{aligned}
$$
\]

Exhibit 3. Required Earnings for Example Firms Using Continuous Compounding

| Quarter | Beginning of Period BV | $\times \mathrm{e}^{25 \mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{c}}}$ | $=$ | End of Period $\mathrm{BV}_{\mathrm{O} .1}$ Before Dividends | $\begin{gathered} \text { Quarterly } \\ \text { Eamings } \\ \left(B V_{Q, T}-B V_{Q, t-1}\right) \end{gathered}$ |  | Quarterly <br> Dividend | $=$ | Retuined Eamings in Quarter : |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | \$8.0000 | $\times \mathrm{e}^{25 \mathrm{~F}_{\mathrm{c}}}$ | $=$ | \$8.3622 | \$3622 | - | \$ 2500 | = | \$. 1122 |
| 2 | 8.1122 | $\times \mathrm{e}^{25 \mathrm{rc}}$ | $=$ | 84794 | 3672 | - | 2500 | $=$ | . 1172 |
| 3 | 8.2294 | $\times \mathrm{e}^{25 \mathrm{ra}_{\mathrm{c}}}$ | $=$ | 8.6019 | 3725 | - | 2500 | = | 1225 |
| 4 | 8.3519 | $\times e^{25 \mathrm{r}} \mathrm{c}$ | $=$ | 8.7300 | 3781 | - | 2500 | $=$ | 1281 |
| 5 | 8.4800 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | \$1.4800 |  | \$1.0000 |  | \$4800 |
|  |  | $\text { Required Earnings }=\$ 148=\frac{\$ 1.0000}{\text { Dividends }}+\begin{gathered} \$ 0.4800 \\ \text { Capital Gain } \\ \text { or } \Delta B V(\Delta P) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Thus, the frequency of compounding is irrelevant as long as the rate base construct employed in calculating a utility's required earnings is consistent with the assumptions inherent in the rate of return employed

## V. Summary

The annual DCF models typically encountered in financial texts, rate hearings, and empirical financial research do not treat correctly the timing of dividends. Also, the market determined DCF cost of equity estimate must generally be adjusted before it can be applied to a regulatory rate base This paper illustrates the bias arising from conventional DCF analyses and presents a simple adjustment to the DCF model which eliminates the timing of dividend problem. In addition, the appropriate procedure for adjusting a market determined rate of return to a regulatory allowed rate of return is presented Finally, the frequency of compounding used in a DCF analysis is shown to be irrelevant.

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# The Irrelevance of Compounding Frequency in Determining a Utility's Cost of Equity 

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## I. Introduction

The relevance of the frequency of compounding in utility rate regulation is often misunderstood. Increasingly, analysts have advocated that the allowed retum on equity capital should be the quarterly or continuously compounded equivalent of the market determined annual rate of return estimate emerging from a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Of course, restating an annual rate of return in terms of its quarterly or continuously compounded equivalent creates a lower return measure. If this lower return were applied to an unchanged rate base, the resulting estimates of the utility's eamings and revenue requirements would also be lower. However, the use of a quarterly or continuously compounded rate will not alter the estimate of a utility's annual earnings requirement as long as it is implemented with a rate base construct that is consistent with quarterly or continuous compounding. That

[^7]is, regardless of the frequency of compounding, the allowed rate of return and, hence, service rates must be set at levels that are expected to generate the quarterly dividends and growth in investment (share price) required by investors.

Linke-Zumwalt [1] and Siegel [2] have explored the effect on capital cost estimation when recognition is given to the fact that firms commonly pay dividends quarterly but change the dividend amount only periodically. Both articles demonstrated that the market return estimate based on quarterly dividends is higher than the traditional DCF model $\left[k_{c}=\left(D P S, 1 P_{0}\right)+g_{d p s}\right]$ return estimate when DPS is $^{\text {is a simple sum of the next }}$ four quarterly dividends. Linke and Zumwalt (L-Z) also showed that the market determined DCF equity cost estimate should be adjusted to a regulatory allowed return in order to estimate a utility's required amounts of earnings and revenues.
$\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{Z}$ went on to argue that this required adjustment is independent of the frequency of compounding (annual, monthly, quarterly or continuous) assumption embodied in the return estimate. Siegel, on the other

Exhibit I. Siegel's Example Utility Data

hand, argued that the earnings requirement for common equity ". . . must be discounted at the continously compounded rate of return rather than the discrete, per period return" [2, p. 51]. This article reconciles the apparent differences in these conclusions and demonstrates that, when the proper rate base construct is used, the frequency of compounding is irrelevant in utility rate regulation.

## II. Irrelevance of the Frequency of Compounding

Siegel's conclusion that continuous compounding must be used by regulators emerges from his assumption that the earnings of a utility are received continuously over time. However, the time configuration of earnings does not dictate that regulators must employ continuous compounding to estimate the annual earnings requirement for a utility. This is not to say that continuous compounding is an inappropriate method. Rather, the point is that annual, quarterly, monthly or continuously compounded rates equivalent to investors' annual required return will provide the same estimate of the annual earnings requirement for a utility if the compounding assumptions of the rate of return measure and the rate base measure are consistent. This can be easily shown using Siegel's example utility data (see Exhibit 1)

The example utility provides shareholders with $\$ 6.00$ of dividends and $\$ 4.00$ price appreciation and, therefore, a market determined DCF annual required return of $21.57892 \%$ ' This is equivalent to a discrete quarterly rate of return of $5.00611 \%$ and a continuously compounded annual rate of return ( $r_{c}^{2}$ ) of $19.53934 \% .^{2}$ Siegel indicates the continuously com-

$$
\$ 5000=\sum_{q=0}^{3} \frac{1.50}{(12157892)^{0254}}+\frac{\$ 5400}{(12157892)}
$$

pounded rate of return should be used to calculate the example utility's annual earnings requirement ( $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{e}}$ ) as shown in his Equation (1.3),

$$
R^{\mathrm{a}}=r_{c} \mathrm{P}_{0}=(0.1953934)(\$ 50)=\$ 9.769671 .^{3}
$$

This estimate of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{a}}$, the annual earnings requirement of the example utility, is too small to provide shareholders their $\$ 6.00$ of dividends and $\$ 4.00$ price (book value) appreciation during year one. However, if earnings on reinvested earnings are included, the $\$ 9.769671$ estimate is, in fact, too large. ${ }^{4}$ The earnings
${ }^{2}$ The continuous annual rate ( $r$ a that is equivalent to the 0.2157892 discrete annual rate of return ( $\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{d}}^{\mathrm{d}}$ ) is

$$
r_{c}^{a}=\ln \left(1+r_{d}^{d}\right)=\ln (12157892)=01953934
$$

The discrete quarterly rate of retum is

$$
\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{d}}^{\mathrm{g}}=\left(1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{d}}^{\mathrm{a}}\right)^{0.25}-1=(1.2157892)^{0.25}-1=00500611
$$

while the continuous quarterly rate is

$$
\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{c}}^{\mathrm{q}}=\ln \left(1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{d}}^{\mathrm{q}}\right)=\ln (10500611)=00488484
$$

${ }^{3}$ In his footnote 9 , Siegel offers a second calculating procedure when eamings of the utility are assumed to grow at a continuous rate ( $g_{c}$ ) Specifically,

$$
\begin{aligned}
R^{\mathrm{a}} & =\mathrm{R}_{0} \mathrm{e}^{\left(g_{c}\right)(1)} \\
& =\left[\left(\left(_{\mathrm{c}}^{\mathrm{s}}-\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c}}^{\mathrm{g}}\right) \mathrm{P}_{0}\right]\left[\mathrm{e}^{\left(\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c}}\right)(1)}\right]\right. \\
& =[(0.19539341-0.076961) \$ 50]] 108] \\
& =\$ 63955
\end{aligned}
$$

Using this formulation, the earnings requirement for Siegel's example utility would be only $\$ 6.3955$, drastically short of the $\$ 10.00$ needed if shareholders are to receive their $\$ 6.00 /$ share of dividends and $\$ 4.00$ price (book value) per share appreciation

This calculating procedure would appear to be applicable to Siegel's example utility which is assumed to experience an $80 \%$ annual growth in its equity rate base and camings. This altemative calculation is incorrect because there is no earnings growth that Siegel has not fully considered in his Equation (13) estimation procedure

[^8]Exhibit 2. Earnings on Beginning Rate Base and Reinvested Earnings for Example Utility (Continuous Compounding)

*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
$\dagger$ The beginning of-period equity rate base is $\$ 48.50$ inasmuch as the $\$ 5000$ (price) book value per share is reduced to $\$ 48.50$ when the $\$ 150$ beginning of-quarter 1 dividend is paid. The term "excess earnings in quarter" refers to camings during a quarter in excess of the end-of-quarter dividend
data shown in Exhibit 2 for the example utility reveal why this is so.

The upper panel of Exhibit 2 shows the quarter-byquarter and annual earnings requirement of the example utility using continuous compounding. ${ }^{5}$ As can be

[^9] these earnings instantancously at $\stackrel{r}{c}_{\text {a }}$
seen, the $\$ 10.00$ of earnings generated over the year provide shareholders with $\$ 6.00$ of dividends and a $\$ 4.00$ increase in price (book value per share).

The lower panel of Exhibit 2 decomposes the $\$ 10.00$ annual earnings requirement into (i) earnings on the beginning-of-period rate base or the rate base implicit in a DCF analysis, and (ii) earnings on reinvested earnings. Row A shows the quarterly earnings associated with the $\$ 48.50$ beginning-of-period rate base. Row B shows the earnings generated during a quarter due to the reinvestment during that quarter of the continuously generated earnings. Rows C, D, and E identify the earnings in subsequent quarters due to the reinvestment of previous quarters' earnings after payment of quarterly dividends.

These reinvested earnings must earn shareholders'

Exhibit 3. Earnings on Beginning Rate Base and Reinvested Earnings for Example Utility (Quarterly Compounding)

| Quanter | Beginning of Quarter Book Value <br> (1) | $\begin{array}{cc}  & \text { Be } \\ \text { Dividend Paid } \\ \text { at Beginning of } \\ \text { Quarter } \\ \text { Qivid } \\ \text { (2) } & \text { (3) } \end{array}$ | Beginning of Quarter Book Value after Dividend Paymen $(3)=(1)-(2)$ | Earnings in Quarter (4) $=(3) \times\left(\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{d}}\right)$ |  | Value at End of Quarter $(5)=(3)+(4)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | \$50.0000 | \$1.50 | \$48.5000 | \$ 2.4280 |  | \$50.9280 |
| 2 | 50.9280 | 1.50 | 49.4280 | 2.4744 |  | 51.9024 |
| 3 | 51.9024 | 1.50 | 50.4024 | 25232 |  | 52.9256 |
| 4 | 52.9256 | 1.50 | 51.4256 | 2.5744 |  | 540000 |
|  |  | \$6.00 |  | \$10.0000 |  |  |
| Composition of Eamings |  | Earnings in Quarter $\mathrm{q}\left(\mathrm{E}_{4}\right)^{*}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Iotal } \\ & \left(\Sigma E_{y}\right) \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  | $E_{1}$ | $\mathrm{E}_{2}$ | $E_{3}$ | $E_{4}$ |  |
| Earnings during Quarter on $\$ 48.50 \dagger$ Beginning of Period |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rate Base |  | \$2.4280 | - \$2.4280 | \$2.4280 |  | \$ 9.7120 |
| Earnings during Quarters 2, 3 and |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 on Quarter 1's Excess Earnings $\ddagger$ |  |  | 0.0464 | 0.0488 | 00512 | 0.1464 |
| Earnings during Quarters 3 and 4 on Quarter 2's Excess Earnings $\ddagger$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 00464 | 0.0488 | 00952 |
| Earnings during Quarter 4 on |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Quarter 3's Excess Earnings $\ddagger$ |  |  |  |  | 00464 | 0.0464 |
| \$2.4280 |  |  | 0 \$2.4744 | \$2.5232 | \$2.5744 | \$10.0000 |

${ }^{*} \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{q}}=$ ( $\mathrm{r} q$ or 005006115 ) (beginning-of-quarter investment)
The beginning-of-period equity rate base is $\$ 48.50$ inasmuch as the $\$ 50.00$ (price) book value per share is reduced to $\$ 48.50$ when the $\$ 150$ beginning-of-quarter 1 dividend is paid
$\ddagger$ The tenn "excess earmings in quarter" refers to earnings during a quarter in excess of the end-of-quarter dividend
required return in order to generate the necessary $\$ 1000$ of annual earnings. The earnings data reveal that the utility requires service rates that provide it the opportunity to earn only $\$ 9.4766$ from the sale of services generated by its beginning-of-period rate base. The $\$ 0.5234$ difference between the $\$ 10.00$ annual earnings requirement and the $\$ 9.4766$ earnings from the sale of services generated by the $\$ 48.50$ beginning-of-period rate base comes from earnings on reinvested earnings.

Altemative rate-of-return measures that are equivalent to investors' annual required return will provide estimates of the utility's quarter-by-quarter and annual earnings requirement that are identical to the estimates obtained using continuous compounding. The upper and lower panels of Exhibit 3 show the calculation of the $\$ 10.00$ earnings requirement using quarterly compounding for both the rate-base measure and investors' required return. As can be seen, the application of the quarterly equivalent of the $21.57892 \%$ annual required return measure to the beginning-of-quarter rate base
values provides for the four $\$ 150$ quarterly dividends and the $\$ 54.00$ ending book value (price). Also, as in the continuous compounding calculations shown in Exhibit 2, the payout ratio is $60 \%$ and the growth in book value (price) conforms to the $8.0 \%$ annual growth rate assumption.

As shown in Exhibits 2 and 3, and in the L-Z article, the quarter-by-quarter and annual eamings requirements of the example utility are identical whether the estimates are based on annual, quarterly or continuous compounding. Thus, it is not necessary that the annual earnings requirement for a utility's common equity be estimated using continuous compounding.

Note, however, that when specifying his $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{n}}$ calculating procedure, Siegel altered his working definition of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{a}}$ so as to exclude earnings on reinvested earnings. He then separated the proportion of the annual $\$ 1000$ earnings requirement that customers must provide through the prices they pay for service generated by the beginning-of-period equity rate base from the proportion of the annual earnings requirement that will be
earned on reinvested earnings. ${ }^{6}$ If, as Siegel assumed, the utility receives its revenues and earnings continuously over the year and can instantaneously reinvest earnings at $r_{c}^{r}$, then customers need to pay service prices that provide only $\$ 9.4766$ (see row $A$ of lower panel of Exhibit 2) of earnings on the generating capacity in place at the beginning of the period. If it is believed, on the other hand, that the utility will only be able to invest earnings in excess of dividends quarter$l y$, rather than instantaneously, then customers need to pay prices for the service generated by beginning-ofperiod capacity that will provide $\$ 9.7120$ (see Exhibit 3) in earnings over the year And, of course, if it is judged by the regulatory body that the utility will only be able to reinvest its earnings annually at investors' required return, then customers must pay prices that will provide the entire $\$ 10.00$ of required earnings. ${ }^{\text {? }}$

## III. Concluding Observations

Setting the allowed rate of equity return in public utility regulation requires that two very different rate of

[^10]return concepts be distinguished - the required market (economic) return and the regulatory allowed (accounting) return. Investors' annual required rate of return is a market determined return that reflects both the amount and timing of expected cash flows from dividends and price appreciation to the beginning-ofperiod investment (price). The regulatory allowed rate of return is a percentage accounting return that emerges when the required quantity of earnings a utility needs to eam, if shareholders are to realize their expected market return, is related to a historical or future test year equity rate base.

Rate of return analysts' DCF estimates of the market required return must be converted into a regulatory allowed return if a utility's earnings requirement is to be correctly estimated. This article has shown that the estimation of a utility's annual earnings requirement is not affected by the frequency of compounding assumed in a DCF analysis. As long as the investment or rate base construct used to estimate the required quantity of earnings is consistent with the compounding assumption implicit in the rate of return measure, the estimated required quantity of earnings and, thus, the regulatory allowed return [(required quantity of earnings)/(regulatory rate base)] are identical whether a continuous or a discrete compounding analysis is undertaken.

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## ARES ANNUAL MEETING

The Fourt Annual Meeting of the American Real Estate Society (ARES) will be held April 13-16, 1988 in San Francisco. For program details and further information, interested persons should contact:

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# An $N$-Stage, Fractional Period, Quarterly Dividend Discount Model 

Robert Brooks and Billy Helms*


#### Abstract

This paper develops a dividend discount model that will allow as many growth stages as desired. The model is directly applicable to most common stocks in that quarterly dividends are assumed and you need not be on a dividend payment date. The equation is easily programmed into a computer and is computationally very fast. The Newton-Rhapson algorithm is suggested as a means for estimating the required rate of return.


## Introduction

The development of dividend discount models (DDMs) beyond the constant growth model has been limited to the two- and three-stage models. The two-stage model was developed by Malkiel [13], and the threestage model was developed by Molodovsky [14]. The primary reason for not going further than three stages has been the difficulty of estimating the appropriate parameters. (See, for example, Elton and Gruber [5].) Another reason for limiting the development of the DDMs to three or fewer stages is the computational difficulty. The literature related to DDMs is vast. A brief summary includes [ $1,3,6-10,15,16$ ].

The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple analytical equation that can handle as many stages as the analyst will brave to estimate. Thus, the analyst can decide the limits with regard to the number of stages rather than being constrained by the model. Also, the model presented here is directly applicable to actual stock price data as it assumes quarterly dividends and fractional periods.
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## The Model

The $N$-stage model presented is based on the assumption that the stages are of the Malkiel type [13] and not of the Molodovsky type [14]. That is, within each stage, dividends grow at a constant rate. The $N$-stage model is also based on the assumption that dividends are adjusted once a year with the first adjustment beginning $h$ quarters from now, and quarterly compounding as opposed to annual compounding is assumed.

If dividends are paid quarterly, it is imperative that quarterly compounding be used in any model. Therefore, if annual rate $k$ is used, the appropriate rate on a quarterly basis is

$$
r=(1+k)^{1 / 4}-1 .
$$

The errors associated with using $k / 4$ instead of $r$ are well documented by Chew and Clayton [2], Horvath [11], and Lindley, Helms, and Haddad [12]. That is, if $k$ is indeed the annual rate of return, large errors result from not using a model that assumes quarterly compounding.

The $N$-stage, fractional period, quarterly dividend discount model is as follows: (The derivation of this model is available from the authors upon request.)

$$
\begin{equation*}
P=Q\left(D F^{-f}\right)\left[T+\left(D F^{h}\right) Z\left\{\sum _ { m = 1 } ^ { N } \left({\left.\left.\left.\left.\left.\underset{j=1}{m-1} B_{j}^{n_{j}}\right) S_{m}\right\}\right] .\right] .\right] .}\right.\right.\right. \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where
$Q=$ last quarterly dividend paid,

$$
D F=\underset{\text { quarter) }}{1 /(1+k)^{1 / 4} \text { (the discount factor for one }}
$$

where
$k=$ required rate of return (annual),
$f=$ fraction of current quarter elapsed since last dividend payment,
$T=\left(1-D F^{h}\right) /\left[(1+k)^{1 / 4}-1\right]$,
$h=$ number of quarters until a change in dividend policy,
$N=$ number of growth stages,
$Z=D F^{-3}+D F^{-2}+D F^{-1}+1$,
$B_{j}=\left(1+g_{j}\right) D F^{4}=\left(1+g_{j}\right) /(1+k)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
g_{j}= & \text { growth rate of dividends for stage } j, j=1, \\
& 2, \ldots, N, \\
n_{j}= & \text { number of years for the } j \text { th stage growth rate, } \\
S_{N}= & \left(1+g_{N}\right) /\left(k-g_{N}\right) \\
S_{m}= & n_{m} I\left(B_{m}=1.0\right)+N E_{m} I\left(B_{m} \neq 1.0\right) \text { for } m= \\
& 1,2, \ldots, N-1,
\end{aligned}
$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is an indicator function-if the statement within the parentheses is true, then $I=1.0$, otherwise $I=0.0$,

$$
N E_{m}=\left(1-B_{m}^{n_{m}}\right)\left(1+g_{m}\right) /\left(k-g_{m}\right) .
$$

0
Also, assume $\pi_{j=1} B_{j}^{n}=1.0$.
If $N=0$, then dividends will remain constant, and thus $h=\infty$ and $D F^{h}=0.0$. Therefore, equation (1) reduces to

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P=Q\left(D F^{-f}\right) T \\
& P=Q\left(D F^{-\Upsilon}\right) /\left[(1+k)^{1 / 4}-1\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

If $N=1$, then $k>g_{1}$ (or else the price is infinite), and $n_{1}=\infty$; thus $S_{1}=N E_{1}=\left(1+g_{1}\right) /\left(k-g_{1}\right)$ and equation (1) reduces to

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P=Q\left(D F^{-f}\right)\left[T+\left(D F^{\prime \prime}\right) Z\left(S_{1}\right)\right] \\
& P=Q\left(D F^{-r}\right)\left[T+\left(D F^{\prime \prime}\right) Z\left(1+g_{1}\right) /\left(k-g_{1}\right)\right] .
\end{aligned}
$$

If $N=2$, then $k>g_{2}$, thus $S_{2}=\left(1+g_{2}\right) /\left(k-g_{2}\right)$ and
$P=Q\left(D F^{-f}\right)\left[T+\left(D F^{h}\right) Z\left\{S_{1}+B_{1}\left(1+g_{2}\right) /\left(k-g_{2}\right)\right\}\right]$.
For $N>2$, then $k>g_{N}$, and equation (1) can be applied.

## The Required Rate of Return

When implementing this model, the current market price is easily observable. In this section, we sketch the methodology for estimating $k$ (the annual required rate of return) using the standard Newton-Rhapson method. The Newton-Rhapson method (see Ellis [4]) is an iterative technique that is easily programmable. The following is an outline of the Newton-Rhapson approach to solving for $k$ in our model.

Step 1. Estimate $k_{i}=(4 Q / P)+g_{N}$, which is the first estimate of $k$ where $i=1$ ( $i$ is a counter). Any rea-
sonable estimate of $k$ is acceptable. This estimate assures $k_{1}>g_{N}$.
Step 2. Calculate $P\left(k_{i}\right)$, the price based on $k_{i}$.
Step 3. Calculate

$$
\left.\frac{d P}{d k}\right|_{k=k_{1}} \equiv P^{\prime}\left(k_{i}\right)
$$

which is the first derivative of price with respect to $k$ and evaluated at $k_{i}$. The appropriate derivative is given in equation (2) below.
Step 4. Calculate $k_{i+1}=k_{i}-\left(\left(P\left(k_{i}\right)-P\right) / P^{\prime}\left(k_{i}\right)\right)$, an improved estimate of $k$.
Step 5. Test to make sure $k_{i+1}>0$ for $N=0$ and $k_{i+1}$ $>g_{N}$ for $N>0$, a rational estimate of $k$. The NewtonRhapson method works well as long as the price based on $k_{i+1}$ is not too small or too large.
Step 6. Calculate $P\left(k_{i+1}\right)$, the price based on $k_{i+1}$ and test accuracy of $k_{i+1}$ to compute the observed price. That is,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { IF }\left(\left|P\left(k_{i+1}\right)-P\right|<\epsilon\right) \text { THEN } \\
& \left.k=k_{i+1} \text { and quit for acceptable } \epsilon \text { (say } \epsilon=0.001\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Step 7. If $k_{i+1}$ is not precise enough, then set $i=i+$ 1 and go to Step 3.

The only problem in implementing the NewtonRhapson method is solving for $P^{\prime}\left(k_{i}\right)$.

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{d P}{d k}=\left[Q f\left(D F^{4 \cdot f}\right) / 4\right]\left[T+\left(D F^{n}\right) Z\left\{\sum_{n=1}^{N}\left(\begin{array}{c}
m-1 \\
m, i-1 \\
n=1
\end{array}\right) S_{m}\right\}\right] \\
& +Q\left(D F^{-\gamma}\right)\left[\left\{h\left(D F^{4-4}\right)\left[(1+k)^{1 / 4}-1\right]\right.\right. \\
& \left.-\left(1-D F^{*}\right)(1+k)^{-14}\right] /\left(4\left[(1+k)^{14}-1\right]^{2}\right) \\
& -\left(h\left(D F^{s, 4}\right) / 4\right) Z \sum_{m=1}^{N}\left(\prod_{j=1}^{m-1} B_{j^{j}}\right) S_{m} \\
& -\left(D F^{n}\right)\left(D F^{*} / 4\right)\left(3 D F^{2}+2 D F+1\right) \sum_{m=1}^{N}\left(\begin{array}{c}
m-1 \\
\prod_{1-1}-1 \\
\beta_{j}^{\prime}
\end{array}\right) S_{m} \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& +\left(D F^{n}\right) Z\left(\sum_{m=1}^{N}\left(\begin{array}{c}
m-1 \\
m_{1-1} \\
m
\end{array}(1+g)^{n_{j}}\right)\right. \\
& \times\left\{-\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m=1} n_{i}\right)(1+k)^{-\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} n_{i}\right)-1} S_{m}\right. \\
& +(1+k)^{-\left(\sum_{i=1}^{\prime} n_{2}\right)-1\left[O I\left(B_{m}=1.0\right)\right.} \\
& +\left(1+g_{n}\right)\left\{n_{m} B_{m_{m}}^{n_{m}:}(1+k)^{-2}(k-g)\right. \\
& \left.\left.\left.\left.-\left(1-B_{n n^{m}}^{n^{m}}\right\}\left(k-g_{m}\right)^{2} I\left(B_{m} \neq 1.0\right\rangle\right]\right\}\right)\right] .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Example

Consider the case of Commonwealth Edison Company (CWE), which supplies electricity to an estimated population of $8,000,000$ in an 11,525 square mile area in northern Illinois. Approximately 33 percent of sales are derived from the Chicago area with 77 percent of the power generated by nuclear and 22 percent by coal. (See Valueline, April 21, 1989). CWE has paid quarterly dividends of $\$ 0.75$ since 1982 . The closing price on June 9 , 1989, was $375 / 8$, the last dividend was paid on May 1, 1989, and the next dividend will be paid on August 1, 1989. (See Barron's, June 12, 1989.)

Three estimates are made of the required rate of return to illustrate the advantage of the dividend discount model presented here: (a) annual dividends, no fractional periods; (b) quarterly dividends, no fractional periods; and (c) quarterly dividends, fractional periods (the model presented here).

Case 1: No Growth. If we assume that CWE will only be able to maintain their $\$ 3.00$ per year dividend and thus no growth in dividends is anticipated, the required rates of return are as follows: (Note that $f=39$ / $92, Q=\$ 0.75$, and $P=\$ 375 / 8$.)

| Compound <br> Period | Fractional <br> Periods? |  | Required Rate <br> of Return |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | No |  |
| (a) Annual |  | $7.973 \%$ |  |
| (b) Quarterly | No |  | $8.215 \%$ |
| (c) Quarterly | Yes |  | $8.287 \%$ |

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Thus, we see that by assuming annual periods and ignoring the fractional period, we produce an estimate of the required rate of return that is off by 31.4 basis points ( $(8.287-7.973) \times 100)$. Assuming quarterly compounding but ignoring the fractional period produced an error of 7.2 basis points $((8.287-8.215) \times 100)$. This error is not that great partly due to being only 39 days through the quarter.

Case 2: Constant Growth. If we assume that CWE's dividends will grow at 3 percent per year ( $g=0.03$ ) after year end ( $h=2$ ), then we have the following required rates of return:

| Compound <br> Period | Fractional <br> Periods? | Required Rate <br> of Return |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| (a) Annual | No |  |
| (b) Quarterly No | $11.213 \%$ <br> (c) Quarterly | Yes |

Again, we see the downward bias of ignoring quarterly compounding as well as fractional periods. The exact downward bias of more complex cases is a function of the parameters selected.

## Summary

The dividend discount model developed incorporates quarterly dividends, fractional periods, and $N$ stages. This model alleviates the need to use a one- or two-stage model to estimate future dividends for the more realistic cases where expected changes in dividend policy do not occur at convenient annual time periods and dividend policy is expected to change more than once or twice. The $N$-stage, fractional period, quarterly dividend discount model presented provides greater precision and more flexibility than previous models. In addition, an efficient procedure is given for estimating the required rate of return.

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## Item 4 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

4. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 18, lines 10-16, please indicate:
(a) Why Dr. Vander Weide has chosen to use the earnings forecasts reported by I/B/E/S and not another service like Zack's or First Call?,
(b) How does the analysts coverage of $\mathrm{I} / \mathrm{B} / \mathrm{E} / \mathrm{S}$ compare to the analysts coverage of the other major earnings reporting services?, and
(c) Are the I/B/E/S earnings forecasts available free of charge on the Internet and, if so, where?

## Response:

a) I chose to use the $I / B / E / S$ earnings growth forecasts rather than those of another service such as Zack's or First Call because: (1) I have performed statistical studies that demonstrate that the I/B/E/S growth estimates are highly correlated with companies' stock prices; (2) in my experience over the past 25 years, the I/B/E/S forecasts have superior availability of historical coverage, estimates for more companies, and more contributing analysts' estimates; (3) the I/B/E/S data have been more widely studied in the academic literature; and (4) I/B/E/S also provides other financial information such as revenue/sales, net income, pre-tax profit, and operating profit. I did not include Zack's or First Call in addition to I/B/E/S because there is considerable overlap in the analysts contributing to the I/B/E/S, Zack's, and First Call surveys, and because I/B/E/S and First Call are now owned by the same firm, Thomson Financial; thus, I/B/E/S and First Call long-term growth estimates should be identical.
b) The I/B/E/S data represents a consensus of annual and long-term forecasts collected from 60 data researchers and 9,000 contributing analysts, and the I/B/E/S data contain historical earnings estimates for more than 35,000 companies worldwide, with U.S. data beginning in 1976 and international data beginning in 1987. Detailed First Call consensus estimate data is confined to U.S. and Canadian companies. I have been unable to find current information from Zack's on the numbers of analysts' providing long-term earnings growth forecasts.
c) Yahoo Finance reports earnings estimates free of charge that it lists as being obtained from Thomson/First Call. However, these data do not include detailed information
relating to whether the estimates are means or medians; the time the estimates were supplied; the number of or identity of the analysts contributing to the estimates; the value of each analyst's estimate; or the standard deviation or coefficient of variation among the estimates.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#4_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY <br> CASE NO. 2007-00143 <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

## Item 5 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

5. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 19, lines 3-8, please provide of all studies known to Dr. Vander Weide which indicate that "I/B/E/S growth rates are widely used by institutional and other investors."

## Response:

My use of analysts' forecasts to estimate the growth component of the DCF model is based on the results of my own studies rather than on the results of studies reported in the literature. As a result, I have not attempted to find all studies that indicate that investors use analysts' forecasts to estimate future eamings growth. However, I am aware of several articles that investigate the relationship between analysts' forecasts and stock prices. The strong correlation between analysts' forecasts and stock prices found in these articles indicates that investors use the analysts' growth forecasts to estimate future earnings growth. See the attached. See also, Cragg, John G. and Burton G. Malkiel, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices, National Bureau of Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, 1982.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#5_061807.pdf

# THE CONSENSUS AND ACCURACY OF SOME PREDICTIONS OF THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE EARNINGS 

J. G. Cragg* and Burton G. Malkiel*

For years economists have emphasized the importance of expectations in a variety of problems. ${ }^{1}$ The extent of agreement on the significance of expectations is almost matched, however, by the paucity of data that can be considered even reasonable proxies for these forecasts. One area in which expectations are highly important is the valuation of the common stock of a corporation. The price of a share is-or should be-determined primarily by investors' current expectations about the future values of variables that measure the relevant aspects of corporations' performance and profitability, particularly the anticipated growth rate of earnings per share. ${ }^{2}$ This theoretical emphasis is matched by efforts in the financial community where security analysts spend considerable effort in forecasting the future earnings of companies they study. These forecasts are of particular interest because one can observe divergence of opinion among different individuals dealing with the same quantities. This paper is devoted to the analysis of a small sample of such predictions and certain related variables obtained from financial houses. ${ }^{3}$

## I. Nature and Sources of Data

The principal data used in this study consisted of figures representing the expected growth of earnings per share for 185 corporations ${ }^{4}$ as of the end of 1962 and 1963. These data were collected from five investment firms. The participants were recruited through requests to two organizations. One was a group of firms who used computers for financial analysis and who met periodically to discuss mutual problems, the other was the New York Society of

[^11]
## The Journal of Finance

Financial Analysts. As a result, eleven firms agreed to participate in the proposed study. From the original eleven, however, only five were able to supply comparable sets of long-term earnings forecasts for use in this study. ${ }^{8}$ Even among these five there was not complete overlap in the corporations for which predictions were available. One of them had no data for 1962. For only two were data available for the full set of 185 companies.

Of the five participating firms, two are large New York City banks heavily involved in trust management, one is an investment banker and investment adviser doing mainly an institutional brokerage business, one is a mutual fund manager, and the remaining firm does a general brokerage and investment advisory business. We would not argue that these estimates give an accurate picture of general market expectations. It would, however, seem reasonable to suggest that they are representative of opinions of some of the largest professional investment institutions and that they may not be wholly unrepresentative of more general expectations. Since investors consult professional investment institutions in forming their own expectations, individuals' expectations may be strongly influenced-and so reflect-those of their advisers. ${ }^{6}$ Also, insofar as investors follow the same sorts of procedures as those used by security analysts in forming expectations, the investors' expectations would resemble those of the analysts. It should be noted, however, that security analysts are not limited to published data in forming their expectations. They frequently visit the companies they study and discuss the corporations' prospects with their executives.

Each growth-rate figure was reported as an average annual rate of growth expected to occur in the next five years. At first thought, such a rate of growth depends on what earnings are expected to be in five years' time and on the base-year earnings figures. However, this dependence need not be very great if the growth rate is regarded more as a parameter of the process determining earnings than as an arithmetic quantity linking the current value to the expected future value. Discussion with the suppliers of the data indicated that all firms were attempting to predict the same future figure, the long-run average ("normalized") earnings level, abstracting from cyclical or special circumstances. The bases used were less clear. Some firms explicitly used their estimates of "normalized" earnings during the year in which the prediction was made. Others provided different figures as bases: in one case the firm estimated actual earnings, in another a prediction of earnings four years in the future was furnished. These differences did not seem to be reffected in the growth rates, however, șince attempts to adjust the rates for differences in
5. We are deeply grateful to the participating firms, who wish to remain anozymous, Not all voluntcers were able to supply data useful to this study, either because the actual supply of data would bave been too burdensome (being kept for internal records in a form that made their extraction dificult) or because the data supplied were not comparable to data used bere (either being of a short-term nature or being made at different dates). Because one of our main objectives is to examine differences and similarities in predictions of the same quantities, such data were not used in the present paper.
6. That several of our participating firms find it worthwhile to publish these projections and provide them to their customers provides prima facio evidence that a certain segment of the market places some reliance on such information in forming its own expectations.
base figures introduced rather than removed disparities among the predictions.
The grôwth rates were given as single numbers for each corporation. No indication was provided of the confidence with which these point estimates were held: One firm did provide an instability index of earnings which represented a measure of the past variability of earnings (around trend) adjusted by the security analyst to indicate potential future variability. Morèover, two firms provided quality ratings, which classified companies into three or four quality categories.

Two of the firms provided estimates of past growith rates as well as predictions. The figures represented perceived growth over the past $8-10$ years, the past 4-5 years; the past 6 years; and the last year. It may seem unnecessary to rely on the participating firms for estimates of historic growith rates. However, the past growth of a company's earnings is not; in any meaningfül sense, a well-defined concept. Earnings-being basically a small difference between two large quantities-can exhibit large year-to-year fluctuations. They also can be negative, which creates problems for most méchanical calculations. In addition, the accounting definition of earnings is not an exact conformity with the economically relevant concept of profits or return on investors' capital. For these reasons, calculated growth rates are sensitive to the particular method employed and the period chosen for the calculation: Consequently, such calculations may be a poor reflection of what growth is generally considered to have been, and may not be useful in assessing the past performance of corporations. Furthermore, it may be supposed that in assessing security analysts' predictions of growth their own estimates of past giowth are more likely to be relevant than objectively calculated rates. The extent of agreement among the two types of measures is among the subjects considered in the next section.

Our participating firms also supplied an industrial classification. While other classifications are available, the concept of industry is not really precise enough to get a fixed, unquestionable assignment of corporations to industries. Particular problems are presented by conglomerate companies. Perceived indústry may be more relevant than any other grouping when investigating anticipations. The clássification we use represents à consénsius about industry am̄ō̄̆g our participants. Where disagreements occurred (as was often the case with conglomerates), the corporation was simply classified as "miscellaneous." The classification represented considerable aggregation over finer classifications and only eight industries were distinguished. These were:

1) Electricals and Electronics
2) Electric Utilities
3) Metals
4) Oils
5) Drugs and Specialty Chemicals
6) Foods and Stores
7) "Cyclical"-inciuding companies such as automobile and aircraft manufacturers, and meat packers
8) "Miscellaneous"

## II. Agreement among Predictors

The agreement among the growth-rate projections is described and summarized in this section. In the course of this description, the extent of agreement about base-earnings figures and the closeness of the projections to past, perceived, and calculated growth rates are also considered.

## A. Comparisons of Predictions of Future Growth Rates,

The extent of agreement among the predictors about future growth rates is summarized in Table 1. Of the five predictors, the correlations among predictors A, B, C and E were all roughly of the same orders of magnitude. ${ }^{7}$ Predictor D showed some tendency towards lower agreement. (Predictor D also had the highest average growth forecast and standard deviation for the companies for which it and others made forecasts.) Over-all agreement among

TABLE 1
Agreement Among Growth-Rate Predictions*

III. Proportions of Total Variance Due to Variance in Average Predictions

|  | Predictors | $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C})$ | $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{D})$ | $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{D})$ | $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{E})$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1962 |  | .87 | .70 | ${ }^{7} 79$ |  |
| 1963 | .85 | .68 | .83 | .87 |  |

[^12]$$
1962
$$

1963

|  | A | B | C |  | A | B | C | D |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| B | $\mathbf{1 8 5}$ |  |  | B | 185 |  |  |  |
| C | 60 |  |  | C | 62 | 62 |  |  |
| D | 178 | 178 | 38 | D | 182 | 182 | 61 |  |

For other comparisons, the number of observations is the minimum of the numbers of observations used to compute the correlations.
7. The analysis is presented mainly for the raw growth figures, but very similar impressions would be obtained from examining their logarithms.
the predictors is further summarized in the second and third parts of Table 1, which show the values of Kendall's coefficient of concordance and the proportion of total variance of the predictions that can be accounted for by differences in the mean prediction among companies. ${ }^{8}$ It may be remarked that the entries in Table 1 are based on different numbers of observations. In each case, we used the maximum number of observations (companies) for which a comparison could be made. The impressions to be gained from Table 1 would be little changed, however, by basing all calculations only on the set for which all predictors provided data.
Though Table 1 suggests considerable agreement, the lack of agreement it also reveals can bardly be considered negligible. In addition to the lack of correlation, there were also some systematic differences among the predictors. For the matched set of observations the means and the standard deviations were of roughly the same sizes. However, the differences among the central tendencies were significant according to both parametric and nonparametric tests.

## B. Analysis of Predictions Within Industrial Classifications.

One might suspect that the correlations among the predictors reflect little more than consensus about the industries that are expected to grow most rapidly rather than agreement about the relative rates of growth of firms within industries. This possibility was investigated by decomposing the correlation coefficients into two parts, one due to correlation within industries ( $r_{w}$ ) and one due to correlation among the industry means ( $\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{n}}$ ).

$$
r=r_{w}+r_{a}
$$

where

$$
r_{w}=\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{y} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{j}}\left(x_{i j}-\bar{x}_{j}\right)\left(y_{i j}-\bar{y}_{j}\right)}{\sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{j}}\left(x_{j}-\bar{x}\right)^{2} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{j}}\left(y_{j j}-\bar{y}\right)^{2}}}
$$

and

$$
r_{n}=\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} N_{j}\left(\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}\right)\left(\bar{y}_{j}-\bar{y}\right)}{\sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{3} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{j}}\left(x_{y}-\bar{x}\right)^{2} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{j}}\left(y_{i j}-\bar{y}\right)^{2}}}
$$

with
8. The values shown in all parts of Table 1 are significant well beyond the conventionally used levels of significance. We may note that Tukey's test for interaction in a two-way analysis of variance [11, pp. 129-37]-the typical model in which the breakdown of variance used in Part 3 of Table 1 is employed-indicated a small but highly "significant" proportion of variance attributable to interaction. However, the usual analysis-of-varlance model does not seem appropriate for this data, not only because of interictions, but also because of possible lack of homogeneity of variance.
$x_{1 j}, y_{i f}$ being the $\mathrm{i}^{\text {th }}$ observations in the $\mathrm{j}^{\mathrm{th}}$ class (industry),
$N_{1}$ being the number of observations in the $j^{\text {th }}$ class,
$I$ being the number of classes,
$\bar{x}_{j}, \bar{y}_{3}$ being the averages within the classes, and
$\bar{x}, \bar{y}$ being the over-all averages.
This decomposition indicated that agreement concerning industry growth rates is not the major factor accounting for the correlations among the forecasts. The first part of Table 2 shows the values of $\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{n}}$ using the industrial classification obtained from the participating firms. As comparison with Table 1 shows, only a small part of the correlations among the predictions are due to correlations among the industry means. Further light can be shed on this question by calculating the partial correlations between the predictions, holding industry classification constant. The second panel of Table 2 reveals

TABLE 2
Industral Classipication and Agreement Among Predictors

that these partial correlations tended to be only slightly less than the simple correlations and, in the case of Predictor D, the partial correlations were actually higher.

It is also interesting to examine the extent to which the correlations among predictors' forecasts varied over the different industry groups. This should indicate whether certain industry groups are more difficult to forecast in an ex ante sense. The correlations among forecasters tended to be lowest in the oil and cyclical industry groups, and highest for electric utility companies. These differences were significant for all pairs of predictions considered. Ranking the correlations over industries, and then comparing these ranks among pairs of predictors, showed substantial concordance over the ordering of the correlations. ${ }^{9}$
9. The test for individual pairs of predictions was the likelihood-ratio test. Note that the ranking comparison is not based on independent observations so a statistical test of the concordance is not appropriate. This suggests that the "significance" of the over-all correlations mentioned carlier should really be treated only as descriptive indications of their sizes. The hypothesis that

## C. Comparisons of Predictions and Past Growth Rates.

The extent of agreement among the predictors can usefully be evaluated by comparisons of the predicted growth rates with earlier predictions and with the past growth rates of earnings. The correlations of the 1963 predictions with the 1962 ones were: $.94, .95, .96$, and .88 for predictors A through $D$ respectively. All of these are considerably higher than the correlations of the predictions with each other. On the other hand, changes in expected growth rates were not highly correlated among predictors. ${ }^{10}$

TABLE 3
Predictions and Past Growth Rates*
(Correlations of Predicted with Past Growti Rates)

|  | 1962 |  |  |  | 1963 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C | D | A | B | C | D | E |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{pl}}$ | . 78 | . 68 | . 75 | . 41 | . 85 | . 73 | . 84 | . 56 | . 67 |
| ${ }_{p p}$ | . 75 | . 67 | . 72 | . 51 | . 79 | . 69 | . 80 | . 58 | . 76 |
| $\mathrm{gab}_{\mathrm{pB}}$ | . 77 | . 71 | . 82 | . 61 | . 75 | . 72 | . 79 | . 70 | . 74 |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{pf}}$ | . 34 | . 37 | . 59 | . 44 | . 33 | . 45 | . 70 | . 75 | . 58 |
| gcl | . 55 | . 46 | . 65 | . 32 | . 63 | . 52 | . 61 | . 30 | . 58 |
| $\mathrm{gc}_{\mathrm{c} 2}$ | . 67 | . 60 | . 68 | . 18 | . 72 | . 58 | . 73 | . 20 | . 56 |
| $\mathrm{Bcs}^{\text {c }}$ | . 75 | . 63 | . 73 | . 17 | .79 | . 66 | . 76 | . 17 | . 57 |
| 8 ct | . 82 | . 68 | . 79 | . 24 | . 83 | . 69 | . 79 | . 29 | . 60 |

* $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 1}$ is $8-10$ year historic growth rate supplied by $A$
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 2}$ is $4-5$ year historic growth rate supplied by A
$\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{ps}}$ is 6 year historic growth rate supplied by D
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 4}$ is preceding 1 year growth rate supplied by D
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 1}$ is log-regression trend fitted to last 4 years
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 2}$ is $\log$-regression trend fitted to last 6 years
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{cB}}$ is log-regression trend fitted to last 8 years
$8_{\mathrm{of}}$ is $\log$-regression trend fitted to last 10 years.
Correlations of the predictions with eight past growth gigures are shown in Table 3. Four of these past growth rates were supplied by the participating firms and represent the firms' perceptions of the growth of earnings per share that had occurred in different preceding periods. The others were calculated as the coefficient in the regression of the logarithms of earnings per share on time over the past 4, 6, 8, and 10 years. These correlations generally are not much lower than those found in comparing the predictions with each other. Among the perceived past growth rates, the correlations are apt to be lowest with the growth rates over the most recent year. With the calculated growth rates, there

[^13]10. These correlations, ior the participants supplying data in both years were:

|  | A | B | C |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| B | .19 |  |  |
| C | .04 | .04 | .29 |
| D | .07 | .11 |  |

Only the two largest of these correlations would be ignificant at the .05 level.
was a tendency for the correlations to increase with the length of period over which the calculations were made. ${ }^{11}$

These comparisons of past with predicted growth rates suggest that the apparent agreement among the predictors may reflect little more than use by all of them of the historic figures. In investigating this possibility, the partial correlations among the predictions, holding constant past perceived growth rates, holding constant past calculated growth rates, and holding both sets constant were calculated. The first two sets of partial correlations were not much smaller than the simple correlations. Holding both sets constant produced the partial correlations shown in Table 4. These are considerably

TABLE 4
Partini. Corpelations of Predictions
Holding Past Growth Rates Constant

| 1962 |  |  |  |  | 1963 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  | A | B | C | D |
| B | . 49 |  |  | B | . 49 |  |  |  |
| C | . 49 | . 18 |  | C | . 25 | . 03 |  |  |
| D | .35 | . 39 | . 22 | D | . 56 | . 46 | . 40 |  |
|  |  |  |  | E | . 56 | . 62 | -. 11 | . 51 |
|  |  |  |  | Obse | IoNs |  |  |  |
|  |  | 962 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C |  | A | B | C | D |
| B | 111 |  |  | B | 112 |  |  |  |
| C | 49 | 49 |  | C | 50 | 50 |  |  |
| D | 111 | 111 | 49 | D | 112 | 112 | 50 |  |
|  |  |  |  | E | 78 | 78 | 36 | 78 |

smaller than the simple correlations, though all but the four smallest entries would be significant beyond the .05 level. Thus, while a substantial part of the agreement among predictors appears to result from their use of historic growth figures, there is also evidence that security analysts tend to make similar adjustments to the past growth rates. ${ }^{12}$

Examination of the correlations among past growth rates help both to evaluate the correlations among the predictions and to indicate the sensitivity of measurements of growth rates to the methods by which they were calculated. Table 5 presents correlations between 13 such past growth rates for our 1962 data. The correlations between the different measures of past growth are fairly low. When exactly the same data are used in the calculations, however, the

[^14]correlations among the growth rates calculated by different methods are relatively high, though probably not so high that the choice of method of calculation would be a matter of no importance. Finally, the perceived growth rates furnished by the security firms tend to be more highly correlated with the growth rates calculated over longer periods. The increase in correlation coefficients did not continue, however, when calculations over more than ten years were made and, as shown in Table 5, it stopped before ten years in some cases. Correlations for other periods and for the 1963 data were of about the same magnitude as those in Table 5.

TABLE 5
Past Growth Correlations, 1962*

|  | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{pI}}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 2}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 8}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 4}$ | $\mathrm{gcl}_{\text {c }}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 2}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} \text { B }}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 4}$ | ges | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{cb}}$ | $\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{c} 7}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 8}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 2}$ | . 70 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p}}$ | . 82 | . 87 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 4}$ | . 49 | . 39 | . 37 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 ct | . 34 | . 47 | . 48 | . 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Be 2 | . 68 | . 74 | . 76 | . 05 | . 62 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{gc}_{\mathrm{c}}$ | . 81 | . 89 | . 97 | . 15 | . 49 | . 90 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ged | . 93 | . 80 | . 87 | . 27 | . 41 | . 75 | . 93 |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{gcs}^{\text {c }}$ | . 14 | . 19 | . 25 | . 39 | . 38 | . 24 | . 16 | . 15 |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c}} 8$ | . 34 | . 46 | . 47 | . 14 | .96 | . 59 | . 45 | . 37 | . 53 |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{Bc}_{7}$ | . 92 | . 67 | . 78 | . 32 | . 48 | . 67 | . 83 | . 95 | . 33 | . 46 |  |  |
| $\mathrm{ges}_{8}$ | . 36 | . 56 | . 49 | . 23 | . 99 | . 63 | . 50 | . 43 | . 40 | . 90 | . 51 |  |
| $\mathrm{geg}_{\text {c }}$ | . 87 | . 75 | . 88 | . 18 | . 46 | . 77 | . 93 | . 99 | . 17 | . 40 | . 91 | . 43 |

* $g_{p 1}-g_{p 4}, g_{c 1}-\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 4}$ as defined in footnote to Table 3
$\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{c} 5}$ is 1 year growth rate calculated from first differences of logarithm
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{cg}}$ is 4 year growth rate calculated from average of first differences of logs
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 7}$ is 10 year growth rate calculated from average of first differences of logs
$\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{cs}}$ is 4 year growth rate calculated from regression of eamings on time
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} \mathrm{\theta}}$ is 10 year growth rate calculated from regression of earnings on time
D. Comparisons of Predictions with Price-Earnings Ratios.

Finally, we may examine the extent of agreement among predictors by comparing their forecasts with the price-earnings ratios of the corresponding securities. By utilizing a normative valuation model (see e.g., [4] or [8]) it is possible to calculate an implicit growth rate from the market-determined earnings multiple of a security. Thus, comparisons of the predictions with price-earnings ratios may be interpreted as examinations of the relationship between the forecasts and market-expected growth rates. Correlations with two versions of the price-earnings ratio are shown in Table 6. The prices used were the closing prices for the last day of the year. The earnings were either the actual earnings or the average of the base-earnings figures supplied by A and B for their growth rates. These latter figures represent "normalized" or trend-earnings figures. Specifically, they represent an attempt to estimate what earnings would be in the absence of cyclical or special factors. The correlation coefficients in the table are about the same as those obtained when the forecasts were compared with each other. Since price-earnings ratios are

TABLE 6
Correlations of Predictions with Price-Earnings
Ratioṣ*

| 1962 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | 8 | C | - |  |
| P/E | . 76 | . 80 | . 86 | . 56 |  |
| P/NE | . 82 | . 83 | . 83 | . 55 |  |
| 1963 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| P/E | . 77 | . 74 | . 86 | . 67 | . 85 |
| P/NE | . 81 | . 76 | . 80 | . 60 | . 85 |

* $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ is the price/earnings ratio. $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{NE}$ is price/average of base (normalized) earnings of A and B.
affected by several variables other than expected growth rates, this exercise underscores the extent of disagreement among the forecasters.


## III. Accuracy of Predictions

In assessing the forecasting abilities of the predictors, we encountered one major difficulty. The five years in the future for which the forecasts were made have not yet elapsed. As a result, we were forced to compare the forecasts with the realized growth of actual and normalized earnings (as estimated by Predictors A and B) through 1965. Since the latter figures represent what earnings are thought to be on their long-run growth path, perhaps not too much violence is done to the intentions of the forecasters by making these a standard of comparison.

## A. Method of Evaluation.

The forecasts were evaluated by the use of simple correlations and by the inequality coefficient, ${ }^{18}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{U}^{2}=\frac{\Sigma\left(\mathrm{P}_{1}-\mathrm{R}_{1}\right)^{2}}{\Sigma \mathrm{R}_{1}^{2}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $P_{1}$ is the predicted and $R_{1}$ the realized growth rates for the $i^{\text {th }}$ company. It will be noticed that the inequality coefficient, in effect, gives a comparison between perfect prediction ( $\mathrm{U}^{2}=0$ ) and a naive prediction of zero growth for all corporations ( $\mathrm{U}^{2}=1$ ).

We also investigated the extent to which errors in predictions were related to 1) errors in predicting the average over-all earnings growth of the sample firms; 2) errors in predicting the ayerage growth rate of particular industries; and 3) errors in predicting the growth rates of firms within industries. To accomplish this, we decomposed the numerator of (1) into three parts. The first comes from the average prediction for all companies not being equal to the average realization. The second part arises from differences among the
13. Note that this is similar to the inequality coefficient introduced by Thell [14].
average industry predictions not being equal to the corresponding differences in industry realizations. The third arises from the differences in predictions for the corporations within an industry not being the same as the differences in realization. ${ }^{14}$ The proportions of $\mathrm{U}^{2}$ arising from these three sources will be called $\mathrm{U}^{\mathrm{SI}} ; \mathrm{U}^{\mathrm{BI}}$, and $\mathrm{U}^{\mathrm{wi}}$ respectively for mean errors, between-industry errors, and within-industry errors:

## B. Over-all Accuracy of the Foreciasts.

Statistics summarizing the forecasting abilities of the predictors and the success of using perceived past growth rates to predict the future are presented in Table 7. By and large, the correlations of predicted and realized growth rates are low, though most of them are significantly greater than zero, and the inequality coefficients are large. The miajor excéeption to this is Predićtor C's forecasts. However, this apparent superiority is largely illusory since C tended to concentrate on large, relatively stable companies and, we suspect, predictions werre made only when there was a priori reason to believe that the forecasts would be reliable. That this conjecture has some validity is borne out by the fact that the set of companies for which C made forecasts had a lower average instability index than did our twhole sample. Möreover, all the other forecasts, including the perceived past growth rates, did better for this set of companies than for the larger set. ${ }^{25}$

Severfal additional points about the over-all accuracy of the forècasts are worth mentioning. First, the forecasts bäsed on perceived past growth rätes, including evën growth over the most recent year, do not perform much differently from the predictions. There seems to be no clear-cut forecasting advantage to the careful and involved procedures our predictors employed over their perceptions of past growth rates either in terms of correlation or of the inequality coefficient.
 each company. However, it is possible to find a single growth rate that would yield lower mean square errors than any of the predictions. This is a result of the average realized growth rates being considerably higher than the average
14. Leetting $P_{k j}$ and $R_{k j}$ be the predicted and realized growth tates for theie $\mathrm{k}^{\text {th }}$ companty ( $k=$ $1, \ldots, N_{j}$ ) in the $j^{\text {th }}$ Industry ( $j \equiv 1, \ldots, J$, wãe cañ wörite thẽ numerator of ( 1 ) as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{k=1}^{N_{j}}\left(P_{k j}-R_{k j}\right)^{2} & =\left[\sum_{j=1}^{J} N_{j}(\bar{P}-\bar{R})^{2}\right]+\left[\sum_{j=1}^{J} N_{j}\left\{\left(\bar{P}_{j}-\bar{P}\right)-\left(\bar{R}_{j}=\bar{R}\right)\right\}^{2}\right] \\
& +\left[\sum_{j=j i}^{J} \sum_{t=1}^{N_{j}}\left\{\left(P_{k j}-\bar{P}_{j}\right)-\left(R_{k j}-\bar{R}_{j}\right)\right\}^{2}\right],
\end{aligned}
$$

when $\overline{\mathrm{P}}_{j}, \overline{\mathrm{R}}_{\mathrm{j}}$ are the everages for the j th industry and $\overline{\mathrm{P}}^{\text {and }} \overline{\mathrm{R}}_{\text {are }}$ the overall meanis. The three terms in squate bracketg are the ones referred to in the text:
15. For this smaller group of companies, the differences among predictors was far less than
 index than the others in 1962 (with D ä very close sêcoiid), buit botli D ánd E wërie slightly better on the matched set in 1963;

TABLE 7
Accuracy of Predictions

| I. 1962 Predictions Compared with Growth of Actual Earnings 1962-1965 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Predictor | A | B | C | D | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{pl}}$ | $\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{p} 2}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p}}$ | $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{p} 4}$ |
| Correlation | . 07 | . 16 | . 66 | . 45 | . 22 | -. 01 | . 23 | . 16 |
| U | . 80 | . 78 | . 57 | . 67 | . 74 | . 88 | . 74 | . 78 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {m }}$ | . 31 | . 32 | . 20 | . 24 | . 17 | . 12 | . 10 | . 20 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {BI }}$ | . 11 | . 10 | . 08 | . 06 | . 11 | . 04 | . 04 | . 12 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {w }}$ | . 58 | . 58 | . 71 | . 70 | . 73 | . 84 | . 75 | . 68 |
| Number of Observations | 185 | 185 | 60 | 178 | 168 | 140 | 140 | 145 |
| II. 1962 Predictions Compared with Growth of Normalized Errnings 1962-1965 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Correlation | . 26 | . 32 | . 68 | . 45 | . 23 | . 16 | . 38 | . 09 |
| U | . 74 | . 72 | . 57 | . 62 | . 72 | . 80 | . 67 | . 76 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {M }}$ | . 25 | . 25 | . 08 | . 13 | . 09 | . 12 | . 09 | . 19 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {a }}$ | . 07 | . 06 | . 06 | . 08 | . 08 | . 07 | . 05 | . 08 |
| Uwr | . 68 | . 69 | . 86 | . 79 | . 83 | . 80 | . 86 | . 73 |
| Number of Observations | 180 | 180 | 59 | 175 | 164 | 136 | 138 | 142 |

III. 1963 Predictions Compared with Growth of Actual Earnings

IV. 1963 Predictions Compared with Growth of Normalized Earnings 1963-1965

| Correlation | .27 | .29 | .70 | .34 | .49 | .36 | .52 | .41 | .32 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $U^{\text {M }}$ | .78 | .78 | .61 | .70 | .74 | .69 | .64 | .67 | .69 |
| $U^{\text {Br }}$ | .35 | .35 | .22 | .23 | .40 | .22 | .33 | .23 | .12 |
| $\mathrm{U}^{\text {WI }}$ | .07 | .06 | .08 | .09 | .09 | .08 | .09 | .05 | .06 |
| Number of Observations | $\mathbf{1 8 0}$ | .59 | .70 | .68 | .50 | .70 | .57 | .72 | .82 |

expectation of each predictor. This may simply indicate a failure to anticipate the continuation of the expansion through the period considered, but it may also reflect the underestimation of change frequently found in investigating forecasts. ${ }^{16}$

Third, with the exception of the past growth rate in the year immediately preceding the forecast date, all predicted and perceived past growth rates were better at predicting the average normalized growth rates than the actual ones. However, whether this is because normalized earnings gave a better picture
16. See, for example, Zarnowitz [16]. Since almost all the actual growth rates were positive, we do not know whether underestimation of change would also characterize predictions when earnings were generally declining. No forecasters predicted a negative rate of growth.
of the true growth of corporations or because normalized earnings calculations are influenced by past growth-rate forecasts is open to question.

## C. Analysis of the Forecasts by Industrial Categories.

Turning to the industry breakdown of the forecasts, we find that failure to forecast industry means ( $\mathrm{U}^{\mathrm{Br}}$ ) accounted for only a very small proportion of the inequality coefficient. The main sources of inequality were the withinindustry errors.

Looking at the correlations of predictions with future growth rates within industries permits us to assess which industries were most difficult to forecast in an ex post sense. The extent to which forecasters found the various indus-

TABLE 8
Rans Scores of Correlations of Predictions and Realizations Summed over Predictors*

|  | 1962-65 Growth of Actual Earnings | $1962-65$ <br> Growth of Normalized Earnings | 1963. 65 Growth of Actual Earnings | $1963-65$ <br> Growth of Normalized Earnings | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industry |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1) | 20 | 23 | 20 | 28 | 91 |
| 2) | 18 | 22 | 14 | 25 | 79 |
| 3) | 9 | 11 | 24 | 14 | 58 |
| 4) | 10 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 35 |
| 5) | 5 | 7 | 24 | 26 | 62 |
| 6) | 8 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 28 |
| 7) | 14 | 15 | 20 | 20 | 69 |
| 8) | 24 | 15 | 29 | 14 | 82 |
| Kendall's W | .76 | .74 | . 72 | . 65 | . 32 |

* Entries are sums of ranks over predictors for correlations of predictions with growth rates indicated in column headings.
tries difficult to predict is indicated in Table 8. To calculate the table, we first ranked each predictor's correlation coefficients between his forecasts and realizations over the eight industry groups. The industry for which the predictor had the most difficulty (worst correlation) was given a rank of one. In Table 8, we present the sums of the ranks for each industry over the four predictors. ${ }^{17}$ If the difficulty ranking for all predictors was identical, the rank totals would be 4 for the most difficult industry (in 1963 when there are four predictors compared), 8 for the next most difficult, etc., and the coefficient of concordance (Kendall's W) would be unity. For each of the sets presented, the values of Kendall's W are significant (beyond the 05 level) as were the differences between industries for the correlation coefficients for each predictor. ${ }^{18}$ Correlation coefficients between forecasts and realizations tended to

[^15]bè highiest in indüstries (1) electricalŝ and electionoìcs; (8) "miscêllaneous," and (2) electric utilities; they were lowest in (6) foods and stores and (4) oils. Industry (5) drugs, showed very low correlations for the 1962 predictions and high ones for the 1963 predictions. Similar patterns emerged, though more weakly, when perceptions of past growith rates over more than one year were used as forecasts. It is interesting to note that certain industries which wére "difficult to forecast" in an ex ante sense (see Section II. B) actually turned out to be difficult to predict, ex post. For example, there was high (low) agreement among predictors concerning the growth rates for the electric utilities (oils) and also high (low) correlation between predictions and realizations:

In general, we had little success in associating forecasting success with any industry or company characteristics: Thē differences between industries in forecasting success were onily moderatëly rèatated either to the average growth rates to be realized or to the variances of the realized growth rates. Two of the industries where the highest correlations were found, industries (1) and (2), had respectivély the highëst and the löwest avèrage growth rates and variances. The third industry where succeses öccurred, (8), fell in the middle range for both quantities. The rank-totals of the last column of Table 8 had a rank correlation with the rank-totals for average growth rates of 14 and of .37 with the rank-totals for the variances.

To further investigate how forecasting ability was related to company characteristics, the corporations were classified according to the quality ratings supplied by two of the predicting firms. There was a tendency for the correlations to be lowest (and negative) in the poorest-quality grouping, but they did not get systematically higher with quality, the highest correlations tending to occur in the middle classes. Similarly, classifying by high, low, or medium values of the instability index showed no pronounced differences in performance. The forecasting performances were again worst for the lowest-quality corporations and best in the middle category. When the corporations were claśsified by high, medium; or low piric̄ē-eärnings multiplé; or past gröwth rate of earnings, or future growth ratès of earnings; sales or assëts, no pronounced or significant patterns emerged.

## IV. An Appraisal of the Forecasts

Thë rather poor over-all forecasting performäncès of the predictors and the fact that their past perceptions of growth rates were about as reliable forecasts as their explicit predictions raisés two queéstions: 1) Doés any naive forecästing devicé based on historic data yield as good forecasts às the painstaking éforts of security analysts? 2) Is it the basisically volatile natire of earnings that explains our fesults and would the predictions appear more accürăte if they wère taken to be forecásts of móore stablè méasurés of the growth of corporations?

To investigate the first of these questions, past growth rates calculated on the basis of arithmetic and logarithmic regressions and on the geometric means of first ratios, calculated over periods up to 14 years; were compared with

TABLE 9
Correlations of Calculated Past Growth Rates on Reayizations*

| I. Correlations |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Growth of Actual Earnings 1962-65 | Growth of Normalized Earnings 1962-65 | Growth of Actual Earnings 1963-65 | Growth of Normalized Earnings 1963-65 |
| gal | . 03 | 42 | 01 | :26 |
| 8 ca | --. 15 | :19 | - 15 | . 06 |
| ges | -. 13 | . 15 | $-.16$ | . 02 |
| ges | -. 10 | . 09 | - 11 | -. 02 |
| $\mathrm{gcs}^{\text {ct }}$ | . 22 | . 62 | . 18 | . 46 |
| $\mathrm{gco}^{\text {c }}$ | . 12 | . 51 | . 06 | . 34 |
| $\mathrm{ger}^{\text {r }}$ | . 01 | . 24 | -. 01 | . 12 |
| $\mathrm{gcB}^{\text {c }}$ | -. 02 | . 37 | -. 03 | . 23 |
| $\mathrm{Bc}_{\mathrm{c}}$ | -. 12 | . 09 | $-.14$ | $\cdots-.01$ |
| II. Inequality Coefficients |  |  |  |  |
| 810 | . 93 | . 79 | . 93 | . 85 |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c} 2}$ | 1.03 | . 95 | 1.01 | . 96 |
| gcs | . 95 | . 88 | . 96 | . 91 |
| $\mathrm{gem}_{4}$ | . 88 | . 82 | . 90 | . 86 |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{co}}$ | 1.27 | 1.22 | 1.11 | 1.08 |
| $\mathrm{BCB}^{\text {c }}$ | . 89 | . 73 | . 90 | . 80 |
| $\mathrm{Bc}_{7}$ | . 83 | . 75 | . 86 | . 80 |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{B}$ | . 98 | . 85 | . 96 | . 87 |
| $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{cc}} 9$ | . 89 | . 83 | , 91 | . 86 |

* For definition of g's see footnote to Table 5.
the realized growth rates through 1965. A selection of these comparisons based on data ending in 1962 is found in Table $9 .{ }^{19}$
It is interesting to note first that the calculated growth rates tend to be more closely correlated with the growth rates of normalized earnings than with the growth rates of actual earnings. This is an even more pronounced feature of the calculated growth rates than of the data considered earlier. Second, while the correlations of the calculated growth rates with the realized growth rates tended to be lower than those found for the predictions and perceptions, and feewer of them differed significantly from zero, these differences are not pronounced. However, unlike the earlier data, the calculations seem to have almost no forecasting ability, a finding similar to that of I. M. D. Little [7] for British corporations. Among the calculated rates, those for shorter periods of time tend to be somewhat better in terms of correlation than those for longer ones, a feature highlighted by the strong showing of the growth rates calculated over only one year ( gcv ). Third, while one would have expected that extrapolations using as the last year for the calculation the same year that is used for the first year in calculation of the realization would have a lower correlation than extrapolations where the data ended a year earlier, in

19. The figures there are typical both of what was found when other periods were used and of the comparisons of calculations ending in 1961 and 1963 with the perceived growth after 1962 and 1963 respectively.
fact the reverse tendency manifested itself. Finally, among the possible ways of calculating growth rates, those based on the geometric means of the first ratios surpassed those based on regressions.
The superiority of the past perceived growth rates over the calculated ones should not be taken too seriously, however, for it was largely due to the fact that negative perceived growth rates were not reported by our participants. The survey respondents only indicated that the rates were negative. As a result, companies for which this was true had to be dropped from the sample when correlations of realized with perceived past growth rates were made. When we dropped the companies whose past calculated growth rates were negative (in order to put the calculated and perceived growth rates on a similar basis), the correlation coefficients of the calculated with the realized growth rates were raised. For example, with this change the first row of Table 9 would read

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
.30 & .53 & .17 & .42
\end{array}
$$

which compares favorably with the data in Table 7. Similar improvements occurred using the other types of calculated growth rates.
The possibilities of obtaining useful forecasts from simple extrapolation were also examined by calculating growth rates over the four preceding years ${ }^{20}$ for (1) earnings plus depreciation, (2) earnings before taxes, (3) sales, (4) assets, and (5) share prices. The correlations of these growth rates calculated to the end of 1962, both with 1962-1965 and 1963-1965 earnings growth and the growth rates of the same variables, are shown in the first five rows of Table 10. It will be noticed that both the levels and the variation of these correlation coefficients are quite similar to those found for the predictions and perceptions of past growth and the equivalently calculated past growth rates of earnings. There was also no marked tendency for the extrapolations to do better at predicting their own growth rates than the growth rates of normalized earnings, but they tended to be better at predicting their own rates than the growth of actual earnings.
The last two rows of Table 10 show the correlations of the price-earnings ratio and the price-to-normalized-earnings ratio with the actual future growth of earnings. As mentioned earlier, these ratios have implicit in them a forecast of the rate of growth anticipated by the market. We find that, in terms of correlation, the market-determined earnings multiples perform no differently from the other predictors we have considered.
A similar picture emerged when the predictions and perceptions of growth rates of earnings were used to predict the growth that would occur in these same variables through the end of 1965 . With the exception of the growth of price, the performance of the predictions and perceptions were about the same in terms of correlation as those shown when they were used to forecast the growth of normalized earnings. The inequality coefficients were, if anything, slightly lower. For price growth, however, these forecasts had virtually

[^16]TABLE 10
Extrapolations from Oteer Sertes as Predictors of Earnings and Own Growth Rates*
(Correlation Coeppicients)

|  | Growth of Actual Earnings 1962-65 | Growth of Normalized Earnings 1962-65 | Growth of Actual Earnings 1963-65 | Growth of Normalized Earnings 1963-65 | Growth Rate of Corresponding Variable 1962-65 | Growth Rate of Corresponding Variable 1963-65 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| gel | . 11 | . 39 | . 05 | . 27 | . 28 | . 20 |
| $\mathrm{gea}^{2}$ | . 29 | . 21 | . 42 | . 30 | . 24 | 38 |
| $\mathrm{gea}^{\text {a }}$ | . 23 | . 37 | . 15 | . 29 | . 39 | . 31 |
| ges | . 29 | . 46 | . 47 | . 60 | . 63 | . 27 |
| Esb | . 04 | . 34 | $\cdots .03$ | . 20 | -. 06 | . 05 |
| P/E | . 21 | . 25 | . 13 | . 18 | - | - |
| P/NE | . 14 | . 35 | . 08 | . 21 | - | - |

* $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{eI}}$ is growth of earnings plus depreciation
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{e} 2}$ is growth of earnings plus taxes
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{oB}}$ is growth of sales
$\mathrm{g}_{04}$ is growth of assets
$\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{e}}$ is growth of price of stock
$P / E$ is price-earnings ratio at end of 1962
P/NE is price-normalized earmings ratio at end of 1962
The period used for the calculations of the growth rates was 1958-62 and the rates were calculated as

$$
g=\sqrt[4]{V_{62} / V_{58}} \text { where } V_{62} \text { and } V_{88} \text { are the values of the variables. }
$$

no merit, with even poorer performance than they had for the growth of actual earnings.

## V. Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined the characteristics of a small sample of security analysts' predictions of the long-run earnings growth of corporations. The extent of agreement among the different predictors was considered and their forecasting abilities assessed. Evidence has recently accumulated [7] that earnings growth in past periods is not a useful predictor of future earnings growth. The remarkable conclusion of the present study is that the careful estimates of the security analysts participating in our survey, the bases of which are not limited to public information, perform little better than these past growth rates. Moreover, the market price-earnings ratios themselves were not better than either the analysts' forecasts or the past growth rates in forecasting future earnings growth.

We must be cautious, however, in overgeneralizing these results. We did not have data to investigate directly whether the performance of the predictions of growth in the period considered were atypical of the usual forecasting abilities of such forecasts. The question is important, however, since it can be argued that the peculiarities of the expansion that occurred after the date of the forecasts made the period especially difficult to forecast. Moreover, our work is hampered by the fact that only a few firms were able to participate in our survey. It may also be that shorter-term earnings predictions are con-
siderably more successful relative to naive forecasting methods. Fortunately, we are presently collecting additional data that will help shed light on these conjectures and permit a study of the generation of earnings forecasts and their usefulness in security evaluation.

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## EXPECTATIONS AND SHARE PRICES*

## EDWIN I. ELTON, $\dagger$ MARTIN J GRUBER $\dagger$ AND MUSTAFA GULTEKIN $\dagger$

It is generally believed that security prices are deternined by expectations conceming firm and economic variables. Despite this beliet here is very litle research examining expectational data. In this paper we examine how expectations concerning earning per share effect share price. We lirst show that knowledge conceming analyst's forecasts of earnings per share cannot by itself lead to excras relurns. Any information contained in the consensus estimate of earnings per share is already included in thare price Investors or managers who buy high growth stocks where high growth is determined by consensus beliefs should not earn an excess return This is not due to earnings having no effect upon share price since knowledge of actual earnings leads to excess return. Much larger excess returns are earned if one is able to detemine those stocks for which analysts wost underestimate return. Finally, the largest returns can be enaraed by knowing which stocks for which analysts will moke the grealest revision in their estimates. This pattern of results suggests that share price is affected by expectations about earnings per share Given any degree of forecasting ability managers can obtain best results by acting on the dilferentes between their forecasts and concensus forecasis.
(FINANCE; FINANCE-INVESTMENT)

## 1. Introduction

A central theme of modern investment theory is that expectations about firm characteristics are incorporated into security prices. This theme can be found in most investment texts and is utilized in much of the current research in finance. Not only does this belief pervade academia it is commonly held by the financial community.

Surprisingly, in light of the strength of this belief, there is very little empirical evidence to support it. Almost all research which attempts to measure the impact of expectations utilizes not expectational data but historical extrapolations of past data that the authors hope will serve as a proxy for expectational data. This is true for most tests of valuation models as well as almost all tests in the efficient markets literature.

The purpose of this article is to examine the importance of expectations conceming one variable, earnings per share, in the determination of share price. Earnings per share is considered a key variable in determining share price and has been studied extensively in the efficient markets literature. In almost all studies, expectations of future earnings per share are formulated as an extrapolation of past eamings. ${ }^{\text {. }}$ Justification for using historical extrapolation is sometimes found in tests of the accuracy of extrapolated data in forecasting future earnings.

While tests such as those found in [3], [4], and [5] provide some evidence of the relative eccuracy of historical extrapolation versus expectational data as forecasts of the future, they do not address the question of the role of expectations in share price formation. The purpose of this paper is to directly address this question. More
*Aceepied by Vijay S Bawa, Fommer Departmental Editor; received September 20, 1979. This paper has been with the authors 4 months for 3 revisions.

New York University.
${ }^{1}$ Malkiel and Crage [B] used expectational datn on earnings growth in a valuation model. However their sample of expectational data was very limited.
specifically, we will address the question of the role of actual future changes in earnings on stock returns, the role of expected changes in earnings, and finally the role of changes in expectations.
: In addition to examining the importance of expectations and earnings, we briefly explore the issuc of the scale of relums that can be eamed by being "more accurate" than average forecasts, If market prices reflect average expectations, then superior forecasting ability should be rewarded with excess returns. We will explore both the size of these returns and the timing of their occurrence.

## 2. Overview: Variables Examined and Sample Design

The testing of the impact of eamings expectations has awaited the development of a broad consistent data base., L.yneh, Jones and Ryan have constructed a data base which contains one and two-year consensus earnings estimates on all corporations followed by one or more analysts at most major brokerage firms, ${ }^{2}$ Lynch, Jones, and Ryan define the consensus carnings estimate for any stock as a simple arithmetic average of the estimates prepared by all of the analysts following that stock. Given this data bose, a study can be made of the role of average expectations in price formation and in particular the importance of earnings expectations in determining share price.

In order to study the role of expectations, we need some measure of the excess retums that can be earned from knowledge concerning future earaings To examine this, we analyzed the actual growth rate in carnings. The actual growth rate was defined as actual carnings for the forecast year minus actual earnings in the previous fiscal year, divided by actual earnings in the previous fiscal year. This variable is computed only for those firms for which the denominator is positive. This does not bias the results of our tests as the denominator is known at the time this variable is formulated. However, the population of stocks to which our tests apply is restricted. Letting $G$, stand for the growth rate in earnings,

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{t}=\frac{E_{t}-E_{t-1}}{E_{t-1}} \text { for } E_{t-1}>0 \tag{l}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $E_{t}$ is reported enraings per share at time $t$.
Anticipating our results for a moment, we will find that knowledge of actual growth will allow a significant risk adjusted excess return to be earned. This indicates that growth in earnings is an importan! variable affecting share price, and that expectations concerning this varinble are worth studying.

If expectations determine share price, then knowledge of the average value of these expectations should already be incorporated in the share price, and buying on the basis of average expectations should not lead to excess returns. Thus, the second variable we examined was the consensus forecast of the growth rate in per share

[^17]earnings. We call this the forecasted growth rate. It is formulated as the consensus forecast of fiscal year earnings minus the actual eamings in the previous fiscal year divided by the actual carnings that occurred in the previous fiscal year. Since this measure cannot be interpreted for a negative denominator, it is computed only for those companies for which the denominator is positive. To be more explicit, let
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
F G_{1}=\frac{C_{2}-E_{t-1}}{E_{t-1}} \quad \text { for } E_{t-1}>0 \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

where $C_{i}$ is the consensus forecosts of the eamings per share that will occur at time $t$, and $F G_{1}$ is the consensus forecast of the growth rate in eamings per share.

If expectations are important and are incorporated in present prices, then one should observe larger excess returns by having knowledge coneerning the error in the growth estimate, than by knowing actual growth itself. Investment in a firm with high actual growth should not necessarily lead to excess returns unless investors were forecasting low growth. Thus, if expectations are important, knowledge concerning differences between actual growth and forecasted growth should lead to higher excess returns than knowledge concerning growth itself. Thus, the third variable we examine is actunl growth minus forecasted growth. This differential growth can be expressed as

$$
\begin{equation*}
D G_{t}=G_{t}-F G_{t} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since the effect of differences between expectations and realizations is the key phenomena that we wish to study, we have measured this phenomena in two additional ways. The first is the error in the carnings forecast defined as the actual earnings in the forecast year minus the forecast earnings. If we denote this variable by $M_{\text {, for }}$ misestimate in consensus forecast of earnings, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
M_{1}=E_{1}-C_{1} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The second is the percentage forecast error, which is measured as the actunl carnings in the forecast year minus the forecast earnings divided by the absolute value of the actual carnings. If we use \% $M_{i}$ to stand for the percentage, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
\% M_{t}=\frac{E_{t}-C_{t}}{\left|E_{t}\right|} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

While most of our analysis consists of an examination of one year forecasts, we decided to take a brief look at the excess returns associnted with errors in two year forecasts. We duplicated the one-year measures and examined the error in earnings forecast for two years and the percentage error in carnings forecast for two years.

If consensus forecasts are more important than the actunl level of future earnings in determining prices, then one should be able to do a better job of selecting stocks by knowing the change in consensus forecasts than by knowing actual earnings. To test this hypothesis, a variable measuring the percentage adjustment in forecasts over time was used. This variable is formulated as negative of the following quantity: the forecast of earnings prepared for the next (as opposed to this) fiscal year minus the forecast of eamings for the same liscal year made one year later divided by this latter number. To better understand this variable, let,$-{ }_{a} C_{7}$ stand for the consensus forecast for earnings at time $t$ which are produced at time $t-a$, and $(r-n+12) C_{\text {, }}$ stands for the forecast for time $f$ which is produced 12 months later. Then the forecrast revision
denoled by $F R$, can be represented as

$$
\begin{equation*}
F R_{\mathrm{f}}=-\frac{(t-\mathrm{a}) C_{t}-(t-a+12) C_{t}}{(t-a+12) C_{i}} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

## 3n The Sample

The raw dath consisted of a monthly file of one and two-year earnings forecasts prepared in the years 1973, 1974, and 1975. We limited our sample of data in several ways. First, the sample was restricted to firms having fiscal years ending on December 31. By confining our sample to firms with fiscal years ending on the same date, forecasts prepared a certain number of months (e.g., nine) in advance of the end of the fiscal year, fall on the same calnodar date. This procedure assures that the same general economic influences (eg, the economy, the market, etc.) were available to all forecasters at the time forecasts were prepared. The date of December 31 was selected because more companies had fiscal years ending on that date than on any other.

Second, forecasts are restricted to two forecast dates, March and September March was selected because it is the earliest date on which financial data for the previous fiscal year would be reported by most companies. September was selected as a month that is far enough from the first forecast and far enough into the fiscal year that significant evidence on companies' performance during the year should be availableYet it is not so far into the year that earnings are known with certainty. Both dates are used for all variables involving one-year forecasts. However, so few two-year forecasts were available in March that only the September date could be used when examining two-year forecasts.

Finally, because we are interested in the impact of consensus forecasts, the sample was restricted to companies which were followed by three or more analysts. The consensus prepared from less than three forecasts could be idiosyncratic and not typical of broad feelings about the stock.

The final sample consisted of a total of 919 one-year forecasts of the fiscal years 1973, 1974, and 1975 and a total of 710 two-year forecasts of fiscal years 1974, 1975, and 1976. Because of negative earnings, some firms had to be eliminated over several measures. This caused the sample size to fall to as low as 913 and 696 for one and two-year forecasts, respectively, As discussed earlier L.ynch, Jones and Ryan survey most large brokerage firms. Since we have included all stocks followed by three or more analysts, the group of stocks in our sample can be considered a universe of all stocks with important analyst interest. Since brokerage firms are interested in providing information to their customers, our sample should include most stocks of major institutional interest.

## 4. Methodology

The first step in our procedure was for each time period studied (March and September) and for each year to rank all stocks on each variable and to divide the stocks into deciles by each variable. For example, we formed deciles for the forecasted growth rates made in September 1973 with the first decile containing the $10 \%$ of the stocks with the highest forecasted growth rate. For each decile, we calculated the average value of the variable being studied (in this case, forecasted growth),

In order to determine whether certain types of information lead to excess returns, it is necessary to have a measure of what return is expected. If we have a measure of
expected return, then excess return is the difference between actunl return and expected return. In order to measure expected return, we use the market model. The market model is a relationship between the return on a security and the retum on a market index.

Let

1. $r_{1}$ be the return on portiolio $i$ in period $t_{n}$
2. $r_{\text {mut }}$ be the return on the market in period $t$.
3. $\alpha_{i}$ and $\beta_{i}$ be parameters for portfolio $i$.
4. $e_{t}$, be deviations from the model.

The market model is:

$$
r_{t t}=\alpha_{t}+\beta_{i} r_{n t}+e_{t}
$$

Using the market model leads to expected returns being determined by the security's normal relationship with the market ( $\beta_{l}$ ), the market return in the period ( $r_{m}$ ) and the security's average nonmarket return ( $\alpha_{i}$ ) Using the market model excess return is

$$
r_{t}-\left(\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i} r_{m s}\right)
$$

Although the market model is frequently used in finance, there are some problens with ils use that can lead to biased tests. First there is measurement error in the coefficients and if this varies systematically with the test statistic, it can lead to an appearance of a relationship when none exists. This was guarded against in several ways.
First we calculated the market model for the deciles discussed carlier. Using grouped data is one way of reducing the measurement error. The one variable where measurement error can be especially bothersome is beta. As Blume [1] has shown the error in measuring beta varies systematically with its difference from one. The use of grouped data helps. In addition, we examined the individunl betas on the groups. There was no systematic pattern, nor did any group beta differ very much from one (the range was 0.93 to I.09). Given this result, we judged that any further adjustment in beta was unnecessary, In the original CAPM tests grouping data was common. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy [7] and Ross and Roll [9] have criticized this on the grounds that the CAPM is a theory of the pricing of single assets and as such has to be shown to explain differences in asset returns. Our purpose here is not to test CAPM but rather to cxamine the effect of expectations on share price. Hence grouping is a reasonable procedure for dealing with measurement error-

The second problem in the use of the market model is its difference from a capital asset pricing model. There are numerous general cquilibrium models that have been derived. If one of these ultimately is shown to be correct, then better estimates of returns should be obtained by using that model rather than the market model. Brennan [2] has shown that the use of alternative models can make some difference. However, in this study the magnitude of the results, the grouping techniques, and the spread in the $\beta_{i}$ 's should mean that there is minimal chance of this source of potential bias explaining the results. ${ }^{3}$ For example, assuming that the beta for each group was equal to one would not change any of our conclusions.

[^18]The market model was estimated by treating each decile as an equally weighted portfolio of the stocks which composed it and estimating the market model parameters for each decile. The market index we used was the Standard and Poor's index adjusted for dividends. The parameters of the model yere estimated in each case using 60 monthly observations on retums up to and including the forecast month. The data dissemination procedure followed by Lynch Jones and Ryan means that forecasts are in the hands of the subseriber by the end of the month. The estimated parameters of the market model were then used in conjunction with actual market returns to forecast normal risk adjusted returns for each of the deciles during each of the 24 months after the forecast month. The risk adjusted retums in each month were close to but not exactly equal to zero. This should not be surprising to the reader. The sum of the residuals in any one month should equal zero only if they are weighted in market proportions and include all stocks in the index. Oor sample meets neither of these conditions. We adjusted our residuals to have a mean (across all deciles) of zero for ease of presentation. Our primary statistical lest is a rank correlation test, subtracting a constant from each entry can not effect the rank. Thus our adjustment had very litue effect on the numbers reported and had no effect on their statistical significance or on our conclusions.

As discussed earier, we calculated risk adjusted excess returns for each of the deciles for each of the variables for the 24 months after the forecast month. In the case of the March data we calculated risk adjusted excess returns from April on and in the case of September from October on. This was done for each of the three years for which we had data. We combined these years and have reported the average risk adjusted return across the three years for each decile.

To aid in understanding the results, we report the sum of the risk adjusted excess retums from the month after the forecast month to the month under consideration, rather than reporting the risk adjusted excess returns in any one month ${ }^{4}$ Thus, for March forecasts, the entry in month 3 is the sum of the risk adjusted excess returns earned in April, May, and June. This allows the reader to more easily deternine the cumulative effect of any influence.

After examining the data we determined that there were no further effects after month 15 for March data and month 9 for September data. Thus, we have not reported results beyond these dates.

In reporting results we have combined the deciles in two ways. First, we report the cumulative risk adjusted excess returns in the upper $30 \%$, middle $40 \%$, and lowest $30 \%$ of firms ranked on each variable. Second, we report the cumulative risk adjusted excess returns in the upper $50 \%$. Since the risk adjusted excess returns add to zero, across all deciles the risk adjusted excess return in the upper $50 \%$ is the negative of the lowest $50 \%$. We chose to present the data in this way since using the ungrouped deciles increases the size of the tables substantially without providing additional insights.
The reader can judge the economic significance of the results by examining the cumulative residuals in Tables 1 through 4. These excess returns are reported before
${ }^{4}$ Many authors aceumulate residuals by calcuiating the product of one plus the recidualy. The justifieation for this is that return over $N$ periods is the product of the $N$ oae period returns. There is a difficulify with this procedure The null hypotheis is that the residuals nverage zero. If this hypothesis is true, it is easy to show that the product of one plas the one period residuals minus one becomes negative and significuntly so as $N$ gets large The sum of the residuals is zero under the null hypothesis and devintions from zero are indications of real effects.
table 2
Time Series of Cumulative Exceur Returnx for the

|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Upper |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30\% | 0.0187 | 0.0272 | 0.0421 | 0.0429 | 0.0466 | 0.0506 | 0.0518 | 0.0638 | 0.0680 |
| Middle |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40\% | 0.0100 | 0.0092 | 0.0014 | $-0.0035$ | $-0.0036$ | -0.0045 | -0.0069 | -0,0065 | -0.0034 |
| Lower |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30\% | -0.0318 | -0.0394 | -0,0441 | -0.0384 | -0.0421 | -0.0445 | -0.0526 | -0.0550 | -0.0635 |
| Rank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corre- | $0.77 *$ | $0.88{ }^{*}$ | 0.84* | $0.88 *$ | 0.99* | 0.92* | 0.95* | 0.94* | 0.85* |
| bation ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

*Rank correlation cotflicients are computed across deciles.

- Indicates signilicance at t\% level.
*"Indicates significance a! 5 石 level.

TABLE 3
Exress Returns for Months 7 and 13 March Dota

*Rank Correiation coelficients are computed across deciles.

- Indicates aignificance at the $1 \%$ level.
"Indicates siknifiennee al the $5 \%$ level.
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table 4

|  | Fortantid Orowlh Equalion (1) |  <br> Crowth <br> Equation (2) | Error in Crowth Equatos (3) | Etror th Foremst (One Year) Equation (4) | Erma In Forcous: (Ons Ycar Equation (5) | Eftor in Forezent (Two Yeant) Equation (4) | Errar is Forcoss (Twa Yeans) Equastion (5) | Fonteas Revition Equation (6) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Uppet 307 | 0.0135 | 0.0399 | 0.0618 | 0.0367 | a.0.52 | 0.0773 | 00192 | 0.8889 |
| Middte 403 | -0.0.0779 | -0.0161 | - 0.00089 | -0.0053 | -0.0084 | -0.0023 | -0.0062 | -0.0141 |
| Luwer 308 | -0.0023 | -0.citc | - 0.0526 | - 00497 | - 0.0851 | -0.0741 | -0.0711 | - 1 2070 |
| Upper $50 \%$ | 0.0073 | 0.0245 | aches | 0.0102 | 0.0409 | 0.0496 | 0.0498 | 0.0512 |
| Rasik Certation' | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.95* | 0.95* | 0.39* | 0.56 | 0.98 ${ }^{\text {- }}$ | 0.83* |

- Rank carriation coetricienta are computed scrons decilics.
- Jodionta aguilicasce it the it fevel.

TABLE 5
Mean Valuer for Each Variable

|  | Equnt (1) <br> Forecatird Orowlh | Еqши (2) <br> Actux] <br> Orowh | 텨unt (1) <br> Etrot to <br> Orowth | Equit. (4) <br> Fortins <br> Emor (1 yn) | Equat 15) <br> Perezatuse <br> Format <br> Ensor (1 yz) | Equat (4) <br>  <br> Forecat <br> Entis (2 yTs) | Equati (5) <br> Factonlage <br> Forecast <br> Extor (2 yan) | Equat. (5) <br> Ferceats <br> Revidion |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afarch Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Upper 10\% | 56614 | 10743\% | 63.878 | 1.05\% | 26.24\% |  |  |  |
| Madtie 40\% | 63 | 277 | 135 | 0.01 | --0.32 |  |  |  |
| Lowte 30\% | -9.18 | - $\mathcal{H} .95$ | -36. 38 | l.0s | - 159.26 |  |  |  |
| Sept. Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Upper 30\% | 818 | 98.03\% | 26.36\% | 051\% | $14.72 \%$ | $0.13 \%$ | 26.74\% | 43.76\% |
| Ntidalc 403 | 934 | 132 | -0.17 | -0.07 | -0.13 | -0.08 | -3.75 | 1.19 |
| Lower 203 | $-15.75$ | -3205 | -27.02 | $-0.67$ | -94,0! | $-\mathrm{t} .64$ | -153.79 | -2734 |

transaction costs. While estimates of round trip transaction costs differ, a reasonable estimate is in the range of two to four percent, Thus, cumulative residuals in excess of 4\% can be accepted as of economic significance.

It is also logical to examine whether the relationship between any of the variables under study and excess return is stntistically significant. This was examined by computing Spearman rank order correlation coefficient between the decile and the rank order of the cumulative excess return for each decile A statistically significant rank order correlation cocificient would indicate that there was a significant relationship between the variable under study and cumulative excess returns. Furthermore, by using a nomparametric test this statement is free of any distributional assumptions (across deciles) about the pattern of excess returns and/or the variables under study. Note that when we compute, the statistical signilicance of the cumulated residuals in successive periods these tests are not independent.

Table 5 presents the average values for each variable studied in this paper.

## 5. Results

The first question to analyze is: Can an investor eam excess retums by selecting stocks on the basis of the conseasus growth rate forccasted by security analysts (Equation (2))? The answer is no. There is no discernable pattern in the cumulative excess returns, In some months the stocks for which high growth was forecasted had positive risk adjusted cumulative excess returns; in other months they had negative ones. As a further check we perfonmed a rank order correlation test on the deciles in
each month. The rank order correlation between forecasted growth and risk adjusted cumulative excess return was never significantly different from zero at the $1 \%$ level and only significantly different from zero from the $5 \%$ level in two months. In the months it was significant it was negative, which is opposite to what one would expect if growth estimates contained information which was not incorporated in stock prices. The lack of a pattern was even more evident in the September data. In no month was the cumulative excess return significantly different from zero at even the $5 \%$ level and the average cumulative excess return varied frequently from positive to negative. The results for each individual month is not reported in the paper but the results for selected months can be seen by examining Tables 3 and 4

This lack of risk adjusted excess returns occurs even though the analysts were projecting some very large growth rates. In September the analysts were projecting that the average growth mate for the top decile would be over $100 \%$ and the growth rate in the second decile would be $33 \%$. In contrast the earnings of stacks in the last decile were expected to decline by $34 \%$.

A number of financial institutions purchase growth stocks as an investment strategy. In the three years we examined, pursuing such a strategy based on consensus estimates would not have led to superior returns, growth forecasts were already incorporated in the security prices. This is what one would expect if expectations are incorporated into security price.

On the other hand, our results show that growth is an important determinant of security returns. Investors with perfect forecasting ability could make risk adjusted excess returns. The results for individual months are not reported. However, the results for selected months, can be seen by examining Tables 3 and 4 . From month 4 on, the rank order of excess returns for the deciles is significant at the $1 \%$ level. The excess return builds up to $7.23 \%$ for the upper $30 \%$ of all stocks by month 9 . It then declines and builds up again to over 7\%. A similar but less distinct pattera can be seen by examining the lowest $30 \%$.

The risk adjusted excess returns from possessing perfect forecasting ability in September are much lower than they were from possessing perfect forecasting ability in March. Furthermore in most months the rank order of the deciles is insignificant at the $1 \%$ level (although it's still sometimes significant at the $5 \%$ level). This is what one would expect. By September investors have a much better idea of actual growth than they do in March.

If prices reflect consensus forecasts, then knowing the error in the consensus estimate of growth should lead to larger profits than just knowing actual growth. How large is the mis-estimate of actual growth by the analysts? In March, the average error for the $30 \%$ of the companics for which earnings growth was most underestimated was $63.6 \%$, while the average error for the $30 \%$ of the companies for which growth was most overestimated was $38.9 \%$. The corresponding numbers for September forceasts are $26.4 \%$ and $20.3 \%$. It is apparent that while there are still large size errors in the September forecasts, the size of the crror has decreased markedly between March and September. Analysts can improve the accuracy of their forecasts as interim earnings reports or as other information comes out and more information is available on company performance.

Tables I and 2 show the time series of cumulative risk adjusted excess return for the errors in the March and September estimates (Equation (3)). The rank order of the deciles is significant from the first month for both the September and March estimates.

The risk adjusted excess returns build up very quickly in both cases. For the March forecasts, the risk adjusted excess returns are close to $7 \%$ by month 6 (September), the major increase occurring in month 5 . Once again, the risk adjusted excess retums have a temporary peak in month 9 and then increase to a global peak in month 13. This rapid build-up is consistent with information about true earnings growth being disseminated over time and the market correctiy incorporating the information

Even in September investors with a better estimate of growth than the consensus had an opportunity for excess profits. Notice that while knowledge of the forecast error as of September allows an excess profit to be eamed, perfect forecast ability did not allow an excess profit to be eamed. This suggests that on average forecasts are accurate enough in September that excess profits can be carned only by isolating those cases where forecasted growth is very much different than actual
The time pattern for all variables is very similar with March forecasts producing excess returns which level out after month 13 and September forecasts producing excess returns which level out after month 7 . Consequenlly, we shall only report results for these months. The cumulated excess returns in these months are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 . In addition, in Table 3 we show the risk adjusted cumulative excess relurns 7 months after the March forecasts for comparison with the effect 7 months after the September forecast.

Note that among the variables discussed so far for both March and September forecasts, the risk adjusted excess return was highest for the error in the growth rate, next highest for actual growth and close to zero for the forccasted growth. What an investor desirous of making excess profits should be most concerned with is finding securities where his forecasts are not only good in the sense of being right but where they are both accurate and different from the consensus.

The same conclusion can be reached by examining errors in the earnings estimates. Tables 3 and 4 present the analysis of excess returns for the error in forecast earnings and the percentage error in earnings forecasts for one year forecasts as of March and September and two-year forecasts as of September. In each case the excess returns appear to be sufficient to cover transaction costs and the rank order correlation coefficient is significant at the $1 \%$ level.

Furthermore, the amount of excess returns that can be earned vary with the magnitude of the forecast error. The two-year estimates made in September and the one-year estimates made in March were considerably less accurate than the one-year forecast made in September. They also produced higher risk adjusted excess returns. However, even in September there is a considerable forecast error in year-end earnings. In September, the percentage forecast error was $26 \%$ for the top decile, $11.6 \%$ in the next decile, and $6.3 \%$ in the next. These crrors, while lower, were still significant enough to lead to an excess risk adjusted retum.

We have now examined evidence that consensus lorecasts are incorporated into price. Further, we have seen that the ability to forecast with more accuracy than the consensus forecast can lead to an excess risk adjusted return. If consensus forecasts play a major role in price determination, then the ability to forecast consensus forecasts themselves should lead to a superior retum. Since we have estimates of the earnings for each company made 15 months in advance (the two-year forecast as of September) and estimates of the same carnings made 12 months later (one-year forecast made in September of the following year), we can mensure the impact of being able to forecast the change in the estimate (Equation (6)). As shown in Table 4, the

TABLE 6
Error in Growth*
(Forecast-actual)

| Percentage of Firms eliminated | Excess return if completely accurate | Excess reium if $50 \%$ error | Excess return it 90\% error |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $0 \%$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 10\% | 1.56 | 0.78 | 0.16 |
| 20\% | 2.88 | 1.44 | 029 |
| 30\% | 3.07 | 1.53 | 0.31 |
| 40\% | 4.32 | 2.16 | 0.43 |
| $50 \%$ | 5.77 | 2.88 | 0.58 |
| 60\% | 7.35 | 3.67 | 0.74 |
| 70\% | 9.08 | 454 | 0.91 |
| 80\% | 9.90 | 4.95 | 0.99 |
| 90\% | 10.42 | 5.21 | 1.04 |

- Forecass of one year growth rates prepared in March Cumblative returns calculated as of April of the following year
retums from being able to estimate forecast revision are substantion. In fact, the return from forecasting future forecasts themselves is higher than the return from being able to forecast actual eamings. This is consistent with our other evidence that it is consensus forecasts which determine security prices.
All of the results presented in this section could be used to analyze the amount of accuracy necessary to earn excess returns. Assume the analysts can identify firms that are in various deciles with respect to the error in estimated earnings. For example, suppose he could identify the $10 \%$ of the firms with the largest forecast error. Column 2 of Table 6 shows the cumulative excess return he would carn. Columns 3 and 4 assumes that he identifies the members of a decile with error Column 3 assumes that $50 \%$ of the time he identifies a firm as a member of a decile he is randomly selecting from among all firms and $50 \%$ of the time he is accurate. Column 4 assumes that $90 \%$ of the time he is randomly selecting from all firms.
For example, if an analyst is attempting to select from among the $30 \%$ of the firms for which the consensus forecast most underestimate true earnings, and he is right $50 \%$ of the lime, he will earn an excess risk adjusted return of $4.54 \%$.

As can be seen from an examination of the table, a little bit of information leads to substantial cumulative excess returns. These kinds of excess returns provide some justification for the effort undertaken by many organizations to forecast earnings.

## 6. Conclusions

In this study we present evidence in support of the hypothesis that expectations are incorporated into security prices. In addition, we have analyzed the timing and size of returns from forecasts which are more accurate than the consensus. Since prices reflect consensus forecasts, the payoff from being accurate in forecasting is increased markedly as the consensus forecast becomes inaccurate. Finally, we have demonstrated that the payoff from being able to forecast the consensus estimate is higher than the payoff from being able to forecast earnings. The market reacts to expectational data. But despite this, or rather because of it Lord Keynes [6] appears to have been right when he likened professional investing to participating in a newspaper contest on a beauty
contest, where ". . each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of other
competitors, all of whom are looking at the contest from the same point of view."
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# Choice among methods of estimating share yield 


#### Abstract

The search for the growth component in the discounted cash flow model.


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 also called its expected return or required return, is an important statistic in finance. Firms use it in choosing among investment opportunities and financing alternatives, and investors use it in making portfolio decisions. Nevertheless, the yield at which a share is selling is a difficult quantity to measure, which has limited its use in the practice of finance. This paper develops and tests a basis for choice among alternative methods of estimating a share's yield

A share's yield, like a bond's yield, is the discount rate that equates its expected future payments with its current price. A bond's yield is easy to measure under the common practice of ignoring default risk, as the future payments are then known with certainty. The future payments on a share, however, are dividends and market price, and these payments are uncertain.

The common practice is to represent these future dividend payments with estimates of two numbers: One is the coming dividend, and the other is a growth rate. The latter can be an estimate of the longrun growth rate in the dividend or of the growth rate in price over the coming period. In the latter case, the estimate is called the expected holding-period return (EHPR); in the former case, it is called the discounted cash flow yield (DCFY). ${ }^{1}$ In either case, the estimate of a share's yield reduces to the sum of its dividend yield and a future growth rate, with the latter inferred in some way from historical data.

There is a wide variety of acceptable methods
for using historical data to estimate future growth This variation in method is illustrated in the testimony of expert witnesses before public utility commissions on the fair return for a public utility. In these cases, the estimates and the methods used are a matter of public record. Some idea of the various methods can be found in Morin (1984) and Kolbe, Read, and Hall (1984). The performance of alternative estimating methods has been examined in Gordon (1974), Kolbe, Read, and Hall (1984), Brigham, Shome, and Vinson (1985), and Harris (1986)

We have derived our basis for comparing the accuracy of alternative methods for estimating the DCFY on a share from the generally accepted propositions that yield should vary according to risk, and that beta is the best estimate of risk. Hence, the DCFY should vary among shares with beta, and, between two methods for estimating growth, the superior method is the one for which the variation in yield among shares is explained better by the variation in beta among the shares.

First we present simple, plausible, and objective measurement rules for implementing four popular and/or attractive methods for estimating the DCFY. We then describe how sample statistics may be used to judge the accuracy of each method. We also describe how the CAPM model has been used to estimate share yield and explain why we do not compare it with the various DCFY methods. The following section carries out the comparison with samples of utility and industrial shares, and the last section pre-
sents the conclusions that may be drawn from the findings.

## ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT <br> RULES FOR A SHARE'S YIELD

Under the DCF method or model for estimating the expected return on a stock, the yield for the jth stock is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{DCFY}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{DYD}_{\mathrm{k}}+\mathrm{GR}_{\mathrm{i}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:

$$
\begin{aligned}
D C F Y_{i} & =\text { DCF yield on the } j \text { th stock at time } t, \\
D Y D_{13} & =\text { dividend yield on the } j \text { th stock at time } t, \\
& \text { and }
\end{aligned}
$$

$\mathrm{GR}_{\mathrm{jt}}=$ long-run growth rate in the dividend on the jth stock that investors expect at time t.

In what follows, we omit the time and firm subscripts on the variables when they are not required. Also, DCFY will refer to the unknown true yield on a share.

The difficult problem in arriving at the DCFY is estimation of the long-run growth rate that investors expect. Four estimates of that quantity are:
$E G R=$ rate of growth in earnings per share over a prior time period, usually the last five years;
DGR $=$ rate of growth in dividend per share over a prior time period, usually the last five years;
FRG $=$ consensus among security analyst forecasts of the growth rate in earnings, over the next five years; and
$B R G=$ an average over the prior five years of the product of the retention rate $b$ and rate of return on common equity $r$ on a stock.

The estimate of share yield that incorporates each of these estimates of growth is denoted KEGR, KDGR, KFRG, and KBRG, respectively.

A case can be made for each of the four methods for estimating growth KEGR, KDGR, and KBRG have been widely used in public utility testimony and in research on stock valuation models. The rationale for KEGR is the belief that the past growth rate in earnings is the best predictor of future growth in earnings and dividends. The rationale for KDGR is that the future growth rate in dividends is the statistic we want to estimate, and the past dividend record is free of the noise in past earnings. ${ }^{2}$ The rationale for KBRG is that all variables will grow at this rate if the firm earns r and retains b. Furthermore, as Gordon and Gould (1980) show, KEGR and KDGR will be biased in one direction or another if $r$ and $b$ have changed over the last five years. As for KFRG, security analysts
are professionals employed to forecast future performance; their forecasts are widely accepted by investors. The IBES collection of forecast growth rates of security analysts compiled by Lynch, Jones, and Ryan has increased the popularity of this estimate

As stated earlier, we may also take the yield on a share as the sum of the dividend yield and the expected rate of growth in price over the coming period. This estimate of a share's yield is widely used in testing the CAPM, with the average HPR over the prior five years commonly used in such empirical work. On the other hand, this estimate of a share's yield varies so widely among firms and over time as to be patently in error as an estimate of share yield. ${ }^{3}$

## BASIS OF COMPARISON

To compare the accuracy of the four estimates of the DCFY stated above, we regress the data under each estimate on beta for a sample of shares. If KEGR is the estimate,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{KEGR}_{i}=\alpha_{\theta}+\alpha_{i} \text { BETA }_{i}+\epsilon_{i} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The rationale for this expression lies in the risk premium theory of share yield, where the share yield is equal to the interest rate plus a risk premium that varies with the share's relative risk. Hence, if BETA is an error-free index of relative risk, $\alpha_{0}$ is equal to the interest rate, and $\alpha_{1}$ is the risk premium on the market portfolio or standard share. ${ }^{\text {4 }}$

The higher the correlation between KEGR and BETA, assuming that $\alpha_{1}$ is positive, the greater the confidence we may have in KEGR as an estimate of DCFY. We cannot rely solely on the correlation, though, in selecting among the methods for estimating DCFY. Errors in KEGR as a basis for estimating the DCFY on the jth share have random and systematic components. The former is $\epsilon_{\mathrm{i}}$, and its average value can be taken as the root mean square error of the regression (MSE). The larger the root MSE of the regression, the less attractive KEGR is as an estimate of share yield, because the error makes the problem of choice between $K E G R_{i}$ and KEGR $_{i}-\epsilon_{i}$ more acute (That problem will be discussed shortly.)

The systematic error is the difference between the unknown true yield on the $j$ th share, DCFY ${ }_{j}$, and the value predicted by Equation (2). There is no obvious measure of the systematic error, as we do not know DCFY ${ }_{i}$, but sample values of $\alpha_{0}$ may provide information on its average value. The difference between $\alpha_{0}$ and the interest rate is an indicator of systematic error, because the difference is zero under the risk premium theory. Error in the measurement of BETA biases $\alpha_{0}$ upward, but, with the same BETA for each share used in all four regressions, differences in $\alpha_{0}$ are indicators of systematic error ${ }^{5}$

In addition to regression statistics, the sample mean and standard deviation of KEGR is a source of information on its accuracy as a method for the estimation of DCFY. If the mean departs radically from the long-term bond rate, or if the standard deviation indicates an unreasonable range of variation among shares, the accuracy of the method is open to question. Also, the sample mean may be a source of information on the systematic error for a method of estimation. Hence, sample values for the mean, standard deviation, correlation, root MSE, and constant term all contribute to a judgment on a method's accuracy for estimating the DCFY on a share. Unfortunately, there is no simple criterion for choice among the alternatives.

Once a conclusion is reached on the most accurate method for estimating DCFY - say, KEGR we then have the problem of choice between KEGR; and $\mathrm{KEGR}_{\mathrm{j}}-\epsilon_{\mathrm{i}}$ for the $j$ th share. If the random error in $\mathrm{KEGR}_{\mathrm{j}}$ is due to error in its measurement for the jth share; we simply use the value predicted by Equation (2), which is $\mathrm{KEGR}_{\mathrm{j}}-\epsilon_{\mathrm{i}}$. On the other hand, KEGR and DCFY may vary among shares with other (omitted) variables as well as BETA, in which case $\epsilon_{i}$ is also due to the omitted variables, and $\mathrm{KEGR}_{;}$may be the better estimate of DCFY. Unfortunately, we have no basis for choice among these two hypotheses, and the smaller the root MSE the less troublesome the problem of choice between them.

A more favorable tax treatment of capital gains over dividends should make investors prefer capital gains to dividends. As Brennan (1973) has shown, the yield investors require on a share would then vary with the excess of its dividend yield over the interest rate. To recognize this, Equation (2) becomes

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{KEGR}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} \mathrm{BETA}_{1}+\alpha_{2} \mathrm{DMI}_{4}+\epsilon_{i} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

with $\mathrm{DMI}_{1}$ the excess of the dividend yield over the interest rate for the $j$ th firm. Although the tax effect should make $\alpha_{2}$ positive, its information in DMI on share risk would tend to make $\alpha_{2}$ negative. That is, dividend yield varies inversely with expected growth, and we would find $\alpha_{2}$ negative insofar as growth is risky. To the extent that these two influences of the dividend yield offset each other, $\alpha_{2}$ will tend toward zero.

The CAPM theory of how expected return varies among shares has been proposed as an alternative to the DCF model for measuring yield. Its value for the jth stock is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{EHPR}_{\mathrm{t}}=\mathrm{INTR}+\mathrm{BETA}_{1}\left[\mathrm{EHPR}_{m}-\mathrm{INTR}\right]_{1} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:
$\begin{aligned} E H P R\end{aligned}=\underset{ }{ } \begin{aligned} & \text { expected holding-period return on the } \\ & j \text { share, }\end{aligned}$

INTR = one-period risk-free interest rate,
$E H P R_{r n}=$ expected holding-period return on the market portfolio.

There is an important difference between this CAPM model of share yield and the DCF model represented by Equation (1). The latter is merely an instrument for measuring share yield: There is nothing in the DCF model that explains the variation in yield among shares. The CAPM, on the other hand, is a theory on why and how yield varies among shares, but one must go outside of the theory to estimate the variables on the right-hand side of Equation (4). Given rules for estimating the variables, EHPR and BETA, empirical work then provides a joint test of the theory and the estimating rules, such as we are carrying out here. ${ }^{6}$

The CAPM nonetheless has been used to estimate share yield in testimony before regulatory commissions by assigning numbers to each of the quantities on the right-hand side of Equation (4) For INTR, a long-term bond yield is sometimes used instead of a one-period rate. BETA is estimated by conventional methods.

The big problem is the expected return on the market portfolio. Here the practice has been to use the average realized risk premium over a period of about fifty years as the estimate of $\mathrm{EHPR}_{m}-$ INTR in Equation (4). Although the implicit assumption is that the risk premium is a constant over time, we would expect the premium to change from one period to the next for various reasons, among them changes in the interest rate, the risk premium on the market portfolio, and the relative taxation of interest and share income Hence, this estimate of share yield is more or less in error at any particular time, but we have no way of estimating this error and comparing the method with the others.

## COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE

We carried out our empirical work with a sample of 75 large electric and gas utility firms and a sample of 244 firms that includes 169 industrial firms drawn from the S\&P 400. We obtained share yield under the four methods for estimating it as of the start of the year for the years 1984, 1985, and 1986

For the explanatory variables, BETA for each share on each date was obtained by regrossing the monthly HPRs for the share on the monthly HPRs for the S\&P 500 over the prior five years. DMI for a share is its dividend yield less the interest rate on the onemonth Treasury bill at the start of each year. EGR and $D G R$ are the growth rates in earnings and in dividends per share, respectively, over the prior five years as reported on the Value Line Tape, BRG is a weighted
average of the retention growth rates over the prior five years, ${ }^{7}$ and FRG is the average of forecast growth rates in earnings over the next five years reported by IBES. The corresponding estimates of share yield were obtained by adding the dividend yield at the start of each year to the estimate of growth.

Table 1 presents the statistics that we obtained with KBRG and KFRG as the estimates of DCFY for the sample of utility shares and of all shares. The means of KBRG for the utility shares seems reasonable, with the interest rate on ten-year government bonds the standard of comparison, the latter being $11.67 \%, 10.43 \%$, and $9.19 \%$ at the start of 1984, 1985, and 1986, respectively. ${ }^{8}$ The standard deviations for KBRG are small enough to make its range of variation well within the bounds of reason. The lower means for all shares reveal that the means for industrial shares are below the means for utility shares. ${ }^{9}$ This casts doubt on the accuracy of KBRG as a basis for estimating the DCFY on industrial shares, because industrials are riskier than utility shares.

The beta model explains none of the variation in KBRG among utility shares, but the two-factor
model is a substantial improvement. The DMI coefficient, $\alpha_{2}$, is positive and significant in every year, meaning that the unfavorable tax effect of a high dividend yield dominates the favorable risk effect. The coefficient on BETA is positive and significant in two of the three years. The only disturbing feature of the data is the sharp fall in $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ and the corresponding rise in the root MSE relative to the standard deviation of KBRG as we go from 1984 to 1986.

The KBRG statistics for all shares are substantially inferior to the utility share statistics. This forces the unhappy conclusion that, for industrial shares, BETA is a poor measure of risk, or KBRG is a poor measure of DCFY, or both.

The KFRG statistics for the utility sample are superior to the KBRG statistics. The means are reasonable under the two criteria of being above the interest rate and moving with it The range of variation of KFRG suggested by its standard deviations seems reasonable. The statistics for the beta model are a slight improvement on the corresponding statistics for KBRG. Furthermore, the two-factor model does a good job of explaining the variation in KFRG among

TABLE 1
Sample and Regression Statistics for KBRG and KFRG, Utility Shares and All Shares, 1984, 1985, and 1986

|  | KBRG |  |  | KFRG |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|  | UTHLITY SHARES (75) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean | 1484 | 1438 | 12.93 | 1564 | 14.56 | 12.93 |
| Standard Deviation | 251 | 187 | 180 | 226 | 1.43 | 142 |
| Beta Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 1426 | 1396 | 13.05 | 1514 | 13.48 | 12.74 |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 144 | 1.21 | -0.28 | 125 | 309 | 0.42 |
| t-statistic | (097) | (12) | (0.19) | (093) | (414) | (037) |
| Root MSE | 252 | 187 | 1.81 | 226 | 129 | 1.43 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0013 | 0017 | 0.001 | 0012 | 0.190 | 0.002 |
| Two-Factor Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 12.45 | 1275 | 12.42 | 1330 | 12.46 | 1197 |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 3.45 | 211 | 0.11 | 328 | 3.85 | 089 |
| ${ }_{\text {t-statistic }}$ | (313) | (2.19) | (0.08) | (3.83) | (6.33) | (088) |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 068 | 045 | 034 | 068 | 0.38 | 041 |
| t-statistic | (822) | (488) | (281) | (10 73) | (6.52) | (4.65) |
| Root MSE | 1.82 | 163 | 1.73 | 141 | 103 | 126 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0491 | 0262 | 0.100 | 0620 | 0491 | 0.232 |
|  | ALL SHARES (244) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean | 1298 | 13.19 | 11.86 | 16.17 | 1587 | 1431 |
| Standard Deviation | 386 | 321 | 3.52 | 2.60 | 2.32 | 2.30 |
| Beta Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 1500 | 1471 | 13.90 | 15.56 | 14.50 | 12.57 |
| $a_{1}$ | -247 | -191 | -2.40 | 074 | 1.72 | 2.05 |
| t-5tatistic | (423) | (4 15) | (4.25) | (1.83) | (5.29) | (570) |
| Root MSE | 373 | 3.10 | 3.40 | 259 | 2.20 | 216 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0069 | 0066 | 0.069 | 0014 | 0.104 | 0.118 |
| Two-Factor Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 14.34 | 14.42 | 1395 | 1540 | 14.61 | 12.75 |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 0.09 | -1.18 | -251 | 137 | 1.44 | 161 |
| t-statistic | (013) | (2.04) | (3 45) | (2.69) | (3.52) | (3 49) |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 048 | 017 | -002 | 012 | $-0.06$ | -0.10 |
| t-statistic | (6.04) | (209) | (0.24) | (201) | (1.12) | (153) |
| Root MSE | 349 | 308 | 3.41 | 2.57 | 2.20 | 216 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0191 | 0.083 | 0.070 | 0.030 | 0.108 | 0127 |

utility shares. The $R^{2} s$ are higher here than for KBRG in every year. Finally, $\alpha_{2}$ is positive and significant in every year, and $\alpha_{1}$ is not significant only in 1986

The implicit means of KFRG for the industrial shares seem high but not beyond reason. On the other hand, the regression statistics for the all-shares sample are not good, which leads to the same unhappy conclusion for industrial shares as we reached for KBRG

Table 2 presents the statistics that we obtained using KEGR and KDGR as estimates of the DCFY on the shares in our samples. Comparison of the regression statistics with those in Table 1 reveals that KEGR and KDGR, particularly the former, fall short by a wide margin of the performance of KBRG and KFRG as estimates of the DCFY on a share.

## CONCLUSION

We have compared the accuracy of four methods for estimating the growth component of the discounted cash flow yield on a share: past growth rate in earnings (KEGR), past growth rate in dividends (KDGR), past retention growth rate (KBRG), and fore-
casts of growth by security analysts (KFRG). Criteria for the comparison were the reasonableness of sample means and standard deviations and the success of beta and dividend yield in explaining the variation in DCF yield among shares. For our sample of utility shares, KFRG performed well, with KBRG, KDGR, and KEGR following in that order, and with KEGR a distant fourth. If we had used past growth in price, it would have been an even more distant fifth. Nevertheless, none of the four estimates of growth performed well under the criteria for a sample that included industrial shares.

Before closing, we have three observations to make. First, the superior performance by KFRG should come as no surprise All four estimates of growth rely upon past data, but in the case of KFRG a larger body of past data is used, filtered through a group of security analysts who adjust for abnormalities that are not considered relevant for future growth. We assume this is done by any analyst who develops retention growth estimates of yield for a firm. If we had done this for all seventy-five firms in our utility sample, it is likely that the correlations

TABLE 2
Sample and Regression Statistics for KEGR and KDGR,
Utility Shares and All Shares, 1984, 1985, and 1986

|  | KEGR |  |  | KDCR |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|  | UTILIIY SHARES (75) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean | 1616 | 032 | 14.91 | 1649 | 1576 | 14.13 |
| Standard Deviation | 331 | 3.47 | 466 | 312 | 2.41 | 2.21 |
| Beta Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 1545 | 1618 | 0.51 | 15.75 | 1453 | 1230 |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 175 | 040 | -787 | 183 | 3.53 | 399 |
| t-statistic | (0) 89) | (0.20) | (216) | (099) | (2.64) | (232) |
| Root MSE | 3.32 | 3.49 | 455 | 312 | 232 | 215 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.010 | 0.001 | 0060 | 0.013 | 0.087 | 0069 |
| Two-Factor Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 1420 | 1583 | 18.76 | 1410 | 13.56 | 1264 |
| $\mathrm{a}_{1}$ | 313 | 0.66 | -8.03 | 365 | 425 | 3.78 |
| t-statistic | (1.66) | (0.32) | (2.18) | (2.23) | (326) | (220) |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | 0.47 | 0.13 | -0.13 | 061 | 035 | -0.18 |
| t-statistic | (3 32) | (0.66) | (0.42) | (5.02) | (286) | (1.21) |
| Root MSE | 311 | 350 | 4.58 | 2.70 | 221 | 214 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0142 | 0.007 | 0063 | 0.269 | 0180 | 0.087 |
|  | ALL SHARES (244) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean | 11.14 | 942 | 7.88 | 15.08 | 13.63 | 11.35 |
| Standard Deviation | 10.67 | 1167 | 1145 | 6.08 | 630 | 6.71 |
| Beta Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 15.96 | 18.28 | 1955 | 1515 | 004 | 1539 |
| $\alpha$ | $-5.90$ | -1116 | -13.70 | -009 | -1.78 | -4.74 |
| t-statistic | (3.62) | (707) | (8.10) | (009) | (192) | (41) |
| Root MSE | 1041 | 10.65 | 1018 | 609 | 627 | 6.47 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.051 | 0.171 | 0213 | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0074 |
| Two-Factor Model $\alpha_{0}$ | 1484 | 18.01 | 19.91 | 14.31 | 1411 | 14.79 |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | -156 | -1049 | -14.62 | 317 | 063 | -3.25 |
| t-statistic | (077) | (5.27) | (672) | (2.73) | (055) | (236) |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 081 | 015 | -0.21 | 0.61 | 0.55 | 0.34 |
| t-statistic | (351) | (0.55) | (0.67) | (457) | (3.47) | (172) |
| Root MSE | 1018 | 1067 | 10.19 | 586 | 613 | 6.45 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.097 | 0.172 | 0215 | 0080 | 0.062 | 0.085 |

would have been as good or better than those obtained with the analyst forecasts of growth.

Second, we examined shares and not portfolios, because our objective is to estimate the DCFY for shares and not for portfolios As common practice in testing the CAPM has been to execute tests on portfolios instead of shares, we classified our population of shares into ten portfolios on the basis of their beta values. Regression statistics were substantially unchanged, except that correlations increased dramatically

Finally, we must acknowledge that we have no basis for estimating the expected HPR or DCF yield for industrial shares with any confidence. Theories on financial decision-making in industrial corporations that rely on that statistic have a weak empirical foundation
${ }^{1}$ The EHPR is a one-period return, while the DCFY is a yield to maturity measure. The two may differ in actuality because of measurement problems, but they also may differ in theory That is, they may differ in the same way that interest rates on bonds of different maturities may differ See Gordon and Gould (1984a). This source of difference between EHPR and DCFY will be ignored here.
${ }^{2}$ A widely accepted hypothesis is that dividends contain information on earnings, because management sets the dividend to pay out a stable fraction of normal or permanent earnings.
${ }^{3}$ Over a five-year period, there may even be a negative rate of growth in price for a large number of firms Furthermore, this negative growth rate may be larger in absolute value than the dividend yield, which leads to the conclusion that investors are holding such shares to earn a negative return. The frequency of negative rates of growth in price is reduced as the prior time period used in its calculation increases in length. As that takes place, however, the estimate of the expected return for a firm approaches a constant or a constant plus the dividend yield. The expected return on a share is one statistic for which it is an error to assume that expectations are on average realized.
${ }^{4}$ Equation (2) is similar to the CAPM according to Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin. They arrived at this expression under very rigorous assumptions. The heuristic risk premium model is adequate for our purposes
${ }^{5}$ It may be thought that Theil's (1966) decomposition of the difference between the actual and predicted values of a variable can be used here, but in fact that decomposition applies to a different problem It assumes that the observed (actual) past values of a variable are free of error, and it decomposes the error in a model that is employed to explain the past values. The purpose of Theil's decomposition is to cast light on the possible error in using the model to predict future values of the dependent variable. Our problem is to determine which set of observed values is closest to the true values, with the risk premium theory of share yield and BETA as the source of information on the true values. Theil's method would be appropriate for decomposing the difference between the actual and predicted values of the realized holding-period return on a share. The actual values here can be observed without error
${ }^{6}$ There is an enormous volume of empirical work devoted to discovering whether the theory is true, but this empirical work does not provide useful estimates of the EHPR on a share To test the truth of Equation (4), the practice has been to regress EHPR on BETA for a sample of firms with the average realized HPR over the prior five or so years used as an estimate of the EHPR Because of the large error in the realized HPR over a prior time period, as noted earlier, neither the actual values of the dependent variable nor the values predicted by the model are usable as estimates of share yield See Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978)
${ }^{7}$ BRG for a year is earnings less dividend divided by the end-of-year book value. The estimate of the expected value as of the start of 1986 is 0.3 BRG $85+0.25$ BRG $84+0.20 \mathrm{BRG} 83$ $+0.15 B R G 83+0.10 \mathrm{BRG} 82$. If any value of BRG was negative, it was set equal to zero.
${ }^{3}$ We expect the yields on shares to be above the risk-free interest rate, bul with a high enough interest rate the more favorable tax treatment of shares can reduce the yield below the interest rate. lnterest rates were not that high in these years. See Gordon and Gould (1984b)
" The statistics reported for all shares and for utility shares were also obtained for industrial shares All methods of estimation performed so poorly for industrial shares, however, as to suggest no confidence can be placed in any of them. To save space, we do not present statistics for the industrial shares. Whatever we want to know about them can be deduced by comparing the data for all shares and utility shares

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## INVESTOR GROWTH EXPECTATIONS

A study done by Vander Weide and Carleton in $1988^{\prime}$ suggests that consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth measures in stock valuation process for domestic companies. We worked with one of the original authors of the study, Dr. James H. Vander Weide, and closely followed his suggestions and methodology to investigate whether the results still hold in more recent times (2001-2003).

We used the following equation to determine which estimate of future growth $(\mathrm{g})$ best predicts the firm's $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ratio when combined with the dividend payout ratio, $\mathrm{D} / \mathrm{E}$, and risk variables, B , Cov, Stb, and Sa .
$P / E=a_{0}(D / E)+a_{1} g($ Growth $)+a_{2} B(B e t a)+a_{3} C o v($ Interest Coverage Ratio $)+a_{4} S t b($ Stability $)+a_{5} S a(S t d$ Dev $)+e$

## Data Description

Earnings Per Share: IBES consensus analyst estimate of the firm's earnings for the unreported year.
Price/Earnings Ratio: Closing stock price for the year divided by the consensus analyst earnings per share for the forthcoming year.

Dividends: Ratio of common dividends per share to the consensus analyst earnings forecast for the forthcoming fiscal year (D/E).

Historical Growth measures

$$
\left.\begin{array}{ll}
\text { EPS Growth Rate: } & \begin{array}{l}
\text { Determined by a log-linear least squares regression for the latest year, } \\
\text { two years, three years, ..., and ten years. }
\end{array} \\
\text { Dividend per Share } & \begin{array}{l}
\text { Determined by a log-linear least squares regression for the latest year, } \\
\text { two years, three years, ..., and ten years. }
\end{array} \\
\text { Growth Rate: }
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l}
\text { Book Value per Share }
\end{array} \begin{array}{l}
\text { Common equity divided by the common shares outstanding. } \\
\text { Growth Rate: }
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l}
\text { Determined by a log-linear least squares regression for the latest year, } \\
\text { two years, three years, .., and ten years. }
\end{array}\right]
$$

## Consensus Analysts' Forecasts

Five-Year Earnings Per Share Growth: Mean analysts' forecast compiled by IBES.

[^19]
## Risk Variables

B: Beta, the firm's beta versus NYSE from Value Line.
Cov: The firm's pretax interest coverage ratio from Compustat.
Stb: Five-year historical earnings per share stability. Average absolute percentage difference between actual reported EPS and a 5yr historical EPS growth trend line from IBES.
Sa: The standard deviation of earnings per share estimate for the fiscal year from IBES.
We set five restrictions on the companies included in the study in order to be consistent with the original study and to obtain more meaningful results.

- Excluded all firms that IBES did not follow.
- Eliminated companies with:
- Negative EPS during any of the years 1991-2003.
- No dividend during any one of the years 1991-2003.
- P/E ratio greater than 60 in years 2001-2003.
- Less than five years of operating history.

The final universe consisted of 411 US firms, fifty-nine of which are utility companies.

## Results

The study was performed in two stages.

## Stage 1

In order to determine which historically oriented growth measure is most highly correlated with each firm's end-of-year P/E ratio, we computed spearman (rank) correlations between all fortytwo historically oriented future growth measures and P/E.

The result of the stage 1 study is displayed in Table 1. Three-year plowback ratio has the highest correbtion with P/E in 2001 and 2002, and five-year EPS growth rate has the highest correlation with $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ in 2003.

Table 1
Stage1 Results for Utility and Non-Utility Companies Combined

| Current Year | Correlations between Historically Based Growth Estimates by Year with P/E |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | y9 | $\bigcirc 10$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\checkmark 1$ | $\mathrm{y}^{2}$ | y 3 | 14 | $\gamma_{5}$ | $\nu 6$ | y 7 | $\gamma^{8}$ |  |  |
| EPS | 0232 | 0210 | 0145 | 0122 | 0059 | 0034 | -0 007 | -0 076 | -0 117 | -0154 |
| DPS | -0243 | -0 297 | -0296 | . 0293 | -0313 | -0316 | -0336 | -0 334 | -0 329 | -0333 |
| 1 BVPS | 0059 | -0017 | -0098 | -0138 | -0150 | -0 182 | -0219 | -0 259 | -0 271 | -0273 |
| 2001 CFPS | 0092 | 0092 | 0087 | 0042 | -0 063 | -0102 | .0141 | -0193 | -0 237 | .0262 |
| plowback | 0203 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback3 | 0308 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | -0007 | 0147 | 0076 | 0080 | 0083 | 0050 | 0030 | -0018 | -0060 | -0089 |
| DPS | -0126 | -0 202 | . 0251 | -0 224 | -0 215 | -0 239 | -0 232 | -0 233 | -0 211 | -0198 |
| 2002 BVPS | -0036 | -0036 | -0078 | -0 115 | -0 114 | -0 127 | -0 152 | -0 162 | -0175 | -0 171 |
| 2002 CFPS | 0056 | 0045 | 0017 | 0021 | 0030 | -0024 | -0050 | -0 080 | -0125 | -0 162 |
| plowback | 0093 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback3 | 0180 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | 0073 | 0084 | 0214 | 0231 | 0244 | 0228 | 0182 | 0158 | 0104 | 0049 |
| DPS | 0120 | 0054 | -0001 | -0078 | -0090 | -0 126 | -0152 | . 0165 | -0183 | -0185 |
| 2003 BVPS | 0097 | 0076 | 0067 | 0036 | -0045 | -0 062 | -0 063 | -0 083 | -0 105 | -0 131 |
| 2003 CFPS | 0146 | 0196 | 0243 | 0239 | 0206 | 0178 | 0107 | 0089 | 0039 | -0022 |
| plowback | -0017 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback 3 | 0038 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

We also independently examined utility and non-utility firms. Table 2 shows the result for the fifty-nine utility firms. Two-year growth in EPS has the highest correlation with P/E in 2001, four-year EPS has the highest correlation in 2002, and six-year EPS has the highest correlation in 2003.

Table 3 exhibits the result for the remaining non-utility firms. EPS one-year growth, two-year growth, and five-year growth has the highest correlation with P/E in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.

Table 2
Stage1 Results for Utility Companies

| Correlations between Historically Based Growth Estimates by Year with P/E |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Current Year | 41 | $\checkmark 2$ | $\mathrm{y}^{3}$ | y 4 | ${ }_{4} 5$ | 16 | y 7 | 18 | $\times 9$ | Y10 |
| EPS | 0305 | 0330 | 0305 | 0319 | 0238 | 0157 | 0129 | 0107 | 0079 | 0048 |
| DPS | -0215 | -0 321 | -0 302 | -0 294 | -0316 | -0281 | -0 332 | -0414 | -0.435 | -0429 |
| 2001 BVPS | 0164 | 0137 | 0147 | -0 027 | -0072 | -0135 | -0117 | -0 104 | -0 106 | -0 140 |
| 2001 CFPS | 0194 | 0135 | 0020 | -0018 | -0 122 | -0157 | -0 135 | -0134 | -0 103 | -0219 |
| plowback | -0 143 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback3 | -0027 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | -0065 | 0044 | 0069 | 0119 | 0071 | 0004 | -0 038 | -0 069 | -0061 | -0 070 |
| DPS | -0 333 | -0 327 | -0278 | .0 313 | -0280 | -0 321 | -0 277 | -0 226 | -0203 | .0210 |
| 2002 BVPS | .0325 | -0239 | -0 182 | -0 177 | -0 230 | -0237 | -0 250 | -0 247 | -0235 | -0 235 |
| 2002 CFPS | -0205 | -0132 | -0 172 | -0166 | -0.216 | -0289 | -0285 | -0265 | -0227 | -0218 |
| plowback | -0 151 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback3 | -0133 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | 0010 | 0136 | 0186 | 0263 | 0365 | 0367 | 0344 | 0343 | 0309 | 0302 |
| DPS | 0151 | -0 029 | -0014 | -0 022 | -0 054 | -0 117 | -0 142 | -0 137 | -0 105 | -0 092 |
| 2003 BVPS | 0212 | 0060 | 0047 | 0019 | 0003 | 0040 | 0022 | 0005 | 0003 | -0002 |
| 2003 CFPS | 0222 | -0046 | 0173 | 0115 | 0165 | 0100 | 0017 | 0077 | 0057 | 0077 |
| plowback | -0365 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| plowback3 | .0403 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 3
Stage1 Results for Non-Utility Companies
Correlations between Historically Based Growth Estimates by Year with P/E

| ations between Historically Based Growth Estimates by Year with P/E |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Curren | nt Year | y 1 | $\chi^{2}$ | $y^{3}$ | V4 | Y5 | y6 | $\chi^{7}$ | $y 8$ | $y 9$ | Y10 |
| 2001 | EPS | 0.1643 | 01660 | 01293 | 01218 | 00873 | 00829 | 00618 | 00106 | -00194 | -00412 |
|  | DPS | -0 2036 | -0 2211 | -02042 | -01935 | -02098 | -0 2066 | -0 2186 | -0 2155 | -02046 | -0 1975 |
|  | BVPS | 00757 | 00084 | -00791 | -0 0997 | -00916 | -01146 | -0 1388 | -0 1783 | - 01866 | -0 1823 |
|  | CFPP | 00864 | 00710 | 00956 | 00704 | -0 0033 | -0 0162 | -00366 | -0.0747 | -01186 | -0 1325 |
|  | plowback | 00781 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | plowback3 | 01781 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2002 | EPS | 00762 | 0.1767 | 00755 | 00817 | 00936 | 00757 | 00708 | 00316 | -00011 | -0 0254 |
|  | DPS | -0 0804 | -0 1693 | -0 2103 | -0 1672 | -0 1519 | -0 1720 | -0 1645 | -0 1636 | -0 1394 | -0 1226 |
|  | BVPS | 00527 | 00236 | -0 0363 | -00777 | -00710 | -00753 | -0 0953 | -01019 | -01118 | -0 1061 |
|  | CFPP | 00905 | 00488 | 00143 | 00237 | 00563 | 00246 | 00097 | -00079 | -00458 | -0 0821 |
|  | plowback | 00634 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | plowback3 | 01306 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2003 | EPS | 01254 | 01783 | 02788 | 02689 | 02791 | 02622 | 02219 | 02039 | 01569 | 01090 |
|  | DPS | 01810 | 01290 | 00655 | -00128 | -0 0101 | -00400 | -0 06330 | -0 0772 | -0 0930 | -0 0952 |
|  | BVPS | 01555 | 01740 | 01534 | 01056 | 00127 | -00069 | -00054 | -00218 | -00416 | -00636 |
|  | CFPS | 01479 | 02200 | 02512 | 02429 | 02004 | 01839 | 01349 | 01286 | 00892 | 00388 |
|  | plowback | -01109 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | plowback3 | -0 0402 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Stage 2

We compared the multiple regression model of historical growth rate with the highest correlation to the $P / E$ ratio from stage 1 to the five-year earnings per share growth forecast.

$$
P / E=a_{0}(D / E)+a_{1} g+a_{2} B+a_{3} C o v+a_{4} S t b+a_{5} S a+e
$$

The regression results are displayed in table 4. The results show that the consensus analysts' forecast of future growth better approximates the firm's P/E ratio, which is consistent with the results found by Vander Weide and Carleton In both regressions, $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ in the regression with the consensus analysts' forecast is higher than the $R^{2}$ in the regression with the historical growth.

Table 4
Stage2 Results for Utility and Non-Utility Companies Combined
Multiple Regression Results
$P / E=a 0+a 1 D / E+a 2 g+a 3 B+a 4$ Cov $+a 5 S t b+a 6 S a$
Historical

| Historical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | a0 | 11 | a2 | a3 | a4 | a5 | a6 | Rsq | F Ratio |
| 2001 | 1043 | 846 | 1079 | 679 | 002 | -003 | -18.83 | 020 | 1390 |
|  | 473 | 5.53 | 293 | 354 | 305 | -306 | -332 |  |  |
| 2002 | 12.36 | 760 | 666 | 101 | 000 | 001 | -3248 | 015 | 946 |
|  | 721 | 6.18 | 261 | 066 | 157 | 1.48 | -4.04 |  |  |
| 2003 | 1334 | 596 | 987 | 5.27 | 001 | -001 | -2046 | 024 | 1761 |
|  | 729 | 404 | 295 | 339 | 362 | -131 | -4.25 |  |  |
| Analysts' Forecasts |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | a0 | a1 | a2 | a3 | 14 | a5 | 96 | Rsq | FRatio |
| 2001 | -126 | 1614 | 14475 | -064 | 001 | -003 | -1076 | 047 | 4800 |
|  | -062 | 1163 | 1322 | -0.38 | 307 | -404 | -229 |  |  |
| 2002 | 337 | 1337 | 10607 | -360 | 000 | 001 | -2185 | 035 | 2973 |
|  | 193 | 1097 | 1059 | -257 | 125 | 150 | . 305 |  |  |
| 2003 | 477 | 1276 | 6193 | 438 | 001 | 000 | -1941 | 033 | 2638 |
|  | 265 | 9.48 | 725 | 301 | 245 | -081 | -433 |  |  |

For utility companies shown in table 5, consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth in 2002 and 2003, $R^{2}$ is lower in the regression with the consensus analysts' forecast in 2001. For nor-utility companies, we found that consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to the alternative in all three years (table 6).

Table 5

## Stage2 Results for Utility Companies

Multiple Regression Results
$P / E=a 0+a 1 D / E+a 2 g+a 3 B+a 4 \mathrm{Cov}+a 5 \mathrm{Stb}+a 6 \mathrm{Sa}$
Historical

|  | a0 | a1 | a2 | a3 | 34 | a5 | a6 | Rsq | FRatio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2001 | 790 | 1107 | -11 19 | -300 | 029 | 000 | -9 37 | 044 | 638 |
|  | 218 | 4.80 | -571 | -0.86 | 088 | 0.64 | . 151 |  |  |
| 2002 | 1387 | 700 | -380 | -689 | 056 | 000 | -2989 | 038 | 511 |
|  | 402 | 3.54 | -066 | -201 | 148 | 0.42 | -270 |  |  |
| 2003 | 1129 | 774 | -165 | -140 | 0.32 | 000 | -569 | 025 | 268 |
|  | 322 | 330 | -0.23 | -0.43 | 105 | -073 | -075 |  |  |

Analysts' Forecasts

|  | a 0 | 11 | a2 | a3 | a4 | a5 | 96 | Rsq | FRatio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2001 | 961 | 920 | 6661 | -7.92 | 0.50 | -0 01 | -1283 | 027 | 295 |
|  | 231 | 3.45 | 368 | -1.86 | 131 | -133 | -176 |  |  |
| 2002 | 1243 | 786 | 5074 | -961 | 050 | 000 | -2494 | 048 | 756 |
|  | 389 | 5.29 | 310 | -294 | 150 | 017 | -241 |  |  |
| 2003 | 581 | 1106 | 10112 | -169 | -0 19 | 000 | -475 | 050 | 781 |
|  | 189 | 6.32 | 480 | -0.58 | .074 | -022 | -074 |  |  |

Table 6

## Stage2 Results for Non-Utility Companies

Multiple Regression Results
$P / E=a 0+a 1 D / E+a 2 g+a 3 B+a 4 C o v+a 5 S t b+a 6 S a$
Historical

|  | a0 | a1 | a2 | a3 | a4 | a5 | a6 | Rsq | F Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2001 | 1590 | 8.39 | 282 | 353 | 002 | -003 | -2105 | 021 | 1245 |
|  | 657 | 413 | 196 | 168 | 297 | -214 | -3.40 |  |  |
| 2002 | 1776 | 846 | 602 | -306 | 000 | 0.02 | -3697 | 027 | 1678 |
| 2003 | 939 | 519 | 328 | -188 | 137 | 252 | -431 |  |  |
|  | 1424 | 986 | 885 | 346 | 0.01 | 000 | -1900 | 030 | 1989 |
|  | 749 | 5.89 | 249 | 211 | 323 | -015 | -373 |  |  |

Analysts' Forecasts

|  | a0 | a1 | a2 | a3 | 34 | a5 | 26 | Rsq | F Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2001 | -051 | 1728 | 140.84 | -106 | 0.01 | -0 03 | -863 | 044 | 3600 |
|  | -022 | 1121 | 1073 | 0.59 | 288 | -262 | -163 |  |  |
| 2002 | 505 | 1567 | 9122 | -406 | 000 | 002 | -2293 | 038 | 2765 |
|  | 248 | 1123 | 766 | -2.74 | +18 | 233 | -287 |  |  |
| 2003 | 725 | 1447 | 4560 | 347 | 001 | 000 | -1909 | 033 | 2230 |
|  | 356 | 9.42 | 468 | 220 | 236 | -0 12 | -3.89 |  |  |

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# Investor growth expectations: Analysts vs. history 

Analysts' growth forecasts dominate past trends in predicting stock prices.

James H. Vander Weide and Willard T. Carleton

 counted Cash Flow (DCF) cost of equity model, the analyst must know which growth estimate is embodied in the firm's stock price. A study by Cragg and Malkiel (1982) suggests that the stock valuation process embodies analysts' forecasts rather than historically based growth figures such as the ten-year historical growth in dividends per share or the fiveyear growth in book value per share. The Cragg and Malkiel study is based on data for the 1960 s, however, a decade that was considerably more stable than the recent past.

As the issue of which growth rate to use in implementing the DCF model is so important to applications of the model, we decided to investigate whether the Cragg and Malkiel conclusions continue to hold in more recent periods. This paper describes the results of our study.

## STATISTICAL MODEL

The DCF model suggests that the firm's stock price is equal to the present value of the stream of dividends that investors expect to receive from owning the firm's shares Under the assumption that investors expect dividends to grow at a constant rate, $g$, in perpetuity, the stock price is given by the following simple expression:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{s}=\frac{D(1+g)}{k-g} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:
$P_{5}=$ current price per share of the firm's stock;
$D=$ current annual dividend per share;
$\mathrm{g}=$ expected constant dividend growth rate; and
$k$ = required return on the firm's stock
Dividing both sides of Equation (1) by the firm's current earnings, $E$, we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{P_{5}}{E}=\frac{D}{E} \cdot \frac{(1+g)}{k-g} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Ihus, the firm's price/earnings ( $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ) ratio is a nonlinear function of the firm's dividend payout ratio (D/ $E)$, the expected growth in dividends (g), and the required rate of return.

To investigate what growth expectation is embodied in the firm's current stock price, it is more convenient to work with a linear approximation to Equation (2). Thus, we will assume that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P / E=a_{0}(D / E)+a_{1} g+a_{2} k \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

(Cragg and Malkiel found this assumption to be reasonable throughout their investigation )

Furthermore, we will assume that the required

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rate of return, $k$, in Equation (3) depends on the values of the risk variables B, Cov, Rsq, and Sa, where B is the firm's Value Line beta; Cov is the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio; Rsq is a measure of the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS; and $S a$ is the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' fiveyear EPS growth forecast for the firm. Finally, as the linear form of the $P / E$ equation is only an approximation to the true P/E equation, and B, Cov, Rsq, and Sa are only proxies for $k$, we will add an error term, $e$, that represents the degree of approximation to the true relationship.

With these assumptions, the final form of our P/E equation is as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
P / E= & a_{6}(D / E)+a_{1} g+a_{2} B+ \\
& a_{3} C o v+a_{4} R s q+a_{3} S a+e \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

The purpose of our study is to use more recent data to determine which of the popular approaches for estimating future growth in the Discounted Cash Flow model is embodied in the market price of the firm's shares

We estimated Equation (4) to determine which estimate of future growth, $g$, when combined with the payout ratio, $D / E$, and risk variables $B, C o v$, Rsq, and Sa , provides the best predictor of the firm's $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ratio. To paraphrase Cragg and Malkiel, we would expect that growth estimates found in the best-fitting equation more closely approximate the expectation used by investors than those found in poorer-fitting equations.

## DESCRIPTION OF DAIA

Our data sets include both historically based measures of future growth and the consensus analysts' forecasts of five-year earnings growth supplied by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System of Lynch, Jones \& Ryan (IBES). The data also include the firm's dividend payout ratio and various measures of the firm's risk. We include the latter items in the regression, along with earnings growth, to account for other variables that may affect the firm's stock price.

The data include:
Earnings Per Share. Because our goal is to determine which earnings variable is embodied in the firm's market price, we need to define this variable with care. Financial analysts who study a firm's financial results in detail generally prefer to "normalize" the firm's reported earnings for the effect of extraordinary items, such as write-offs of discontinued operations, or mergers and acquisitions. They also attempt, to the extent possible, to state earnings for different firms using a common set of accounting conventions.

We have defined "earnings" as the consensus analyst estimate (as reported by IBES) of the firm's earnings for the forthcoming year ' This definition approximates the normalized earnings that investors most likely have in mind when they make stock purchase and sell decisions. It implicitly incorporates the analysts' adjustments for differences in accounting treatment among firms and the effects of the business cycle on each firm's results of operations. Although we thought at first that this earnings estimate might be highly correlated with the analysts' five-year earnings growth forecasts, that was not the case. Thus, we avoided a potential spurious correlation problem. Price/Earnings Ratio. Corresponding to our definition of "earnings," the price/earnings ratio ( $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ) is calculated as the closing stock price for the year divided by the consensus analyst earnings forecast for the forthcoming fiscal year.
Dividends. Dividends per share represent the common dividends declared per share during the calendar year, after adjustment for all stock splits and stock dividends) The firm's dividend payout ratio is then defined as common dividends per share divided by the consensus analyst estimate of the earnings per share for the forthcoming calendar year (D/E). Although this definition has the deficiency that it is obviously biased downward - it divides this year's dividend by next year's earnings - it has the advantage that it implicitly uses a "normalized" figure for earnings. We believe that this advantage outweighs the deficiency, especially when one considers the flaws of the apparent alternatives Furthermore, we have verified that the results are insensitive to reasonable alternative definitions (see footnote 1)
Growth. In comparing historically based and consensus analysts' forecasts, we calculated forty-one different historical growth measures. These included the following: 1) the past growth rate in EPS as determined by a $\log$-linear least squares regression for the latest year, ${ }^{2}$ two years, three years, , and ten years; 2) the past growth rate in DPS for the latest year, two years, three years, ..., and ten years; 3) the past growth rate in book value per share (computed as the ratio of common equity to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, . , and ten years; 4) the past growth rate in cash flow per share (computed as the ratio of pretax income, depreciation, and deferred taxes to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, ..., and ten years; and 5) plowback growth (computed as the firm's retention ratio for the current year times the firm's latest annual return on common equity).

We also used the five-year forecast of earnings
per share growth compiled by IBES and reported in mid-January of each year. This number represents the consensus (i.e., mean) forecast produced by analysts from the research departments of leading Wall Street and regional brokerage firms over the preceding three months. IBES selects the contributing brokers "because of the superior quality of their research, professional reputation, and client demand" (IBES Monthly Summary Book)
Risk Variables. Although many risk factors could potentially affect the firm's stock price, most of these factors are highly correlated with one another. As shown above in Equation (4), we decided to restrict our attention to four risk measures that have intuitive appeal and are followed by many financial analysts: 1) B, the firm's beta as published by Value Line; 2) Cov, the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio (obtained from Standard \& Poor's Compustat); 3) Rsq, the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS (measured by the $R^{2}$ from a log-linear least squares regression); and 4) Sa , the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' five-year EPS growth forecast (mean forecast) as computed by IBES.

After careful analysis of the data used in our study, we felt that we could obtain more meaningful results by imposing six restrictions on the companies included in our study:

1. Because of the need to calculate ten-year historical growth rates, and because we studied three different time periods, 1981, 1982, and 1983, our study requires data for the thirteen-year period 1971-1983. We included only companies with at least a thirteen-year operating history in our study
2. As our historical growth rate calculations were based on log-linear regressions, and the logarithm of a negative number is not defined, we excluded all companies that experienced negative EPS during any of the years 1971-1983.
3. For similar reasons, we also eliminated companies that did not pay a dividend during any one of the years 1971-1983.
4. To insure comparability of time periods covered by each consensus earnings figure in the P/E ratios, we eliminated all companies that did not have a December 31 fiscal year-end.
5. To eliminate distortions caused by highly unusual events that distort current earnings but not expected future earnings, and thus the firm's price/ earnings ratio, we eliminated any firm with a price/ earnings ratio greater than 50 .
6. As the evaluation of analysts' forecasts is a major part of this study, we eliminated all firms that IBES did not follow.

Our final sample consisted of approximately
sixty-five utility firms ${ }^{3}$

## resurts

To keep the number of calculations in our study to a reasonable level, we performed the study in two stages. In Stage 1, all forty-one historically oriented approaches for estimating future growth were correlated with each firm's P/E ratio. In Stage 2, the historical growth rate with the highest correlation to the P/E ratio was compared to the consensus analyst growth rate in the multiple regression model described by Equation (4) above. We performed our regressions for each of three recent time periods, because we felt the results of our study might vary over time

## First-Stage Correlation Study

Table 1 gives the results of our first-stage correlation study for each group of companies in each of the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. The values in this table measure the correlation between the historically oriented growth rates for the various time periods and the firm's end-of-year P/E ratio.

The four variables for which historical growth rates were calculated are shown in the left-hand column: EPS indicates historical earnings per share growth, DPS indicates historical dividend per share growth, BVPS indicates historical book value per share growth, and CFPS indicates historical cash flow per share growth. The term "plowback" refers to the product of the firm's retention ratio in the currennt year and its return on book equity for that year. In all, we calculated forty-one historically oriented growth rates for each group of firms in each study period.

The goal of the first-stage correlation analysis was to determine which historically oriented growth rate is most highly correlated with each group's year-end P/E ratio Eight-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with P/E in 1981 and 1982, and ten-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with yearend P/E in 1983 In all cases, the plowback estimate of future growth performed poorly, indicating that contrary to generally held views - plowback is not a factor in investor expectations of future growth

## Second-Stage Regression Study

In the second stage of our regression study, we ran the regression in Equation (4) using two different measures of future growth, g: 1) the best historically oriented growth rate $\left(\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{n}}\right)$ from the first-stage correlation study, and 2) the consensus analysts' forecast $\left(g_{0}\right)$ of five-year EPS growth. The regression results, which are shown in Table 2, support at least

TABLE 1
Correlation Coefficients of All Historically Based Growth Estimates by Group and by Year with P/E
Historical Growth Rate Period in Years

| Current Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | $-002$ | 007 | 003 | 001 | 003 | 012 | 008 | 009 | 009 | 009 |
| DPS | 0.05 | 018 | 01.4 | 015 | 014 | 015 | 019 | 023 | 023 | 023 |
| BVPS | 001 | 011 | 013 | 013 | 016 | 018 | 015 | 015 | 0.15 | 015 |
| CFPS | -005 | 0.04 | 013 | 0.22 | 028 | 031 | 030 | 031 | -057 | -054 |
| Plowback | 019 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | -010 | $-013$ | -006 | -002 | -002 | -001 | -003 | -003 | 000 | 000 |
| DPS | -019 | -010 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 009 | 011 | 013 | 0.13 |
| BVPS | 007 | 008 | 0.11 | 011 | 009 | 010 | 011 | 011 | 009 | 009 |
| CFPS | -0.02 | $-008$ | 0.00 | 010 | 0.16 | 019 | 023 | 025 | 024 | 007 |
| Plowback | 004 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EPS | -006 | -025 | -025 | $-024$ | -016 | -011 | -005 | 0.00 | 002 | 002 |
| DPS | 0.03 | -010 | -003 | 008 | 015 | 021 | 0.21 | 021 | 022 | 024 |
| BVPS | 0.03 | 010 | 004 | 0.09 | 015 | 016 | 0.19 | 021 | 022 | 021 |
| CFPS | -008 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 008 | 020 | 029 | 035 | 038 | 040 | 042 |
| Plowback | -0.08 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

two general conclusions regarding the pricing, of equity securities

First, we found overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. In every case, the $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ in the regression containing the consensus analysts' forecast is higher than the $R^{2}$ in the regression containing the historical growth measure. The regression
coefficients in the equation containing the consensus analysts' forecast also are considerably more significant than they are in the alternative regression. These results are consistent with those found by Cragg and Malkiel for data covering the period 1961-1968. Our results also are consistent with the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than historically oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy-and--sell decisions.

IABLE 2
Regression Results Model I
Part A: Historical
$P / E=a_{n}+a_{1} D / E+a_{2} g n+a_{3} B+a_{4} \operatorname{Cov}+a_{5} R s q+a_{4} S a$

| Year | $\mathrm{a}_{0}$ | $A_{1}$ | $\hat{a}_{2}$ | $W_{3}$ | $\dot{3}^{\text {a }}$ | $\mathrm{A}_{5}$ | $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{b}}$ | $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | F Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981 | -6.42* | $1031^{*}$ | 7.67* | 324 | $054 *$ | $1.42^{*}$ | 5743 | 083 | 4649 |
|  | (5 50) | (1479) | (220) | (286) | (250) | (285) | (407) |  |  |
| 1982 | -290* | $932 *$ | $8.49^{*}$ | 285 | $045^{*}$ | -042 | 363 | 086 | 6553 |
|  | (275) | (1852) | (418) | (283) | (260) | (0.05) | (026) |  |  |
| 1983 | -596* | $10.20^{*}$ | $1978{ }^{*}$ | 485 | $0.44^{*}$ | 033 | 3249 | 082 | 4526 |
|  | (370) | (12 20) | (4.83) | (295) | (1.89) | (050) | (129) |  |  |

Part B: Analysis
$P / E=a_{0}+a_{1} D / E+a_{2} g_{t}+a_{3} B+a_{4} \operatorname{Cov}+a_{5} R s q+a_{n} S a$

| Year | $\hat{a}_{0}$ | $3_{1}$ | $\dot{a}_{2}$ | $\dot{a}_{1}$ | $\dot{a}_{\text {a }}$ | $\dot{a}_{\text {, }}$ | $\hat{s}_{6}$ | $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | Fratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981 | -497* | $106{ }^{*}$ | 54 85* | -061 | $033 *$ | $0.63 *$ | 434 | 091 | 10310 |
|  | (623) | (2157) | (8.56) | (068) | (228) | (174) | (037) |  |  |
| 1982 | -216* | $947{ }^{*}$ | $5071 *$ | $-107$ | $036{ }^{*}$ | -031 | $11905^{\circ}$ | 090 | 9762 |
|  | (259) | (22.46) | (931) | (114) | (2.53) | (1.09) | (160) |  |  |
| 1983 | -847* | $11.96 *$ | 79 054 | 216 | $056{ }^{*}$ | 020 | -34 43 | 0.87 | 6981 |
|  | (7.07) | (16 48) | (7.84) | (1.55) | (308) | (0)38) | (1 44) |  |  |

[^20]Second, there is some evidence that investors tend to view risk in traditional terms. The interest coverage variable is statistically significant in all but one of our samples, and the stability of the operating income variable is statistically significant in six of the twelve samples we studied. On the other hand, the beta is never statistically significant, and the standard deviation of the analysts' five-year growth forecasts is statistically significant in only two of our twelve samples. This evidence is far from conclusive, however, because, as we demonstrate later, a significant degree of cross-correlation among our four risk variables makes any general inference about risk extremely hazardous

## Possible Misspecification of Risk

The stock valuation theory says nothing about which risk variables are most important to investors. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility that the risk variables of our study are only proxies for the "true" risk variables used by investors. The inclusion of proxy variables may increase the variance of the parameters of most concern, which in this case are the coefficients of the growth variables. ${ }^{4}$

To allow for the possibility that the use of risk proxies has caused us to draw incorrect conclusions concerning the relative importance of analysts' growth forecasts and historical growth extrapolations, we have also estimated Equation (4) with the risk variables excluded. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3.

Again, there is overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' growth forecast is superior to the historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. The $R^{2}$ and $t$-statistics are higher in every case.

## CONCLUSION

The relationship between growth expectations and share prices is important in several major areas of finance. The data base of analysts' growth forecasts collected by Lynch, Jones \& Ryan provides a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that investors rely more heavily on analysts' growth forecasts than on historical growth extrapolations in making security buy-and-sell decisions. With the help of this data base, our studies affirm the superiority of analysts' forecasts over simple historical growth extrapolations in the stock price formation process. Indirectly, this finding lends support to the use of valuation models whose input includes expected growth rates.

[^21] As our results were insensitive to reasonable alternative

IABLE 3
Regression Results Model II

Part A: Historical

| Year | $\dot{5}_{0}$ | $\mathrm{a}_{1}$ | $\dot{a}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{R}^{\text { }}$ | F Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981 | $-105$ | 959 | 2120 | 0.73 | 8295 |
|  | (161) | (12.13) | (705) |  |  |
| 1982 | 054 | 892 | 1218 | 083 | 16797 |
|  | (138) | (17 73) | (695) |  |  |
| 1983 | -075 | 892 | 1218 | 0.77 | 10782 |
|  | (113) | (1238) | (794) |  |  |

Part B: Analysis

| Year | $\mathrm{i}_{4}$ | $3_{1}$ | $5^{3}$ | $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | F Raino |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981 | 396 | 1007 | 60.53 | 090 | 27416 |
|  | (831) | (8.31) | (2091) | (1579) |  |
| 1982 | -175 | 919 | 4492 | 088 | 24636 |
|  | (400) | (400) | (21 35) | (1106) |  |
| 1983 | -497 | 1095 | 8202 | 083 | 16828 |
|  | (693) | (693) | (1593) | (11 02) |  |

Notes:

* Coefficient is significant at the $5 \%$ level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign 1 -statistic in parentheses
definitions of "earnings" we report only the results for the IBES consensus.
${ }^{2}$ For the latest year, we actually employed a point-to-point growth calculation because there were only two available observations
"We use the word "approximately," because the set of available firms varied each year. In any case, the number varied only from zero to three firms on either side of the figures cited here.
-See Maddala (1977)


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## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 6 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

6. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 19, lines 15-20, please provide a copy of the article written by Dr. Vander Weide from the Journal of Portfolio Management.

## Response:

A copy of the requested article is provided in response to this Request for Information No. 5. Please refer to electronic file KAW_R_AGDR1\#5_061807.pdf (bookmarked as attachment 4).

For electronic version of this response, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#6_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 7 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

7. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 20, lines 20-22 please provide a copy of the updated study by State Street Financial Advisers.

## Response:

A copy of the requested article is provided in response to this Request for Information No. 5. Please refer to electronic file KAW_R_AGDR1\#5_061807.pdf (bookmarked as attachment 5).

For electronic version of this response, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#7_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 8 of 312

## Witness: Michael Miller

8. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 21, lines 15-23, please provide:
(a) Estimates of the floatation costs (direct expenses as well as market pressure costs) of the equity issued by KAWC and/or its parent over the past five years, and
(b) The prospectuses for all equity issues by KAWC and/or its parent over the past five years.

## Response:

(a) None.
(b) Not applicable.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#8_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 9 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

9. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 24, lines 7-17, please indicate what water companies were eliminated by each of the screens applied to the companies listed in the Value Line Investment Survey.

## Response:

Connecticut Water Services was eliminated because it did not have at least one analyst's long-term growth forecast. No other Value Line water company was eliminated.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#9_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 10 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

10. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 26, lines 1-2 (Table), please provide copies of the I/B/E/S analyst research reports for the water companies in the proxy group.

## Response:

I/B/E/S surveys analysts in the investment community and publishes the average of analysts’ growth forecasts for individual companies. I/B/E/S itself does not prepare research reports on individual companies. The average analysts’ growth forecast for each of the companies in Dr. Vander Weide's comparable water company group is shown in Exhibit JVW-1, Schedule 1.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#10_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY 

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 11 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

11. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 28, lines 1-10, please provide copies of all studies performed by Dr. Vander Weide which indicates that the LDCs are similar in business and financial risk to:
(a) KAWC, and
(b) The proxy group of water companies.

## Response:

(a \& b) As Dr. Vander Weide has testified, there are very few publicly-traded water companies that are followed by the investment community. Given the relatively small sample of water companies that are suitable as reasonable proxies for the purposes of estimating KAWC's cost of equity, Dr. Vander Weide believes that the public service commission should consider cost of equity results for additional companies in other regulated industries. From Dr. Vander Weide’s experience over the last 30 years as an expert on regulated industries, he believes that the LDCs are the most reasonable companies to include as an additional proxy group to the water company proxy group. The reasons for Dr. Vander Weide’s belief that LDCs are similar to KAWC are stated in response to Question 56, page 29, of his direct testimony. Dr. Vander Weide has not conducted quantitative studies that compare the risks of LDCs to water companies. He notes, however, that his DCF results for the LDCs are similar to the DCF results for the water companies.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#11_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY <br> CASE NO. 2007-00143 <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

## Item 12 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

12. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 28, lines 11-21, please indicate what gas companies were eliminated by each of the screens applied to the companies listed in the Value Line Investment Survey.

## Response:

The following table identifies the Value Line companies that were not included in Dr. Vander Weide's DCF study and the reasons why each company was not included:
$\left.\begin{array}{l|lcll}\hline \text { Company } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Decrease or } \\ \text { No Dividend }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Fewer than 3 I/B/E/S } \\ \text { Growth Estimates } \\ \text { (No. of Estimates) }\end{array} & \text { Merger } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Low Safety } \\ \text { Rank and/or } \\ \text { Bond Rating }\end{array} \\ \hline \text { Cascade Nat.Gas } & & 0 & \begin{array}{l}\text { Merger with } \\ \text { KDU }\end{array} & \\ \text { Keyspan } & 1 & \begin{array}{l}\text { To be } \\ \text { acquired by }\end{array} & \\ \begin{array}{l}\text { Laclede Gp.Hldg. } \\ \text { NICOR } \\ \text { (Integrys) Peoples }\end{array} & & 1 & \text { National Grid }\end{array}\right]$

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#12_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY <br> CASE NO. 2007-00143 <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

## Item 13 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

13. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 29, lines 14-18 please provide:
(a) The exact methodology employed by Value Line in developing its 'Safety Rank,'
(b) How Value Line’s 'Safety Rank' compares to other measures of risk employed by Dr. Vander Weide,
(c) The number and percentage of companies followed by Value Line that have a safety rank of 1,2 , and 3 , and
(d) Copies of all studies known to Dr. Vander Weide that evaluate Value Line’s 'Safety Rank.'

## Response:

(a) Value Line describes its "Safety Rank" as:
a measurement of potential risk associated with individual common stocks. The Safety Rank is computed by averaging two other Value Line indexes, the Price Stability Index and the Financial strength Rating. Safety Ranks range from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest). Conservative investors should try to limit their purchases to equities ranked 1 (Highest) and 2 (Above Average) for Safety. [From Value Line Investment Analyzer]

In addition, Value Line states:
The Value Line Safety ${ }^{\mathrm{TM}}$ Rank measures the total risk of a stock. It is derived from the stock's Index of Price Stability relative to the 1700 other stocks and from the Financial Strength rating of the company. Safety ranks are also given on a scale from 1 (safest) to 5 (riskiest) as follows:

Rank 1 (Highest): This stock is probably one of the safest, most stable, and least risky stock market investments.
Rank 2 (Above Average): This stock is safer and less risky than most.
Rank 3 (Average): This stock is of average risk and safety.
Rank 4 (Below Average): This stock is riskier and less safe than most.

Rank 5 (Lowest): This stock is probably one of the riskiest and least safe. [From How to Invest in Common Stocks: A Guide to Using the Value Line Investment Survey]
(b) With the exception of the capital structure data shown on Schedule 9, Dr. Vander Weide did not use other measures of risk.
(c) In the data set contained in The Value Line Investment Analyzer at June 1, 2007, out of 1,667 companies that have a Value Line Safety Rank, 1,403 have a ranking of 1,2 , or 3 .

| Safety Rank | No. of <br> Companies | \% of <br> Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | 110 | $7 \%$ |
| 2 | 228 | $14 \%$ |
| 3 | 1,065 | $64 \%$ |
| Total No. of Cos. | 1,667 |  |

(d) I am aware of Value Line's own study, which provides data on the returns during periods of market declines on stocks which it ranks with a Safety Rank of 1 or 2. The Value Line data indicate that stocks with a Safety Rank of 1 or 2 fall less than the market as a whole when stock prices drop. See Table below, which is reproduced from How to Invest in Common Stocks: A Guide to Using the Value Line Investment Survey:

Results of Safety Ranks in Major Market Declines

| Safety | $2 / 11 / 66-$ | $12 / 13 / 68-$ | $4 / 14 / 72-$ | $6 / 17 / 87-$ | $8 / 26 / 87-$ | $7 / 13 / 90-$ | $4 / 22 / 98-$ | $5 / 22 / 01-$ | $4 / 16 / 02-$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | $10 / 7 / 66$ | $7 / 2 / 70$ | $9 / 11 / 74$ | $12 / 4 / 87$ | $12 / 4 / 87$ | $11 / 2 / 90$ | $10 / 08 / 98$ | $9 / 21 / 01$ | $10 / 9 / 02$ |
| 1 | $-15.6 \%$ | $-28.6 \%$ | $-40.5 \%$ | $-10.5 \%$ | $-24.7 \%$ | $-19.0 \%$ | $-6.1 \%$ | $-11.5 \%$ | $-20.8 \%$ |
| 2 | -18.2 | -29.6 | -39.9 | -16.2 | -28.7 | -15.5 | -14.0 | -14.0 | -23.8 |
| 3 | -24.0 | -41.1 | -47.2 | -25.2 | -36.0 | -24.9 | -29.7 | -23.4 | -33.1 |
| 4 | -26.5 | -57.0 | -53.3 | -33.6 | -40.7 | -33.2 | -41.7 | -41.7 | -55.2 |
| 5 | -29.2 | -64.8 | -70.0 | -31.4 | -46.9 | -33.1 | -37.8 | -34.3 | -51.7 |

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#13_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 14 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

14. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 29, lines 21-23, please provide copies of the I/B/E/S analyst research reports for the gas companies in the proxy group.

## Response:

I/B/E/S surveys analysts in the investment community and publishes the average analysts' growth forecasts for individual companies. I/B/E/S itself does not prepare research reports on individual companies. The average analysts’ growth forecast for each of the companies in Dr. Vander Weide's comparable gas company group is shown in Exhibit JVW-1, Schedule 2.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#14_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Item 15 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

15. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 32, lines 8-18, and Schedule 3 of Exhibit __(JVW-1), please provide:
(a) Copies of all work papers used in Dr. Vander Weide's ex ante risk premium study,
(b) An electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of the data used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact, and
(c) Copies of the regressions run on the data.

## Response:

The requested data are supplied with Dr. Vander Weide's work papers that are attached in response to this Request for Information No. 20. Please refer to electronic version KAW_R_AGDR1\#20_061807.xls.

For electronic version of this response, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#15_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Item 16 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

16. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 33, line 1 to page 39, line 11, and Schedule 4 of Exhibit __(JVW-1), please provide:
(a) Copies of all work papers used in Dr. Vander Weide's ex post risk premium study using the S\&P 500,
(b) The sources of the data items employed,
(c) An electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of the data used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact, and
(d) Copies of the regressions run on the data.

## Response:

The requested data are supplied with Dr. Vander Weide’s work papers that are attached in response to this Request for Information No. 20. Please refer to electronic version KAW_R_AGDR1\#20_061807.xls.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#16_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Item 17 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

17. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 41, line 1 to page 42, line 8, and Schedule 5 of Exhibit __(JVW-1), please provide
(a) All work papers used in Dr. Vander Weide's ex post risk premium study using the S\&P Utilities Stock Index,
(b) The sources of the data items employed, and
(c) An electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of the data used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

The requested data are supplied with Dr. Vander Weide's work papers that are attached in response to this Request for Information No. 20. Please refer to electronic version KAW_R_AGDR1\#20_061807.xls.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#17_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 18 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

18. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. With respect to page 42, line 9 to page 43, line 10, and Schedule 8 of Exhibit __(JVW-1), for each company listed in the S\&P 500, please provide:
(a) The number of analysts providing an EPS growth rate forecast as well as the market capitalization weight used for each company,
(b) The company names and growth rates for those companies with negative expected growth rates,
(c) The company names, dividend, price, expected growth, cost of equity, and market cap for all companies, including the $25 \%$ highest and lowest DCF results, and
(d) An electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of the data used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

The requested data are attached. For excel version of S\&P 500 data, please refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#18_061807.xls.

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#18_061807.pdf

COMPANY NAME(DS)
3M
ABBOTT LABS
ACE
ADC TELECOM
ADOBE SYSTEMS
ADVANCED MICRO DEVC
AES
AETNA
AFFILIATED CMP SVS ' $A^{\prime}$
AFLAC
AGILENT TECHS
AIR PRDS \& CHEMS
ALCOA
ALLEGHENY EN
ALLEGHENY TECHS
ALLERGAN
ALLIED WASTE INDS
ALLSTATE
ALLTEL
ALTERA
ALTRIA GROUP INCO
AMAZON COM
AMBAC FINANCIAL
AMER.ELEC PWR
AMER STANDARD
AMEREN
AMERICAN EXPRESS
AMERICAN INTL GP
AMERIPRISE FINL
AMERISOURCEBERGEN
AMGEN
ANADARKO PETROLEUM
ANALOG DEVICES
ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS
AON
APACHE
APARTMENT INV MAN ' $A$ '
APOLLO GP 'A'
APPLE
APPLERA APPD BIOS
73,391
$6 \quad 5,573$

| APPLIED MATS | 13 | 25,042 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ARCHER-DANLS -MIDL | 5 | 22,030 |
| ARCHSTONE SMITH TST | 1 | 11,972 |
| ASHLAND | \#NA | 4,152 |
| AT\&T | 9 | 227,340 |
| AUTODESK | 11 | 9,219 |
| AUTOMATIC DATA PROC | 10 | 26,788 |
| AUTONATION | 6 | 4,535 |
| AUTOZONE | 9 | 8,660 |
| AVALONBAY COMMNS | 2 | 9,795 |
| AVAYA | 10 | 5,490 |
| AVERY DENNISON | 5 | 7,127 |
| AVON PRODUCTS | 7 | 16,204 |
| BAKER HUGHES | 4 | 20,736 |
| BALL | 4 | 4,695 |
| BANK OF AMERICA | 14 | 224,579 |
| BANK OF NEW YORK CO. | 13 | 29,931 |
| BARD CR | 6 | 8,078 |
| BARR PHARMACEUTICALS | 7 | 5,302 |
| BAUSCH \& LOMB | 3 | 2,750 |
| BAXTER INTL. | 4 | 31,951 |
| $B B \& T$ | 12 | 22,541 |
| BEAR STEARNS | 7 | 17,665 |
| BECTON DICKINSON | 10 | 18,313 |
| BED BATH \& BEYOND | 16 | 11,208 |
| BEMIS | 3 | 3,448 |
| BEST BUY | 19 | 22,337 |
| BIGLOTS | 2 | 2,636 |
| BIOGENIDEC | 10 | 14,951 |
| BIOMET | 8 | 10,336 |
| BJ SVS | 4 | 7,759 |
| BLACK \& DECKER | 5 | 5,436 |
| BMC SOFTWARE | 7 | 6,111 |
| BOEING | 12 | 68,818 |
| BOSTON PROPS | 2 | 13,672 |
| BOSTON SCIENTIFIC | 5 | 23,569 |
| BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB | 10 | 53,355 |
| BROADCOM 'A' | 11 | 15,493 |
| BROWN-FORMAN 'B' | 3 | 4,254 |
| BRUNSWICK | 8 | 2,918 |
| BURL NTHN SANTA FEC | 6 | 27,830 |
| CA | 7 | 13,442 |
| CAMPBELL SOUP | 11 | 15,487 |
| CAPITAL ONE FINL | 12 | 23,399 |
| CARDINAL HEALTH | 10 | 27,849 |
| CAREMARK RX | 11 | 26,035 |
| CARNIVAL | 8 | 28,642 |
| CATERPILLAR | 4 | 41,010 |
| CB RICHARD ELLIS GP | 3 | 7,337 |
| CBS 'B' | 6 | 21,249 |
| CELGENE | 8 | 18,080 |
| CENTERPOINT EN | 4 | 5,475 |
| CENTEX | 3 | 5,505 |
| CENTURYTEL | 6 | 5,125 |
| CH ROBINSON WWD | 6 | 8,703 |
| CHARLES SCHWAB | 7 | 22,963 |
| CHESAPEAKE ENERGY | 5 | 13,751 |
| CHEVRON | 5 | 145,601 |


| CHI MERC EX.HDG | 5 | 18,808 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CHUBB | 9 | 20,846 |
| CIENA | 8 | 2,302 |
| CIGNA | 10 | 14,463 |
| CINCINNATI FIN. | 2 | 7,408 |
| CINTAS | 9 | 6,285 |
| CIRCUIT CITY STORES | 18 | 3,107 |
| CISCO SYSTEMS | 10 | 152,813 |
| CIT GP. | 5 | 10,789 |
| CITIGROUP | 13 | 245,536 |
| CITIZENS COMMS | 7 | 4,764 |
| CITRIX SYS | 10 | 5,645 |
| CLEAR CHL COMMS | 5 | 17,867 |
| CLOROX | 10 | 9,514 |
| CMS ENERGY | 5 | 3,797 |
| COACH | 16 | 17,642 |
| COCA COLA | 7 | 106,249 |
| COCA COLA ENTS | 7 | 9,586 |
| COGNIZANT TECH SLTN 'A' | 12 | 12,404 |
| COLGATE-PALM | 11 | 34,219 |
| COM BANC | 11 | 6,144 |
| COMCAST 'A' | 7 | 52,213 |
| COMERICA | 9 | 9,443 |
| COMPASS BANCSHARES | 7 | 8,722 |
| COMPUTER SCIS | 10 | 8,893 |
| COMPUWARE | 3 | 3,174 |
| CONAGRA FOODS | 6 | 12,331 |
| CONOCOPHILLIPS | 1 | 106,751 |
| CONSOLEN | 4 | 6,385 |
| CONSOLIDATED EDISON | 5 | 12,347 |
| CONSTELLATION BRANDS 'A' | 7 | 4,104 |
| CONSTELLATION EN | 4 | 14,006 |
| CONVERGYS | 9 | 3,450 |
| COOPERINDS | 7 | 8,269 |
| CORNING | 8 | 31,755 |
| COSTCO WHOLESALE | 16 | 25,217 |
| COUNTRYWIDE FINL | 9 | 22,992 |
| COVENTRY HLTHCR. | 11 | 8,661 |
| CSX | 4 | 15,799 |
| CUMMINS | 5 | 7,020 |
| CVS | 6 | 25,613 |
| DRHORTON | 7 | 7,943 |
| DANAHER | 12 | 21,600 |
| DARDEN RESTAURANTS | 16 | 5,777 |
| DEAN FOODS NEW | 6 | 6,291 |
| DEERE | 7 | 23,930 |
| DELL | 14 | 52,656 |
| DEVON ENERGY | 5 | 28,487 |
| DILLARDS 'A' | 7 | 2,469 |
| DOLLAR GENERAL | 11 | 5,124 |
| DOMINION RES | 5 | 30,066 |
| DONNELLEY R R \& SONS | 4 | 7,771 |
| DOVER | 3 | 9,632 |
| DOW CHEMICALS | 4 | 40,630 |
| DOW JONES \& CO | 8 | 2,231 |
| DTE ENERGY | 3 | 8,300 |
| DU PONTEIDE NEMOURS | 6 | 46,289 |
| DUKE ENERGY | 4 | 24,421 |


| DYNEGY 'A' | 1 | 3,230 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| E TRADE FINL. | 5 | 9,688 |
| EASTMAN CHEMICALS | 3 | 4,817 |
| EASTMAN KODAK | 4 | 6,805 |
| EATON | 9 | 11,880 |
| EBAY | 17 | 42,980 |
| ECOLAB | 7 | 10,395 |
| EDISON INTL | 2 | 15,414 |
| EL.PASO | 4 | 9,770 |
| ELECTRONIC ARTS | 10 | 15,223 |
| ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS | 3 | 14,255 |
| ELI LILLY | 13 | 58,582 |
| EMBARQ | 3 | 7,981 |
| EMC | 9 | 29,865 |
| EMERSON ELECTRIC | 7 | 34,133 |
| ENSCOINTL | 7 | 7,430 |
| ENTERGY | 4 | 19,910 |
| EOG RES | 6 | 16,050 |
| EQUIFAX | 8 | 4,721 |
| EQUITY RESD TST PROPS SHBI | \#NA | 14,300 |
| ESTEE LAUDER COS ${ }^{\text {' }}$ ' ${ }^{\prime}$ | 10 | 5,693 |
| EXELON | 4 | 43,037 |
| EXPRESS SCRIPTS 'A' | 12 | 9,960 |
| EXXON MOBLL | 4 | 408,332 |
| FAMILY DOLLAR STORES | 12 | 4,355 |
| FANNIE MAE | 5 | 53,482 |
| FEDERATED DEPT STRS | 8 | 23,239 |
| FEDERATED INVRS 'B' | 8 | 3,707 |
| FEDEX | 7 | 34,551 |
| FIDELITY NAT INFO.SVS | 8 | 12,979 |
| FIFTH THIRD BANCORP | 10 | 22,317 |
| FIRST DATA | 12 | 18,614 |
| FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL | 9 | 5,356 |
| FIRSTENERGY | 6 | 19,679 |
| FISERV | 14 | 8,843 |
| FLUOR | 4 | 7,536 |
| FORD MOTOR | 2 | 13,799 |
| FOREST LABS | 16 | 16,163 |
| FORTUNE BRANDS | 6 | 12,061 |
| FPL GROUP | 6 | 23,455 |
| FRANK RES | 8 | 29,034 |
| FREDDIE MAC | 6 | 43,155 |
| FREEPORT-MCMOR CPR \& GD ' ${ }^{\text {' }}$ | 2 | 10,758 |
| GANNETT | 7 | 14,176 |
| GAP | 13 | 14,915 |
| GENERAL DYNAMICS | 10 | 30,534 |
| GENERAL ELECTRIC | 11 | 359,443 |
| GENERAL MILLS | 7 | 19,156 |
| GENERAL MOTORS | 1 | 17,319 |
| GENUINE PARTS | 4 | 8,215 |
| GENWORTH FINANCIAL | 9 | 15,845 |
| GENZYME | 7 | 16,013 |
| GILEAD SCIENCES | 10 | 32,390 |
| GOLDMAN SACHS GP | 9 | 80,491 |
| GOODRICH | 10 | 6,049 |
| GOODYEAR TIRE \& RUB | \#NA | 4,901 |
| GOOGLE 'A' | 16 | 97,995 |
| GRAINGER W W | 8 | 6,518 |


| H\& R BLOCK | 6 | 6,946 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HALLIBURTON | 5 | 31,151 |
| HARLEY-DAVIDSON | 9 | 16,424 |
| HARMAN INTL INDS | 7 | 6,386 |
| HARRAHS ENTM | 9 | 15,665 |
| HARTFORD FINL SVS GP | 8 | 30,174 |
| HASBRO | 4 | 4,571 |
| HEINZ HJ | 7 | 14,899 |
| HERCULES | 1 | 2,189 |
| HESS | 4 | 14,457 |
| HEWLETT-PACKARD | 13 | 105,214 |
| HILTON HOTELS | 10 | 13,493 |
| HOME DEPOT | 13 | 79,614 |
| HONEYWELL INTL | 8 | 36,725 |
| HOSPIRA | 4 | 6,089 |
| HUDSON CITY BANC | 5 | 7,540 |
| HUMANA | 11 | 9,955 |
| HUNTINGTON BCSH | 5 | 5,353 |
| IACINTERACTIVECORP | 6 | 10,158 |
| ILLINOIS TOOL WKS | 11 | 28,444 |
| IMS HEALTH | 6 | 5,571 |
| INGERSOLL-RAND | 9 | 13,115 |
| INTEGRYS ENERGY GROUP | 2 | 4,112 |
| INTEL. | 15 | 110,822 |
| INTERNATIONAL BUS MACH. | 9 | 136,927 |
| INTERPUBLIC GP | 7 | 5,435 |
| INTL. FLAV \& FRAG | 1 | 4,132 |
| INTL GAME TECH | 8 | 13,564 |
| INTLPAPER | 2 | 15,947 |
| INTUIT | 8 | 10,153 |
| ITT | 3 | 10,615 |
| JABIL CIRCUIT | 8 | 5,594 |
| JANUS CAPITAL GP | 9 | 4,065 |
| JDS UNIPHASE | 4 | 3,231 |
| JOHNSON \& JOHNSON | 5 | 179,288 |
| JOHNSON CONTROLS | 5 | 18,779 |
| JONES APPAREL GROUP | 9 | 3,518 |
| JP MORGAN CHASE \& CO | 9 | 167,169 |
| JUNIPER NETWORKS | 14 | 10,410 |
| KB HOME | 6 | 4,412 |
| KELLOGG | 10 | 19,596 |
| KEYCORP | 11 | 15,099 |
| KEYSPAN | 1 | 7,148 |
| KIMBERLY-CLARK | 8 | 30,692 |
| KIMCO REALTY | 1 | 11,810 |
| KINDER MORGAN KANS | 2 | 14,170 |
| KING PHARMS | 3 | 4,483 |
| KLA TENCOR | 10 | 9,968 |
| KOHLS | 17 | 23,304 |
| KROGER | 8 | 17,947 |
| L3 COMMUNICATIONS | 8 | 10,605 |
| LABORATORY CORP OF AM HDG | 8 | 8,572 |
| LEGG MASON | 7 | 13,067 |
| LEGGETT\&PLATT | 4 | 4,272 |
| LEHMAN BROS HDG | 8 | 37,931 |
| LENNAR 'A' | 7 | 6,200 |
| LEXMARK INTL GP A | 9 | 5,746 |
| LIMITED BRANDS | 16 | 10,472 |


| LINCOLN NAT | 12 | 18,768 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LINEAR TECH | 14 | 9,602 |
| LIZ CLAIBORNE | 6 | 4,509 |
| LOCKHEED MARTIN | 9 | 40,457 |
| LOEWS | \#NA | 23,415 |
| LOWE'S COMPANIES | 16 | 48,638 |
| LSILOGIC | 2 | 3,990 |
| M\&T BK. | 6 | 13,090 |
| MANOR CARE | 7 | 3,862 |
| MARATHON OIL | 4 | 31,370 |
| MARRIOTT INTL 'A' | 11 | 18,447 |
| MARSH \& MCLENNAN | 6 | 16,170 |
| MARSHALL \& ILSLEY | 12 | 12,123 |
| MASCO | 7 | 11,400 |
| MATTEL | 4 | 10,380 |
| MAXIM INTEGRATED PRDS | 13 | 10,127 |
| MBIA | 6 | 8,955 |
| MCCORMICK \& CONV | 7 | 4,428 |
| MCDONALDS | 13 | 54,009 |
| MCGRAW-HILL | 5 | 22,722 |
| MCKESSON | 8 | 16,143 |
| MEADWESTVACO | 1 | 5,447 |
| MEDCO HEALTH SLITN | 14 | 19,193 |
| MEDIMMUNE | 3 | 7,394 |
| MEDTRONIC | 11 | 56,578 |
| MELLON FINL | 12 | 17,625 |
| MERCK \& CO | 10 | 95,937 |
| MEREDITH | 4 | 2,232 |
| MERRILL LYNCH \& CO. | 7 | 72,441 |
| METLIFE | 10 | 47,499 |
| MGIC INVT | 7 | 4,786 |
| MICRON TECHNOLOGY | 10 | 8,929 |
| MICROSOFT | 16 | 271,835 |
| MILLIPORE | 5 | 3,834 |
| MOLEX | 7 | 2,831 |
| MOLSON COORS BREWING 'B' | 6 | 5,407 |
| MONSANTO | 6 | 27,675 |
| MONSTER WORLDWIDE | 15 | 5,877 |
| MOODYS | 7 | 18,495 |
| MORGAN STANLEY | 9 | 78,275 |
| MOTOROLA | 12 | 45,062 |
| MURPHY OIL | 4 | 9,501 |
| MYLAN LABORATORIES | 5 | 4,383 |
| NABORS INDS | 3 | 8,727 |
| NAT CITY | 7 | 24,082 |
| NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO | 3 | 12,053 |
| NATIONAL SEMICON | 7 | 7,954 |
| NCR | 3 | 8,135 |
| NETWORK APPLIANCE | 12 | 13,952 |
| NEW YORK TIMES 'A' | 6 | 3,524 |
| NEWELL RUBBERMAID | 8 | 8,413 |
| NEWMONT MINING | 2 | 18,216 |
| NEWS CORP 'A' | 3 | 47,928 |
| NICOR | 1 | 2,036 |
| NIKE 'B' | 9 | 19,535 |
| NISOURCE | 6 | 6,427 |
| NOBLE | 4 | 9,368 |
| NORDSTROM | 14 | 13,471 |


| NORFOLK SOUTHERN | 4 | 18,396 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NORTHERN TRUST | 14 | 12,973 |
| NORTHROP GRUMMAN | 10 | 25,152 |
| NOVELL | 6 | 2,187 |
| NOVELLUS SYSTEMS | 8 | 3,858 |
| NUCOR | 4 | 17,746 |
| NVIDIA | 9 | 10,494 |
| OCCIDENTALPTL | 5 | 38,606 |
| OFFICE DEPOT | 11 | 9,293 |
| OFFICEMAX | 5 | 3,767 |
| OMNICOM GP | 11 | 17,231 |
| ORACLE | 17 | 86,594 |
| PACCAR | 7 | 16,981 |
| PACTIV | 4 | 4,218 |
| PALL | 4 | 4,453 |
| PARKER-HANNIFIN | 7 | 9,731 |
| PATTERSON COMPANIES | 7 | 4,606 |
| PAYCHEX | 16 | 14,924 |
| PEABODY ENERGY | 4 | 10,273 |
| PENNEYJC | 10 | 17,731 |
| PEPSI BOTTLING GP | 6 | 7,283 |
| PEPSICO | 8 | 103,064 |
| PERKINELMER | 3 | 2,834 |
| PFIZER | 11 | 175,685 |
| PG\&E | 5 | 16,018 |
| PHELPS DODGE | 3 | 25,120 |
| PINNACLE WEST CAP | 3 | 4,734 |
| PITNEY-BOWES | 3 | 10,348 |
| PLUM CREEK TIMBER | 3 | 6,860 |
| PMC-SIERRA | 4 | 1,336 |
| PNC FINL SVS.GP. | 9 | 21,522 |
| POLO RALPH LAUREN 'A' | 10 | 5,054 |
| PPG INDUSTRIES | 6 | 10,739 |
| PPL | 6 | 14,442 |
| PRAXAIR | 8 | 19,555 |
| PRINCIPAL FINL GP | 9 | 16,083 |
| PROCTER \& GAMBLE | 12 | 199,294 |
| PROGRESS ENERGY | 5 | 12,318 |
| PROGRESSIVE OHIO | 6 | 17,321 |
| PROLOGIS | 1 | 15,846 |
| PRUDENTIAL FINL | 9 | 43,606 |
| PUB SER ENTER GP | 3 | 18,630 |
| PUBLIC STORAGE | 1 | 16,623 |
| PULTE HOMES | 4 | 7,552 |
| QLOGIC | 9 | 2,723 |
| QUALCOMM | 10 | 65,399 |
| QUEST DIAGNOSTICS | 9 | 9,666 |
| QUESTAR | 5 | 7,081 |
| QWEST COMMS INTL | 9 | 16,208 |
| RADIOSHACK | 10 | 3,336 |
| RAYTHEON 'B' | 8 | 23,474 |
| REALOGY | 1 | 7,396 |
| REGIONS FINL NEW | 9 | 25,867 |
| REYNOLDS AMERICAN | 4 | 17,635 |
| ROBERT HALF INTL | 8 | 6,336 |
| ROCKWELL AUTOMATION | 6 | 10,071 |
| ROCKWELL COLLINS | 12 | 11,001 |
| ROHM \& HAAS | 9 | 11,321 |


| ROWAN COS | 6 | 3,356 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RYDER SYSTEM | 5 | 3,058 |
| SABRE HDG | 3 | 4,327 |
| SAFECO | 8 | 7,618 |
| SAFEWAY | 8 | 15,019 |
| SANDISK | 7 | 8,603 |
| SANMINA-SCl | 6 | 1,892 |
| SARA LEE | 6 | 11,963 |
| SCHERING-PLOUGH | 11 | 34,173 |
| SCHLUMBERGER | 5 | 73,364 |
| SCRIPPS EW 'A' | 7 | 5,694 |
| SEALED AIR | 5 | 5,082 |
| SEARS HOLDINGS | 3 | 27,256 |
| SEMPRAEN. | 5 | 15,555 |
| SHERWIN-WILLIAMS | 3 | 8,746 |
| SIGMA ALDRICH | 6 | 5,332 |
| SIMON PR.GP | 1 | 24,064 |
| SLM | 9 | 17,241 |
| SMITH INTL. | 4 | 8,223 |
| SNAP-ON | 3 | 2,893 |
| SOLECTRON | 7 | 2,803 |
| SOUTHERN | 5 | 26,293 |
| SOUTHWEST AIRLINES | 4 | 11,984 |
| SOVEREIGN BANC. | 8 | 11,747 |
| SPECTRA ENERGY | 3 | 15,857 |
| SPRINT NEXTEL | 9 | 55,438 |
| ST.JUDE MED. | 14 | 13,597 |
| STANLEY WORKS | 7 | 4,504 |
| STAPLES | 10 | 18,391 |
| STARBUCKS | 15 | 22,439 |
| STARWOOD HTLS \& RSTS. WORLDWIDE | 9 | 13,672 |
| STATE STREET | 12 | 21,727 |
| STRYKER | 13 | 24,837 |
| SUN MICROSYSTEMS | 5 | 21,821 |
| SUNOCO | 1 | 7,750 |
| SUNTRUST BANKS | 13 | 30,222 |
| SUPERVALU | 6 | 7,658 |
| SYMANTEC | 14 | 15,625 |
| SYNOVUS FINL | 9 | 10,448 |
| SYSCO | 7 | 19,744 |
| T ROWE PRICE GP | 8 | 12,164 |
| TARGET | 17 | 52,418 |
| TECO ENERGY | 4 | 3,487 |
| TEKTRONIX | 6 | 2,312 |
| TELLABS | 6 | 4,497 |
| TEMPLE INLAND | 2 | 6,184 |
| TENET HLTHCR | 3 | 3,032 |
| TERADYNE | 6 | 2,938 |
| TEREX | 2 | 6,418 |
| TEXAS INSTS | 13 | 45,644 |
| TEXTRON | 8 | 11,222 |
| THE DIRECTV GROUP | 7 | 27,666 |
| THE HERSHEY COMPANY | 10 | 9,015 |
| THE TRAVELERS COS | 7 | 34,901 |
| THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC | 2 | 18,066 |
| TIFFANY \& CO | 11 | 5,809 |
| TIME WARNER | 8 | 76,044 |
| TJXCOS | 7 | 12,424 |-1,892

SARA LEE34,173
SCHLUMBERGER5,694
SEALED AIR27,256
SEMPRA8,746signaldorich24,0648,2232,803
SOUTHERN1,984
SOVEREIGN BANC5,857
SPRINT NEXTEL13,597
STANLEY WORKS18,391
STARBUCKS ..... 22,435
STATE STREET ..... 21,727SUN MICROSYSTEMS21,82130,222
SUPERVALU ..... 7,6580,448
SYSCO12,164
TARGET3,487
TEKTRONIX4,497
TEMPLE INLAND3,032
TERADYNE6,418
TEXAS INSTS11,222
THE DIRECTV GROUP9,015
THE TRAVELERS COS8,066
TIME WARNER76,044
TJX COS ..... 7 12,424

| TORCHMARK | 8 | 6,262 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TRANSOCEAN | 3 | 22,099 |
| TRIBUNE | 7 | 7,218 |
| TXU | 4 | 30,540 |
| TYCO INTL | 7 | 59,455 |
| TYSON FOODS 'A' | 4 | 4,873 |
| UNIONPACIFIC | 6 | 26,384 |
| UNISYS | 4 | 2,859 |
| UNITED PARCEL SER | 6 | 46,253 |
| UNITED TECHNOLOGIES | 8 | 64,079 |
| UNITEDHEALTH GP | 15 | 72,980 |
| UNIVISION COMMS 'A' | 1 | 8,985 |
| UNUM GROUP | 7 | 7,264 |
| US BANCORP | 10 | 62,285 |
| US STEEL | 3 | 10,190 |
| UST | 3 | 9,046 |
| VF | 9 | 8,913 |
| VALERO ENERGY | 1 | 34,434 |
| VARIAN MED SYS | 6 | 5,780 |
| VERISIGN | 8 | 5,984 |
| VERIZON COMMS | 14 | 106,504 |
| VIACOM 'B' | 12 | 24,986 |
| VORNADO REALTY TST | 1 | 17,273 |
| VULCAN MATERIALS | 3 | 11,125 |
| WACHOVIA | 14 | 86,602 |
| WAL MART STORES | 16 | 199,273 |
| WALGREEN | 11 | 44,197 |
| WALT DISNEY | 12 | 70,224 |
| WASHINGTON MUTUAL | 8 | 40,247 |
| WASTE MAN | 3 | 17,799 |
| WATERS | 4 | 5,584 |
| WATSON PHARMS | 7 | 2,635 |
| WEATHERFORD INTL | 5 | 13,641 |
| WELLPOINT | 12 | 49,031 |
| WELLS FARGO \& CO | 16 | 116,268 |
| WENDY'S INTL | 11 | 3,697 |
| WESTERN UNION | 17 | 16,130 |
| WEYERHAEUSER | 3 | 20,384 |
| WHIRLPOOL | 3 | 6,840 |
| WHOLE FOODS MARKET | 9 | 6,499 |
| WILLIAMS COS | 4 | 15,642 |
| WINDSTREAM | 3 | 6,856 |
| WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR. | 9 | 10,772 |
| WYETH | 11 | 65,720 |
| WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE | 2 | 6,889 |
| XCEL ENERGY | 5 | 9,497 |
| XEROX | 4 | 16,294 |
| XILINX | 9 | 8,396 |
| XL CAP 'A' | 10 | 12,584 |
| XTO EN | 8 | 18,399 |
| YAHOO | 17 | 41,266 |
| YUM! BRANDS | 12 | 14,898 |
| ZIMMER HDG | 13 | 19,900 |
| ZIONS BANCORP | 12 | 9,082 |

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

Attachment to Request for information No. 18 Part (b)

There is no company in the S\&P 500 in the February $2007 \mathrm{IV} / \mathrm{E} / \mathrm{S}$ Thomson Financial data that has a negative long-term expected growth rate estimate

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY Attachment to Request for Information No 18 Parts (c) and (d)

| COMPANY NAME(DS) | Ticker | Feb-07 | Feb-07 | Jan-07 | Jan-07 | Dec.06 | Dec. 06 | $\mathrm{P}_{0}$ | $\mathrm{D}_{0}$ | IBES EPS <br> LTG MEAN | Costof Equily | Market Cap 5 (mils) | $1+9$ | EPSLIG HESTS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3M | M M M | 77.43 | 7352 | 7988 | 73.09 | 8155 | 7735 | 7714 | 192 | 1121\% | 14.2\% | 53.581 | 11121\% | 7 |
| ABBOTI LABS | ABT | 5506 | 5206 | 53.85 | 48.75 | 4910 | 4625 | 5085 | 130 | 1074\% | 13.8\% | 81,798 | 11074\% | 9 |
| ACE | ACE | 5996 | 5566 | 6103 | 5740 | 6190 | 5591 | 5864 | 100 | $1212 \%$ | $141 \%$ | 18.107 | 112 12\% | 9 |
| ADC TELECOM | ADCT | 1759 | 15.94 | 16.65 | 1453 | 1524 | 1340 | 3556 | 000 | 10.85\% | 10.9\% | 1.823 | 11085\% | 10 |
| ADOBE SYSTEMS | ADBE | 4110 | 3745 | 4132 | 3720 | 4322 | 3761 | 39.65 | 000 | 1486\% | 14.0\% | 22.552 | 11486\% | 7 |
| ADVANCED MCRO DEVC | AMD | 1591 | 1443 | 20.63 | 15.52 | 2300 | 1990 | 18.23 | 000 | 14 28\% | 14.3\% | 7.779 | 11428\% | 9 |
| AES | AES | 2310 | 20.50 | 2232 | 1992 | 2385 | 2190 | 2193 | 000 | 1500\% | 15.0\% | 13.689 | \$1500\% | 3 |
| AETNA | AET | 4660 | 4185 | 4361 | 4031 | 4390 | 4101 | 4288 | 004 | 1579\% | 15.9\% | 23,078 | 11579\% | 9 |
| AFFILIATED CMP SVS A' | ACS | 5450 | 48.89 | 4982 | 4779 | 5117 | 48.06 | 50.04 | 000 | 1289\% | 120\% | 4.712 | 11289\% | 9 |
| AFLAC, | AFL. | 49.37 | 46.66 | 4871 | 4550 | 46.20 | 43.34 | 46.66 | 074 | 1466\% | 16\%\% | 23.098 | 114.66\% | 13 |
| AGILENT TECHS | A | 34.15 | 3124 | 35.48 | 3187 | 3569 | 3168 | 3335 | 000 | 14.75\% | 148\% | 12.506 | 114.75\% | 4 |
| AIR PRDS \& CHEMS | APD | 78.63 | 73.35 | 75.00 | 6858 | 7245 | 68.76 | 7280 | 136 | 1171\% | 138\% | 15.781 | 11171\% | 6 |
| ALCOA | AA | 36.05 | 3207 | 3262 | 28.09 | 3133 | 2886 | 3150 | 0.68 | 1178\% | 143\% | 28.434 | 11178\% | 6 |
| ALLEGHENY EN | AYE | 50.25 | 4531 | 4794 | 4428 | 46.25 | 4355 | 4626 | 0.00 | 2140\% | 21.4\% | 7.739 | 121.40\% | 5 |
| ALLEGHENY TECHS | AII | 110.00 | 9579 | 10417 | 85.10 | 98.72 | 8433 | 9635 | 0.52 | 15.00\% | 157\% | 9.899 | 11500\% | 2 |
| Allergan | AGN | 11823 | 110.10 | 12122 | 105.00 | 123.02 | 115.01 | 115.43 | 0.40 | 17 29\% | 177\% | 16.862 | 11729\% | 7 |
| ALLIED WASTE INDS | AW | 1332 | 1186 | 1288 | 1228 | 13.14 | 1222 | 1262 | 000 | 13.50\% | 13.5\% | 4.549 | 11350\% | 4 |
| Allstate | ALL | 62.44 | 59.52 | 65.85 | 60.05 | 6614 | 6267 | 6278 | 152 | 9.47\% | 123\% | 36.877 | 109 47\% | 10 |
| ALLETEL | AT | 6388 | 59.50 | 63.04 | 6000 | 6260 | 5654 | 60.94 | 050 | 751\% | 8.4\% | 21.578 | 10751\% | 11 |
| ALTERA | ALTR | 2232 | 19.99 | 20.65 | 1929 | 2054 | 19.30 | 20.35 | 000 | 1870\% | 8.7\% | 7.331 | 11870\% | 10 |
| ALTRIA GROUP INCO | MO | 8785 | 8117 | 9050 | 86.00 | 8656 | 83.43 | 85.92 | 344 | $750 \%$ | 121\% | 174.964 | 10750\% | 4 |
| AMAZON COM | AMZN | 4200 | 36.68 | 3914 | 3630 | 4064 | 3770 | 38.74 | 000 | 2353\% | 235\% | 15.629 | 12353\% | 11 |
| AMBAC FINANCIAL | ABK | 9183 | 86.49 | 90.49 | 8611 | 90.75 | 84.15 | 8830 | 072 | $1150 \%$ | 125\% | 9.006 | 11150\% | 6 |
| AMERELEC PWR | AEP | 46.76 | 43.48 | 43.90 | 4167 | 43.13 | 4154 | 43.41 | 156 | 427\% | B3\% | 17.749 | 104.27\% | 7 |
| AMER STANDARD | ASD | 55.30 | 5152 | 49.47 | 4521 | 46.80 | 4436 | 4878 | 0.72 | 13.13\% | $14 \%$ | 10.510 | 11313\% | 8 |
| AMEREN | AEE | 55.00 | 5162 | 5433 | 5241 | 55.08 | 5325 | 5362 | 254 | 620\% | 11:0\% | 10.649 | 106.20\% | 5 |
| AMERICAN EXPRESS | AXP | 59.15 | 5450 | 6190 | 5714 | 6250 | 5800 | 5887 | 0.60 | 1238\% | 13.6\% | 66.103 | 11238\% | 9 |
| AMERICANINTL GP | AIG | 7019 | 6538 | 72.45 | 6794 | 7297 | 6917 | 6968 | 0.66 | 1257\% | 137\% | 180.785 | 11257\% | 7 |
| AMERIPRISE FINL. | AMP | 6308 | 5674 | 59.35 | 54.68 | 55.79 | 5320 | 5714 | 0.44 | 10.69\% | 11.0\% | 13.673 | 11069\% | 8 |
| AMERISOURCEBERGEN | ABC | 5552 | 5195 | 5440 | 45.08 | 48.02 | 4429 | 4988 | 0.20 | 13.50\% | 14.0\% | 9.927 | 113.50\% | 6 |
| AMGEN | AMGN | 7049 | 6386 | 76.95 | 6785 | 7199 | 6788 | 69.84 | 000 | 16.09\% | 10.1\% | 72.032 | 11609\% | 13 |
| ANADARKO PETROLEUM | APC | 4487 | 3955 | 4417 | 4016 | 5050 | 4201 | 43.54 | 0.36 | 8.80\% | 97\% | 18.123 | $10880 \%$ | 5 |
| ANALOG DEVICES | ADI | 3717 | 3253 | 3453 | 3228 | 33.82 | 3207 | 33.73 | 072 | 2088\% | 23.6\% | 11.797 | $12088 \%$ | 4 |
| ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS | BUD | 52.25 | 4861 | 5156 | 48.50 | 4975 | 4739 | 49.68 | 118 | 8.63\% | 11.4\% | 37,011 | 10863\% | 7 |
| AON | AOC | 3921 | 3569 | 36.20 | 3430 | 3711 | 3487 | 36.23 | 060 | 786\% | 9.8\% | 11.631 | 10786\% | 7 |
| APACHE | APA | 7274 | 68.00 | 73.44 | 6301 | 7050 | 65.34 | 68.84 | 060 | 1064\% | 117\% | 22.244 | 11064\% | 7 |
| APARTMENT INV MAN 'A' | AlV | 6579 | 5759 | 6300 | 5414 | 5811 | 54.20 | 5881 | 240 | 400\% | 85\% | 5.511 | 10400\% | 1 |
| APOLLO GP 'A' | APOL | 4885 | 4170 | 4354 | 3902 | 4040 | 3750 | 41.84 | 0.00 | 15.25\% | 15\% | 7.969 | 115.25\% | 12 |
| APPLE | AAPL | 9081 | 8286 | 97.80 | 8190 | 92.33 | 76.77 | 87.08 | 0.12 | 20.78\% | 21.\% | 73.391 | 12078\% | 10 |
| APPLERA APPD BIOS | ABI | 3478 | 30.52 | 3759 | 3400 | 38.31 | 36.20 | 3523 | 0.17 | 10.50\% | 111\% | 5.573 | 110 50\% | 6 |
| APPLIED MATS | AMAT | 19.48 | 1772 | 19.79 | 1735 | 19.33 | 17.42 | 1852 | 0.20 | 15.31\% | 18.0\% | 25.042 | 115.31\% | 13 |
| ARCHER-DANLS MIDL | ADM | 36.55 | 3299 | 3300 | 30.20 | 35.23 | 3120 | 33.20 | 0.46 | 10.40\% | 12.0\% | 22.030 | 110.40\% | 5 |
| ARCHSTONE SMITHTST | ASN | 6211 | 55.26 | 6477 | 5655 | 60.81 | 5601 | 5925 | 181 | 700\% | 10.5\% | 11.972 | 10700\% | 1 |
| ATET | $T$ | 38.18 | 35.19 | 3788 | 3270 | 36.21 | 3374 | 35.65 | 1.42 | 8.27\% | 12.9\% | 227.340 | $10827 \%$ | 9 |
| AUTODESK | ADSK | 45.07 | 3888 | 45.19 | 39.81 | 4288 | 39.65 | 4191 | 0.00 | 1654\% | 10.5\% | 9.219 | 11654\% | 11 |
| AUTOMATIC DATA PROC | ADP | 5150 | 4815 | 49.28 | 46.85 | 4978 | 4752 | 48.85 | 092 | 1230\% | 14.5\% | 26.788 | $11230 \%$ | 10 |
| AUTONATION | AN | 2319 | 2185 | 2252 | 20.65 | 2152 | 20.38 | 2169 | 0.00 | 1146\% | 115\% | 4,535 | $11146 \%$ | 6 |
| Allozone | AZO | 13222 | 123.17 | 12614 | 11594 | 120.37 | 11239 | 12171 | 000 | 1350\% | 135\% | 8.660 | 113.50\% | 9 |
| AVALONBAY COMMMS | AVB | 14994 | 13400 | 14926 | 12826 | 13460 | 125.22 | 13688 | 3.40 | 700\% | 08\% | 9.795 | 10700\% | 2 |
| AVAYA | AV | 13.49 | 1196 | 1489 | 1235 | 1425 | 1247 | 4324 | 000 | 10.70\% | 107\% | 5.490 | 110.70\% | 10 |
| AVERY DENNISON | AVY | 6916 | 6521 | 7135 | 6708 | 6931 | 66.45 | 6809 | 160 | 1100\% | 138\% | 7.127 | 11100\% | 5 |
| AVON PRODUCTS | AVP | 4013 | 34.29 | 3514 | 3255 | 3425 | 3204 | 3473 | 074 | 10.65\% | 132\% | 16.204 | 110.65\% | 7 |


| BAKER HUGHES | BHI | 7255 | 63.34 | 7466 | 65.55 | 78.85 | 7153 | 7108 | 0.52 | 1800\% | 18.9\% | 20.736 | 118.00\% | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BALL. | BL | 4920 | 45.28 | 4755 | 43.51 | 44.08 | 42.40 | 4534 | 0.40 | 1250\% | 13.5\% | 4.695 | 112.50\% | 4 |
| BANK OF AMERICA | BAC | 54.21 | 49.00 | 54.18 | 5135 | 55.00 | 5132 | 5251 | 224 | 866\% | 13.0\% | 224.579 | 108.66\% | 14 |
| BANK OF NEW YORK CO | BK | 43.46 | 39.47 | 4139 | 3905 | 40.55 | 3513 | 3984 | 088 | 1131\% | 13.9\% | 29.931 | 11131\% | 13 |
| BARDCR | BCR | 8366 | 7901 | 86.17 | 7712 | 85.72 | 8174 | 8224 | 0.56 | 14.80\% | 15.6\% | 8.078 | 114.80\% | 6 |
| BARR PHARMACEUTICALS | BRL. | 56.66 | 5201 | 56.15 | 50.24 | 5228 | 50.03 | 5290 | 000 | 14.66\% | 14.7\% | 5.302 | 114.66\% | 7 |
| BAUSCH \& LOMB | BOL | 5592 | 5130 | 56.10 | 5112 | 53.88 | 4736 | 52.61 | 052 | 10.67\% | 118\% | 2.750 | 110.67\% | 3 |
| BAXTER INTL. | BAX | 5099 | 4810 | 4998 | 46.07 | 48.54 | 4428 | 4799 | 067 | 13.03\% | 14.7\% | 31.951 | 113.03\% | 4 |
| BB \& $T$ | BET | 4419 | 4210 | 4430 | 4192 | 4474 | 4274 | 4333 | 168 | 853\% | 13.8\% | 22.541 | 108.53\% | 12 |
| BEAR STEARNS | BSC | 17023 | 149.10 | 17261 | 16091 | 16620 | 149.73 | 16146 | 128 | 1157\% | \$25\% | 17.665 | 11157\% | 7 |
| BECTON DICKINSON | BDX | 7883 | 74.60 | 7730 | 6930 | 7330 | 6998 | 7389 | 098 | 1245\% | 44.0\% | 18,313 | 112.45\% | 10 |
| BED BATH \& BEYOND | BBBY | 4332 | 39.87 | 4238 | 3779 | 4172 | 3782 | 40.48 | 000 | 16.38\% | 70.4\% | 11.208 | 116.38\% | 16 |
| BEMIS | BMS | 3484 | 3300 | 3653 | 3201 | 3499 | 33.76 | 34.19 | 084 | 10.67\% | 536\% | 3.448 | 11067\% | 3 |
| BESTEUY | BBY | 5180 | 4611 | 5180 | 4801 | 5559 | 4695 | 50.04 | 040 | 16.20\% | 172\% | 22.337 | 11620\% | 19 |
| BIGLOTS | BIG | 2749 | 2413 | 2635 | 2271 | 2411 | 2148 | 2438 | 000 | $750 \%$ | 75\% | 2.636 | $10750 \%$ | 2 |
| BIOGENIDEC | B1B | 5051 | 45.02 | 5245 | 4704 | 5272 | 48.00 | 49.29 | 0.00 | 1082\% | 108\% | 14.951 | 11082\% | 10 |
| BIOMET | BMET | 4267 | 4215 | 4252 | 4117 | 4250 | 3740 | 4140 | 030 | 1575\% | 188\% | 10.336 | 11575\% | 8 |
| B. SVS | BJS | 28.65 | 26.50 | 2910 | 25.55 | 33.89 | 28.94 | 28.77 | 0.20 | 2300\% | $238 \%$ | 7.759 | 12300\% | 4 |
| BLACK \& DECKER | BDK | 90.91 | 83.37 | 8739 | 78.81 | 8766 | 76.85 | 84.17 | 168 | 960\% | 118\% | 5.436 | 10960\% | 5 |
| BMC SOFTWARE | BMC | 36.92 | 2964 | 35.84 | 3225 | 33.50 | 3185 | 33.33 | 0.00 | 1236\% | 12.4\% | 6.111 | 11236\% | 7 |
| BOEING | BA | 9224 | 85.24 | 90.34 | 84.60 | 9185 | 88.35 | 8877 | 140 | 1556\% | 175\% | 68.818 | 115 56\% | 12 |
| BOSTON PROPS | Exp | 13302 | 117.00 | 12656 | 10907 | \$18.22 | 10752 | 11857 | 272 | 600\% | 8.6\% | 13.672 | 10600\% | 2 |
| BOSTON SCIENTIFIC | BSX | 18.47 | 15.85 | 18.69 | 16.61 | 1735 | 15.67 | 1711 | 000 | 956\% | 0.6\% | 23.569 | 10956\% | 5 |
| BRISTOL MYERS SQUBB | BMY | 2933 | 2589 | 2939 | 25.73 | 26.41 | 2460 | 26.89 | 112 | $1158 \%$ | 16.6\% | 53.355 | 11158\% | 10 |
| BROADCOM 'A' | BRCM | 3705 | 3131 | 3470 | 2927 | 35.18 | 3139 | 3315 | 000 | 23.14\% | 23.1\% | 15.493 | 123 14\% | 11 |
| BROWN-FORMAN ' ${ }^{\prime}$ | BFB | 6825 | 6453 | 68.14 | 6420 | 6980 | 6527 | 6670 | 121 | 10.40\% | 125\% | 4.254 | 11040\% | 3 |
| BRUNSWICK | BC | 3486 | 32.00 | 3464 | 2967 | 3287 | 3125 | 3255 | 060 | 983\% | 120\% | 2.918 | $10983 \%$ | B |
| BURL NTHN SANTA FE C | BNI | 8590 | 7818 | 8156 | 7151 | 7890 | 7189 | 7799 | 100 | 14.10\% | 45.6\% | 27.830 | 114.10\% | 6 |
| CA | CA | 2746 | 2450 | 2577 | 2298 | 2335 | 2129 | 2423 | 016 | 13.61\% | 44.4\% | 13.442 | 113.61\% | 7 |
| CAMPBELL SOUP | CPB | 4265 | 3850 | 3894 | 3720 | 3998 | 3781 | 39.18 | 080 | 6.78\% | 91\% | 15.487 | 106.78\% | 11 |
| CAPITAL ONE FINL | COF | 83.84 | 75.78 | 8073 | 7530 | 7874 | 75.75 | 78.36 | 0.11 | 1256\% | 127\% | 23,399 | 112 56\% | 12 |
| CARDINAL HEALTH | CAH | 73.10 | 69.50 | 7334 | 63.32 | 6699 | 6405 | 68.38 | 0.36 | 14 15\% | 148\% | 27.849 | 114 15\% | 10 |
| CAREMARK RX | CMX | 64.34 | 60.20 | 6159 | 5492 | 58.08 | 46.83 | 5766 | 0.40 | 1854\% | 19\%\% | 26,035 | 11854\% | 11 |
| CARNIVAL | CCL. | 5241 | 45.75 | 52.73 | 49.69 | 50.31 | 46.81 | 4962 | 110 | 1463\% | 173\% | 28.642 | 114.63\% | 8 |
| CATERPILLAR | CAT | 68.43 | 63.01 | 6434 | 5798 | 63.95 | 6030 | 6300 | 120 | 1347\% | 15.8\% | 41.010 | $11347 \%$ | 4 |
| CB RICHARD ELIIS GP | CBG | 3915 | 3200 | 3784 | 3250 | 34.26 | 3174 | 3458 | 000 | 1133\% | 113\% | 7.337 | 11133\% | 3 |
| CBS 'B' | CBS | 3227 | 28.45 | 3197 | 30.50 | 32.04 | 29.45 | 3078 | 088 | 10.02\% | 13.4\% | 21,249 | 110.02\% | 6 |
| CELGENE | CELG | 57.41 | 5230 | 58.60 | 5269 | 60.12 | 5350 | 55.77 | 000 | 50.81\% | 50.8\% | 18.080 | 15081\% | 8 |
| CENTERPOINT EN | CNP | 1895 | 1725 | 1754 | 16.40 | 16.87 | 1602 | 1717 | 068 | 1100\% | 45.7\% | 5.475 | 11100\% | 4 |
| CENTEX | CTX | 55.62 | 4594 | 56.45 | 5056 | 58.42 | 5438 | 53.56 | 016 | 13.33\% | 137\% | 5.505 | 113.33\% | 3 |
| CENTURYTEE. | CTL. | 4680 | 4430 | 4499 | 4266 | 44.11 | 4199 | 4414 | 026 | 3.50\% | $4 \%$ | 5.125 | 103.50\% | 6 |
| CH ROBINSON WWD | CHRW | 54.67 | 5026 | 5350 | 4211 | 44.40 | 39.44 | 4740 | 0.72 | 1617\% | 18.0\% | 8.703 | 116.17\% | 6 |
| CHARIES SCHWAB | SCHW | 1997 | 1795 | 20.86 | 1799 | 19.49 | 1778 | 19.01 | 0.20 | 1526\% | 165\% | 22.963 | 155.26\% | 7 |
| CHESAPEAKE ENERGY | CHK | 3183 | 2888 | 3011 | 2727 | 3416 | 29.00 | 30.21 | 0.24 | 1500\% | 10.0\% | 13,75! | 11500\% | 5 |
| CHEVRON | cVX | 7496 | 68.02 | 73.44 | 6848 | 7620 | 7183 | 7216 | 208 | 5.16\% | 84\% | 145.601 | 105 16\% | 5 |
| CHIMERC EX HDG | CME | 58766 | 510.00 | 596.30 | 515.96 | 550.33 | 50305 | 54388 | 3.44 | 2223\% | 23.0\% | 18.808 | 122 23\% | 5 |
| CHubb | CB | 53.60 | 50.60 | 5386 | 5157 | 5368 | 5101 | 5239 | 116 | 982\% | 12.4\% | 20.846 | 10982\% | 9 |
| CIENA | CEEN | 3280 | 26.08 | 30.56 | 2708 | 29.73 | 2439 | 28.44 | 000 | 1088\% | 10.9\% | 2.302 | 11088\% | 8 |
| CIGNA | Cl | 14670 | 13199 | 13299 | 12700 | 13265 | 12412 | 13258 | 010 | 1194\% | 12.\% | 14.463 | 11194\% | 10 |
| CINCINNATI FIN | CINF | 46.24 | 4299 | 46.00 | 44.49 | 46.89 | 4380 | 45.07 | 1.42 | 10.50\% | 14.2\% | 7.408 | 11050\% | 2 |
| CINTAS | CTAS | 4289 | 40.16 | 4205 | 3968 | 43.24 | 38.48 | 4108 | 039 | 1389\% | 15.0\% | 6.285 | $11389 \%$ | 9 |
| CIRCUIT CITY STORES | CC | 2202 | 18.99 | 20.90 | 18.95 | 25.52 | 1825 | 2077 | 016 | 16.45\% | 17.4\% | 3,107 | 116 45\% | 18 |
| CISCO SYSTEMS | CSCO | 28.85 | 2544 | 28.99 | 25.76 | 2796 | 26.45 | 2724 | 0.00 | 1463\% | 14.6\% | 152.813 | 11463\% | 10 |
| CIT GP | Cl | 6159 | 5492 | 59.23 | 5412 | 56.66 | 5121 | 5629 | 1.00 | 775\% | 9.8\% | 10.789 | 10775\% | 5 |
| CItigroup | C | 5550 | 4956 | 56.28 | 5350 | 5700 | 4883 | 53.45 | 216 | 981\% | 148\% | 245.536 | 109.81\% | 13 |
| CIIZENS COMMS | CZN | 1521 | 14.01 | 1469 | 1392 | 14.49 | 1395 | 1438 | 100 | 404\% | 119\% | 4.764 | 104.04\% | 7 |
| CITRIX SYS | CTXS | 3330 | 30.86 | 3299 | 2610 | 2975 | 26.62 | 2994 | 0.00 | 1460\% | 146\% | 5.645 | 114.60\% | 10 |
| CLEAR CHL COMMS | CCU | 3714 | 35.61 | 3755 | 3531 | 3578 | 35.16 | 36.09 | 0.75 | 1201\% | 145\% | 17.867 | 11201\% | 5 |
| CLOROX | CLX | 6750 | 6250 | 6620 | 6284 | 6490 | 63.21 | 6453 | 124 | 1030\% | 125\% | 9.514 | 110.30\% | 10 |
| CMS ENERGY | CMS | 18.41 | 1663 | 16.88 | 1598 | 1700 | 15.93 | 16.81 | 0.20 | 6.60\% | 78\% | 3.797 | 106.60\% | 5 |
| COACH | COH | 5103 | 4247 | 47.03 | 4251 | 4499 | 4185 | 4498 | 0.00 | 2069\% | 207\% | 17.642 | 12069\% | 16 |
| COCA COLA | KO | 4855 | 4556 | 4900 | 4749 | 4935 | 46.23 | 4770 | 136 | 8.47\% | 118\% | 106.249 | 108 47\% | 7 |
| COCA COLA ENTS | CCE | 2125 | 20.05 | 2122 | 20.12 | 2103 | 1997 | 2061 | 024 | 8.69\% | 10.0\% | 9.586 | 10869\% | 7 |
| COGNIZANT TECH SLIN 'A' | CTSH | 9555 | 8467 | 85.37 | 75.75 | 8249 | 7527 | 8318 | 000 | 34.92\% | 34.9\% | 12.404 | 13492\% | 12 |
| COLGATE-PALM | CL | 69.00 | 66.67 | 68.56 | 65.01 | 66.48 | 6416 | 66.65 | 128 | 10.23\% | 125\% | 34.219 | 110.23\% | 11 |
| COMBANC | CBH | 35.01 | 33.00 | 36.15 | 30.45 | 36.66 | 3425 | 34.25 | 052 | 13.73\% | 15.0\% | 6.144 | 113.73\% | 11 |
| COMCAST A' | CMCSA | 2946 | 24.92 | 30.18 | 2789 | 28.94 | 2683 | 28.04 | 000 | 18.47\% | 185\% | 52.213 | 118.47\% | 7 |
| COMERICA | CMA | 63.39 | 59.21 | 5997 | 5768 | 5972 | 5755 | 59.59 | 256 | 6.86\% | 118\% | 9.443 | 106.86\% | 9 |
| COMPASS BANCSHARES | CBSS | 70.74 | 6074 | 6108 | 5861 | 60.88 | 56.81 | 6148 | 172 | $1014 \%$ | 134\% | 8.722 | 110 14\% | 7 |
| COMPUTER SCIS | CSC | 56.25 | 5202 | 53.20 | 5075 | 5413 | 5137 | 5295 | 0.00 | 1075\% | 10.8\% | 8,893 | 11075\% | 10 |


| COMPUWARE | CPWR | 9.68 | 8.92 | 903 | 8.28 | 875 | 829 | 8.83 | 0.00 | 1100\% | 140\% | 3.174 | 11100\% | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CONAGRA FOODS | CAG | 26.40 | 2489 | 2773 | 2563 | 28.35 | 25.27 | 2638 | 072 | 717\% | 103\% | 12.331 | 107 17\% | 6 |
| CONOCOPHLLLPS | COP | 68.44 | 64.01 | 7150 | 6159 | 74.89 | 66.05 | 6775 | 164 | 700\% | 98\% | 106.751 | 10700\% | 1 |
| CONSOL EN | CNX | 38.06 | 3396 | 35.00 | 2915 | 3772 | 3188 | 3430 | 028 | 16.93\% | 170\% | 6.385 | $11693 \%$ | 4 |
| CONSOLIDATED EDISON | ED | 5005 | 4800 | 4870 | 4707 | 4928 | 4755 | 4844 | 232 | 296\% | 82\% | 12.347 | 10296\% | 5 |
| CONSTELLATION BRANDS ${ }^{\circ} \times$ | STZ | 24.89 | 2301 | 2917 | 24.07 | 2914 | 2779 | 2635 | 0.00 | 1175\% | 11.8\% | 4,104 | 11175\% | 7 |
| CONSTELLATION EN | CEG | 8316 | 7255 | 7265 | 68.78 | 7020 | 6770 | 7251 | 174 | 1250\% | 15.4\% | 14.006 | 112 50\% | 4 |
| CONVERGYS | CVG | 2718 | 25.38 | 2650 | 23.84 | 2432 | 23.45 | 25.11 | 0.00 | 11.44\% | 114\% | 3.450 | $11144 \%$ | 9 |
| COOPERINDS | CBE | 9623 | 89.74 | 95.66 | 88.32 | 94.49 | 8828 | 9212 | 168 | 12.43\% | 14.6\% | 8.269 | 112 43\% | 7 |
| CORNING | GLW | 2280 | 19.56 | 2173 | 18.12 | 2234 | 18.62 | 20.53 | 0.00 | 1750\% | 17.5\% | 31.755 | 117 50\% | 8 |
| COSTCO WHOLESALE | COST | 5870 | 55.05 | 5725 | 5243 | 5512 | 5173 | 55.05 | 0.52 | 1299\% | 141\% | 25,217 | $11299 \%$ | 16 |
| COUNTRYWIDE FINL | CFF | 4519 | 36.93 | 4526 | 39.86 | 4310 | 3921 | 4159 | 0.60 | 1083\% | 12.5\% | 22.992 | 110.83\% | 9 |
| COVENTRY HLTHCR. | CVH | 56.87 | 5120 | 5220 | 48.78 | 5185 | 4828 | 5153 | 0.00 | 1355\% | ¢3.6\% | 8,661 | 113.55\% | 11 |
| CSX | $\operatorname{csx}$ | 4253 | 36.63 | 3700 | 33.50 | 3789 | 3355 | 36.85 | 0.48 | 1686\% | t65\% | 15.799 | 116.86\% | 4 |
| CUMMINS | CMI | 146.80 | 133.02 | 135.00 | 11264 | 124.27 | 11755 | 12821 | 1.44 | 1256\% | 13.0\% | 7,020 | 11256\% | 5 |
| CVS | CVS | 33.58 | 30.76 | 33.72 | 30.46 | 3183 | 2847 | 31.47 | 019 | 13.95\% | 147\% | 25.613 | 11395\% | 6 |
| DR HORTON | DHI | 3113 | 2505 | 2938 | 2505 | 2781 | 2571 | 2736 | 060 | 13.29\% | 15.9\% | 7.943 | 113.29\% | 7 |
| DANAHER | DHR | 75.00 | 70.04 | 75.97 | 70.47 | 7440 | 7137 | 72.88 | 008 | 1489\% | 150\% | 21.600 | 11489\% | 12 |
| DARDEN RESTAURANTS | DRI | 43.23 | 3898 | 40.68 | 3815 | 4162 | 39.51 | 4036 | 0.46 | 1205\% | $134 \%$ | 5.777 | 11205\% | 16 |
| DEAN FOODS NEW | DF | 46.39 | 4291 | 44.78 | 4095 | 43.55 | 4223 | 4347 | 000 | 10.04\% | 10.0\% | 6.291 | 11004\% | 6 |
| DEERE | DE | 11650 | 100.44 | 10095 | 90.23 | 98.51 | 93.55 | 100.03 | 176 | 967\% | 197\% | 23,930 | 10967\% | 7 |
| DELL | DELL | 2551 | 2251 | 27.48 | 2357 | 2758 | 25.04 | 25.28 | 0.00 | 1238\% | 12.4\% | 52.656 | 11238\% | 14 |
| DEVON ENERGY | DVN | 7124 | 6478 | 7091 | 6324 | 74.49 | 66.23 | 6848 | 0.45 | 11 19\% | 12.0\% | 28.487 | 11119\% | 5 |
| DILLARDS A ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | DDS | 3610 | 3290 | 3578 | 3278 | 3615 | 33.89 | 34.60 | 0.16 | 6.00\% | 6.5\% | 2.469 | 10600\% | 7 |
| DOLLAR GENERAL | DG | 1801 | 16.38 | 17.88 | 16.16 | 1617 | 1501 | 16.60 | 0.20 | $1212 \%$ | 13.5\% | 5.124 | 112 $12 \%$ | 11 |
| DOMINION RES | D | 8830 | 8297 | 84.00 | 79.67 | 8430 | 8039 | 83.27 | 284 | 730\% | 112\% | 30.066 | 10730\% | 5 |
| DONNELLEYRR\& SONS | RRD | 38.71 | 35.40 | 3748 | 35.22 | 36.00 | 3493 | 36.29 | 104 | 1000\% | 13.4\% | 7.771 | 110.00\% | 4 |
| DOVER | DOV | 50.92 | 4713 | 5000 | 4712 | 5040 | 4829 | 48.98 | 074 | 1267\% | 14.5\% | 9.632 | 11267\% | 3 |
| DOW CHEMICALS | DOW | 4726 | 4110 | 4268 | 39.02 | 40.65 | 3945 | 4169 | 150 | 980\% | 14.0\% | 40.630 | 10980\% | 4 |
| DOW JONES \& CO | DJ | 38.34 | 35.43 | 40.08 | 36.61 | 39.20 | 3560 | 3754 | 100 | 13.66\% | 16.9\% | 2.231 | 113.66\% | 8 |
| dte energy | DTE | 48.69 | 46.03 | 49.42 | 4514 | 49.24 | 4698 | 4758 | 212 | 567\% | 107\% | 8,300 | 105.67\% | 3 |
| DU PONT EI DE NEMOURS | DD | 5367 | 4863 | 5100 | 4758 | 49.68 | 45.90 | 49.41 | 148 | 801\% | 115\% | 46.289 | 108.01\% | 6 |
| DUKE ENERGY | DUK | 20.43 | 1943 | 2000 | 1840 | 20.09 | 18.30 | 19.44 | 084 | 5.25\% | 10:\% | 24,421 | 105 25\% | 4 |
| DYNEGY 'A' | DYN | 8.81 | 695 | 725 | 6.47 | 732 | 659 | 723 | 000 | 4.00\% | 4.0\% | 3,230 | 10400\% | 1 |
| E TRADE FINL | ETFC | 2489 | 2225 | 2608 | 2250 | 2409 | 2218 | 23.67 | 0.00 | $1430 \%$ | 143\% | 9.688 | 11430\% | 5 |
| EASTMAN CHEMICALS | EMN | 6183 | 5760 | 6322 | 5754 | 6000 | 5773 | 59.65 | 176 | 667\% | 10.0\% | 4.817 | 10667\% | 3 |
| EASTMAN KODAK | EK | 2708 | 23.74 | 2650 | 2438 | 2654 | 25.13 | 25.56 | 0.50 | 475\% | 6.0\% | 6.805 | 104.75\% | 4 |
| EATON | ETN | 84.89 | 76.78 | 7858 | 7191 | 7884 | 7432 | 7755 | 172 | 1087\% | \$3.5\% | 11.880 | 110.87\% | 9 |
| EBAY | EbAY | 3435 | 3088 | 3380 | 28.60 | 3322 | 3002 | 3181 | 000 | 2225\% | 223\% | 42.980 | 122 25\% | 17 |
| ECOLAB | ECL. | 44.91 | 4162 | 4537 | 4277 | 4578 | 4381 | 4404 | 0.46 | $1752 \%$ | 768\% | 10.395 | 19752\% | 7 |
| EDISONINTL. | EIX | 5100 | 4500 | 46.28 | 4276 | 4715 | 4479 | 4616 | 116 | 650\% | 9.3\% | 15.414 | 106.50\% | 2 |
| ELPASO | EP | 15.66 | 1423 | 15.63 | 1426 | 1584 | 1440 | 15.00 | 016 | 1200\% | $133 \%$ | 9.770 | 11200\% | 4 |
| ELECTRONIC ARTS | ERTS | 5439 | 4914 | 54.43 | 4796 | 56.68 | 50.21 | 5214 | 000 | 18.69\% | 187\% | 15.223 | 118.69\% | 10 |
| ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS | EDS | 2994 | 2596 | 2774 | 2575 | 2793 | 26.33 | 2728 | 020 | $2133 \%$ | 223\% | 14.255 | 12133\% | 3 |
| ELILLLLY | LLY | 5520 | 5230 | 5437 | 5157 | 54.92 | 5113 | 5325 | 170 | 8.24\% | 110\% | 58,582 | 108 24\% | 13 |
| EMBARQ | EQ | 5756 | 5194 | 5700 | 5162 | 53.32 | 49.90 | 5356 | 200 | 3.33\% | 75\% | 7.981 | 10333\% | 3 |
| EMC | EMC | 14.89 | 13.47 | 1454 | 1307 | 1379 | 1286 | 13.77 | 0.00 | 14.49\% | 14.5\% | 29.865 | 11449\% | 9 |
| EMERSON ELECTRIC | EMR | 46.08 | 4273 | 4520 | 43.11 | 4465 | 4195 | 43.95 | 105 | 1043\% | 13.2\% | 34.133 | 110.43\% | 7 |
| ENSCOINTL | ESV | 5293 | 48.52 | 5119 | 45.00 | 5575 | 4983 | 50.54 | 010 | 3400\% | 343\% | 7.430 | 13400\% | 7 |
| ENTERGY | ETR | 105.20 | 9245 | 9416 | 89.60 | 9403 | 9050 | 94.32 | 216 | 825\% | t0.9\% | 19.910 | 108.25\% | 4 |
| EOGRES | EOG | 69.95 | 6440 | 6975 | 59.21 | 7072 | 6187 | 65.98 | 036 | 984\% | 50.5\% | 16.050 | $10984 \%$ | 6 |
| EQuFax | EFX | 4200 | 3746 | 4164 | 39.37 | 4164 | 3773 | 3997 | 016 | 10.63\% | 119\% | 4.72 | 11063\% | 8 |
| ESTEE LAUDER $\cos { }^{\circ}{ }^{\circ}$ | EL | 48.73 | 45.60 | 4815 | 39.52 | 4215 | 4028 | 4407 | 050 | $1144 \%$ | 120\% | 5.693 | 11144\% | 10 |
| EXELON | EXC | 7231 | 5993 | 6299 | 58.74 | 6282 | 6082 | 6294 | 176 | 875\% | 120\% | 43.037 | 10875\% | 4 |
| EXPRESS SCRIPTS ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | ESRX | 79.58 | 6925 | 7203 | 6464 | 75.00 | 65.99 | 7108 | 000 | 1708\% | 17\% | 9.960 | 17708\% | 12 |
| EXXON MOBLL | XOM | 76.10 | 7118 | 76.27 | 7064 | 79.00 | 7482 | 7467 | 128 | 6.15\% | 8:\% | 408,332 | 10615\% | 4 |
| FAMILY DOLLAR STORES | FDO | 33.31 | 2876 | 3274 | 2859 | 2999 | 2777 | 3019 | 0.46 | 1175\% | 13.6\% | 4.355 | 11175\% | 12 |
| FANNIE MAE | FNM | 6025 | 55.85 | 60.44 | 5497 | 6150 | 56.34 | 5823 | 160 | 9.22\% | 12.4\% | 53.482 | 10922\% | 5 |
| FEDERATED DEPT STRS | FD | 45.00 | 40.88 | 4161 | 3612 | 4160 | 3739 | 40.43 | 0.51 | 1216\% | 13.7\% | 23,239 | 112 16\% | 8 |
| FEDERATED INVRS ${ }^{\text {B }}$ | FII | 38.40 | 3502 | 36.90 | 3337 | 3420 | 3244 | 35.06 | 072 | 1125\% | 13.7\% | 3.707 | 11125\% | B |
| FEDEX | FDX | 12142 | 110.30 | 11290 | 106.63 | 11774 | 10669 | 11261 | 0.36 | 1354\% | 13.9\% | 34.551 | 11354\% | 7 |
| FIDELITY NAT INFO SVS. | FIS | 4775 | 4242 | 4260 | 39.99 | 4187 | 3935 | 4233 | 0.20 | 1288\% | 53.4\% | 12.979 | 11288\% | 8 |
| FIFTH THIRD BANCORP | FITB | 4130 | 39.57 | 41.41 | 38.86 | 4157 | 3914 | 4031 | 160 | 1045\% | 15.1\% | 22.317 | 110.45\% | 10 |
| FIRST DATA | FDC | 2596 | 24.19 | 2650 | 24.34 | 2574 | 2329 | 2500 | 012 | $1167 \%$ | 122\% | 18.614 | 11167\% | 12 |
| FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL | FHN | 45.44 | 4249 | 4405 | 39.75 | 4200 | 3961 | 4222 | 180 | 733\% | 122\% | 5.356 | 107 33\% | 9 |
| FIRSTENERGY | FE | 66.29 | 5936 | 6123 | 5777 | 6170 | 5987 | 61.04 | 200 | 750\% | 113\% | 19.679 | 10750\% | 6 |
| FISERV | FISV | 55.08 | 5193 | 5387 | 5111 | 53.60 | 50.24 | 5264 | 000 | 1421\% | 142\% | 8.843 | 11421\% | 14 |
| FLUOR | FLR | 90.00 | 8300 | 8281 | 75.22 | 88.01 | 80.88 | 8332 | 080 | 23.33\% | 24.0\% | 7.536 | 123 33\% | 4 |
| FORD MOTOR | F | 897 | 760 | 862 | 743 | 815 | 685 | 794 | 0.00 | 8.98\% | 9.0\% | 13.799 | 10898\% | 2 |
| FOREST LABS | FRX | 5797 | 5116 | 56.54 | 50.00 | 5213 | 48.82 | 5277 | 0.00 | 1539\% | 15.4\% | 16.163 | 115 39\% | 16 |


| FORTUNE BRANDS | FO | 8421 | 7895 | 8690 | 7950 | 8596 | 79.97 | 8258 | 156 | 10.56\% | 12.8\% | 12.061 | 110 56\% | 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FPL GROUP | FPL | 6307 | 5667 | 5687 | 53.72 | 5557 | 5304 | 56.49 | 164 | 8.40\% | 11.8\% | 23,455 | 108.40\% | 6 |
| FRANK RES | BEN | 126.71 | 115.16 | 12177 | 11131 | 11470 | 104.49 | 11569 | 060 | 1487\% | 15.5\% | 29.034 | 114.87\% | 8 |
| FREDDE MAC | FRE | 6697 | 6282 | 68.55 | 6371 | 69.85 | 66.30 | 66.37 | 200 | 964\% | 13.2\% | 43.155 | 109.64\% | 6 |
| FREEPORT-MCMOR CPR \& GD I | IFCX | 6199 | 5265 | 58.56 | 4885 | 6289 | 53.40 | 56.39 | 125 | 13.50\% | 10.2\% | 10.758 | 11350\% | 2 |
| GANNETT | GCI | 6350 | 5792 | 60.94 | 57.46 | 6146 | 59.28 | 60.09 | $\dagger 24$ | 8.26\% | 10.0\% | 14.176 | 108 26\% | 7 |
| GAP | GPS | 20.26 | 18.21 | 2104 | 1850 | 2070 | 18.56 | 1955 | 0.32 | 1063\% | 125\% | 14.915 | 11063\% | 13 |
| GENERAL DYNAMICS | GD | 80.48 | 7425 | 8128 | 7359 | 75.97 | 7236 | 76.32 | 0.92 | 1013\% | 115\% | 30.534 | 110 43\% | 10 |
| GENERAL ELECTRIC | GE | 36.60 | 3450 | 38.28 | 35.76 | 38.49 | 3496 | 3643 | 112 | 1067\% | 44.3\% | 359.443 | 11067\% | 11 |
| GENERAL MILLS | GIS | 58.33 | 5457 | 5798 | 56.08 | 5923 | 55.79 | 5700 | 148 | B.13\% | 11\% | 19.156 | 10813\% | 7 |
| GENERAL MOTORS | GM | 3724 | 3131 | 3333 | 29.10 | 3113 | 28.84 | 31.82 | 100 | 6.03\% | 9.6\% | 17.319 | 10603\% | 1 |
| GENUINE PARTS | GPC | 5075 | 47.46 | 48.60 | 46.19 | 48.34 | 4629 | 4794 | 1.46 | 963\% | 132\% | 8.215 | 10963\% | 4 |
| GENWORTH FINANCIAL | GNW | 3716 | 3470 | 3527 | 33.69 | 3501 | 3218 | 3467 | 036 | 1036\% | 176\% | 15,845 | 110.36\% | 9 |
| genzyme | GENZ | 6784 | 6078 | 6877 | 60.53 | 6435 | 5971 | 6366 | 000 | $1736 \%$ | 174\% | 16,013 | $11736 \%$ | 7 |
| GILEAD SCIENCES | GLD | 7497 | 6951 | 6698 | 6192 | 6823 | 6311 | 6745 | 000 | 1791\% | 170\% | 32,390 | 11791\% | 10 |
| GOLDMAN SACHS GP | GS | 22275 | 194.65 | 220.51 | 19782 | 20670 | 19152 | 205.66 | 140 | 1553\% | 184\% | 80.491 | 115.53\% | 9 |
| GOODRICH | GR | 5200 | 4665 | 49.16 | 4497 | 4648 | 44.29 | 4726 | 080 | 1477\% | 18.8\% | 6,049 | 11477\% | 10 |
| GOOGLE 'A' | GOOG | 506.01 | 443.04 | 573.00 | 46111 | 49240 | 45234 | 47798 | 000 | 36.54\% | 36.5\% | 97.995 | 136.54\% | 16 |
| GRAINGER W W | GWW | 80.37 | 76.28 | 7787 | 6877 | 7442 | 69.68 | 74.57 | 116 | 1221\% | 141\% | 6.518 | 11221\% | 8 |
| H\&RBLOCK | HRB | 2495 | 2154 | 24.86 | 2286 | 24.05 | 2269 | 23.49 | 0.54 | \$3.67\% | 10.4\% | 6,946 | 11367\% | 6 |
| Hallieurton | HAL | 3230 | 29.35 | 30.90 | 2765 | 33.78 | 3080 | 3080 | 0.30 | 18.00\% | 19.2\% | 31.151 | 11800\% | 5 |
| HARLEY-DAVIDSON | HOG | 70.32 | 65.23 | 7403 | 68.26 | 74.74 | 6764 | 7004 | 0.84 | 1289\% | 143\% | 16.424 | 11289\% | 9 |
| HARMAN INTL INDS | HAR | 10568 | 9453 | 10452 | 9240 | 10790 | 9853 | 100.59 | 005 | 21 13\% | 21.2\% | 6.386 | 121 13\% | 7 |
| HARRAHS ENTM | HET | 85.55 | 83.75 | 8558 | 8231 | 8425 | 7752 | 8316 | 160 | 1366\% | 10.0\% | 15,665 | 11366\% | 9 |
| HARTFORD FINL SVS GP | HG | 9795 | 9255 | 9504 | 9030 | 9375 | 8378 | 923 | 200 | 1072\% | 133\% | 30.174 | 110.72\% | 8 |
| HASbro | HAS | 2980 | 2761 | 2894 | 2704 | 2769 | 2614 | 2787 | 0.64 | 1050\% | 132\% | 4,571 | 110.50\% | 4 |
| HENZHJ | HNZ | 4795 | 4551 | 4716 | 4490 | 4675 | 44.13 | 4607 | 140 | 734\% | 108\% | 14.899 | $10734 \%$ | 7 |
| HERCULES | HPC | 2140 | 1958 | 2009 | 1828 | 1973 | 1811 | 19.53 | 000 | 1000\% | 10.0\% | 2.189 | 11000\% | 1 |
| HESS | HES | 5660 | 5203 | 5486 | 4596 | 5270 | 48.40 | 5176 | 0.40 | 907\% | 10.0\% | 14.457 | 10907\% | 4 |
| HEWLETT-PACKARD | HPQ | 43.24 | 3847 | 43.72 | 4105 | 4170 | 3921 | 4123 | 0.32 | 1288\% | 13.8\% | 105.214 | 11268\% | 13 |
| Hilton hotels | HLT | 3782 | 3411 | 36.49 | 3315 | 35.79 | 3237 | 3496 | 0.16 | 1349\% | 14.0\% | 13.493 | 113.49\% | 10 |
| HOME DEPOT | HD | 4201 | 39.29 | 4184 | 3906 | 40.37 | 3818 | 4013 | 0.90 | 1261\% | 55.3\% | 79.614 | 11261\% | 13 |
| HONEYWELLINTL. | HON | 48.50 | 45.51 | 45.99 | 4314 | 45.77 | 41.49 | 4507 | 100 | $1113 \%$ | +3.7\% | 36.725 | $11113 \%$ | 8 |
| HOSPIRA | HSP | 40.66 | 35.30 | 3713 | 33.60 | 3476 | 3258 | 35.67 | 000 | 1075\% | 10.8\% | 6.089 | 11075\% | 4 |
| HUDSON CITY BANC | HCEK | 1400 | 13.18 | 1425 | 13.59 | 1409 | 1308 | 13.70 | 032 | 1700\% | 19.9\% | 7.540 | 11700\% | 5 |
| HUMANA | HUM | 6450 | 55.17 | 5668 | 5100 | 5693 | 5285 | 56.19 | 000 | $18.54 \%$ | 185\% | 9,955 | 118.54\% | 11 |
| HUNTINGTON BCSH | HBAN | 2410 | 23.04 | 2414 | 2284 | 2497 | 2287 | 23.66 | 106 | 580\% | 10\%\% | 5.353 | 105.80\% | 5 |
| IACINTERACTIVECORP | 1 ACl | 4099 | 3770 | 39.48 | 3687 | 3866 | 35.49 | 3820 | 000 | 1246\% | 12.5\% | 10.158 | 112 46\% | 6 |
| HLINOS TOOL WKS | ITW | 5365 | 5082 | 5120 | 4560 | 4809 | 45.93 | 49.22 | 084 | 1268\% | 14\% | 28.444 | 11268\% | 11 |
| IMS HEALTH | RX | 30.07 | 2805 | 28.86 | 2626 | 2798 | 26.97 | 2803 | 0.12 | 1245\% | 13.0\% | 5,571 | 112.45\% | 6 |
| INGERSOLL.RAND | IR | 45.62 | 4110 | 43.89 | 3825 | 4160 | 3783 | 4138 | 072 | 1196\% | 14.0\% | 13.115 | 11196\% | 9 |
| INTEGRYS ENERGY GROUP | TEG | 58.04 | 53.05 | 55.47 | 5272 | 54.83 | 5187 | 5433 | 264 | 5.00\% | 10.5\% | 4.112 | 10500\% | 2 |
| INTEL | INTC | 2167 | 19.80 | 2230 | 20.14 | 2145 | 20.03 | 2090 | 0.45 | 1258\% | 45.2\% | 110.822 | 11258\% | 15 |
| INTERNATIONAL BUS MACH | IBM | 100.44 | 9247 | 10090 | 9455 | 9788 | 9055 | 9613 | 120 | 1056\% | \$2.0\% | 136,927 | 11056\% | 9 |
| INTERPUBLIC GP | IPG | 1334 | 1238 | 13.94 | 1208 | 1283 | 11.43 | 1267 | 0.00 | 995\% | 0.9\% | 5.435 | $10995 \%$ | 7 |
| INTLFLAV \& FRAG | IFF | 49.46 | 46.29 | 5100 | 4727 | 4988 | 4692 | 4847 | 0.84 | 1000\% | 120\% | 4.132 | 11000\% | 1 |
| INTL. GAME TECH | IGT | 4480 | 3952 | 4879 | 4168 | 4676 | 4340 | 44.6 | 052 | 1519\% | 106\% | 13,564 | 115 49\% | 8 |
| INTLPAPER | IP | 38.00 | 3359 | 34.86 | 3275 | 3525 | 3290 | 34.56 | 100 | 600\% | 93\% | 15,947 | 10600\% | 2 |
| INTUT | INTU | 3210 | 2893 | 3223 | 28.54 | 3211 | 29.90 | 30.64 | 000 | 1525\% | 153\% | 10.153 | 115.25\% | 8 |
| ITI | ITT | 6171 | 5810 | 6026 | 56.30 | 57.44 | 5250 | 5772 | 056 | 1233\% | 135\% | 10.615 | $11233 \%$ | 3 |
| JABIL CIRCUIT | ${ }^{\mathrm{JBL}}$. | 27.86 | 2395 | 2551 | 23.45 | 29.48 | 23.40 | 25.61 | 028 | 23.97\% | 254\% | 5.594 | 123.97\% | 8 |
| JANUS CAPITAL GP | JNS | 22.40 | 2058 | 2260 | 2004 | 2180 | 19.96 | 2123 | 004 | 1796\% | 182\% | 4,065 | $11796 \%$ | 9 |
| JDS UNIPHASE | JDSU | 1750 | 1550 | 1799 | 1569 | 1865 | 16.61 | 16.99 | 000 | 18.75\% | 18.8\% | 3,231 | 118.75\% | 4 |
| JOHNSON \& JOHNSON | JNJ | 6715 | 6272 | 6822 | 6590 | 6725 | 65.29 | 6509 | 150 | 846\% | $11 \%$ | 179.288 | 108.46\% | 5 |
| JOHNSON CONTROLS | JCl | 9967 | 9130 | 9413 | 8428 | 88.44 | 8109 | 8982 | 132 | 1400\% | 15.8\% | 18.779 | \$1400\% | 5 |
| JONES APPAREE GROUP | JNY | 3431 | 3230 | 35.54 | 3270 | 3451 | 3294 | 3372 | 0.56 | 9.67\% | 11.6\% | 3.518 | 10967\% | 9 |
| JP MORGAN CHASE \& CO | JPM | 5195 | 4760 | 5116 | 4732 | 49.00 | 4551 | 4876 | 136 | 1036\% | 130\% | 167.169 | 11036\% | 9 |
| JUNIPER NETWORKS | JNPR | 20.19 | 1785 | 20.92 | 1784 | 2178 | 18.40 | 1950 | 000 | 1762\% | 178\% | 10.410 | $11762 \%$ | 14 |
| KB HOME | KBH | 56.08 | 48.65 | 54.41 | 4769 | 53.70 | 4951 | 5169 | 100 | 1200\% | 143\% | 4.412 | 11200\% | 6 |
| KELLOGG | K | 50.42 | 48.68 | 5100 | 48.95 | 5095 | 4933 | 49.89 | 116 | 898\% | 117\% | 19.596 | 108.98\% | 10 |
| KEYCORP | KEY | 39.90 | 3742 | 38,30 | 3700 | 38.63 | 35.73 | 3783 | 146 | 691\% | 113\% | 15.099 | 106.91\% | 11 |
| KEYSPAN | KSE | 4136 | 40.60 | 4152 | 40.62 | 4136 | 4079 | 4108 | 190 | 250\% | 7.6\% | 7.148 | 10250\% | 1 |
| KIMBERLY-CLARK | KMB | 7028 | 6725 | 6997 | 6766 | 6858 | 65.90 | 6827 | 212 | 721\% | 10.3\% | 30.692 | $10721 \%$ | 8 |
| KIMCO REALTY | KIM | 5360 | 4893 | 4993 | 4359 | 47 ¢3 | 4420 | 4790 | 144 | 8.00\% | 11.5\% | 11.810 | 10800\% | 1 |
| KINDER MORGAN KANS | KM | 10650 | 10558 | 10702 | 10500 | 106.20 | 10496 | 10588 | 350 | 1000\% | 13.9\% | 14.170 | 11000\% | 2 |
| KINGPHARMS | KG | 1895 | 1750 | 1813 | 1579 | 16.92 | 15.86 | 1719 | 000 | 5.73\% | 5.7\% | 4.483 | 10573\% | 3 |
| KLA TENCOR | KLAC | 54.66 | 4830 | 5284 | 4685 | 5240 | 4926 | 5072 | 0.48 | 1733\% | 88.5\% | 9.968 | $11733 \%$ | 10 |
| KOHLS | KSS | 7463 | 6831 | 7110 | 6584 | 7249 | 6766 | 7001 | 0.00 | 1767\% | 177\% | 23,304 | 11767\% | 17 |
| KROGER | KR | 2669 | 2478 | 25.73 | 2294 | 24.48 | 21.41 | 24.34 | 026 | 892\% | 10.1\% | 17.947 | 10892\% | 8 |
| L3 COMMUNICATIONS | LLL | 8942 | 8275 | 83.25 | 7926 | 84.49 | 7800 | 8286 | 100 | 14.34\% | 15\% | 10.605 | 114 34\% | 8 |


| LABORATORY CORP OF AM HD | (LH) | 81.00 | 7271 | 74.85 | 70.94 | 7430 | 7026 | 7401 | 0.00 | 1313\% | 13.1\% | 8,572 | 113.13\% | 8 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LEGG MASON | LM | 110.17 | 100.55 | 10968 | 9563 | 9875 | 9383 | 10144 | 0.84 | 1350\% | 14.5\% | 13.067 | 113.50\% | 7 |
| LEGGETT\&PLATT | IEG | 2471 | 2359 | 2467 | 23.07 | 2446 | 2311 | 2394 | 0.68 | 1450\% | 18.0\% | 4.272 | 114.50\% | 4 |
| LEHMAN BROS HDG | LEH | 8618 | 7280 | 8413 | 76.20 | 7888 | 7226 | 7841 | 060 | 1263\% | 13.5\% | 37.931 | 11263\% | 6 |
| LENNARA | LEN | 5654 | 4876 | 54.62 | 48.33 | 54.61 | 50.57 | 5224 | 064 | 1121\% | 127\% | 6.200 | 11121\% | 7 |
| LEXMARKINTL GPA | LXK | 6451 | 5924 | 73.20 | 6157 | 7468 | 68.49 | 6695 | 000 | 918\% | 9.2\% | 5.746 | 109 18\% | 9 |
| LIMITED BRANDS | LTD | 29.88 | 2722 | 30.03 | 26.16 | 3196 | 28.77 | 2900 | 0.60 | 13.40\% | 15.9\% | 10.472 | 113 40\% | 16 |
| LINCOLNNAT | LINC | 7118 | 6569 | 6751 | 64.29 | 66.72 | 6252 | 66.32 | 158 | 10.71\% | 13.5\% | 18.768 | 11071\% | 12 |
| LINEAR TECH | LLTC | 34.78 | 30.78 | 3303 | 2972 | 34.42 | 29.81 | 3209 | 072 | 1775\% | 20.6\% | 9.602 | \$1775\% | 14 |
| LIZ CLABBORNE | L.12 | 46.84 | 43.40 | 4618 | 4315 | 4450 | 4219 | 4438 | 022 | 13.67\% | 44\% | 4.509 | 11367\% | 6 |
| LOCKHEED MARTIN | LMT | 10350 | 95.84 | 9875 | 9108 | 93.24 | 8985 | 95.38 | 140 | 1124\% | $130 \%$ | 40.457 | 11124\% | 9 |
| LOWES COMPANES | L.OW | 35.74 | 3244 | 3395 | 3113 | 3198 | 3015 | 3257 | 0.20 | 1538\% | $18 \%$ | 48,638 | 115 38\% | 16 |
| LSIL LOGIC | L.SI | 1019 | 878 | 1067 | 8.95 | 1070 | 8.97 | 971 | 0.00 | 1750\% | 175\% | 3.990 | $11750 \%$ | 2 |
| M\&T BK. | MTE | 12513 | 11880 | 123.21 | 118.47 | 12304 | 11768 | 12106 | 240 | 9.17\% | $115 \%$ | 13.090 | 109 17\% | 6 |
| MANOR CARE | HCR | 5533 | 5283 | 53.43 | 4607 | 48.49 | 46.43 | 50.43 | 0.68 | 14.43\% | 18\% | 3,862 | 11443\% | 7 |
| MARATHON OLL | MRO | 9414 | 8868 | 9150 | 8300 | 9873 | 9030 | 9106 | 160 | 976\% | 11.8\% | 31.370 | 10976\% | 4 |
| MARRIOTT INTL A' | MAR | 5150 | 4636 | 48.31 | 44.79 | 4831 | 44.81 | 4735 | 025 | 15.47\% | 18.1\% | 18.447 | 115 47\% | 11 |
| MARSH \& MCLENNAN | MMC | 3049 | 2895 | 3175 | 29.37 | 3208 | 2975 | 30.40 | 076 | 1108\% | 14.0\% | 16.170 | 11108\% | 6 |
| MARSHALL \& ILSLEY | M 1 | 49.26 | 46.40 | 4874 | 46.13 | 48.62 | 45.46 | 47.44 | 108 | 9.67\% | 12.3\% | 12.123 | 10967\% | 12 |
| MASCO | MAS | 34.72 | 29.64 | 3206 | 28.95 | 30.53 | 28.51 | 3074 | 088 | 1243\% | 85.9\% | 11.400 | 112 43\% | 7 |
| MATTEL. | MAT | 2747 | 2443 | 2478 | 2262 | 23.17 | 2152 | 2400 | 065 | 10.00\% | \$3.2\% | 10.380 | 110.00\% | 4 |
| MAXIMINTEGRATED PRDS | MXIM | 33.71 | 30.05 | 3372 | 3030 | 3286 | 2991 | 3176 | 062 | 18.77\% | 21.2\% | 10.127 | 118.77\% | 13 |
| MBIA | MBI | 73.48 | 65.38 | 7602 | 7023 | 73.49 | 6834 | 7116 | 136 | 10.33\% | 120\% | 8.955 | 11033\% | 6 |
| MCCORMCK \& CONV | MKC | 3959 | 3794 | 3936 | 3715 | 39.82 | 38.44 | 38.72 | 0.80 | 9.59\% | 120\% | 4.428 | 10959\% | 7 |
| MCDONALDS | MCD | 4621 | 4338 | 45.06 | 4254 | 4468 | 4170 | 4393 | 100 | 8.69\% | 113\% | 54.009 | 10869\% | 13 |
| MCGRAW.HIL. | MHP | 6986 | 6277 | 69.98 | 65.01 | 6925 | 6592 | 6713 | 0.82 | 1238\% | 138\% | 22.722 | 11238\% | 5 |
| MCKESSON | MCK | 5807 | 5506 | 56.93 | 50.80 | 5145 | 4843 | 53.46 | 0.24 | 1425\% | 14.8\% | 16.143 | 11425\% | 8 |
| MEADWESTVACO | MWV | 3246 | 2985 | 3074 | 28.52 | 30.50 | 29.15 | 3020 | 092 | 1100\% | 14.0\% | 5.447 | 11100\% | 1 |
| MEDCOHEALTHSETN | MHS | 69.00 | 5793 | 59.45 | 5252 | 55.34 | 49.56 | 5730 | 000 | 1679\% | 10.8\% | 19.193 | 116.79\% | 14 |
| MEDIMMUNE | MED | 35.06 | 30.37 | 35.46 | 3232 | 33.67 | 3138 | 33.04 | 000 | 38.14\% | 3a.1\% | 7.394 | 138.14\% | 3 |
| MEDTRONIC | MDT | 5469 | 49.69 | 5486 | 5221 | 5466 | 5140 | 52.92 | 044 | 13.81\% | 4.8.8\% | 56.578 | 113.8\% | 11 |
| MELLON FINL | MEL | 46.24 | 4250 | 4424 | 41.80 | 43.08 | 3959 | 4291 | 088 | \$151\% | 830\% | 17.625 | 11151\% | 12 |
| MERCK \& CO | MRK | 45.44 | 4235 | 46.55 | 4316 | 4590 | 42.63 | 4434 | 152 | 732\% | 112\% | 95.937 | 107 32\% | 10 |
| MEREDITH | MDP | 6039 | 5735 | 59.05 | 5568 | 5729 | 5360 | 5723 | 0.74 | $1188 \%$ | 134\% | 2.232 | 11188\% | 4 |
| MERRILLLYNCH\& CO | MER | 9598 | 8250 | 98.68 | 9127 | 9393 | 8582 | 9123 | 1.40 | 1275\% | 14.6\% | 72.441 | 11275\% | 7 |
| METLIFE | MET | 6625 | 6212 | 6287 | 58.74 | 59.72 | 5721 | 6115 | 059 | 1101\% | 12.1\% | 47.499 | 11101\% | 10 |
| MGIC INVT | MTG | 7010 | 5955 | 63.83 | 58.55 | 63.50 | 5745 | 6246 | 100 | 1028\% | 12.2\% | 4.786 | 110.28\% | 7 |
| MICRON TECHNOLOGY | MU | 1325 | 1176 | 1431 | 1279 | 15.05 | 13.12 | 13.38 | 000 | 15.33\% | 55.3\% | 8.929 | 115.33\% | 10 |
| MICROSOFT | MSFT | 30.94 | 2779 | 31.48 | 29.40 | 30.26 | 28.80 | 2978 | 0.40 | 13.64\% | 15.3\% | 271.835 | 11364\% | 66 |
| MILIUPORE | MLI. | 76.13 | 68.49 | 6929 | 6529 | 7016 | 66.41 | 6930 | 000 | 15.80\% | 15.8\% | 3.834 | 11580\% | 5 |
| MOLEX | MOLX | 3100 | 2925 | 3234 | 2816 | 3363 | 3155 | 30.99 | 0.30 | 1457\% | 157\% | 2.831 | 114 57\% | 7 |
| MOLSON COORS BREWING 'B' | TAP | 88.06 | 80.30 | 8130 | 7511 | 7699 | 7090 | 78.78 | 128 | 1107\% | 13.0\% | 5.407 | $11107 \%$ | 6 |
| MONSANTO | MON | 5708 | 5104 | 56.24 | 4910 | 53.49 | 4712 | 5235 | 0.50 | 2153\% | 22.8\% | 27.675 | 12153\% | 6 |
| MONSTER WORLDWIDE | MNST | 5479 | 4881 | 5139 | 45.77 | 4820 | 4186 | 48.47 | 000 | 2540\% | 25.4\% | 5.877 | 125 40\% | 15 |
| MOODYS | MCO | 7609 | 6351 | 7260 | 6754 | 7170 | 68.81 | 7004 | 032 | 1407\% | 14.6\% | 18.495 | 114.07\% | 7 |
| MORGAN STANLEY | MS | 8439 | 7304 | 8466 | 79.60 | 83.40 | 74.51 | 7993 | 108 | 1319\% | 14.8\% | 78.275 | 11319\% | 9 |
| MOTOROLA | MOT | 1998 | 1825 | 20.91 | 1790 | 2255 | 20.17 | 1996 | 020 | 1181\% | 13.0\% | 45.062 | 11181\% | 12 |
| MURPHY OLL | MUR | 5300 | 4886 | 5091 | 45.45 | 54.39 | 50.06 | 50.45 | 060 | 10.17\% | 11.0\% | 9.501 | 110.17\% | 4 |
| MYLAN LABORATORIES | MYL | 2275 | 20.99 | 2215 | 1990 | 20.92 | 19.72 | 2107 | 024 | 15.80\% | 77.2\% | 4.383 | 115.80\% | 5 |
| NABORS INDS | NBR | 3274 | 29.27 | 3051 | 2753 | 34.62 | 29.65 | 30.72 | 000 | 18.00\% | 56.0\% | 8.727 | 118.00\% | 3 |
| NAT CITY | NCC | 38.52 | 3743 | 3835 | 34.82 | 37.43 | 35.29 | 36.97 | 156 | 721\% | 12 $1 \%$ | 24.082 | 10721\% | 7 |
| NATIONAL OLWELL VARCO | NOV | 7103 | 59.69 | 6195 | 5375 | 6860 | 6080 | 6264 | 0.00 | 2756\% | 27 0\% | 12.053 | 12756\% | 3 |
| NATIONAL SEMICON. | NSM | 26.15 | 2220 | 2362 | 2165 | 2518 | 22.42 | 2354 | 0.16 | 1386\% | 147\% | 7.954 | 11386\% | 7 |
| NCR | NCR | 4825 | 45.45 | 4760 | 4234 | 43.40 | 40.67 | 4462 | 0.00 | 900\% | 9.0\% | 8.135 | 10900\% | 3 |
| NETWORK APPLIANCE | NTAP | 4062 | 3661 | 40.89 | 36.20 | 4156 | 3826 | 3902 | 000 | 2367\% | 237\% | 13,952 | 12367\% | 12 |
| NEW YORK TIMES 'A' | NYT | 2690 | 2315 | 2437 | 2277 | 24.61 | 2355 | 2423 | 070 | 770\% | 11.0\% | 3,524 | 107 70\% | 6 |
| NEWELL. RUBBERMAID | NWL | 3195 | 2954 | 30.65 | 28.66 | 29.50 | 2831 | 2977 | 084 | 938\% | 12.7\% | 8.413 | 109.38\% | 8 |
| NEWMONT MINING | NEM | 4833 | 4379 | 45.67 | 4191 | 4780 | 4476 | 4538 | 0.40 | 20.00\% | $211 \%$ | 18.216 | 120.00\% | 2 |
| NEWS CORP ${ }^{\prime}$ A' | NWS A | 2410 | 2221 | 23.40 | 2114 | 2194 | 20.29 | 22.18 | 012 | 18.00\% | 187\% | 47.928 | 118.00\% | 3 |
| NICOR | GAS | 4833 | 4535 | 4738 | 44.46 | 49.86 | 46.46 | 46.97 | 186 | 310\% | 75\% | 2.036 | 103.10\% | 1 |
| NIKE ${ }^{\text {B }}$ | NKE | 108.90 | 9844 | 10035 | 9492 | 10120 | 94.79 | 99.77 | 148 | 13.56\% | 15.3\% | 19.535 | $11356 \%$ | 9 |
| NISOURCE | N | 2480 | 2367 | 24.49 | 2304 | 28.03 | 23.72 | 2463 | 092 | 3.33\% | 75\% | 6.427 | 10333\% | 6 |
| NOBLE | NE | 7671 | 6881 | 76.02 | 6798 | 8231 | 75.01 | 74.47 | 0.16 | 4625\% | 488\% | 9.368 | 14625\% | 4 |
| NORDSTROM | JWN | 59.70 | 5112 | 5599 | 50.00 | 51.40 | 4726 | 5258 | 0.54 | 1380\% | 15.0\% | 13.471 | 11380\% | 14 |
| NORFOLK SOUTHERN | NSC | 5268 | 46.68 | 5384 | 47.05 | 5198 | 4862 | 5014 | 088 | 15.45\% | 17.0\% | 18.396 | 11545\% | 4 |
| NORTHERN TRUST | NTRS | 63.49 | 59.72 | 6269 | 5866 | 61.40 | 5600 | 6033 | 100 | 1205\% | 14.0\% | 12.973 | 11205\% | 14 |
| NORTHROP GRUMMAN | NOC | 75.72 | 70.50 | 7192 | 6623 | 6877 | 6604 | 6986 | 1.48 | $1167 \%$ | 14.2\% | 25.152 | 11167\% | 10 |
| NOVELL. | NOVL | 732 | 6.18 | 735 | 605 | 6.36 | 570 | 649 | 000 | 1133\% | 113\% | 2.187 | 11133\% | 6 |
| NOVELLUS SYSTEMS | NVLS | 33.09 | 3046 | 34.97 | 29.63 | 35.00 | 3143 | 3243 | 015 | 1775\% | 80.3\% | 3.858 | 11775\% | 8 |
| NUCOR | NUE | 66.99 | 59.42 | 6488 | 53.20 | 6755 | 5460 | 6111 | 044 | $666 \%$ | 75\% | 17.746 | 10566\% | 4 |


| NVIDIA | NVDA | 3491 | 3030 | 3752 | 2991 | 38.96 | 3490 | 34.42 | 000 | 1647\% | 105\% | 10.494 | 166.47\% | 9 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OCCIDENTALPTL. | OXY | 48.75 | 45.60 | 48.86 | 4206 | 52.40 | 48.04 | 4762 | 0.88 | 828\% | 104\% | 38,606 | 108 28\% | 5 |
| OFFICE DEPOT | ODP | 38.13 | 3302 | 39.66 | 3672 | 4106 | 36.87 | 3758 | 000 | 14.54\% | 145\% | 9.293 | 114 54\% | 11 |
| OFFICEMAX | OMX | 55.40 | 4829 | 5123 | 4787 | 51.80 | 46.44 | 5017 | 060 | 15.40\% | 18\%\% | 3.767 | 115.40\% | 5 |
| OMNICOM GP | OMC | 10690 | 100.61 | 10530 | 10057 | 106.06 | 10240 | 103.64 | 100 | 1142\% | 12.6\% | 17.231 | $11142 \%$ | 11 |
| ORACLE | ORCL | 17.44 | 1600 | 1798 | 16.77 | 1934 | 1693 | 1741 | 000 | 14.31\% | 14.3\% | 86,594 | 11431\% | 17 |
| PACCAR | PCAR | 7423 | 6670 | 6972 | 63.23 | 6925 | 63.42 | 6776 | 080 | 1131\% | 12.7\% | 16.981 | 11131\% | 7 |
| PACTIV | PTV | 3356 | 3156 | 3691 | 3158 | 36.53 | 3360 | 33.96 | 000 | 1100\% | \$1.0\% | 4.218 | 11100\% | 4 |
| PALI. | PLL | 36.34 | 34.36 | 3519 | 3323 | 35.57 | 3081 | 3425 | 0.48 | 1100\% | 12.6\% | 4.453 | 11100\% | 4 |
| PARKER-HANNIFIN | PH | 88.19 | 8181 | 8465 | 7562 | 84.89 | 76.73 | 8198 | 104 | $1128 \%$ | 12.8\% | 9.731 | 11128\% | 7 |
| PATTERSON COMPANES | PDCO | 39.76 | 3171 | 3829 | 3513 | 38.28 | 35.47 | 36.44 | 0.00 | 1614\% | 12.5\% | 4.605 | 116.14\% | 7 |
| PAYCHEX | PAYX | 4250 | 40.03 | 4100 | 3879 | 4121 | 38.66 | 40.37 | 0.84 | 1571\% | 183\% | 14.924 | 115.71\% | 16 |
| PEABODY ENERGY | BTU | 44.60 | 39.50 | 4196 | 3620 | 48.59 | 40.29 | 4186 | 0.24 | 2001\% | 207\% | 10.273 | 12001\% | 4 |
| PENNEY JC | JCP | 8718 | 7952 | 8409 | 7523 | 8178 | 75.98 | 8063 | 0.72 | 1548\% | 18.6\% | 17.731 | 115.48\% | 10 |
| PEPSI BOTTLING GP | PBG | 3254 | 3093 | 3199 | 30.13 | 3231 | 30.59 | 31.42 | 0.44 | 963\% | 113\% | 7,283 | $10963 \%$ | 6 |
| PEPSICO | PEP | 65.39 | 6250 | 65.54 | 6229 | 6417 | 61.46 | 6356 | 120 | 1102\% | 13.2\% | 103.064 | 11102\% | 8 |
| PERKINELMER | PKI | 2466 | 2335 | 23.94 | 2128 | 2258 | 2112 | 2282 | 028 | 13.00\% | 14.5\% | 2.834 | 11300\% | 3 |
| PFIZER | PFE | 2700 | 2494 | 27.41 | 25.78 | 2786 | 2350 | 2608 | 116 | $480 \%$ | 0,6\% | 175.685 | 10480\% | 11 |
| PG\&E | PCG | 4932 | 4550 | 4795 | 45.34 | 4817 | 4566 | 46.99 | 132 | 780\% | 11.0\% | 16.018 | 10780\% | 5 |
| PHEEPS DODGE | PD | 128.00 | 12119 | 12477 | 11425 | 124.75 | 116.68 | 12161 | 080 | $2413 \%$ | 25.0\% | 25.120 | 124.13\% | 3 |
| PINNACLE WEST CAP | PNW | 49.05 | 4721 | 5167 | 4809 | 5100 | 48.96 | 49.33 | 210 | 4.53\% | 8.3\% | 4.734 | 104.53\% | 3 |
| PITNEY-BOWES | PBI | 4895 | 4716 | 48.50 | 4587 | 4705 | 45.96 | 4725 | 132 | 10.00\% | 133\% | 10.348 | 110.00\% | 3 |
| PL.UM CREEK TIMBER | PCL . | 4164 | 38.64 | 4198 | 3815 | 40.00 | 36.64 | 3951 | 168 | 6.57\% | 114\% | 6,860 | 106.57\% | 3 |
| PMC-SIERRA | PMCS | 7.47 | 6.31 | 678 | 606 | 797 | 640 | 6.83 | 0.00 | 1875\% | 188\% | 1.336 | 118.75\% | 4 |
| PNC FINL SVS GP | PNC | 76.41 | 7280 | 75.65 | 7202 | 7515 | 7055 | 7376 | 220 | 967\% | 13\% | 21.522 | 10967\% | 9 |
| POLO RALPHI LAUREN A' | RL. | 8907 | 8166 | 84.10 | 7790 | 8315 | 76.17 | 82.01 | 020 | 15.80\% | 10 \% | 5.054 | 115 $80 \%$ | 10 |
| PPGINDUSTREES | PPG | 6909 | 64.84 | 6788 | 6401 | 6669 | 6302 | 6592 | 200 | 904\% | 12.6\% | 10.739 | 10904\% | 6 |
| PPL | PPL | 3968 | 3514 | 3666 | 34.43 | 3734 | 3550 | 36.46 | 122 | 1150\% | 15.5\% | 14.442 | 11150\% | 6 |
| PRAXAIR | PX | 65.00 | 6023 | 6335 | 5797 | 6327 | 5851 | 6139 | 120 | 1155\% | 13.0\% | 19.555 | 11155\% | 8 |
| PRINCIPAL FINL. GP | PFG | 6417 | 59.71 | 6186 | 5819 | 59.40 | 5685 | 60.03 | 080 | 1213\% | \$3.7\% | 16.083 | 11213\% | 9 |
| PROCTER \& GAMBELE | PG | 65.64 | 6125 | 66.30 | 6311 | 6473 | 6221 | 63.87 | 124 | 11.45\% | 13.7\% | 199,294 | 11145\% | 12 |
| PROGRESS ENERGY | PGN | 50.95 | 4748 | 50.00 | 4705 | 49.55 | 4768 | 48.79 | 244 | 406\% | 0.6\% | 12.318 | 10406\% | 5 |
| PROGRESSIVE OHIO | PGR | 23.76 | 2250 | 2475 | 2290 | 24.73 | 2219 | 23.47 | 0.03 | 817\% | B3\% | 17.321 | 108.17\% | 6 |
| PROLOGS | PLD | 7208 | 64.12 | 65.08 | 5732 | 65.81 | 59.16 | 6393 | 184 | 19.00\% | 228\% | 15.846 | 11900\% | 1 |
| PRUDENTIAL FINL | PRU | 9326 | 89.05 | 89.33 | 85.38 | 8718 | 8100 | 8753 | 095 | 13.35\% | 147\% | 43.606 | 113.35\% | 9 |
| PUB SERENTER GP | PEG | 7803 | 6648 | 6775 | 64.32 | 6810 | 6570 | 6840 | 234 | 867\% | 12.6\% | 18,630 | 108.67\% | 3 |
| PUBLIC STORAGE | PSA | 11716 | 100.93 | 10941 | 96.02 | 9805 | 94.01 | 10260 | 200 | 800\% | 10.2\% | 16,623 | 108 00\% | 1 |
| PULTE HOMES | PHM | 3556 | 2931 | 3490 | 3103 | 35.31 | 3200 | 33.02 | 0.16 | 1325\% | 93.8\% | 7.552 | 11325\% | 4 |
| OLOGIC | OLGC | 1881 | 1741 | 22.46 | 1810 | 2272 | 2130 | 20.13 | 0.00 | 14.41\% | 44.4\% | 2.723 | 11441\% | 9 |
| QUALCOMM | QCOM | 43.61 | 3700 | 3996 | 3679 | 40.99 | 35.80 | 3902 | 0.48 | 1810\% | 19.6\% | 65.399 | 118 10\% | 10 |
| QUEST DIAGNOSTICS | DGX | 5429 | 50.30 | 5291 | 4882 | 54.20 | 5134 | 5198 | 0.40 | 1300\% | 130\% | 9.666 | 11300\% | 9 |
| QUESTAR | STR | 86.32 | 7933 | 8281 | 7596 | 8956 | 82.45 | 8274 | 0.94 | 1182\% | 132\% | 7.081 | 11182\% | 5 |
| QWEST COMMS INTL | Q | 890 | 787 | 863 | 806 | 8.47 | 750 | 8.24 | 000 | 800\% | 8.0\% | 16.208 | 108.00\% | 9 |
| RADIOSHACK | RSH | 26.24 | 2178 | 2224 | 1669 | 17.85 | 16.42 | 2020 | 025 | 10.35\% | 11.8\% | 3.336 | 110 35\% | 10 |
| RAYTHEON 'B' | RTN | 55.63 | 5190 | 53.22 | 50.96 | 5417 | 5100 | 5281 | 096 | 16.16\% | 10.4\% | 23,474 | 11616\% | 8 |
| REALOGY | H | 3008 | 2955 | 30.30 | 29.42 | 3111 | 25.41 | 29.31 | 000 | 15.00\% | 550\% | 7.396 | 11500\% | 1 |
| REGIONS FINL NEW | RF | 3761 | 3531 | 3817 | 35.76 | 3799 | 3640 | 36.87 | 144 | 783\% | 123\% | 25.867 | 10783\% | 9 |
| REYNOLDS AMERICAN | RAI | 6510 | 6005 | 66.19 | 6200 | 6634 | 6356 | 63.87 | 3.00 | 6.25\% | 110\% | 17.635 | 10625\% | 4 |
| ROBERT HALF INTL. | RHi | 4221 | 38.44 | 41.40 | 3702 | 38.87 | 36.61 | 3909 | 0.40 | 1825\% | 10.5\% | 6.336 | 118.25\% | 8 |
| ROCKWELL AUTOMATION | ROK | 6531 | 6101 | 6301 | 5673 | 65.69 | 60.34 | 6202 | 116 | 1183\% | 140\% | 10.071 | 11183\% | 6 |
| ROCKWELL COLLINS | COL | 69.91 | 64.39 | 6975 | 62.45 | 64.31 | 59.80 | 6510 | 064 | 13.46\% | 14.8\% | 11.001 | 113.46\% | 12 |
| ROHM \& HAAS | ROH | 55.95 | 5159 | 5754 | 5013 | 5299 | 5032 | 5309 | 132 | 1153\% | $145 \%$ | 11.321 | 11153\% |  |
| ROWAN COS | RDC | 33.20 | 30.07 | 33.04 | 29.97 | 3799 | 3290 | 3286 | 0.40 | 2737\% | 29.0\% | 3.356 | 12737\% | 6 |
| RYDER SYSTEM | R | 55.62 | 5120 | 54.75 | 5155 | 5289 | 5036 | 5273 | 0.84 | 11.42\% | 13.3\% | 3.058 | 11142\% | 5 |
| SAERE HDG | TSG | 3261 | 3210 | 32.47 | 3182 | 3212 | 2717 | 3138 | 052 | 1066\% | \$2.6\% | 4.327 | 11066\% | 3 |
| SAFECO | SAF | 6915 | 64.07 | 6461 | 5743 | 64.85 | 6037 | 63.41 | 120 | 9.88\% | 121\% | 7.618 | 10988\% | 8 |
| SAFEWAY | SWY | 3724 | 3372 | 36.24 | 3286 | 3561 | 3036 | 34.34 | 0.23 | 10.45\% | 11.2\% | 15.019 | $11045 \%$ | 8 |
| SANDISK | SNDK | 4220 | 3613 | 4524 | 38.89 | 4698 | 4200 | 4207 | 0.00 | 1653\% | 16.5\% | 8.603 | 11653\% | 7 |
| SANMINA-SCl | SANM | 3.94 | 3.42 | 3.66 | 3.24 | 392 | 3.42 | 3.60 | 0.00 | 1550\% | 15.5\% | 1.892 | 115.50\% | 6 |
| SARA LEE | SLE | 1749 | 16.00 | 1730 | 1659 | 1718 | 16.50 | 1684 | 0.40 | 6.81\% | 95\% | 11,963 | 106.81\% | 6 |
| SCHERING-PLOUGH | SGP | 25.24 | 23.00 | 25.37 | 2309 | 2407 | 2178 | 2376 | 0.26 | 24 23\% | 25\% | 34.173 | 124.23\% | 11 |
| SCHLUMEERGER | SLB | 65.79 | 6180 | 64.37 | 5568 | 6918 | 6168 | 6308 | 070 | $2197 \%$ | 234\% | 73,364 | 12197\% | 5 |
| SCRIPPSEWA | SSP | 49.42 | 4435 | 53.39 | 48.37 | 5090 | 4865 | 4918 | 0.48 | 1081\% | 12.0\% | 5.694 | 10081\% | 7 |
| SEALED AIR | SEE | 6774 | 6356 | 66.32 | 63.02 | 6576 | 5855 | 6416 | 080 | 11.40\% | 12.9\% | 5.082 | \$1140\% | 5 |
| SEARS HOLDINGS | SHED | 18997 | 175.77 | 18167 | 16431 | 178.00 | 166.07 | 175.97 | 0.00 | 1033\% | 10.3\% | 27.256 | \$1033\% | 3 |
| SEMPRAEN | SRE | 6253 | 5725 | 58.01 | 54.73 | 5735 | 5457 | 5741 | 124 | 6.11\% | 8.5\% | 15.555 | 106 $11 \%$ | 5 |
| SHERWIN-WILLIAMS | SHW | 7111 | 6465 | 6927 | 6128 | 6476 | 6143 | 65.42 | 126 | 1147\% | 134\% | 8.746 | 111 17\% | 3 |
| SIGMA ALDRICH | SIAL | 4291 | 37.65 | 4000 | 3740 | 39.68 | 3764 | 3921 | 0.46 | 9.41\% | 10.8\% | 5.332 | 109.41\% | 6 |
| SIMON PR GP | SPG | 123.96 | 110.60 | 11509 | 9850 | 10408 | 9783 | 10834 | 3.36 | 700\% | 105\% | 24.064 | 10700\% | , |
| SLM | SLM | 4664 | 4030 | 4996 | 4397 | 50.34 | 45.51 | 4612 | 100 | 15.52\% | 182\% | 17.241 | 115 52\% | 9 |


| SMITH INTL | SII | 4292 | 39.49 | 4107 | 3613 | 4468 | 4081 | 40.85 | 040 | 18.00\% | 192\% | 8,223 | 11800\% | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SNAP.ON | SNA | 5166 | 48.50 | 48.42 | 46.46 | 4865 | 46.76 | 48.41 | 108 | 1067\% | 133\% | 2.893 | 11067\% | 3 |
| SOLECTRON | SLR | 348 | 321 | 3.51 | 318 | 3.48 | 310 | 333 | 0.00 | 14.95\% | 15.0\% | 2.803 | 114 95\% | 7 |
| SOUTHERN | So | 36.95 | 35.11 | 3725 | 36.10 | 3740 | 36.16 | 36.50 | 155 | 520\% | 10.0\% | 26.293 | 105 20\% | 5 |
| SOUTHWEST AIRLINES | Luv | 16.14 | 15.00 | 1658 | 1495 | 16.03 | 15.18 | 15.65 | 0.02 | 10.18\% | 10.3\% | 11.984 | 11018\% | 4 |
| SOVEREIGN BANC | SOV | 25.59 | 2487 | 2591 | 23.64 | 26.60 | 24.64 | 25.38 | 0.32 | 813\% | 9.6\% | 11.747 | $10813 \%$ | 8 |
| SPECTRA ENERGY | \#NA | 2713 | 25.05 | 3000 | 25.11 | 2900 | 2750 | 2730 | 0.88 | 533\% | 8.8\% | 15.857 | 10533\% | 3 |
| SPRINT NEXTEL | S | 19.81 | 1757 | 19.78 | 16.93 | 19.92 | 18.61 | 1877 | 010 | 8.74\% | 9.4\% | 55.438 | 10874\% | 9 |
| ST JUDE MED | STJ | 43.46 | 3896 | 43.20 | 3490 | 3907 | 36.37 | 3933 | 000 | 15.97\% | 10.0\% | 13.597 | 11597\% | 14 |
| STANLEY WORKS | SWK | 5899 | 5505 | 5754 | 4995 | 5196 | 4861 | 53.68 | 120 | 1157\% | 14.2\% | 4.504 | 11157\% | 7 |
| STAPLES | SPLS | 2766 | 2560 | 2762 | 2529 | 2800 | 2494 | 2652 | 029 | 1620\% | 47.5\% | 18.391 | 11620\% | 10 |
| STARBUCKS | sbux | 35.42 | 30.24 | 36.61 | 3349 | 3714 | 3490 | 3463 | 000 | 2200\% | 220\% | 22.439 | 12200\% | 15 |
| STARWOOD HTLS\& RSTS W | HOT | 69.65 | 63.00 | 64.45 | 59.63 | 65.98 | 6202 | 64.12 | 168 | 1472\% | 170\% | 13,672 | 11472\% | 9 |
| STATE STREET | STT | 7214 | 64.78 | 72.82 | 6731 | 6856 | 6096 | 6776 | 084 | 1260\% | 14.1\% | 21.727 | 11260\% | 12 |
| STRYKER | SYK | 6427 | 59.44 | 6237 | 5489 | 55.92 | 5190 | 58.13 | 0.22 | 19.19\% | 107\% | 24.837 | 119.19\% | 13 |
| SUN MICROSYSTEMS | SUNW | 6.78 | 5.40 | 6.66 | 544 | 588 | 534 | 5.92 | 0.00 | 1276\% | 12.8\% | 21.821 | 11276\% | 5 |
| SUNOCO | SUN | 67.46 | 5977 | 6338 | 56.68 | 6942 | 6201 | 6312 | 110 | 1230\% | 144\% | 7.750 | 11230\% | 1 |
| SUNIRUST BANKS | SII | 8743 | 8309 | 85.54 | 8133 | 8564 | 8111 | 84.02 | 292 | 8 40\% | 12.4\% | 30.222 | 108.40\% | 13 |
| SUPERVALU | SVI) | 39.02 | 3620 | 38.23 | 34.46 | 3659 | 3393 | 36.41 | 066 | 9.20\% | 11.3\% | 7.658 | 10920\% | 6 |
| SYMANTEC | SYMC | 1837 | 1665 | 2186 | 1726 | 2190 | 1964 | 1928 | 000 | 1301\% | 13.0\% | 15.625 | 11301\% | 14 |
| SYNOVUS FINL. | SNV | 33.82 | 3186 | 3210 | 3039 | 3113 | 2969 | 3150 | 078 | 1222\% | +5.2\% | 10.448 | 11222\% | 9 |
| SYSCO | SYY | 35.23 | 3229 | 36.74 | 3380 | 3704 | 3521 | 3505 | 076 | 1353\% | 76.1\% | 19.744 | 11353\% | 7 |
| TROWE PRICE GP | TROW | 50.30 | 45.57 | 4894 | 45.03 | 45.22 | 4263 | 46.28 | 068 | 1285\% | 140\% | 12.164 | 11285\% | 8 |
| TARGET | TGT | 6474 | 59.40 | 6296 | 56.61 | 60.00 | 56.69 | 60.07 | 0.48 | 1479\% | 158\% | 52.418 | 114.79\% | 17 |
| TECO ENERGY | TE | 1728 | 16.42 | 1749 | 16.69 | 1750 | 16.91 | 1705 | 0.76 | $388 \%$ | 8.8\% | 3,487 | 103.88\% | 4 |
| TEKTRONIX | TEK | 2950 | 2801 | 2970 | 2778 | 3162 | 26.40 | 2884 | 024 | 1275\% | 137\% | 2.312 | 11275\% | 6 |
| TELLABS | TLAB | 1099 | 993 | 1111 | 9.75 | 1082 | 9.61 | 1037 | 000 | 783\% | 7.8\% | 4,497 | 107 83\% | 6 |
| TEMPLEINLAND | TIN | 6361 | 4872 | 50.58 | 4429 | 4671 | 3892 | 48.81 | 112 | 6.00\% | 8.6\% | 6.184 | 10600\% | 2 |
| TENETHLTHCR | THC | 7.67 | 6.75 | 768 | 700 | 736 | 6.75 | 720 | 0.00 | 10.00\% | 10.0\% | 3.032 | 11000\% | 3 |
| TERADYNE | TER | 16.84 | 1492 | 16.46 | 1464 | 1559 | 14.43 | 15.48 | 000 | 1475\% | \$4 $8 \%$ | 2.938 | 11475\% | 6 |
| TEREX | TEX | 7275 | 56.22 | 62.80 | 54.75 | 66.52 | 5465 | 6128 | 0.00 | 850\% | 85\% | 6.418 | 10850\% | 2 |
| TEXAS INSTS | TXN | 3257 | 29.91 | 3134 | 28.24 | 30.93 | 28.43 | 30.24 | 0.16 | 16.65\% | 173\% | 45.644 | 16.65\% | 13 |
| TEXIRON | TXT | 98.43 | 8952 | 98.80 | 90.78 | 98.50 | 9270 | 9479 | 155 | 1288\% | 14.8\% | 11.222 | 11288\% | 8 |
| THE DIRECTV GROUP | DTV | 26.09 | 2165 | 2525 | 23.82 | 25.57 | 2246 | 2414 | 0.00 | 1770\% | 177\% | 27.666 | 17770\% | 7 |
| THE HERSHEY COMPANY | HSY | 5417 | 5056 | 5267 | 4970 | 5209 | 49.17 | 5139 | 108 | 9.38\% | 11.8\% | 9,015 | 10938\% | 10 |
| THE TRAVELERS COS | TRV | 5433 | 5045 | 5464 | 5030 | 5500 | 5096 | 5261 | 104 | 9.97\% | 12.3\% | 34.901 | 109 97\% | 7 |
| THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC | TMO | 4990 | 44.56 | 49.43 | 4454 | 4634 | 4320 | 4633 | 000 | 1600\% | 10.0\% | 18.066 | 11600\% | 2 |
| TIFFANY \& CO | TF | 45.98 | 39.13 | 40.50 | 3817 | 4080 | 3745 | 40.34 | 040 | 1191\% | 431\% | 5.809 | 11191\% | 11 |
| TIME WARNER | TWX | 2192 | 19.20 | 2315 | 2159 | 2225 | 2010 | 2137 | 0.22 | 14.42\% | 15.7\% | 76,044 | 11442\% | 8 |
| TJXCOS | T.JX | 2943 | 2722 | 3024 | 2781 | 29.46 | 26.67 | 28.47 | 028 | 1214\% | 133\% | 12.424 | 11214\% | 7 |
| TORCHMARK | TMK | 66.87 | 6333 | 65.49 | 6221 | 64.59 | 6250 | 6417 | 0.52 | 956\% | 105\% | 6262 | 109.56\% | 8 |
| TRANSOCEAN | RIG | 8000 | 7531 | 8029 | 7247 | 84.23 | 76.50 | 7813 | 0.00 | $3100 \%$ | 31.0\% | 22.099 | 13100\% | 3 |
| TRIBUNE | TRB | 3150 | 2971 | 3124 | 2994 | 3290 | 30.74 | 3101 | 072 | 874\% | 1.4\% | 7.218 | 108.74\% | 7 |
| TXU | TXU | 68.45 | 5367 | 55.72 | 5285 | 5826 | 53.05 | 57.00 | 173 | 1325\% | 16.9\% | 30.540 | 11325\% | 4 |
| TYCO INTL | TYG | 3329 | 3050 | 3232 | 2928 | 3186 | 29.40 | 3111 | 0.40 | 1271\% | 14.2\% | 59.455 | 11271\% | 7 |
| TYSON FOODS ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | TSN | 1920 | 1755 | 1794 | 1567 | 1709 | 1571 | 1719 | 016 | 8.50\% | 9.6\% | 4.873 | 10850\% | 4 |
| UNION PACIFIC | UNP | 114.20 | 96.50 | 10123 | 8958 | 9616 | 8989 | 9793 | 140 | 1719\% | 790\% | 26,384 | 117 19\% | 6 |
| UNISYS | UIS | 947 | 800 | 8.68 | 778 | 787 | 712 | 815 | 0.00 | 875\% | 88\% | 2.859 | 10875\% | 4 |
| UNITED PARCEL SER | UPS | 75.32 | 6993 | 7598 | 70.38 | 78.77 | 73.62 | 74.00 | 168 | 1203\% | 147\% | 46.253 | 11203\% | 6 |
| UNITED TECHNOLOGIES | UTX | 69.49 | 6475 | 6824 | 6185 | 65.49 | 6180 | 6527 | 106 | 1203\% | 14.0\% | 64,079 | 11203\% | 8 |
| UNIEDHEALTH GP | UNH | 5495 | 5051 | 5629 | 50.76 | 54.46 | 48.49 | 5258 | 003 | 1611\% | 16.2\% | 72.980 | 116.14\% | 15 |
| UNIVISION COMMS 'A' | UVN | 3609 | 3570 | 35.97 | 35.42 | 3555 | 3528 | 35.67 | 000 | 1300\% | 13.0\% | 8.985 | 11300\% | 1 |
| UNUM GROUP | UNM | 22.88 | 2089 | 2225 | 1979 | 2093 | 1990 | 2111 | 030 | 1000\% | \$17\% | 7.264 | 11000\% | 7 |
| US BANCORP | USB | 36.84 | 3477 | 36.29 | 35.01 | 3685 | 33.45 | 3554 | 160 | 909\% | 44.4\% | 62.285 | 10909\% | 10 |
| US STEEL | $X$ | 9495 | 8255 | 84.18 | 6883 | 7901 | 7122 | 80.12 | 080 | 500\% | 6.1\% | 10.190 | 10500\% | 3 |
| UST | UST | 6117 | 5748 | 58.81 | 5553 | 5949 | 5496 | 5791 | 240 | 700\% | 117\% | 9.046 | 10700\% | 3 |
| $V F$ | VFC | 80.97 | 7464 | 8329 | 73.59 | 83.10 | 76.92 | 78.75 | 220 | 9.67\% | 12.8\% | 8,913 | 109.67\% | 9 |
| VALEROENERGY | VLO | 59.67 | 5462 | 54.46 | 4766 | 5709 | 50.90 | 5407 | 0.48 | 310\% | 4\%\% | 34.434 | 103.10\% | 1 |
| VARIAN MED SYS | VAR | 50.05 | 45.85 | 5021 | 4401 | 50.80 | 46.77 | 4795 | 000 | 1583\% | 15.8\% | 5.780 | 115.83\% | 6 |
| VERISIGN | VRSN | 26.78 | 24.72 | 2479 | 2292 | 26.00 | 23.99 | 2487 | 000 | 1563\% | 45.6\% | 5.984 | 11563\% | 8 |
| VERIZON COMMS | VZ | 38.77 | 3583 | 3868 | 36.48 | 3754 | 34.43 | 3697 | 162 | 519\% | 10.1\% | 106.504 | $10519 \%$ | 14 |
| VIACOM 'B' | VIAB | 41.47 | 38.05 | 4261 | 3966 | 4113 | 3750 | 4007 | 000 | 1380\% | 73 $6 \%$ | 24.986 | $11380 \%$ | 12 |
| VORNADO REALTY TST | VNO | 136.55 | 120.94 | 126.25 | 11629 | 13135 | 119.65 | 125.17 | 3.40 | 800\% | 11\% | 17.273 | 10800\% | 1 |
| VULCAN MATERIALS | VMC | 125.79 | 10233 | 10283 | 8727 | 9200 | 8674 | 9949 | 184 | 1133\% | 135\% | 11.125 | 11133\% | 3 |
| WACHOVIA | WB | 5880 | 5440 | 5757 | 5562 | 5767 | 53.63 | 56.28 | 224 | 9.19\% | 138\% | 86.602 | 10919\% | 14 |
| WAL MART STORES | WMT | 5042 | 4744 | 4878 | 4651 | 46.89 | 4480 | 47.47 | 067 | 1256\% | 142\% | 199.273 | 11256\% | 16 |
| WALGREEN | WAG | 46.49 | 43.39 | 46.69 | 44.80 | 4728 | 40.05 | 4478 | 031 | 1550\% | 10.3\% | 44.197 | 11550\% | 11 |
| WALT DISNEY | DIS | 36.09 | 3265 | 3597 | 33.95 | 3489 | 3276 | 3439 | 031 | 1359\% | 147\% | 70.224 | 11359\% | 12 |
| WASHINGTON MUTUAL | WM | 45.60 | 4220 | 4602 | 43.49 | 46.38 | 43.43 | 4455 | 216 | $1100 \%$ | 10.8\% | 40.247 | 11100\% | 8 |
| WASTE MAN | WMI | 38.70 | 33.45 | 38.07 | 3550 | 3790 | 3567 | 36.55 | 096 | 10.33\% | 134\% | 17.799 | $11033 \%$ | 3 |


| WATERS | WAT | 58.61 | 53.03 | 5776 | 4855 | 5115 | 48.35 | 5291 | 000 | 15.50\% | 15.5\% | 5,584 | 115.50\% | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WATSON PHARMS | WPI | 29.43 | 2627 | 2738 | 2532 | 2733 | 25.28 | 26.84 | 000 | 15.74\% | 15.7\% | 2.635 | 115.74\% | 7 |
| WEATHERFORD INTL | WFT | 4254 | 38.65 | 4165 | 3590 | 4705 | 4139 | 4120 | 0.00 | 24.20\% | 24.2\% | 13.641 | 124.20\% | 5 |
| WELLPONT | WLP | 84.15 | 7701 | 79.05 | 73.88 | 78.98 | 75.00 | 78.01 | 000 | 15.05\% | 15.1\% | 49.031 | 11505\% | 12 |
| WELLS FARGO \& CO | WFC | 36.36 | 3380 | 36.64 | 35.37 | 36.16 | 35.01 | 35.56 | 112 | 11 19\% | 14.9\% | 116,260 | 11119\% | 16 |
| WENDYS SINTL. | WEN | 34.42 | 3127 | 3454 | 3268 | 35.33 | 3212 | 33.39 | 034 | 1259\% | 13.8\% | 3,697 | 112 59\% | 11 |
| WESTERN UNION | \#NA | 23.56 | 2142 | 23.34 | 20.74 | 24.14 | 2192 | 2252 | 004 | 12.41\% | 12.0\% | 16.130 | 112.41\% | 17 |
| WEYERHAEUSER | WY | 8709 | 74.65 | 76.55 | 70.71 | 75.50 | 6412 | 74.77 | 240 | 6.33\% | 10.0\% | 20.384 | $10633 \%$ | 3 |
| WHiRLPOOL | WHR | 96.77 | 88.01 | 9168 | 83.23 | 8751 | 80.80 | 88.00 | 172 | 15.67\% | f01\% | 6.840 | 11567\% | 3 |
| WHOLE FOODS MARKET | WFMI | 52.43 | 43.17 | 4732 | 4213 | 49.75 | 46.75 | 46.93 | 072 | 1711\% | 90.0\% | 6.499 | 117 11\% | 9 |
| WhLIAMS COS | WMB | 2871 | 26.46 | 2723 | 25.17 | 2805 | 2605 | 26.95 | 0.36 | 1725\% | 18.9\% | 15.642 | 11725\% | 4 |
| WINDSTREAM | WIN | 1563 | 1450 | 15.20 | 13.75 | 14.43 | 1354 | 1451 | 100 | $233 \%$ | 10.0\% | 6.856 | 10233\% | 3 |
| WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR | WWY | 53.45 | 48.52 | 5256 | 4954 | 5330 | 50.88 | 5138 | 116 | 10.42\% | 13.1\% | 10.772 | 110.42\% | 9 |
| WVETH | WVE | 5100 | 48.52 | 5225 | 4878 | 5154 | 4805 | 5002 | 104 | $786 \%$ | 10.2\% | 65,720 | 10786\% | 11 |
| WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE | WYN | 3562 | 3109 | 3290 | 2972 | 3339 | 3075 | 3224 | 0.00 | 1250\% | 125\% | 6.889 | $11250 \%$ | 2 |
| XCEL ENERGY | XEL | 24.73 | 2329 | 2362 | 2278 | 2363 | 2271 | 23.46 | 0.89 | 5.60\% | 9.9\% | 9.497 | 10560\% | 5 |
| XEROX | XRX | 18.32 | 1710 | 1730 | 1612 | 1729 | 1620 | 17.06 | 0.00 | 1175\% | 118\% | 16,294 | 11175\% | 4 |
| XLINX | XL.NX | 26.79 | 24.08 | 25.04 | 22.68 | 2730 | 2340 | 2488 | 0.48 | 1628\% | 187\% | 8.396 | 11628\% | 9 |
| XLCAP 'A' | XL | 74.40 | 6904 | 7280 | 6693 | 7262 | 70.00 | 70.97 | 152 | 1176\% | 143\% | 12.584 | 11176\% | 10 |
| XTOEN | XTO | 53.79 | 4916 | 50.80 | 4386 | 50.94 | 46.45 | 49.17 | 0.48 | 16.79\% | 18.0\% | \$8,399 | 116.79\% | 8 |
| YAHOO | YHOO | 3284 | 2815 | 29.88 | 2526 | 2761 | 25.13 | 28.15 | 000 | 26.57\% | 26.8\% | 41.266 | 12657\% | 17 |
| YUMI BRANDS | YUM | 6222 | 5647 | 60.38 | 5740 | 63.48 | 5782 | 59.63 | 120 | 1151\% | 13.9\% | 14.898 | 11151\% | 12 |
| ZMMMERHDG. | ZMH | 8727 | 8174 | 85.00 | 76.50 | 79.11 | 7288 | 80.48 | 000 | 14.97\% | 15.0\% | 19.900 | 114.97\% | 13 |
| ZIONS BANCORP | 210 N | 8856 | 84.18 | 8495 | 8118 | 83.15 | 7737 | 83.23 | 156 | 990\% | 12.1\% | 9.082 | 10990\% | 12 |
| Market-weighted Average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 14. $2 \%$ |  |  |  |
| Simple Average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $143 \%$ |  |  |  |

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY <br> CASE NO. 2007-00143 <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

Item 19 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

19. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony, With respect to page 45, lines 11-23, please provide:
(a) All regulatory cases in which Dr. Vander Weide has provided a rate of return or cost of equity recommendation since January 1, 2000,
(b) All regulatory cases in which Dr. Vander Weide has provided a rate of return or cost of equity recommendation since January 1, 2000 using a market-value capital structure for ratemaking purposes, and
(c) Copies of the rate of return section of all rate orders in which regulatory commissions have adopted Dr. Vander Weide's market-value capital structure for ratemaking purposes.

## Response:

(a) The requested data are attached.
(b) The requested data are attached.
(c) Dr. Vander Weide does not routinely receive or maintain information on the orders issued by the state commissions in the dockets in which he has testified.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#19_061807.pdf

Kentucky-American Water Company
Response to Request No 19 (a)

| COMPANY | URRISDICIION | DATE | DOCKETNO. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Duke Energy Carolinas | North Carolina | May-07 | E-7 Sub 828 ct a |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (homeowners) | North Carolina | Dec-06 |  |
| San Diego Gas \& Electric | FERC | Nov-06 | ER27-284-600 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (workers compensation) | North Carolina | Aug-0\% |  |
| Union Electric Company $\mathrm{d} / \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{a}$ AmerenUl: | Missouri | Jun-06 | ER-2007-0002 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (homeowners) | North Carolina | May 06 |  |
| North Carolina Rate Burcau (dwelling fare) | North Carolina | Mar-66 |  |
| Empire District Electric Company | Missouri | Feb-06 | ER-2006-0315 |
| Verizon Maine | Maine | Dec-05 | 2005-155 |
| Dominion Virginia Power | Virginia | Nov-05 | PUE-2004-00048 |
| Empire District Blectric Company | Kansas | Sep-05 | 05-EPDE-980-RTS |
| North Carolina Rate Burcau (workers comp) | North Carolina | Sep-05 |  |
| Verizon Southwest | Texas | Jul-05 | 29315 |
| PG\&E Company | PERC | Jul-05 | ER-05-1284 |
| Dominion Hope | West Virginin | Jun-05 | 05-034-6421 |
| Verizon New England | US District Court New Hampshire | May-05 | 04-CV-65-113 |
| San Diego Gas \& Plectric | Califorrin | May-05 | 05-05-012 |
| Progress Energy | Tlorida | May-05 | 50078 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (homeowners) | North Carolina | Feb-05 |  |
| Verizon Vermon | Vermont | Fcb 05 | 6959 |
| $V$ erizon Mlorida | Florida | Jan-05 | 050050-1L |
| Verizon Ilmois | Illinois | Jan-05 | 00-0812 |
| Dominion Resources | North Carolina | Sep-04 | 1-22 Sub 41? |
| Tennessec-American Water Company | Tennessee | Aug-04 | 04-00288 |
| Valor Telecommunications of Texas, 1 P | New Mexico | jul-04 | 3405 Phase C. |
| PG\&E Company | California | May-04 | 04-05-21 |
| Verizon Northwest | Washington | Apr-04 | UT-()40788 |
| Empire District Elcetric Company | Missouri | Apr-04 | ER-2004-0570 |
| MidAmerican Energy | South Dikota | Apr-04 | NG4001 |
| Kentueky-American Water Company | Kentucky | Aprob | 200400103 |
| Interstate Power and Iight Company | Iowa | Mar-04 | RP的-04-01 |
| Northern Natural Gas Company | HERC | Feb-04 | RP(04-155-000 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (iuto) | North Carolina | Feb-04 |  |
| Verizon New Jersey | New Jerscy | Jan-04 | 1000060356 |
| Verizon | FCC | Jan-04 | 03-173. FCC: 03-224 |
| Verizon | FCC | Dec-03 | 03-173, FCC. 03-224 |
| Phillips County Telephone Company | Colorado | Nov-03 | 03S-3159 |
| Verizon California Inc | California | Nov-03 | R03-04-003.193-04-002 |
| PG\&E Company | FERC | Oct-03 | 12R04-109-000 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureau (homeowners) | North Carolina | Oct-03 |  |
| Allstate Insurance Company | Texas | Sep-03 | 2568 |
| Verizon Northwest Inc | Washington | Jul-03 | UT-023003 |
| Empire District Electric Company | Ohlahoma | Jul-0.3 | Case No PUD 200300121 |
| Verizon Virginia Ine | FCC | Apr-03 | CC-00218,00249.00251 |
| Northern Natural Gas Company | Ferc | Apr-03 | R1903-398-000 |
| North Carolina Rate Bureu (dwelling fire) | North Carolina | Apr-03 |  |
| MidAmerican Energy | Iowa | Apr-03 | RPU-03-1, WRU-03-25-156 |
| PG\&E Company | FIERC | Mar-03 | ER03666000 |
| Verizon North | Indiana | F\%b-03 | 42259 |
| San Diego Gas \& Electric | HERC | $\mathrm{Feb}-63$ | ER03-601000 |
| Verizon Morida Inc | Florida | Feb-03 | 981834-TP/900321-1P |
| PG\&E Company | Herc | Jan-03 | ER03409000 |
| North Carolina Rate Burcau (auto) | Nortis Carolina | Jan-03 |  |
| Verizon New England Ine New Hampshire | New Hampshire | Dec-02 | DT 02-110) |

PG\&EE Company
Verizon Northwest
MidAmerican Energy
North Carolina Rate Bureau (workers comp)
Verizon Michigan
Verizon New England Inc New Hampshire PG\&E Company
Verizon New England Ine Rhode Island
Verizon New England Ine Massachusetts
MidAmerican Energy Company
North Carolina Rate Burcau (homeowners)
North Carolina Natural Gas Company
North Carolina Rate Burcau (auto)
Verizon lennsylvania
PG\&E Company
Verizon florida
Verizon Delaware
Florida Power Corporation
North Carolina Rate Bureau (workers comp)
Verizon Washington DC
Sherburne County Rural Telephone Company Verizon Virginia
Verizon Maryland
Verizon Massachusetts
North Carolina Rate Burenu (auto)
PG\&E Company
Verizon New York
PG\&E Company
Verizon New Jersey
North Carolina Rate Burenu (workers comp)
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| Pennsylvania | Dec-01 |
| FERC | Nov-01 |
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| Washington, DC | Jul-01 |
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| Massachusetts | May-01 |
| North Carolina | Apr-01 |
| FERC | Mar-01 |
| New York | Oct-00 |
| FIERC | Oct-(0) |
| New Jersey | Oct-00 |
| North Carolina | Sep-00) |
| New Jersey | Sep-00 |
| California | Aug.00 |
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| California | May-00 |
| FERC | Mar-00 |
| PERC | Mar-00 |
| New York | Feb-00 |
| PCC | Jan-00 |

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Civil Action No 00-7320B
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Docket No 2681
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96-324 Phase II $000824-\mathrm{EJ}$

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CC-00218,00249,00251

## 8879

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98-C-1357
94-1. $96-262$

Kentucky-American Water Company
Response to Request No 19 (b)

| COMPANY | JURISDICIION | DATE | DOCKEINO. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Duke Energy Carolinas | North Carolina | May-07 | E-7 Sub 828 ct al |
| Sm Diego Gas \& Electric | MERC | Noval | ER07-284-000 |
| Union Electric Company d/b/a Amerenue | Missouri | Jun-06 | ER-2007-0002 |
| Empire District Electric Company | Missouri | $\mathrm{Feb}-0 \mathrm{O}$ | ER-2006-0315 |
| Verizon Maine | Maine | Dec-05 | 2005-155 |
| Dominion Virginia Power | Virginia | Nov-15 | PUE-2004-00048 |
| Empire District Electric Company | Kansas | Sep-05 | 05-EPDE-980-RTS |
| Verizon Southwest | Texas | Jul-05 | 20315 |
| PG\&EC Company | FERC | Jul-05 | DR-05-1284 |
| Dominion Hope | West Virginia | Jun-05 | 05-034-G42-1 |
| Verizon New England | US District Court ${ }^{\text {N }}$ | May-05 | $04-\mathrm{CV}-65-\mathrm{PB}$ |
| San Diego Gas \& Electric | California | May-05 | 05-05-012 |
| Progress Energy | Florida | May-05 | 50078 |
| Verizon Vermont | Vermont | Feb-05 | 6951 |
| Verizon Florida | Florida | Jan-05 | 050059 T |
| Verizon Illinois | Ilinois | Jan-05 | 00-0812 |
| Dominion Resources | North Carolina | Sep-04 | E-22 Sub 412 |
| Valor Ielecommunications of Texas, I. P | New Mexico | Jul-04 | 3495 Phase C |
| PG\&E Company | Californa | May-04 | 04-05-21 |
| Verizon Northwest | Washington | Apr-04 | UT-040788 |
| Empire District Electric Company | Missouri | Aprof | ER-2004-0570 |
| Midntmerican Energy | South Dakota | Apr-04 | NG4-001 |
| Verizon New Jerscy | New Jersey | Jand 04 | TO00060356 |
| Verizon | FCC | Jan 04 | 03-173, FCC, 03-224 |
| Verizon | FCC | Dec-03 | 03-173, FCC, 03-224 |
| Verizon California Ine | Callformia | Nov-03 | R03-04-003.193-04-002 |
| PG\&E Company | FERC | Oct-03 | ERO4-109-000 |
| Verizon Northwest Inc | Washington | Jul-03 | U1-023003 |
| Verizon Virgina Inc | FCC | Apr-03 | CC-00218,00249.00251 |
| PG\&E Company | FERC | Mar-03 | ER03666000 |
| Verizon North | Indiana | Teb-03 | 42250 |
| San Diego Gas \& Eilcetric | Ferc | Feb-03 | ER03-601000 |
| Verizon Florida Ine | Florida | Feb-03 | 981834-TP/900321-TP |
| PG\&E Company | FERC | Jan 03 | ER03409000 |
| Verizon New lenghand Inc New Hampshire | New Hampshire | Dec-02 | DI 02-110 |
| Verizon Northwest | Washington | Dec-02 | U1 020406 |
| Verizon Michigan | US District Courl Et | Sep-02 | Civil Action No 00-73208 |
| Verizon New lengland Inc New Hampshire | New Hamphire | Aug-02 | DT 02-110 |
| Verizon New England Inc Rhode lsland | Rhode Island | May-02 | Docket No 2681 |
| Verizon New Eingland Inc Massachusetts | FCC | May-02 | EB 02 MD 006 |
| $V$ Vrizon Pennsyluania | Pennsylvania | Dec-01 | R-00016683 |
| Verizon Florida | Florida | Nov-01 | $99064 \mathrm{~B}-\mathrm{TP}$ |
| Verizon Delaware | Delaware | Oct-01 | 96-324 Phase Il |
| Verizon Washington DC | Washington, DC | Jul-01 | 962 |
| Verizon Virginin | PC, | Jul-01 | CC-00218.00249,00251 |
| Verizon Margland | Maryland | May-01 | 8879 |
| Verizon Massachusetts | Massachusetts | May-01 | DTE 01-20 |
| Verizon New York | New York | Oct-00 | 98-C.1357 |
| Verizon New Jersey | New Jersey | Oct-00 | TO00060356 |
| Verizon New Jerscy | New Jersey | Sep-00 | TO99120934 |
| Verizon New York | New York | Jul-00 | 98-C-1357 |
| Bell Athntic | New York | F「cb-00 | 98-C.-1357 |
| USTA | PCC | Jan-00 | 94-1, 96-262 |

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 20 of 312

## Witness: Dr. James H. Vander Weide

20. RE: Vander Weide Direct Testimony. Please provide an electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of the following Schedules, with all data and equations left intact: Schedules 1, 2, $3,4,5,6,7,8$, and 9 .

## Response:

Please refer to electronic file KAW_R_AGDR1\#20_061807.xls for the requested data.
For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#20_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 21 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

21. RE: Mike Miller Direct Testimony. With respect to Exhibit MAM-3, please provide:
(a) All data, work papers, and copies of source documents used in the development of the capitalization amounts ( 13 Month Average Amounts, and adjustments as reflected in the Add (1) column, and
(b) An electronic version (Microsoft Excel) of Exhibit MAM-3, and all supporting Schedules and work papers used to determine the 13-month capitalization amounts, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

(a) Please see the schedules attached which include the Business Plan numbers that were the beginning basis for the rate filing (adjusted as required for more recent data included in the rate filing, the Value Line Publication of Feb. 23, 2007 and the detailed pages from Exhibit 37, Schedule J which also were part of the original filing in this case). The Add (1) column is the ITC which the Commission has historically recognized in the capital structure used to determine fair and reasonable rates.
(b) Exhibit MAM-3 is the 13 month average capital structure taken from Exhibit 37, Schedule J. The electronic version of this file is KAW_AGDR1\#21b_Exhibit_ MAM3.061807.xls.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#21_061807.pdf
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AFTER FINANCING:

KAW__R_AGDR1\#21_061807
Page 2 of 37

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ${ }^{2087}$ | SAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | Jun | SㄴL | $\triangle \mathrm{LuG}$ | SEP | OCT | NOV | 2008 |
| LONG TERM DEET (Bands) | 99,900,000 | 99,300,000 | 99,900,000 | 106,800,000 | 106,800,000 | 106,800,000 | 105,800,000 | 106,800,000 | 106,800,000 | 106,800,000 | 123,800,000 | 123,800,000 | 123,800,000 |
| PREFERRED STOCK (Prafered) | 5,966,700 | 5,956,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,965,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,965,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,866,700 | 5,966,700 |
| SHORT TERM DEET (SCh.3.L46) | 7,444,309 | t0,902,539 | 12,387,610 | 820,446 | 820,445 | 4,007,270 | $9,206,224$ | 13,632,482 | 17,254,649 | 23,081,291 | 350,408 | 1,439,023 | $4,233,628$ |
| COMMON EQUITY (Sch.6.173) | 83,550,955 | 83,.80, 289 | 84,207,515 | 87,475,794 | 88,903,, 28 | 89,407,769 | 89,133, 176 | 90,212,302 | 91,347,610 | ${ }_{91,359,997}$ | 97,404,557 | 90,257,453 | 97,443,389 |
|  | $\stackrel{\text { 196.781,954 }}{ }$ | 200.577 .528 | 202.461 .825 | 201,052.940 | $202,490.974$ | 205.181 .739 | 211,05.100 | 216.611,484 | 221.366 .859 | 227,207,888 | 227.521 .645 | 229.683 .176 | 231,443.777 |
| \% Of total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LONG TERM DEET | 50.8\% | 49.8\% | 49.3\% | 53.7\% | 52.7\% | 51.\% | 50.5\% | 49.3\% | 48.2\% | 47.0\% | 54.4\% | $54.0 \%$ | 53.5\% |
| PREFERRED STOCK | 3.0\% | 3.0\% | 2.9\% | 3.05 | 2.9\% | 2.9\% | 2.8\% | 2.8\% | 2.7\% | 2.6\% | 2.6\% | 2.6\% | 2.5\% |
| Short term debt | 3.8\% | 5.4\% | 6.15 | 0.4\% | 0.4\% | 1.9\% | $4.4 \%$ | 6.3\% | 7.8\% | 10.2\% | 0.2\% | 0.6\% | 1.8\% |
| COMMON EQUITY | 42.4\% | 41.8\% | 41.6\% | 43.5\% | 43.9\% | $43.4 \%$ | 42.2\% | $41.6 \%$ | 41.3\% | 40.2\% | 42.85 | 42.85 | 42.1\% |
|  | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 1000\% | 10008 | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 1000\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| Varance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LONG TERM DEBT (Bonds) |  | 0 |  | 8,900,000 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47,000,000 |  |  |
| PREFERRED STOCK (Prefered) |  | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,90, 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SHORT TERM DEET (SCh.3.146) |  | 3,488,230 | 1,455,071 | (11,557,164) | 0 | 3,186,824 | 5,198,954 | 4,426,258 | 3,622,167 | 5,826,642 | [22,730,883) | 1,088,615 | 2,794,605 |
| COMMON EQUITY (SCh.6, L73) |  | 303,334 | ${ }_{403.226}$ | 3.268.279 | 1.478.034 | 503,941 | (1274.593) | 1,079,175 | 1.135,308 | 12.287 | 6,044.640 | 852,916 | (814,064) |
|  | 0 | 3.791.564 | 1.888.297 | (1,398.885) | 1,4288.034 | 3.690,765 | 4.924,361 | 5,505.384 | 4.757.475 | 5.838.929 | 313.757 | 1.941.531 | 1.980.541 |
| Now Fiancings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Debt $\quad 6.30 \%$ |  |  |  | 10,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17,000,000 |  |  |
| Equity |  |  |  | 5,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5.000,000 |  |  |
| Total Fiancings | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22.000.000 | 0 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  | (3,100.000) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | (3.100.000) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11,900,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22,000,000 | 0 | 0 |

PAGES 4849-4864
File in page order in the Selection \& Opinion binder

PARI 2
Selection $\mathcal{E}$ Opinion
FEBRUARY23, 2007

Dear Subscribers,
As part of our ongoing efforts to keep The Value Line Investment Survey the most valuable investment resource for our subscribers, the entire service is now being released on the Value Line Web Site at 8:00 A.M. Eastern Time on Mondays. You can access each week's issue at www.valueline.com by entering your user name and password. We look forward to continuing to provide you with accurate and timely investment research. Thank you.
 The Quarterly Economic Review

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The Selection \& Opinion Index appears on
page 4992 (December I, 2006).
In Three Parts: Part 1 is the Summary \& Index.
This is Part 2, Selection \& Opinion. Part 3 is
Ratings \& Reports. Volume LXII, Number 26.
Pudlished week by VALUE UNE FUGESHItiG, ING.
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## ECONOMIC AND STOCK MARKET COMMENTARY

Three months ago, in our last Quarterly Economic Review, we noted that the U.S. economy had slowed abruptly during the middle of 2006, with the rate of business growth moderating from $5.6 \%$ in the opening quarter to just $2.6 \%$ in the April-to-June period. We then added that this more restrained pace of U.S. economic activity was likely to be the rule over the final six months. That observation was true enough for the third quarter, when the nation's gross domestic product growth moderated somewhat further to $2.0 \%$. However, the economy then showed surprising strength in the fourth quarter as a solid rise in consumer spending helped drive the nation's gross domestic product forward by a solid $3.5 \%$. (Note that this was the initial estimate for fourth-quarter GDP. A revision in the figures, which could very well be downward, is due out on February 28th.) We expect growth to move onto a more measured, but still healthy, $2.5 \%$ $30 \%$ path during the current three months. Once more, the consumer is likely to play a decisive role in this prospective improvement, with some recent reported strength in consumer confidence being indicative of the current
good news coming out of this critical sector. Recent gains in nonmanufacturing, a relatively good showing on the employment front (where non-farm payroll growth has averaged 168,000 a month over the past six months), and a firming up in factory orders are added reasons for optimism at this time.

We expect the economy to move forward over the balance of 2007 . Once again, we probably will get the cooperation of the U.S. consumer (who accounts for about two-thirds of total GDP). That vital support should be sustained by further likely gains in personal income and employment, resilience in consumer confidence, recent moderation in heating oil and gasoline prices, and a recently strong stock market. Weakness in housing is likely to continue; although the sharp drop in housing demand-which some are still forecast-ing-may not take place. The reasons are that mortgage rates remain too low and personal income is still too high for a housing collapse, in our view. Our sense is that economic growth will average $2.5 \%-3.0 \%$ in 2007 . That pace should be

Continued on page 4852

| VALUE LINE FORECAST FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY <br> Statistical Summary for 2006-2008 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2006:3 | 2006:4 | $2007: 1$ | 2007:2 | 2007:3 | 2007:4 | 2008:1 | 2008:2 | 2007 | 2008 |
| GDP AND OTHER KEY MEASURES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Real Gross Domestic Product | 11444 | 11542 | 11619 | 11697 | 11781 | 11868 | 11956 | 12045 | 11741 | 12093 |
| Total Light Vehicle Sales (Mill Units) | ) 166 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 16.6 | 16.6 | 16.4 | 16.7 |
| Housing Start (Million Units) | 171 | 1.56 | 1.58 | 1.55 | 1.55 | 1.57 | 1.58 | 1.58 | 1.56 | 1.60 |
| Corporate Economic Profits (\$Bill) | 1653 | 1659 | 1726 | 1719 | 1752 | 1742 | 1830 | 1839 | 1735 | 1839 |
| ANNUALIZED RATES OF CHANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gross Domestic Product (Real) | 20 | 3.5 | 27 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 30 | 3.0 | 30 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| GOP Deflator | 19 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 23 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 21 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| CPI-All Urban Consumers | 29 | $-2.2$ | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 23 | 2.3 | 22 | 2.3 | 23 |
| AVERAGE FOR THE PERIOD |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| National Unemployment Rate | 47 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 |
| Prime Rate | 82 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.0 |
| 10-Year Treasury Note Rate | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.1 |

Value Line Forecast for the U.S. Economy

|  | ACTUAL | ESTIMATED |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2006:3 | 2006:4 | 2007:1 | 2007:2 | 2007:3 | 2007:4 | 2008:1 | 2008:2 |
| GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ITS COMPONENTS ( 2000 CHAIN WEIGHTED $\$$ ) BILLIONS OF DOLLARS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Final Sales | 11382 | 11500 | 11571 | 11651 | 11738 | 11825 | 11918 | 12010 |
| Total Consumption | 8111 | 8199 | 8266 | 8325 | 8383 | 8443 | 8506 | 8569 |
| Nonresidential Fixed Investment | 1334 | 1333 | 1356 | 1382 | 1399 | 1413 | 1427 | 1443 |
| Structures | 282 | 284 | 291 | 299 | 303 | 304 | 305 | 307 |
| Equipment \& Software | 1061 | 1056 | 1071 | 1090 | 1108 | 1125 | 1140 | 1154 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | 570 | 541 | 519 | 503 | 495 | 493 | 497 | 501 |
| Exports | 1310 | 1342 | 1366 | 1394 | 1422 | 1452 | 1482 | 1512 |
| Imports | 1939 | 1923 | 1956 | 1974 | 1996 | 2019 | 2040 | 2058 |
| Federal Government | 739 | 747 | 753 | 757 | 764 | 767 | 769 | 771 |
| State \& Local Governments | 1260 | 1270 | 1279 | 1283 | 1290 | 1297 | 1302 | 1307 |
| Gross Domestic Product | 13323 | 13487 | 13671 | 13834 | 13998 | 14167 | 14343 | 14517 |
| Real GDP (2000 Chain Weighted \$) | 11444 | 11542 | 11619 | 11697 | 11781 | 11868 | 11956 | 12045 |
| Prices and wages-ANNuAL rates of change |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP Deflator | 1.9 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| CPI-All Urban Consumers | 2.9 | -2.2 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 23 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
| PPI-Finished Goods | 02 | -3.3 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Employment Cost Index-Total Comp | 36 | 32 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Productivity | -0.1 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 20 | 2.2 |
| PRODUCTION AND OTHER KEY MEASURES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Industrial Prod (\% Change, Annualized) | 4.0 | -0.5 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 20 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| Factory Operating Rate (\%) | 80.9 | 80.2 | 80.0 | 80.0 | 80.0 | 79.9 | 79.8 | 80.0 |
| Nonfarm Inven Change (2000 Chain Weighted \$) | 533 | 33.4 | 34.9 | 34.2 | 23.6 | 28.7 | 22.7 | 25.3 |
| Housing Starts (Mill Units) | 1.71 | 1.56 | 1.58 | 1.55 | 1.55 | 1.57 | 1.58 | 1.58 |
| Existing House Sales (Mill Units) | 628 | 6.24 | 6.25 | 6.15 | 6.00 | 5.90 | 5.90 | 5.95 |
| Total Light Vehicle Sales (Mill. Units) | 16.6 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 16.6 | 16.6 |
| National Unemployment Rate (\%) | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| Federal Budget Surplus (Unified, FY, \$Bill) | -41.7 | -80.4 | -130.0 | 45.0 | -55.0 | -75.0 | -125.0 | 15.0 |
| Price of Oil (\$Bbl, U S. Refiners' Cost) | 65.12 | 54,66 | 54.25 | 57.00 | 55.75 | 56.00 | 56.50 | 55.75 |
| MONEY AND INTEREST RATES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate (\%) | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 |
| Federal Funds Rate (\%) | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 10-Year Treasury Note Rate (\%) | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Long-Term Treasury Bond Rate (\%) | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
| AAA Corporate Bond Rate (\%) | 57 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.7 |
| Prime Rate (\%) | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| INCOMES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Personal Income (Annualized \% Change) | 5.9 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| Real Disp Inc (Annualized \% Change) | 4.1 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| Personal Savings Rate (\%) | -12 | -1.0 | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.1 |
| Corporate Economic Profits (Annualized \$Bill) | 1653 | 1659 | 1726 | 1719 | 1752 | 1742 | 1830 | 1839 |
| Yr-to-Yr \% Change | 30.6 | 19.1 | 10.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 7.0 |
| COMPOSITION OF REAL GDP-ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gross Domestic Product | 2.0 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Final Sales | 1.9 | 4.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| Total Consumption | 2.8 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Nonresidential Fixed Investment | 10.0 | -0.4 | 7.0 | 8.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.5 |
| Structures | 15.7 | 2.8 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 5.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| Equipment \& Software | 77 | -1.8 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.0 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | -186 | -19.2 | -15.0 | -12.0 | -6.0 | -2.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| Exports | 6.8 | 10.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 8.4 |
| Imports | 5.6 | -3.2 | 7.0 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 3.6 |
| Federal Government | 13 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| State \& Local Governments | 1.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Q2007. Vafue Line Putbisting, inc. All rights teserved. Factual malenial is obtained fom sources believed to be reliable and is provided without warranties of any kind. THE PHELSHER - IS NOT RESPONSBLE FOR ANY ERFORS OR OMISSIONS HEREIN. This publicationIS strictly for subscriber's Own, non-commerciat, inlernal use No part of il may be reproduced, <br>  resold, stored of transmilted in any printed, electronic or other form. or used for generating or matkeling any printod or electronic publication. service or product |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# Value Line Forecast for the U.S. Economy 

|  | ACTUAL |  |  |  | ESTIMATED |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
| GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ITS COMPONENTS ( 2000 CHAIN WEIGHTED $\$$ ) BILLIONS OF DOLLARS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Final Sales | 10036 | 10285 | 10648 | 11025 | 11370 | 11696 | 12047 | 12421 | 12806 | 13215 |
| Total Consumption | 7099 | 7295 | 7577 | 7841 | 8092 | 8354 | 8605 | 8872 | 9155 | 9458 |
| Nonresidential Fixed Investment | 1072 | 1082 | 1146 | 1224 | 1315 | 1387 | 1447 | 1512 | 1573 | 1640 |
| Structures | 254 | 244 | 249 | 252 | 274 | 299 | 305 | 308 | 314 | 322 |
| Equipment \& Software | 820 | 843 | 904 | 985 | 1051 | 1099 | 1164 | 1240 | 1315 | 1407 |
| Residential Fixed Investment | 470 | 509 | 560 | 608 | 582 | 503 | 518 | 536 | 563 | 602 |
| Exports | 1013 | 1026 | 1120 | 1196 | 1302 | 1409 | 1530 | 1665 | 1798 | 1924 |
| Imports | 1485 | 1545 | 1711 | 1815 | 1920 | 1986 | 2073 | 2185 | 2308 | 2437 |
| Federal Government | 643 | 687 | 717 | 728 | 742 | 760 | 771 | 770 | 774 | 772 |
| State \& Local Governments | 1216 | 1218 | 1224 | 1230 | 1257 | 1287 | 1309 | 1327 | 1343 | 1359 |
| Gross Domestic Product | 10470 | 10961 | 11712 | 12456 | 13254 | 13916 | 14613 | 15379 | 16193 | 17080 |
| Real GDP (2000 Chain Weighted \$) | 10049 | 10301 | 10704 | 11049 | 11422 | 11741 | 12093 | 12480 | 12880 | 13305 |
| PRICES AND WAGES-ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP Deflator | 17 | 2.1 | 28 | 30 | 2.9 | 22 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| CPI-All Urban Consumers | 1.6 | 2.3 | 27 | 3.4 | 32 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| PPI-Finished Goods | -13 | 3.2 | 36 | 4.9 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Employment Cost Index-Total Comp. | 38 | 3.8 | 38 | 31 | 2.9 | 31 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 |
| Productivity | 43 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 23 |
| PRODUCTION AND OTHER KEY MEASURES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Industrial Prod (\% Change) | . 03 | 06 | 4.1 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| Factory Operating Rate (\%) | 735 | 737 | 771 | 78.9 | 80.4 | 80.0 | 79.8 | 79.9 | 80.0 | 80.2 |
| Nonfarm Inven. Change (2000 Chain Weighted \$) | 152 | 140 | 470 | 19.6 | 4.3 .9 | 45.0 | 30.0 | 40.0 | 42.0 | 45.0 |
| Housing Starts (Mill. Units) | 1.71 | 185 | 1.95 | 2.07 | 1.82 | 1.56 | 1.60 | 1.65 | 1.75 | 1.85 |
| Existing House Sales (Mill. Units) | 565 | 6.18 | 672 | 706 | 6.50 | 6.08 | 5.95 | 6.00 | 6.20 | 6.40 |
| Total Light Vehicle Sales (Mill. Units) | 16.8 | 16.6 | 169 | 16.9 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.8 | 17.0 | 17.3 |
| National Unemployment Rate (\%) | 5.8 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.6 |
| Federal Budget Surplus (Unified, FY, \$Bill) | -1578 | -3770 | -4130 | -318.0 | -248.0 | -260.0 | -230.0 | -225.0 | -195.0 | -145.0 |
| Price of Oil (\$Bbl, U S Refiners' Cost) | 24.00 | 28.60 | 3691 | 50.31 | 60.12 | 55.75 | 56.00 | 56.00 | 53.00 | 50.00 |
| MONEY AND INTEREST RATES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate (\%) | 1.6 | 10 | 1.4 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.1 |
| Federal Funds Rate (\%) | 17 | 1.1 | 14 | 32 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
| 10-Year Treasury Note Rate (\%) | 4.6 | 40 | 43 | 43 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.6 |
| Long-Term Treasury Bond Rate (\%) | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 46 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.8 |
| AAA Corporate Bond Rate (\%) | 6.5 | 5.7 | 56 | 52 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.5 |
| Prime Rate (\%) | 4.7 | 4.1 | 43 | 6.2 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| INCOMES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Personal income (\% Change) | 18 | 32 | 6.2 | 52 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.0 |
| Real Disp. Inc. (\% Change) | 3.1 | 2.2 | 36 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Personal Savings Rate (\%) | 24 | 2.1 | 2.0 | -0.4 | -7.0 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Corporate Economic Profits (\$Bili) | 886 | 993 | 1183 | 1331 | 1618 | 1735 | 1839 | 1931 | 2066 | 2231 |
| Yr-to-Yr \% Change | 15.5 | 12.1 | 191 | 12.5 | 21.6 | 7.2 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 7 n 0 | 8.0 |
| COMPOSITION OF REAL GDP-ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gross Domestic Product | 16 | 2.5 | 39 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| Final Sales | 12 | 25 | 3.5 | 35 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Total Consumption | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 35 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| Nonresidential Fixed Investment | -9.2 | 10 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 4.3 |
| Structures | -17.0 | -4.1 | 22 | 1.1 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Equipment \& Software | -6.2 | 2.8 | 73 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 4.5 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 7.0 |
| Residential Fixed investment | 49 | 84 | 99 | 86 | -4.2 | -13,6 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 70 |
| Exports | -2.3 | 13 | 92 | 68 | 8.9 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 7.0 |
| Imports | 3.4 | 4.1 | 10.8 | 61 | 5.8 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| Federal Covernment | 70 | 6.8 | 4.3 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.4 | -0.1 | 0.5 | -0.2 |
| State \& Local Governments | 31 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 05 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
CASE NO: 2007-00143
COST OF CAPITAL SUMMARY AT CURRENT AND PROPOSED RATES
i3 MONTH AVERAGE


| 13 Month Average Amount | \% of Tolal | Add (1) | Adjusted Capital | Cost Rate | Average Weighted Cos: |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$8,036,966 | 3.889\% S | 42.153 | \$8,079,119 | 5.250\% | 0.20\% |
| 103,387,163 | 50.031\% | 542,282 | 103,929,445 | 6.580\% | 3.29\% |
| 5,944,726 | 2.877\% | 31.184 | 5,975,910 | 7.750\% | 0.22\% |
| 89,276,928 | 43.203\% | 468,274 | 39,745,202 | 11.400\% | 4.93\% |
| \$206,645,783 | 100.000\% 5 | 1,083,893 | \$207.729.676 |  | 8.64\% |

 $\begin{array}{lllll}\mathbf{\$ 2 0 6 , 6 4 5 , 7 8 3}-100.000 \% & \$ 1,083,893 \quad \$ 207.729 .670\end{array}$
Average
Weighted
Cost
$\xlongequal{\$ \quad 1,083,892}$ DATE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AVERAGE FOR FORECASTED PERIOD
TYPE OF FILING; X_ORIGINAL_UPDATED _ REVISED
WORKPAPER REFERENCE NO(S).: WIP-7
Class of $\qquad$ (1) JDITC:
Class of
Capital

(1) Jottc.



Page 11 of 37
DATA: BASE PERIOD_X_FORECASTED PERIOD TYPE OF FILING:_X_ORIGINAL__ UPDATED_REVISED
WORKPAPER REFERENGE NOIS): WIP-T

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
EMEEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEET
November 30,2008
DATA: X_ BASE PERIOD_FORECASTED PERIOD
DATE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AS OF END OF BASE PERIOD
TYPE OF FILING: X_ORIGINAL_ UPDATED REVISED
TYPE OF FILING: _X_ORIGINAL__UPDATED__REVISED
WORKPAPER REFERENCE NO(S).: WIP-7


Page 13 of 37

Page 14 of 37
DATA: _ $X$ BASE PERIOD_FORECASTED PERIOD
DATE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AS OF END OF BASE PERIOD
TYPE OF FILING: _ ORIGINAL__ UPDATED ___ REVISED
KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
CASE NO: 2007-00143
EMBEDDED COST OF PREFERRED STOCK
AS OF JULY 31, 2007

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
LONG TERM DEET

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
LONG TERM DEBT

| $\begin{gathered} \text { Line } \\ \substack{\mathrm{No}} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Debtissue Type \& Rale | $\begin{gathered} \text { Inicerest } \\ \text { Rale } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Balance @ | Bulance (1) Feb. 2008 | Balance (1) Mar-2008 | Balance © Apr- 2008 | Balance © May-2008 | Balance (1) Jun-2008 | Batance (@) Jur-200B | Balance (a) Aug-2008 | Balance (1) Sep-2008 | Balance (a) Oct-2008 | Batanct (1) Nov-2009 | 13 Month Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Senes $6.87 \%$ | 6.870\% | \$2,400,000 | 12,400,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300.000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 9,300,000 | 10,253,846 |
| 6 | Series 6.96\% | 6.960\% | 7,000,000 | 7,000,000 | 7.000 .000 | 7,000,000 | 7,000,000 | 7,000,000 | 7,000,000 | 7,000,000 | $7.000,000$ | 7.000,000 | 7,000.000 | ,000,000 |
| 7 | Saries 7.15\% | 7.150\% | 7,500,000 | 7,500,000 | 7,500,000 | 7,500,000 | 7.500,000 | 7,500.000 | $7,500,000$ | $7.500,000$ | 00000 | 7,500,000 | ,0000 |  |
| 8 | Senes $6.99 \%$ | 6.990\% | 9,000.000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9,000,000 | 9.000,000 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% | 5.650\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | Seres $4.75 \%$ | 4.750\% | 14,000,000 | 14,000.000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 | 14,000,000 |
| ${ }_{11}$ | Proposed $5.81 \%$ | 5.810\% | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50.000,000 | 50,000.000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 | 50,000,000 |
| 12 | Proposed 5.81\%\% | 5.810\% | 0 | 0 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10.000,000 | 10,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 6,923.077 |
| 13 | Proposod $5.81 \%$ | 5.810\% | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17,000,000 | 17,000,000 | 2.615,365 |
| 1515 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{17}^{16}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2021 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2425 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 | total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{29}^{28}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 29 \\ & 30 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{34}^{33}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3536 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 383838 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 383940 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 41 42 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
UNAMORTIZED DEBT EXPENSE

| Line <br> No. | Debt lssue Type \& Rate | Balance (a) | Batance (1) Feb-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (10) } \\ & \text { Marr2007 } \end{aligned}$ | Balance (1) | Batance (1) Mav-2007 | Balance (1) Jun-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Eatance (1) } \\ & \text { Jut } 2007 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Batance (a) } \\ & \text { Aug-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | Balance (1) Sep-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (1) } \\ & \text { Ocl-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (1) } \\ & \text { Nov-2007 } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Belance (1) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ' |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{3}{3}$ | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Senes 6.87\% | 260,390 | 255,182 | 249,974 | 244,766 | 239.558 | 234,350 | 229,142 | 223.934 | 218,726 | 213.518 | 208,310 | 203,102 |
| 6 | Series $6.56 \%$ | 39,233 | 39,039 | 38,845 | 38,651 | 38,457 | 38,263 | 38,069 | 37,.75 | 37.681 | 37,487 | 37,293 | 37,099 |
| 7 | Series 7.15\% | 48,582 | 48,380 | 48,178 | 47,976 | 47,774 | 47.572 | 47,370 | 47,168 | 46,966 | 46,764 | 46,562 | 46,360 |
| 8 | Series 6.99\% | 69,591 | 69.319 | 69.947 | 66,775 | 68.503 | 68.231 | 67.959 | 67.687 | 67.415 | 67.143 | 66.871 | 66.599 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% | 217 | 163 | 109 | 55 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | Series 4.75\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 。 | - |
| 11 | Proposed $5.81 \%$ | - | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 2.500.000 | 2,483,750 | 2,467. |
| ${ }^{12}$ | Proposed 5.81\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |
| 13 14 | Proposed $5.81 \%$ Serios $8.5 \%$ w/o over fild of $6.95 \% / \mathrm{issu}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14 15 | Series 8.5\% w/o over fide of 6.96\%\% issu | 15706 | 15,628 | 15,550 | 15,472 | 15,394 | 15,316 | 15,238 | 15,160 | 15,082 | 15,004 | 1,926 | 14,848 |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{18}$ | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 | total | S $433,719 \mathrm{~s}$ | ${ }^{3} 427,711$ | 421,703 | 5 415,695 | 5409.686 | 5 403,732 | 5 397,778 | $5 \quad 391.824$ | 5 385,870 | 5 2,879,916 | ¢ 2,857,712 | 2.835,508 |
| ${ }_{23}^{22}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{24}^{23}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{27}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 29 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 33 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{35}^{34}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 36 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}^{37}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{40}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{42}^{41}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
UNAMORTIZED DEBT EXPENSE

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Line } \\ & \text { No } \end{aligned}$ | Debl issute Type $\&$ Rale | Batance (@ Jan-200 | Balance © Feb-2008 | Balance (:) Mar-2008 | Balance (1) | Batance (4) May 200 B | Batance (a) Jun-2008 | Balance (e) Jul-2006 | Balance (1) Aug-2008 | Balance (1) Sep-2008 | Balance (사 Oct-2008 | Balance (1) | 13 Month Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\stackrel{1}{2}$ | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Senes 6.87\% | 197,894 | 192,686 | 187,478 | 192,270 | 177.062 | 171,854 | 166,645 | 161,438 | 156.230 | 151.022 | 145,814 | 177,062 |
| 6 | Series 6.95\% | 36,905 | 36,711 | 36.517 | 36,323 | 36.129 | 35,935 | 35,741 | 35.547 | 35,353 | 35,159 | 34,965 | 36,129 |
| 7 | Series 7.15\% | 45,158 | 45,956 | 45.754 | 45,552 | 45,350 | 45,148 | 44.946 | 44,744 | 44,542 | 44,340 | 44,138 | 45,350 |
| ${ }^{8}$ | Senies 6.99\% | 56.327 | 66,055 | 65,783 | 65.511 | 65.239 | 64,967 | 64,695 | 64,423 | 64,159 | 63.879 | 63,607 | 65.239 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% | 0 | - |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | Senes 4.75\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | Proposed 5.81\% | 2,451,250 | 2,435.000 | 2.418,750 | 2,402,500 | 2,386,250 | 2,370,000 | 2,353,750 | 2,337,500 | 2,321,250 | 2,305,000 | 2,288,750 | 2,386,250 |
| 12 | Proposed 5.81\% | 0 | 0 | 500,000 | 495,833 | 491,667 | 487,500 | 483,333 | 479,167 | 475,000 | 470,833 | 466,667 | 334,615 |
| 13 | Proposed 5.81\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 850.000 | 842,083 | 846.042 |
| ${ }^{14}$ | Seffes $8.5 \%$ wfo over fife of $6.96 \%$ issu | 14,770 | 14,692 | 14,614 | 14,536 | 14,458 | 14,380 | 14,302 | 14,224 | 14,146 | 14,068 | 13,990 | 14,458 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 15 \\ & 15 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 | total | 5 2,813,304 ${ }^{\text {s }}$ | 5 2, 791,100 | 3,268,895 | 5 3,242,525 | 5 3,216,155 | 3,189,784 | 3,163,413 | 3,137,043 | 3,410,972 | S 3,934, 301 | $53,500,014$ | 3,905, 145 |
| ${ }^{23}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{24}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 26 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{28}^{27}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 29 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{33}^{32}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 36 37 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{42}^{41}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Line <br> No. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Debt issue } \\ \text { Type \& } \\ \text { Rale } \end{gathered}$ Rale | Amount © Jan-2007 | Amount (1) Feb-2007 | Amount (e) Mar-2007 | Amount (1) Apr-2007 | Amount © May. 2007 | Amount (1) | $\underset{\substack{\text { Amouni (1) } \\ \text { ju-2007 }}}{\substack{\text { den }}}$ | Amount (1) Aub-2007 | Amount © Spe-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (1) } \\ & \text { Oct-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | Ampunt ( ${ }^{\text {N }}$ Nov-2007 | Amount ( ) Doc-2007 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| , |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 4 4 | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Series 6.87\% | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5.20 |
| 6 | Series 6.96\% | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 4 | 194 |
| 7 | Series 7.15\% | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 |
| ${ }^{8}$ | Series $6.99 \%$ | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | Sernes 4.75\% |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 15, |
| 11 | Propased 5.81\% |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15.250 | 16.2 | 15, |
| 12 | Proposed 5.81\% |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | Proposed 5.81\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{15}^{14}$ | Series 8.5\% wio over fifo of $5.96 \%$ issu | 78 | 78 | 78 | ${ }^{76}$ | ${ }^{78}$ | 78 | 78 | ${ }^{78}$ | 78 | ${ }^{78}$ | 78 | 78 |
| ${ }_{16}^{15}$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{22}^{21}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 | total | S 6.008 | 6,008 | $\mathrm{s}^{6.008}$ | $5 \quad 6.008$ | 6,008 | $5 \quad 5,954$ | s. 5.954 | $5 \quad 5.954$ | $5 \quad 5.954$ | $5 \quad 22.204$ | 5 22,204 | $5 \quad 22.204$ |
| ${ }_{29}^{28}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{30}^{29}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 33 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 36 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}^{37}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{42}^{48}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Line } \\ & \text { No. } \end{aligned}$ | Debt 1554 e Type 8 Ratio | Amount (1) | $\underset{\text { Fab- } 2000}{ }$ | Amount © © Mar-200s | Amount (). <br> Apr. 200 B | Amount © <br> May-2008 | Amount (e) Jun-2008 | Amount © jut-2008 | Amount () Aug:2008 | Amount (1) Sep-2008 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount @ } \\ & \text { Oct-2000 } \end{aligned}$ | Amount (1) Nov. 2008 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Test Period } \\ \text { Tolat } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Series 6.87\% | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5,208 | 5,208 | 5.208 | 5.208 | 5.208 | 5,208 | 5,208 | 62.496 |
| 6 | Series $6.95 \%$ | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 194 | 2.328 |
| 7 | Serie5 $7.15 \%$ | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 2,424 |
| ${ }^{8}$ | Senes $6.99 \%$ | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 2 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 3.254 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| 10 | Series $4.75 \%$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 11 | Proposed 5.81\% | 16,250 | 16.250 | 16,250 | 16,250 | 16,250 | 16,250 | 16,250 | 16.250 | 16,250 | 16.250 | 66,250 | 195.000 |
| 12 | Proposed $5.81 \%$ |  | 。 | 4.167 | 4,167 | 4.167 | 4.157 | 4.167 | 4.167 | 4,467 | 4,167 | 4.167 | 37.500 |
| 13 | Proposed 5.61\% |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 7.917 | 7,917 | 15,833 |
| 14 15 | Series $8.5 \%$ wlo over fle of $6.965 \%$ issu | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | ${ }^{76}$ | ${ }^{78}$ | ${ }^{78}$ | 8 | ${ }^{936}$ |
| 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{18}^{18}$ | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{19}$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{23}^{22}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & 26 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 | total | 5 22.204 | 22,204 | $5 \quad 26.371$ | 5 26,371 | 26,371 | 5 26,371 | s 26, 279 | 26,371 | $5 \quad 26.371$ | $5 \quad 34,287$ | 34,287 | 319.781 |
| ${ }_{29}^{28}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{33}^{32}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3536 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3738 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{array}{r}38 \\ 39 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{4}^{40}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{42}^{41}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Line No. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Debt Issue } \\ \text { Type \& } \\ \text { Rate } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Amount (1) jan-2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (G8) } \\ & \text { Feb-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{\text {M }}$ Amount (1) | $\underset{\substack{\text { Amount (1) } \\ \text { Apr-2007 }}}{ }$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amounl © (9) } \\ & \text { May-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount } 9 \\ & \text { Jun-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { R.mount © } \\ \text { Jul } 2007 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (1) } \\ & \text { Aug-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | Amount (4) $\operatorname{sep}-2007$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount © } \\ & \text { Ocl-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { Amportl (4) } \\ \text { Nov-2007 }}}{ }$ | ${ }_{\text {Dec. }}$ Amount (1) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{3}{3}$ | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Seres 5.87\% | 1,064,850 | 1,064,850 | ${ }^{851,880}$ | 851,880 | 851,880 | 851,880 | 851,880 | ${ }^{851.880}$ | ${ }^{851,880}$ | ${ }^{851,880}$ | 851,880 | 851,880 |
| 6 | Series 6.96\% | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487.200 | 487,700 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487,200 | 487.200 |
| 7 | Series 7.15\% | 536,250 | 536,250 | 536,250 | 536.250 | 536,250 | 536,250 | 536.250 | 536,250 | 536,250 | 536,250 | 536.250 | 536,250 |
| 8 | Sents 6.99\% | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 |
| 9 | Series 5.65\% | 1,356,000 | 1,356,000 | 1,356,000 | 1,356,000 | 1,356,000 |  |  |  |  | 0 |  | $\bigcirc$ |
| 10 | Series 4.75\% | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 655.000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665.000 | 665,000 | 665,000 |
| 11 | Proposed 5.81\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 2,905,000 | 2.905,000 | 2.905,000 |
| 12 | Proposed 5.81\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ${ }_{14}^{13}$ | Froposed 5.81\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 14 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{18}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | total | S 4,739,400 | 4,736,400 | 4,525,430 | 4,525,430 | 4,525,430 | 3,169,430 | 3,169,430 | $3.169,430$ | 3,169,430 | 6,074,430 | 6.074,430 | 6,074,430 |
| 21 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{23}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{24}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 26 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 26 27 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{28}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{30}^{29}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{34}^{33}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 36 37 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 42 42 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Line <br> No. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Debi lissue } \\ \text { Type \& } \end{gathered}$ Rale | Amount (1) | $\underset{\text { Feb-2008 }}{\text { Ampun © }}$ | Amount (1) Mar-2008 | Amount (i) Apr-2000 | Amount (1) May-2008 | Amount (1) Jun-2008 | Amount @ Jul-2008 | Amount (1) Aug-2008 | Amount (1) Sep-2008 | Amount (1) Oct-2008 | Amount (ic) Nav-2008 | $\begin{aligned} & 13 \text { Month } \\ & \text { Average } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | general mortgage bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Seties $6.87 \%$ | ${ }^{851.880}$ | ${ }^{851,880}$ | 638.910 | 639,910 | 638,910 | 638.910 | ${ }^{638.910}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | Serias $6.96 \%$ | 487.200 | 487.200 | 487,200 | 487.200 | 487.200 | 487.200 | 487.200 | 487.200 | 487.200 | ${ }_{487,200}$ | 487.200 | 4877.200 |
| 7 | Seicios 7.15\% | 536.250 | 536,250 | 536.250 | 536.250 | 5356250 | 536.250 | 536,250 | 536.250 | 536.250 | 536.250 | 536.250 | 536.250 |
| 8 | Series 6.99\% | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629.100 | 629,100 | 629,100 | 629,100 |
| 9 | Serios 5.65\% | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | Serios 5.75\% | 665.000 | 665.000 | 665.000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665.000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 865,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 | 665,000 |
| 11 | Proposed 5.81\% | 2.905,000 | 2,905,000 | 2.905.000 | 2,905,000 | 2.905.000 | 2,905,000 | 2.905.000 | 2.955,000 | 2,905,000 | 2,905,000 | 2,905,000 | 2,905 |
| 12 | Proposed $5.81 \%$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 581,000 | 581.000 | 561,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 | 402,231 |
| 13 | Proposed 5.81\% | 0 | 。 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 987,700 | 987,700 | 151,954 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{18}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | total | 56 | 6.074. | 6.442.460 | 6.442.460 | 6.442.460 | 6.442.460 | 6.442.460 | 6.442.460 | 6.442 .460 | 7,430,160 | $7.430,160$ | 6,48 |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{23}^{22}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{26}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{28}^{27}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{29}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 33 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{37}^{36}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}^{37}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 42 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
PREFERRED STOCK

| Line <br> No. | Debtissue Type $\&$ <br> Type 8 <br> Rale | $\begin{gathered} \text { hatorest } \\ \text { Rate } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Bulance (ay } \\ & \text { Jan-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | Balance (1) Fab-2007 | Balanco (圈 | Apr-200 <br> Batance (a) | Batance (1) <br> May 2007 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (a) } \\ & \text { jun-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Ealance (@) } \\ & \text { Jul-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Batance (1) } \\ & \text { Aug-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Balanee (1) } \\ \text { Sep-2007 } \end{gathered}$ | Balance (1) Ocl-2007 | Batance (1) Nov-2007 | Balance (1) Dec-2007 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 2 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Seres $8.53 / 4 \% \%$, $5100 \mathrm{~Pa}_{7}$ | 5.750\% | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,600 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391,800 |
| 7 | Senes C, 5 1/2\%, 3100 Pz | 5.500\% | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488.300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 |
| 1 | Senes D. $5 \%$, 5100 Par | 5.000\% | 586,600 | 566,600 | 566,600 | 586.600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 566,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 |
| ${ }_{11}^{10}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{13}^{12}$ | 8.47\% Senes, 5100 Par | ${ }^{0.4703 \%}$ | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4.500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4.500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 |
| 14 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{18}^{17}$ | total |  | 5.965,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966.700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{21}^{20}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{24}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 26 27 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 29 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{31}^{30}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{34}^{33}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{36}^{36}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 38 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 41 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 42 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
PREFERRED STOCK

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Line } \\ & \text { No. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Debi issue } \\ \text { Type } 8 \\ \text { Rate } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { interest } \\ \text { Rate } \end{gathered}$ | Balance @ jan-2008 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (1) } \\ & \text { Feb-200B } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (14 } \\ & \text { Mar-2008 } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Balance (e) } \\ & \text { Apt-2000 } \end{aligned}$ | Balance (1) | Batance (1) Jun-2008 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Balance (1) } \\ \text { Jul-2008 } \end{gathered}$ | Balance (4) Aus-2008 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Batance (匈 } \\ & \text { S.ep-2000 } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Batance @ } \\ \text { Oct-2009 } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Balance (1) Nov-2008 | 33 Month |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 2 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Series B, 53/4\%\%, 5100 Pa | 5.750\% | 391.800 | 391.600 | 391,800 | 391.800 | 391.800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 391.800 | 391,800 | 391,800 | 397,800 | 391,800 |
| 7 | Series C, 5 \%/2\%, S100 Pi | 5.500\% | 488,300 | 488,300 | 486,300 | 488,300 | 488.300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488,300 | 488.300 | 488,300 | 488,300 |
| 9 | Seritios 0, 5\%, 5100 Par | 5.000\% | 566,600 | 586,600 | 566,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 596,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586,600 | 586.600 |
| 110 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 13 | 8.47\% Serics. 5100 Par | 8.470\% | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | 4.500,000 | 4.500,000 | 4,50,000 | 4.50,000 | 4,500.000 | 4,500,000 | 4.500,000 |
| ${ }_{15}^{14}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 | total |  | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5.966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 | 5,966,700 |
| 19 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{23}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 26 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{28}^{27}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{29}^{29}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{33}^{32}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 36 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 37 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 38 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{40}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{4}^{41}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 42 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
UNAMORTIZED PREFERRED STOCK EXPENSE

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
UNAMORTIZED PREFERRED STOCK EXPENSE


KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
PREFERRED STOCK EXPENSE AMORTIZATION

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
PREFERRED STOCK EXPENSE AMORTIZATIOA


KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
SHORT TERM DEBT

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
COMMON EQUITY

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Line } \\ & \text { No. } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\underset{\substack{\text { Amount ( } \\ \text { Jan-2007 }}}{ }$ | Amount (G) | Ambunt () | Amount (:) | Amount (3) | Amount (:) | Amount (1) | ${ }^{\text {Amount (1) }}$ Au9:2007 | Amounl 1 ( Sep-2007 | $\underset{\substack{\text { Ampunt } \\ \text { Ocl-2007 }}}{\text { (1) }}$ | Amount (:) Nov-2007 | Amount (:) Dec-2007 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 3 4 | balance | S 73,228,973 | s 73,187,262 | S 73,129,635 | $572.552,670$ | s 72,577,476 | 5 72.696.590 | S 72,672,394 | S 73,357,159 | S 74,088,749 | s 74,544,574 | 5 84,155,537 | 84,584,942 |
| 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | ADD: EQUITY INFUSION |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9,000,000 |  |  |
| ${ }_{8}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | ADD: NET INCOME TO COMMON EQUI | (41,711) | (57,627) | 541,809 | 24,006 | 119,144 | 210,913 | 684,765 | 731,590 | 742,893 | 510,963 | 429,405 | 523,786 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | Less: onvienos on common eautr |  |  | (11188744) |  |  | 1235 |  |  |  |  |  | (1.607.773) |
| 13 | Less.anomos oncomon |  |  | (, |  |  | [23, |  |  | (28,08 |  |  | (1.607.773) |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 |  | S 73,187,262 | 5. $73,129,635$ | 5 . $72,552,670$ | S 72,577,476 | 572.696 .590 | $5 \xlongequal{72,672,394}$ | 5 73, 357, 159 | 5 74,089,749 | 5 74,544,574 | 5 84,155,537 | S 84,564,942 | S 83,500,955 |
| 17 |  |  | 73129 | 72552670 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |  | $s$. | s |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{24}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{27} 26$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 29 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{33}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{34}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 36 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{38}^{37}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 38 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
COMMON EQUITY

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
JDITC

| Line No. |  | Amount (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (1) } \\ & \text { Feb-20007 } \end{aligned}$ | Amount (1) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Amount © } \\ \text { Apr-2007 } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (a) } \\ & \text { May-2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount @ } \\ & \text { Jun-20007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (a) } \\ & \text { Jul-20007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (1) } \\ & \text { Aug:2007 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Amount ( © } \\ \text { Sepozoot } \end{gathered}$ | Ambunt Oct-2007 | Amounl (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (i) } \\ & \text { Dec-2007 } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{1}{2}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{8}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | DEFERREDITC (JOITC - 4\% AND 10\%) | $5 \quad 1.186 .740$ | \% 1,180,312 s | 1.173 .884 s | s 1,167,455 | $s$ \%161,029 s | s 1,154,600 s | s 1,746,172 5 | ¢ 1141,744 s | 1,135,316 | 1,128,889 | 5. $4.122,460$ | 1,116,032 |
| 11 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{13}^{12}$ | DEfERREDITC-3\% | S 100.841 | s 108,203 s | 107.565 s | s 106,927 | s 106, 289 5 | s 105,651 s | ¢ 105,013 s | \% 104,375 s | 103,737 s | 103.099 | 102,461 s | 101,823 |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{16}^{15}$ | AnNLAL AMORTIZATION OF 36 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  | S |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{18}$ | ANNUAL AMORTILATION OF 4\%: ITC | s 6,300 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
JDITC

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Line } \\ & \mathrm{Na} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount @ } \\ & \text { fan-2008 } \end{aligned}$ |  | Amouni (i) <br> Fet-2008 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount @ © } \\ & \text { Mar-200B } \end{aligned}$ |  | Amaunl (i) <br> Adr-2000 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount (1) } \\ & \text { May-2009 } \end{aligned}$ |  | Amount (1) <br> Jun-2008 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Amount : }) \\ & \text { Jut-2008 } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | Amount @ Aug-2008 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { imounl (1) } \\ & \text { Sep-2008 } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { mount : } \\ & \text { Oct-2008 } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { mount (). } \\ & \text { vov-2008 } \end{aligned}$ |  | 3 Month Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | DEFERRED ITC (JDITC - 4\% AND 10\%) | 3 | 1,109,604 | 5 | 1,103,176 | 5 | 1,096,748 |  | 1,090,320 |  | 1,083,892 |  | 1,077,464 | 5 | 1,071,036 | 5 | 1,064,608 | $s$ | 1,058, 180 | 5 | 1,051,752 | $s$ | 1,045,324 | $s$ | 1,083,892 |
| 11 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13 | DEFERREDITC-3\% | s | 101,185 | s | 100,547 | 5 | 99,909 | 5 | 99,271 | $s$ | 98,633 | $s$ | 97,995 | s | 97,357 | $s$ | 96.719 | $s$ | 96,081 | $s$ | 95,443 | s | 94,805 | $s$ | 98,633 |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 | ANNUAL AMORTIZATION OF $3 \%$ ITC |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 | ANNUAL AMORTIZATION OF $4 \%$ ITC |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 22 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

22. RE: Mike Miller Direct Testimony. With respect to Exhibit MAM-3, please provide:
(a) All data, work papers, assumptions on costs and interest rates in all pro forma financings, and other data used to determine the cost rates for short-term debt, long-term debt, and preferred stock, and
(b) An electronic version of all supporting Schedules and work papers used to determine the senior capital costs, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

(a) Please see the response to AGDR1, question 21. Also please see Exhibit MAM-5 and the responses to questions 20 and 21 for a full explanation of how the cost rates for additional Long-term debt and Short-term debt were determined for the forecasted test-year.
(b) Please see the response to AGDR1, question 21.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#22_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Item 23 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

23. RE: Mike Miller Direct Testimony. With respect to Exhibit MAM-4, please provide:
(a) All data and work papers used in the analysis of the financings, and
(b) An electronic version of all supporting Schedules and work papers used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

Please see the electronic version of the workpapers and additional schedules that support Exhibit MAM-4. Please refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#23_Exhibit_MAM4_061807.xls

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#23_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY 

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 24 of 312

Witness: Michael A. Miller
24. RE: Mike Miller Direct Testimony. With respect to Exhibit MAM-5, please provide:
(a) All data and work papers used in the analysis of interest rates, as well as an detailed explanation of the analysis which is performed in Exhibit MAM-5, and
(b) An electronic version of Exhibit MAM-5 (pages 1 and 2) along with all supporting Schedules and work papers used in the analysis, with all data and equations left intact.

## Response:

(a) The source of all data used on Exhibit MAM-5 is the Value Line Publication from the date of publication as indicated on the Exhibit. No other workpapers or analysis was used other than as shown and noted on the Exhibit.
(b) Please refer to electronic file KAW_R_AGDR1\#24_Exhibit_MAM5_061807.xls.

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#24_061807.pdf

KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 25 of 312

Witness: Michael A. Miller
25. RE: Pension Assets. Please provide the following:
(a) The overall expected rate of return used for pension assets;
(b) The expected rates of return for alternative assets classes (long-term bonds, common stock) used in determining the overall expected rate of return used for pension assets; and
(c) Copies of all documentation used in determining the expected rates of return for alternative assets classes (long-term bonds, common stock).

## Response:

(a) Please see the American Water Pension Plan actuarial report dated May 7, 2007 provided in response to KAW_R_PSCDR2\#28b_061807.pdf which contains the requested information and all assumptions and sources used by the actuary, Towers Perrin.
(b) See the response to part a. above.
(c) See the response to part a. above.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#25_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Item 26 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

26. Please provide a complete bill frequency analysis (also known as a consolidation analysis), separately for each customer class, meter size, and rate division and subdivision. Please provide this analysis in one or more electronic files in one of the following formats that most closely matches the original, in an unprotected (no password) format: Microsoft Excel, Lotus 1-2-3, Microsoft Access, dBASE, SPSS, SAS, comma delimited text, ASCII text, Adobe Acrobat (not a scanned or image file).

## Response:

The electronic version of the bill frequency analysis for the base period actual from August 2006 through January 2007 is titled KAW_R_AGDR1\#26_billfrequency.xls.

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#26_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY <br> CASE NO. 2007-00143 <br> <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

 <br> <br> ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION}

Item 27 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

27. Please provide the original electronic spreadsheet file used to create Exhibit 37M, with all formulas and links intact, including all files linked thereto that are necessary for the proper functioning of the file. If any of the links are to a mainframe database or application, please provide the version of the output from such database or application that was used to produce Exhibit 37M.

## Response:

See the electronic files filed in response to AGDR1\#46. The spreadsheet used to create Exhibit 37M is titled Rev07.xls.

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#27_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Item 28 of 312

## Witness: Michael A. Miller

28. Please provide the original electronic spreadsheet file used to create Exhibit MAM-9, with all formulas and links intact, including all files linked thereto that are necessary for the proper functioning of the file. If any of the links are to a mainframe database or application, please provide the version of the output from such database or application that was used to produce Exhibit MAM-9.

## Response:

Please see KAW_R_AGDR1\#57_Exhibit_MAM9_061807.xls for the electronic version of the requested information.

For electronic version of this document, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#28_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 29 of 312

## Witness: Linda C. Bridwell

29. RE: Testimony of Linda Bridwell, p. 22, lines 1-3. The witness states that all new meter installations have AMR capabilities. Please describe the current methods by which KAWC reads meters (for example, manual, touch pad, AMR, etc.). For each such method, please state the number of meters by customer class and the approximate amount of time it takes to read each such meter.

## Response:

KAW reads meters manually, via touch pad, and via AMR. The manual and touch pad meters take approximately 2.5 minutes each to read. AMR requires only walking past or driving past at the posted speed limit. KAW first deployed AMR in rural areas where two meter readers are required for safety considerations. AMR is now deployed in new residential areas and areas with large residential lots. The table below shows the number of meters by revenue class and meter type as of May 31, 2007.

| REVENUE CLASS | AMR | MANUAL | TOUCH <br> PAD | TOTAL |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Residential | 25,663 | 77,672 | 2,006 | 105,341 |
| Commercial | 2,968 | 5,342 | 4256 | 8,736 |
| Industrial | 36 | 1 | 7 | 44 |
| Other Public Authority | 452 | 187 | 79 | 718 |
| Other Water Utility | 6 | 0 | 17 | 23 |
| Private Fire | 107 | 708 | 377 | 1,192 |
| TOTAL | 29,232 | 83,910 | 1,112 | 116,054 |

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#29_061807.pdf

# KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY 

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 30 of 312

## Witness: Paul Herbert

30. RE: Testimony of Paul Herbert, p. 3, lines 13-14. The witness states: "The allocated cost of service is one of several criteria appropriate for consideration in designing customer rates to produce the required revenues." What are the other criteria that the witness considers "appropriate for consideration" in designing rates in this case? Please list each such factor and describe how the witness considered or applied it in this case.

## Response:

Please refer to the direct testimony of Paul Herbert, page 9, line 23 through page 10, line 5 , for the other criteria appropriate to consider in designing rates. The factors considered are listed on lines 7-13 on page 10 of the testimony.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#30_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 31 of 312

## Witness: Paul Herbert

31. RE: Testimony of Paul Herbert, p. 6, lines 19-21. What is the basis for the witness's statement that purchased water, power, and chemicals "require little administrative and general expense"?

## Response:

The basis for the statement can be found in AWWA Manual M1, page 57, which states that the allocation of administrative and general expense should be based on the allocation of all other expenses exclusive of purchased power and chemical costs. Once they have been contracted for, they require little administrative and general expense other than to pay the monthly bill.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#31_061807.pdf

## KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. 2007-00143

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

## Item 32 of 312

## Witness: Paul Herbert

32. RE: Testimony of Paul Herbert, p. 8, lines 8-9 and Exhibit 36, Schedule C (Factor G). Did the witness consider any other method to allocate meter reading costs (such as a method based on the cost or efficiency of reading meters for each class of customers)? If so, please provide copies of all analyses and workpapers evaluating such other methods. If not, please explain why not.

## Response:

The witness considered using information that would provide an analysis of man-days to read meters by classification; however, such data was not readily available.

For electronic version, refer to KAW_R_AGDR1\#32_061807.pdf


[^0]:    ${ }^{\text {A }}$ A review of recent rate rellef requests by a gas distribution uility. a telecommunication firm and un electric utility in a large industrial state revealed that a 100 basis poim bias in the equity cost estimate would account for approximately nine percent. fifteen percent, and eleven percent of the total revenue increases requested
    ${ }^{3}$ The typical DCF treatment uses either the sum of four quarterly dividends or the sum of four quarterly dividends multiplied by $(1+g)$ For the standard textbook DCF treatment see 11. Chapter 15: and 10

[^1]:    Chapter 8 ) In either case the cost of equity will be understated untess the time value of quarterly dividends is considered Although DCF analyses presented in rate regulatory hearings fail to recognize this bias. in recent years several academic rate of retum witnesses have recognized this source of estimation bias. For example, see [5.6.8.9]
    In passing. it is worth noting that institutional investors stock rankings based upon DCF expected retums may be altered by this bias Also. DCF estimutes of equity capital cosi may be a source of bias in empirical financial research. Examples of empirical research using annual growth estimates and/or annual dividend values inelude [3, 4, 7]

[^2]:    The CAPM suffers the same bias This is apparent when the CAPM is rewriten in terms of $P_{0}$ or $P_{0}=\left(P_{1}+D_{1}\right) /\left[1+R_{f}+\beta\left(R_{m}-R_{f}\right)\right]$, where $P_{0}$ is the current price. $P_{1}$ and $D_{1}$ are the expected price and dividend at the end of the nex period. and $\| 1+R_{f}+\beta\left(R_{m}-R_{f}\right)$ is the risk"udjusted required return In contrast. the time value of periodic payments is not ignored by bond dealers in the calculation of the yield to maturity for US Government and corporate bonds

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Although firms typically pay a dividend per share amonnt that is rounded to the nearest cent. The paper will use fractional cents for mathernatical and expository convenience
    "An iterative solution procedure for solving Equation ([1a) is

    $$
    5800=\left[\frac{\sum_{\mathrm{L}}^{4} \$ 25(1+k)^{1-250}}{(1+06)}\right]\left[\frac{1-\frac{(1+06)^{\prime}}{(1+k)^{1}}}{\frac{1+k}{1+06}-1}\right]
    $$

    using a large value for $t$ (ie. $t \geq 100$ ).
    This equation is one of several formulations for growing cash flow streams For example. the equation reduces to Equation A 8 in the text by Copeland and Weston 12. p 706] Also as shown on page 17. when 4
    $D_{1}=\underset{\mathrm{Q}=1}{\mathrm{~S}} \$ 2511+193751^{1-250}$ the equation reduces to equation A 9 in Copeland and Weston A trial and arror process can be used to eakeulate the true cost of equity

[^4]:    "Ex. dividend and dividend payment dates are important variables in the analysis. Equations (S) and (6) are developed under the assumption that the analysis date occurs immediately after a dividend payment Given quarterly dividend payments. the time periods for which the time value of dividend adjustments are required are 75 year, 50 year. 25 year. and 00 year. A different set of time periods would be involved if the analysis occurred between dividend payment dates
    ${ }^{7}$ The mathematical complexity of estimating $k$ via Equation (6) can be reduced substantially by approximating the $k$ in the numerator as $k=$ $\left[4\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{O} 1, \mathrm{~s}}\right) / \mathrm{P}\right)+\mathrm{g}$ This approximation echnique causes $k$ to be understated slightly Additional iterations can determine the exact required retum

[^5]:    *One measure often used to indicate the efficacy of regulation is the price/book value ratio. The argument generally made is that when a utility has a $P / B V=10$. the utility is earning the required retum. The extent to which this measure is correct depends on how closely the book value reflects the economic value of the assets
    "It should be observed that the required carnings per share are on an after-lax basis Revenue requirements are of course, on a before-fux basis.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ In passing, it should be pointed out that the same intra-year compounding problem exists in connection with the calculation of the cost of a utility's embedded debs. Conventional practice of both utilities and regulatory commissions is to calculate a utility's embedded debt cost as the weighted average of the coupon yields ( $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i} \text { :coupon }}$ ) of outstanding bond issues rather than to calculate a weighted average of the yields-tomaturity ( $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i}: \mathrm{y} \text { m }}$ ) (with $\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{P}_{1}=\$ 1000$ ) that gives recognition to intrayear compounding Interestingly, ignoring intra-year compounding does not create the serious bias problem in the cost of debt measure that it does with respect to the cost of equity estimate. This is because $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i} \text { agg }}$ $\left.=\mathrm{k}_{\text {i:coupon }}=\mathrm{n} \mid\left(1+\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i}: \mathrm{y} \text { ma }}\right)^{1 / n}-1\right]$ when $n$ is two, $\mathrm{P}_{0}=\mathrm{P}_{1}=\$ 1000$. and the seminannual interest payment is level.
    "A caveat is in order inasmuch as this presentation abstracts from various realities in the regulatory process. For example, a regulatory commission may choose to exclude specific assets from a utilify's rate base. or not allow certain expenses to be recovered However, introduction of these regulatory realities would not atter the conclusions reached in the puper regarding the proper procedures to be followed in implementing a DCF analysis of equity capital cost in rate regulation

[^7]:    The authors wish to thank Bob Taggant, the Editor, and Marvin Rosenberg, Office of Regulatory Analysis of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for their helpful comments.

[^8]:    ${ }^{4}$ Siegel defines the annual equity earnings requirement $\left(R^{n}\right)$ for a utility to be the earnings " . from rate payers plus interest and dividends

[^9]:    from securities owned [earnings on reinvested carnings] less all operating expenses and payments of interest on debt and dividends on preferred slock outstanding" [2, p. 51]. Later in the same paragraph when discussing the calculation of $R^{n}$, Siegel states that $R^{a}$ must be estimated as $R^{\mathrm{a}}={ }^{n} \mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{P}_{0}$ because the utility receives eamings continuously and this .. allows the firm to earn an additional rate of return on its revenue [earnings] before it disburses funds [quarterly dividends] to sharcholders, [thereby] lowering the annual revenue [ie, earnings] requirement below the level that would exist if the firm obtained revenue [ie, earnings] allotments at the end of the quarter" [2, p. 51]
    ${ }^{5}$ Implicit in the Exhibit 2 data is the assumption that the uility receives earnings through the continuous sale of service and is able to reinvest

[^10]:    ${ }^{6}$ The scrvice rates established during a rate hearing will allow sharebolders to eam their required market retum in the future if it can be safely assumed that: (i) the required market retum does not change; (ii) the post rate hearing unit demand relative to productive capacity is unchanged; (iii) the [(operating costs per unit output)/(authorized service rate per unit output)] ratio does not change over time; and (iv) the average total investment and average equity investment per unit of capacity does not change over time. These assumptions may have worked colerably well in the 1950s and 1960s. However, developments in the 1970s and 19805, particularly inflation, changed the reasonableness of these crucial assumptions and fostered the incteased volume of rate hearings.
    ${ }^{7}$ The appropriate reinvestment rate to use in an analysis of the earnings requirement for a utility will be affected by such variables as seasonality of revenues and camings, the rate of growth and timing of capital expenditures and the rate base measure. This means. of course. that the appropriate reinvestment rate may range from zero up to investors' required retum, and is. ultimately, an empirical issue

[^11]:    * University of British Columbia and Princeton University, respectively. This Research was supported by the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, the National Science Foundation, and the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. We are indebted to Paul Cootner for belpful comments.

    1. A number of studies of anticipations data bave been collected in two National Bureau Volumes [12] and [13]. Some more recent work on the assessment of expectations or forecasts has been done by Zarnowitz [16].
    2. The classic theoretical statement of the anticipations view of the determination of share valuation may be found in J. B. Williams [151. This position is also adopted in the standard textbook in the field [3]. The emphasis on the importance of earnings growth may also be found in [4], [5], and [19].
    3. One of the few attempts to conduct a study of this type was made by the Continental Illinois Bans and Trust Company of Chicago [1] in 1963. The bank collected a sample of earnings estimates one year in advance from tbree investment firms. An analysis of these projections revealed that the financial firms tended to overestimate earnings and that over-all quality of the estimates tended to be poor.
    4. The 185 companies for which the growth-rate estimates were made tended to be the large corporations in whose securities investment interest is centered. This selection was made on the basis of availability of data and was not chosen as a random sample.
[^12]:    * The numbers of observations on which this table and other tables are based varies between cells. For the correlations, the numbers of observations are reported below:

[^13]:    the correlations are all zero within industries could, however, be rejected well beyond conventional significance levels. Predictor $C$ was dropped from these tests due to paucity of data in many industries.

[^14]:    11. This effect was also found when the calculated growth rates were based on either 1) the regression of eamings per share on time; or, 2) the appropriate root of the ratio of earnings per share at the end of the period to earnings at the beginning.
    12. The numbers of observations on which Table 4 is based are considerably smaller than those for which predictions were available. Only a small part of this loss was due to tnability to calculate past growth rates due to negative earnings figures. Much more important was the fact that the predictors did not give numerical figures for past growth rates when these would be negative. One might think that the companies for which past growth rates were easily calculated would be ones with highest simple correlations among the predictors. However, the only cases for which this appeared to be true were the correlations of predictor $D$ with $A, B$, and $E$.
[^15]:    17. Predictor $C$ could not be included in this calculation because of a lack of observations in some industries.
    18. The latter, however, was tested only on the basis of the asymptotic distribution of the correlation coefficient and the assumption that the data were distributed normally.
[^16]:    20. Other periods and methods of calculating growth rates were also used. The ones presented tended to be very slightly better than the others and are comparable to the most successful of the longer-term earnings extrapolations.
[^17]:    ${ }^{2}$ Lyach. Jones and Ryon. a New York-based brokerage firm, have avainable in computer readable form consensus (avermge) earnings estimates updated monthly for the eurrent and next fiscal year as well as forecasts of aach individual analyst following anch stock. They designate this the the $1 / \mathrm{B} / \mathrm{E} / \mathrm{S}$ service. During the time period studied Lynch, Jones and Ryan surveyed brokerage lirms Our sample consisted of all stocks listed on the New Yofk Slock Exchange which were lollowed by three or more analysts. The average number of amalysts following each of these firms was slightly above seven. Furthermore, slightly less than 70 atocks were followed by ten or more analysts. The maximum number of analysts following any stock was 18 .

[^18]:    ${ }^{3}$ We could bave used differenees from $R_{m}$. rather than the markel model in reporting our resuls. However the render might then question to what extent our conclusions were dae to differences in market risk Alteraatively we could have followed Watts [10] methodology to force the Beta on each Portolio to be exnety one. However since the differences in Beta from one were neither large nor systematicanty related to any criteria across our deciles we did not take this additional step.

[^19]:    ${ }^{1}$ Vander Weide, J. H., and W I Carleton "Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs History" The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988, pp 78-82

[^20]:    Notes:

    * Coefficient is significant at the $5 \%$ level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign T-statistic in parentheses

[^21]:    ' We also tried several other definitions of "earnings," including the firm's most recent primary earnings per share prior to any extraordinary items or discontinued operations

