

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

APPLICATION OF DUKE ENERGY KENTUCKY,)	
INC. FOR APPROVAL TO TRANSFER)	
FUNCTIONAL CONTROL OF ITS)	
TRANSMISSION ASSETS FROM THE)	CASE NO.
MIDWEST INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION)	2010-00203
SYSTEM OPERATOR TO THE PJM)	
INTERCONNECTION REGIONAL)	
TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION AND)	
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED TREATMENT)	

O R D E R

On May 20, 2010, Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc. ("Duke Kentucky") filed an application for authority to transfer functional control of its transmission facilities from the Midwest Independent System Transmission Operator ("Midwest ISO") to the PJM Interconnection Regional Transmission Organization ("PJM"). The Midwest ISO and PJM, both of which are Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), requested and were granted full intervention in this case.

By Order dated June 24, 2010, a procedural schedule was established for this case which included: (1) the filing of testimony by Duke Kentucky in support of its application; (2) two rounds of discovery on Duke Kentucky; (3) an opportunity for intervenors to file testimony; (4) one round of discovery on intervenors; (5) a formal hearing; and (6) the filing of post-hearing briefs. Neither the Midwest ISO nor PJM filed intervenor testimony. A public hearing was held on November 3, 2010 and all parties filed post-hearing briefs. The matter now stands submitted for decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Duke Kentucky's request falls within the Commission's jurisdiction under KRS 278.218, which governs a change in ownership or control of assets of an electric utility where those assets have an original book value of \$1,000,000 or more. That statute provides, in part, that "[t]he commission shall grant its approval if the transaction is for a proper purpose and is consistent with the public interest."¹ While the statute does not define "public interest," the Commission has, in the context of a transfer of a utility, interpreted the "public interest" as follows:

[A]ny party seeking approval of a transfer of control must show that the proposed transfer will not adversely affect the existing level of utility service or rates or that any potentially adverse effects can be avoided through the Commission's imposition of reasonable conditions on the acquiring party. The acquiring party should also demonstrate that the proposed transfer is likely to benefit the public through improved service quality, enhanced service reliability, the availability of additional services, lower rates or a reduction in utility expenses to provide present services. Such benefits, however, need not be immediate or readily quantifiable.²

While the application in this case involves the transfer of functional control of utility assets, rather than a transfer of ownership of a utility, the same criteria applies in determining whether the proposed transfer satisfies the "public interest" standard.³

¹ KRS 278.218(2).

² Case No. 2002-00018, Application for Approval of the Transfer of Control of Kentucky-American Water Company to RWE Aktiengesellschaft and Thames Water Aqua Holdings GmbH, at 7 (Ky. PSC May 30, 2002).

³ Case No. 2002-00475, Application of Kentucky Power Company d/b/a American Electric Power, for Approval, to the Extent Necessary, to Transfer Functional Control of Transmission Facilities Located in Kentucky to PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. Pursuant to KRS 278.218 (Ky. PSC Aug. 25, 2003).

Duke Kentucky's Application

Duke Kentucky's proposed move from the Midwest ISO to PJM is directly tied to the move of its parent, Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. ("Duke Ohio"), from the Midwest ISO to PJM. Nearly all of the transmission facilities used to serve Duke Kentucky's customers are owned by Duke Ohio. The only transmission assets owned by Duke Kentucky are 18 138 kV high-side connections, including breakers and switches, to the Duke Ohio transmission system. Duke Kentucky states that, since it is not interconnected to any other utility in the Midwest ISO, realignment with PJM will keep outage coordination and related functions of these 18 connections under the functional control of a single transmission operator. That operator, PJM, will also control the Duke Ohio transmission system to which Duke Kentucky's facilities are connected.

With its interconnectivity to the Duke Ohio system and its effective status as a transmission dependent utility, Duke Kentucky states that it is in the public interest for it to make the same move, from the Midwest ISO to PJM, as Duke Ohio. That move will permit Duke Kentucky to participate fully in PJM markets and avoid potential inefficiencies, operational complexities, and additional costs that would result from creating a Midwest ISO/PJM seam that would affect Duke Kentucky's generation as well as its load.⁴

Prior to transferring its transmission assets to PJM, Duke Kentucky is required to obtain the approval of this Commission, as well as that of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Duke Kentucky filed a joint application with Duke

⁴ Duke Kentucky's application, at 15.

Ohio for FERC approval of their realignment with PJM, and FERC has granted that approval.⁵

Duke Kentucky's application cites various benefits to Duke Ohio of the proposed realignment, including lower RTO administration fees, a portion of which are allocated to Duke Kentucky, and aligning co-owners of Duke Ohio's jointly owned generating units into a single RTO for future investment planning and improved efficiencies in Ohio's competitive wholesale and retail power supply markets. Duke Kentucky's application points out that, even if it does not move from the Midwest ISO to PJM, once Duke Ohio moves to PJM, all of Duke Kentucky's generation, which is located in Ohio and Kentucky, will be in PJM, since it is dependent on the Duke Ohio transmission system. Unless Duke Kentucky also moves to PJM, the Duke Kentucky generation will be in PJM but the load will be in the Midwest ISO, creating potential inefficiencies and additional, unnecessary costs.⁶

Duke Kentucky states that PJM's capacity market should facilitate off-system sales and that the three-year forward-looking nature of the PJM market should provide a greater degree of certainty with regard to future capacity prices. Duke Kentucky also states that its ability to engage in off-system sales will likely be enhanced in the PJM market and that this will benefit both Duke Kentucky and its customers because of its off-system sales profit-sharing mechanism, Rider PSM, which was implemented in

⁵ FERC Docket Nos. ER10-1562-000 and ER10-2254-000, Order dated October 21, 2010.

⁶ Duke Kentucky referred to this arrangement as one requiring it to pseudo-tie its load to PJM through the Midwest ISO and pseudo-tie its generation from PJM to the Midwest ISO.

conjunction with the acquisition of Duke Kentucky's existing generating facilities from Duke Ohio.

Duke Kentucky performed a financial analysis to determine the level of benefits that would likely result from joining PJM rather than remaining in the Midwest ISO. That analysis reflected the sale of both capacity and energy in the Midwest ISO market compared to the PJM market. The study included the estimated costs of RTO realignment, the level of capacity reserve requirements in each RTO, and the level of excess capacity and energy that would be available to sell into each market. The Duke Kentucky analysis showed that membership in PJM would be more financially beneficial to ratepayers than remaining in the Midwest ISO.⁷

In addition to the benefits of avoiding inefficiencies related to creating a Midwest ISO/PJM seam and the likely enhancement of off-system sales, Duke Kentucky offers the following commitments as part of its effort to demonstrate that its proposed move from the Midwest ISO to PJM is in the public interest:

1. Duke Kentucky will not seek to recover in base rates or in any adjustment mechanism any exit fee imposed by the Midwest ISO in conjunction with the move to PJM.⁸

⁷ Duke Kentucky requested and was granted confidential protection for its financial analysis, and copies were made available to intervenors on a confidential basis.

⁸ Duke Kentucky clarified and expanded on this commitment at the November 3, 2010 hearing by also committing not to seek a deferral of the Midwest ISO exit fee.

2. Duke Kentucky will not seek to double-recover in a future rate case the transmission expansion fees that it may be charged by both the Midwest ISO and PJM in the same period or overlapping periods.

3. Duke Kentucky will hold its customers harmless from the costs of integration into PJM.

Based on these commitments, the previously discussed enhancements in off-system sales if it joins PJM, and the avoidance of costs and operational complexities that will be experienced if it is not in the same RTO as Duke Ohio, Duke Kentucky states that the transfer of control of its transmission facilities from the Midwest ISO to PJM will be in accordance with the law, for a proper purpose, and in the public interest.

PJM's Position

PJM did not file testimony or issue any information requests, but it did file a post-hearing brief. In its brief, PJM focuses on a number of issues that were raised at the November 3, 2010 hearing.

The first of those issues is PJM's methodology for allocating among its members the costs of new transmission projects included in the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. For new transmission projects in PJM that will operate at 500 kV or above, known as "Regional Facilities," costs are allocated to all loads on an annual load-ratio share basis. For new transmission projects that will operate at below 500 kV, costs are allocated on a "beneficiary pays" basis, as determined by a computer model that analyzes the transmission constraint that necessitates the new facility. PJM allocates the cost of the Regional Facilities, including any lower-voltage facilities needed to support the Regional Facilities, on an annual basis. Consequently, new members in

PJM are required to pay their load-ratio share of the Regional Facilities approved prior to their membership.

The next issue discussed by PJM is its capacity market and the ability of generation-owning members of PJM to bid all of their capacity into the Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM") auctions and then buy back at market prices sufficient capacity to meet the needs of their load. Alternatively, generation owners can select a Fixed Resource Requirement ("FRR") whereby they reserve sufficient capacity to serve their load, with the ability to bid any excess into the RPM market, subject to certain limits. PJM also explained that, under either RPM or FRR, Duke Kentucky will be required to maintain a capacity reserve margin that is set by PJM. However, that margin will be lower than what would be needed on a stand-alone basis due to the load diversity of Duke Kentucky's non-coincident peak and the PJM coincident peak.

PJM also discussed the types of transmission services it offers and the impact of those services on Duke Kentucky's ability to sell capacity into the PJM market. Currently, as a non-member of PJM, Duke Kentucky is unable to sell capacity into PJM because it must rely on point-to-point transmission service and there is not sufficient transmission capacity available to make such sales. However, if Duke Kentucky becomes a member of PJM, its generation will be designated as network resources, and it will then be eligible for network transmission service which would allow for the sale of capacity into the PJM market.

Finally, PJM addressed its rules for retail customers participating in PJM's demand-response programs. PJM allows retail customers to participate in such programs either directly or through Curtailment Service Providers. However, if the utility

sells less than 4 million MWh annually, which Duke Kentucky does, the prior approval of the relevant electric retail regulatory authority must be obtained for demand response to be offered into PJM. For those utilities that sell in excess of 4 million MWh annually, the relevant electric retail regulatory authority has the ability to prohibit retail customers from participating in demand response; but, absent such a prohibition, PJM will allow participation.

MISO's Position

The Midwest ISO also did not file testimony, but it did issue two information requests to Duke Kentucky and it responded to an information request from Duke Kentucky. In its post-hearing brief, the Midwest ISO states that it recognizes that RTO membership is voluntary, and it fully supports its members' rights to elect to withdraw. The Midwest ISO characterizes the issue here as not being Duke Kentucky's contractual right to realign, but Duke Kentucky's failure to satisfy either the proper purpose or the public interest criteria set forth in KRS 278.218. Based on a claim of insufficient evidentiary support for the realignment, the Midwest ISO opposes Duke Kentucky's move to PJM and recommends that the transfer be denied.⁹

⁹ The Midwest ISO's post-hearing opposition to Duke Kentucky's transfer seems to be in contrast to both its request to intervene "to either clarify Duke's responses or respond to issues more directly," Midwest ISO Motion to Intervene at 3, and its testimony in a prior case that, upon a utility's request to exit, the Midwest ISO "would not be in a position to protest, other than to provide what we could provide in terms of facts to the Commission for their consideration." Case No. 2010-00043, Application of Big Rivers Electric Corporation for Approval to Transfer Functional Control of Its Transmission System to Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., September 15, 2010 Hearing, video transcript, 16:33-16:35. See also Duke Kentucky's post-hearing brief at 3-4.

The Midwest ISO claims that Duke Kentucky has failed to demonstrate that there will not be adverse effects on service or rates resulting from its proposed move from the Midwest ISO to PJM. It also claims that Duke Ohio is the focus and intended beneficiary of the realignment with PJM, and that Duke Kentucky's decision to realign was not made independently, but was pre-ordained by its transmission dependence on Duke Ohio and by Duke Ohio's decision to exit the Midwest ISO and join PJM.

According to the Midwest ISO, Duke Kentucky has provided little information in support of its decision to realign with PJM other than the financial interests associated with Duke Ohio selling generation into the PJM capacity market. It argues that Duke Kentucky has not adequately supported claims of operational complexities, potential inefficiencies, and additional costs to pseudo-tie its generation to the Midwest ISO as a means of remaining a member while Duke Ohio moves to PJM. It also contends that Duke Kentucky's criticism of pseudo-tying arrangements is inconsistent with the existing operation of Duke Ohio and Duke Kentucky generation physically located in PJM.

The Midwest ISO also asserts that Duke Kentucky's failure to meet the statutory criteria for approval of the proposed transfer creates a number of alternatives for the Commission, including: (1) denying the application now; (2) deferring a decision until Duke Kentucky files supplemental information to support its application; (3) approving the application now but delaying the actual transfer date until January 1, 2014; or (4) approving the application now but prohibiting the imposition of any realignment costs or risks on ratepayers, while providing that any benefits of the realignment be shared with ratepayers.

The Midwest ISO's brief also raises a number of other issues that were not fully developed in the record, including the impact of Duke Kentucky's exit on the potential membership of another utility, East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. ("East Kentucky Power"), the negotiation of a transmission path through PJM in lieu of membership in PJM, and whether PJM may ultimately acquire control of Duke Kentucky's generating facilities.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Based on the evidence of record and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Commission finds that Duke Kentucky has provided the minimum level of evidence, consisting of testimony and financial analysis, to support its decision to move from the Midwest ISO to PJM. While a more comprehensive and detailed analysis by Duke Kentucky might have obviated the need to impose additional commitments on the transfer, we are not persuaded by the Midwest ISO's arguments that the move to PJM should be denied.

It is clear that Duke Kentucky's decision to align with PJM was made as a direct result of Duke Ohio's alignment with PJM. However, standing alone, that fact does not nullify Duke Kentucky's decision, since that decision is supported by sufficient evidence. Had Duke Kentucky not been so dependent on the Duke Ohio transmission facilities for serving the Kentucky load, a more in-depth analysis of the costs and benefits of the transfer would have been expected.

We recognize that Duke Kentucky could potentially remain in the Midwest ISO, even though Duke Ohio moves to PJM. Other utilities have developed pseudo-tie arrangements for individual generating plants when the generation is not in the same

RTO as the load. For example, the East Bend generating plant, which is jointly owned by Duke Kentucky and Dayton Power and Light, is now entirely in the Midwest ISO because Duke Ohio's transmission is in that RTO. But, since Dayton Power and Light is a member of PJM, the portion of East Bend owned by Dayton Power and Light is pseudo-tied to PJM. Although Duke Kentucky did not develop specific estimates of the costs associated with pseudo-tying all of its generation to the Midwest ISO, while the transmission serving its load is in PJM, it is clear that avoiding the need for such arrangements will eliminate the incremental costs and administrative complexities associated with such pseudo-tie arrangements.

There is no dispute that Duke Kentucky's interest in realigning with PJM is directly related to the realignment of its parent, Duke Ohio. Given Duke Kentucky's transmission dependence on Duke Ohio, this interest is understandable and appropriate. However, even though the Commission recognizes Duke Kentucky's interest in joining PJM, we must closely examine this move to insure that there is no adverse impact on rates or service and that Duke Kentucky's customers are likely to realize benefits as a result of the RTO realignment. Based on our review of the nature and extent of the commitments offered by Duke Kentucky in its application and testimony, we find it reasonable and necessary to clarify, refine, and expand those commitments as set forth below.

Midwest ISO Exit Fee

Although there was some discussion and clarification at the November 3, 2010 hearing of the projected fees that Duke Kentucky will incur upon exiting the Midwest ISO, there continues to be some uncertainty regarding the exact nature and calculation

of the fees to be imposed by the Midwest ISO. Accordingly, the Commission will require Duke Kentucky to commit that it will not seek to recover, in base rates or through any type of rate mechanism, an exit fee or any other type of fee imposed by the Midwest ISO as a result of Duke Kentucky's move to PJM, regardless of how that fee is identified or labeled, and regardless of whether or not the recovery of such fee is approved by FERC.

Transmission Expansion Fees

Duke Kentucky has indicated that it will not seek to double-recover in a future rate case the transmission plan expansion fees that it may be charged by the Midwest ISO and PJM in the same period or overlapping periods. However, Duke Kentucky has also indicated that it does not know the amounts of such future fees, nor does it know in what increments or the time period over which it may be charged fees for the Midwest ISO transmission expansion projects approved during the time it was a member of that RTO. In addition, Duke Kentucky is unsure if its final payment for the Midwest ISO expansion plan projects will be made in one lump sum or over a period of years.

In recognition that the primary factor for Duke Kentucky's move to PJM was Duke Ohio's business decision to make that same move, the Commission finds that Kentucky ratepayers should not be at risk for the payment of any Midwest ISO transmission expansion plan costs that exceed those of PJM. Consequently, we will require Duke Kentucky to commit that it will not seek to double-recover in a future rate case the annual, recurring transmission expansion fees that it may be charged by the Midwest ISO and by PJM in the same period or in overlapping periods, nor will it seek rate recovery, or the deferral and amortization of, the transmission expansion plan fees

imposed by the Midwest ISO as a result of the exit for projects approved during the time it was a member of the Midwest ISO, regardless of whether or not the recovery of any such fees is approved by FERC.

Integration Costs

Duke Kentucky has stated that it will hold its customers harmless from the costs of integration into PJM. In cases involving any number of parties, the Commission has been exposed to different interpretations of the term "hold harmless," both in relation to unilateral commitments and to multilateral stipulations, such as settlement agreements. For that reason, the Commission will require Duke Kentucky to commit that it will not seek to recover, in base rates or in any type of rate mechanism, any costs of integration into PJM, nor will it seek to defer and amortize any PJM integration costs it incurs in conjunction with its alignment with PJM, regardless of whether or not such costs are approved by FERC.

PJM Capacity Obligation

Duke Kentucky stated at the November 3, 2010 hearing that no decision had yet been made as to whether it would initially bid its generating capacity into PJM's RPM market or whether it would choose the FRR alternative. Although Duke Kentucky testified that it would likely make a decision on this issue by the end of the year, it was unable to state with certainty who would make that decision, and the record does not disclose the specific criteria that will be used by the decision maker.¹⁰

¹⁰ November 3, 2010 Hearing, video transcript, 14:55, 15:30-31.

Prior to Duke Kentucky's acquisition of generating capacity in 2006,¹¹ the Commission had noted its concern that Duke Kentucky's historic practice of purchasing power under a contract with Duke Ohio could potentially result in Kentucky customers being exposed to the volatility of market-priced power. Now, Duke Kentucky is considering the option of bidding its capacity into PJM's RPM market, and then purchasing capacity from that market sufficient for its load and its reserve obligations. However, Duke Kentucky has not filed a comprehensive analysis comparing the costs and benefits of RPM versus FRR, and the evidence before us in this case is insufficient to show that choosing the RPM option will insulate Kentucky customers from volatility in the PJM market. Since Duke Kentucky has not demonstrated that its customers will be protected against market-based prices under the RPM option, the Commission will require Duke Kentucky to commit that it will participate in PJM only under an FRR capacity plan until it requests and receives our approval to participate in the RPM market.

Benefits of PJM Membership

The commitments addressed above relate to maintaining the status quo in that they are intended to insure that Duke Kentucky's transfer of functional control of its transmission assets will not adversely affect its customers. However, the Commission's established interpretation of the "public interest" also requires a demonstration that the

¹¹ Case No. 2003-00252, Application of The Union Light, Heat and Power Company for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Acquire Certain Generation Resources and Related Property; for Approval of Certain Purchase Power Agreements; for Approval of Certain Accounting Treatment; and for Approval of Deviation from Requirements of KRS 278.2207 and 278.2213(6), Order issued December 5, 2003.

proposed transfer is likely to provide benefits through improved service or reliability, additional services, lower rates, or reduced costs of providing service.

Duke Kentucky has stated that its ability to sell excess power into the PJM market should have a positive impact on its ability to engage in off-system sales and that this will benefit its customers because of its off-system sales profit-sharing mechanism, Rider PSM. While this is a potential benefit, there are potential risks to participating in the PJM market that could diminish or eliminate any benefit. For example, Duke Kentucky's 2008 integrated resource plan shows its generating capacity to be sufficient to meet its peak demand and maintain a 15 percent capacity reserve margin through 2019. However, expanded environmental regulations or climate change legislation could lead to a decrease in its available coal-fired generation, which would have a direct impact on its future levels of off-system energy and capacity sales. With these uncertainties in mind, the Commission will condition its approval of Duke Kentucky's request to join PJM upon Duke Kentucky's commitment to file a revised Rider PSM, to be effective January 1, 2012, that continues to allocate the first \$1 million in annual profits to ratepayers, but shares the profits in excess of \$1 million annually in the ratio of 75 percent to ratepayers and 25 percent to shareholders, rather than the current ratio of 50:50.

Duke Kentucky also states that one benefit available through membership in PJM is the ability of retail customers to directly participate in PJM's demand-response programs. As outlined by Duke Kentucky, the PJM process for participation by retail customers requires the utility to first evaluate whether the relevant electric retail regulatory authority permits direct participation by retail customers. Duke Kentucky

states that its tariffs do not currently allow such direct participation by its customers and that it does not currently plan to participate in PJM's demand-response programs. Duke Kentucky states that, prior to any future decision on customer participation, it will first seek Commission approval.

To ensure clarity for all parties concerning the need for the Commission's prior approval, we will condition the approval of membership in PJM upon Duke Kentucky's commitment that no retail customer will be allowed to participate directly or through a third party in a PJM demand-response program until either: (1) the customer has entered into a special contract with Duke Kentucky and that contract has been filed with, and approved by, the Commission; or (2) Duke Kentucky receives Commission approval of a tariff authorizing such customer participation. In addition, we will require PJM to file a written acknowledgment of this requirement and require PJM to publicize this requirement according to its demand-response program rules.

Other Midwest ISO Issues

The Midwest ISO's brief raises three issues that were not fully developed in discovery and not addressed at the hearing. As to the issue of how Duke Kentucky's move to PJM might impact a future decision by East Kentucky Power to join the Midwest ISO, we note that this case has been here for almost seven months and East Kentucky Power did not request to intervene or otherwise seek to participate. As to Duke Kentucky's ability to negotiate a transmission path through PJM rather than joining PJM, the feasibility of that option was not fully developed. However, we note that nothing prohibits a utility from proposing an asset transfer merely because some of the proposed benefits might be achieved without a transfer. Finally, as to PJM acquiring

control of Duke Kentucky's generating assets, the pending application does not request that authority. Until such time as Duke Kentucky expressly requests and is granted our authority to transfer control of its generation, that generation remains under Duke Kentucky's control, where it is subject to our authority and jurisdiction. For all of these reasons, the Commission finds the Midwest ISO's newly raised issues are unpersuasive.

FINDINGS AND SUMMARY OF DECISION

Based on the evidence of record and being otherwise advised, the Commission finds that:

1. Duke Kentucky's request to transfer functional control of its transmission assets from the Midwest ISO to PJM is for a proper purpose and in the public interest and should be approved subject to Duke Kentucky's acceptance of the six conditions specified below and PJM's acceptance of the one condition specified below related to participating in demand-response programs.

2. Duke Kentucky should not seek to recover, in base rates or any type of rate mechanism, an exit fee or any other type of fee imposed by the Midwest ISO in conjunction with Duke Kentucky's move from the Midwest ISO to PJM, regardless of how that fee is identified or labeled, and regardless of whether or not such fee is approved by FERC.

3. Duke Kentucky should not seek to double-recover in a future rate case the transmission expansion fees that it may be charged by the Midwest ISO and PJM in the same period or overlapping periods, nor should it seek to defer and/or amortize any transmission expansion fees it incurs for Midwest ISO transmission expansion projects

which received approval when it was a member of the Midwest ISO, regardless of whether or not such fees are approved by FERC.

4. Duke Kentucky should not seek to recover, in base rates or any type of rate mechanism, its costs of integration into PJM, nor should it seek to defer and/or amortize any PJM integration costs it incurs in conjunction with its alignment with PJM, regardless of whether or not such costs or fees are approved by FERC.

5. Duke Kentucky should file a revised Rider PSM to provide that, effective January 1, 2012, the first \$1 million in annual profits from off-system sales is allocated to ratepayers, with any profits in excess of \$1 million split 75:25, with ratepayers receiving 75 percent and shareholders receiving 25 percent.

6. No customer should be allowed to participate directly or through a third party in any PJM demand-response program until that customer has entered into a special contract with Duke Kentucky which has been filed with, and approved by, the Commission, or until Duke Kentucky has an approved tariff authorizing customer participation.

7. Duke Kentucky should participate in PJM under a FRR capacity plan until it requests and receives this Commission's approval to participate in the RPM capacity market.

8. The Chief Executive Officer of Duke Kentucky should file, within seven days of the date of this Order, a letter accepting and agreeing to be bound by the conditions set forth in finding paragraphs 2 through 7 above.

9. The Chief Executive Officer of PJM should file, within seven days of the date of this Order, a letter accepting and agreeing to be bound by the condition set forth

in Finding No. 6 above and shall publicize that condition according to its demand response rules.

10. The approval of Duke Kentucky's request to transfer functional control of its 138 kV transmission facilities from the Midwest ISO to PJM and its request to join PJM should not diminish the Commission's authority to review and set Duke Kentucky's electric rates based on the value of its property used to provide electric service.

11. The approval of Duke Kentucky's request to transfer functional control of its 138 kV transmission facilities from the Midwest ISO to PJM and its request to join PJM should not diminish Duke Kentucky's existing obligation to:

a. Regularly file for Commission review an integrated resource plan detailing Duke Kentucky's load, specifying appropriate reserve requirements, and identifying sources of energy, demand-side resources, and projected need for new generation and transmission facilities.

b. Provide regulated service to its customers through the provision of bundled generation, transmission, and distribution electric service.

c. File for a certificate of public convenience and necessity prior to commencing construction of an electric generation or transmission facility.


IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:


1. Duke Kentucky's request to transfer functional control of its transmission system from the Midwest ISO to PJM is approved subject to the filing, within seven days of the date of this Order, of the written acknowledgements described in finding paragraphs 8 and 9 above.

2. Any customer seeking to participate directly or through a third party in any PJM demand-response program shall do so only in accordance with the procedures set forth in finding paragraph 6 above.

3. Within 20 days of the date of this Order, Duke Kentucky shall file its revised tariff Rider PSM as approved herein, with an effective date of January 1, 2012.

By the Commission



ATTEST:

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