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July 31, 2015

RECEIVED

AUG 4 2015

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Jeff R. Derouen
Executive Director
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Boulevard
P.O. Box 615
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615

RE: *In the Matter of: Carrollton Utilities*
Case No. 2015-00178

Dear Mr. Derouen,

In accordance with the Order entered by the Kentucky Public Service Commission on July 30, 2015, please find the enclosed Response of Carrollton Utilities to the Commission's Order of June 15, 2015 and Motion to Suspend Hearing and Schedule Informal Conference. Please notify Mr. James and Mr. Osborne if any additional information is needed or if an informal conference is scheduled.

Very truly yours,

JAMES & WELLS, P.S.C.

Amy L. Eversole

Amy L. Eversole

Enclosure

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

CARROLLTON UTILITIES	)	
	)	
	)	CASE NO. 2015-00178
ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 49 CRF § 191.9(a)	)	

RESPONSE OF CARROLLTON UTILITIES TO THE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF JUNE 15, 2015 AND MOTION TO SUSPEND HEARING AND SCHEDULE INFORMAL CONFERENCE

On June 15, 2015, the Kentucky Public Service Commission ("Commission") issued an Order directing Carrollton Utilities to file a written response to the allegations contained in the Investigation Report prepared by Commission Staff for an event occurring on May 27, 2014 at 1104 11th Street in Carrollton, Kentucky.

On July 20, 2015 Commission staff attorney Jonathon Beyer contacted the law office of James & Wells, P.S.C., Carrollton Utilities legal representation, inquiring about the status of Carrollton Utilities response to the Commission Order, dated June 15, 2015, regarding case number 2015-00178 (Attachment A). Mr. Beyer indicated that the order had been emailed to Carrollton Utilities on June 15, 2015. However, neither Carrollton Utilities, nor the law office of James & Wells, P.S.C. had received a copy of the order, via email or otherwise, and neither were aware that a case (No. 2015-00178) had been established by the Commission. Following the conversation with Mr. Beyer, James & Wells received a copy of the Commission Order, via email, from Commission staff on July 20, 2015. James & Wells emailed a copy of the Commission Order to Carrollton Utilities that same day.

The Commission Order required, in part, the following:

- Carrollton shall submit to the Commission, within 20 days of the date of this Order, a written response to the allegations contained in the Investigation Report and the alleged regulatory violation as set forth in the findings above.
- Any requests for an informal conference with Commission Staff shall be set forth in writing and filed with the Commission within 20 days of the date of this Order.

Due to the fact Carrollton Utilities was unaware of the pending case and had not previously received a copy of the Investigation Report or the Order, it was unable to submit a written response addressing the allegations contained in the Investigation Report or request an informal conference with Commission Staff within the allotted 20 days of the date of the Order. Please accept this as our response to the Order dated June 15, 2015, received on July 20, 2015, regarding case number 2015-00178.

On July 27, Carrollton Utilities submitted a motion for an extension of time until August 10, 2015 to submit a written response and, if necessary, to request an informal conference. That motion was granted by the Commission through an Order dated July 30, 2015.

For its response to the Commission's Order and the Investigation Report, Carrollton Utilities states as follows:

On May 27, 2014 at approximately 14:05 hours, Carrollton Utilities was notified of an event that occurred at 1104 11th Street, Carrollton, Kentucky approximately five minutes prior involving a fire and report of an explosion. Carrollton Utilities responded to the notification and arrived on scene within ten minutes. Carrollton Fire Department was also dispatched and arrived on scene at approximately 14:12 hours. Carrollton Fire Department requested Carrollton

Utilities to shut off the natural gas flow to the house. At approximately 15:00 hours Carrollton Utilities made telephonic notification of the event to the National Response Center ("NRC") and the Commission.

Due to the structure fire at the meter set, including the meter valve, Carrollton Utilities was unable to shut off gas at the meter, but rather performed a squeeze-off on the service line approximately fifteen feet upstream of the meter set assembly.

As part of its emergency response and investigation, Carrollton Utilities conducted a leak survey of the area and performed odorant tests. Carrollton Utilities found no leaks and the odorant tests indicated the gas was sufficiently odorized to satisfy the requirements of 49 CFR 192.625.

On May 28, 2014 at approximately 08:15 hours, Commission Pipeline Safety investigators, Bill Aitken and Joel Grugin arrived on scene and witnessed Carrollton Utilities performing the pressure test on the service line to the house at 1104 11th Street. Mr. Aitken and Mr. Grugin also reviewed Carrollton Utilities previous pressure records and weekly odorant tests. It was determined that the operating pressure at the time of the incident was approximately 35 psig, well below the system Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure of 60 psig. Furthermore, their review of the odorant tests and records indicated that the gas was odorized to sufficient levels to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 192 – Odorization of gas. (Attachment B)

The Carrollton Fire Department and Carrollton Utilities conducted investigations to determine the cause and origin of the fire and explosion. The results of the Carrollton Fire Department investigation are included in its report (Attachment C) and, while the exact cause could not be determined, the origin was found to be in the basement of the structure. Within a

week of the event, Carrollton Utilities completed its investigation and determined that the fire did not involve a release of gas from a pipeline or other jurisdictional facility operated by Carrollton Utilities and was not reportable.

On July 28, 2014 Carrollton Utilities, due to a misinterpretation of the reporting requirements, submitted a Final Form PHMSA F7100.1: *Incident Report-Gas Distribution Systems* (Attachment D) to PHMSA and the Commission, even though Carrollton Utilities determined the event was not an incident as described in 49 CFR 191.3 and was classified as "non-reportable".

Due, in part, to the fact that Carrollton Utilities did not receive an inspection, investigation, or any other report from the Commission citing any probable violations or deficiencies, Carrollton Utilities believed it had complied with all necessary requirements and regulations regarding this event. There was no additional correspondence between the Commission and Carrollton Utilities regarding the event *for nearly eleven months.*

Carrollton Utilities, after discussions with other natural gas operators, recognized that the Final Form PHMSA F7100.1: *Incident Report-Gas Distribution Systems* ("Final Report") should not have been submitted to PHMSA or the Commission.

On June 15, 2015 Carrollton Utilities sent a letter (see Attachment E) to PHMSA and the Commission requesting that the Final Report be deleted from record and noted accordingly.

On July 20, 2015 Commission staff attorney Jonathon Beyer contacted the law office of James & Wells, P.S.C., Carrollton Utilities legal representation, inquiring about the status of Carrollton Utilities response to the Commission Order, dated June 15, 2015, regarding case number 2015-00178. Mr. Beyer indicated that the order had been emailed to Carrollton Utilities

on June 15, 2015. However, neither Carrollton Utilities, nor the law office of James & Wells, P.S.C. had received a copy of the order, via email or otherwise, and neither were aware that a case (No. 2015-00178) had been established by the Commission. Following the conversation with Mr. Beyer, James & Wells received a copy of the Commission Order, via email, from Commission staff on July 20, 2015. James & Wells emailed a copy of the Commission Order to Carrollton Utilities.

On July 27, Carrollton Utilities submitted a motion for an extension of time until August 10, 2015 to submit a written response and, if necessary, to request an informal conference. That motion was granted by the Commission through an Order dated July 30, 2015.

As described in its June 15, 2015 order, Case No. 2015-00178, the PSC alleges that "the explosion was reportable pursuant to 49 CFR 191.9(a)" and "Carrollton Utilities was therefore required to submit the requisite report ***within 30 days, which ran through June 26, 2014***." (emphasis added)

49 CFR 191.9(a) requires "each operator of a distribution pipeline system to submit Department of Transportation Form PHMSA F7100.1 as soon as practicable but not more than 30 days ***after detection of an incident*** (emphasis added) required to be reported under 191.5". Department of Transportation Form PHMSA F7100.1 is required only if an *incident* occurs and is due not more than 30 days after ***detection*** of an incident. Carrollton Utilities would have only been required to submit the report *if* it determined it was an *incident,* and would have had up to 30 days from that date of determination. However, based on its and the Carrollton Fire Departments investigations, Carrollton Utilities concluded that the event was not an incident.

Therefore, an incident was not "detected" and the Department of Transportation Form PHMSA F7100.1 did not have to be submitted by June 26, 2014.

Carrollton Utilities concluded that the event was not reportable because the origin of the fire and explosion was found to be in the basement of the structure and not on Carrollton Utilities jurisdictional pipeline facilities. Therefore, it is Carrollton Utilities position that this event does not meet the definition of "Incident" pursuant to 49 CFR 191.3, and did not require an incident report to be filed as required by 49 CFR 191.9.

In support of its position that the event that occurred on May 27, 2014 was not a reportable incident and Carrollton Utilities did not violate the requirements of 49 CFR 191.9(a), Carrollton Utilities offers the following:

Federal pipeline safety regulations and, more specifically, 49 CFR 191.3, define an incident as any of the following events:

(1) An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline, or of liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, refrigerant gas, or gas from an LNG facility, **and** (emphasis added) that results in one or more of the following consequences:

   i. A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization;

   ii. Estimated property damage of $50,000 or more, including loss to the operator and others, or both, but excluding cost of gas lost;

   iii. Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million cubic feet or more;

(2) An event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility. Activation of an emergency shutdown system for reasons other than an actual emergency does not constitute an incident.

(3) An event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it did not meet the criteria of paragraphs (1) or (2) of this definition.

To determine if this event meets the criteria of an incident it must meet the criteria of 49 CFR 191.3(1), (2), and/or (3).

191.3(1) is an *"event that involves a release of gas from a **pipeline*** (emphasis added) *and results in one or more of the following consequences:"* as described in 191.3(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). 49 CFR 192.3 includes the following definitions:

> *Pipeline* means all parts of those physical facilities through which gas moves in ***transportation*** *(emphasis added)*, including pipe, valves, and other appurtenance attached to pipe, compressor units, metering stations, regulator stations, delivery stations, holders, and fabricated assemblies
>
> *Transportation of gas* means the gathering, transmission, or distribution of gas by pipeline or the storage of gas, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
>
> *Service line* means a distribution line that ***transports*** *(emphasis added)*, gas from a common source of supply to an individual customer, to two adjacent or adjoining residential or small commercial customers, or to multiple residential or small commercial customers served through a meter header or manifold. ***A service line ends at the outlet of the customer meter*** *(emphasis added)* or at the connection to a customer's piping, whichever is further downstream, or at the connection to customer piping if there is no meter.

Customer meter means the meter that measures the ***transfer*** *(emphasis added)* of gas ***from an operator to a consumer*** *(emphasis added).*

Operator means a person who engages in the **transportation** (emphasis added) of gas.

By definition, because the meter was at the house, the service line ends at the outlet of the customer meter, whereby the "transfer of ownership" from the operator to the consumer occurs. At that point, the gas is no longer in "transportation" and any piping downstream of the outlet of the meter would be considered "customer piping". Customer piping is not subject to the federal pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR 191, 192, 198, 199) and Carrollton Utilities has no ownership, authority, or responsibility for such piping. The Carrollton Fire Department determined the origin of the fire and explosion was to have occurred in the basement of the structure, demonstrating that Carrollton Utilities ***pipeline*** was not involved with or a contributor to the initial fire and explosion. Because there was no release of gas "from a pipeline" this event does not meet the definition of an incident under 191.3(1). It is unnecessary to consider the consequences in (i), (ii), and (iii) because the definition of incident is an event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline **AND** results in one or more of the consequences. However, review of 191.3(1)(i), (ii), and (iii) further supports Carrollton Utilities position that this event was not an incident and is considered "non-reportable".

191.3(1)(i) A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization;

No death or personal injury necessitating in patient hospitalization occurred as a result of this event.

191.3(1)(ii) Estimated property damage of $50,000 or more, including loss to the operator and others, or both, but excluding cost of gas lost;

While significant damage (in excess of $50,000) to property occurred as a result of this event, it was not due to an incident on or involving Carrollton Utilities jurisdictional pipeline facilities. PHMSA's instructions for completing Form PHMSA F7100.1 (rev 10-2014): *Incident Report-Gas Distribution Systems* define a secondary ignition (also referred to as "Fire First") as a fire where the origin of the fire is unrelated to the gas systems ***subject to Parts 191 and 192*** (emphasis added). It goes on to state that "(a)n incident caused by secondary ignition is not to be reported unless a release of gas escaping ***from facilities subject to regulation under Parts 191 or 192*** *(emphasis added)* results in one or more of the consequences as described in 191.3 under "Incident" (1)". Guidance in the instructions also states that *"A gas distribution system incident attributed to secondary ignition is NOT to be reported to PHMSA* ***unless the damage to facilities subject to Parts 191 or 192*** *(emphasis added) equals or exceeds $50,000".*

As noted in the Carrollton Fire Department's report, the origin of the fire was in the basement of the structure and, therefore, unrelated to any Carrollton Utilities gas facilities that are subject to Parts 191 and 192. None of the consequences described in 191.3(1) resulted as a result of gas escaping from Carrollton Utilities facilities subject to regulation under Parts 191 or 192. Lastly, damage to Carrollton Utilities facilities subject to Parts 191 or 192 did not equal or exceed $50,000.

191.3(1)(iii) Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million cubic feet or more;

There was no unintentional gas loss of three million cubic feet or more as a result of this event.

191.3(2) is an *"event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility. Activation of an emergency shutdown system for reasons other than an actual emergency does not constitute an incident."*

The event does not meet the criteria of 191.3(s) because Carrollton Utilities does not operate and did activate an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility

191.3(3) is an *"event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it did not meet the criteria of paragraphs (1) or (2) of this definition."*

The event was not "significant in the judgment of the operator" because it did not involve and was not attributable to Carrollton Utilities natural gas pipeline facilities. The event did not involve a release of gas from Carrollton Utilities pipeline, result in damage to Carrollton Utilities facilities subject to Parts 191 or 192 equaling or exceeding $50,000, there were no deaths or injuries requiring in-patient hospitalization, or result in gas loss of three million cubic feet or more.

For the reasons stated above, it is Carrollton Utilities position that it did not fail to comply with 49 CFR 191.9(a) and should not be assessed any penalty under KRS 2778.992.

NOW THEREFORE, Carrollton Utilities requests that this case be dismissed, or, in the alternative, that the hearing date set for September 15, 2015 be suspended and that an informal conference be scheduled with the Commission Staff for the purposes of discussion and expediting resolution of this proceeding.

Respectfully Submitted,

Amy L. Gresole for
G. Edward James
Attorney for Carrollton Utilities
516 Highland Avenue, P.O. Box 373
Carrollton, Kentucky 41008
(502) 732-4777

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by regular U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon the following on this the 31st day of July, 2015:

Jeff R. Derouen
Executive Director
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Boulevard
P.O. Box 615
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615

By: Amy L. Gresole for
G. Edward James

ATTACHMENT A – KY PSC ORDER 2015-00178

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

CARROLLTON UTILITIES	)	
	)	
	)	CASE NO. 2015-00178
ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 49 CFR § 191.9(a)	)	

ORDER

On June 15, 2015, the Commission issued an Order directing Carrollton Utilities ("Carrollton") to tender a written response to the allegation that it should be subject to penalties for violation of 49 CFR § 191.9(a). The Commission directed Carrollton to submit a response within 20 days of the date of the Order.

On July 27, 2015, Carrollton, through counsel, submitted a motion for an extension of time until August 10, 2015, to submit a written response and, if necessary, to request an informal conference. In support, Carrollton asserts that the Commission's June 15, 2015 Order was never received. Carrollton tendered affidavits from its general manager Bill Osborne and safety director Tim Pearson attesting that they did not receive copies of the Order.

The Commission, finding that Carrollton has demonstrated good cause to grant an extension of time within which to file its response to the Commission's June 15, 2015 Order and, if necessary, to request an informal conference HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. Carrollton's motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Commission's June 15, 2015 Order and request an informal conference is granted.

2. Carrollton shall submit to the Commission a written response to the allegations contained in the Investigation Report and the alleged regulatory violations as set forth in the Commission's June 15, 2015 Order no later than August 10, 2015.

3. Any requests for an informal conference with Commission Staff shall be set forth in writing and filed with the Commission no later than August 10, 2015.

By the Commission

ENTERED

JUL 30 2015

KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

ATTEST:

Executive Director

*Carrollton Utilities
225 6th Street
P. O. Box 269
Carrollton, KY 41008

*G. Edward James
516 Highland Avenue
P.O. Box 373
Carrollton, KENTUCKY 41008

*Bill Osborne
General Manager
Carrollton Utilities
225 6th Street
P. O. Box 269
Carrollton, KY 41008

ATTACHMENT B – KY PSC INCIDENT REPORT

Kentucky Public Service Commission

Engineering-Gas Pipeline Safety Branch Incident Report

Utility/Operator: City of Carrollton Gas District System
PHMSA Operator ID: 2116
225 6th Street
Carrollton, KY 41008

Utility/Operator Type: Municipal Gas Operator

Reported By: Tim Pearson, Safety Officer / Compliance

Incident Occurred: Approximately 14:00 PM (ET), May 27, 2014

Gas Operator Notified: Approximately 14:05 PM (ET), May 27, 2014

PSC Notified: Approximately 15:00 PM (ET), May 27, 2014, by phone call to the KYPSC office

30 Day Report Received: July 28, 2014 (PHMSA Original Report Date)

PSC On-Site Investigation: May 28, 2014

Incident Description:

This incident occurred at 1104 11th Street in Carrollton, Carroll County, Kentucky, at approximately 14:00 hours (Eastern Time) on May 27, 2014. An explosion occurred initially subsequently followed by a fire which destroyed the residence. There were no injuries to occupants of the home that required inpatient hospitalization. (See Attachment B.)

Response to Incident:

Carrollton Utilities
Carrollton Utilities personnel arrived on scene at approximately 14:15 hours. Carrollton fire incident commander Mike Terrell requested that the gas service be shut off to the residence. The area immediately around the meter set assembly was engulfed by the structure fire denying access to the meter valve. Utility personnel then went approximately 15 feet prior to the meter set assembly and excavated a hole and squeezed the flow of gas off there.
Utility personnel then conducted a gas leakage survey of the area around the incident site to determine if any gas leakage was present. No gas leaks were detected.
Refer to Attachment B.

Incident Investigation:

Gas Pipeline Safety Branch staff ("Staff"), Joel Grugin and Bill Aitken, arrived at the incident scene on May 28 at approximately 08:15 hours.

Pipeline pressure charts, produced by the operator, were reviewed by Staff and the charts indicated that, at the time of the incident, the operating pressure of the distribution system was approximately 35 psig, below the system Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure ("MAOP") of 60 psig. The PHMSA Incident report showed that the MAOP of the system was 90 psig, this is incorrect, 60 psig is the correct MAOP, 90 was entered in error. Tim Pearson confirmed this by phone.

Records of weekly odor tests conducted by the operator prior to the incident and subsequent tests conducted by the operator immediately after the incident were reviewed by Staff and indicated that the gas was odorized to sufficient levels meeting requirements of 49 CFR 192.625.

Examination of the gas meter and service regulator could not be performed by Staff due to the fact that they were destroyed as a result of the incident.

Operator personnel disconnected the service line at the gas main so that a pressure drop test could be applied from that point to the meter valve. The above ground portion of the service line riser and meter valve had apparently been subjected to extreme heat for a period of time during the fire. The Regulator had partially melted, therefore, operator personnel removed it and installed a plug on the outlet side of the valve. The first pressure drop test showed a small leak. Operator personnel determined the plastic pipe inside the metal riser assembly melted due to the heat exposure to the riser assembly during the fire.(The leakage was found by the operator personnel in the riser assembly, which was located outside the structure and above ground)
The riser assembly was then dug up and cut out by the operator personnel; a cap was then installed on the service line just prior to the riser where the service line had not been exposed to extreme heat. A second pressure test was performed by the operator personnel and no leakage was found.

Findings:

The Carrollton fire department report, see _Attachment A, stated that the cause was undetermined due to the structure not being safe to enter. The Carrollton fire department report also stated that a bulge in the floor of the structure indicated that the origin of the explosion occurred in the basement. Staff contacted fire chief Terrell by phone a few weeks after the incident and he revealed that the insurance company holding the policy on the structure had decided not to perform any further investigation of this incident. The house has since been demolished and construction began on a new one
Staff found that the operator failed to submit Department of Transportation Form RSPA F 7100.1: Incident Report Form within 30 days after its detection of the incident per pipeline safety regulation 49 CFR 191.9(a). Staff found no other probable violations of Federal pipeline safety regulations.

Attachments:

A. Carrollton fire department report.
B. PHMSA Incident Report – Gas Distribution System

Investigated By:	Name:	Agency/Title:
	Joel Grugin	KPSC / Investigator III
	Bill Aitken	KPSC/ Investigator IV

Signed: Joel Grugin Date: 3/9/15

Signed: Bill Aitken Date: 3/9/15

ATTACHMENT C – CARROLLTON FIRE DEPT. REPORT

NFIRS - 1 Basic

A

FDID	State	Incident Date (MM DD YYYY)	Station	Incident Number	Exposure
21099	KY	05/27/2014		1400042	1

B Location

1 - Street addred

Address Type	Census Tract	Number/Airport	Prefix	Street or Highway	Street Type	Suffix
		1104		11th	Street	

Apt./Suite/Room	City	State	Zip Code
	Carrollton	KY	41008

Cross street or directions, as applicable: Winslow

C Incident Type

111 - Building fires

D Aid Given or Received

Their FDID	Their State	Their Incident Number

1 - Mutual aid received

E1 Dates & Times (Midnight is 0000)

	Month	Day	Year	Hour	Min	Seconds
Alarm	05/27/2014			14:08:54		
Arrival	05/27/2014			14:12:20		
Controlled	05/27/2014			16:56:32		
Last Unit Cleared	05/27/2014			19:22:02		

E2 Shifts & Alarms

Shift or Platoon	Alarms	District

E3 Special Studies

Special Study ID	Special Study Value

F Actions Taken

81 - Incident command
41 - Identify, analyze hazardous materials
11 - Extinguish

Actions Taken

G1 Resources

[N] Check this box and skip this section if no Apparatus or Personnel were used

	Apparatus	Personnel
Suppression	3	15
EMS	0	0
Other	2	4

[N] Check box if resource counts include aid received resources

G2 Estimated Dollar Losses & Values

LOSSES Required for all fires. Optional for other types.

Property	$	150000
Contents	$	70000

PRE-INCIDENT VALUE: Optional

Property	$	150000
Contents	$	70000

H1 Casualties

	Deaths	Injuries
Fire Service	0	0
Civilian	0	0

H2 Detector: U - Unknown

H3 Hazardous Materials Release: 1 - Natural gas: slow leak, no evac.

I Mixed Use Property:

J Property Use: 419 - 1 or 2 family dwelling

K1 Person/Entity Involved

Mr., Mrs., Miss	First Name	MI	Last Name	Suffix
	Travis		Noble	

Number	Prefix	Street or Highway	Street Type	Suffix
1104		11th	Street	

Post Office Box	Apt./Suite/Room	City
		Carrollton

State	Zip Code	Business name (if applicable)	Area Code	Phone Number
KY	41008			

K2 Owner

Mr., Mrs., Miss	First Name	MI	Last Name	Suffix
	Travis		Noble	

Number	Prefix	Street or Highway	Street Type	Suffix
1104		11th	Street	

Post Office Box	Apt./Suite/Room	City
		Carrollton

State	Zip Code	Business name (if applicable)	Area Code	Phone Number
KY	41008			

NFIRS-2 Fire

A

FDID	State	Incident Date (MM DD YYYY)	Station	Incident Number	Exposure
21099	KY	05/27/2014		1400042	1

B Property Details

B1 (Estimated number of residential living units in building of origin): 1 — N (Not Residential)

B2 (Number of buildings involved): 0

B3 (Acres burned (outside fires)):

C On-Site Materials or Products

UUU - Undetermined

N - None

D Ignition

D1 (Area of fire origin): 62 - Heating room or area, w

D2 (Heat source): UU - Undetermined

D3 (Item first ignited): UU - Undetermined

D4 (Type of material first ignited): UU - Undetermined

(Confined to object of origin):

E1 Cause of Ignition

0 - Cause, other (conversion and

E2 Factors Contributing To Ignition

71 - Exposure fire

E3 Human Factors Contributing To Ignition

Estimated age of person involved:

Gender of person involved:

F1 Equipment Involved In Ignition

NNN - None

(Brand):

(Model):

(Serial #):

Year:

F2 Equipment Power

(Equipment power source):

F3 Equipment Portability

(Equipment portability):

G Fire Suppression Factors

112 - Roof collapse
341 - Natural or other lighter than air gas present
131 - Wall collapse

H1 Mobile Property Involved

N - None

(Mobile property involved):

H2 Mobile Property Type & Make

(Mobile property type):

(Mobile property make):

(Mobile property model):

Year:

(License plate number):

State:

(VIN number):

Local Use

A

FDID	State	Incident Date (MM DD YYYY)	Station	Incident Number	Exposure	NFIRS-3
21099	KY	05/27/2014		1400042	1	Structure Fire

I1 Structure Type: 1 - Enclosed building

I2 Building Status: 2 - In normal use

I3 Building Height: 1 (Total number of stories at or above grade); 1 (Total number of stories below grade)

I4 Main Floor Size: 1500 (Total square feet)

OR

(Length in feet) BY (Width in feet)

J1 Fire Origin: 1 (Story of fire origin)

J2 Fire Spread: 4 - Confined to buil

J3 Number of Stories Damaged By Flame:

0	Number of stories w/ minor damage (1 to 24% flame damage)
0	Number of stories w/ significant damage (25 to 49% flame damage)
0	Number of stories w/ heavy damage (50 to 74% flame damage)
2	Number of stories w/ extreme damage (75 to 100% flame damage)

K Material Contributing Most To Flame Spread:

K1: 64 - Flammable liquid/gas in c (Item contributing most to flame spread)

K2: 11 - Natural gas (Type of material item contributing most to flame spread)

L1 Presence of Detectors: 1 - Detectors Present

L2 Detector Type: 1 - Smoke

L3 Detector Power Supply: 1 - Battery Only

L4 Detector Operation: U - Undetermined

L5 Detector Effectiveness:

L6 Detector Failure Reason:

M1 Presence of Automatic Extinguishment System: N - None Present

M2 Type of Automatic Extinguishment System:

M3 Automatic Extinguishment System Operation:

M4 Number of Sprinkler Heads Operating:

M5 Automatic Extinguishment System Failure Reason:

A | 21099 | KY | 05/27/2014 | | 1400042 | 1 | NFIRS Remarks

Remarks

CFD was Dispatched to 1104 11th Street in Carrollton, Ky. in reference to house collapse/explosion and fire. A Carroll County EMS crew was returining from a transport and witnessed the explosion and notified dispatch. Upon arrival of unit 200 the entire northern half of the house was leveled, fire was blowing out back (west) or C side of the home you could hear the natural gas flowing but could not access the meter and valve due to the heat and fire coming from the basement of the home. The home owner advised everyone was out at this time. E-205 caught the hydrant as they arrived on scene and laid a 5" supply line and began deploying attack lines. Unit 250 requested Carrollton Utilities to assist in shutting of the gas feed. Heavy black smoke was filling the entire scene at this time. First attack line was to the gas meter area in the back of the house. the second line was to the home on the D side to protect that exposure. 3" supply lines and ground monitors were set up on both sides of the structure and a 2 1/2" handline was established at the front of the house. All units were advised to use care and until the gas feed was shut down. Unit 250 requested Kentucky Utilities to assist is shutting down electrical lines coming to the scene. He also requested Ghent Fire Protection Dist. for assistance in fire control and manpower. Advised to have them come in from Tilley Dr. and access the C side of the structure. Once the gas was shut off 250 requested dispatch to contact the State Fire Marshalls Office to send a representative to this scene. R. Allen arrived shortly after we had the scene under control and we began trying to put out the hot spots and determine the cause of the fire and explosion. Utilities assisted with their backhoe in removing debris and exposing the floor which showed a bulge in the center and the corners indicating the origin was in the basement. The structure is too unstable to make entry into the basement at this time and conduct a thorough investigation. We questioned the home owner as to what he saw, heard, etc. just before the incident and as to waht was in the basement of the home. He advised the furnace, hot water heater, and a fire place in the basement were all supplied by natural gas. He also stated he had been working on his water softener in the basement earlier in the day and had shut off the city water supply to the house and bleed off the pressure in preperation of making repairs. When asked, he advised that he didn't smell any odors or notice any other problems prior to the incident. His mother, who was sitting on the front porch at the time of the explosion stated that she did not smell or notice anything unusual prior to this either. The cause of this is still undetermined due to structure not being safe to enter the basement and check these sources. CFD will work with the insurance company and their investigators and determine if they want start to demo the home, to the point of making it safe enough to enter and determine the actual point of origin and the actual cause. There is no suspicion of any illegal acts or improper storage of materials contribuiting to this incident at this time.

Also the home to the North (D Side of Fire Structure) received minor damage to some of its vinyl siding and craked a couple of windows due to the heat exposure but it did not receive any fire damage. The Clark's who own the other house were not at home at the time of this incident.

M Authorization

Officer in charge ID	Signature	Position or rank	Assignment	Month	Day	Year
250	Michael Terrell	Chief	Command	05/28/2014		

Member making report ID	Signature	Position or rank	Assignment	Month	Day	Year
250	Michael Terrell	Chief	Command	05/28/2014		

ATTACHMENT D – CARROLLTON UTILITIES LETTER TO PHMSA AND THE COMMISSION

CARROLLTON UTILITIES
P.O. BOX 269
CARROLLTON, KENTUCKY 41008
PHONE: 502-732-7055
FAX: 502-732-7058

June 15, 2015

Information Resources Manager, PHP-10
Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
U.S Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, D.C. 20590-0001

RE: **Fire at 1104 Eleventh Street**
Carrollton, Carroll County, Kentucky
Date of Incident: May 27, 2014
NCR Number: 20140060-16033

To Whom It May Concern:

The above referenced incident was communicated to DOT and PSC on May 27, 2014 by Carrollton Utilities. At the time the incident occurred Carrollton Utilities could not immediately determine the origin of the fire so we promptly notified DOT and the PSC.

Within a week of the incident, Carrollton Utilities completed our investigation and determined that this fire did not involve a release of gas from a pipeline or other jurisdictional facility operated by Carrollton Utilities. Carrollton Utilities concluded that the incident was not reportable and should not have filed a Final Report.

Through a misinterpretation of the reporting requirements Carrollton Utilities thought a Final Report was required even though the incident was not reportable. Moreover, Carrollton Utilities thought the local fire chief's report was required to complete the Final Report. Carrollton Utilities waited on the fire chief's report and filed a Final Report in July 2014.

Carrollton Utilities apologizes for any confusion caused by mistaking filing the Final Report and requests that the Final Report be deleted from recorded or noted accordingly. Carrollton Utilities will correct the reporting procedures in the future to avoid confusion and maintain

compliance with applicable requirements. Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (502) 732-1215.

Sincerely,

Carrollton Utilities

By:_____

Bill R. Osborne, P.E.
General Manager

cc: Mr. Jason Hunt
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Blvd.
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602

ATTACHMENT E – CARROLLTON UTILITIES FORM PHMSA F7100.1

NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.

OMB NO: 3137-0522
EXPIRATION DATE: 02/28/2014

U.S Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Original Report Date:	07/28/2014
No.	20140060- 15893
	(DOT Use Only)

INCIDENT REPORT - GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.

INSTRUCTIONS

Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline

PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION

Report Type: *(select all that apply)*	Original: Yes	Supplemental:	Final:
Last Revision Date			

1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID):	2118
2. Name of Operator	CARROLLTON GAS DISTRICT SYSTEM, CITY OF
3. Address of Operator:	
3a. Street Address	225 5TH STREET
3b. City	CARROLLTON
3c. State	Kentucky
3d. Zip Code	41008
4. Local time *(24-hr clock)* and date of the incident:	05/27/2014 14:00
5. Location of incident:	
5a. Street Address or location description	1104 11th Street
5b. City	Carrollton
5c. County or Parish	Carroll
5d. State:	Kentucky
5e. Zip Code:	41008
5f. Latitude:	38.6808958
Longitude:	-85.1793978
6. National Response Center Report Number:	
7. Local time *(24-hr clock)* and date of initial telephonic report to the National Response Center:	
8. Incident resulted from:	Unintentional release of gas
9. Gas released:	Natural Gas
- Other Gas Released Name:	
10. Estimated volume of gas released - Thousand Cubic Feet (MCF):	13.00
11. Were there fatalities?	No
- If Yes, specify the number in each category:	
11a. Operator employees	
11b. Contractor employees working for the Operator	
11c. Non-Operator emergency responders	
11d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with the Operator	
11e. General public	
11f. Total fatalities (sum of above)	
12. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization?	No
- If Yes, specify the number in each category:	
12a. Operator employees	
12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator	
12c. Non-Operator emergency responders	
12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with the Operator	
12e. General public	
12f. Total injuries (sum of above)	
13. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident?	No
- If No, Explain:	3/4" plastic service line was squeezed off initially and abandoned

	this morning.
- If Yes, complete Questions 13a and 13b: *(use local time, 24-hr clock)*	
13a. Local time and date of shutdown:	
13b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:	
- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)	
14. Did the gas ignite?	Yes
15. Did the gas explode?	Yes
16. Number of general public evacuated:	4
17. Time sequence *(use local time, 24-hour clock)*:	
17a. Local time operator identified incident:	05/27/2014 14:05
17b. Local time operator resources arrived on site:	05/27/2014 14:15

PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION

1. Was the incident on Federal land?	No
2. Location of incident	Private property
3. Area of incident:	Aboveground
Specify:	Other
If Other, Describe:	House
Depth of Cover:	
4. Did incident occur in a crossing?	No
- If Yes, specify type below:	
- If Bridge crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased:	
- If Railroad crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Road crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Water crossing –	
Cased/ Uncased	
Name of body of water (if commonly known):	
Approx. water depth (ft):	

PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION

1. Indicate the type of pipeline system:	Natural Gas Distribution, municipality owned
- If Other, specify:	
2. Part of system involved in incident:	Service Riser
- If Other, specify:	
2a. Year "Part of system involved in incident" was installed:	1976
Unknown?	
3. When "Main" or "Service" is selected as the "Part of system involved in incident" (from PART C, Question 2), provide the following:	
3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):	
3b. Pipe specification (e.g., API 5L, ASTM D2513):	
Unknown?	
3c. Pipe manufacturer:	
Unknown?	
3d. Year of manufacture:	
Unknown?	
4. Material involved in incident:	Steel
- If Other, specify:	
4a. If Steel, Specify seam type:	
None/Unknown?	Unknown
4b. If Steel, Specify wall thickness (inches):	
Unknown?	Yes
4c. If Plastic, Specify type:	
- If Other, describe:	
4d. If Plastic, Specify Standard Dimension Ratio (SDR):	
Or wall thickness,	
Unknown?	
4e. If Polyethylene (PE) is selected as the type of plastic in Part C, Question 4.c:	
- Specify PE Pipe Material Designation Code (i.e. 2406, 3408, etc.)	
Unknown?	
5. Type of release involved :	Other
- If Mechanical Puncture - Specify Approx size:	
Approx. size: in. (axial):	
in. (circumferential):	
- If Leak - Select Type:	

- If Other, Describe:	
- If Rupture - Select Orientation:	
- If Other, Describe:	
Approx. size: (widest opening):	
(length circumferentially or axially):	
- If Other - Describe:	Service Riser, Meter and Regulator was damaged due to a house exploding on 1104 11th street. When the block wall collapsed it fell on the meter, regulator, damaging it and knocking it loose from the service riser causing the gas releasing to ignite due to the house/structure already being on fire.

PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION

1. Class Location of Incident:	Class 1 Location
2. Estimated Property Damage:	
2a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property damage	$ 95,000
2b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs	$ 0
2c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response	$ 500
2d. Estimated other costs	$ 0
- Describe:	
2e. Total estimated property damage (sum of above)	$ 95,500
Cost of Gas Released	
2f. Estimated cost of gas released	$ 84
3. Estimated number of customers out of service:	
3a. Commercial entities	0
3b. Industrial entities	0
3c. Residences	1

PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION

1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the incident (psig):	35.00
2. Normal operating pressure at the point and time of the incident (psig):	35.00
3. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and time of the incident (psig):	60.00
4. Describe the pressure on the system relating to the incident:	Pressure did not exceed MAOP
5. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the incident?	No
- If Yes:	
5a. Was it operating at the time of the incident?	
5b. Was it fully functional at the time of the incident?	
5c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the detection of the incident?	
5d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the incident?	
6. How was the incident initially identified for the Operator?	Notification from Emergency Responder
6a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel, including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Ground Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 6, specify the following:	
- If Other, Specify:	
7. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the incident?	No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the incident
- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: *(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)*	
- If Yes, Specify investigation result(s) *(select all that apply)*:	
- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue	
- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue	
- Provide an explanation for why not:	
- Investigation identified no control room issues	
- Investigation identified no controller issues	
- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or controller error	

- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response	
- Investigation identified incorrect procedures	
- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation	
- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response	
- Investigation identified areas other than those above	
Describe:	

PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION

1. As a result of this incident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	No
- If Yes:	
1a. Specify how many were tested:	
1b. Specify how many failed.	
2. As a result of this incident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	No
- If Yes:	
2a. Specify how many were tested.	
2b. Specify how many failed:	

PART G - CAUSE INFORMATION

Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the Apparent Cause of the incident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the incident in the narrative (PART H)

Apparent Cause:	G8 - Other Incident Cause
G1 - Corrosion Failure – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column.	
Corrosion Failure Sub-Cause:	
- If External Corrosion:	
1. Results of visual examination:	
- If Other, Specify:	
2. Type of corrosion:	
- Galvanic	
- Atmospheric	
- Stray Current	
- Microbiological	
- Selective Seam	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following:	
- Field examination	
- Determined by metallurgical analysis	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?	
- If Yes:	
4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at the time of the incident?	
- If Yes, Year protection started:	
4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the point of the incident?	
4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the incident?	
If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
- If No:	
4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?	
5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion?	
6. Pipeline coating type, if steel pipe is involved:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Internal Corrosion:	

7. Results of visual examination:	
- If Other, Describe:	
8. Cause of corrosion *(select all that apply)*:	
- Corrosive Commodity	
- Water drop-out/Acid	
- Microbiological	
- Erosion	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
9. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 8 is based on the following: *(select all that apply)*:	
- Field examination	
- Determined by metallurgical analysis	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
10. Location of corrosion *(select all that apply)*:	
- Low point in pipe	
- Elbow	
- Drop-out	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
11. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitor or biocides?	
12. Were any liquids found in the distribution system where the incident occurred?	
Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Part of system involved in incident" (from PART C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
13. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted	
14. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure	
G2 – Natural Force Damage – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column	
Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:	
1. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Heavy Rains/Floods:	
2. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Lightning:	
3. Specify:	
- If Temperature:	
4. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If High Winds:	
- Other Natural Force Damage:	
5. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.	
6. Were the natural forces causing the incident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event?	
6.a If Yes, specify *(select all that apply)*:	
- Hurricane	
- Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
G3 – Excavation Damage – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column	
Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):	
- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):	

- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:	
- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:	
Complete the following ONLY IF the "Part of system involved in incident" (from Part C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
1. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted	
2. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure:	
Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected.	
3. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?	
3a. If Yes, Notification received from: *(select all that apply)*:	
- One-Call System	
- Excavator	
- Contractor	
- Landowner	
Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.	
4. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-DIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?	
5. Right-of-Way where event occurred *(select all that apply)*:	
- Public	
- If Public, Specify:	
- Private	
- If Private, Specify:	
- Pipeline Property/Easement	
- Power/Transmission Line	
- Railroad	
- Dedicated Public Utility Easement	
- Federal Land	
- Data not collected	
- Unknown/Other	
6. Type of excavator :	
7. Type of excavation equipment :	
8. Type of work performed :	
9. Was the One-Call Center notified?	
9a. If Yes, specify ticket number:	
9b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:	
10. Type of Locator:	
11. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?	
12. Were facilities marked correctly?	
13. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?	
13a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption:	
14. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause *(select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well)*:	
- Root Cause Description:	
- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
- If Other/None of the Above (explain), specify:	
G4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Other Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:	
- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:	
1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:	
- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost Their Moorings:	
2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:	

- Hurricane	
- Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Heavy Rains/Flood	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:	
- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:	
- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:	
Complete the following ONLY IF the "Part of system involved in incident" (from Part C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
3. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted:	
4. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure (psig):	
- If Intentional Damage:	
5. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Other Outside Force Damage:	
6. Describe:	
G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld – Sub-Cause:	
- If Body of Pipe:	
1. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Butt Weld:	
2. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Fillet Weld:	
3. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Pipe Seam:	
4. Specify:	
- If Other, Describe:	
- If Threaded Metallic Pipe:	
- If Mechanical Fitting:	
5. Specify the mechanical fitting involved:	
- If Other, Describe:	
6. Specify the type of mechanical fitting:	
- If Other, Describe:	
7. Manufacturer:	
8. Year manufactured:	
9. Year installed:	
10. Other attributes:	
11. Specify the two materials being joined:	
11a. First material being joined:	
- Steel	
- Cast/Wrought Iron	
- Ductile Iron	
- Copper	
- Plastic	
- Unknown	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
11b. If Plastic, specify:	
- If Other Plastic, specify:	
11c. Second material being joined:	
- Steel	

- Cast/Wrought Iron	
- Ductile Iron	
- Copper	
- Plastic	
- Unknown	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
11d. If Plastic, specify:	
- If Other Plastic, Specify:	
12. If used on plastic pipe, did the fitting – as designed by the manufacturer – include restraint?	
12a. If Yes, specify:	
- If Compression Fitting:	
13. Fitting type:	
14. Manufacturer:	
15. Year manufactured:	
16. Year installed:	
17. Other attributes:	
18. Specify the two materials being joined:	
18a. First material being joined:	
- Steel	
- Cast/Wrought Iron	
- Ductile Iron	
- Copper	
- Plastic	
- Unknown	
- Other	
- If Other, specify:	
18b. If Plastic, specify:	
- If Other Plastic, specify:	
18c. Second material being joined:	
- Steel	
- Cast/Wrought Iron	
- Ductile Iron	
- Copper	
- Plastic	
- Unknown	
- Other	
If Other, specify:	
18d. If Plastic, specify	
- Other Plastic, specify:	
- If Fusion Joint:	
19. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
20. Year installed:	
21. Other attributes:	
22. Specify the two materials being joined:	
22a. First material being joined:	
- If Other, Specify:	
22b. Second material being joined:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Other Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure:	
23. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure sub-cause is selected.	
24. Additional Factors (*select all that apply*):	
- Dent	
- Gouge	
- Pipe Bend	
- Arc Burn	
- Crack	
- Lack of Fusion	
- Lamination	
- Buckle	
- Wrinkle	
- Misalignment	
- Burnt Steel	
- Other	

25. Was the incident a result of:	
- Construction defect	
Specify:	
- Material defect	
Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- Design defect	
- Previous damage	
26. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure:	
G6 - Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause:	
- If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment:	
1. Specify:	
- Control Valve	
- Instrumentation	
- SCADA	
- Communications	
- Block Valve	
- Check Valve	
- Relief Valve	
- Power Failure	
- Stopple/Control Fitting	
- Pressure Regulator	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Threaded Connection Failure:	
2. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Non-Threaded Connection Failure:	
3. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Valve:	
4. Specify:	
- If Other, Specify:	
4a. Valve type:	
4b. Manufactured by:	
4c. Year manufactured:	
- If Other Equipment Failure:	
5. Describe:	
G7 - Incorrect Operation - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Incorrect Operation Sub-Cause:	
- If Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor NOT Related to Excavation and NOT due to Motorized Vehicle/Equipment Damage:	
- If Valve Left or Placed in Wrong Position, but NOT Resulting in an Overpressure:	
- If Pipeline or Equipment Overpressured:	
- If Equipment Not Installed Properly:	
- If Wrong Equipment Specified or Installed:	
- If "Other Incorrect Operation:	
1. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Incorrect Operation sub-cause is selected.	
2. Was this incident related to: (select all that apply)	
- Inadequate procedure	
- No procedure established	
- Failure to follow procedure	

- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
3. What category type was the activity that caused the incident:	
4. Was the task(s) that led to the incident identified as a covered task in your Operator Qualification Program?	
4a. If Yes, were the individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s)?	

G8 - Other Incident Cause - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Other Incident Cause – Sub-Cause:	Unknown
- If Miscellaneous:	
1. Describe:	
- If Unknown:	
2. Specify:	Investigation complete, cause of incident unknown

PART H - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

On May 27th, at approximately 2:00 pm, CU personnel were dispatched to a possible house explosion at 1104 11th street, Carrollton Ky. CU staff personnel responded 10 minutes later. The Incident Commander, Carrollton Fire Chief Mike Terrell advised he would like to have the gas shut off to the house. CU personnel could not get to the meter due to the fire on the structure. Therefore, the service line was located about 15 feet from the house, excavated, and squeezed off. The cause of the explosion was not determined. Odorant tests were performed on the day of the incident at the adjacent residents and found to be in compliance. A pressure test was performed on the service line the following day. The test was observed by Kentucky Public Service Commission staff. The pressure test passed. The distribution system pressure recording chart showed no abnormalities. The Fire Chief¿s final report was not able to determine the cause of the explosion.

PART I - PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Preparer's Name	Timothy Pearson
Preparer's Title	Safety Officer Compliance
Preparer's Telephone Number	502-525-0441
Preparer's E-mail Address	tpearson@carrolltonutilities.com
Preparer's Facsimile Number	502-732-7050
Authorized Signature	
Authorize Signature's Name	Bill Osborne
Authorized Signature's Title	General Manager
Authorized Signature Telephone Number	502-732-1215
Authorized Signature's Email Address	bosborne@carrolltonutilities.com
Date	07/10/2014

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