# BEFORE THE <br> <br> PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION 

 <br> <br> PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION}

## Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

v.
: Docket No. R-00994638
Pennsylvania American Water Company :

## DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

DR. J. RANDALL WOOLRIDGE

FOR THE
PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE

July 1999

# Pennsylvania American Water Company Docket No. R-00994638 

Direct Testimony of<br>Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

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## Title

Recommended Rate of Return
Summary Financial Statistics
Monthly Dividend Yields
Growth Rate Indicators
Risk Premium Study
Public Utility Capital Cost Indicators
Industry Average Betas
Three-Stage Dividend Discount Model
Risk Premium Assessment

## Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME, ADDRESS, AND OCCUPATION.

A. My name is J. Randall Woolridge and my business address is 120 Haymaker Circle, State College, PA 16801. I am a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs \& Co. and Frank P. Smeal Endowed University Fellow in Business Administration at the University Park Campus of the Pennsylvania State University. In addition, I am affiliated with the Columbia Group Inc., a public utility consulting firm based in Ridgefield, CT. A summary of my educational background, research, and related business experience is provided in Appendix A.

## I. SUBJECT OF TESTIMONY AND

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

## Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. I have been asked by the Office of Consumer Advocate ("OCA") to provide an opinion as to the overall fair rate of return for Pennsylvania American Water Company ("PAWC" or "Company") and to evaluate PAWC's rate of return testimony in this proceeding.

## Q. PLEASE REVIEW YOUR COST OF CAPITAL RETURN FINDINGS.

A. I have independently arrived at a cost of capital for the Company. I have established an equity cost rate of $9.0 \%$ for PAWC primarily by applying the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach to a group of publicly-held water service companies. I have also performed a risk premium study which supports my equity cost rate recommendation. Utilizing my equity cost rate, capital structure ratios, and senior capital cost rates, I am recommending an overall fair rate of return for the Company of $8.25 \%$. This recommendation is summarized in Schedule JRW-1.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY'S RATE OF

## RETURN POSITION.

A. The Company's rate of return testimony is offered by Mr. James E. Harrison, Vice President and Treasurer of PAWC. Mr. Harrison provides a recommendation for the Company's capital structure, senior capital cost rates, equity cost rate, and overall rate of return. The Company's proposed rate of return is inflated due to an overstated equity cost rate. Mr. Harrison's estimated equity cost rate of $11.75 \%$ is unreasonably high primarily due to (1) an inflated growth rate forecast he uses in his DCF equity cost rate, (2) an outdated and flawed risk premium study, and (3) an unjustified 45 basis point adjustment he makes to his equity cost rate.

## II. BAROMETER GROUP SELECTION

## Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR APPROACH TO DEVELOPING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATION FOR PAWC.

A. To develop a fair rate of return recommendation for PAWC, I evaluate the return requirements of investors on the common stock of a group of publicly-held water service companies.

## Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR GROUP OF WATER SERVICE COMPANIES.

A. The group, which I refer to as the Value Line Water Group, are the six water companies which are followed by the Value Line Investment Survey. This group includes American Water Works, The Aquarion Company, California Water Service Company, E'Town Corporation,

Philadelphia Suburban Corp., and United Water Resources. Summary financial statistics for these companies are provided on page 1 of Schedule JRW-2. On average, the group has average net plant of $\$ 1,163$ million and average total revenues of $\$ 337$ million. The average pre-tax interest coverage ratio for the group is 3.0 X . The group has an average common equity ratio of $42.5 \%$, and a current earned return on common equity of $12.0 \%$. The average market-to-book ratio is currently 1.96.

## Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AND SENIOR CAPITAL COST RATES

 ARE YOU USING TO ESTIMATE AN OVERALL RATE OF RETURN FOR PAWC?A. At this point, I am utilizing the Company's proposed capital structure. As shown in Schedule 1 of PAWC Exhibit No. 4-A, this capital structure consists of $42.31 \%$ common equity, $1.37 \%$ preferred stock, and $56.32 \%$ long-term debt. In addition, I will also use the Company's proposed cost rates for preferred stock of $8.04 \%$ and long-term debt of $7.69 \%$.

## III. CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AND DEBT COST RATES








## Q. WHY MUST AN OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL OR FAIR RATE OF RETURN BE ESTABLISHED FOR A PUBLIC UTILITY?

A. In a competitive industry the return on a firm's common equity capital is determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the capital requirements needed to provide utility services, however, and to the economic benefit to society from avoiding duplication of these services, public utilities are monopolies. It is not appropriate to permit utilities to set their own prices because of the lack of competition and the essential nature of the services. Thus, regulation seeks to establish prices which are fair to consumers and at the same time are sufficient to meet the operating and capital costs of the utility, i.e., provide an adequate return on capital to attract investors.

## Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE COST OF CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM.

A. The total cost of operating a business includes the cost of capital. The cost of common equity capital is the expected return on a firm's common stock that the marginal investor would deem sufficient to compensate for risk and the time value of money. In equilibrium, the expected and required rates of return on a company's common stock are equal.

Normative economic models of the firm, developed under very restrictive assumptions, provide insight into the relationship between firm performance or profitability, capital costs, and the value of the firm. Under the economist's ideal model of perfect competition, where entry and exit is costless, products are undifferentiated, and there are increasing marginal costs of production, firms
produce up to the point where price equals marginal cost. Over time, a long-run equilibrium is established where price equals average cost, including the firm's capital costs. In equilibrium, total revenues equal total costs, and because capital costs represent investors' required return on the firm's capital, actual returns equal required returns and the market value and the book value of the firm's securities must be equal.

In the real world, firms can achieve competitive advantage due to product market imperfections - most notably through product differentiation (adding real or perceived value to products) and achieving economies of scale (decreasing marginal costs of production). Competitive advantage allows firms to price products above average cost and thereby earn accounting profits greater than those required to cover capital costs. When these profits are in excess of that required by investors, or in other words when a firm earns a return on equity in excess of its cost of equity, investors respond by valuing the firm's equity in excess of its book value.

James M. McTaggart, founder of the international management consulting firm Marakon Associates, has described this essential relationship between the return on equity, the cost of equity, and the market-to-book ratio in the following manner: ${ }^{1}$

Fundamentally, the value of a company is determined by the cash flow it generates over time for its owners, and the minimum acceptable rate of return required by capital investors. This "cost of equity capital" is used to discount the expected equity cash flow, converting it to a present value. The cash flow is, in turn, produced by the interaction of a company's return on equity and the annual rate of equity growth. High return on equity (ROE) companies in low-growth markets, such as Kellogg,

[^0]are prodigious generators of cash flow, while low ROE companies in high-growth markets, such as Texas Instruments, barely generate enough cash flow to finance growth.

A company's ROE over time, relative to its cost of equity, also determines whether it is worth more or less than its book value. If its ROE is consistently greater than the cost of equity capital (the investor's minimum acceptable return), the business is economically profitable and its market value will exceed book value. If, however, the business earns an ROE consistently less than its cost of equity, it is economically unprofitable and its market value will be less than book value.

As such, the relationship between a firm's return on equity, cost of equity, and market-to-book ratio is relatively straight-forward. A firm which earns a return on equity above (below) its cost of equity will typically see its common stock sell at a price above (below) its book value.

## Q. WHAT ECONOMIC FACTORS HAVE AFFECTED THE COST OF EQUITY

## CAPITAL FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES?

A. Schedule JRW-6 provides indicators of public utility equity cost rates for recent years. Page 1 gives the quarterly yields on ' A ' rated public utility bonds. These yields have gradually declined over the past two decades from a high of 17.0 percent range in the 1st quarter of 1982 to the $7.5 \%$ range as of the middle of 1999.

The dividend yields for public utilities, as shown on page 2 of Schedule JRW-6 for the fifteen utilities in the Dow Jones Utilities Average, have generally followed bond yields. After peaking in the 12.0 percent range in 1981, these yields have declined and reached an all-time low of less than $4.0 \%$ in 1998.

Average earned returns on common equity and market-to-book ratios are given on page 3 of Schedule JRW-6. Over the past decade, earned returns on common equity have consistently been
in the 11.0-12.0 percent range. Market-to-book ratios increased to the 1.6 range in 1993, then declined to about 1.3 over the next two years, and since then have increased significantly. As of 1998, the market-to-book ratio for the Dow Jones Utilities hit 1.8, an all-time high.

The indicators in Schedule JRW-6 all suggest that capital costs for the Dow Jones Utilities have decreased significantly over the years. Specifically for the equity cost rate, the significant increase in the market-to-book ratio since 1995, coupled with only a small increase in the average return on equity, suggests a substantial decline in the equity cost rate.

## Q. WHAT FACTORS DETERMINE INVESTORS' EXPECTED OR REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY?

A. The expected or required rate of return on common stock is a function of market-wide as well as company-specific factors. The most important market factor is the time value of money as indicated by the level of interest rates in the economy. Common stock investor requirements generally increase and decrease with like changes in interest rates. The perceived risk of a firm is the predominant factor that influences investor return requirements on a company-specific basis. Firm risk is often separated into business and financial risk. Business risk encompasses all factors that affect a firm's operating revenues and expenses. Financial risk results from incurring fixed obligations in the form of debt in financing its assets.

## Q. COMPARE THE BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISK OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND OTHER INDUSTRIES.

A. Due to the essential nature of their service as well as their regulated status, public utilities
are exposed to a lesser degree of business risk than other, non-regulated businesses. The relatively low level of business risk allows public utilities to meet much of their capital requirements through borrowing in the financial markets, thereby incurring greater than average financial risk. Nonetheless, the overall investment risk of public utilities is below most other industries. Schedule JRW-7 provides an assessment of investment risk for 97 different industries as measured by beta, which according to modern capital market theory is the only relevant measure of investment risk that need be of concern for investors. These betas come from the Value Line Investment Survey and are compiled by Aswath Damodoran of New York University. They may be found on the WWW at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. The investment risk of water utilities is ranked the $3^{\text {rd }}$ lowest of the 97 industries. Only income-oriented investment companies and gold/silver mining companies have lower measures of investment risk than water utilities.

## Q. HOW CAN THE EXPECTED OR REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON

 EQUITY CAPITAL BE DETERMINED?A. The costs of debt and preferred stock are normally based on historic or book values and can be determined with a great degree of accuracy. The cost of common equity capital, however, cannot be determined precisely and must instead be estimated from market data and informed judgment. The return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having comparable risks.

According to valuation principles, the present value of an asset equals the discounted value of its expected future cash flows. Investors discount these expected cash flows at their required rate
of return which, as noted above, reflects the time value of money and the perceived riskiness of the expected future cash flows. As such, the cost of common equity is the rate at which investors discount expected cash flows associated with common stock ownership.

Models have been developed to ascertain the cost of common equity capital for a firm. Each model, however, has been developed using restrictive economic assumptions. Consequently, judgment is required in selecting appropriate financial valuation models to estimate a firm's cost of common equity capital, in determining the data inputs for these models, and in interpreting the models' results. All of these decisions must take into consideration the firm involved as well as conditions in the economy and the financial markets.

## Q. HOW DO YOU PLAN TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANY?

A. I rely primarily on the discounted cash flow (DCF) model to estimate the cost of equity capital. I believe that the DCF model provides the best measure of equity cost rates for public utilities. I have also performed a risk premium (RP) study, but I give these results less weight because I believe that risk premium studies provide a less reliable indication of equity cost rates for public utilities.
B. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

## Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE THEORY BEHIND THE TRADITIONAL DCF

## MODEL.

A. According to the discounted cash flow (DCF) model, the current stock price is equal to the discounted value of all future dividends which investors expect to receive from investment in the firm. As such, stockholders' returns ultimately result from current as well as future dividends. As owners of a corporation, common stockholders are entitled to a pro-rata share of the firm's earnings. The DCF model presumes that earnings which are not paid out in the form of dividends are reinvested in the firm so as to provide for future growth in earnings and dividends. The rate at which investors discount future dividends, which reflects the timing and riskiness of the expected cash flows, is interpreted as the market's expected or required return on the common stock. Therefore this discount rate represents the cost of common equity. Algebraically, the DCF model can be expressed as:

$$
\mathrm{P}=\begin{gathered}
\mathrm{D}_{1} \\
----\mathrm{k} \\
(1+\mathrm{k})^{1}
\end{gathered}+\begin{gathered}
\mathrm{D}_{2} \\
----)^{2} \\
(1+\mathrm{k})^{2}
\end{gathered}+\begin{gathered}
\mathrm{D}_{3} \\
----\mathrm{k})^{3}
\end{gathered}
$$

where $P$ is the current stock price, $D_{n}$ is the dividend in year $t$, and $k$ is the cost of common equity.
Q. HOW DO YOU ESTIMATE STOCKHOLDERS' EXPECTED OR REQUIRED

## RATE OF RETURN USING THE DCF MODEL?

A. Under certain assumptions, including a constant and infinite expected growth rate, and constant dividend/earnings and price/earnings ratios, The DCF model can be simplified to the
following:

$$
P=\frac{D_{1}}{k-g}
$$

where $D_{1}$ represents the expected dividend over the coming year and $g$ is the expected growth rate of dividends. This is known as the constant-growth version of the DCF model. To use the constant-growth DCF model to estimate a firm's cost of equity, you solve for k in the above expression and obtain the following:

$$
\mathrm{k}=\frac{\mathrm{D}_{1}}{-----}+\mathrm{g}
$$

In the constant-growth version of the DCF model, the current dividend payment and stock price are directly observable. Therefore, the primary problem and controversy in applying the DCF model to estimate equity cost rates entails estimating investors' expected dividend growth rate.

## Q. WHAT FACTORS SHOULD ONE CONSIDER WHEN APPLYING THE DCF METHODOLOGY?

A. One should be sensitive to several factors when using the DCF model to estimate a firm's cost of equity capital. In general, one must recognize the assumptions under which the DCF model was developed in estimating its components (the dividend yield and expected growth rate). The dividend yield can be measured precisely at any point in time, but tends to vary somewhat over
time. Estimation of expected growth is considerably more difficult. One must consider recent firm performance, in conjunction with current economic developments and other information available to investors, to accurately estimate investors' expectations.

## Q. IS THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL CONSISTENT WITH VALUATION TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY INVESTMENT FIRMS?

A. Yes. Virtually all investment firms use some form of the DCF model as a valuation technique. Schedule JRW-8 provides a description of a three-stage DCF or dividend discount model (DDM), which is commonly referred to as the Merrill Lynch DDM. ${ }^{2}$ This model presumes that a company's dividend payout progresses initially through a growth stage, then proceeds through a transition stage, and finally assumes a steady state stage. The dividend payment stage of a firm depends on the profitability of its internal investments which, in turn, is largely a function of the life cycle of the product or service. Given the regulated status of public utilities, and especially the fact that their returns on investment are effectively set through the rate-making process, the industry would be in the steady-state stage of a three-stage DDM. The DCF valuation procedure for companies in this stage is the constant-growth DCF.
Q. WHAT DIVIDEND YIELD DO YOU EMPLOY IN YOUR DCF ANALYSIS FOR THE VALUE LINE WATER GROUP?
A. The dividend yields on the common stock of the group are given on page 1 of Schedule

[^1]JRW-3 for the twelve-month period ending July 1999. Over this period, the average monthly dividend yield for the group has ranged from a high of $4.3 \%$ to a low of $3.6 \%$. The 12 -month average for the group is $4.0 \%$. For the group, I will employ the average of the 12 -month mean (4.0\%) and the July 1999 (3.6\%) dividend yields, which is $3.8 \%$.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT TO THE SPOT

## DIVIDEND YIELD.

A. According to the traditional DCF model, the dividend yield term relates to the dividend yield over the coming period. As indicated by Professor Myron Gordon, who is commonly associated with the development of the DCF model for popular use, the appropriate dividend yield for a firm which pays dividends on a quarterly basis is found by (1) multiplying the expected dividend over the coming quarter by 4 , and (2) dividing this dividend by the current stock price. ${ }^{3}$

In applying the DCF model, it is common to adjust the current dividend for growth over the coming year as opposed to the coming quarter. This can be complicated because firms tend to announce changes in dividends at different times during the year. As such, the dividend yield computed based on presumed growth over the coming quarter as opposed to the coming year can be quite different. Consequently, it is common to adjust the dividend yield by some fraction of the long-term expected growth rate.

The appropriate adjustment to the dividend yield is further complicated in the regulatory

[^2]process when the overall cost of capital is applied to a projected or end-of-future-test-year rate base. The net effect of this application is an overstatement of the equity cost rate estimate derived from the DCF model. In the context of the constant-growth DCF model, both the adjusted dividend yield and the growth component are overstated. Put simply, the overstatement results from applying an equity cost rate computed using current market data to a future or test-year-end rate base which includes growth associated with the retention of earnings during the year.

## Q. GIVEN THIS DISCUSSION, WHAT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR WILL YOU USE FOR YOUR DIVIDEND YIELD?

A. I will adjust the dividend yield for the Value Line Water Group by $1 / 2$ the expected growth so as to reflect growth over the coming year.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE GROWTH RATE COMPONENT OF THE DCF MODEL.

A. There is much debate as to the proper methodology to employ in estimating the growth component of the DCF model. By definition, this component is investors' expectation of the longterm dividend growth rate. Presumably, investors use some combination of historic and/or projected growth rates for earnings and dividends per share and for internal or book value growth to assess long-term potential. Alternative approaches to measure these expectations tend to generate different results, and therein lies the debate.

## Q. HOW ARE YOU DETERMINING A GROWTH RATE COMPONENT FOR YOUR DCF MODEL?

A. I have analyzed many measures of growth for the companies in the water company group.

Initially I evaluated historic earnings, dividends, and book value per share growth rates. In addition, I have utilized growth rate forecasts provided by Zacks - which compiles the earnings forecasts for companies made by securities analysts -- and the Value Line Investment Survey - which is a very well known investment information source in the U.S. Finally, I have also assessed prospective growth as measured by prospective earnings retention rates and returns on average common equity.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS HISTORIC GROWTH IN EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS AS WELL AS INTERNAL GROWTH.

A. Historic growth rates for earnings, dividends, and book value per share are readily available to virtually all investors and presumably an important ingredient in forming expectations concerning future growth. However, one must use historic growth numbers as measures of investors' expectations with caution. In some cases, past growth may not reflect future growth potential. Also, employing a single growth rate number (for example, for five or ten years), is unlikely to accurately measure investors' expectations due to the sensitivity of a single growth rate figure to fluctuations in individual firm performance as well as overall economic fluctuations (i.e., business cycles). However, one must appraise the context in which the growth rate is being employed. According to the conventional DCF model, the expected return on a security is equal to the sum of the dividend yield and the expected long-term (actually infinite) growth in dividends. Therefore, to best estimate the cost of common equity capital using the conventional DCF model, one must look to long-term growth rate expectations.

Internally-generated growth is a function of the percentage of earnings retained within the
firm (the earnings retention rate) and the rate of return earned on those earnings (the return on equity). The internal growth rate is computed as the retention rate times the return on equity. Internal growth is significant in determining long-run earnings and, therefore, dividends. Investors recognize the importance of internally-generated growth and pay premiums for stocks of companies that retain earnings and earn high returns on internal investments.

## Q. WHAT GROWTH DATA HAVE YOU REVIEWED FOR THE GROUP OF WATER COMPANIES?

A. Schedule JRW-4 provides the following growth rates for the Value Line Water Group: historic five- and ten- year historic growth rates in earnings, dividends, and book value per share as computed by Value Line (using the Value Line methodology); and projected five-year EPS growth rates from Zacks and Value Line's projected 5-year growth rates for earnings, dividends, and book value per share.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORIC AND PROSPECTIVE GROWTH OF THE VALUE LINE WATER GROUP.

A. Table 1 (see page 18) provides a summary of historic and prospective growth rates for the Value Line Water Group. For the group, the average historic five- and ten- year earnings, dividends, and book value growth is $3.4 \%$. Prospective internal growth is $4.8 \%$, with Value Line average projected retention and equity return rates of $41 \%$ and $11.6 \%$, respectively. Other projected growth rates range from a high of $7.3 \%$ for Value Line earnings growth rate to a low of 3.7\% for Value Line dividend growth rate. Zacks projected earnings rates show a mean 5-year
projection of $4.6 \%$. According to Yahoo, which covers 13 water service companies, the average projected earnings growth rate for the industry over the next five years is $4.2 \%$. The average of prospective internal growth and the forecasts for growth in earnings, dividends, and book value per share is $4.4 \%$. Considering the average projections of Zacks, the Yahoo industry average, and Value Line, prospective internal growth, and the historic growth rate range, expected growth appears to be in the 4.5 to 5.0 percent range. Given these results, I will use the midpoint of this range $-4.75 \%$ - as expected growth for the Value Line Water Group.

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE FROM THE DCF MODEL FOR THE VALUE LINE WATER GROUP?

A. My DCF-derived equity cost rates for the Value Line Water Group:

Value Line Water Group

$$
3.80 \% * 1.02375+4.75 \%=8.6 \%
$$

| $\begin{array}{c}\text { Table 1 } \\ \text { Value Line Water Group }\end{array}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Growth Rate Indicators |  |$)$

C. RISK PREMIUM APPROACH
Q. HOW WILL YOU ESTIMATE THE COMPANY'S EQUITY COST RATE USING THE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH?
A. According to the risk premium approach, the cost of equity is the sum of the interest rate on a risk-free bond $\left(R_{f}\right)$ and a risk premium ( $R P$ ), as in the following:

$$
\mathrm{k}=\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}+\mathrm{RP}
$$

I use the yield on long-term Treasury securities as the risk-free interest rate, and estimate the risk premium by assessing investors' return requirements and market-to-book ratios for water service
companies.

## Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM APPROACH.

A. My risk premium approach is based on two fundamental economic concepts: the economic theory of the firm as discussed earlier in my testimony, and the fundamental financial proposition of a positive relationship between risk and return. According to economic theory, when a firm's accounting profits (which include capital costs) are sufficient to meet investors' requirements, the market value and the book value of the firm will be equal. Likewise, if a firm is generating earnings greater (less) than required by investors, the market-to-book ratio will be greater (less) than 1.0. In recent years, the market-to-book ratios for water service companies have been greater than 1.0 , indicating that the earnings of these companies are more than sufficient to meet investors' requirements. The positive relationship between risk and return requires that, in a world of risk aversion, investors require a higher expected return for a higher level of perceived risk in an investment. By definition, the premium for assuming risk is based on the difference between the expected return on the risky investment and the expected return on a riskless investment.

## Q. HOW DO YOU PERFORM YOUR RISK PREMIUM STUDY?

A. A market-to-book ratio of 1.0 indicates that investors' return requirements are being met. In my approach, the risk premium, defined as the return on common equity minus the riskless interest rate, is compared to contemporaneous market-to-book ratios. As such, this methodology shows the additional return which utility common stock investors require above the risk-free interest rate.

To establish a cost of equity for the Company, I examine required rates of return as
indicated by both accounting and market based rates of return. I perform the study in three steps for the Value Line Water Group: (1) using the six water service companies in the group, I compute the premium for risk required by investors as the expected return on equity minus the yield on longterm Treasury securities; (2) I regress the risk premium for each firm on the market-to-book ratio for different time periods; and (3) I add the indicated average risk premium for the water service companies to the current yield on long-term Treasury securities.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE FEATURES OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM STUDY.

A. First, by directly comparing the expected returns on equity (minus the risk-free interest rate) to market-to-book ratios, I am directly measuring the accounting earnings required by investors. Risk premium studies which measure a risk premium as the difference between bond and stock returns do not directly address the adequacy of accounting earnings. Second, I am using forecasted returns on equity and not historic bond and stock returns to determine investor return requirements and an appropriate risk premium. Security prices and capital cost rates are based on expectations of the future and not on extrapolations of returns from the past. Third, I am employing a group of water service companies (and not a broader group of companies or utilities) to measure investors' return requirements. Fourth, I am using the same base in my risk premium study - the yield on long-term Treasury securities - as I use in estimating the cost of equity for the Company employing the risk premium approach. I do not establish a risk premium utilizing bond returns as a base and then estimate an equity cost rate utilizing current bond yields as a base rate. And finally, since my risk premium study does not evaluate returns derived from a series of security prices over long time
periods, the appropriate measure of central tendency for historic returns - arithmetic mean or median, or geometric mean returns - is not an issue.

## Q. WHAT RISK-FREE RATE OF INTEREST ARE YOU USING IN YOUR

## ANALYSIS?

A. The riskless or risk-free rate of interest is presumed to be equal to the yields on obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These obligations are termed riskless because they are presumed to have no default risk.

Page 6 of Schedule JRW-5 shows the yields on long-term Treasury securities from 1996 to the present. Over the first six months of 1999 , these yields have been in the $5.39 \%$ to $6.31 \%$ range. The current long-term bond yield (as of July 15) is $5.9 \%$. Considering the midpoint of the range in 1999 and the current figure, I will utilize the $5.9 \%$ as the risk-free rate in my risk premium approach.

## Q. PLEASE PROVIDE THE DETAILS OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM STUDY.

A. As described above, I examine required rates of return as indicated by both accounting and market based rates of return. My risk premium study uses expected returns (and not past returns) since capital cost rates and security prices are based on expectations of the future. I perform a risk premium study for Value Line Water Group. Forecasts of returns on common equity (ROE) are available from the Value Line Investment Survey for these companies. I use a one-year base period (1998/99) in my risk premium study. Value Line publishes individual company updates four times per year. For each Value Line update, I obtain the year $t, t+1$ and the $3-5$ year projected ROE.

Market-to-book ratios as of the month of the update are obtained from C. A. Turner Utility Reports. The yield on long-term Treasury securities for the appropriate month comes from the Federal Reserve Bulletin (or Wall Street Journal, depending on availability). For each company, I compute the risk premium as the ROE minus the yield on long-term Treasury securities. I use three definitions of expected ROE in estimating risk premiums: (1) 3-Year ROE - the expected ROE is computed as the average of the projected ROEs for years $t, t+1$, and the 3-5 year projected ROE; (2) 2-Year ROE - the expected ROE is computed as the average of the ROEs for year $t+1$ and the 3-5 year projected ROE; and (3) Projected ROE - the expected ROE equals the 3-5 year projected ROE. I regress the risk premium (using the alternative definitions of ROE) on the market-to-book ratio for the firms in the water group. Finally, I add the indicated average risk premium to the current yield on long-term Treasury securities to obtain an equity cost rate for the Company.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS SCHEDULE JRW-5.

A. Page 1 of Schedule JRW-5 summarizes the results of my risk premium study. Pages 2-5 show the summary regression results and the data employed. The risk premium, which signifies the premium investors require above the long-term Treasury yield, is derived from the regression of the premiums on the market-to-book ratios and is computed as the sum of the Constant and XCoefficient.

For the Value Line group, the risk premium has ranged from $3.15 \%$ to $4.51 \%$ over the past year. The mean risk premium over this period is 3.6 percent.

## Q. WHAT EQUITY COST RATE DO YOU ESTIMATE FOR THE COMPANY

## USING THE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH?

A. Using the risk premium approach, the indicated equity cost rate for the Value Line group is:

Value Line Group $\quad 5.90 \%+3.6 \%=9.5 \%$
D. EQUITY COST RATE SUMMARY
Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EQUITY COST RATE STUDY.
A. My equity cost rate study is summarized in Table 2. My DCF and risk premium analyses for the Value Line Water Group indicates equity cost rates of $8.6 \%$ and $9.5 \%$. Giving primary weight to the DCF results, an equity cost rate of $9.0 \%$ is indicated.

## Q. GIVEN THESE RESULTS, WHAT EQUITY COST RATE RECOMMENDATION

## ARE YOU MAKING FOR PAWC?

A. Given these results, I am recommending an equity cost rate of $9.0 \%$ for PAWC.
Q. HOW DO YOU TEST THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR 9.0\% RECOMMENDATION?
A. To test the reasonableness of my $9.0 \%$ recommendation, I have examined the relationship between the return on common equity and the market-to-book ratios for the Value Line Water Group.


## Q. WHAT DO THE RETURNS ON COMMON EQUITY AND MARKET-TO-BOOK

RATIOS FOR THE GROUP INDICATE ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR 9.0\% RECOMMENDATION?
A. Schedules JRW-2 and JRW-4 provide financial performance and market valuation statistics for the group. The average current and projected returns on equity are $12.0 \% / 11.6 \%$ and $10.9 \% / 10.8 \%$, respectively. The average market-to-book ratios for the group is 1.96 . These results - current and projected returns on equity in the 11-12 percent range and a market-to-book ratio of almost 2.0 - indicate that these companies have been earning and/or are expected to continue to earn returns on equity well in excess of their equity cost rates. As such, the current and expected returns
on equity for these companies are clearly above the equity cost rates for these companies. These observations provide clear evidence that my recommended equity cost rate of $9.0 \%$ is reasonable and fully consistent with the financial performance and market valuation of water utilities.

## Q. FINALLY, PLEASE diSCUSS THIS RECOMMENDATION IN LIGHT OF RECENT YIELDS ON PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS.

A. In recent months the yields on public utility have been in the 7.0-7.5 percent range. By historical comparisons, my recommended rate of return may not appear to offer a sufficient premium over this yield. However, it is important to recognize that there has been a significant shift in the risk and return characteristics of bonds and stocks over the past decade. This change and its implications for equity risk premiums are discussed in depth in my critique of Mr . Harrison's testimony. In short, the relative risk of stock and bonds has changed in recent years as stocks have become less volatile and risky while bonds have become more volatile and risky. This change is readily evidenced by the high level of real interest rates (nominal yields minus inflation) in the economy. Today, with 30-year Treasuries yielding about $6.0 \%$ and inflation of about $2.0 \%$, the real rate of interest is approximately 4.0 percent. Historically, this figure has averaged 2.0 to 3.0 percent. The fact that stocks and bonds are nearly equal in terms of volatility and risk implies that investors' required rates of returns on stocks and bonds are much closer today than in the past. Accordingly, the return premium that equity investors require over bond yields is much lower than
it was when stock returns were much more volatile than bond returns. ${ }^{4}$

## V. CRITIQUE OF PAWC'S RATE OF RETURN TESTIMONY

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. HARRISON'S OVERALL RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATION.

A. As summarized below, Mr. Harrison's overall rate of return recommendation is $9.41 \%$.

| Source | Capital <br> Ratio | Cost <br> Rate | Weighted <br> Cost Rate |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| L-T Debt | $56.32 \%$ | $\underline{7.69 \%}$ | $4.33 \%$ |
| Preferred Stock | $1.37 \%$ | $8.04 \%$ | $0.11 \%$ |
| Common Equity | $\underline{42.31 \%}$ | $\underline{11.75 \%}$ | $\underline{4.97 \%}$ |
| Cost of Capital |  |  | $9.41 \%$ |

Whereas I have adopted Mr. Harrison's capital structure and senior capital cost rates, I believe that his equity cost rate is excessive and his adjustment for management efficiency is not justified.
Q. PLEASE REVIEW MR. HARRISON'S EQUITY COST RATE APPROACHES.
A. Mr. Harrison estimates an equity cost rate for PAWC by applying two equity cost rate models to the Value Line Water Group. He performs both a DCF and a risk premium analysis. His equity cost rate estimates are summarized below:

[^3]Summary of Approaches and Results

> | DCF |
| :---: |
| Current/52 Week |
| $11.24 \% / 10.99 \%$ |

Risk
Premium $11.50 \%$

Based on these figures, he arrives at an equity cost rate estimate for PAWC of $11.30 \%$. He then makes a 45 basis point adjustment for company-specific factors to arrive at his overall equity cost rate recommendation of $11.75 \%$.

The primary errors in his equity cost rate recommendation are (1) he only considers two measures of growth for the Value Line Water Group in arriving at his inflated DCF growth rate of $6.88 \%$, (2) he has performed an outdated and biased equity risk premium study which ignores changes in investment fundamentals, and (3) he has provided inadequate justification for his 45 basis point adjustment.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. HARRISON'S DCF ESTIMATES.

A. Mr. Harrison performs a traditional DCF analyses. For the dividend component of his DCF, he uses both a 52 -week ( $4.12 \%$ ) and spot ( $4.37 \%$ ) adjusted dividend yield. For the growth component of the DCF, he employs only two measures of growth: Value Line's (8.0\%) and S\&P's $(5.8 \%)$ projected 5 -year earnings per share growth rate. He then uses the average of these figures, $6.88 \%$, as his DCF growth rate. Using the two dividend yields and the growth rate, his DCFderived equity cost rates are $10.99 \%$ using the 52 -week dividend yield and $11.24 \%$ using the spot dividend yield. He concludes that the average of these figures - $11.10 \%$ - is the appropriate DCF equity cost rate for the Value Line Water Group.

## Q. PLEASE EXPRESS YOUR CONCERNS WITH MR. HARRISON'S DCF ESTIMATE.

A. My primary concern with Mr. Harrison's DCF study is his growth rate methodology. As noted, he arrives at his $6.88 \%$ DCF growth rate using only Value Line and S\&P projections for EPS. His $6.88 \%$ projected growth rate is excessive. Below I have reprinted Table 1 from above. It shows six measures of historic growth and six measures of projected growth for the Value Line Water Group. Reviewing these figures in light of Mr. Harrison's 6.88\% DCF growth rate illustrates how inflated his figure is.


Several observations are worth noting concerning these figures and Mr. Harrison's $6.88 \%$ growth
rate estimate:
(1) Mr. Harrison has totally ignored the historic growth rate figures for the group which range from $1.5 \%$ to $4.7 \%$. Historic growth rate figures are provided by virtually all investment firms and presumably influence investors' expectations;
(2) The updated Value Line projected EPS figure is only $7.3 \%$ as opposed to $8.0 \%$;
(3) Of the all the historic and projected figures, only the Value Line projected EPS figure is as large as $6.88 \%$. It is larger in this case because Value Line does not measure growth from the present, but it uses a three-year moving average of projected growth. In this case, Value Line is measuring projected EPS growth from a base period of 1996-1998 to 2002-2004. Obviously, going back three years in the base period establishes a smaller base using historic earnings and thereby inflates projected earnings growth from the present (1999);
(4) Zacks, S\&P, and I/B/E/S retrieve and compile EPS forecasts from Wall Street Analysts. These analysts come from both sell side (Merrill Lynch, Paine Webber) and the buy side (Prudential Insurance, Fidelity Investments) investment firms. It is well known that the EPS forecasts of these analysts, especially those on the sell side, are overly optimistic and therefore biased upwards. It has been my experience that this bias is especially noteworthy for S\&P's EPS forecasts. The graph below, which comes from a study I am currently doing, shows the magnitude of the bias. The top line is the analysts'

## One-Year Ahead EPS Estimates vs. Actual EPS (Average)


forecasts of earnings (one-year ahead) and the bottom line is the actual earnings.
Whereas the upward bias has declined in recent years, it still is in the $10 \%$ range for the one-year ahead forecasts;
(5) The relevant growth variable in the DCF model is dividends. The average Value Line projected dividend growth rate for the group is only $3.7 \%$, far below Mr. Harrison's 6.88\%.
Q. PLEASE REVIEW MR. HARRISON'S RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.
A. Mr. Harrison arrives at a risk premium derived equity cost rate of $11.5 \%$ for the Company. This figure includes a base yield of $7.50 \%$ and an equity risk premium of $4.00 \%$. The equity cost estimate is excessive due to an overstated base yield and a biased and inflated risk premium which
does not reflect today's investment fundamentals.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE BASE YIELD OF MR. HARRISON'S RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.

A. The base yield in Mr. Harrison's risk premium analysis is the prospective yield on the Company's $\$ 30 \mathrm{M}$ Medium Term Note that is to be issued this year. Using the yield on these securities inflates the required return of equity investors in two ways. The primary error with using this base is that medium- and long- term bonds are subject to interest rate risk, a risk which does not affect common stockholders since dividend payments (unlike bond interest payments) are not fixed but tend to increase over time. The bias problem of using such yields on medium-tem or long-term bonds in an equity risk premium study is recognized in the 1987 Ibbotson Associates yearbook: "Because common stocks are not strictly comparable to bonds, horizon and default premia are omitted in the analysis of the component of equity returns." ${ }^{5}$ The second reason that this base yield is inflated is that the expected return on a note or bond subject to credit risk is above its yield-tomaturity and, hence, overstates investors' return expectations.

## Q. PLEASE EVALUATE MR. HARRISON'S RISK PREMIUM STUDIES.

A. Mr. Harrison performs two historic risk premium studies. The results are provided in Schedule 6. One study represents an analysis of historic stock and bond returns for the S\&P Public Utilities. This study involves an assessment of the historic difference between S\&P Public Utility

[^4]Index stock returns and 'A' rated public utility bond returns over the years 1928-1998. This type of evaluation is sometimes called the "Ibbotson methodology." This study suggests a historic equity risk premium of $5.45 \%$ using the arithmetic mean return and of $3.61 \%$ using the geometric mean return.

Mr. Harrison's second risk premium study is a comparison of the historic difference between the annual stock returns for the Value Line Water Group and the returns on ' A ' rated public utility bonds. The time period for this study is 1988-1998. This study indicates a historic equity risk premium of $4.94 \%$ using the arithmetic mean return and of $4.18 \%$ using the geometric mean return.

Using the historic relationship between stock and bond returns is erroneous and overstates the true market equity risk premium. In particular, using historic returns masks the dramatic change in the risk and return relationship between stocks and bonds which suggests that the market risk premium has declined.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ERRORS IN USING HISTORIC STOCK AND BOND RETURNS TO ESTIMATE AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

A. There are several flaws in using historic returns over long time periods to estimate expected equity risk premiums. Most significant is the implicit assumption that (1) risk premiums do not change over time, and (2) there has been no change in the relative risk of stocks and bonds.

Specific problems with the methodology include:
(A) Biased historical bond returns;
(B) The arithmetic versus the geometric mean return;
(C) Unattainable and biased stock historical returns; and
(D) The change in risk and return.

These issues will be addressed in this order.

## Q. HOW ARE HISTORIC BOND RETURNS BIASED?

A. An essential assumption of these studies is that over long periods of time investors' expectations are realized. However, the experienced returns of bondholders in the past violates this critical assumption. As indicated in the 1987 Ibbotson yearbook, historic bond returns are biased downward as a measure of expectancy because of capital losses suffered by bondholders over the period. ${ }^{6}$ As such, risk premiums derived from this data are biased upwards.
Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ISSUE RELATING TO THE USE OF THE ARITHMETIC VERSUS THE GEOMETRIC MEAN RETURNS IN THE IBBOTSON METHODOLOGY.
A. The measure of investment return has a significant effect on the interpretation of the risk premium results. When analyzing a single security price series over time (i.e., a time series), the best measure of investment performance is the geometric mean return. Using the arithmetic mean

[^5]overstates the return experienced by investors. A study by Carleton and Lakonishok entitled "Risk and Return on Equity: The Use and Misuse of Historical Estimates" demonstrates the potential biases introduced by using alternative return measures. The authors make the following observation: "The geometric mean measures the changes in wealth over more than one period on a buy and hold (with dividends invested) strategy. ${ }^{77}$ Since Mr. Harrison is using two studies which both cover more than one period (and he assumes that dividends are reinvested), he should be employing the geometric mean and not the arithmetic mean.

## Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATING THE PROBLEM WITH USING THE ARITHMETIC MEAN RETURN.

A. When stock returns and earnings growth rates are reported in the financial press, they are normally reported using the geometric mean. This is because of the upward bias of the arithmetic mean. To demonstrate this bias, consider the following example. Assume that you have a stock (that pays no dividend) that is selling for $\$ 100$ today, increases to $\$ 200$ in one year, and then falls back to $\$ 100$ in two years. The table below shows the prices and returns.

| Time Period | Stock Price | Annual <br> Return |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | $\$ 100$ |  |
| 1 | $\$ 200$ | $100 \%$ |
| 2 | $\$ 100$ | $-50 \%$ |

[^6]The arithmetic mean return is simply $(100 \%+(-50 \%)) / 2=25 \%$ per year. The geometric mean return is $\left((1 * .50)^{\wedge}(1 / 2)\right)-1=0 \%$ per year. Hence, the arithmetic mean return suggests that your stock has appreciated at an annual rate of $25 \%$, while the geometric mean return indicates an annual return of $0 \%$. Since after two years, your stock is still only worth $\$ 100$, the geometric mean return is the appropriate return measure. Hence, Mr. Harrison's arithmetic mean and median return measures are biased and should be disregarded.

## Q. YOU NOTE THAT HISTORIC STOCK RETURNS ARE BIASED USING THE IBBOTSON METHODOLOGY. PLEASE ELABORATE.

A. Returns developed using Ibbotson's methodology (1) cannot be reflective of expectations because these returns are unattainable to investors, and (2) produce biased results. This methodology assumes (a) monthly portfolio rebalancing and (b) reinvestment of interest and dividends. Monthly portfolio rebalancing presumes that investors rebalance their portfolios at the end of each month so as to have an equal dollar amount invested in each security at the beginning of each month. The assumption would obviously generate extremely high transactions costs and, as such, these returns are unattainable to investors. In addition, an academic study demonstrates that the monthly portfolio rebalancing assumption produces biased estimates of stock returns. ${ }^{8}$

It should be noted that the assumption of monthly portfolio rebalancing, implicit in the Ibbotson return computation methodology, effectively presumes a monthly investment horizon for

[^7]investors. This monthly rebalancing horizon is nearly impossible to replicate due to the large transactions costs it would generate.

## Q. FINALLY, PLEASE DISCUSS THE NOTION THAT MR. HARRISON'S RISK PREMIUM STUDIES DO NOT REFLECT THE CHANGE IN RISK AND RETURN IN TODAY'S FINANCIAL MARKETS.

A. The methodology employed by Mr. Harrison is also unrealistic in that: (1) this method makes the explicit assumption that the chosen time horizon is appropriate for estimating the current market risk premium, and (2) risk premiums do not change over time. These assumptions are not valid in today's environment. Economic developments over the past decade have resulted in a dramatic change in the risk/return relationship between stocks and bonds. The nature of the change is that bonds have increased in risk relative to stocks.

Page 1 of Schedule JRW-9 shows interest rates on long-term government bonds since 1926. Obviously, the interest rate levels of the past twenty years are significantly above those of the previous 50 years. Page 2 of Schedule JRW-9 provides the annual market risk premiums for the 1926 to 1997 period where the annual premium is defined as the return on common stock minus the return on long-term Treasury Bonds. There is considerable variability in this series and a clear decline in recent decades. The high was $54 \%$ in 1933 and the low was $-38 \%$ in 1931. Clear evidence of a change in the relative riskiness of bonds and stocks is provided on page 3 of Schedule

JRW-9 which plots the standard deviation of annual stock and bond returns since 1926. The plot shows that, whereas stock returns were much more volatile than bond returns from the 1920 s to the 1970s, bond returns became more variable than stock returns during the 1980s. In recent years stocks and bonds have been almost equally volatile. The increase in the relative volatility of bonds has been attributed to several factors, including greater economic volatility, deregulation of the financial system and the increase in the use of debt financing. Further evidence of the greater relative riskiness of bonds is shown on page 4 of Schedule JRW-9, which plots real interest rates (the nominal interest rate minus inflation) from 1926 to 1997 . Real rates have been well above historic norms during the past $10-15$ years. These high real interest rates reflect the fact that investors view bonds as riskier investments.

The net effect of the change in risk and return has been a significant decrease in the return premium that stock investors require over bond yields. In short, the market risk premium has declined in recent years. As such, Mr. Harrison's historic market risk premium analysis is simply outdated and not reflective of current investor expectations and investment fundamentals. ${ }^{9}$

## Q. HAS THIS CHANGE IN THE RISK AND RETURN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STOCKS AND BONDS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY?

A. Yes. One of the first studies in this area was by Stephen Einhorn, one of Wall Street's

[^8]leading investment strategists. ${ }^{10}$ His study showed that the market or equity risk premium had declined to the 2.0 to 3.0 percent range by the early 1990s. Among the evidence he provided in support of a lower equity risk premium is the inverse relationship between real interest rates (observed interest rates minus inflation) and stock prices. He noted that the decline in the market risk premium has led to a significant change in the relationship between interest rates and stock prices. One implication of this development was that stock prices had increased higher than would be suggested by the historic relationship between valuation levels and interest rates.

## Q. DOES THE RECOGNITION OF A LOWER EQUITY RISK PREMIUM EXTEND TO TODAY'S STOCK MARKET?

A. Yes. Goldman, Sachs has recently published a report on the "Brave New Business Cycle" of the 1990s and its implications for corporate profitability and stock market valuation. According to the report, the "Brave New Business Cycle," which features longer periods of business expansion, has resulted from heightened competition, globalization, deregulation, and technology. Among the implications of the new business cycle is higher stock valuation levels (higher P/E ratios) due to a lower equity risk premium. According to the report: ${ }^{11}$

Signs of a reduced equity risk premium. In theory, by stabilizing the growth of the earnings stream, the Brave New Business Cycle should reduce the premium that investors require for equity investments. This premium is nothing more than the difference in expected total return between investing in equities and investing in "safe" fixed-income

[^9]assets with similar duration, such as intermediate- to long-term government bonds. However, although the equity risk premium is easy to define conceptually, it is difficult to measure because ex post returns are not the same as ex ante expectations, even for periods of several years. Even so, support for the notion that the equity risk premium has declined can be found in two related facts. First, the P/E multiple for the S\&P 500 has been trending up for more than a decade, whereas it should normally rise in recessions and early expansions and then fall progressively during expansions, as the excess slack in the economy is exhausted. Second, this increase has far outstripped the modest decline in real yields on 10 -year government bonds that has occurred since the early 1980s. These disparate trends strongly suggest that the equity risk premium is probably moving down."

## Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO THE IMPLICATIONS OF A

## LOWER EQUITY RISK PREMIUM?

A. More and more market observers are identifying the lower equity risk premium as a primary reason for the advance of the stock market in the 1990s. They indicate that analyzing historic stock and bond returns (as Mr. Harrison has) overstates the current, forward-looking equity risk premium. They indicate that investors no longer view the stock market to be as risky as in the past, and cite as evidence that fact that stocks and bonds are almost equally voltile and (therefore almost equally risky) today. Or, in other words, the equity risk premium is lower today than in the past. ${ }^{12}$

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MR. HARRISON'S RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.

A. Mr. Harrison's risk premium studies and analysis is erroneous and should be disregarded in estimating PAWC's equity cost rate. As indicated, the base yield of $7.50 \%$ (1) includes interest rate

[^10]risk, a risk not generally faced by equity investors, and (2) is above investors' expected return on medium-term public utility bonds. The equity risk premium of $4.0 \%$ is based on two historic risk premium studies of stock and bond returns over periods of up to 70 years that (1) erroneously use the arithmetic and not the geometric mean, (2) employ biased and unattainable stock and bond returns, and (3) most importantly, masks the change in the relative risk of stocks and bonds and the resulting decline in the equity risk premium. As indicated, this latter point reflects a dramatic change in investment fundamentals that has been recognized by the investment community and is responsible in part for the bull market for stocks in the 1990s.

## Q. PLEASE DISCUSS MR. HARRISON'S EQUITY COST ADJUSTMENT.

A. The average of Mr. Harrison's DCF and risk premium studies is $11.3 \%$. He has recommended an equity cost rate for the Company of $11.75 \%$, which represents a 45 basis point upward adjustment. He argues that this adjustment is appropriate for three reasons: (1) the impact of the Company's sales erosion, (2) the Commission's practice of reducing the revenue requirement to reflect consolidated tax savings, and (3) a reward to the Company for acquiring small water systems.

## Q. HOW HAS MR. HARRISON'S JUSTIFIED THIS 45 BASIS POINT

## ADJUSTMENT, AND IS THE ADJUSTMENT WARRANTED?

A. Mr. Harrison has not justified or quantified this adjustment in any way in his testimony. It is totally arbitrary. Absent a quantified justification for these factors, he is simply asking the

Commission to make an ad hoc adjustment to his estimated equity cost rate.
In fact, these factors are actually revenue and expense items that, as opposed to providing a revenue/expense justification for, he has chosen to seek rate relief through an ad hoc adjustment to the allowed return on equity.

With regards to the sales erosion issue, the purpose of applying a rate of return to the rate base in regulation is to provide adequate earnings to cover the cost of capital. Thus, the key issue is the amount of earnings and not the amount of sales that are needed to cover capital costs. As part of its current filing, the Company has made its case on revenues and expenses. If sales erosion will affect earnings over the future test year, the issue involves revenues and expenses and not rate of return.

The second issue involves consolidated tax savings. Again, this issue revolves around revenues and expenses and not rate of return. The textbook treatment for calculating the cost of capital for a company includes multiplying the cost of debt by one minus the tax rate to reflect the fact that interest payments are tax deductible and therefore the after-tax cost of debt is effectively lower. As taxpayers, we understand this concept when we can deduct the interest on our mortgage in computing our tax liability. In determining revenue requirements in setting service rates, it is the Commission's policy to recognize this tax-shielding effect of interest payments not as an adjustment to the debt cost rate but instead as an adjustment to the revenue requirement.

The final equity cost adjustment issue involves a reward to PAWC for acquiring small water systems. This request is not substantiated in any way. According to Pennsylvania statute and
the Commission's policy, of course, the premiums paid in water company acquisitions are included in rate base and amortized over a reasonable period of time to provide earnings to cover the costs of small water company acquisitions. As such, the Company does recover the dilutive element of these acquisitions through the ratemaking process and, through the DSIC, can recover capital investments on a timely basis.

## Q. MR. HARRISON ARGUES THAT THIS ADJUSTMENT IS NECESSARY TO

 MAINTAIN PAWC'S CREDIT WORTHINESS. DO YOU AGREE?A. No. The Commission has taken steps in many areas to ensure the credit worthiness of water companies in the Commonwealth and therefore unsupported ad hoc equity cost rate adjustments are not necessary. In fact, the Commission's policies, as they pertain to the credit worthiness of PAWC, were highlighted in a July 1998 S\&P Utility Credit Report on PAWC which may be found in PAWC Exhibit 3-H (Response to Question No. 4, at page 59):

The PPUC is considered progressive and supportive of PAWC's credit quality. Favorable ratemaking principles include using a future-test year methodology, which helps minimize lags in recovering fixed and operating costs, and the allowance to recover acquisition premiums of smaller, troubled systems. Recognizing the rising cost of water service and the need to rehabilitate aging water mains, the PPUC recently approved the allowance of a Distribution System Improvement Charge (DSIC). This mechanism allows water companies to recover capital costs, return on equity, and depreciation related to certain infrastructure improvements via an additional charge on a customer bill. The surcharge is believed to be the first of its kind in the water industry.

## Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. Yes it does.

## Appendix A

## EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND, RESEARCH, AND RELATED BUSINESS EXPERIENCE

## J. RANDALL WOOLRIDGE

J. Randall Woolridge is a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs \& Co. and Frank P. Smeal Endowed Faculty Fellow in Business Administration in the College of Business Administration of the Pennsylvania State University in University Park, PA. He is a Vice President of the Columbia Group, a public utility consulting firm based in Ridgefield, CT. He also serves on the Investment Committee of ARIS Corporation, an asset management company based in State College, PA.

Professor Woolridge received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from the University of North Carolina, a Master of Business Administration degree from the Pennsylvania State University, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Business Administration (major area-finance, minor area-statistics) from the University of Iowa. At Iowa he received a Graduate Fellowship and was awarded membership in Beta Gamma Sigma, a national business honorary society. He has taught Finance courses at the University of Iowa and Cornell College as well as the Pennsylvania State University. These courses include corporation finance, commercial and investment banking, and investments at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

Professor Woolridge's research has centered on the theoretical and empirical foundations of corporation finance and financial markets and institutions. He has published over 25 articles in the best academic and professional journals in the field, including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Harvard Business Review. His research has been cited extensively in the business press. His work has been featured in the New York Times, Forbes, Fortune, The Economist, Financial World, Barron's, Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Washington Post, Investors' Business Daily, Worth Magazine, USA Today, and other publications. In addition, he has provided commentary on CNN's Money Line and CNBC's Business Today.

Dr. Woolridge co-authored two books that have been published in 1999 - Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs: Achieving Faster Growth and Better Performance (Financial Executives Research Foundation) and The Streetsmart Guide to Valuing a Stock (McGraw Hill).

Professor Woolridge has consulted with and prepared research reports for private businesses, investment banking firms, and government agencies (including the National Association of Security Dealers, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission). In addition, he has directed and participated in over 350 company-sponsored professional development programs for executives in more than 20 countries in North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. His clients have included major corporations and financial institutions around the world.

Dr. Woolridge has prepared testimony on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate in the following cases before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission: Bell Telephone Company (R-811819), Peoples Natural Gas Company (R-832315), Pennsylvania Power Company (R-832409), Western Pennsylvania Water Company
(R-832381), Pennsylvania Power Company (R-842740), Pennsylvania Gas and Water Company (R-850178), Metropolitan Edison Company (R-860384), Pennsylvania Electric Company (R-860413), North Penn Gas Company (R860535), Philadelphia Electric Company (R-870629), Western Pennsylvania Water Company (R-870825), York Water Company (R-870749), Pennsylvania-American Water Company (R-880916), Equitable Gas Company (R-880971), the Bloomsburg Water Co. (R-891494), Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc. (R-891468), Pennsylvania-American Water Company (R-90562), Breezewood Telephone Company (R-901666), York Water Company (R-901813), Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc. (R-901873), National Fuel Gas Distribution Company (R-911912), Pennsylvania-American Water Company (R-911909), Borough of Media Water Fund (R-912150), UGI Utilities, Inc. - Electric Utility Division (R922195), Dauphin Consolidated Water Supply Company - General Waterworks of Pennsylvania, Inc, (R-932604), National Fuel Gas Distribution Company (R-932548), Commonwealth Telephone Company (I-920020), Conestoga Telephone and Telegraph Company (I-920015), Peoples Natural Gas Company (R-932866), Blue Mountain Consolidated Water Company (R-932873), National Fuel Gas Company (R-942991), UGI - Gas Division (R-953297), UGI - Electric Division (R-953534) and Pennsylvania-American Water Company (R-973944). He has prepared testimony on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate in the following case before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation (RP-92-73-000). He has prepared testimony for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel: New Jersey-American Water Company (R91081399J), New Jersey-American Water Company (R-92090908J), and Environmental Disposal Corp (R-94070319). He has prepared testimony for the Hawaii Office of the Consumer Advocate: East Honolulu Community Services, Inc. (Docket No. 7718). He has prepared testimony for the County of Nassau in New York State: Long Island Lighting Company (PSC Case No. 942354). He has prepared testimony for the Office of Consumer Counsel in Connecticut: United Illuminating (Docket No. 96-03-29). He has prepared testimony for the Office of the People's Counsel in the District of Columbia: Potomac Electric Power Company (Formal Case No. 939).


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ James M. McTaggart, "The Ultimate Poison Pill: Closing the Value Gap," Commentary (Spring 1988), p. 2.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ A description of this model is found in William F. Sharp, Gordon J. Alexander, and Jeffrey V. Bailey, Investments (Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 590-1.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ See Direct Testimony of Myron J. Gordon and Lawrence I. Gould before the FCC at FCC Docket No. 79-05, in the Matter of ATT Petition for Modification of Prescribed Rate of Return, April 1980, p. 62.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ The observation implies that the premium that investors require lower return premiums today to invest in common stocks. For example, see "Choosing the Right Mixture, The Economist (February 27, 1999), pp. 1-2.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ See Ibbotson Associates, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 1987 Yearbook (Chicago: Ibbotson Associates, 1987), p. 53.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ See Ibbotson Associates, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 1987 Yearbook (Chicago: Ibbotson Associates, 1987), p. 91.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ Willard T. Carleton and Josef Lakonishok, "Risk and Return on Equity: The Use and Misuse of Historical Estimates," Financial Analysts Journal (January-February, 1985), pp. 38-47.

[^7]:    ${ }^{8}$ See Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium," Journal of Financial Economics (1983), pp. 371-86.

[^8]:    ${ }^{9}$ While Mr. Harrison's second risk premium study using the Value Line Water Group covers a shorter historic time period, it is highly unlike to be reflective of investor expectations since it covers a ten-year period which ranks among the very best in terms of stock market performance.

[^9]:    ${ }^{10}$ See Steven G. Einhorn, "The Perplexing Issue of Valuation: Will the Real Value Please Stand Up?" Financial Analysts Journal (July-August 1990 (pp. 11-16).
    ${ }^{11}$ Edward F. McKelvey, "The Brave New Business Cycle: Its Implications for Corporate Profitability," U.S. Economic Research, Goldman, Sachs \& Co., p. 7.

[^10]:    ${ }^{12}$ For example, see "Welcome to Bull Country," The Economist (July 18, 1998), pp. 21-3, and "Choosing the Right Mixture," The Economist (February 27, 1999), pp. 71-2.

