COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

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GENERAL ADJUSTMENTS IN ELECTRIC RATES OF KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY CASE NO. 2005-00341

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JAN 9 2003

CONTIMISSION

DIRECT TESTIMONY

AND EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. ROSWELL, GEORGIA

JANUARY 2006

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO

| 1 | | I. QUALIFICATIONS AND SUMMARY |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | Q. | Please state your name and business address. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | A. | My name is Richard A. Baudino. My business address is J. Kennedy and Associates, |
| 5 | | Inc. ("Kennedy and Associates"), 570 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, Roswell, Georgia |
| 6 | | 30075. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | What is your occupation and by whom are you employed? |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | A. | I am a utility rate and economic consultant holding the position of Director of |
| 11 | | Consulting with the firm of Kennedy and Associates. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | Please describe your education and professional experience. |

| 1 | А. | I received my Master of Arts degree with a major in Economics and a minor in Statistics |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | from New Mexico State University in 1982. I also received my Bachelor of Arts Degree |
| 3 | | with majors in Economics and English from New Mexico State in 1979. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | I began my professional career with the New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff |
| 6 | | in October of 1982 and was employed there as a Utility Economist. During my |
| 7 | | employment with the Staff, my responsibilities included the analysis of a broad range of |
| 8 | | issues in the ratemaking field. Areas in which I testified included cost of service, rate of |
| 9 | | return, rate design, revenue requirements, analysis of sale/leasebacks of generating |
| 10 | | plants, utility finance issues, and generating plant phase-ins. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | | In October 1989 I joined the utility consulting firm of Kennedy and Associates as a |
| 13 | | Senior Consultant where my duties and responsibilities covered substantially the same |
| 14 | | areas as those during my tenure with the New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff. |
| 15 | | I became Manager in July 1992 and was named to my current position in January 1995. |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | | Exhibit(RAB-1) summarizes my expert testimony experience. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | On whose behalf are you testifying? |
| 20 | | |
| | | |

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| 21 | Q. | How is your testimony organized? |
|----|----|---|
| 20 | | |
| 19 | | recommendation overstates the investors' required rate of return for Kentucky Power. |
| 18 | | equity of 11.50%. As I will demonstrate later in my testimony, Mr. Moul's |
| 17 | | Further, I recommend that the Commission reject Mr. Moul's recommended return on |
| 16 | | |
| 15 | | interest rates. |
| 14 | | with current capital market requirements and with the prevailing environment of low |
| 13 | | adopt an allowed return on equity for KPCo of 9.35%. My recommendation is consistent |
| 12 | А. | I recommend that the Kentucky Public Service Commission ("KPSC" or "Commission") |
| 11 | | |
| 10 | Q. | Please summarize your recommendation. |
| 9 | | |
| 8 | | the Company's witness Mr. Paul Moul. |
| 7 | | "Company"). I will also respond to the return on equity recommendation proffered by |
| 6 | A. | The purpose of testimony is to address return on equity for Kentucky Power ("KPCo" or |
| 5 | | |
| 4 | Q. | What is the purpose of your Direct Testimony? |
| 3 | | |
| 2 | | ("KIUC"). |
| 1 | A. | I am testifying on behalf of the Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. |

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|---|--|
| ł | |
| | |

| 2 | А. | Section II provides a summary of past and current economic conditions, which sets the |
|---|----|---|
| 3 | | backdrop for my rate of return analysis. Section III contains a discussion of my |
| 4 | | approach to estimating the cost of equity and the results of the methodologies that I |
| 5 | | utilize. Section IV contains my response to the Direct Testimony of Mr. Moul. |

| 1 | | II. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | Q. | Please describe the general economic trends that have affected utilities in the last few |
| 5 | | years. |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | A. | The trend for the stock and bond markets was quite positive through the '90s. Although |
| 8 | | there was a recession in late 1990 through early 1991, the markets posted strong, above |
| 9 | | average gains through 1999. During the period from 1990 - 1999, the S&P 500 posted an |
| 10 | | average annual return of 18.2%, well above the long-term average stock market return of |
| 11 | | 12.4% ¹ . Long-term government bonds also provided excellent returns during the '90s, |
| 12 | | averaging 8.8% per year compared to the long-run average of 5.8%. During the 1990s, |
| 13 | | inflation remained moderate, averaging 2.9%. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | In the years from 2000 - 2004, the stock and bond markets substantially diverged. Large |
| 16 | | company stocks as measured by the S&P 500 produced a negative annual return of -2.3%, |
| 17 | | while small company stocks actually did quite well, posting a compound annual return of |
| 18 | | 14.3%. Long-term corporate and government bonds also performed well, with annual |
| 19 | | compound returns of 10.7% and 10.3%, respectively. Inflation averaged a moderate 2.5% |
| 20 | | per year during this period. |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | The year 2004 was generally a good one for stocks, bonds, and the economy as a whole. |
| 23 | | Ibbotson Associates reported that both small and large company stocks saw gains during |
| 24 | | the year, posting annual returns of 18.39% and 10.87%, respectively. Long-term corporate |
| | 1 | Stocks, Bonds Bills, and Inflation 2005 Yearbook, Ibbotson Associates, pages 19 and 33. |

| 1 | | and government bonds also posted returns that were greater than long-term historical |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | returns. U.S. Gross Domestic Product grew at a rate of 4.4% for 2004, compared with |
| 3 | | 3.0% for 2003. The unemployment rate fell from 5.7% in 2003 to 5.4% in 2004, while |
| 4 | | inflation rose 3.26%. With respect to monetary policy, the Federal Reserve raised its |
| 5 | | federal funds rate five times during 2004 and ended the year at 2.25%. ² |
| 6 | | • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |
| 7 | | So far in 2005, Value Line ³ reported that for the week ending December 23, the S&P 500 |
| 8 | | index rose a moderate 5.4% over the prior 12-month period. Inflation as measured by the |
| 9 | | Consumer Price Index – Urban was up 3.5% for November 2005, according to the Bureau |
| 10 | | of Labor Statistics. The unemployment rate stood at 5.0% at the end of November. Value |
| 11 | | Line noted that the Federal Reserve continued to increase interest rates, raising the federal |
| 12 | | funds rate 13 times since mid-2004. As of December 23, 2005, the federal funds rate |
| 13 | | stood at 4.25%, a 200 basis point increase from the end of 2004. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | Q. | What has the trend in capital costs been over the last few years? |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | А. | Exhibit(RAB-2) presents a graphic depiction of the trend in interest rates from |
| 18 | | January 1995 through November 2005. The interest rates shown are for the 20-year U.S. |
| 19 | | Treasury Bond and the average public utility bond from the Mergent Bond Record. |
| 20 | | Exhibit(RAB-2) shows that the yields on long-term treasury and utility bonds have |
| 21 | | declined significantly since early 1995, although rates have been quite volatile. Increased |

2 Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 2005 Yearbook, Ibbotson Associates, pages 9 and 17 – 18.

³ Value Line Investment Survey *Selection and Opinion*, December 23, 2005.

| 1 | bond market volatility actually began in the early 1970s, when inflation became more of a |
|----|--|
| 2 | sustained long-term concern. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Yields have trended downward from 2002 through 2005, with the 20-year bond yield |
| 5 | declining from 5.69% to 4.83% at the end of November 2005. The yield on the average |
| 6 | public utility bond also decreased significantly over the last three years, falling from 7.83% |
| 7 | in March 2002 to 5.88% in November 2005, a decline of 195 basis points. Public utility |
| 8 | bond yields fell far more than long-term Treasury yields during this time. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Current bond yields are either at or near their lowest levels in recent history. |
| 11 | Exhibit(RAB-2) shows that since 1995 public utility bond yields are at their lowest |
| 12 | level over that ten-year historical period. I also reviewed the Mergent Public Utility |
| 13 | Manual and found that average public utility bond yields have not been as low as they are |
| 14 | now since the 1968 – 1969 time period, almost 36 years ago. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | As I noted earlier, the Federal Reserve began to raise short-term interest rates in 2004. As |
| 17 | a result, short and medium term interest rates have risen over the last two years. However, |
| 18 | longer term interest rates have been relatively stable since 2004 and have even declined. |
| 19 | At the beginning of 2004, the average public utility bond yield was 6.23%, compared with |
| 20 | 5.88% in November 2005. Likewise, the 20-year Treasury bond yield was 5.01% in |
| 21 | January 2004 and at the end of November 2005 stood at 4.83%. Currently, Moody's |
| 22 | reported that as of December 23, 2005, the average public utility bond yield was 5.73% |
| 23 | and the December 2005 long-term Treasury bond yield was 4.73%, according to Federal |
| 24 | Reserve data. |

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J. Kennedy and Associates, Inc.

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Richard A. Baudino Page 8

| 1 | | |
|----------|------|---|
| 2 | Q. | Mr. Baudino, in your opinion what effect does the current interest rate environment |
| 3 | | have on utility stocks? |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | A. | In my view, low current bond yields strongly suggest lower return on equity requirements |
| 6 | | on the part on the investing public. The results of my return on equity analysis in the |
| 7 | | subsequent section of my Direct Testimony are consistent with these historically low bond |
| 8 | | yields. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q. | In 2003, Congress enacted a change in tax policy that lowered the tax rate on |
| 11 | | dividends and capital gains. Please explain the effect of this tax change on utility |
| 12 | | common stocks and on investor required returns for utilities. |
| 13 | | |
| 14 15 | A. | Other things being equal, the dividend tax rate reduction means that investors should |
| | 2 %. | |
| 16 | | require lower pre-tax rates of return for utilities. This is because the after-tax dividend |
| 17 | | streams have now become more valuable due to the reduction in federal taxation. Thus, |
| 18 | | for a given stock price investors will discount the future dividend payments at a lower |
| 19 | | return on equity. The stock prices that I use in my cost of equity analyses fully |
| 20 | | incorporate the effects of this change in tax rates and on the expected returns for |
| 21 | | utilities. This also means that investors require lower risk premiums for stocks |
| 22 | | compared to utility bonds. |

23

Richard A. Baudino Page 9

| 1 | Q. | How does the investment community regard the electric utility industry as a whole? |
|--------|----|---|
| 2 | А. | The March 4, 2005 Value Line profile of the electric utility industry (east) noted the |
| 3 | | following: |
| Л | | |
| 4 5 | | "For a period of several years, beginning in the mid-1990s, many electric |
| 6 | | utilities eschewed dividend increases in favor of investing in nonregulated |
| 7 | | operations or M&A activity with another utility Many of these |
| 8 | | nonregulated investments turned sour, or time proved that some of the |
| 9 | | acquiring utilities in mergers had overpaid. As a result, some companies had |
| 10 | | little choice but to cut or suspend their common dividends. |
| 11 | | - |
| 12 | | Utilities began to take another look at raising the dividend after the federal |
| 13 | | government cut the tax rate on dividends in 2003. Some were still getting |
| 14 | | their finances in order as part of their "back to basics" strategies, so |
| 15 | | noteworthy dividend boosts didn't start to occur until 2004. |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | | * * * * |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | The good news of dividends has continued in early 2005. A few companies |
| 20 | | that cut or suspended the dividend in the late 1990s or early 2000s have |
| 21 | | reinstated it, increased it, or stepped up the growth rate." |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | The April 1, 2005 Value Line profile of the electric utility industry (central) noted the |
| 24 | | following: |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | "utility profits slumped in 2002. This was due largely to unsuccessful |
| 27 | | investments abroad and overbuilding domestically. These missteps resulted |
| 28 | | in heavy write-offs, weakened capital structures, and debt rating reductions |
| 29 | | by major rating organizations. Starting in 2003, managements began taking |
| 30 | | steps to reverse course. Overseas assets were sold and plant construction was |
| 31 | | scaled back. That began a profit rebound. By the end of 2004, most previous |
| 32 | | mistakes had been overcome, and 2005 began with a relatively clean slate." |
| 33 | | |

| 1 | | On October 25, 2005, Standard and Poor's published an article entitled "Hurricanes, |
|----------|----|---|
| 2 | | Mergers Drive U.S. Utility Rating Actions in Third Quarter." S&P noted that the principle |
| 3 | | drivers of rating changes for U.S. utilities were the recent Gulf Coast hurricanes and |
| 4 | | merger and acquisition activity. S&P noted that the outlook for regulated utilities remains |
| 5 | | relatively stable and that much of the industry is reemphasizing its "core competencies", |
| 6 | | although this is not without its own risks. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | Value Line's November 11, 2005 profile of the electric utility (west) companies noted that |
| 9 | | the Value Line Utility Average was down 7% since its October peak, likely reflecting |
| 10 | | investors' concerns over higher interest rates and partly due to a general correction of |
| 11 | | utility share prices. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | What conclusions do you draw from Value Line's and S&P's comments regarding |
| 14 | | the state of the electric industry today? |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | A. | In my opinion, it appears that the electric industry is entering a more stable, less risky |
| 17 | | environment than it experienced during the last few years. Companies that focus on core |
| 18 | | electric operations will be lower risk than those with unregulated and/or deregulated |
| 19 | | operations and investments. |
| | | |
| 20 | | |
| 20 21 | Q. | Mr. Baudino, how does the investment community view Kentucky Power? |
| | Q. | Mr. Baudino, how does the investment community view Kentucky Power? |

| 1 | A. | KPCo currently carries a senior long-term debt rating of BBB from Standard and Poor's |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | and Baa2 from Moody's. Both ratings are investment grade for KPCo's debt. ⁴ |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | Moody's noted in its October 18, 2005 report on the Company that credit strengths |
| 5 | | included: |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | • Mitigation of environmental compliance costs by Kentucky legislation allowing |
| 8 | | recovery through an environmental surcharge. |
| 9 | | • Measured approach to deregulation, which isn't expected in the near to |
| 10 | | intermediate future due to already low rates enjoyed by customers. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | | Moody's also noted a credit challenge from potentially large capital expenditures related to |
| 13 | | environmental compliance. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | Standard and Poor's noted in its September 13, 2005 report on KPCo that its current |
| 16 | | credit ratings were based on the consolidated credit profile of the parent American |
| 17 | | Electric Power Company. KPCo's business profile was deemed satisfactory and its |
| 18 | | financial profile was considered adequate. |
| 19 | | |

4

Bond rating reports were provided by the Company in response to KIUC's First Set, Item No. 1.

| 1 | | III. DETERMINATION OF FAIR RATE OF RETURN |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | Q. | Please describe the methods you employed in estimating a fair rate of return for |
| 4 | | KPCo. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | A. | I employed a Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") analysis for a group of comparison electric |
| 7 | | companies to estimate the cost of equity for KPCo's regulated electric operations. I also |
| 8 | | employed several Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") analyses, although I did not |
| 9 | | incorporate these results into my recommendation. |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | Q. | What are the main guidelines to which you adhere in estimating the cost of equity for |
| 12 | | a firm? |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | А. | Generally speaking, the estimated cost of equity should be comparable to the returns of |
| 15 | | other firms with similar risk structures and should be sufficient for the firm to attract |
| 16 | | capital. These are the basic standards set out in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural |
| 17 | | Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Bluefield W.W. & Improv. Co. v. Public Service |
| 18 | | <u>Comm'n.</u> , 262 U.S. 679 (1922). |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | From an economist's perspective, the notion of "opportunity cost" plays a vital role in |
| 21 | | estimating the cost of equity. One measures the opportunity cost of an investment equal to |
| 22 | | what one would have obtained in the next best alternative. For example, let us suppose |
| 23 | | that an investor decides to purchase the stock of a publicly traded electric utility. That |
| 24 | | investor made the decision based on the expectation of dividend payments and perhaps |
| 25 | | some appreciation in the stock's value over time. However, that investor's opportunity cost |

is measured by what she or he could have invested in as the next best alternative. That
 alternative could have been another utility stock, a utility bond, a mutual fund, a money
 market fund, or any other number of investment vehicles.

4

5 The key determinant in deciding whether to invest, however, is based on comparative 6 levels of risk. Our hypothetical investor would not invest in a particular electric company 7 stock if it offered a return lower than other investments of similar risk. The opportunity 8 cost simply would not justify such an investment. Thus, the task for the rate of return 9 analyst is to estimate a return that is equal to the return being offered by other risk-10 comparable firms. Failing this, the subject firm will be impaired in its ability to attract 11 capital.

12

13 Q. What are the major types of risk faced by utility companies?

14

15 A. In general, risk associated with the holding of common stock can be separated into three 16 major categories: business risk, financial risk, and liquidity risk. Business risk refers to 17 risks inherent in the operation of the business. Volatility of the firm's sales, long-term 18 demand for its product(s), the amount of operating leverage, and quality of management 19 are all factors that affect business risk. The quality of regulation at the state and federal 120 levels also plays an important role in business risk for regulated utility companies.

21

Financial risk refers to the impact on a firm's future cash flows from the use of debt in the capital structure. Interest payments to bondholders represent a prior call on the firm's cash flows and must be met before income is available to the common shareholders. Additional

| 1 | | debt means additional variability in the firm's earnings, leading to additional risk. |
|----------|----|--|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | Liquidity risk refers to the ability of an investor to quickly sell an investment without a |
| 4 | | substantial price concession. The easier it is for an investor to sell an investment for cash, |
| 5 | | the lower the liquidity risk will be. Stock markets, such as the New York and American |
| 6 | | Stock Exchanges, help ease liquidity risk substantially. Investors who own stocks that are |
| 7 | | traded in these markets know on a daily basis what the market prices of their investments |
| 8 | | are and that they can sell these investments fairly quickly. Many electric utility stocks are |
| 9 | | traded on the New York Stock Exchange and are considered liquid investments. |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | Q. | Are there any indices available to investors that quantify the total risk of a company? |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | A. | Yes. Published measures exist that categorize companies based on various measures of |
| 14 | | risk. One of the best-known and most widely available sources is from Value Line. Each |
| 15 | | company on which Value Line reports is assigned a Safety Rank. The Safety Rank |
| 16 | | consists of a number from 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest - meaning least risky - and 5 |
| 17 | | being the lowest - meaning most risky. The Safety Rank measures the total risk of a stock |
| 18 | | and encompasses a wide array of factors that affect financial and business risk. These |
| 19 | | factors include: |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | • Stock price volatility |
| 22 | | • Fixed charge coverage ratio |
| 23 | | Quality of earnings Conitalization ratio |
| 24 25 | | Capitalization ratio Earnings on common stock |
| 23 26 | | Payout ratio |
| 27 | | Regulatory risk |
| - · | | |

Richard A. Baudino Page 15

| 1 | | |
|----------|--------------|--|
| 2 | | By selecting companies with the same Safety Rank, investors may rely upon a widely-read |
| 3 | | third party assessment of which investments are similarly risky. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | Bond ratings are another good tool that investors may utilize to determine the risk |
| 6 | | comparability of firms. Bond rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's |
| 7 | | perform detailed analyses of factors that contribute to the business and financial risk of a |
| 8 | | particular investment. The end result of their analyses is a bond rating that reflects these |
| 9 | | risks. |
| 10 11 | <u>Disco</u> | unted Cash Flow Method |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | Please describe the basic DCF approach. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | A. | The basic DCF approach is rooted in valuation theory. It is based on the premise that |
| 16 | | the value of a financial asset is determined by its ability to generate future net cash |
| 17 | | flows. In the case of a common stock, those future cash flows take the form of |
| 18 | | dividends and appreciation in price. The value of the stock to investors is the discounted |
| 19 | | present value of future cash flows. The general equation then is: |
| | | |

.

20
$$V = \frac{R}{(1+r)} + \frac{R}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{R}{(1+r)^3} + \dots + \frac{R}{(1+r)^n}$$

21 *Where:* V = asset value

| R = | yearly cash flows |
|-----|-------------------|
| r = | discount rate |

This is no different from determining the value of any asset from an economic point of 4 5 view. However, the commonly employed DCF model makes certain simplifying 6 assumptions. One is that the stream of income from the equity share is assumed to be 7 perpetual; that is, there is no salvage or residual value at the end of some maturity date (as is the case with a bond). Another important assumption is that financial markets are 8 reasonably efficient; that is, they correctly evaluate the cash flows relative to the 9 appropriate discount rate, thus rendering the stock price efficient relative to other 10 alternatives. Finally, the model I employ also assumes a constant growth rate in 11 12 dividends. The fundamental relationship employed in the DCF method is described by 13 the formula:

14

1 2 3

•

15

 $k = \frac{D_I}{P_0} + g$

| 16 | Where: | D_i = the next period dividend |
|----|--------|--|
| 17 | | $P_{\theta} = current \ stock \ price$ |
| 18 | | g = expected growth rate |
| 19 | | k = investor-required return |

20

It is apparent that the "k" so determined must relate to the investors' expected return. Use of the discounted cash flow method to determine an investor-required return is complicated by the need to express investors' expectations relative to dividends,

| 1 | | earnings, and book value over an infinite time horizon. Financial theory suggests that |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | stockholders purchase common stock on the assumption that there will be some change |
| 3 | | in the rate of dividend payments over time. We assume that the rate of growth in |
| 4 | | dividends is constant over the assumed time horizon, but the model could easily handle |
| 5 | | varying growth rates if we knew what they were. Finally, the relevant time frame is |
| 6 | | prospective rather than retrospective. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | What was your first step in conducting your DCF analysis for KPCo? |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | А. | My first step was to construct a comparison group of companies with a risk profile that |
| 11 | | is reasonably similar to KPCo. Since the Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of |
| 12 | | American Electric Power ("AEP") and does not have publicly traded common stock, |
| 13 | | KPCo's cost of equity cannot be estimated directly using the DCF model. As a result, it |
| 14 | | is necessary to construct a group of comparison companies that has a risk profile that is |
| 15 | | reasonably similar to Kentucky Power. |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | Q. | Please describe your approach for selecting a comparison group of electric |
| 18 | | companies. |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | A. | I used several criteria to select a comparison group. First, using the December 2005 issue |
| 21 | | of the AUS Utility Reports, I selected electric companies that were rated either Baa/BBB or |
| | | |

.

| 1 | Baa/BI | 3B/A by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. From that group I selected companies |
|----------|----------|--|
| 2 | that ha | d at least 50% of their revenues from electric operations. This resulted in a group of |
| 3 | electric | c and/or electric and gas companies that have operational and risk profiles similar to |
| 4 | KPCo. | |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | From t | his group, I then eliminated companies that had cut or eliminated dividends in the |
| 7 | | o years, were recently or currently involved in merger activities, and had recent |
| 1 | iust tw | o years, were recently of carrenally inforted in merger accounted, and the recent |
| 8 | experi | ence with significant earnings fluctuations. These criteria are important because |
| 9 | utilitie | s that are undergoing those types of changes are not good candidates for the DCF |
| 10 | model | |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | The re | sulting group of comparison electric companies I used in my analysis is: |
| 1.7 | | |
| 13 14 | 1. | Avista Corporation |
| 14 | 2. | Cleco Corporation |
| 16 | 3. | DPL, Inc. |
| 17 | 4. | Duquesne Light Holdings |
| 18 | 5. | Empire District Electric |
| 19 | 6. | Energy East Corp. |
| 20 | 7. | First Energy Corporation |
| 21 | 8. | Green Mountain Power |
| 22 | 9. | Hawaiian Electric Industries |
| 23 | 10. | Northeast Utilities |
| 24 | 11. | Pinnacle West Capital Corp. |
| 25 | 12. | PNM Resources |
| 26 | 13. | PPL Corporation |
| 27 | 14. | Progress Energy |
| 28 | 15. | Puget Energy |
| 29 | 16. | UniSource Energy Corp. |

| 1 2 | Q. | What was your first step in determining the DCF return on equity for the |
|--------|----|--|
| 3 | | comparison group? |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | А. | I first determined the current dividend yield, D_0/P_0 , from the basic equation. My general |
| 6 | | practice is to use six months as the most reasonable period over which to estimate the |
| 7 | | dividend yield. The six-month period I used covered the months from July through |
| 8 | | December 2005. I obtained historical prices and dividends from Yahoo! Finance and the |
| 9 | | S&P Stock Guide. The annualized dividend divided by the average monthly price |
| 10 | | represents the average dividend yield for each month in the period. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | | The resulting average dividend yield for the group is 4.03%. These calculations are shown |
| 13 | | in Exhibit(RAB-3). |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | Q. | Having established the average dividend yield, how did you determine the expected |
| 17 | | growth rate for the electric comparison group? |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | A. | "Expected" refers to the investor's expected growth rate. The task, in theory, is to use a |
| 20 | | growth rate that will correctly forecast the constant rate of growth in dividends. We refer |
| 21 | | to a perpetual growth rate since the DCF model has no arbitrary cut-off point. The obvious |

| 1 | | fact is that there is no way to know with absolute certainty what investors expect the |
|--|----|--|
| 2 | | growth rate to be in the short term, much less in perpetuity. The dividend growth rate is a |
| 3 | | function of earnings growth and the payout ratio, neither of which is known precisely for |
| 4 | | the future. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | In this analysis, I relied on three major sources of analysts' forecasts for growth. These |
| 7 | | sources are Value Line, Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks"), and First Call/Thomson |
| 8 | | Financial. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q. | Please briefly describe Value Line, Zacks, and First Call/Thomson Financial. |
| 11 | | |
| | | |
| 12 | A. | Value Line is an investment survey that is published for approximately 1,700 companies, |
| | A. | Value Line is an investment survey that is published for approximately 1,700 companies, both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most |
| 12 | A. | |
| 12 13 | A. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most |
| 12 13 14 | А. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information services. It provides both |
| 12 13 14 15 | Α. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information services. It provides both historical and forecasted information on a number of important data elements. Value Line |
| 12 13 14 15 16 | A. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information services. It provides both historical and forecasted information on a number of important data elements. Value Line neither participates in financial markets as a broker nor works for the utility industry in any |
| 12 13 14 15 16 17 | A. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information services. It provides both historical and forecasted information on a number of important data elements. Value Line neither participates in financial markets as a broker nor works for the utility industry in any |
| 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | A. | both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information services. It provides both historical and forecasted information on a number of important data elements. Value Line neither participates in financial markets as a broker nor works for the utility industry in any capacity of which I am aware. |

| 1 | | firms including regulated electric utilities. The estimates of the analysts responding are |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | combined to produce consensus average and median estimates of earnings growth. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | Like Zack's, First Call/Thomson Financial also provides detailed investment research on |
| 5 | | numerous companies. First Call/ Thomson also compiles and reports consensus analysts' |
| 6 | | forecasts of earnings growth. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | Why did you rely on analysts' forecasts in your analysis? |
| 9 | | · |
| 10 | A. | The finance literature has shown that analysts' forecasts provide better predictions of future |
| 11 | | growth than do estimates based on historical growth $alone^5$. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | How did you utilize your data sources to estimate growth rates for the comparison |
| 14 | | group? |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | A. | Exhibit(RAB-4), pages 1 and 2, presents the details of the calculations for the Value |
| 17 | | Line, Zacks, and First Call/Thomson Financial forecasted growth estimates. The Value |
| 18 | | Line growth estimates are based on five-year forecasts for dividend growth and six-year |

⁵ See Rozeff (Journal of Forecasting, Volume 2, Issue No. 4, 1983), Brown and Rozeff (Journal of Finance, March 1978), Moyer, Chatfield and Kelley (International Journal of Forecasting, 1985), and a study by Vander Weide and Carleton that was incorporated as part of the Edison Electric Institute's comments in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's generic cost of capital proceedings.

| 1 | forecasts for earnings growth. The Zacks and First Call/Thomson Financial earnings |
|----------------------------|--|
| 2 | growth estimates are forecasts for the next three to five years. These earnings and |
| 3 | dividend growth estimates for the comparison group are summarized on Columns (1) |
| 4 | through (5) of page 1 of Exhibit(RAB-4). |
| 5 | |
| 6 | I also utilized the sustainable growth formula in estimating the expected growth rate. The |
| 7 | sustainable growth method, also known as the retention ratio method, recognizes that the |
| 8 | firm retains a portion of its earnings fuels growth in dividends. These retained earnings, |
| 9 | which are plowed back into the firm's asset base, are expected to earn a rate of return. |
| 10 | This, in turn, generates growth in the firm's book value, market value, and dividends. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | The sustainable growth method is calculated using the following formula: |
| 13 | |
| 14 15 16 17 18 | $G = B \ x \ R$ Where: $G = expected \ retention \ growth \ rate$ $B = the \ firm's \ expected \ retention \ ratio$ $R = the \ expected \ return$ |
| | |
| 19 | In its proper form, this calculation is forward-looking. That is, the investors' expected |
| 20 | retention ratio and return must be used in order to measure what investors anticipate will |
| 21 | happen in the future. Data on expected retention ratios and returns may be obtained from |
| 22 | Value Line. |

| 1 | | |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | The expected sustainable growth estimates for the comparison group are presented in |
| 3 | | Column (3) on page 1 of Exhibit (RAB-4). The data came from the Value Line |
| 4 | | forecasts for the comparison group. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | Q. | How did you proceed to determine the DCF cost of equity for the electric comparison |
| 7 | | group? |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | A. | To estimate the expected dividend yield (D_1) for the group, the current dividend yield must |
| 10 | | be moved forward in time to account for dividend increases over the next twelve months. |
| 11 | | I estimated the expected dividend yield by multiplying the current dividend yield by one |
| 12 | | plus one-half the expected growth rate. |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | I then added the expected growth rate ranges to the expected dividend yield for the |
| 15 | | comparison group. The calculation of the resulting DCF returns on equity is presented on |
| 16 | | page 3 of Exhibit(RAB-4). The expected growth rates I utilized in this proceeding |
| 17 | | range from 4.83% to 5.43%. The retention growth method resulted in a growth rate of |
| 18 | | 3.69%, 114 basis points below the low end of this range. |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | Q. | Please explain how you calculated your DCF cost of equity estimates. |
| 21 | | |

•

| 1 | А. | Page 3 of Exhibit(RAB-4) shows four alternative DCF cost of equity calculations |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| 2 | | using four of the growth estimates shown on page 1. The growth rates I used were the |
| 3 | | Value Line forecasts for dividend and earnings growth and the analysts' forecasts from |
| 4 | | Zack's and First Call/Thomson Financial. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | The DCF returns range from 8.95% to 9.57%. The DCF return on equity utilizing the |
| 7 | | average of all four growth rates is 9.34%. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | <u>Capi</u> | tal Asset Pricing Model |
| 10 | | |
| | | |
| 11 | Q. | Briefly summarize the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") approach. |
| 11 12 | Q. | Briefly summarize the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") approach. |
| | Q. A. | Briefly summarize the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") approach. The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, |
| 12 | - | |
| 12 13 | - | The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, |
| 12 13 14 | - | The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, may combine assets to minimize the total risk of the portfolio. Diversification allows |
| 12 13 14 15 | - | The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, may combine assets to minimize the total risk of the portfolio. Diversification allows investors to diversify away all risks specific to a particular company and be left only with |
| 12 13 14 15 16 | - | The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, may combine assets to minimize the total risk of the portfolio. Diversification allows investors to diversify away all risks specific to a particular company and be left only with market risk that affects all companies. Thus, CAPM theory identifies two types of risks |
| 12 13 14 15 16 17 | - | The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified portfolios, may combine assets to minimize the total risk of the portfolio. Diversification allows investors to diversify away all risks specific to a particular company and be left only with market risk that affects all companies. Thus, CAPM theory identifies two types of risks for a security: company-specific risk and market risk. Company-specific risk includes |

.

| 1 | affect all stocks and cannot be diversified away. The idea behind the CAPM is that |
|----------|---|
| 2 | diversified investors are rewarded with returns based on market risk. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Within the CAPM framework, the expected return on a security is equal to the risk-free |
| 5 | rate of return plus a risk premium that is proportional to the security's market, or |
| 6 | nondiversifiable risk. Beta is the factor that reflects the inherent market risk of a security. |
| 7 | It measures the volatility of a particular security relative to overall market for securities. |
| 8 | For example, a stock with a beta of 1.0 indicates that if the market rises by 15.00%, that |
| 9 | stock will also rise by 15.00%. This stock moves in tandem with movements in the overall |
| 10 | market. Stocks with a beta of 0.5 will only rise or fall 50.00% as much as the overall |
| 11 | market. So with an increase in the market of 15.00%, this stock will only rise 7.50%. |
| 12 | Stocks with betas greater than 1.0 will rise and fall more than the overall market. Thus, |
| 13 | beta is the relevant measure of the risk of individual securities vis-à-vis the market. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Based on the foregoing discussion, the equation for determining the return for a security in |
| 16 | the CAPM framework is: |
| 17 | |
| 18 | $K = Rf + \beta(MRP)$ |
| 19 | |
| 20 21 | Where: K = Required Return on equity Rf = Risk-free rate |
| 21 | MRP = Market risk premium |
| 23 | $\beta = Beta$ |
| | |

| 1 2 | | This equation tells us about the risk/return relationship posited by the CAPM. Investors |
|--------|----|--|
| 3 | | are risk averse and will only accept higher risk if they receive higher returns. These returns |
| 4 | | can be determined in relation to a stock's beta and the market risk premium. The general |
| 5 | | level of risk aversion in the economy determines the market risk premium. If the risk-free |
| 6 | | rate of return is 3.00% and the required return on the total market is 15.00%, then the risk |
| 7 | | premium is 12.00%. Any stock's required return can be determined by multiplying its beta |
| 8 | | by the market risk premium. Stocks with betas greater than 1.0 are considered riskier than |
| 9 | | the overall market and will have higher required returns. Conversely, stocks with betas |
| 10 | | less than 1.0 will have required returns lower than the market as a whole. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | Q. | In general, are there concerns regarding the use of the CAPM in estimating the |
| 13 | | return on equity? |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | A. | Yes. There is considerable controversy surrounding the use of the CAPM ⁶ . There is |
| 16 | | strong evidence that beta is not the primary factor in determining the risk of a security. For |
| 17 | | example, Value Line states that its Safety Rank is a measure of total risk, not its calculated |
| 18 | | beta coefficient. Beta coefficients usually describe only a small amount of total investment |
| 19 | | risk. Also, recent finance literature has questioned the usefulness of beta in predicting the |
| | | |

6 For a more complete discussion of some of the controversy surrounding the use of the CAPM, refer to A Random Walk Down Wall Street by Burton Malkiel, pages 229 – 239, 1999 edition.

| 1 | | relationship between risk and required return. Finally, a considerable amount of judgment |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | must be employed in determining the risk-free rate and market return portions of the |
| 3 | | CAPM equation. The analyst's application of judgment can significantly influence the |
| 4 | | results obtained from the CAPM. My past experience with the CAPM indicates that it is |
| 5 | | prudent to use a wide variety of data in estimating returns. Of course, the range of results |
| 6 | | may also be wide, indicating the difficulty in obtaining a reliable estimate from the CAPM. |
| 7 | | , |
| 8 | Q. | How did you estimate the market return portion of the CAPM? |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | A. | The first source I used was the Value Line Investment Survey for Windows for December |
| 11 | | 2005. Value Line provides a summary statistical report detailing, among other things, |
| 12 | | forecasted growth in dividends, earnings, and book value for the companies Value Line |
| 13 | | follows. I have presented these three growth rates and the average on page 2 of Exhibit |
| 14 | | (RAB-5). The average growth rate is 12.84%. Combining this growth rate with the |
| 15 | | average expected dividend yield of the Value Line companies of 1.29% results in an |
| 16 | | expected market return of 14.13%. The detailed calculations are shown on page 1 of |
| 17 | | Exhibit(RAB-5). |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | I also considered a supplemental check to this market estimate. Ibbotson Associates |
| 20 | | published a study of historical returns on the stock market in its Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and |
| 21 | | Inflation 2005 Yearbook. Some analysts employ this historical data to estimate the market |

| 1 | | risk premium of stocks over the risk-free rate. The assumption is that a risk premium |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | calculated over a long period of time is reflective of investor expectations going forward. |
| 3 | | Exhibit(RAB-6) presents the calculation of the market return using the Ibbotson |
| 4 | | historical data. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | Q. | Mr. Baudino, please comment on the Value Line market return of 14.13%. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | A. | In my opinion, the market return calculation based on Value Line data is greatly |
| 9 | | overstated. The expected return on the market based on Value Line's most recent forecasts |
| 10 | | appears to be quite volatile at this time and likely exceeds the long-term expected growth |
| 11 | | rate for the market. In a piece of return on equity testimony I filed in 2004 for Aquila |
| 12 | | Networks - WPC, the expected return on the market was 11.70%. Later that year, I filed |
| 13 | | return on equity testimony for Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO") in |
| 14 | | which the market return jumped substantially to 13.38%. Now in this proceeding, the |
| 15 | | Value Line market return jumped once again to 14.13%. This change substantially |
| 16 | | increased the CAPM results in this proceeding compared to my Aquila and SWEPCO |
| 17 | | testimonies. However, my DCF results have remained fairly stable and are consistent with |
| 18 | | interest rates trends throughout 2004 and 2005. |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | I conducted an alternative analysis using a forecast of earnings growth for the S&P 500 as |
| 21 | | a check on the results from the Value Line calculation. First Call's five-year forecast of |
| | | |

| 1 | | earnings growth for the S&P 500 is 10.50%. Combining this growth forecast with the |
|----------------|----|--|
| 2 | | current dividend yield on the S&P 500 of 1.84% ⁷ results in the following total return on |
| 3 | | the market: |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | Market ROE = 1.94% + 10.50% = 12.44% |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | As I will show later in my testimony, this estimate of the expected market return is closer |
| 8 | | to the results based on historical data. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q. | Please address the use of historical earned returns to estimate the market risk |
| 11 | | premium. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | A. | The use of historic earned returns on the Standard and Poor 500 to estimate the current |
| 14 | | market risk premium is rather suspect because it naively assumes that investors currently |
| 15 | | expect historical risk premiums to continue unchanged into the future forever regardless of |
| 16 | | present or forecasted economic conditions. Brigham, Shome and Vinson noted the |
| 17 | | following with respect to the use of historic risk premiums calculated using the returns as |
| 18 | | reported by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (referred to in the quote as "I&S"): |
| 19 20 21 | | "There are both conceptual and measurement problems with using I&S data for purposes of estimating the cost of capital. Conceptually, |

7 The S&P dividend yield as of November 30, 2005 was 1.84%.

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | | there is no compelling reason to think that investors expect the same relative returns that were earned in the past. Indeed, evidence presented in the following sections indicates that relative expected returns should, and do, vary significantly over time. Empirically, the measured historic premium is sensitive both to the choice of estimation horizon and to the end points. These choices are essentially arbitrary, yet can result in significant differences in the final outcome. ³⁸ |
|---|----|--|
| 10 | | In summary, the use of historic earned returns should be viewed with a great deal of |
| 11 | | caution. There is no real support for the proposition that an unchanging, mechanistically |
| 12 | | applied historical risk premium is representative of current investor expectations and |
| 13 | | return requirements. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | Q. | How did you determine the risk free rate? |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | A. | I used the average yields on the 20-year Treasury bond and five-year Treasury note over |
| 18 | | the six-month period from July through December 2005. The 20-year Treasury bond is |
| 19 | | often used by rate of return analysts as the risk-free rate, but it contains a significant |
| 20 | | amount of interest rate risk. The five-year Treasury note carries less interest rate risk |
| 21 | | than the 20-year bond and is more stable than three-month Treasury bills. Therefore, I |
| 22 | | have employed both of these securities as proxies for the risk-free rate of return. This |
| 23 | | approach provides a reasonable range over which the CAPM may be estimated. |

⁸ Brigham, E.F., Shome, D.K. and Vinson, S.R., "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity", *Financial Management*, Spring 1985, pp. 33-45.

Richard A. Baudino Page 31

| 1 | | |
|------|----|--|
| 2 | Q. | What is your estimate of the market risk premium? |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | A. | Exhibit(RAB-5), line 9 of page 1, presents my estimates of the market risk premium |
| 5 | | based on a DCF analysis applied to current market data. The market risk premium is |
| 6 | | 9.49% using the 20-year Treasury bond and 9.92% using the five-year Treasury bond. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | Using the alternative market return estimate from the S&P 500, the market risk premium |
| 9 | | is: |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | | 12.44% - 4.64% = 7.80% (20-year bond) |
| 12 | | 12.44% - 4.21% - 8.23% - (5-year bond) |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | Utilizing the historical Ibbotson data on market returns, the market risk premium ranges |
| 15 | | from 5.20% to 7.20%. This is shown on Exhibit(RAB-6). |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | Q. | How did you determine the value for beta? |
| 18 - | | |
| 19 | A. | I obtained the betas for the companies in the electric company comparison group from |
| 20 | | most recent Value Line reports. The average of the Value Line betas for the electric group |
| 21 | | is .83. |

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| 1 | | |
|----|--------------|---|
| 2 | Q. | Please summarize the CAPM results. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | А. | Please refer to line 14 of page 1 of Exhibit(RAB-5) for the CAPM results for the 20- |
| 5 | | year and five-year Treasury bond yields. For the electric comparison group, the CAPM |
| 6 | | returns are 12.49% (five-year bond) and 12.56% (20-year bond). |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | Using the risk premium from the S&P 500, the CAPM results are: |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | | ROE = 4.64% + .83 (7.80%) = 11.11% (20-year bond) |
| 11 | | ROE = 4.21% + .83 (8.23%) = 11.04% (5-year bond) |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | | The CAPM results using the historical Ibbotson data range from 8.98% to 10.64%. These |
| 14 | | results are shown on Exhibit(RAB-6). |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | <u>Concl</u> | usions and Recommendations |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | Q. | Please summarize the cost of equity estimates you have developed up to this point in |
| 19 | | your testimony. |
| 20 | | |

| A. | Utilizing the DCF model, I developed cost of equity estimates for a comparison group of |
|----|--|
| | electric utility companies. The results for the electric company comparison group using |
| | the constant-growth DCF model ranged from 8.95% to 9.57%. The results using the |
| | CAPM ranged from 8.98% to 12.56%. |
| | |
| Q. | What is your recommendation for a fair rate of return on equity for KPCo? |
| | |
| A. | My recommended rate of return on equity for the Company is 9.35%. This |
| | recommendation is based on the average of the four DCF cost of equity estimates. Given |
| | current conditions in the financial markets, I believe 9.35% is a reasonable estimate of the |
| | investor-required return on equity for a BBB/Baa-rated company such as KPCo. |
| | |
| Q. | Your CAPM results are higher than your DCF results. Why didn't you take this |
| | into account in your recommended return on equity? |
| | |
| A. | It is my opinion that the CAPM results for the comparison group are overstated at this |
| | time. This is due, in part, to the application of Value Line's beta for the group of .83. |
| | Value Line determines its betas based on five years of historical price data. Over the last |
| | five years, utility share prices in general have been quite volatile due to restructuring, |
| | deregulation, and the increase of unregulated investments that were more risky than core |
| | electric operations. These factors likely increased the historical betas for electric utilities, |
| | Q. A. |

1 other things being equal. It now appears that the industry will be more stable going $\mathbf{2}$ forward and, in my opinion, historical betas are therefore likely to fall from their current level. 3 4 5 Secondly, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony, I believe that the CAPM results utilizing 6 the Value Line forecast for market return is greatly overstated. The market return of 7 14.13% is completely out of line with the S&P forecast and with the results based on 8 historical data. I believe that the Value Line forecasts for the next five years exceed long-9 term expectations for market returns and I recommend that the Commission disregard 10 these results. 11 Third, a recent study by Ibbotson and Chen⁹ suggests that the historical risk premiums I 12 13 presented in Exhibit (RAB-6) may be too high. The Ibbotson/Chen study estimated a 14 revised risk premium that factors out rising price/earnings ("P/E") ratios over time, which 15 served to inflate achieved historical returns. The assumption in this analysis is that P/E 16 ratios would not be expected to rise continuously into the future. The results of the study

indicate a revised historical risk premium of 4% to 6%, well below the historical risk
 premiums of 5.2% - 7.2% shown in Exhibit ____(RAB-6). Incorporating the lower revised
 risk premiums would result in CAPM estimates of 7.96% to 9.62%.

20

9

Roger G. Ibbotson and Peng Chen, Long Run Stock Returns: Participating in the Real Economy,

| 1 | Q. | In Section II of your Direct Testimony, you mentioned the passage of the 2003 tax bill |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | that reduced taxes on qualifying dividends to 15%. Do you believe that this reduced |
| 3 | | tax rate on dividends has affected the investor required returns for electric utilities |
| 4 | | companies? |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | A. | Yes. As I stated earlier, I believe that the new favorable tax rate on dividends has reduced |
| 7 | | the investors' required pre-tax cost of equity for electric utilities. Basic economic theory |
| 8 | | supports this proposition. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | | Prior to the passage of the 2003 tax bill, dividends were taxed at the normal tax rates, |
| 11 | | which could be as high as 35%. These same dividends are now being taxed at a much |
| 12 | | lower 15% rate. What this means is that for a given after-tax rate of return, such as 7% for |
| 13 | | example, an investor would now require a lower pretax return in order to earn that 7% |
| 14 | | after-tax return. In the realm of regulation, experts must estimate, and commissions must |
| 15 | | set, a pretax rate of return on equity that will be applied to a company's rate base. With |
| 16 | | lower tax rates on dividends, these pretax returns will inevitably decline. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | In conclusion, other things being equal, the reduction in dividend taxation should lead to |
| 19 | | lower required returns for investors. When viewed from this perspective, a 9.35% return |
| 20 | | on equity for KPCo is quite reasonable. |

January/February 2003, AIMR.

1

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| 1 | | |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | Q. | Have you compared your recommendation to Mr. Moul's based on the pretax cost of |
| 3. | | equity? |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | A. | Yes. Using the Company's tax gross-up factor of 1.6656, my recommended cost of equity |
| 6 | | on a pretax basis is 15.57%. Mr. Moul's recommended cost of equity on a pretax basis is |
| 7 | | 19.15%. Not only is Mr. Moul's recommended 11.50% overstated, on a pretax basis the |
| 8 | | overstatement is exacerbated by including the effect of income taxes. |
| 9 | | |

.

| 1 2 | | | IV. RESPONSE TO COMPANY WITNESS MOUL |
|----------------|----|---------|--|
| 3 | Q. | Have y | ou reviewed the direct testimony of Kentucky Power witness Mr. Paul Moul? |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | А. | Yes. I | have reviewed Mr. Moul's direct testimony. |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | Q. | Please | summarize the results of your review of Mr. Moul's testimony, analyses, and |
| 8 | | cost of | equity recommendation. |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | A. | Mr. M | oul's recommended cost of equity of 11.50% greatly overstates the investor's |
| 11 | | require | ed return on Kentucky Power's regulated utility operations. |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | | The ar | reas that contribute to Mr. Moul's overstatement of the cost of equity in this |
| 14 | | procee | ding are as follows: |
| 15 | | | |
| 16 17 | | 1. | Mr. Moul's statements regarding the increased risk of the electric utility industry do not justify the increased cost of equity estimate that he recommends. Much of |
| 18 | | | the increased industry risk described by Mr. Moul does not apply to Kentucky |
| 19 | | | Power. |
| 20 21 | | 2. | Mr. Moul's electric company group does not provide an adequate basis for |
| 22 | | | estimating the cost of equity for KPCo. |
| 23 24 25 | | 3. | Mr. Moul's emphasis on earnings per share growth results in an excessively high cost of equity estimate for Kentucky Power. |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 28 | | 4. | In one of his DCF recommendations, Mr. Moul utilized a 13.75% value for the upper end of the range of DCF estimates. This value is unrepresentative of the |

Richard A. Baudino Page 38

| 1 2 | | | majority of results from his alternative DCF method and using 13.75% inflated his DCF cost of equity recommendation. |
|----------------------------------|----|--------|---|
| 3 4 5 | | 5. | Mr. Moul's leverage adjustment is unreasonable, inappropriate, and serves to inflate his cost of equity estimate. |
| 6 7 | | 6. | Mr. Moul's flotation cost adjustment is inappropriate and should be rejected. |
| 8 9 10 11 | | 7. | Mr. Moul's use of forecasted interest rates in his Risk Premium and CAPM studies are inappropriate and result in overstated cost of equity estimates. |
| 12 13 14 | | 8. | Mr. Moul's risk premium analysis should be viewed with a good deal of caution. It should not be used as the primary basis for determining the cost of equity in this proceeding. |
| 15 16 17 18 | | 9. | Mr. Moul's CAPM approach should be rejected. He used an inappropriate beta in his analysis that inflates the end result. Mr. Moul also significantly overstated the market return in his CAPM analysis. |
| 19 20 21 22 23 24 | | 10. | Mr. Moul's Comparable Earnings analysis should be rejected. The results from this analysis are clearly outside the realm of reasonableness for returns on regulated electric utility operations. |
| 25 | Q. | Pleas | e address Mr. Moul's position regarding certain risks associated with the |
| 26 | | electi | ric utility industry. |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | A. | Begin | nning on page 5 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Moul discussed several risk factors |
| 29 | | that c | contribute to "increasing competitive risks" in the electric utility industry. |
| 30 | | | |
| 31 | | The f | first risk Mr. Moul cited was increased costs for compliance with the Clean Air Act |
| 32 | | ("CA | A")(page 5, line 19 through page 6, line 2). This clearly is not a risk at all for |
| 33 | | Kent | ucky Power because the Company is allowed to collect its CAA-related costs |

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| 1 | | through a surcharge mechanism, including a current return. Kentucky Power's |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | Environmental Cost Recovery Mechanism ("ECR") virtually eliminates any risk that the |
| 3 | | Company has relating to collecting its costs associated with CAA compliance. Further, |
| 4 | | since Kentucky Power is a low-cost utility, these additional CAA costs do not add |
| 5 | | significant risk that the Company will become less competitive with alternative service |
| 6 | | providers. Mr. Moul's argument regarding the applicability of this alleged risk to |
| 7 | | Kentucky Power should be rejected. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | | On page 6, lines 2 through 9, Mr. Moul cited risk associated with potential loss of |
| 10 | | revenues from deregulation and market pricing. This alleged risk is not applicable to |
| 11 | | Kentucky Power at this time. Kentucky is not currently contemplating retail access for |
| 12 | | electric customers, so there is no competitive threat from other providers present in the |
| 13 | | Company's system. Further Mr. Moul did not cite any specific examples of competition |
| 14 | | that are currently applicable to Kentucky Power. |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | Q. | Overall, do any of Mr. Moul's statements regarding increased risk for electric |
| 17 | | utilities justify a higher return on equity for Kentucky Power? |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | А. | No. In fact, I would argue the contrary point. Since Kentucky Power is a low-cost |
| 20 | | utility that operates in a state that does not allow retail competition, it does not have the |
| 21 | | competitive risk that other utilities are facing at this time. Further, all of the risks facing |

| 1 | | Kentucky Power have been evaluated by rating agencies such and Standard and Poor's |
|----|--------------|--|
| 2 | | and Moody's and are reflected in the Company' current bond rating. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | <u>Mr. N</u> | Aoul's Fundamental Risk Analysis |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | Q. | Beginning on page 8 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Moul describes how he |
| 7 | | constructed his comparison group of companies. Do you agree with the Electric |
| 8 | | Group he used to estimate the cost of equity for KPCo? |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | A. | No. I believe that the screens I used result in a comparison group that is more |
| 11 | | appropriate for estimating the cost of equity for KPCo in this proceeding. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | In Case No. 2002-00169, which was the Company's environmental surcharge |
| 14 | | proceeding, you accepted Mr. Moul's electric group. Why are you rejecting it in |
| 15 | | this case? |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | A. | For purposes of KPCo's environmental surcharge case, which was rather narrow in its |
| 18 | | scope, I was willing to agree with Mr. Moul's electric group even though he used certain |
| 19 | | criteria for constructing his group that I had not ordinarily used. However, this |
| 20 | | proceeding is a general rate case in which the Commission will be setting the |

| 1 | Company's base rates for the foreseeable future. Thus, I rigorously evaluated Mr. |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 2 | Moul's electric group in this case and found it wanting in several important areas. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | First, several companies have less that half of their revenues coming from regulated |
| 5 | electric operations. These companies and the percentage of regulated electric revenues |
| 6 | are as follows: |
| 7 | |
| 8 9 10 | DTE Energy - 37% Vectren Corp 23% WPS Resources - 16% |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Second, several companies have bond ratings different from Kentucky Power. Those |
| 13 | companies are: |
| 14 | |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Ameren – A-/A2 Exelon – A-/A2 MGE Energy – AA-/Aa3 Vectren – A/A3 Wisconsin Energy – A-/A1 WPS Resources – AA-/Aa2 |
| 21 | |
| 22 | Third, Mr. Moul limited his group to companies that operate within the Great Lakes |
| 23 | region of the U.S. I believe this criterion unnecessarily restricts the sample of electric |
| 24 | companies that could be included in a reasonable comparison group. My comparison |

- group, which consists of sixteen utilities from across the United States, provides a more 1 2 robust basis upon which to estimate the cost of equity. 3 Finally, one of his companies, Exelon, is involved in a pending merger with Public 4 5 Service Enterprise Group. Companies that are involved in mergers are not appropriate 6 candidates for a comparison group because their share prices are influenced by expectations about the pending merger. Further, their growth forecasts are no longer 7 8 relevant because the merged company will look substantially different from each 9 separate company. 10 11 Given the smaller electric group used by Mr. Moul in this case compared to the group he 12 used in Case No. 2002-00169, the differences in bond ratings, lower percentage of 13 revenues from electric operations, and merger activity of one of the constituents, I 14 believe that my comparison group is a better one to utilize in estimating the return on 15 equity for KPCo in this case. 16 17 **DCF** Analysis
- 18
- 19 Q. Please address Mr. Moul's DCF analyses in this proceeding.
- 20

| 1 | A. | In his DCF analyses, Mr. Moul relied solely upon earnings growth estimates in |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | formulating his DCF result. In my opinion, it is appropriate to include dividend growth |
| 3 | | forecasts, which are lower than current earnings growth forecasts, in order to establish a |
| 4 | | reasonable range of cost of equity estimates for the Commission to consider. I pointed |
| 5 | | out on pages 9 and 10 of my testimony that dividend payments have assumed greater |
| 6 | | prominence in recent years. In my opinion, this should factor into investors' future |
| 7 | | growth expectations. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | | Mr. Moul selected an earnings growth forecast of 5.50% for use in his DCF analysis. |
| 10 | | However, the range of his earnings growth forecasts was from 4.51% to 5.63%. The |
| 11 | | midpoint of this range is 5.07%. Mr. Moul failed to provide a reasonable basis for |
| 12 | | selecting a number that is 43 basis points above the midpoint of his range of growth |
| 13 | | forecasts. Mr. Moul's arbitrary selection of a 5.50% growth rate overstates his DCF |
| 14 | | results. |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | Q. | Beginning on page 26 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Moul discussed differences in |
| 17 | | financial risk between the capital structures of his electric group measured at book |
| 18 | | value and market value. Please summarize Mr. Moul's assertion in this regard. |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | A. | Mr. Moul testified that since the market values of common stock for the companies in |
| 21 | | his barometer group are greater than the book value of common stock, capital structure |
| | | |

| 1 | | ratios measured on book value have higher financial risk. Based on this allegation, Mr. |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | Moul added a "leverage adjustment" to both his DCF and CAPM cost of equity |
| 3 | | estimates that increased his recommendations by 0.74%, or 74 basis points. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | On page 27, Mr. Moul recognized that the Commission rejected this adjustment in Case |
| 6 | | No. 2002-0016 and offered several reasons why the adjustment should not have been |
| 7 | | rejected by the Commission. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | Q. | Is Mr. Moul's leverage adjustment reasonable? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | А. | No. Mr. Moul's leverage adjustment is still unreasonable and should still be rejected by |
| 12 | | the Commission. |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | As I pointed out in Case No. 2002-0016, bond rating agencies and securities analysts do |
| 15 | | not assess a utility company's risk based on the market value of its capital structure, but |
| 16 | | on the book value of its capital structure. It is reasonable to assume that investors assess |
| 17 | | capital structure risk in the same manner. Mr. Moul provided absolutely no foundation |
| 18 | | for his assertion that investors require higher returns when market values exceed book |
| 19 | | values of common stock. This unfounded assertion should be categorically rejected. |
| 20 | | |

| 1 | | Mr. Moul never addressed the issue of why current market values exceed book values of |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | common stock. There are a number of reasons why this situation may be occurring, |
| 3 | | such as the relative safety of regulated utilities, investors' desires for dividend paying |
| 4 | | stocks, and that perhaps investors expect utilities to earn more that their required cost of |
| 5 | | capital. In any event, the appropriate measure for the investor required return on |
| 6 | | common equity is the current stock price plus estimated growth. It is inappropriate for |
| 7 | | Mr. Moul to inflate his DCF estimate by 74 basis points for so-called leverage risk that |
| 8 | | does not exist. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q. | Mr. Moul also added an adjustment for flotation costs to his DCF estimate. Please |
| 11 | | comment on this adjustment. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | А. | Mr. Moul's flotation cost adjustment should be rejected. Mr. Moul did not tie the equity |
| 14 | | offerings in 2002 and 2003 by AEP to Kentucky Power's operations. Mr. Moul made no |
| 15 | | showing that AEP's equity offerings had any effect on Kentucky Power's capital |
| 16 | | structure or operations. Thus, it is inappropriate to increase the cost of equity by 21 |
| 17 | | basis points for flotation costs. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | What would the results of Mr. Moul's DCF analysis be if you eliminated the |
| | | |
| 20 | | leverage adjustment, flotation cost adjustment, and used the midpoint of his |

Richard A. Baudino Page 46

| 2 | A. | Using the formula provided by Mr. Moul on page 31, line 19 of his Direct Testimony, |
|----|-----|---|
| 3 | | his DCF result would be: |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | 4.08% + 5.07% = 9.15% |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | The revised DCF result of 9.15% is substantially less than Mr. Moul's recommendation |
| 8 | 'n | of 10.32%. |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q., | Beginning on page 32 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Moul presented the results of an |
| 11 | | alternative DCF analysis that, according to him, generally followed a procedure |
| 12 | | outlined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. His results ranged from |
| 13 | | 8.08% to 13.75% with a midpoint of 10.92%. Please comment on Mr. Moul's |
| 14 | | analysis. |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | A. | Mr. Moul's use of a midpoint grossly overstated his alternative DCF results. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | Exhibit No. PRM-1, Schedule 9 shows that the 13.75% result for Exelon Corp. is an |
| 19 | | outlier. The vast majority of company results fall far below that number. Exhibit |
| 20 | | (RAB-7) presents the results of the DCF cost of equity for each company and the |
| 21 | | average for the group using the low/high dividend yield for each of the two alternative |

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J. Kennedy and Associates, Inc.

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| 1 | growth rate methods. The group average results range from 8.47% to 9.61%. The |
|----|--|
| 2 | average of all four results is 9.04%. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | My analysis proves that using an unrepresentative value such as 13.75% renders Mr. |
| 5 | Moul's DCF midpoint meaningless. Taken as whole, the results of Mr. Moul's |
| 6 | alternative DCF analyses suggest a much lower number than 10.92%. In fact, these |
| 7 | results support a number closer to my recommendation of 9.35%. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | I should also add that Mr. Moul further overstated his recommendation by adding a 99 |
| 10 | basis point leverage adjustment and a flotation cost adjustment. These adjustments |
| 11 | should also be subtracted out of his alternative DCF recommendation. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | I recommend that the Commission reject Mr. Moul's alternative DCF midpoint |
| 14 | recommendation. |
| 15 | |

...

1 **<u>Risk Premium Analysis</u>**

2 3 Please summarize Mr. Moul's risk premium analysis. **Q**. 4 5 Mr. Moul developed a risk premium cost of equity analysis using historical equity risk A. 6 premiums applied to a current corporate bond yield. Mr. Moul developed historical 7 equity risk premiums over several historical periods by comparing the historic returns on 8 the S&P Public Utility index to historic yields on utility bonds. Mr. Moul then added 9 these historic risk premiums to the forecasted yield on A-rated utility bonds to determine 10 his risk premium cost of equity of 11.46% including flotation costs. 11 12 Q. Please respond to Mr. Moul's risk premium analysis. 13 14 The problem with Mr. Moul's historical risk premium analysis is similar to the problem Α. 15 with using historical earned returns in the CAPM analysis. This approach naively assumes that earned returns and the resulting risk premiums in an historical period are reflective of 16 17 current investor expectations. For the reasons I stated earlier in my testimony, such an 18 assumption should be viewed with a good deal of caution. Given changing investor 19 expectations over time, it is risky to assume that investors base their current required 20 returns on an unchanging risk premium based on history. Finance literature has shown that 21 historical risk premiums can change over time. Although historical risk premiums may

| 1 | | provide rough guides to estimating current required returns, I believe that it is preferable to |
|--|-----------------|---|
| 2 | | place greater weight on DCF calculations that employ current, rather than historic data. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | It should also be noted that the recent change in dividend taxation should reduce the |
| 5 | | expected risk premium of stocks over bonds going forward, other things being equal. As I |
| 6 | | stated earlier in my testimony, reduced taxation on dividends should lower the investor's |
| 7 | | required pretax return on equity, other things being equal. Since there was no change in |
| 8 | | the tax treatment of bond income, the required equity premium over bonds should decline |
| 9 | | going forward. Thus, historical risk premiums could overstate the current required risk |
| 10 | | premiums of utility stocks over bonds. |
| 1 1 | | |
| 11 | | |
| 11 | Q. | Do you agree with Mr. Moul's use of a forecast of an A-rated bond yield in his |
| | Q. | Do you agree with Mr. Moul's use of a forecast of an A-rated bond yield in his calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? |
| 12 | Q. | |
| 12 13 | Q. A. | |
| 12 13 14 | | calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? |
| 12 13 14 15 | | calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? No. It is appropriate to use current interest rates rather than forecasted rates. This is |
| 12 13 14 15 16 | | calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? No. It is appropriate to use current interest rates rather than forecasted rates. This is because current interest rates incorporate all information available in the marketplace, |
| 12 13 14 15 16 17 | | calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? No. It is appropriate to use current interest rates rather than forecasted rates. This is because current interest rates incorporate all information available in the marketplace, including investor expectations on the course of future interest rates. Those expectations |
| 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | | calculation of his risk premium cost of equity? No. It is appropriate to use current interest rates rather than forecasted rates. This is because current interest rates incorporate all information available in the marketplace, including investor expectations on the course of future interest rates. Those expectations carry some weight in terms of the price investors are currently willing to pay for bonds. |

| 2 | | In my view, if investors knew for a fact that utility bond yields were going to rise to the |
|----|------------|---|
| 3 | | 6.50% level contained in Mr. Moul's analysis, then they already would have adjusted the |
| 4 | | prices they are currently willing to pay for those bonds and yields would quickly rise to |
| 5 | | 6.50%. That is because with certain knowledge, it is unlikely a rational investor today |
| 6 | | would knowingly accept a certain future capital loss and not discount the price of his or |
| 7 | | her utility bond. Thus, current bond yields are the best measure of investors' |
| 8 | | expectations of economic trends since they reflect all currently available market |
| 9 | | information. |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | <u>CAP</u> | <u>M Analysis</u> |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | Do you agree with Mr. Moul's CAPM analysis? |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | A. | No. First, Mr. Moul utilized a levered beta that inflates the historical beta of his Electric |
| 16 | | Group. Second, Mr. Moul overstated the market return component of the CAPM. Both |
| 17 | | of these flaws lead to a serious overstatement of his CAPM results. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | Why is Mr. Moul's beta estimate incorrect? |
| 20 | | |

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| 1 | A. | The appropriate beta to use in the CAPM is one that investors expect based on a stock's |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | price movements relative to the overall market. Sources for these betas come from |
| 3 | | published and widely recognized sources of investor information such as Value Line and |
| 4 | | Merrill Lynch. However, Mr. Moul introduced a highly inappropriate adjustment based |
| 5 | | on his claimed differences between market and book value capital structures for his |
| 6 | | Electric Group. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | Mr. Moul's claim that his leveraged beta should be used in the CAPM for ratemaking |
| 9 | | purposes is incorrect and should be rejected by the Commission. Mr. Moul provided no |
| 10 | | evidence that investors use his leverage adjustment to calculate their expected future |
| 11 | | betas for the companies in his Electric Group. In my opinion, investors' expectations |
| 12 | | will most likely be influenced by widely published sources of betas, not Mr. Moul's |
| 13 | | calculations in this rate proceeding. Mr. Moul's leverage adjustment merely inflates his |
| 14 | | CAPM result. |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | | Finally, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony even the use of published betas may |
| 17 | | overstate the CAPM results at this time. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | Do you agree with Mr. Moul's use of a forecast for the risk-free rate in his CAPM |
| 20 | | analysis? |
| 21 | | |

| 1 | A. | No. For the reasons I explained in my response to his Risk Premium analyses, it is |
|----|-------------|---|
| 2 | | inappropriate to use forecasted interest rates in the calculation of the CAPM return on |
| 3 | | equity. Mr. Moul's use of a forecasted yield on the 20-year Treasury bond inflates his |
| 4 | | CAPM return by about 86 basis points, or 0.86%. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | <u>Comp</u> | parable Earnings |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | Does Mr. Moul's cost of equity estimate based on comparable earnings provide a |
| 9 | | sound basis on which to estimate the cost of equity for Kentucky Power? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | А. | No. Mr. Moul's comparable earnings method should be rejected. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | Please explain why Mr. Moul's comparable earnings approach should be rejected. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | A. | There are several reasons why Mr. Moul's comparable earnings approach should be |
| 16 | | rejected. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | First, book returns for unregulated companies are an inappropriate means to measure the |
| 19 | | cost of equity for a regulated utility company such as Kentucky Power. The Company |
| 20 | | enjoys a protected service territory that has no competition from outside firms. This means |
| 21 | | that investors will require a lower return on equity for a regulated monopoly such as |

.

| 1 | | Kentucky Power compared to unregulated firms that must compete for their customers' |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | business. Using book returns for unregulated companies vastly overstates the required |
| 3 | | return for Kentucky Power's regulated utility operations. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | Second, Mr. Moul used an arbitrarily determined time period over which to calculate |
| 6 | | realized returns for his analysis (five years historical and five years projected). Such a |
| 7 | | short historical time period as five years may not be representative of long-term investor |
| 8 | | expectations regarding returns. Further, historical returns do not necessarily have anything |
| 9 | | to do with expected returns, which are based on today's economic conditions and |
| 10 | | expectations of future conditions. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | Q. | Does this conclude your direct testimony? |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | A. | Yes. |

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

| GENERAL ADJUSTMENTS IN |) | |
|------------------------|---|------------|
| ELECTRIC RATES OF |) | CASE NO. |
| KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY |) | 2005-00341 |

EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. ROSWELL, GEORGIA JANUARY 2006

Exhibit (RAB-1) Page 1 of 11

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EDUCATION

New Mexico State University, M.A. Major in Economics Minor in Statistics

New Mexico State University, B.A. Economics English

Twenty two years of experience in utility ratemaking. Broad based experience in revenue requirement analysis, cost of capital, utility financing, phase-ins, auditing and rate design. Has designed revenue requirement and rate design analysis programs.

REGULATORY TESTIMONY

Preparation and presentation of expert testimony in the areas of:

Electric and Gas Utility Rate Design Cost of Capital for Electric, Gas and Water Companies Ratemaking Treatment of Generating Plant Sale/Leasebacks Electric and Gas Utility Cost of Service Revenue Requirements Gas industry restructuring and competition Fuel cost auditing

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EXPERIENCE

1989 to

Present: <u>Kennedy and Associates</u>: Director of Consulting - Responsible for consulting assignments in the area of revenue requirements, rate design, cost of capital, economic analysis of generation alternatives, gas industry restructuring and competition.

1982 to

1989: <u>New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff</u>: Utility Economist - Responsible for preparation of analysis and expert testimony in the areas of rate of return, cost allocation, rate design, finance, phase-in of electric generating plants, and sale/leaseback transactions.

CLIENTS SERVED

Regulatory Commissions

Louisiana Public Service Commission Georgia Public Service Commission New Mexico Public Service Commission

Industrial Groups

Taconite Intervenors (Minnesota) Tyson Foods

Ad Hoc Committee for a Competitive **Electric Supply System** Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers Arkansas Gas Consumers Armco Steel Company, L.P. Association of Business Advocating **Tariff Equity** Climax Molybdenum Company General Electric Company Industrial Energy Consumers Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers Large Electric Consumers Organization Newport Steel Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers Maryland Industrial Group Occidental Chemical **PSI Industrial Group**

| | Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|---|-------|---------------|------------|---|------------------------------------|---|
| | 3/83 | 1780 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Boles Water Co. | Rate design, rate of return. |
| | 10/83 | 1803, 1817 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Southwestern Electric Coop | Rate design. |
| | 11/84 | 1833 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Service contract approval, rate design, performance standards for Palo Verde nuclear generating system |
| | 1983 | 1835 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Public Service Co. of NM | Rate design. |
| | 1984 | 1848 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Sangre de Cristo Water Co. | Rate design. |
| | 02/85 | 1906 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Southwestern Public Service Co. | Rate of return. |
| | 09/84 | 1907 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Jomada Water Co. | Rate of return. |
| | 11/85 | 1957 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Southwestern Public Service Co. | Rate of return. |
| - | 04/86 | 2009 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Phase-in plan, treatment of sate/leaseback expense. |
| | 06/86 | 2032 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Sale/leaseback approval. |
| | 09/86 | 2033 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Order to show cause, PVNGS audit. |
| | 02/87 | 2074 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Diversification. |
| | 05/87 | 2089 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Fuel factor adjustment. |
| | 08/87 | 2092 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Rate design. |

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| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|----------|---------------------|------------|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| | | | | | |
| 10/88 | 2146 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Public Service Co. of New Mexico | Financial effects of restructuring, reorganization. |
| 07/88 | 2162 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | El Paso Electric Co. | Revenue requirements, rate design, rate of return. |
| 01/89 | 2194 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Plains Electric G&T Cooperative | Economic development. |
| 1/89 | 2253 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Plains Electric G&T Cooperative | Financing. |
| 08/89 | 2259 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Homestead Water Co. | Rate of return, rate design. |
| 10/89 | 2262 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Public Service Co. of New Mexico | Rate of return. |
| 09/89 | 2269 | NM | New Mexico Public Service Commission | Ruidoso Natural Gas Co. | Rate of return, expense from affiliated interest. |
| 12/89 | 89-208-TF | AR | Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers | Arkansas Power & Light Co. | Rider M-33. |
| 01/90 | U-17282 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Gulf States Utilities | Cost of equity. |
| 09/90 | 90-158 | KΥ | Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers | Louisville Gas & Electric Co. | Cost of equity. |
| 09/90 | 90-004-U | AR | Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Western Gas Co. | Cost of equity, transportation rate. |
| 12/90 | U-17282 Phase IV | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Gulf States Utilities | Cost of equity. |
| 04/91 | 91-037-U | AR | Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Westem Gas Co. | Transportation rates. |
| 12/91 | 91-410- EL-AIR | ОН | Air Products & Chemicais, Inc., Armco Steel Co., General Electric Co., Industrial Energy Consumers | Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. | Cost of equity. |

| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|-------|--------------------|------------|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| | | | | | |
| 05/92 | 910890-EI | FL | Occidental Chemical Corp. | Florida Power Corp. | Cost of equity, rate of return. |
| 09/92 | 92-032-U | AR | Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. | Cost of equity, rate of return, cost-of-service. |
| 09/92 | 39314 | ID | Industrial Consumers for Fair Utility Rates | Indiana Michigan Power Co. | Cost of equity, rate of return. |
| 09/92 | 92-009-U | AR | Tyson Foods | General Waterworks | Cost allocation, rate design. |
| 01/93 | 92-346 | KY | Newport Steel Co. | Union Light, Heat & Power Co. | Cost allocation. |
| 01/93 | 39498 | IN. | PSI Industrial Group | PSI Energy | Refund allocation. |
| 01/93 | U-10105 | MI | Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equality (ABATE) | Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. | Return on equity. |
| 04/93 | 92-1464- EL-AIR | ОН | Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Armco Steel Co., Industrial Energy Consumers | Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. | Retum on equity. |
| 09/93 | 93 - 189-U | AR | Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. | Transportation service terms and conditions. |
| 09/93 | 93-081-U | AR | Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. | Cost-of-service, transporta- tion rates, rate supplements; return on equity; revenue requirements. |
| 12/93 | U-17735 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission Staff | Cajun Electric Power Cooperative | Historical reviews; evaluation of economic studies. |
| 03/94 | 10320 | ΚY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers | Louisville Gas & Electric Co. | Trimble County CWIP revenue refund. |

| | Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|---|-------|---------------------|------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| | | E-015/ GR-94-001 | MN | Large Power Intervenors | Minnesota Power Co. | Evaluation of the cost of equity, capital structure, and rate of return. |
| | 5/94 | R-00942993 | PA | PG&W Industrial Intervenors | Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. | Analysis of recovery of transition costs. |
| · | 5/94 | R-00943001 | PA | Columbia Industrial Intervenors | Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania | Evaluation of cost allocation, rate design, rate plan, and carrying charge proposals. |
| | 7/94 | R-00942986 | PA | Armoo, Inc., West Penn Power Industrial Intervenors | West Penn Power Co. | Return on equity and rate of return. |
| | | 94-0035- E-42T | WV | West Virginia Energy Users' Group | Monongahela Power Co. | Retum on equity and rate of return. |
| | 8/94 | 8652 | MD | Westvaco Corp. | Potomac Edison Co. | Return on equity and rate of return. |
| | 9/94 | 930357-C | AR | West Central Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp. | Evaluation of transportation service. |
| | 9/94 | U-19904 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Gulf States Utilities | Return on equity. |
| | 9/94 | 8629 | MD | Maryland Industrial Group | Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. | Transition costs. |
| | 11/94 | 94-175-U | AR | Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkla, Inc. | Cost-of-service, rate design, rate of return. |
| | 3/95 | RP94-343- 000 | FERC | Arkansas Gas Consumers | NorAm Gas Transmission | Rate of return. |
| | 4/95 | R-00943271 | PA | PP&L Industrial Customer Alliance | Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. | Return on equity. |
| | 6/95 | U-10755 | MI | Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity | Consumers Power Co. | Revenue requirements. |
| | 7/95 | 8697 | MD | Maryland Industrial Group | Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. | Cost allocation and rate design. |

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| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|----------|---------------------|------------|---|---|---|
| 8/95 | 95-254-TF U-2811 | AR | Tyson Foods, inc. | Southwest Arkansas Electric Cooperative | Refund allocation. |
| 10/95 | ER95-1042 -000 | FERC | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Systems Energy Resources, Inc. | Return on Equity. |
| 11/95 | I-940032 | PA | Industrial Energy Consumers of Pennsylvania | State-wide - all utilities | Investigation into Electric Power Competition. |
| 5/96 | 96-030-U | AR | Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers | Arkansas Western Gas Co. | Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service. |
| 7/96 | 8725 | MD | Maryland Industrial Group | Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Potomac Electric Power Co. and Constellation Energy Corp. | Return on Equity. |
| 7/96 | U-21496 | LA | Louisiana Public Servíce Commission | Central Louisiana Electric Co. | Return on equity, rate of return. |
| 9/96 | U-22092 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Return on equity. |
| 1/97 | RP96-199- 000 | FERC | The Industrial Gas Users Conference | Mississippi River Transmission Corp. | Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service. |
| 3/97 | 96-420-U | AR | West Central Arkansas Gas Corp. | Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp. | Revenue requirements, rate of retum, cost of service and rate design. |
| 7/97 | U-11220 | MI | Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity | Michigan Gas Co. and Southeastern Michigan Gas Co. | Transportation Balancing Provisions |
| 7/97 | R-0097394 | 4 PA | Pennsylvania American Water Large Users Group | Pennsylvania- American Water Co. | Rate of return, cost of service, revenue requirements. |
| 3/98 | 8390-U | GA | Georgia Naturai Gas Group and the Georgia Textile Manufacturers Assoc. | Atlanta Gas Light | Rate of return, restructuring issues, unbundling, rate design issues. |


| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|----------|------------|------------|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| 7/98 | R-00984280 | PA | PG Energy, Inc. | PGE Industrial Intervenors | Cost allocation. |
| 8/98 | U-17735 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Cajun Electric Power Cooperative | Revenue requirements. |
| 10/98 | 97-596 | ME | Maine Office of the Public Advocate | Bangor Hydro- Electric Co. | Retum on equity, rate of return. |
| 10/98 | U-23327 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | SWEPCO, CSW and AEP | Analysis of proposed merger. |
| 12/98 | 98-577 | ME | Maine Office of the Public Advocate | Maine Public Service Co. | Return on equity, rate of return. |
| 12/98 | U-23358 | LA . | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Return on equity, rate of return. |
| 3/99 | 98-426 | KΥ | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. | Louisville Gas and Electric Co | Return on equity. |
| 3/99 | 99-082 | KY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. | Kentucky Utilities Co. | Return on equity. |
| 4/99 | R-984554 | PA | T. W. Phillips Users Group | T. W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. | Allocation of purchased gas costs. |
| 6/99 | R-0099462 | PA | Columbia Industrial Intervenors | Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania | Balancing charges. |
| 10/99 | U-24182 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Entergy Guif States,Inc. | Cost of debt. |
| 10/99 | R-00994782 | PA | Peoples Industrial Intervenors | Peoples Natural Gas Co. | Restructuring issues. |
| 10/99 | R-00994781 | PA | Columbia Industrial Intervenors | Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania | Restructuring, balancing charges, rate flexing, alternate fuel. |
| 01/00 | R-00994786 | PA | UGI Industrial Intervenors | UGI Utilities, Inc. | Universal service costs, balancing, penalty charges, capacity assignment. |

| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|-------|--|------------|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |
| 01/00 | 8829 | MD | Maryland Industrial Gr. & United States | Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. | Revenue requirements, cost allocation, rate design. |
| 02/00 | R-00994788 | PA | Penn Fuel Transportation | PFG Gas, Inc., and | Tariff charges, balancing provisions. |
| 05/00 | U-17735 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Louisiana Electric Cooperative | Rate restructuring. |
| 07/00 | 2000-080 | KY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers | Louisville Gas and Electric Co. | Cost allocation. |
| 07/00 | U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket F |) | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Southwestern Electric Power Co. | Stranded cost analysis. |
| 09/00 | R-00005654 | PA | Philadelphia Industrial And Commercial Gas Users Group. | Philadelphia Gas Works | Interim relief analysis. |
| 10/00 | U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket I |) | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Restructuring, Business Separation Plan. |
| 11/00 | R-00005277 (Rebuttal) | PA | Penn Fuel Transportation Customers | PFG Gas, Inc. and North Penn Gas Co. | Cost allocation issues. |
| 12/00 | U-24993 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Return on equity. |
| 03/01 | U-22092 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Stranded cost analysis. |
| 04/01 | U-21453 U-20925 (St U-22092 (St (Subdocket (Addressing | c) | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Restructuring issues. |
| 04/01 | R-00006042 | 2 PA | Philadelphia Industrial and Commercial Gas Users Group | Philadelphia Gas Works | Revenue requirements, cost allocation and tariff issues. |
| 11/01 | U-25687 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Comm. | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Return on equity. |

| Date | Case J | urisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|----------|-------------------------|-----------|--|--|---|
| | | | | | |
| 03/02 | 14311-U | GA | Georgia Public Service Commission | Atlanta Gas Light | Capital structure. |
| 08/02 | 2002-00145 | KY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers | Columbia Gas of Kentucky | Revenue requirements. |
| 09/02 | M-00021612 | PA | Philadelphia Industrial And Commercial Gas Users Group | Philadelphia Gas Works | Transportation rates, terms, and conditions. |
| 01/03 | 2002-00169 4 | Ŷ | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers | Kentucky Power | Return on equity. |
| 02/03 | 02S-594E | со | Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining Company | Aquila Networks – WPC | Return on equity. |
| 04/03 | U-26527 | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Entergy Gulf States, Inc. | Return on equity. |
| 10/03 | CV020495AB | GA | The Landings Assn., Inc. | Utilities Inc. of GA | Revenue requirement & overcharge refund |
| 03/04 | 2003-00433 | KY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers | Louisville Gas & Electric | Return on equity, Cost allocation & rate design |
| 03/04 | 2003-00434 | KY | Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers | Kentucky Utilities | Return on equity |
| 4/04 | ER03-583-000 et. al. |), FERC | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Entergy Corp. | Return on Equity |
| 4/04 | 04S-035E | со | Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining Company, Goodrich Corp., Holcim (U.S.) Inc., and The Trane Co. | Aquila Networks – WPC | Return on equity. |
| 9/04 | U-23327, Subdocket B | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Southwestern Electric Power Company | Fuel cost review |
| 10/04 | U-23327 Subdocket A | LA | Louisiana Public Service Commission | Southwestern Electric Power Company | Return on Equity |
| 06/05 | 050045-EI | FL | South Florida Hospital and HeallthCare Assoc. | Florida Power & Light Co. | Review Requirements, Rate Design, Cost Allocation. |

| Date | Case | Jurisdict. | Party | Utility | Subject |
|----------|------|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 08/05 | 9036 | MD | Maryland Industrial Group | Baltimore Gas & Electric | Revenue requirement, cost allocation, rate design, tariff issues |

Exhibit ____(RAB-2)



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KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

| | | Dec '05 | Nov '05 | Oct '05 | Sept '05 | Aug '05 | July '05 |
|--------------------------|-----------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------|
| Avista Corp. | High Price (\$) | 18.84 | 17.96 | 19.55 | 20.20 | 19.61 | 19.36 |
| - | Low Price (\$) | 17.47 | 16.76 | 17.01 | 18.11 | 17.90 | 18.10 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 18.16 | 17.36 | 18.28 | 19.16 | 18.76 | 18.73 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.140 | 0.140 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.08% | 3.23% | 2.95% | 2.82% | 2.88% | 2.88% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 2.97% | | | | | |
| Cleco Corporation | High Price (\$) | 22.29 | 22.98 | 24.36 | 23.96 | 23.52 | 22.58 |
| · | Low Price (\$) | 19.00 | 20.64 | 20.56 | 22.10 | 21.65 | 21.00 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 20.65 | 21.81 | 22.46 | 23.03 | 22.59 | 21.79 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.225 | 0.225 | 0.225 | 0.225 | 0.225 | 0.225 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 4.36% | 4.13% | 4.01% | 3.91% | 3.98% | 4.13% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 4.09% | | | | | |
| DPL, Inc. | High Price (\$) | 26.40 | 26.85 | 28.19 | 27.95 | 28.34 | 27.97 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 25.10 | 25.29 | 24.33 | 26.73 | 26.43 | 26.85 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 25.75 | 26.07 | 26.26 | 27.34 | 27.39 | 27.41 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.240 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.73% | 3.68% | 3.66% | 3.51% | 3.51% | 3.50% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 3.60% | | | | | |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | | 17.34 | 17.35 | 17.59 | 18.42 | 19.52 | 19.41 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 16.21 | 16.10 | 16.08 | 17.06 | 17.57 | 18.47 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 16.78 | 16.73 | 16.84 | 17.74 | 18.55 | 18.94 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
| | Mo, Avg, Div. | 5.96% | 5.98% | 5.94% | 5.64% | 5.39% | 5.28% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 5.70% | | | | | |
| Empire District | High Price (\$) | 21.25 | 21.07 | 23.27 | 24.16 | 24.41 | 25.01 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 20.32 | 20.01 | 19.25 | 22.49 | 22.30 | 23.57 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 20.79 | 20.54 | 21.26 | 23.33 | 23.36 | 24.29 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.320 | 0.320 | 0.320 | 0.320 | 0.320 | 0.320 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 6.16% | 6.23% | 6.02% | 5.49% | 5.48% | 5.27% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 5.77% | | | | | |
| Energy East | High Price (\$) | 23.88 | 24.20 | 25.95 | 26.69 | 27.92 | 29.35 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 22.60 | 22.50 | 22.80 | 24.82 | 25.65 | 27.20 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 23.24 | 23.35 | 24.38 | 25.76 | 26.79 | 28.28 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.290 | 0.290 | 0.290 | 0.275 | 0.275 | 0.275 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 4.99% | 4.97% | 4.76% | 4.27% | 4.11% | 3.89% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 4.50% | | | | | |
| First Energy Corporation | | 50.07 | 47.67 | 53.36 | 53.00 | 51.11 | 50.45 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 46.73 | 45.78 | 45.94 | 50.35 | 48.41 | 47.46 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 48.40 | 46.73 | 49.65 | 51.68 | 49.76 | 48.96 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.430 | 0.430 | 0.430 | 0.430 | 0.413 | 0.413 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.55% | 3.68% | 3.46% | 3.33% | 3.32% | 3.37% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 3.45% | | | | | |

KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

| | | Dec '05 | Nov '05 | Oct '05 | Sept '05 | Aug '05 | July '05 |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------|
| Green Mountain Power | High Price (\$) | 30.90 | 32.65 | 33.09 | 33.03 | 30.75 | 30.00 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 26.62 | 28.74 | 31.90 | 30.50 | 28.75 | 29.10 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 28.76 | 30.70 | 32.50 | 31.77 | 29.75 | 29.55 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
| | Mo, Avg. Div. | 3.48% | 3.26% | 3.08% | 3.15% | 3.36% | 3.38% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 3.28% | | | | | |
| Hawaiian Electric Ind. | High Price (\$) | 26.72 | 26.90 | 28.50 | 28.76 | 27.81 | 27.77 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 25.65 | 25.50 | 25.50 | 26.38 | 26.21 | 26.51 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 26.19 | 26.20 | 27.00 | 27.57 | 27.01 | 27.14 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.310 | 0.310 | 0.310 | 0.310 | 0.310 | 0.310 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 4.74% | 4.73% | 4.59% | 4.50% | 4.59% | 4.57% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 4.62% | | | | | |
| Northeast Utilities | High Price (\$) | 20.25 | 19.03 | 20.20 | 20.48 | 21.95 | 21,74 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 18.42 | 17.30 | 17.62 | 19.35 | 19.52 | 20.41 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 19.34 | 18.17 | 18.91 | 19.92 | 20.74 | 21.08 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.62% | 3.85% | 3.70% | 3.51% | 3.38% | 3.32% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 3.56% | | | | | |
| Pinnacle West | High Price (\$) | 43.33 | 42.19 | 44.97 | 46.06 | 46.68 | 46.16 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 41.05 | 39.91 | 39.81 | 43.13 | 43.22 | 43.76 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 42.19 | 41.05 | 42.39 | 44.60 | 44.95 | 44.96 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.475 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 4.74% | 4.87% | 4.72% | 4.26% | 4.23% | 4.23% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 4.51% | | | | | |
| PNM Resources | High Price (\$) | 26.1 9 | 26.26 | 29.22 | 29.98 | 30.45 | 29.85 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 24.15 | 24.03 | 24.07 | 27.62 | 27.90 | 28.24 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 25.17 | 25.15 | 26.65 | 28.80 | 29.18 | 29.05 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.200 | 0.200 | 0.200 | 0.200 | 0.200 | 0.200 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.18% | 3.18% | 3.00% | 2.78% | 2.74% | 2.75% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 2.94% | | | | | |
| PPL Corp. | High Price (\$) | 30.90 | 31.14 | 33.68 | 33.51 | 65.12 | 62.14 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 28.59 | 28.25 | 29.01 | 31.55 | 61.62 | 59.50 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 29.75 | 29.70 | 31.35 | 32.53 | 63.37 | 60.82 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.250 | 0.460 | 0.460 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 3.36% | 3.37% | 3.19% | 3.07% | 2.90% | 3.03% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 3.15% | | | | | |
| Progress Energy | High Price (\$) | 45.20 | 45.50 | 45.14 | 45.00 | 45.00 | 46.00 |
| | Low Price (\$) | 43.39 | 42.62 | 40.77 | 43.03 | 41.90 | 43.80 |
| | Avg. Price (\$) | 44.30 | 44.06 | 42.96 | 44.02 | 43.45 | 44.90 |
| | Dividend (\$) | 0.590 | 0.590 | 0.590 | 0.590 | 0.590 | 0.590 |
| | Mo. Avg. Div. | 5.33% | 5.36% | 5.49% | 5.36% | 5.43% | 5.26% |
| | 6 mos. Avg. | 5.37% | | | | | |

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KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

| | - | Dec '05 | Nov '05 | Oct '05 | Sept '05 | Aug '05 | July '05 |
|------------------------|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| Puget Energy | High Price (\$) Low Price (\$) Avg. Price (\$) Dividend (\$) Mo. Avg. Div. 6 mos. Avg. | 20.90 20.21 20.56 0.250 4.86% 4.52% | 21.33 20.26 20.80 0.250 4.81% | 23.70 20.50 22.10 0.250 4.52% | 23.82 22.40 23.11 0.250 4.33% | 23.54 22.05 22.80 0.250 4.39% | 24.36 23.26 23.81 0.250 4.20% |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | High Price (\$) Low Price (\$) Avg. Price (\$) Dividend (\$) Mo. Avg. Div. 6 mos. Avg. | 32.86 30.80 31.83 0.190 2.39% 2.37% | 32.78 30.39 31.59 0.190 2.41% | 33.86 29.86 31.86 0.190 2.39% | 33.92 31.80 32.86 0.190 2.31% | 33.60 31.19 32.40 0.190 2.35% | 32.70 30.50 31.60 0.190 2.41% |
| Average Dividend Yield | | 4.03% | | | | | |

Source: Yahoo! Finance, S&P Stock Guide

KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

| Company | (1) Value Line DPS | (2) Value Line EPS | (3) Value Line B x R | (4) First Call/ Thomson | (5) Zacks |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| Avista Corp. | 6.13% | 10.89% | 4.27% | 5.50% | 5.00% |
| Cleco Corporation | 0.00% | 1.56% | 3.00% | 4.65% | 4.00% |
| DPL, Inc. | 0.82% | 1.25% | 4.04% | 4.67% | 5.00% |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | 0.00% | 3.23% | 3.57% | 2.50% | 5.00% |
| Empire District Electric | 0.00% | 5.09% | 1.32% | 2.00% | 5.00% |
| Energy East Corporation | 4.96% | 4.72% | 3.25% | 4.50% | 5.00% |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | 6.96% | 9.98% | 5.46% | 5.00% | 5.00% |
| Green Mountain Power | 10.96% | 3.24% | 3.96% | N/A | N/A |
| Hawaiian Electric Industries | 0.00% | 2.38% | 3.06% | 3.70% | 4.00% |
| Northeast Utilities | 9.01% | 10.87% | 5.15% | 7.70% | 8.00% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | 4.95% | 3.35% | 2.11% | 6.00% | 6.00% |
| PNM Resources | 11.59% | 7.23% | 3.29% | 10.66% | 8.00% |
| PPL Corporation | 8.80% | 6.12% | 7.50% | 7.44% | 7.00% |
| Progress Energy Inc. | 1.51% | -0.24% | 2.65% | 3.92% | 4.00% |
| Puget Energy | 2.29% | 5.63% | 3.24% | 4.00% | 5.00% |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | 9.34% | 5.55% | 3.15% | N/A | N/A |
| Averages Excluding Negative Values | 4.83% | 5.41% | 3.69% | 5.16% | 5.43% |
| Sources: Zacks Analysts' Forecasts, Deco Value Line investment Survey, N First Call/Thomson Earnings Fo | lovember 11, Dece | | nber 30, 2005 | | |

Value Line Projected Dividend Per Share Growth

| Company | 2004 DPS | Pr | ojected DPS | Compound Growth Rate |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----|----------------|----------------------------|
| Avista Corp. | \$ 0.52 | \$ | 0.70 | 6.13% |
| Cleco Corporation | \$ 0.90 | \$ | 0.90 | 0.00% |
| DPL, Inc. | \$ 0.96 | \$ | 1.00 | 0.82% |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | \$ 1.00 | \$ | 1.00 | 0.00% |
| Empire District Electric | \$ 1.28 | \$ | 1.28 | 0.00% |
| Energy East Corporation | \$ 1.06 | \$ | 1.35 | 4.96% |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | \$ 1.50 | \$ | 2.10 | 6.96% |
| Green Mountain Power | \$ 0.88 | \$ | 1.48 | 10.96% |
| Hawailan Electric Industries | \$ 1.24 | \$ | 1,24 | 0.00% |
| Northeast Utilities | \$ 0.63 | \$ | 0.97 | 9.01% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | \$ 1.83 | \$ | 2.33 | 4.95% |
| PNM Resources | \$ 0.63 | \$ | 1.09 | 11.59% |
| PPL Corporation | \$ 0.82 | \$ | 1.25 | 8.80% |
| Progress Energy Inc. | \$ 2.32 | \$ | 2.50 | 1.51% |
| Puget Energy | \$ 1.00 | \$ | 1.12 | 2.29% |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | \$ 0.64 | \$ | 1.00 | 9.34% |
| Average | | | | 4.83% |

KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

Value Line Projected Earnings Per Share Growth

| Company | I-Year Avg. EPS | ojected EPS | Compound Growth Rate |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| Avista Corp. | \$ 0.81 | \$ 1.50 | 10.89% |
| Cleco Corporation | \$ 1.37 | \$ 1.50 | 1.56% |
| DPL, Inc. | \$ 1.21 | \$ 1.30 | 1.25% |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | \$ 1.16 | \$ 1.40 | 3.23% |
| Empire District Electric | \$ 1.11 | \$ 1.50 | 5.09% |
| Energy East Corporation | \$ 1.52 | \$ 2.00 | 4.72% |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | \$ 2.26 | \$ 4.00 | 9.98% |
| Green Mountain Power | \$ 2.02 | \$ 2.45 | 3.24% |
| Hawaiian Electric Industries | \$ 1.52 | \$ 1.75 | 2.38% |
| Northeast Utilities | \$ 1.08 | \$ 2.00 | 10.87% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | \$ 2.54 | \$ 3.10 | 3.35% |
| PNM Resources | \$ 1.22 | \$ 1.85 | 7.23% |
| PPL Corporation | \$ 1.75 | \$ 2.50 | 6.12% |
| Progress Energy Inc. | \$ 3.45 | \$ 3.40 | -0.24% |
| Puget Energy | \$ 1.26 | \$ 1.75 | 5.63% |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | \$ 1.19 | \$ 1.65 | 5.55% |
| Average | | | 5.05% |

Sustainable Growth Calculation

| Company | Forecasted Payout Ratio | Forecasted Retention Ratio | Expected Return | Growth Rate |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Avista Corp. | 46.67% | 53.33% | 8.00% | 4.27% |
| Cleco Corporation | 60.00% | 40.00% | 7.50% | 3.00% |
| DPL, Inc. | 76.92% | 23.08% | 17.50% | 4.04% |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | 71.43% | 28.57% | 12.50% | 3.57% |
| Empire District Electric | 85.33% | 14.67% | 9.00% | 1.32% |
| Energy East Corporation | 67.50% | 32.50% | 10.00% | 3.25% |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | 52.50% | 47.50% | 11.50% | 5.46% |
| Green Mountain Power | 60.41% | 39.59% | 10.00% | 3.96% |
| Hawalian Electric Industries | 70.86% | 29.14% | 10.50% | 3.06% |
| Northeast Utilities | 48.50% | 51.50% | 10.00% | 5.15% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | 75.16% | 24.84% | 8.50% | 2.119 |
| PNM Resources | 58.92% | 41.08% | 8.00% | 3.29% |
| PPL Corporation | 50.00% | 50.00% | 15.00% | 7.50% |
| Progress Energy Inc. | 73.53% | 26.47% | 10.00% | 2.65% |
| Puget Energy | 64.00% | 36.00% | 9.00% | 3.24% |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | 60.61% | 39.39% | 8.00% | 3.15% |
| Average | 63.90% | 36.10% | 10.31% | 3.69% |

KENTUCKY POWER COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

| RETURN ON EQUITY CALCULATION COMPARISON GROUP | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| | (1) Value Line <u>Dividend Gr.</u> | (2) Value Line <u>Earnings Gr.</u> | (3) First Call/ <u>Thomson</u> | (4) Zack's <u>Earning Gr.</u> | (5) Average of <u>All Gr. Rates</u> | |
| Dividend Yield | 4.03% | 4.03% | 4.03% | 4.03% | 4.03% | |
| Growth Rate | 4.83% | 5.41% | 5.16% | 5.43% | 5.21% | |
| Expected Div. Yield | <u>4.12%</u> | <u>4.13%</u> | <u>4.13%</u> | <u>4.14%</u> | <u>4.13%</u> | |
| DCF Return on Equity | 8.95% | 9.54% | 9.29% | 9.57% | 9.34% | |
| | | | | | | |

KENTUCKY POWER Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Comparison Group

20-Year Treasury Bond

Line

| Line <u>No.</u> | | Value Line |
|--------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 1 2 3 4 | Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return | 1.29% <u>12.84%</u> 14.13% |
| 5 6 | Risk-free Rate of Return, 20-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months | 4.64% |
| 8 9 | Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6) | 9.49% |
| 10 | Comparison Group Beta | 0.83 |
| 11 12 | Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 10 * Line 9) | 7.92% |
| 13 14 | CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6) | 12.56% |
| | 5-Year Treasury Bond | |
| 1 2 3 4 | Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return | 1.29% <u>12.84%</u> 14.13% |
| 5 6 | Risk-free Rate of Return, 5-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months | 4.21% |
| 8 9 | Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6) | 9.92% |
| 10 | Comparison Group Beta | 0.83 |
| 11 12 | Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 9 * Line 10) | 8.28% |
| 13 14 | CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6) | 12.49% |

KENTUCKY POWER Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Comparison Group

Supporting Data for CAPM Analyses

20 Year Treasury Bond Data

5 Year Treasury Bond Data

| | Avg. Yield | | Avg. Yield |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|
| July-05 | 4.48% | July-05 | 3.98% |
| August-05 | 4.53% | August-05 | 4.12% |
| September-05 | 4.51% | September-05 | 4.01% |
| October-05 | 4.74% | October-05 | 4.33% |
| November-05 | 4.83% | November-05 | 4.45% |
| December-05 | 4.73% | December-05 | 4.39% |
| 6 month average | 4.64% | 6 month average | 4.21% |

Value Screen III Growth Rate Data:

| Forecasted Data: | |
|------------------|---------------|
| Earnings | 15.84% |
| Book Value | 11.18% |
| Dividends | <u>11.51%</u> |

Average 12.84% Source: Value Line Investment Survey for Windows, December 2005

Value Line Betas Comparison Group:

| Avista Corp. | 0.90 |
|------------------------------|------|
| Cleco Corporation | 1.15 |
| DPL, Inc. | 1.00 |
| Duquesne Light Holdings | 0.80 |
| Empire District Electric | 0.70 |
| Energy East Corporation | 0.85 |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | 0.75 |
| Green Mountain Power | 0.60 |
| Hawalian Electric Industries | 0.70 |
| Northeast Utilities | 0.80 |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corp. | 0.90 |
| PNM Resources | 0.90 |
| PPL Corporation | 1.00 |
| Progress Energy Inc. | 0.85 |
| Puget Energy | 0.80 |
| UniSource Energy Corp. | 0.65 |
| | |
| Average | 0.83 |

Source: Value Line Investment Reports

KENTUCKY POWER Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis

Historic Market Premium

| | Geometric Mean | Arithmetic <u>Mean</u> |
|--|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Long-Term Annual Return on Stocks | 10.40% | 12.40% |
| Long-Term Annual Income Return on Long-Term Government Bonds | <u>5.20%</u> | <u>5.20%</u> |
| Historical Market Risk Premium | 5.20% | 7.20% |
| Comparison Group Beta | <u>0.83</u> | 0.83 |
| Beta * Market Premium | 4.34% | 6.01% |
| Current 20-Year Tresury Bond Yield | <u>4.64%</u> | <u>4.64%</u> |
| CAPM Cost of Equity | 8.98% | 10.64% |

Source: Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 2005 Yearbook, Ibbotson Associates

MR. MOUL'S ALTERNATIVE DCF ANALYSIS Average of All DCF Results

| | Retention Growth | | IBES/First Call | |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| | Low | <u>High</u> | Low | <u>High</u> |
| Ameren Corp. | 7.08% | 7.37% | 8.26% | 8.55% |
| DTE Energy | 9.35% | 9.60% | 8.73% | 8.98% |
| Exelon Corp. | 13.44% | 13.75% | 8.71% | 9.01% |
| FirstEnergy Corp. | 9.35% | 9.62% | 8.08% | 8.35% |
| MGE Energy | 7.51% | 7.91% | | |
| Vectren Corp. | 8.31% | 8.58% | 8.32% | 8.59% |
| WPS Resources | 10.78% | 11.04% | 8.49% | 8.75% |
| Wisconsin Energy | 8.90% | 9.04% | 8.70% | 8.84% |
| Averages | 9.34% | 9.61% | 8.47% | 8.72% |