COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

ī.

AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE GAS AND ELECTRIC RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

MAR 2 3 2004

PUBLIC SERVICE COLORISCION CASE NO. 2003-00433

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DIRECT TESTIMONY

AND EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. ROSWELL, GEORGIA

MARCH 2004

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO

I. QUALIFICATIONS AND SUMMARY

1		
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3		
4	А.	Richard A. Baudino, J. Kennedy and Associates, Inc. ("Kennedy and Associates"),
5		570 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, Roswell, Georgia 30075.
6		
7	Q.	What is your occupation and who employs you?
8		
9	А.	I am a utility rate and economic consultant holding the position of Director of
10		Consulting with the firm of Kennedy and Associates.
11		
12	Q.	Please describe your education and professional background.
13		
14	A.	I received my Master of Arts degree with a major in Economics and a minor in
15		Statistics from New Mexico State University in 1982. I also received my Bachelor

of Arts degree with majors in Economics and English from New Mexico State in 1979.

I began my professional career with the New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff in October of 1982 and was employed there as a Utility Economist. During my employment with the Staff, my responsibilities included the analysis of a broad range of issues in the ratemaking field. Areas in which I testified included cost of service, rate of return, rate design, revenue requirements, analysis of sale/leasebacks 8 of generating plants, utility finance issues, and generating plant phase-ins. 9

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In October 1989 I joined the utility consulting firm of Kennedy and Associates as a 11 Senior Consultant where my duties and responsibilities covered substantially the 12 same areas as those during my tenure with the New Mexico Public Service 13 Commission Staff. I became Manager in July 1992 and was named to my current 14 position in January 1995. 15

- Exhibit (RAB-1) summarizes my expert testimony experience. 17
- 18

16

- On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding? 19 Q.
- 20
- I am testifying of behalf of the Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. 21 A. ("KIUC"). 22
- 23
- What issues will you address in your direct testimony? 24 **Q**.
- 25

1	A.	This piece of testimony will address cost allocation and rate design issues relating to
2		Louisville Gas and Electric Company's ("LG&E" or "Company") proposed gas
3		tariffs and rates. I will respond to the Direct Testimonies of Mr. William Steven
4		Seelye and Mr. Clay Murphy, witnesses for LG&E.
5		
6	Q.	Please summarize your recommendations to the Kentucky Public Service
7	-	Commission ("KPSC" or "Commission").
8		
9	A.	My recommendations are as follows:
10 11 12		1. I recommend that the Commission allocate any increase in gas revenues so that existing class rate subsidies are reduced by 25%.
13 14 15 16 17		2. I recommend that LG&E's proposed changes to its monthly cash-out prices for transportation customers be denied and that the current cash-out prices continue to remain in effect.
18 19 20 21		3. I recommend that LG&E's proposed reduction in the notice period for implementation of an operational flow order ("OFO") from 24 hours to 18 hours be rejected. The current 24-hour notice period is reasonable and should remain in effect.
22		
23	<u>Cost c</u>	of Service and Revenue Allocation
24		
25	Q.	Have your conducted a review of the Company's cost of service study that was
26		prepared and sponsored by Mr. Seelye?
27		
28	A.	Yes. I reviewed both Mr. Seelye's Direct Testimony and Volume 5 of 7 of the
29		Company's historical year filing requirements, which contains all of Mr. Seelye's
30		gas cost of service exhibits. I also reviewed the Company's discovery responses that

- provided work papers and spreadsheets supporting Mr. Seelye's testimony and
 exhibits.
- 3

4 Q. Briefly summarize Mr. Seelye's approach to the Company's gas cost of service 5 study.

6

Beginning on page 12 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Seelye provided a detailed 7 Α. explanation of the functionalization, classification, and allocation principles 8 associated with his preparation of the gas cost of service study. On page 21, Mr. 9 Seelye described his use of the zero-intercept methodology to classify distribution 10 mains between demand-related and customer-related costs. This methodology was 11 applied to both high-pressure and medium and low-pressure mains to determine the 12 demand/customer split of costs. Mr. Seelye presented the resulting percentage splits 13 14 on page 24 of his Direct Testimony.

15

16 Mr. Seelye also presented the cost allocation factors for demand, commodity, and 17 customer costs beginning on page 15 of his Direct Testimony.

18

19 Q. Please comment on Mr. Seelye's use of the zero-intercept method for classifying
20 the costs of distribution mains.

21

A. Mr. Seelye's use of the zero-intercept method is, in my opinion, a conservative estimate of the customer-related portion of distribution main costs. As Mr. Seelye pointed out in his Direct Testimony, an alternative method for quantifying the customer-related portion of mains is the minimum size method. This method uses

the cost per foot of the smallest diameter main being installed by the Company to
 determine the customer-related portion of mains. This method generally results in a
 larger portion of main costs being classified as customer-related.

- 4
- 5

Q. What would be the effect of using the minimum size method to classify distribution main costs?

7

6

A. I have not recalculated the Company's cost of service study to quantify this effect.
However, Seelye Exhibit 6, page 4 of 6 contains a listing of the different sizes of
main, the cost, and total number of feet of each main size. Based on my review of
the data, I conclude that the most reasonable proxy for the Company's minimum
size main would be 2-inch main. The cost per foot of 2-inch main is \$10.90 per foot,
which would represent the customer-related portion per foot. This compares to
\$2.79 per foot that resulted from Mr. Seelye's zero-intercept analysis.

15

Applying \$10.90 to the Company's distribution mains results in a customer-related portion of \$250,279,064, or 53.2% of the total distribution main investment. In comparison, Seelye Exhibit 6, page 6 of 6, shows that 13.6% of the Company's total main investment would be classified as customer-related using the zero-intercept study.

21

What this means is that under the minimum size method, the Residential class would be allocated a greater percentage of the Company's cost of service than it was allocated using the zero-intercept method. This is because the Residential class has by far the highest number of customers of any class and, as a result, the highest

1		customer allocation percentage. Since the Residential class' demand allocation
2		factor is less than its customer allocation factor, any shift in the classification of
3		main costs from demand to customer would increase the Residential class' cost
4		responsibility.
5		
6		Thus, using a minimum size method to classify distribution main costs would result
7		in an even greater subsidy to the Residential class than the Company shows in its
8		filed cost of service study.
9		
10	Q.	For purposes of this case, will you accept the Company's use of the zero-
11		intercept study?
12		
13	А.	For purposes of this case, yes. It is my understanding that the Commission has
14		accepted the use of the zero-intercept method in past cases, so I will accept its use in
15		this proceeding. It is important that some method be used to classify distribution
16		main costs between demand and customer related costs. To allocate all distribution
17		main costs on the basis of demand would be inappropriate and understate the cost
18		responsibility of the Residential class.
19		
20	Q.	Have you reviewed the resulting customer class rates of return associated with
21		Mr. Seelye's cost of service study?
22		
23	A.	Yes. Mr. Seelye summarized the results of the cost of service study on page 26 of
24		his Direct Testimony.
25		

1		The results of the Company's cost of service study indicate that the Residential class
2		is receiving a significant subsidy from all of the other customer classes. The
3		Residential class rate of return is only 1.75%, compared to the system average return
4		under present rates of 3.56%. The other classes are above the current system
5		average rate of return, particularly Firm Transportation Service (Rate FT), which has
6		a current return of 30.53%.
7		
8	Q.	Briefly describe Mr. Seelye's proposal for allocating the revenue increase
9		proposed by the Company.
10		
11	A.	Mr. Seelye's proposed revenue increase significantly increases the Residential class

rate of return and reduces the subsidy paid by that class. Table 1 below summarizes
the Company's proposed percentage increases by class including gas costs.

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		TAE	BLE 1			
	LG8	E REVENUE IN	ICREASE SUMI	MARY		
	Non-Gas 	Current GSC Revenues	Total Revenues	Proposed Revenue Increase	Total Proposed Revenues	Pct. Increase
Residential - RGS	\$54,629,970	\$171,563,752	\$226,193,722	\$17,187,887	\$243,381,609	7.60%
Commercial - CGS	\$20,869,615	\$82,727,197	\$103,596,812	\$1,593,870	\$105,190,682	1.54%
Industrial - IGS	\$1,880,008	\$10,093,647	\$11,973,655	\$198,751	\$12,172,406	1.66%
Rate AAGS	\$250,665	\$2,754,718	\$3,005,383	\$6	\$3,005,389	0.00%
Firm Transportation - FT	\$3,696,671	\$242,537	\$3,939,208	\$0	\$3,939,208	0.00%
Pooling Service - PS - FT	\$60,600	\$0	\$60,600	\$0	\$60,600	0.00%
Special Contracts	\$1,681,970	\$0	\$1,681,970	\$0	\$1,681,970	0.00%
Total	\$83,069,499	\$267,381,851	\$350,451,350	\$18,980,514	\$369,431,864	5.42%

15

16 17 Under the Company's proposal, the Residential class return rises from 1.75% to 6.15%. This return is only about 1.0% below the system average rate of return.

1		The Company's proposal makes significant strides in reducing the Residential
2		subsidy. However, the FT rate of return stays about the same since the Company
3		proposes no increase for that class.
4		
5	Q.	Do you have an alternative revenue allocation for the Commission to consider?
6		
7	A.	Yes. I proposed that the Commission allocate revenue responsibility among the
8		classes so that the subsidies in current rates are reduced by 25%. This is the same
9		proposal as Mr. Steven Baron's, KIUC's witness who addresses LG&E's and KU's
10		electric cost of service allocations.
11		
12	Q.	Please describe how this proposal would work.
13		
14	A.	Exhibit(RAB-2) presents the 25% subsidy reduction analysis in a step-by-step
15		fashion.
16		
17		First, the revenue subsidy at current rates is determined. Please refer to line 7,
18		"Subsidy At Current Rates", on Exhibit(RAB-2). For example, the Residential
19		subsidy is currently \$7.1 million, meaning that the residential customers are
20		receiving a yearly revenue subsidy of \$7.1 million. In contrast, the FT customers are
21		providing a subsidy of \$2.2 million, meaning that current FT rates are over
22		collecting \$2.2 million annually from FT customers.
23		
24		Second, please refer to line 16 of Exhibit(RAB-2), which shows the revenue
25		increase that would be required for each class in order to achieve the Company's

1		proposed system rate of return (7.14%). The Residential class would require an
2		increase of \$21.1 million and the FT class would require a decrease of \$1.9 million
3		to achieve the proposed system rate of return of 7.14%. This line shows that the
4		Residential class would have to have a revenue increase greater than the Company's
5		proposed total rate revenue increase of \$18.9 million to achieve the system average
6		rate of return.
7		
8		Third, please refer to line 17 of Exhibit(RAB-2). This shows the class revenue
9		increases that I recommend the Commission adopt in this proceeding. These
10		increases reduce the subsidies in existing rates by 25%. The Residential class
11		receives an increase of \$15.8 million, while FT customers receive a revenue
12		reduction of \$0.26 million.
13		
14		Finally, as proof of the subsidy reduction, please refer to line 21, which presents the
15		subsidy at KIUC's proposed revenue allocation. The Residential class subsidy is
16		reduced to \$5.3 million, while the subsidy paid by the FT class is reduced to \$1.6
17		million.
18		
19	Q.	Please compare the results of KIUC's proposed revenue allocation under the
20		25% subsidy reduction with the Company's proposed revenue allocation.
21		
22	A.	Table 2 below presents a comparison of the class revenue increases between KIUC's
23		proposal and the Company's proposal. Table 2 presents percentage increases
24		including Gas Supply Cost Recovery revenues.
25		

COMPARISON OF KI	UC AND LG&E	BLE 2 REVENUE ALL Gas Revenues)	OCATION PRO	POSALS
	LG&E Proposed Increase	KIUC Proposed Increase	LG&E Percentage Increase	KIUC Percentage Increase
Residential - RGS	\$17,187,887	\$15,756,230	7.60%	6.97%
Commercial - CGS	\$1,593,870	\$3,209,919	1.54%	3.10%
Industrial - IGS	\$198,751	\$292,558	1.66%	2.44%
Rate AAGS	\$6	\$13,780	0.00%	0.46%
Firm Transportation - FT	\$0	-\$256,847	0.00%	-6.52%
Pooling Service - PS - FT	\$0	\$0	0.00%	0.00%
Special Contracts	\$0	-\$35,127	0.00%	-2.09%
Total	\$18,980,514	\$18,980,514	5.42%	5.42%

1 Table 2 shows that KIUC proposal has two beneficial effects compared to the 2 Company's proposed revenue increase. First, the Company's proposed increase to 3 the Residential class is reduced by \$1.4 million, thereby mitigating the rate impact 4 on Residential customers. Second, the enormous subsidy being paid by the FT 5 customers is reduced compared to the Company's proposal, although a large \$1.6 6 million subsidy still remains even under KIUC's revenue allocation proposal.

7

8

9

Q. Mr. Baudino, is it reasonable for the FT class to receive a decrease when other customer classes are receiving an increase in this proceeding?

10

11 A. Yes. LG&E witnesses Seelye and Clay Murphy discuss the significant risks of 12 bypass by transportation customers. On page 2, lines 14 - 17 of his Direct 13 Testimony, Mr. Seelye stated that allocating a portion of the increase to 14 transportation customers would provide greater impetus for these customers to 15 bypass LG&E's system. Mr. Murphy also has a detailed discussion of bypass risk 16 from transportation customers in this testimony as well. On pages 5 and 6 of his

1		Direct Testimony, Mr. Murphy noted that LG&E's industrial rates were higher than
2		the national average. He further described the Company's concerns about physical
3		bypass of its system on page 7 of his Direct Testimony.
4		
5		Given the unreasonably high return being paid by FT customers and the genuine risk
6		of bypass, it is both reasonable and advisable for the Commission to rectify the
7		excessive FT rates in this proceeding by reducing them. KIUC's proposed 25%
8		subsidy reduction contains a modest decrease in current FT rates while avoiding rate
9		shock to other customer classes. In fact, KIUC's proposal has a lower recommended
10		increase for the Residential class than the Company's proposal.
11		
12		I recommend that the KPSC adopt my 25% subsidy reduction plan in this
13		proceeding.
14		
15	Q.	How should the Commission proceed with your proposal if it grants an increase
16		less than LG&E's requested revenue increase?
17		
18	A.	I recommend that the Commission allocate any increase based on each customer
19		class' percentage share of the total increase based on my recommended 25% class
20		subsidy reduction. Table 3 below presents my recommended procedure for the
21		Commission assuming that it grants the Company a lower increase than it requested.
22		
23		First, Column 1 of Table 3 shows each customer class' respective increase or
24		decrease using my recommended 25% reduction in existing subsidies. Column 2
25		shows each class' percentage share of that increase. For example, the Residential

class' share of the Company's requested increase is 83% and the FT class' share is a
-1.35%. Column 3 shows how an increase of \$6 million would be allocated based
on each class' share in Column 2. The Residential class would receive \$4.98 million
and the FT class would receive a reduction of \$81,000.

5

		TABLE 3			
		LOCATION PR			1
		(1) KIUC Proposed Increase	(2) Percentage Of Total Increase		(3) Increase At \$6 Milion
Residential - RGS	\$	15,756,230	83.01%	\$	4,980,760
Commercial - CGS	\$	3,209,919	16.91%	\$	1,014,699
Industrial - IGS	\$	292,558	1.54%	\$	92,482
Rate AAGS	\$	13,780	0.07%	\$	4,356
Firm Transportation - FT	\$	(256,847)	-1.35%	\$	(81,193)
Pooling Service - PS - FT	\$	-	0.00%	\$	-
Special Contracts	<u>\$</u>	(35,127)	<u>-0.19%</u>	<u>\$</u>	(11,104)
Total	\$	18,980,514	100.00%	\$	6,000,000

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- 7

8

9 Rate FT Tariff Issues

10

11	Q.	Have you reviewed the proposed changes in the Rate FT tariff proposed by
12		Mr. Murphy in his Direct Testimony?
13		
14	A.	Yes. Mr. Murphy proposed the following changes in the FT tariff:
15		

1		1. Decrease the notice period for issuing and operational flow order ("OFO")
2		from 24 hours to 18 hours.
3		
4		2. Change the cash-out reference price for over- or under-deliveries while
5		otherwise retaining the sliding scale of cash-out percentages.
6		
7	Q.	Should the Commission approve Mr. Murphy's proposed changes to Rate
8		FT?
9		
10	A.	No. The Commission should reject these changes. I recommend that the notice
11		period for issuing an OFO remain at 24 hours and that the cash-out reference price
12		remains the same as contained in the current Rate FT tariff.
13		
14	Q.	Please explain why the Commission should reject the proposed changes.
15		
16	A.	Generally speaking, Mr. Murphy failed to show that these changes are justified.
17		The proposed changes would make transportation on the Company's system more
18		expensive and more restrictive. However, Mr. Murphy has not shown that such
19		changes are justified by the Company's experience with transportation customers.
20		As always, the Company has to carry the burden of proof and show why any
21		changes to its rates and tariffs are reasonable. The Company has failed to carry its
22		burden of proof with respect to its proposed changes to Rate FT.
23		

1	Q.	Please describe the Company's current and proposed cash-out mechanisms.						
2								
3	A.	Currently, LG&E cashes out monthly imbalances for Rate FT in the following						
4		manner:						
5								
6 7 8 9		 The cash-out price is based on the monthly average of the daily mid-point prices posted in "Gas Daily" for Dominion-South Point for the month during which the imbalance occurred. Monthly imbalances are cashed out on a sliding scale based on the 						
10 11		 Monting initialances are cashed out on a shalling scale based on the following percentages: 						
12 13		Over delivery imbalance:						
14 15		$0\% - \le 5\%$ 100% of reference price						
16		$>5\% - \le 10\%$ 90% of reference price						
17		$>10\%$ - $\leq 15\%$ 80% of reference price						
18		$>15\% - \leq 20\%$ 70% of reference price						
19		>20% 60% of reference price						
20								
21 22		Under delivery imbalance:						
23		$0\% - \le 5\%$ 100% of reference price						
24		$>5\% - \le 10\%$ 110% of reference price						
25		$>10\% - \le 15\%$ 120% of reference price						
26		$>15\% - \le 20\%$ 130% of reference price						
27		>20% 140% of reference price						
28								
29		The sliding scale percentage function as a deterrent to FT customers to)					
30		accumulating large imbalances at the end of the month. It should also be noted						
31		that FT customers must balance on a daily basis as well. The current daily	that FT customers must balance on a daily basis as well. The current daily					
32		balancing tolerance is 10%, above or below which the FT customer incurs a	l					
33		balancing charge of \$0.3807/Mcf of imbalance. According to Mr. Murphy, the	;					
34		imbalance rate is current as of November 1, 2003. The daily imbalance rate	2					

1		changes quarterly. Daily balancing also functions as a deterrent to running							
2		balances both on a daily and monthly basis.							
3									
4		Under Mr. Murphy's proposal, the sliding scale percentages will remain the same.							
5		However, the cash-out price will change as follows:							
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		 Over deliveries of gas will be cashed out at the lowest daily midpoint price posted in <i>Gas Daily</i> for the Dominion – South Point area during the month. Under deliveries of gas will be cashed out at the highest daily midpoint price posted in <i>Gas Daily</i> for the Dominion – South Point area during the month. 							
15		The result of Mr. Murphy's proposal is twofold. First, the reference prices							
16		themselves penalize FT customers for imbalances within the 0 - 5% band in							
17		which 100% of the new reference price is charged. Second, the penalty effects of							
18		the new reference prices are magnified by the sliding scale percentages for							
19		imbalances in excess of 5%.							
20									
21	Q.	How does Mr. Murphy justify the new cash-out prices?							
22									
23	A.	On pages 22 and 23 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Murphy states that these new							
24		prices will deter FT customers from gaming the system. For example, Mr.							
25		Murphy testified that the new method will further penalize customers who deliver							
26		quantities of gas that are in excess of their requirements when prices are low in							
27		order to hedge against future higher prices. This proposal would also further deter							

1		FT customers from under delivering quantities of gas that are less than their
2		requirements when prices are high currently, according to Mr. Murphy.
3		
4	Q.	Did Mr. Murphy provide any evidence that would support his contention
5		that such gaming has actually occurred on LG&E's system?
6		
7	А.	No. In fact, Mr. Murphy testified on page 23 of his Direct Testimony that
8		"[g]aming is often difficult to detect and nearly impossible to prove
9		conclusively." No solid analysis or other evidence was provided by Mr. Murphy
10		to support the contention that the type of gaming he described in his Direct
11		Testimony is occurring.
12		
13	Q.	Why should the Commission reject Mr. Murphy's proposed cash-out prices
14		and continue the currently effective cash-out price?
15		
16	A.	The Company provided no evidence that any changes are required to its cash-out
17		reference price. The current mechanism, with its sliding scale percentages,
18		already contains penalties for over and under-deliveries. The daily balancing
19		provision also protects against running up large monthly imbalances. Absent any
20		evidence from the Company that the current cash-out mechanism is not effective,
21		the Company's proposal should be rejected.
22		

4

5 A. No. On page 25 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Murphy asserts that the 18-hour 6 notice period will allow the Company to more flexibly respond to conditions that 7 may threaten system reliability. However, he provided no evidence or examples 8 in which the current 24-hour period hindered the Company from timely calling 9 and implementing an OFO or that the current notice period contributed to 10 situations that threatened system reliability. Again, the Company has not 11 provided a sound basis for this proposed change.

12

Q. On page 24, lines 18 through 23, Mr. Murphy testified that the Company is
proposing the shortened notice period to "reflect regulatory changes in the
gas industry, and to increase its flexibility in issuing such OFOs when
conditions exist that may cause supply disruptions." Please respond to Mr.
Murphy's testimony.

18

19 A. Mr. Murphy's discussion of the evolution of the gas industry does not really 20 justify the proposed shortening of the notice period. The introduction of intra-day 21 nomination change on the interstate pipelines does not have a direct connection to 22 shortening the OFO notice period that I can see. If the Company can provide hard 23 evidence that the current 24-hour notice period is threatening reliability, it may

1		have a case for shortening the notice period. However, the Company has not
2		provided such evidence. Thus, the proposed 18-hour notice provision should be
3		rejected.
4		
5	Q.	Does this conclude your direct testimony?
6		
7	A.	Yes.
8		
9		
10		

RECEIVED

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AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE GAS AND ELECTRIC) RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF) LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY))

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EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. **ROSWELL, GEORGIA**

MARCH 2004

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EDUCATION

New Mexico State University, M.A. Major in Economics Minor in Statistics

New Mexico State University, B.A. Economics English

Twenty years of experience in utility ratemaking. Broad based experience in revenue requirement analysis, cost of capital, utility financing, phase-ins and rate design. Has designed revenue requirement and rate design analysis programs.

REGULATORY TESTIMONY

Preparation and presentation of expert testimony in the areas of:

Electric and Gas Utility Rate Design Cost of Capital for Electric, Gas and Water Companies Ratemaking Treatment of Generating Plant Sale/Leasebacks Electric and Gas Utility Cost of Service Revenue Requirements Gas industry restructuring and competition

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EXPERIENCE

1989 to Kennedy_and_Associates: Director of Consulting - Responsible for consulting assignments in the area of revenue requirements, rate design, cost of capital, economic analysis of generation alternatives, gas industry restructuring and competition.

1982 to

1989: New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff: Utility Economist - Responsible for preparation of analysis and expert testimony in the areas of rate of return, cost allocation, rate design, finance, phase-in of electric generating plants, and sale/leaseback transactions.

CLIENTS SERVED

Regulatory Commissions

Louisiana Public Service Commission

Industrial Groups

Ad Hoc Committee for a Competitive Electric Supply System Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers Arkansas Gas Consumers Armco Steel Company, L.P. Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity General Electric Company Industrial Energy Consumers Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers Large Electric Consumers Organization Newport Steel Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers Maryland Industrial Group Occidental Chemical **PSI Industrial Group** Taconite Intervenors (Minnesota) Tyson Foods

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
3/83	1780	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Boles Water Co.	Rate design, rate of return.
10/83	1803, 1817	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Electric Coop	Rate design.
11/84	1833	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Service contract approval, rate design, performance standards for Palo Verde nuclear generating system
1983	1835	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of NM	Rate design.
1984	1848	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Sangre de Cristo Water Co.	Rate design.
02/85	1906	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Rate of return.
09/84	1907	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Jornada Water Co.	Rate of return.
11/85	1957	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Rate of return.
04/86	2009	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Phase-in plan, treatment of sale/leaseback expense.
06/86	2032	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Sale/leaseback approval.
09/86	2033	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Order to show cause, PVNGS audit.
02/87	2074	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Diversification.
05/87	2089	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Fuel factor adjustment.
08/87	2092	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Rate design.

.

D)ate	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
10	0/88	2146	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of New Mexico	Financial effects of restructuring, reorganization.
07	7/88	2162	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Revenue requirements, rate design, rate of return.
0	1/89	2194	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Plains Electric G&T Cooperative	Economic development.
1/	/89	2253	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Plains Electric G&T Cooperative	Financing.
0	8/89	2259	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Homestead Water Co.	Rate of return, rate design.
1	0/89	2262	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of New Mexico	Rate of return.
0	9/89	2269	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Ruidoso Natural Gas Co.	Rate of return, expense from affiliated interest.
1	2/89	89-208-TF	AR	Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers	Arkansas Power & Light Co.	Rider M-33.
0	1/90	U-17282	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Cost of equity.
0	9/90	90-158	KY	Kentucky Industriał Utility Consumers	Louisville Gas & Electric Co.	Cost of equity.
0	9/90	90-004-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Cost of equity, transportation rate.
1	2/90	U-17282 Phase IV	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Cost of equity.
0)4/91	91-037-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Transportation rates.
1	12/91	91-410- EL-AIR	он	Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., Armco Steel Co., General Electric Co., Industrial Energy Consumers	Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.	Cost of equity.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
05/92	910890-EI	FL	Occidental Chemical Corp.	Florida Power Corp.	Cost of equity, rate of return.
09/92	92-032-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Cost of equity, rate of return, cost-of-service.
09/92	39314	ID	Industrial Consumers for Fair Utility Rates	Indiana Michigan Power Co.	Cost of equity, rate of return.
09/92	92-009-U	AR	Tyson Foods	General Waterworks	Cost allocation, rate design.
01/93	92-346	KY	Newport Steel Co.	Union Light, Heat & Power Co.	Cost allocation.
01/93	39498	IN	PSI Industrial Group	PSI Energy	Refund allocation.
01/93	U-10105	МІ	Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equality (ABATE)	Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.	Return on equity.
04/93	92-1464- EL-AIR	ОН	Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Armco Steel Co., Industrial Energy Consumers	Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.	Return on equity.
09/93	93-189-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Transportation service terms and conditions.
09/93	93-081-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Cost-of-service, transporta- tion rates, rate supplements; return on equity; revenue requirements.
12/93	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission Staff	Cajun Electric Power Cooperative	Historical reviews; evaluation of economic studies.
03/94	10320	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Louisville Gas & Electric Co.	Trimble County CWIP revenue refund.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
4/94	E-015/ GR-94-001	MN	Large Power intervenors	Minnesota Power Co.	Evaluation of the cost of equity, capital structure, and rate of return.
5/94	R-00942993	PA	PG&W Industrial Intervenors	Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co.	Analysis of recovery of transition costs.
5/94	R-00943001	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Evaluation of cost allocation, rate design, rate plan, and carrying charge proposals.
7/94	R-00942986	PA	Armco, Inc., West Penn Power Industrial Intervenors	West Penn Power Co.	Return on equity and rate of return.
7 <i>1</i> 94	94-0035- E-42T	WV	West Virginia Energy Users' Group	Monongahela Power Co.	Return on equity and rate of return.
8/94	8652	MD	Westvaco Corp.	Potomac Edison Co.	Retum on equity and rate of return.
9/94	930357-C	AR	West Central Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.	Evaluation of transportation service.
9/94	U-19904	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Return on equity.
9/94	8629	MD	Maryland industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.	Transition costs.
11/94	94-175-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkla, Inc.	Cost-of-service, rate design, rate of return.
3/95	RP94-343- 000	FERC	Arkansas Gas Consumers	NorAm Gas Transmission	Rate of return.
4/95	R-00943271	PA	PP&L Industrial Customer Alliance	Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.	Return on equity.
6/95	U-10755	Mi	Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity	Consumers Power Co.	Revenue requirements.
7/95	8697	MD	Maryland Industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.	Cost allocation and rate design.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
8/95	95-254-TF U-2811	AR	Tyson Foods, Inc.	Southwest Arkansas Electric Cooperative	Refund allocation.
10/95	ER95-1042 -000	FERC	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Systems Energy Resources, Inc.	Return on Equity.
11/95	I-940032	PA	Industrial Energy Consumers of Pennsylvania	State-wide - all utilities	Investigation into Electric Power Competition.
5/96	96-030-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service.
7 <i>1</i> 96	8725	MD	Maryland Industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Potomac Electric Power Co. and Constellation Energy Corp.	Return on Equity.
7/96	U-21496	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Central Louisiana Electric Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
9/96	U-22092	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
1/97	RP96-199- 000	FERC	The Industrial Gas Users Conference	Mississippi River Transmission Corp.	Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service.
3/97	96-420-U	AR	West Central Arkansas Gas Corp.	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.	Revenue requirements, rate of return, cost of service and rate design.
7 <i>1</i> 97	U-11220	М	Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity	Michigan Gas Co. and Southeastern Michigan Gas Co.	Transportation Balancing Provisions
7/97	R-00973944	PA	Pennsylvania American Water Large Users Group	Pennsylvania- American Water Co.	Rate of return, cost of service, revenue requirements.
3/98	8390-U	GA	Georgia Natural Gas Group and the Georgia Textile Manufacturers Assoc.	Atlanta Gas Light	Rate of return, restructuring issues, unbundling, rate design issues.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
7/98	R-00984280	PA	PG Energy, Inc.	PGE Industriai Intervenors	Cost allocation.
8/98	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Cajun Electric Power Cooperative	Revenue requirements.
10/98	97-596	ME	Maine Office of the Public Advocate	Bangor Hydro- Electric Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
10/98	U-23327	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	SWEPCO, CSW and AEP	Analysis of proposed merger.
12/98	98-577	MÉ	Maine Office of the Public Advocate	Maine Public Service Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
12/98	U-23358	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Retum on equity, rate of return.
3/99	98-426	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc.	Louisville Gas and Electric Co	Return on equity.
3/99	99-082	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc.	Kentucky Utilities Co.	Return on equity.
4/99	R-984554	PA	T. W. Phillips Users Group	T. W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co.	Allocation of purchased gas costs.
6/99	R-0099462	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Balancing charges.
10/99	U-24182	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States,Inc.	Cost of debt.
10/99	R-00994782	PA	Peoples Industrial Intervenors	Peoples Natural Gas Co.	Restructuring issues.
10/99	R-00994781	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Restructuring, balancing charges, rate flexing, alternate fuel.
01/00	R-00994786	PA	UGI Industrial Intervenors	UGI Utilities, Inc.	Universal service costs, balancing, penalty charges, capacity assignment.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
01/00	8829	MD	Maryland Industrial Gr. & United States	Baitimore Gas & Electric Co.	Revenue requirements, cost allocation, rate design.
02/00	R-00994788	PA	Penn Fuel Transportation	PFG Gas, Inc., and	Tariff charges, balancing provisions.
05/00	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm,	Louisiana Electric Cooperative	Rate restructuring.
07/00	2000-080	KY	Kentucky Industriał Utility Consumers	Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Cost allocation.
07/00	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket B	;)	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Southwestern Electric Power Co.	Stranded cost analysis.
09/00	R-00005654	PA	Philadelphia Industrial And Commercial Gas Users Group.	Philadelphia Gas Works	Interim relief analysis.
10/00	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket F	;)	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Restructuring, Business Separation Plan.
11/00	R-00005277 (Rebuttai)	PA	Penn Fuel Transportation Customers	PFG Gas, Inc. and North Penn Gas Co.	Cost allocation issues.
12/00	U-24993	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
03/01	U-22092	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Stranded cost analysis.
04/01	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket E (Addressing	;)	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Restructuring issues.
04/01	R-00006042	PA	Philadelphia Industrial and Commercial Gas Users Group	Philadelphia Gas Works	Revenue requirements, cost allocation and tariff issues.
11/01	U-25687	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.

Date	Case .	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
03/02	14311-U	GA	Georgia Public Service Commission	Atlanta Gas Light	Capital structure.
08/02	2002-00145	KΥ	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Columbia Gas of Kentucky	Revenue requirements.
09/02	M-00021612	PA	Philadelphia Industrial And Commercial Gas Users Group	Philadelphia Gas Works	Transportation rates, terms, and conditions.
01/03	2002-00169	٢Y	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Kentucky Power	Return on equity.
02/03	02S-594E	со	Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining Company	Aquila Networks – WPC	Return on equity.
04/03	U-26527	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
10/03	CV020495AB	GA	The Landings Assn., Inc.	Utilities Inc. of GA	Revenue requirement & overcharge refund

Exhibit (RAB-2) Page 1 of 2

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

KIUC SUBSIDY ANALYSIS AND REVENUE ALLOCATION PROPOSAL

		Total	Residential	Commercial	<u>n</u>	Si Industrial	Seasonal Off- Peak	Uncommitted Gas Svc.	Firm Transportation		Special Contracts
Description		System	(RGS)	(CGS)		(IGS)	(G-6)	(G-7)	(FT)		(SP)
1 Cost of Service Summary Pro-Forma											
2 Total Pro-Forma Operating Revenue	Ф	84,967,113 \$	56,135,517	\$ 21,192,337	\$ 70	1,917,068 \$	149,915	\$ 112,286	\$ 3,774,285	ب	1,685,705
3 Total Operating Expenses	₩	69,424,737 \$	51,900,036	\$ 13,847,622	\$ 1,3	1,313,763 \$	78,888	\$ 102,035	\$ 1,341,617	ŝ	840,776
4 Net Operating Income (Adjusted)	÷	11,250,024 \$	4,064,150	\$ 4,768,455	ю Ф	393,840 \$	43,282	\$ 7.741	\$ 1,459,889	÷	512,667
5 Net Cost Rate Base	\$	316,046,375 \$	232,588,676	\$ 69,651,241	\$ 6,1;	6,130,531 \$	236,970	\$ 247,091	\$ 4,781,862	بې جو	2,410,004
6 Rate of Return		3.56%	1.75%	6.85%		6.42%	18.26%	3.13%	30.53%		21.27%
7 Subsidy at Current Rates	ŝ	\$ O	(7,115,709)	\$ 3,864,404	3 3	296,466 \$	58,827	\$ (1,780)	\$ 2,177,156	ŝ	720,635
LG&E Proposed Increases 8 Proposed Base Rate Increase		18,980,514 \$	17,187,887	\$ 1,593,870	د 1	198,751 \$	(33,450)	\$ 33,456	' ب	θ	,
9 Increase in Miscellaneous Charges - Disc/Reconn	÷	12,006 \$	10,440	\$ 1,294	ŝ	147 \$	23	\$ 23	\$ 79	÷	·
10 Increase in Miscellaneous Charges - Other	θ	112,194 \$	72,029	\$ 33,040	÷	3,763 \$	584	\$ 590	\$ 1,538	с о	651
11 Incremental income Taxes	Ь	(7,787,731) \$	(7,039,984)	\$ (663,711)	3) \$	(82,612) \$	13,388	\$ (13,888)	\$ (659)	ф	(265)
12 Net Operating Income after increase	Ь	22,567,007 \$	14,294,522	\$ 5,732,948	2 \$	513,889 \$	23,827	\$ 27,922	\$ 1,460,847	ф	513,052
13 Rate of Return at LG&E Proposed Rates		7.14%	6.15%	8.23%		8.38%	10.05%	11.30%	30.55%		21.29%

Exhibit (RAB-2) Page 2 of 2

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

KIUC SUBSIDY ANALYSIS AND REVENUE ALLOCATION PROPOSAL

		Total	Residential	Commercial	S Industrial	Seasonal Off- Peak	Uncommitted Gas Svc.	Firm Transportation	Special Contracts
Description		System	(RGS)	(CGS)	(IGS)	(G-6)	(G-7)	(FT)	(SP)
				-					
14 Subsidy at LG&E Proposed Rates	ь	\$ 9	(3,905,125)	\$ 1,282,254 \$	128,542 \$	11,659 \$	17,352 \$	1,889,714 \$	575,603
15 Change in Subsidy resulting from LG&E Proposed Rates			-45.1%	-66.8%	-56.6%	-80.2%	-1075.0%	-13.2%	-20.1%
16 Base Rate Increase Required for Equalized Rates of Return	ŝ	18,980,514 \$	21,093,012	\$ 311,616 \$	70,209 \$	(45,109) \$	16,104 \$	(1,889,714) \$	(575,603)
17 KIUC Recommended Increase, 25% Subsidy Reduction	69	18,980,514 \$	15,756,230	\$ 3,209,919 \$	292,558 \$	\$ (686)	14,769 \$	(256,847) \$	(35, 127)
18 Incremental Income Taxes	⇔	(7,787,731) \$	(6,456,392) \$	\$ (1,322,468) \$	(120,851) \$	156 \$	(6,270) \$	104,040 \$	14,054
19 Net Operating Income after increase	ф	22,567,007 \$	13,446,457	\$ 6,690,240 \$	569,457 \$	43,056 \$	16,853 \$	1,308,699 \$	492,244
20 KIUC Recommended Class Rate of Return		7.14%	5.78%	9.61%	9.29%	18.17%	6.82%	27.37%	20.43%
21 Subsidy after 25% Subsidy Reduction 22 Change in Subsidy resulting from 25% Subsidy Reduction	θ	0	(5,336,781.40) -25.0%	2,898,303.15 -25.0%	222,349.71 -25.0%	44,120.41 -25.0%	(1,334.85) -25.0%	1,632,866.66 -25.0%	540,476.31 -25.0%
23 Adjusted Revenue at Current Rates	ю	83,059,062 \$	54,622,849 \$	20,866,480 \$	1,880,008 \$	144,160 \$	106,472 \$	3,757,123 \$	1,681,970
24 Percentage Increase proposed by LG&E		22.85%	31.47%	7.64%	10.57%	-23.20%	31.42%	0.00%	0.00%
25 Percentage Increase to achieve equalized Rates of Return		22.85%	38.62%	1.49%	3.73%	-31.29%	15.12%	-50.30%	-34.22%
26 Percentage Increase to achieve 25% subsidy reduction		22.85%	28.85%	15.38%	15.56%	-0.69%	13.87%	-6.84%	-2.09%

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE GAS AND ELECTRIC)RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF)LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY)

DIRECT TESTIMONY

AND EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. ROSWELL, GEORGIA

MARCH 2004

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MAR 2 3 2004

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO.

2003-00433

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE GAS AND ELECTRIC RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

CASE NO. 2003-00433

)

)

) }

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO

I. QUALIFICATIONS AND SUMMARY

1		
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3		
4	А.	Richard A. Baudino, J. Kennedy and Associates, Inc. ("Kennedy and Associates"),
5		570 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, Roswell, Georgia 30075.
6		
7	Q.	What is your occupation and who employs you?
8		
9	A.	I am a utility rate and economic consultant holding the position of Director of
10		Consulting with the firm of Kennedy and Associates.
11		
12	Q.	Please describe your education and professional background.
13		
14	A.	I received my Master of Arts degree with a major in Economics and a minor in
15		Statistics from New Mexico State University in 1982. I also received my Bachelor

J. Kennedy and Associates, Inc.

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PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION

of Arts degree with majors in Economics and English from New Mexico State in
 1979.

I began my professional career with the New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff in October of 1982 and was employed there as a Utility Economist. During my employment with the Staff, my responsibilities included the analysis of a broad range of issues in the ratemaking field. Areas in which I testified included cost of service, rate of return, rate design, revenue requirements, analysis of sale/leasebacks of generating plants, utility finance issues, and generating plant phase-ins.

10

3

In October 1989 I joined the utility consulting firm of Kennedy and Associates as a Senior Consultant where my duties and responsibilities covered substantially the same areas as those during my tenure with the New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff. I became Manager in July 1992 and was named to my current position in January 1995.

16

17

Exhibit (RAB-1) summarizes my expert testimony experience.

18

19 Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?

20

A. I am testifying of behalf of the Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc.
("KIUC").

23

Q. What issues will you be addressing in this piece of your Direct Testimony?
25

1	A.	I will offer testimony on the allowed return on equity for the electric and gas
2		operations of Louisville Gas and Electric Company ("LG&E" or "Company").
3		
4	Q.	Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations with respect to
5		EGSI's return on equity.
6 7	A.	I recommend that the Kentucky Public Service Commission ("KPSC" or
8		"Commission") authorize a return on equity of 8.70% for LG&E's electric
9		operations. I also recommend that the Commission authorize a return on equity of
10		8.90% for LG&E's gas operations.
11		
12		I also reviewed the Testimony of LG&E witness Robert Rosenberg. Mr. Rosenberg
13		recommended a cost of equity of 11.25% for LG&E's electric operations and 11.5%
14		for the Company's gas operations. These recommendations are excessive and
15		overstate the investors' required return on equity for LG&E's electric and gas
16		operations. I recommend that the Commission reject Mr. Rosenberg's return on
17		equity recommendations.
18		
19	Q.	How is the rest of your direct testimony organized?
20		
21	А.	The rest of my testimony is organized into the following subsections:
22		
23		II. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
24		III. DETERMINATION OF FAIR RATE OF RETURN

1 IV. RESPONSE TO LG&E WITNESS ROBERT ROSENBERG

2

1

II. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

2

3

4

Q. Please describe the general economic trends that have affected utilities in the

- last few years.
- 5

The trend for the stock and bond markets was quite positive through the '90s. 6 A. 7 Although there was a recession in late 1990 through early 1991, the markets 8 continued to post strong, above average gains through 1999. During the period from 9 1990 - 1999, the S&P 500 posted an average annual gain of 18.2%, still well above the long-term average stock market return of 12.2%¹. Long-term government bonds 10 11 also provided excellent returns during the '90s, averaging 8.8% per year compared 12 to the long-run average of 5.8%. During the 1990s, inflation remained moderate, 13 averaging 2.9%.

14

In 2000, the stock and bond markets substantially diverged. The total return for the S&P 500 was -9.11%, while the return for small company stocks was -3.59%. Bonds prices, however, staged a strong rally despite two interest rate increases by the Federal Reserve. The total return for long-term government bonds for the year was 21.48%, with the yield falling from 6.82% at the end of 1999 to 5.58% at the end of December 2000. The inflation rate rose to 3.39% for the year.

21

During 2001, the economy slowed considerably and was affected drastically by the terrorist attacks of September 11. The unemployment rate rose to 5.8% and GDP growth slowed to only 1.1% for the year. Stock and bond markets again showed

1

Stocks, Bonds Bills, and Inflation 2003 Yearbook, Ibbotson Associates, pages 18 and 112.

divergent returns. The Standard and Poor's 500 returned -11.88% for the year,
 while small company stocks actually did quite well, posting a total return of 22.77%.
 Long-term government bonds returned 3.70% during 2001.

5 For 2002, Ibbotson Associates reported that the unemployment rate rose to 6.0% and 6 GDP grew at an inflation-adjusted rate of 2.4%. This compares the 0.3% growth 7 rate for GDP in 2001. The S&P 500 returned –22.10% for the year, the third straight 8 yearly loss for large-company stocks. However, long-term government bond 9 returned 17.84%, well above the long-run average yearly return.

10

4

11 2003 was a much better year for the stock market in general as the U.S. economy 12 staged a recovery. According to the Value Line Investment Survey's Selection and 13 Opinion, January 9, 2004, the S&P 500 rose 26.2% during the year. Interest rates remained low, with the Prime Rate at 4.0%, the discount rate at 2.0%, and the 14 15 Federal Funds rate at 1.0%. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the U.S. 16 unemployment rate stood at 5.7% at the end of December 2003, a decline from 17 2002. The inflation rate remained low at 2.0% for the year. Utility stocks also did 18 well during 2003, with prices staging a significant rally during the year. The Dow 19 Jones Utility Average began the year at 215.16 and closed the year at 266.9, an 20 increase of 24%.

21

22

Q.

23

A. Exhibit (RAB-2) presents a graphic depiction of the trend in interest rates from
January 1994 through January 2004. The interest rates shown are for the 20-year

What has the trend in capital costs been over the last few years?

U.S. Treasury Bond and the average public utility bond from the Mergent Bond Record. Exhibit ____(RAB-2) shows that the yields on long-term treasury bonds have declined significantly since early 1995, although rates have been quite volatile. Increased bond market volatility actually began in the early 1970s, when inflation became more of a sustained long-term concern. Interest rate volatility remains higher now than it has been historically.

7

Yields have trended downward from 2002 through 2004, with the 20-year bond
yield ending the month of February 2004 at 4.94%. The yield on the average public
utility bond has also decreased significantly in 2002 and 2003, falling from 7.83% in
March 2002 to 6.23% in January 2004. As of March 11, the Moody's average
public utility bond yield stood at 5.95%. A-rated utility bonds yielded 5.91%, while
Baa bonds yielded 6.01%.

14

Over the last six months, bonds have reached their lowest levels in recent history. Exhibit ____(RAB-2) shows that since 1994 public utility bond yields are at their lowest level over that ten-year historical period. I also reviewed the Mergent *Public Utility Manual* and found that average public utility bond yields have not been as low as they are now since the 1968 – 1969 time period, almost 35 years ago.

20

Q. Mr. Baudino, in your opinion what effect does the current interest rate
environment have on both electric and natural gas distribution utility stocks?

23

A. In my view, the currently low bond yields strongly suggest lower return on equity
requirements on the part on the investing public. The results of my return on equity

1		analysis in the subsequent section of my Direct Testimony are consistent with these
2		historically low bond yields.
3		
4	Q.	How does the investment community regard the electric utility industry as a
5		whole?
6 7	A.	The Value Line Investment Survey reported the following in its March 5, 2004
8		report on the electric utility industry (east):
9		
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19		"The bankruptcy of Enron and the California energy crisis prompted a majority of utilities to adopt a "back-to-basics" strategy in recent years. <i>Duquesne Light Holdings</i> is one noteworthy example. This means that most power companies are once again largely reliant on traditional distribution businesses for net-profit growth. Nearly half of all the states in the U.S. have adopted some form of retail open-market rules since deregulation began in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, many more years will likely pass before the rest of the country completely embraces retail competition."
20		Value Line also noted that most electric utilities have stepped back from risky
21		financial energy trading ventures, enhancing future earnings predictability. Net
22		profit prospects for the industry through 2007 are generally favorable, but growth
23		prospects will not be exceptional, according to Value Line's report.
24		
25	Q.	What does Value Line have to say about the current state of the natural gas
26		distribution industry?
27		

A. The following quote is from the December 18, 2003 report on the Natural Gas
 (Distribution) sector from the Value Line Investment Survey:

"It is noteworthy, however, that the business profile of gas utilities is changing as they expand into unregulated areas. Investors should consider how much exposure a company has to nonregulated activities before making an investment decision here. Unregulated operations usually add more volatility to the share price, but increase total-return possibilities. Companies that stay focused on distribution have greater earnings predictability and may be more likely to increase the dividend consistently over time."

12

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Q.

What is your view of Value Line's comments regarding the state of the electric and gas industries today?

15

16 Α. In my opinion, Value Line's comments indicate that utilities have ventured into 17 higher risk unregulated operations that can increase risk and, in certain cases, harm 18 their overall financial performance. These unregulated operations have increased 19 risk for electric and gas utilities. Now that many utilities have backed away from 20 such ventures, their overall risk should decline and their financial situations should 21 stabilize. Further, I believe that utility stocks have become much more attractive to 22 investors over the last 12 to 15 months. Much of the uncertainty brought about by 23 the California energy crisis and the Enron debacle has subsided, reducing the 24 perceived risk of utility companies in general.

25

Further, as the previously cited Value Line report noted, many states have retreated from deregulation and restructuring. Since Louisville Gas and Electric is located in a state that follows the traditional regulatory model and which does not have any

1		deregulation or restructuring activities, the Company is lower risk than utilities
2		located in states that operate under some form of deregulation and/or competition.
3		
4	Q.	What is LG&E's current bond rating?
5		
6	A.	LG&E is currently rated A- by Standard and Poor's and A1 by Moody's. These
7		rating are generally in the middle of S&P's and Moody's investment grade ratings.
8		
9		In its report on Louisville Gas and Electric Company dated January 21, 2004, S&P
10		noted the following:
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21		"Louisville Gas' above-average business profile is supported by low production costs, lack of nuclear-generating assets, and a favorable regulatory environment. The Company's electric operations benefit from a cost-of-fuel-adjustment mechanism and an environmental cost- recovery mechanism, while the company's gas operations benefits from a weather normalization-adjustment clause and a cost-of-gas- adjustment mechanism. Collectively, these mechanisms reduce exposure to environmental legislation, weather, and potential volatility in natural gas prices, all of which normally concern Standard & Poor's."
22		

1		III. DETERMINATION OF FAIR RATE OF RETURN
2		
3	Q.	Please describe the methods you employed in estimating a fair rate of return
4		for LG&E.
5		
6	A.	I employed a Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") analysis for a group of comparison
7		electric companies to estimate the cost of equity for the Company's electric
8		operations. I also applied the DCF to a group of gas distribution companies in order
9		to estimate the required return for LG&E's gas operations. I also employed a
10		Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") analysis, although I did not incorporate its
11		results into my recommendation.
12		
13	Q.	What are the main guidelines to which you adhere in estimating the cost of
14		equity for a firm?
15		
16	A.	Generally speaking, the estimated cost of equity should be comparable to the returns
17		of other firms with similar risk structures and should be sufficient for the firm to
18		attract capital. These are the basic standards set out in Federal Power Comm'n v.
19		Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Bluefield W.W. & Improv. Co. v.
20		Public Service Comm'n., 262 U.S. 679 (1922).
21		
22		From an economist's perspective, the notion of "opportunity cost" plays a vital role
23		in estimating the cost of equity. One measures the opportunity cost of an investment
24		equal to what one would have obtained in the next best alternative. For example, let
25		us suppose that an investor decides to purchase the stock of a publicly traded electric

1 utility. That investor made the decision based on the expectation of dividend 2 payments and perhaps some appreciation in the stock's value over time. However, 3 that investor's opportunity cost is measured by what she or he could have invested in 4 as the next best alternative. That alternative could have been another utility stock, a 5 utility bond, a mutual fund, a money market fund, or any other number of 6 investment vehicles.

7

8 The key determinant in deciding whether to invest, however, is based on 9 comparative levels of risk. Our hypothetical investor would not invest in a particular 10 electric company stock if it offered a return lower than other investments of similar 11 risk. The opportunity cost simply would not justify such an investment. Thus, the 12 task for the rate of return analyst is to estimate a return that is equal to the return 13 being offered by other risk-comparable firms. Failing this, the subject firm will be 14 impaired in its ability to attract capital.

15

16 Q. What are the major types of risk faced by utility companies?

17

18A.In general, risk associated with the holding of common stock can be separated into19three major categories: business risk, financial risk, and liquidity risk. Business risk20refers to risks inherent in the operation of the business. Volatility of the firm's sales,21long-term demand for its product(s), the amount of operating leverage, and quality22of management are all factors that affect business risk. The quality of regulation at23the state and federal levels also plays an important role in business risk for regulated24utility companies.

25

Financial risk refers to the impact on a firm's future cash flows from the use of debt in the capital structure. Interest payments to bondholders represent a prior call on the firm's cash flows and must be met before income is available to the common shareholders. Additional debt means additional variability in the firm's earnings, leading to additional risk.

6

Liquidity risk refers to the ability of an investor to quickly sell an investment without 7 8 a substantial price concession. The easier it is for an investor to sell an investment 9 for cash, the lower the liquidity risk will be. Stock markets, such as the New York 10 and American Stock Exchanges, help ease liquidity risk substantially. Investors who 11 own stocks that are traded in these markets know on a daily basis what the market 12 prices of their investments are and that they can sell these investments fairly quickly. 13 Many electric utility stocks are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and are 14 considered liquid investments.

15

16Q.Are there any indices available to investors that quantify the total risk of a17company?

18

A. Yes. Published measures exist that categorize companies based on various measures
of risk. One of the best-known and most widely available sources is from Value
Line. Each company on which Value Line reports is assigned a Safety Rank. The
Safety Rank consists of a number from 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest - meaning
least risky - and 5 being the lowest - meaning most risky. The Safety Rank
measures the total risk of a stock and encompasses just about all factors that affect
financial and business risk. These factors include:

1				
2		Stock price volatility		
3		• Fixed charge coverage ratio		
4		• Quality of earnings		
5		Capitalization ratio		
6 7		Earnings on common stock		
8		Payout ratioRegulatory risk		
0		C Regulatory fisk		
9				
10		By selecting companies with the same Safety Rank, investors can be relatively		
11		confident that the market views them as similarly risky investments.		
12				
13		Bond ratings are another good tool that investors may utilize to determine the risk		
14		comparability of firms. Bond rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard and		
15		Poor's perform detailed analyses of all the factors that contribute to the business and		
16		financial risk of a particular investment. The end result of their analyses is a bond		
17		rating that reflects these risks.		
18				
19	Disco	ounted Cash Flow Method		
20				
21	Q.	Please describe the basic DCF approach.		
22				
23	A.	The basic DCF approach is rooted in valuation theory. It is based on the premise		
24		that the value of a financial asset is determined by its ability to generate future net		
25		cash flows. In the case of a common stock, those future cash flows take the form		
26		of dividends and appreciation in price. The value of the stock to investors is the		
27		discounted present value of future cash flows. The general equation then is:		

1
$$V = \frac{R}{(1+r)} + \frac{R}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{R}{(1+r)^3} + \dots + \frac{R}{(1+r)^n}$$

Where:V = asset valueR = yearly cash flowsr = discount rate

6 This is no different from determining the value of any asset from an economic 7 point of view. However, the DCF model that I employ does make certain simplifying assumptions. One is that the stream of income from the equity share 8 9 is assumed to be perpetual; that is, there is no salvage or residual value at the end 10 of some maturity date (as is the case with a bond). Another important assumption 11 is that financial markets are efficient; that is, they correctly evaluate the cash 12 flows relative to the appropriate discount rate, thus rendering the stock price 13 efficient relative to other alternatives. Finally, the model I employ also assumes a 14 constant growth rate in dividends. The fundamental relationship employed in the 15 DCF method is described by the formula:

16

2

3

4

5

17

$$k = \frac{D_I}{P_0} + g$$

18	Where:	D_i = the next period dividend
19		$P_{\theta} = current \ stock \ price$
20		g = expected growth rate
21		\tilde{k} = investor-required return
22		1

1		It is apparent that the "k" so determined must relate to the investors' expected	
2		return. Use of the discounted cash flow method to determine an investor-required	
3		return is complicated by the need to express investors' expectations relative to	
4	dividends, earnings, and book value over an infinite time horizon. Financial		
5	theory suggests that stockholders purchase common stock on the assumption that		
6		there will be some change in the rate of dividend payments over time. We assume	
7	that the rate of growth in dividends is constant over the assumed time horizon, but		
8		the model could easily handle varying growth rates if we knew what they were.	
9		Finally, the relevant time frame is prospective rather than retrospective.	
10			
11	<u>DCF</u>	Applied to Electric Operations	
12			
13	Q.	What was your first step in conducting your DCF analysis for LG&E's	
13 14	Q.	What was your first step in conducting your DCF analysis for LG&E's electric operations?	
	Q.		
14	Q. A.		
14 15	-	electric operations?	
14 15 16	-	electric operations? My practice is to first construct a comparison group of companies that has a risk	
14 15 16 17	-	electric operations? My practice is to first construct a comparison group of companies that has a risk profile that is reasonably similar to that of LG&E. This is necessary because	
14 15 16 17 18	-	electric operations? My practice is to first construct a comparison group of companies that has a risk profile that is reasonably similar to that of LG&E. This is necessary because LG&E is an operating subsidiary of E.ON AG and, as such, does not have	
14 15 16 17 18 19	-	electric operations? My practice is to first construct a comparison group of companies that has a risk profile that is reasonably similar to that of LG&E. This is necessary because LG&E is an operating subsidiary of E.ON AG and, as such, does not have publicly traded common stock. Thus, a DCF analysis cannot be performed	
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	-	electric operations? My practice is to first construct a comparison group of companies that has a risk profile that is reasonably similar to that of LG&E. This is necessary because LG&E is an operating subsidiary of E.ON AG and, as such, does not have publicly traded common stock. Thus, a DCF analysis cannot be performed	

1		
2	A.	I normally use several criteria to select a comparison group. These criteria include:
3		
4		Comparable bond ratings
5		• 50% of revenues from electric operations
6		• Exclusion of utilities involved in merger activity
7		• Exclusion of utilities that have recently cut dividends
8		• Exclusion of utilities that have significantly fluctuating or erratic earnings
9		
10		In this proceeding, I reviewed LG&E witness Rosenberg's electric utility group and
11		found it to be a reasonable one to use to estimate the cost of equity for LG&E. Mr.
12		Rosenberg used similar criteria to select his group, which included the following:
13		
14		Bond ratings of AA/A or Aa/A from Standard and Poor's and Moody's
15		• Exclusion of utilities involved in merger activity
16		• Exclusion of utilities with significant unregulated operations
17		• Exclusion of utilities not paying a dividend or for which a dividend cut was
18		forecast by Value Line.
19		
20		These criteria are generally reasonable, although they are not identical to the criteria
21		I use in constructing a comparison group. However, for purposes of this proceeding
22		I will use the group of companies that Mr. Rosenberg used. The resulting group of
23		companies is reasonable for purposes of estimating the cost of equity for LG&E's
24		electric operations. In addition, using the same group as Mr. Rosenberg will
25		eliminate at least one disagreement between us in our respective analyses and
26		provide a consistent basis on which to compare our results.
27		
28		The group of comparison electric companies I used in my analysis is:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16		 Alliant Energy Corp. Ameren Corp. CH Energy Group Consolidated Edison DTE Energy Co. Exelon Corp. MGE Energy NSTAR Pinnacle West SCANA Corp. Southern Co. Vectren Corp. Wisconsin Energy Corp. 		
17	Q.	What was your first step in determining the DCF return on equity for the		
18		comparison group?		
19				
20	A.	I first determined the current dividend yield, D_0/P_0 , from the basic equation. My		
21		general practice is to use six months as being the most reasonable period over which		
22		to estimate the dividend yield. The six-month period I used covered the period from		
23		September 2003 through February 2004. I then obtained the indicated annualized		
24		dividend as reported in the Standard and Poor's Stock Guide over the same six-		
25		month period. The annualized dividend divided by the average monthly price		
26		represents the average dividend yield for each month in the period.		
27				
28		Using this approach results in an average dividend yield for the group of 4.48%.		
29		These calculations are shown in Exhibit (RAB-3).		
30 31	Q.	Having established the average dividend yield, how did you determine the		
32		expected growth rate for the electric comparison group?		

1	A.	"Expected" refers to the investor's expected growth rate. The task, in theory, is to
2		use a growth rate that will correctly forecast the constant rate of growth in dividends.
3		We refer to a perpetual growth rate since the DCF model has no cut-off point. The
4		obvious fact is that there is no way to know with absolute certainty what investors
5		expect the growth rate to be in the short term, much less in perpetuity. The dividend
6		growth rate is a function of earnings growth and the payout ratio, neither of which is
7		known precisely for the future.
8		
9		In this analysis, I relied on two major sources of analysts' forecasts for growth.
10		These sources are Value Line and Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks").
11		
12	Q.	Please briefly describe Value Line and Zacks.
13		
14	A.	Value Line is an investment survey that is published for approximately 1,700
15		companies, both regulated and unregulated. It is updated quarterly and probably
16		represents the most comprehensive and widely used of all investment information
17		services. It provides both historical and forecasted information on a number of
10		
18		important data elements. Value Line neither participates in financial markets as a
18		important data elements. Value Line neither participates in financial markets as a broker nor works for the utility industry in any capacity of which I am aware.
19		
19 20		broker nor works for the utility industry in any capacity of which I am aware.
19 20 21		broker nor works for the utility industry in any capacity of which I am aware. According to Zacks' website, Zacks "was formed in 1978 to compile, analyze, and
19 20 21 22		broker nor works for the utility industry in any capacity of which I am aware. According to Zacks' website, Zacks "was formed in 1978 to compile, analyze, and distribute investment research to both institutional and individual investors."

1		responding are combined to produce consensus average and median estimates of
2		earnings growth.
3		
4	Q.	Why did you rely on analysts' forecasts in your analysis?
5		
6	A.	Recent finance literature has shown that analysts' forecasts provide better predictions
7		of future growth than do estimates based on historical growth alone ² .
8		
9	Q.	How did you utilize your data sources to estimate growth rates for the
10		comparison group?
11		
12	A.	Exhibit (RAB-4), pages 1 and 2, presents the details of the calculations for the
13		Value Line and Zacks forecasted growth estimates. The Value Line growth
14		estimates are based on five-year forecasts for dividend growth and six-year forecasts
15		for earnings growth. The Zacks earnings growth estimates are forecasts for the next
16		five years. These earnings and dividend growth estimates for the comparison group
17		are summarized on Columns (1) through (3) of page 1 of Exhibit (RAB-4).
18		
19		I also utilized the sustainable growth formula in estimating the expected growth rate.
20		The sustainable growth method, also known as the retention ratio method,
21		recognizes that the firm's retaining a portion of its earnings fuels growth in
22		dividends. These retained earnings, which are plowed back into the firm's asset

See Rozeff (Journal of Forecasting, Volume 2, Issue No. 4, 1983), Brown and Rozeff (Journal of Finance, March 1978), Moyer, Chatfield and Kelley (International Journal of Forecasting, 1985), and a study by Vander Weide and Carleton that was incorporated as part of the Edison Electric Institute's comments in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's generic cost of capital proceedings.

base, are expected to earn a rate of return. This, in turn, generates growth in the
 firm's book value, market value, and dividends.

R

4 The sustainable growth method is calculated using the following formula:

3

5

6

7		
8	Where:	G = expected retention growth rate
9		B = the firm's expected retention ratio
10		R = the expected return

11		In its proper form, this calculation is forward-looking. That is, the investors'
12		expected retention ratio and return must be used in order to measure what investors
13		anticipate will happen in the future. Data on expected retention ratios and returns
14		may be obtained from Value Line.
15		
16		The expected sustainable growth estimates for the comparison group are presented
17		in Column (4) on page 1 of Exhibit (RAB-4). The data came from the Value
18		Line forecasts for the comparison group.
10		
19		
19 20	Q.	How did you proceed to determine the DCF cost of equity for the electric
	Q.	How did you proceed to determine the DCF cost of equity for the electric comparison group?
20	Q.	
20 21	Q. A.	
20 21 22	-	comparison group?
20 21 22 23	-	comparison group? To estimate the expected dividend yield (D ₁) for the group, the current dividend
20 21 22 23 24	-	comparison group? To estimate the expected dividend yield (D ₁) for the group, the current dividend yield must be moved forward in time to account for dividend increases over the next

1		
2		I then added the expected growth rate ranges to the expected dividend yield for the
3		comparison group. The calculation of the resulting DCF returns on equity is
4		presented on page 3 of Exhibits(RAB-4).
5 6	Q.	Please explain how you calculated your DCF cost of equity estimates.
7	A.	Page 3 of Exhibit(RAB-4) shows four alternative DCF cost of equity
8		calculations using the four growth estimates shown on page 1. In calculating the
9		average growth rates for the group, I eliminated negative earnings growth rates for
10		two companies in the group because negative growth rates are not appropriate
11		proxies for long-term growth expectations.
12		
13		The DCF returns range from 7.34% to 9.31%. The DCF return on equity utilizing
14		the average of all the growth rates is 8.66%.
15 16	<u>DCF</u>	Applied to Gas Operations
17 18	Q.	How did you apply the DCF analysis to LG&E's gas operations?
19		
20	A.	First, I reviewed the comparison group of companies used by Mr. Rosenberg in
21		his Direct Testimony. In selecting his group of companies, Mr. Rosenberg
22		employed the following criteria:
23		
24		• Bond ratings of Aa/A from Moody's and AA/A from S&P
25		• Exclusion of utilities involved in merger activity

1		• Exclusion of utilities with significant unregulated operations
2		• Exclusion of utilities not paying a dividend or for which a dividend cut was
3		forecast by Value Line.
4		
5		For the reasons I stated earlier in my testimony with respect to Mr. Rosenberg's
6		selection of his electric utility group, I find these criteria generally reasonable. For
7		purposes of this case, I will use the natural gas distribution group that Mr. Rosenberg
8		used in his Direct Testimony. The natural gas group is as follows:
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 		 AGL Resources Atmos Energy KeySpan Laclede Group Northwest Natural Gas Peoples Energy
17	Q.	How did you estimate the cost of equity for the natural gas distribution group?
18		
19	A.	I used the same procedure that I applied in estimating the cost of equity for the
20		electric comparison group.
21		
22		First, I calculated the six-month average dividend yield for each company in the
23		group using prices and dividend data for the six-month period for September 2003
24		through February 2004. Please refer to Exhibit (RAB-5). The average
25		dividend yield for the natural gas distribution group was 4.64%
26		
27		Second, I obtained forecasted dividend and earnings growth rates from Value Line
		Second, i obtained foreasted dividend and earnings growth rates nom value Line

1		Please refer to page 1 of Exhibit(RAB-6). The growth rates ranged from
2		1.34% (dividend growth) to 5.97% (Value Line earnings growth).
3		
4		Third, I moved the current dividend yield up to a forecasted dividend yield by
5		applying one-half of the growth rate to the current dividend yield. Please refer to
6		page 3 of Exhibit(RAB-6).
7		
8		Finally, I added the growth rates to the expected dividend yield to obtain the
9		estimated cost of equity range for the group. Please refer to page 3 of Exhibit
10		(RAB-6). The results ranged from 6.01% to 10.75%. The average return on
11		equity using all growth rates is 8.91%.
12		
13	<u>Capit</u>	al Asset Pricing Model
14		
15	Q.	Briefly summarize the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") approach.
16		
17	А.	The theory underlying the CAPM approach is that investors, through diversified
18		portfolios, may combine assets to minimize the total risk of the portfolio.
19		Diversification allows investors to diversify away all risks specific to a particular
20		company and be left only with market risk that affects all companies. Thus, CAPM
21		theory identifies two types of risks for a security: company-specific risk and market
22		risk. Company-specific risk includes such events as strikes, management errors,
23		marketing failures, lawsuits, and other events that are unique to a particular firm.
~ ·		
24		Market risk includes inflation, business cycles, war, variations in interest rates, and

- be diversified away. The idea behind the CAPM is that diversified investors are rewarded with returns based on market risk.
- Within the CAPM framework, the expected return on a security is equal to the risk-4 free rate of return plus a risk premium that is proportional to the security's market, or 5 6 nondiversifiable risk. Beta is the factor that reflects the inherent market risk of a 7 security. It measures the volatility of a particular security relative to overall market 8 for securities. For example, a stock with a beta of 1.0 indicates that if the market rises by 15.00%, that stock will also rise by 15.00%. This stock moves in tandem 9 10 with movements in the overall market. A stock with a beta of 0.5 will only rise or 11 fall 50.00% as much as the overall market. So with an increase in the market of 12 15.00%, this stock will only rise 7.50%. Stocks with betas greater than 1.0 will rise 13 and fall more than the overall market. Thus, beta is the relevant measure of the risk 14 of individual securities vis-à-vis the market.
- 15

1

2

3

Based on the foregoing discussion, the equation for determining the return for a
security in the CAPM framework is:

18 19

20

 $K = Rf + \beta(MRP)$

21Where:K = Required Return on equity22Rf = Risk-free rate23MRP = Market risk premium24 $\beta = Beta$

25

This equation tells us about the risk/return relationship posited by the CAPM. Investors are risk averse and will only accept higher risk if they receive higher returns. These returns can be determined in relation to a stock's beta and the market

risk premium. The general level of risk aversion in the economy determines the market risk premium. If the risk-free rate of return is 3.00% and the required return on the total market is 15.00%, then the risk premium is 12.00%. Any stock's required return can be determined by multiplying its beta by the market risk premium. Stocks with betas greater than 1.0 are considered riskier than the overall market and will have higher required returns. Conversely, stocks with betas less than 1.0 will have required returns lower than the market as a whole.

8

9 Q. In general, are there concerns regarding the use of the CAPM in estimating the 10 return on equity?

11

12 A. Yes. There is considerable controversy surrounding the use of the CAPM³. There is strong evidence that beta is not the primary factor in determining the risk of a 13 14 security. For example, Value Line states that its Safety Rank is a measure of total 15 risk, not its calculated beta coefficient. Beta coefficients usually describe only a 16 small amount of total investment risk. Also, recent finance literature has questioned 17 the usefulness of beta in predicting the relationship between risk and required return. 18 Finally, a considerable amount of judgment must be employed in determining the 19 risk-free rate and market return portions of the CAPM equation. The analyst's 20 application of judgment can significantly influence the results obtained from the CAPM. My past experience with the CAPM indicates that it is prudent to use a 21 wide variety of data in estimating returns. Of course, the range of results may also 22 23 be wide, indicating the difficulty in obtaining a reliable estimate from the CAPM.

³ For a more complete discussion of some of the controversy surrounding the use of the CAPM, refer to *A Random Walk Down Wall* Street by Burton Malkiel, pages 229 – 239, 1999 edition.

2 Q. How did you estimate the market return portion of the CAPM?

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

A. The first source I used was the Value Line Investment Survey for Windows. Value Line provides a summary statistical report detailing, among other things, forecasted growth in dividends, earnings and book value for the companies Value Line follows. I have presented these three growth rates and the average on page 2 of Exhibit _____(RAB-7). The average growth rate is 9.91%. Combining this growth rate with the average expected dividend yield of the Value Line companies of 1.21% results in an expected market return of 11.12%. The detailed calculations are shown on page 1 of Exhibit (RAB-7).

12

11

13I also considered a supplemental check to this market estimate. Ibbotson Associates14published a study of historical returns on the stock market in its *Stocks, Bonds, Bills,*15and Inflation 2003 Yearbook. Some analysts employ this historical data to estimate16the market risk premium of stocks over the risk-free rate. The assumption is that a17risk premium calculated over a long period of time is reflective of investor18expectations going forward. Exhibit ____(RAB-8) presents the calculation of the19market return using the Ibbotson historical data.

20

Q. Please address the use of historical earned returns to estimate the market risk premium.

23

A. The use of historic earned returns on the Standard and Poor 500 to estimate the current market risk premium is rather suspect because it naively assumes that investors currently expect historical risk premiums to continue unchanged into the
 future forever regardless of present or forecasted economic conditions. Brigham,
 Shome and Vinson noted the following with respect to the use of historic risk
 premiums calculated using the returns as reported by Ibbotson and Sinquefield
 (referred to in the quote as "I&S"):

7 "There are both conceptual and measurement problems with 8 using I&S data for purposes of estimating the cost of capital. 9 Conceptually, there is no compelling reason to think that investors expect the same relative returns that were earned in 10 11 the past. Indeed, evidence presented in the following sections 12 indicates that relative expected returns should, and do, vary 13 significantly over time. Empirically, the measured historic 14 premium is sensitive both to the choice of estimation horizon and 15 to the end points. These choices are essentially arbitrary, yet can 16 result in significant differences in the final outcome."4

17

6

In summary, the use of historic earned returns should be viewed with a great deal of caution and skepticism. There is no real support for the proposition that an unchanging, mechanistically applied historical risk premium is representative of current investor expectations and return requirements.

22

23 Q. How did you determine the risk free rate?

24

A. I used the average yields on the 20-year Treasury bond and five-year Treasury
 note over the six-month period from September 2003 through February 2004.
 The 20-year Treasury bond is often used by rate of return analysts as the risk-free

⁴ Brigham, E.F., Shome, D.K. and Vinson, S.R., "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity", *Financial Management*, Spring 1985, pp. 33-45.

1		rate, but it contains a significant amount of interest rate risk. The five-year
2		Treasury note carries less interest rate risk than the 20-year bond and is more
3		stable than three-month Treasury bills. Therefore, I have employed both of these
4		securities as proxies for the risk-free rate of return. This approach provides a
5		reasonable range over which the CAPM may be estimated.
6		
7	Q.	What is your estimate of the market risk premium?
8		
9	A.	Exhibit(RAB-7), line 9 of page 1, presents my estimates of the market risk
10		premium based on a DCF analysis applied to current market data. The market risk
11		premium is 6.01% using the 20-year Treasury bond and 7.93% using the five-year
12		Treasury bond.
13		
14		Utilizing the historical Ibbotson data on market returns, the market risk premium
15		ranges from 5.00% to 7.00%. This is shown on Exhibit(RAB-8).
16		
17	Q.	How did you determine the value for beta?
18		
19	А.	I obtained the betas for the companies in the electric company comparison group
20		from most recent Value Line reports. The average of the Value Line betas for the
21		electric group is .68.
22		
23	Q.	Please summarize the CAPM results using the electric company group beta.
24		

1	A.	Please refer to line 14 of page 1 of Exhibit(RAB-7) for the CAPM results for
2		the 20-year and five-year Treasury bond yields. For the electric comparison group,
3		the CAPM returns are 8.59% (five-year bond) and 9.20% (20-year bond).
4		
5		The CAPM results using the historical Ibbotson data range from 8.51% to 9.89%.
6		
7	Q.	Did you also estimate the CAPM using the beta from the natural gas
8		distribution group?
9		
10	А.	Yes. Exhibits (RAB-9) and (RAB-10) present the results of the CAPM
11		using the average beta from the natural gas distribution group. Page 2 of Exhibit
12		(RAB-9) shows that the average beta for this group is .70, not significantly
13		different from the electric company group.
14		
15		The results of the CAPM analyses range from 8.61% to 10.01%.
16		
17	<u>Conc</u>	lusions and Recommendations
18		
19	Q.	Please summarize the cost of equity estimates you have developed up to this
20		point in your testimony.
21		
22	A.	Utilizing the DCF model, I developed cost of equity estimates for a comparison
23		group of electric utility companies. The results for the electric company comparison
24		group using the constant-growth DCF model ranged from 7.34% to 9.31%. The
25		results using the CAPM ranged from 8.51% to 9.89%.

1		
2		The DCF results for the natural gas comparison group ranged from 6.01% to
3		10.75%. The average return on equity using all growth rates is 8.91%. The results
4		using the CAPM ranged from 8.61% to 10.01%.
5		
6		
7	Q.	What is your recommendation for a fair rate of return on equity for LG&E's
8		electric operations?
9		
10	A.	My recommended rate of return on equity for LG&E's electric operations is 8.70%.
11		This recommendation is based on the results of my DCF analyses. This
12		recommendation also falls within the range of CAPM estimates.
13		
14		I believe this value is the most representative of the investor-required return on
15		equity for an A-rated company such as LG&E. This return on equity is fair and
16		reasonable in light of the historically low interest rates that currently exist in the
17		marketplace today. Given an average public utility bond yield at around 6%, an
18		8.70% return on equity for LG&E's electric operations is certainly reasonable.
19		
20	Q.	What is your recommendation for a fair return on equity for LG&E's gas
21		operations?
22		
23	A.	I recommend that the Commission allow a return on equity for LG&E's gas
24		operations of 8.90%. This is based on my DCF analysis from the natural gas
25		distribution company group.

For the reasons I believe that my recommended return on LG&E's electric operations is reasonable, I also believe that an 8.90% return on equity for the Company's gas operations is a fair rate of return in today's economic environment.

1

1 2		IV. RESPONSE TO LG&E WITNESS ROBERT ROSENBERG
3	Q.	Have you reviewed the Testimony of Mr. Rosenberg?
4		
5	A.	Yes. I have reviewed Mr. Rosenberg's Testimony and exhibits. The purpose of this
6		section of my Direct Testimony is to respond to Mr. Rosenberg's recommended cost
7		of equity for LG&E.
8		
9	Q.	What is Mr. Rosenberg's recommended cost of equity for LG&E?
10		
11	A.	Mr. Rosenberg recommended a cost of equity for LG&E's electric operations of
12		11.25%. He recommended a cost of equity of 11.5% for the Company's gas
13		operations.
14		
15	Q.	Are Mr. Rosenberg's cost of equity recommendations reasonable?
16		
17	A.	No. Mr. Rosenberg's recommendations for LG&E are excessive and I recommend
18		that the KPSC reject them.
19		
20	Q.	How is the remainder of this section of your Direct Testimony organized?
21		
22	A.	The rest of this section will address the specifics of Mr. Rosenberg's Testimony.
23		
24	Rate	of Return in Context
25		

1	Q.	On pages 7 through 9 of his Testimony, Mr. Rosenberg described his view of
2	×.	the importance of the level of rate of return in "the current economic and
2 3		financial climate (page 5, lines 3 through 4)." Please summarize your view of
4		his comments.
5		
6	A.	Mr. Rosenberg described several concerns regarding the level of allowed returns in
7		the utility industry. His main concerns are as follows:
8		 Utility bond downratings have outnumbered upratings in 2003.
9		 Utility financings have been problematic in some instances.
10		 According to FERC Chairman William Massey, investor confidence has
11		been shaken by the western energy crisis and the collapse of Enron.
12		
13	0	Please respond to the concerns about utility rate of return levels raised by Mr.
14	Q.	Rosenberg in his Testimony.
15		Rosenberg in his resultion,
16		First, Mr. Rosenberg failed to mention the low level of interest rates and utility bond
17	А.	yields that are currently present in the U.S. economy. This one factor, more than any
18		other, suggests that the investor's required return on equity for utility companies
19		should be at correspondingly lower levels than at any time in recent memory. Based
20		on my analysis, current interest rate levels also indicate that Mr. Rosenberg's
21		on my analysis, current interest fate levels also interest.
22	2	recommended return on equity for LG&E is grossly overstated.
23	3	the Dependence recording certain events in the utility
24	4	Second, the concerns raised by Mr. Rosenberg regarding certain events in the utility
2	5	industry do not apply to LG&E. In my view, the market has fully sorted out the

effects of the Enron collapse and the western energy crisis and has moved on. I
 believe that my opinion is borne out by the fact that utility share prices experienced a
 significant rebound in 2003. Based on my review of LG&E's present situation, I do
 not believe that Enron and the western energy crisis currently have any negative
 effect on the Company.

6

I believe it is clear that investors and credit rating agencies will evaluate relative risk 7 and return requirements based, in part, on the extent to which a utility company is 8 involved in nonregulated activities. On page 6, lines 23 through 27 of his 9 Testimony, Mr. Rosenberg provided a quote from S&P's publication Regulatory 10 Support for U.S. Electric Utility Credit Continues To Disappoint, which is 11 informative in this regard. S&P stated that the rating trend of the electric industry is 12 decidedly negative, "with insufficient regulated authorized returns and expanding 13 nonregulated investments providing the most downward pressure." 14

15

Nonregulated activities are indeed viewed as more risky than regulated utility 16 operations and, as this quote points out, can have a negative effect on earnings. It is 17 important to note that in this proceeding, Mr. Rosenberg and I are providing 18 recommendations to the Commission as to the allowed return on LG&E's regulated 19 electric and gas utility operations in Kentucky. My discussion of the Company in 20 Section II of my testimony indicates that LG&E is a lower risk company compared 21 to the average electric utility. The credit agency reports I reviewed indicate no 22 adverse impacts from Enron or the western energy crisis. I believe these concerns 23 cited by Mr. Rosenberg are irrelevant in determining the cost of equity for LG&E. 24

25

1		I would also like to respond to Mr. Rosenberg's concern regarding financing
2		difficulties. No evidence was presented by Mr. Rosenberg or any other LG&E
3		witness that LG&E has had problems obtaining financing. Given the Company's
4		current credit profile, LG&E should be able to continue to obtain financing at
5		reasonable cost and terms.
6		
7	<u>Disco</u>	ounted Cash Flow Model
8		
9	Q.	Please briefly summarize Mr. Rosenberg's DCF calculations.
10		
11	A.	Mr. Rosenberg employed a two-stage DCF model. He did this because, according to
12		his testimony on pages 19 and 20, the constant growth form of the DCF is not
13		applicable because of the current state of flux in the utility industry today. Mr.
14		Rosenberg applied a two-stage DCF model to the electric and gas utility groups in
15		estimating the DCF cost of equity for the Company's electric and gas operations.
16		
17		Mr. Rosenberg started with the comparison group of electric and companies that I
18		described earlier in my Direct Testimony. He used a six-month average of prices for
19		the companies in these groups. The expected two-stage growth rate was estimated
20		as follows. The first stage was based on the Value Line and First Call earnings
21		growth rates. The second stage consisted of three proxies for long-term growth: (1)
22		long-term growth rate in nominal Gross Domestic Product; (2) sustainable growth
23		using Value Line projections; and, (3) projected industry growth from Zack's, Value
24		Line, S&P, and First Call.
25		

1 This two-stage approach to expected growth resulted in a DCF range of 10.1% to 2 10.7% based on the average results for the electric company group. These results 3 are presented on page 24 of Mr. Rosenberg's Testimony. For the gas company 4 group, the results ranged from 10.9% to 11.4%. The results are summarized on page 5 58 of Mr. Rosenberg's Testimony. 6 7 Q. Please describe the shortcomings of Mr. Rosenberg's two-stage DCF approach. 8 9 A. Mr. Rosenberg's two-stage DCF model has a number of serious flaws that tend to 10 overstate the results. My response to his two-stage approach applies to both the 11 electric company group and gas company group analyses. 12 13 First, Mr. Rosenberg erroneously assumed that the Value Line and First Call 14 earnings growth rates are appropriate for the first stage of his growth rate analysis. It 15 is important to keep in mind that the DCF model discounts cash flows in the form of 16 dividends and equates that cash flow to the stock price. Mr. Rosenberg's DCF 17 formula on page 13 of his Testimony shows that dividends are discounted, not 18 earnings. I agree that investors expect the dividend growth rate to be lower than 19 earnings growth over the next five years. This is consistent with the results in 20 Exhibit (RAB-3), page 1 of 3, which shows that the Value Line *dividend* 21 growth forecast is much lower than the three *earnings* growth forecasts. This is also 22 true for the natural gas company group. Exhibit (RAB-5) shows lower 23 forecasted dividend growth compared to earnings growth. 24

For a proper two-stage growth rate analysis to be conducted, Mr. Rosenberg should have used the lower dividend growth rate for his first stage. Then, a higher second stage growth rate could be applied based on expected earnings or retention growth for the industry. Mr. Rosenberg's approach inflated his two-stage DCF results.

Second, I disagree with Mr. Rosenberg's use of long-term GDP growth as the 6 second stage. Mr. Rosenberg presented no evidence that electric utility dividend 7 growth is correlated with nominal GDP growth over time. In fact, I believe that the 8 9 available data shows that expected long-term growth for the electric utility industry should be lower than that of the stock market as a whole. Referring to Exhibit 10 (RAB-7), which contains my CAPM analysis, the expected earnings growth 11 rate for the stock market as a whole is 9.91%, compared to the average growth rate 12 13 for the comparison group of 4.09%. Utilities have much higher dividend yields than 14 the stock market as a whole. These higher yields tend to compensate somewhat for lower expected growth rates. To apply a higher growth rate based on total economic 15 growth will overstate the expected growth rate for electric utilities and the expected 16 17 return. Mr. Rosenberg's use of GDP growth should be rejected.

18

5

19

Q. Are there better long-term growth assumptions for the industry?

20

A. Yes. Value Line presents forecasted retention growth for the industry in its
introductory description of the electric utility industry in the Value Line Investment
Survey. In the March 5, 2004 issue, page 154, Value Line projects that the longterm retention growth for the electric utility industry will be 4.5%. Similarly, Value
Line's expected retention growth for the natural gas distribution industry is 4.3%.

- 1 These forecasts are more relevant to investors than Mr. Rosenberg's unfounded 2 assumption regarding GDP growth of 5.91%.
- 3

Q. Have you performed an alternative calculation of the two-stage DCF growth rate based on the arguments you presented earlier?

6

7 Exhibit (RAB-11) presents three alternative calculations of Mr. Α. Yes. Rosenberg's two-stage DCF analysis that he presented in Schedule 3, page 1 of 3. 8 9 This analysis was conducted for the electric company comparison group. For the 10 first stage, I used the dividend growth rates from Value Line. For the second stage, I used three alternative growth estimates: long-term nominal GDP growth of 5.91% as 11 12 presented by Mr. Rosenberg, Value Line's sustainable growth rate forecast for each company in the group, the industry growth projection of 5.30% used by Mr. 13 Rosenberg and explained on pages 18 and 19 of his testimony. 14

15

For purposes of this analysis, I accepted Mr. Rosenberg's long-term GDP growth rate for the second stage merely for presentation purposes to show the effect of properly using the near-term dividend growth rate while holding his long-term growth rate constant. I also used updated the six-month average stock prices for each company from Exhibit ____(RAB-3). I also excluded Alliant from the analysis due to the fact that its Value Line dividend growth forecast was negative.

22

Exhibit ____(RAB-11), pages 1 through 3 shows that the corrected average DCF results for the group are 8.71%, 9.54%, and 10.06%. A proper two-stage DCF

1		analysis results in much lower returns on equity than Mr. Rosenberg calculated. Mr.
2		Rosenberg's analysis should be rejected.
3		
4	Q.	Did you also perform a revised analysis with respect to Mr. Rosenberg's
5		natural gas company group?
6		
7	A.	Yes. Exhibit(RAB-12) presents my revised two-stage analyses for the natural
8		gas company group. As in Exhibit(RAB-11), I used updated six-month
9		average stock prices and the Value Line dividend growth forecast for the first stage.
10		The second stage growth rate utilized Mr. Rosenberg's forecasted growth in nominal
11		GDP, Value Line retention growth forecasts for each company in the natural gas
12		group, and Mr. Rosenberg's natural gas distribution industry forecast of 5.7%. The
13		results range from 8.75% to 9.93%. Again, this represents a significant reduction in
14		the two-stage DCF results presented by Mr. Rosenberg.
15		
16	Q.	On page 21 of his Testimony, Mr. Rosenberg explained that he calculated his
17		Value Line forecasted retention growth numbers by adding a component for
18		external stock financing, sv. Please explain this component of retention growth.
19		
20	А.	The "sv" component refers to additional growth that accrues to shareholders through
21		the issuance of common stock above book value. This component requires a
22		forecast of the growth in common stock and the fraction of funds obtained from the
23		sale of common stock that accrues to the existing shareholders.
24		

Mr. Rosenberg's work papers indicate that his use of the "sv" component added 2 0.69% to the average retention growth estimate for the electric company group and 3 1.46% for the natural gas company group.

4

1

5 6

Do you agree with including an "sv" component to the retention growth **Q**. calculation?

7

8 A. No. Estimating growth from external stock financing is problematic. It requires a 9 forecast of stock issuances for each company in the group as well as the accretion 10 rate from sales above book value, if any. To forecast these variables is exceedingly 11 difficult. Mr. Rosenberg assumed that the currently high market-to-book ratios 12 being experienced by utility stocks would hold into the future. However, assuming 13 that utility market-to-book ratios will fall to around 1.0 if these companies earn their required rate of return in the long run, then the "v" component falls to zero and the 14 "sv" component would also fall to zero. No adjustment would be necessary in this 15 16 scenario. Finally, I would note that in its presentation of forecasted retention growth 17 in its individual company reports, Value Line does not add an "sv" component. 18 Thus, I doubt whether investors would expect such an increment to retention growth 19 in formulating their own growth expectations.

20

21 Q. Mr. Rosenberg did not use a constant growth form of the DCF in this 22 proceeding. He stated in his Testimony that it was inappropriate at this time. 23 Please address the use of the constant-growth form of the DCF model.

24

1 A. In my opinion, the constant growth form of the DCF is appropriate in today's economic environment. No one knows with certainty what investors' future growth 2 3 expectations are. I believe my approach of averaging four forecasted growth rates for use in the constant growth DCF model is appropriate. It gives primary weight 4 5 (75%) to higher earnings growth forecasts, but also recognizes and gives weight to 6 lower near-term dividend growth. This array of expected growth rates can be used 7 effectively to estimate investor-required returns for utilities at this time. I would add 8 that when Mr. Rosenberg's two-stage DCF analysis is revised to appropriately 9 reflect lower near-term dividend growth and long run retention growth, the results 10 are quite close to my recommendation. 11 12 **Capital Asset Pricing Model** 13 Please briefly describe Mr. Rosenberg's approach to the CAPM. 14 Q. 15 16 Α. Mr. Rosenberg employed four alternative approaches to the CAPM for his electric 17 and gas company groups. For the electric group, Mr. Rosenberg employed a beta of 18 .65 and a risk-free rate of return of 5.0%. For the natural gas company group, Mr. 19 Rosenberg used a beta of .68. 20 21 The first approach involved using the long-term historical risk premium of stocks 22 over long-term Treasury Bonds from Ibbotson Associates' Risk Premia Over Time 23 *Report: 2003.* This resulted in a CAPM cost of equity of 9.6% for the electric group 24 and 9.8% for the natural gas company group. Mr. Rosenberg also used an 25 alternative version of the CAPM called the Empirical CAPM. This formulation of

1	the CAPM attempts to compensate for a potential understatement of CAPM returns
2	for utilities that have betas less than 1.0. Mr. Rosenberg presented the ECAPM
3	formula on page 28 of his Testimony. His result using the ECAPM was 10.2% for
4	the electric company group and 10.3% for the natural gas company group.
5	
6	The second approach involved estimating a DCF cost of equity for the market using
7	the Standard and Poor's 500. Mr. Rosenberg used an earnings growth rate of 13.0%
8	for the S&P 500 and a dividend yield of 1.75% to calculate an expected return on the
9	market of 14.75%. Mr. Rosenberg then derived a market risk premium and a CAPM
10	cost of equity of 11.3% for the electric company group and 11.6% for the natural gas
11	company group. The result of his ECAPM was 12.2% for the electric company
12	group and 12.4% for the natural gas company group.
13	
14	Mr. Rosenberg then applied a size premium of 60 basis points, or 0.60%, to further
15	increases the many of matures he coloulated for the CADM and ECADM for the
15	increase the range of returns he calculated for the CAPM and ECAPM for the
16	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and
16	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and
16 17	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and mid-capitalization firms require higher returns than would otherwise be indicated by
16 17 18	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and mid-capitalization firms require higher returns than would otherwise be indicated by the CAPM. The resulting range of CAPM and ECAPM estimates is 10.2% to
16 17 18 19	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and mid-capitalization firms require higher returns than would otherwise be indicated by the CAPM. The resulting range of CAPM and ECAPM estimates is 10.2% to
16 17 18 19 20	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and mid-capitalization firms require higher returns than would otherwise be indicated by the CAPM. The resulting range of CAPM and ECAPM estimates is 10.2% to 12.8%.
16 17 18 19 20 21	electric company group. Mr. Rosenberg did this based on the theory that small and mid-capitalization firms require higher returns than would otherwise be indicated by the CAPM. The resulting range of CAPM and ECAPM estimates is 10.2% to 12.8%. For the natural gas company group, Mr. Rosenberg applied a size premium of 90

Q. Please turn to Mr. Rosenberg's use of the historical risk premium from Ibbotson Associates. What are your comments on this analysis?

3

4 Α. One should approach historical risk premiums with a good deal of caution and 5 skepticism. There is no good reason to suspect that investors expect historical risk premiums to apply into the future. Please refer to the quote on page 27 of my Direct 6 7 Testimony, which discusses the potential pitfalls of relying on historical risk 8 premiums to estimate current investor required returns. This approach mechanically 9 assumes that no matter what interest rates are, investors expect the same risk 10 premium forever into the future. The article from which I took the quote on page 27 11 showed that risk premiums vary substantially over time. The assumption of an 12 unchanging risk premium is tenuous at best and, most likely, is unjustified.

13

17

Q. On page 31 of his Testimony, Mr. Rosenberg stated that the arithmetic mean of historical returns should be used to estimate the historical risk premium and that the geometric mean was inappropriate. Please address this issue.

18A.I disagree with Mr. Rosenberg's position on the use of the geometric mean returns19for purposes of computing the expected market return in the CAPM. Geometric20mean returns are widely published and available to investors. For example, annual21reports for mutual funds commonly report compounded yearly returns over periods22such as three, five, or ten years and compare these compounded yearly returns to the23overall market for stocks. Geometric means provide valuable information about the24actual performance of assets over time and are relied upon by investors. It would be

- inappropriate to exclude consideration of the geometric mean return for purposes of
 assessing investors' future expectation of returns on the stock market.
- 3

4

5

Q. Please comment on Mr. Rosenberg's second approach that employed a DCF return on the S&P 500.

6

7 A, Mr. Rosenberg's approach grossly overstated the expected return for the market. Exclusively using a five-year earnings growth estimate ignores a substantial amount 8 9 of historical evidence and other projections that indicate that the 13% earnings 10 growth rate he used is unsustainable for the long-term. For example, Exhibit 11 (RAB-7), page 2 of 2, shows that Value Line's expected growth rates range 12 from 6.68% to 14.03% with an average of 9.91%. To ignore substantially lower 13 dividend and book value growth rates is inappropriate and will inflate an analyst's 14 DCF projection.

15

16 In all of the numbers I cited, earnings growth is by far the highest value. To state 17 that investors expect cash flows from dividends to grow at high earnings growth rates for the long-term is simply not supported by the weight of the evidence. This is 18 19 why I used a wide range of expected growth rate estimates in formulating my DCF market return in Exhibit ____(RAB-7). It is quite a challenge to estimate a DCF 20 21 market return. For Mr. Rosenberg to limit his analysis to only earnings growth rate 22 forecasts is both unjustified and unwise, particularly if this earnings growth rate is 23 unsustainably high. I recommend the Commission reject Mr. Rosenberg's market 24 DCF calculation.

25

Q. Did Mr. Rosenberg consider long-term GDP growth in estimating a DCF market return?

A. No. Mr. Rosenberg failed to consider long-term GDP growth for his market DCF,
even though he used it for his DCF analysis of electric utilities.

- There are a number of different ways to devise a two-stage growth rate for the 6 market using long-term GDP growth. For example, one could weight Mr. 7 8 Rosenberg's S&P earnings growth rate of 13% by one-half and his long-term GDP growth estimate of 5.91% by one-half. This results in a two-stage growth rate of 9 10 9.46%, very close to the 9.91% growth estimate I showed for the Value Line group 11 of companies on Exhibit (RAB-7). Adding 9.46% to Mr. Rosenberg's dividend yield of 1.75% results in a DCF market cost of equity of 11.21%. Using Mr. 12 13 Rosenberg's risk-free rate of return of 5.0% results in a market premium of 6.21%. 14 Finally, applying this revised market premium, the results of Mr. Rosenberg's 15 CAPM are as follows:
- 16

5

17	CAPM Electric Group ROE =	5.0 + 0.65(6.21) = 9.04%
18	CAPM Natural Gas Group ROE =	5.0 + 0.68 (6.21) = 9.22%

19

20 Obviously, using lower near-term growth rates for the first stage of the analysis 21 would produce even lower estimates of the CAPM cost of equity. I conclude that 22 Mr. Rosenberg seriously overstated the CAPM result. I recommend that the 23 Commission reject his CAPM analyses.

24

25 Q. Please address Mr. Rosenberg's use of the ECAPM.

1		
2	A.	In my opinion, use of the ECAPM further points out the weaknesses and
3		inaccuracies of the CAPM. Most importantly, Mr. Rosenberg failed to provide any
4		evidence that investors make the .25/.75 weighting in their own formulations of the
5		CAPM, to the extent that investors use the CAPM at all in formulating their
6		expected return on common equity. Second, the .25/.75 weighting factors may or
7		may not be applicable in the current economic environment. Third, I question the
8		relevance of this entire exercise given questionable relationship between beta and
9		common stock returns.
10		
11	Q.	Please address Mr. Rosenberg's addition of a size premium to his CAPM
12		results.
13		
14	A.	Mr. Rosenberg's application of a size premium is unfounded and should be rejected
15		by the Commission.
16		
17		The data employed by Mr. Rosenberg come from Ibbotson Associates' publication
18		Risk Premium Over Time Report: 2003. The so-called size premiums for low- and
19		mid-capitalization stocks include stocks of both regulated utilities and other
20		unregulated companies. Nothing in this data suggests that the size premiums apply
21		to regulated utility companies, which are lower risk than the overall market and
22		which have lower expected returns as a result. In my view, it is inappropriate to
23		assume that there is a CAPM size premium that is applicable to regulated utilities
24		
24		based on the study relied upon by Mr. Rosenberg. I recommend that his 60 and 90

1		
2	<u>Risk</u>	Premium
3		
4	Q.	Please briefly describe Mr. Rosenberg's risk premium approach.
5		
6	A.	Mr. Rosenberg presented two alternative risk premium studies in estimating the
7		expected return on LG&E's electric operations. The first relied upon historical
8		earned returns from the Moody's electric utility common stock index. The second
9		approach utilized Commission-allowed returns from 1980 through the third quarter
10		of 2003.
11		
12		For LG&E's gas operations, Mr. Rosenberg also employed two alternative risk
13		premium studies. The first relied upon historical earned returns from the Moody's
14		gas distribution common stock index. The second approach utilized Commission-
15		allowed returns from 1980 through the third quarter of 2003.
16		
17		
18	Q.	Please comment on Mr. Rosenberg's first risk premium approach.
19		
20	A.	Mr. Rosenberg's first risk premium approach suffers from the same infirmities as his
21		CAPM formulation, which used the historical Ibbotson data. This approach naively
22		assumes that a risk premium calculated over a long historic period and mechanically
23		applied in today's economic environment can accurately reflect the investor required
24		rate of return. This is incorrect. Expected risk premiums can and do change
25		significantly over time. There is no reason to assume that in today's environment

1		investors either expect or require a risk premium over utility bonds that is equivalent
2		to a 69-year average historical risk premium. Current evidence strongly suggests
3		that investors are requiring risk premiums over bonds that are much smaller than the
4		4.29% historical average risk premium calculated by Mr. Rosenberg. This evidence
5		comes from my recent experience in the utility industry, my current DCF and
6		CAPM calculation, and the corrections to Mr. Rosenberg's DCF and CAPM
7		calculations that I presented earlier.
8		
9	Q.	Please comment on Mr. Rosenberg's second risk premium approach.
10		
11	A.	I disagree with relying on historical return on equity awards from other commissions
12		in setting the return on equity in this proceeding. This approach suggests that the
13		KPSC should rely on what other commissions did in past cases rather than rely on
14		the evidence presented in this case. These decisions are based on many factors that
15		may have absolutely no bearing on LG&E's circumstances.
16		
17		Further, LG&E is lower-risk utility company. Assuming that the average of these
18		rate awards would apply to an average risk utility, then LG&E's return would be
19		lower. LG&E's risk associated with its electric operations is further mitigated by the
20		environmental surcharge, something that the average utility company would
21		definitely not have the benefit of. The environmental surcharge significantly
22		reduces the Companies' risk vis-à-vis other electric utilities.
23		
24	<u>Com</u> r	parable Earnings
25		

1	Q.	Please briefly summarize Mr. Rosenberg's comparable earnings approach.
2		
3	A.	Mr. Rosenberg calculated historical and projected earned returns on book equity for
4		firms with a Value Line Safety Rank of 2. His results ranged from 13.7% to 14.5%.
5		
6	Q.	Please comment on Mr. Rosenberg's comparable earnings approach.
7		
8	A.	The comparable earnings approach should be rejected.
9		
10		Earned returns on book equity for unregulated companies have absolutely no
11		relevance to the required return for LG&E. Using historical earned returns on book
12		equity is especially inappropriate since it assumes that earned book equity returns
13		are what investors expect for the future regardless of economic conditions.
14		
15		It would appear that Mr. Rosenberg did not place any reliance on his comparable
16		earnings results in formulating his recommended return on equity range since 13.7%
17		and 14.5% substantially exceed the top end of his recommended range. Obviously,
18		these returns are unreasonable on their face because they are far greater than any of
19		the results that either Mr. Rosenberg or I presented in our testimonies.
20		
21	<u>LG&</u>	E Should Not Be Awarded a Return In the Upper End of the Range
22		
23	Q.	What reasons did Mr. Rosenberg give for LG&E and LG&E being awarded a
24		return on equity in the upper end of his recommended range for both electric
25		and gas operations?

A. Mr. Rosenberg gave several reasons. First, LG&E deserves a special award for
being an efficient utility. Second, the "unsettled nature" of the electric industry
indicates the need for a solid company financial condition at this time. Third, the
current low level of interest rates indicates that upward changes are likely, especially
in light of large projected Federal budget deficits.

7

8

1

Q. Are any of these reasons valid?

9 A. No. None of these reasons provides a valid basis for increasing the Companies' cost
10 of equity in this proceeding.

11

12 Q. Please address the first of Mr. Rosenberg's reasons.

13

14 A. A utility company should not be given a special reward for providing low-cost, 15 efficient service to its customers. These are things that customers should expect 16 from a prudently run utility company and they should not have to pay extra for them. 17 Moreover, LG&E, like all electric utilities in Kentucky, are low-cost electric 18 providers for reasons that are inherent to Kentucky and not necessarily related to 19 management performance. Low-cost coal is abundant in Kentucky. Proximity to 20 this coal means low transportation and fuel costs. Nuclear power plants are 21 effectively outlawed in Kentucky. State utility taxes are low in Kentucky relative to 22 the rest of the country. The KPSC has exercised prudent regulation, including the 23 imposition of minimal Demand Side Management costs and virtually no PURPA 24 purchased power expenses. There is no good reason to reward shareholders for 25 these factors.

1		
2		In addition, on advice from counsel, I believe that it would be illegal for the KPSC
3		to add an increment to the return on equity for efficiency. My opinion is based on a
4		1982 case decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court involving South Central Bell
5		Telephone Company and the Kentucky Utility Regulatory Commission ⁵ . In this
6		case, the Court struck down a penalty to the return on equity that the Commission
7		imposed due to poor service on the part of the telephone company. In this decision,
8		the Court stated:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		"The rate making process is to provide for the utility a reasonable profit on its operations so that its owners may achieve a return on their investment. Such matters are purely those of a financial nature. In addition, we concur with the trial judge that the quality of service is not germane to the normal, time- tested factors that go into the determination of a proper rate for the services rendered by a utility."
21		the return on equity for efficiency.
22		
23	Q.	Please address the second reason given by Mr. Rosenberg that relates to the
24		"unsettled nature of the industry."
25		
26	A.	If investors believe that the alleged "unsettled nature of the industry" is making
27		utilities more risky, then those perceptions will already be reflected in utility
28		common stock prices. Thus, to the extent this additional risk exists, it is already

⁵ Ky., 837 S.W. 2d 649

1		reflected in the stock prices used by Mr. Rosenberg and myself in our DCF analyses.
2		No further upward adjustment would be warranted. To add an additional increment
3		to the return on equity for such alleged risk would, in effect, be double counting and
4		overstating the investors' required return.
5		
6		In addition, I believe that it is highly unlikely that the "unsettled situation" that Mr.
7		Rosenberg described would have a measurable effect on LG&E, assuming that there
8		is any such effect in the first place. As I stated earlier in my Direct Testimony,
9		LG&E is a lower-risk company that operates in a regulatory environment in which
10		restructuring and retail electric competition is not present. It is highly doubtful that
11		any stock market effects from Enron and the western energy crisis, which happened
12		years ago, are having a negative impact on LG&E today.
13		
14	Q.	
	Q.	Please address the third point raised by Mr. Rosenberg regarding the current
15	Q.	Please address the third point raised by Mr. Rosenberg regarding the current state of interest rates.
	Q.	
15	Q. A.	
15 16	-	state of interest rates.
15 16 17	-	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed,
15 16 17 18	-	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed, current stock market data points to lower required returns in response to low interest
15 16 17 18 19	-	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed,
15 16 17 18 19 20	-	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed, current stock market data points to lower required returns in response to low interest rates. Mr. Rosenberg's speculation regarding the future course of interest rates is an
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	-	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed, current stock market data points to lower required returns in response to low interest rates. Mr. Rosenberg's speculation regarding the future course of interest rates is an insufficient basis for raising his recommended cost of equity for LG&E to the upper
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 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	A.	state of interest rates. Current utility bond yields are at their lowest point in recent memory. This certainly does not justify a <i>higher</i> return on equity than one's analysis suggests. Indeed, current stock market data points to lower required returns in response to low interest rates. Mr. Rosenberg's speculation regarding the future course of interest rates is an insufficient basis for raising his recommended cost of equity for LG&E to the upper end of his range. I recommend that the Commission reject his recommendation.

Richard A. Baudino Page 54

1 A. Yes.

2

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE GAS AND ELECTRIC) **RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF** LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY))

COMMISSION

CASE NO. 2003-00433

)

EXHIBITS

OF

RICHARD A. BAUDINO

ON BEHALF OF THE

KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.

J. KENNEDY AND ASSOCIATES, INC. **ROSWELL, GEORGIA**

MARCH 2004

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PUBLIC SERVICE

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EDUCATION

New Mexico State University, M.A. Major in Economics Minor in Statistics

New Mexico State University, B.A. Economics English

Twenty years of experience in utility ratemaking. Broad based experience in revenue requirement analysis, cost of capital, utility financing, phase-ins and rate design. Has designed revenue requirement and rate design analysis programs.

REGULATORY TESTIMONY

Preparation and presentation of expert testimony in the areas of:

Electric and Gas Utility Rate Design Cost of Capital for Electric, Gas and Water Companies Ratemaking Treatment of Generating Plant Sale/Leasebacks Electric and Gas Utility Cost of Service Revenue Requirements Gas industry restructuring and competition

RESUME OF RICHARD A. BAUDINO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULTING

EXPERIENCE

1989 toPresent:Kennedy_and_Associates:Director of Consulting - Responsible for consulting
assignments in the area of revenue requirements, rate design, cost of capital, economic
analysis of generation alternatives, gas industry restructuring and competition.

1982 to

1989: New Mexico Public Service Commission Staff: Utility Economist - Responsible for preparation of analysis and expert testimony in the areas of rate of return, cost allocation, rate design, finance, phase-in of electric generating plants, and sale/leaseback transactions.

CLIENTS SERVED

Regulatory Commissions

Louisiana Public Service Commission

Industrial Groups

Ad Hoc Committee for a Competitive Electric Supply System Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers Arkansas Gas Consumers Armco Steel Company, L.P. Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity General Electric Company Industrial Energy Consumers Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers Large Electric Consumers Organization Newport Steel Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers Maryland Industrial Group Occidental Chemical **PSI Industrial Group** Taconite Intervenors (Minnesota) **Tyson Foods**

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
3/83	1780	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Boles Water Co.	Rate design, rate of return.
10/83	1803, 1817	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Electric Coop	Rate design.
11/84	1833	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Service contract approval, rate design, performance standards for Palo Verde nuclear generating system
1983	1835	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of NM	Rate design.
1984	1848	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Sangre de Cristo Water Co.	Rate design.
02/85	1906	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Rate of return.
09/84	1907	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Jomada Water Co.	Rate of return.
11/85	1957	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Southwestern Public Service Co.	Rate of return.
04/86	2009	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Phase-in plan, treatment of sale/leaseback expense.
06/86	2032	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Sale/leaseback approval.
09/86	2033	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Order to show cause, PVNGS audit.
02/87	2074	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Diversification.
05/87	2089	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Fuel factor adjustment.
08/87	2092	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Rate design.

 Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
10/88	2146	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of New Mexico	Financial effects of restructuring, reorganization.
07/88	2162	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	El Paso Electric Co.	Revenue requirements, rate design, rate of return.
01/89	2194	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Ptains Electric G&T Cooperative	Economic development.
1/89	2253	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Plains Electric G&T Cooperative	Financing.
08/89	2259	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Homestead Water Co.	Rate of return, rate design.
10/89	2262	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Public Service Co. of New Mexico	Rate of return.
09/89	2269	NM	New Mexico Public Service Commission	Ruidoso Natural Gas Co.	Rate of return, expense from affiliated interest.
12/89	89-208-TF	AR	Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers	Arkansas Power & Light Co.	Rider M-33.
01/90	U-17282	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Cost of equity.
09/90	90-158	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers	Louisville Gas & Electric Co.	Cost of equity.
09/90	90-004-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Cost of equity, transportation rate.
12/90	U-17282 Phase IV	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Cost of equity.
04/91	91-037-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Transportation rates.
12/91	91-410- EL-AIR	он	Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., Armco Steel Co., General Electric Co., Industrial Energy Consumers	Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.	Cost of equity.

	Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
	05/92	910890-EI	FL	Occidental Chemical Corp.	Florida Power Corp.	Cost of equity, rate of return.
	09/92	92-032-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Cost of equity, rate of return, cost-of-service.
	09/92	39314	ID	Industrial Consumers for Fair Utility Rates	Indiana Michigan Power Co.	Cost of equity, rate of return.
	09/92	92-009-U	AR	Tyson Foods	General Waterworks	Cost allocation, rate design.
	01/93	92-346	KY	Newport Steel Co.	Union Light, Heat & Power Co.	Cost allocation.
	01/93	39498	IN	PSI Industrial Group	PSI Energy	Refund allocation.
	01/93	U-10105	MI	Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equality (ABATE)	Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.	Return on equity.
I	04/93	92-1464- EL-AIR	ОН	Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Armco Steel Co., Industrial Energy Consumers	Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.	Return on equity.
1	09/93	93-189-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Transportation service terms and conditions.
l	09/93	93-081-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.	Cost-of-service, transporta- tion rates, rate supplements; return on equity; revenue requirements.
	12/93	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission Staff	Cajun Electric Power Cooperative	Historical reviews; evaluation of economic studies.
	03/94	10320	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Louisville Gas & Electric Co.	Trimble County CWIP revenue refund.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
4/94	E-015/ GR-94-001	MN	Large Power Intervenors	Minnesota Power Co.	Evaluation of the cost of equity, capital structure, and rate of return.
5/94	R-00942993	РА	PG&W Industrial Intervenors	Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co.	Analysis of recovery of transition costs.
5/94	R-00943001	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Evaluation of cost allocation, rate design, rate plan, and carrying charge proposals.
7/94	R-00942986	PA	Armco, Inc., West Penn Power Industrial Intervenors	West Penn Power Co.	Return on equity and rate of return.
7/94	94-0035- E-42T	WV	West Virginia Energy Users' Group	Monongahela Power Co.	Return on equity and rate of return.
8/94	8652	MD	Westvaco Corp.	Potomac Edison Co.	Return on equity and rate of return.
9/94	930357-C	AR	West Central Arkansas Gas Consume rs	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.	Evaluation of transportation service.
9/94	U-19904	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Gulf States Utilities	Return on equity.
9/94	8629	MD	Maryland Industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.	Transition costs.
11/94	94-175-U	AR	Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkla, Inc.	Cost-of-service, rate design, rate of return.
3/95	RP94-343- 000	FERC	Arkansas Gas Consumers	NorAm Gas Transmission	Rate of return.
4/95	R-00943271	PA	PP&L Industrial Customer Alliance	Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.	Return on equity.
6/95	U-10755	МІ	Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity	Consumers Power Co.	Revenue requirements.
7/95	8697	MD	Maryland Industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.	Cost allocation and rate design.


Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
8/95	95-254-TF U-2811	AR	Tyson Foods, Inc.	Southwest Arkansas Electric Cooperative	Refund allocation.
10/95	ER95-1042 -000	FERC	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Systems Energy Resources, Inc.	Return on Equity.
11/95	I-940032	PA	Industrial Energy Consumers of Pennsylvania	Stat e wi de - all utilities	Investigation into Electric Power Competition.
5/96	96-030-U	AR	Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers	Arkansas Western Gas Co.	Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service.
7/96	8725	MD	Maryland Industrial Group	Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Potomac Electric Power Co. and Constellation Energy Corp.	Return on Equity.
7/96	U-21496	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Central Louisiana Electric Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
9/96	U-22092	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
1/97	RP96-199- 000	FERC	The Industrial Gas Users Conference	Mississippi River Transmission Corp.	Revenue requirements, rate of return and cost of service.
3/97	96-420-U	AR	West Central Arkansas Gas Corp.	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.	Revenue requirements, rate of return, cost of service and rate design.
7/97	U-11220	Mi	Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity	Michigan Gas Co. and Southeastern Michigan Gas Co.	Transportation Balancing Provisions
7/97	R-00973944	PA	Pennsylvania American Water Large Users Group	Pennsylvania- American Water Co.	Rate of return, cost of service, revenue requirements.
3/98	8390-U	GA	Georgia Natural Gas Group and the Georgia Textile Manufacturers Assoc.	Atlanta Gas Light	Rate of return, restructuring issues, unbundling, rate design issues.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
7/98	R-00984280	PA	PG Energy, Inc.	PGE Industrial Intervenors	Cost allocation.
8/98	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Cajun Electric Power Cooperative	Revenue requirements.
10/98	97-596	ME	Maine Office of the Public Advocate	Bangor Hydro- Electric Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
10/98	U-23327	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	SWEPCO, CSW and AEP	Analysis of proposed merger.
12/98	98-577	ME	Maine Office of the Public Advocate	Maine Public Service Co.	Return on equity, rate of return.
12/98	U-23358	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity, rate of return.
3/99	98-426	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc.	Louisviile Gas and Electric Co	Return on equity.
3/99	99-082	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc.	Kentucky Utilities Co.	Return on equity.
4/99	R-984554	PA	T. W. Phillips Users Group	T. W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co.	Allocation of purchased gas costs.
6/99	R-0099462	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Balancing charges.
10/99	U-24182	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States,Inc.	Cost of debt.
10/99	R-00994782	PA	Peoples Industrial Intervenors	Peoples Natural Gas Co.	Restructuring issues.
10/99	R-00994781	PA	Columbia Industrial Intervenors	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania	Restructuring, balancing charges, rate flexing, alternate fuel.
01/00	R-00994786	PA	UGI Industrial Intervenors	UGI Utilities, Inc.	Universal service costs, balancing, penalty charges, capacity assignment.

Date	Case	Jurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
01/00	8829	MD	Maryland Industrial Gr. & United States	Baitimore Gas & Electric Co.	Revenue requirements, cost allocation, rate design.
02/00	R-00994788	PA	Penn Fuel Transportation	PFG Gas, Inc., and	Tariff charges, balancing provisions.
05/00	U-17735	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Louisiana Electric Cooperative	Rate restructuring.
07/00	2000-080	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers	Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Cost allocation.
07/00	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket E	;)	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Southwestern Electric Power Co.	Stranded cost analysis.
09/00	R-00005654	PA	Philadelphia Industriał And Commerciał Gas Users Group.	Philadelphia Gas Works	Interim relief analysis.
10/00	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket E	;)	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, inc.	Restructuring, Business Separation Plan.
11/00	R-00005277 (Rebuttal)	PA	Penn Fuel Transportation Customers	PFG Gas, Inc. and North Penn Gas Co.	Cost allocation issues.
12/00	U-24993	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
03/01	U-22092	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Stranded cost analysis.
04/01	U-21453 U-20925 (SC U-22092 (SC (Subdocket E (Addressing))	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Restructuring issues.
04/01	R-00006042	PA	Philadelphia Industrial and Commercial Gas Users Group	Philadelphia Gas Works	Revenue requirements, cost allocation and tariff issues.
11/01	U-25687	LA	Louisiana Public Service Comm.	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.

 Date	Case .	lurisdict.	Party	Utility	Subject
03/02	14311-U	GA	Georgia Public Service Commission	Atlanta Gas Light	Capital structure.
08/02	2002-00145	KY	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Columbia Gas of Kentucky	Revenue requirements.
09/02	M-00021612	PA	Philadelphia Industrial And Commercial Gas Users Group	Philadelphia Gas Works	Transportation rates, terms, and conditions.
01/03	2002-00169 k	ίΥ	Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers	Kentucky Power	Return on equity.
02/03	02S-594E	CO	Cripple Creek & Victor Gold Mining Company	Aquila Networks – WPC	Return on equity.
04/03	U-26527	LA	Louisiana Public Service Commission	Entergy Gulf States, Inc.	Return on equity.
10/03	CV020495AB	GA	The Landings Assn., Inc.	Utilities Inc. of GA	Revenue requirement & overcharge refund





LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

	-	Sept '03	Oct '03	Nov '03	Dec '03	Jan '04	Feb '04
Alliant Energy Corp.	High Price (\$)	22.700	24.300	24.740	25.090	26.110	26.390
	Low Price (\$)	20.830	21.940	23.390	24.000	24.540	25.380
	Avg. Price (\$)	21.765	23.120	24.065	24.545	25.325	25.885
	Dividend (\$)	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.59%	4.33%	4.16%	4.07%	3.95%	3.86%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.16%					
Ameren Corp.	High Price (\$)	43.280	44.970	45.090	46.170	48.340	48.290
	Low Price (\$)	42.110	42.920	42.550	44.050	44.910	46.000
	Avg. Price (\$)	42.695	43.945	43.820	45.110	46.625	47.145
	Dividend (\$)	0.635	0.635	0.635	0.635	0.635	0.635
	Mo. Avg. Div.	5.95%	5.78%	5.80%	5.63%	5.45%	5.39%
	6 mos. Avg.	5.67%					
CH Energy Group	High Price (\$)	45.930	45.390	44.800	47.000	47.150	49.200
	Low Price (\$)	43.650	42.920	42.540	43.850	45.130	45.900
	Avg. Price (\$)	44.790	44.155	43.670	45.425	46.140	47.550
	Dividend (\$)	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.82%	4.89%	4.95%	4.76%	4.68%	4.54%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.77%					
Consolidated Edison	High Price (\$)	41.250	41.430	41.310	43.480	44.100	44.490
	Low Price (\$)	39.050	40.050	38.800	40.050	42.210	42.450
	Avg. Price (\$)	40.150	40.740	40.055	41.765	43.155	43.470
	Dividend (\$)	0.560	0.560	0.560	0.560	0.565	0.565
	Mo. Avg. Div.	5.58%	5.50%	5.59%	5.36%	5.24%	5.20%
	6 mos. Avg.	5.41%					
DTE Energy Co.	High Price (\$)	37.660	38.190	37.710	39.760	39.990	40.780
	Low Price (\$)	34.760	35.460	35.120	37.240	38.270	37.920
	Avg. Price (\$)	36.210	36.825	36.415	38.500	39.130	39.350
	Dividend (\$)	0.515	0.515	0.515	0.515	0.515	0.515
	Mo. Avg. Div.	5.69%	5.59%	5.66%	5.35%	5.26%	5.24%
	6 mos. Avg.	5.47%					
Exelon Corp.	High Price (\$)	63.950	65.130	65.270	66.620	67.190	67.470
	Low Price (\$)	58.900	63.300	60.950	61.500	64.360	65.090
	Avg. Price (\$)	61.425	64.215	63.110	64.060	65.775	66.280
	Dividend (\$)	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.550	0.550
	Mo. Avg. Div.	3.26%	3.11%	3.17%	3.12%	3.34%	3.32%
	6 mos. Avg.	3.22%					

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

	:	Sept '03	Oct '03	Nov '03	Dec '03	Jan '04	Feb '04
MGE Energy	High Price (\$)	32.860	32.730	33.000	32.850	32.200	32.300
	Low Price (\$)	29.950	30.260	31.000	30.750	31.320	30.910
	Avg. Price (\$)	31.405	31.495	32.000	31.800	31.760	31.605
	Dividend (\$)	0.338	0.338	0.338	0.338	0.338	0.338
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.31%	4.29%	4.23%	4.25%	4.26%	4.28%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.27%					
NSTAR	High Price (\$)	48.340	47.990	48.590	48.960	49.980	51.200
	Low Price (\$)	44.580	45.080	46.360	47.000	48.000	48.340
	Avg. Price (\$)	46.460	46.535	47.475	47.980	48.990	49,770
	Dividend (\$)	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.555	0.555	0.555
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.65%	4.64%	4.55%	4.63%	4.53%	4.46%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.58%					
Pinnacle West	High Price (\$)	36.740	36.850	39.830	40.480	40.810	39.280
	Low Price (\$)	34.180	34.910	36.210	38.590	38.070	36.900
	Avg. Price (\$)	35.460	35.880	38.020	39.535	39.440	38.090
	Dividend (\$)	0.425	0.450	0.450	0.450	0.450	0.450
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.79%	5.02%	4.73%	4.55%	4.56%	4.73%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.73%					
SCANA Corp.	High Price (\$)	35.230	35.700	34.770	34.680	35.580	35.780
	Low Price (\$)	33.780	33.770	32.800	32.870	33.710	33.410
	Avg. Price (\$)	34.505	34.735	33.785	33.775	34.645	34.595
	Dividend (\$)	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.00%	3.97%	4.08%	4.09%	3.98%	3.99%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.02%					
Southern Co.	High Price (\$)	29.760	30.580	30.170	30.410	30.560	30.340
	Low Price (\$)	28.120	29.060	28.550	29.100	29.110	29.050
	Avg. Price (\$)	28.940	29.820	29.360	29.755	29.835	29.695
	Dividend (\$)	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.84%	4.69%	4.77%	4.71%	4.69%	4.71%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.74%					
Vectren Corp.	High Price (\$)	24.050	24.270	24.150	24.850	25.050	25.050
	Low Price (\$)	22.710	22.730	22.970	23.760	24.280	24.110
	Avg. Price (\$)	23.380	23.500	23.560	24.305	24.665	24.580
	Dividend (\$)	0.275	0.275	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.285
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.70%	4.68%	4.84%	4.69%	4.62%	4.64%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.70%					
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	High Price (\$)	30.750	33.150	33.180	33.680	33.840	34.300
	Low Price (\$)	29.120	30.630	31.310	31.600	32.850	31.780
	Avg. Price (\$)	29.935	31.890	32.245	32.640	33.345	33.040
	Dividend (\$)	0.200	0.200	0.200	0.200	0.200	0.200
	Mo. Avg. Div.	2.67%	2.51%	2.48%	2.45%	2.40%	2.42%
	6 mos. Avg.	2.49%					
Average Dividend Yield		4.48%					

Source: Standard and Poor's Stock Guide, October 2003 through March 2004

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

Company	(1) Value Line DPS	(2) Value Line EPS	(3) Zacks	(4) Value Line <u>B x R</u>
Alliant Energy Corp.	-9.71%	-1.04%	5.00%	3.13%
Ameren Corp.	0.62%	0.87%	3.00%	2.27%
CH Energy Group	0.00%	0.49%	N/A	1.82%
Consolidated Edison	0.88%	-0.04%	3.00%	2.21%
DTE Energy Co.	0.39%	5.49%	5.00%	5.31%
Exelon Corp.	6.25%	5.88%	5.00%	9.39%
MGE Energy	0.59%	5.20%	N/A	4.64%
NSTAR	2.78%	3.00%	4.00%	4.88%
Pinnacle West	5.50%	1.09%	5.00%	3.55%
SCANA Corp.	5.22%	5.60%	4.00%	5.43%
Southern Co.	3.36%	5.18%	5.00%	4.63%
Vectren Corp.	3.49%	7.31%	6.00%	4.38%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	<u>4.56%</u>	7.86%	<u>7.00%</u>	6.36%
Averages Excluding Negative Values	2.80%	4.36%	4.73%	4.46%

Value Line Projected Dividend Per Share Growth

	2002/ 2003	Pr	ojected	Compound Growth
Company	 DPS		DPS	Rate
Alliant Energy Corp.	\$ 2.00	\$	1.20	-9.71%
Ameren Corp.	\$ 2.54	\$	2.62	0.62%
CH Energy Group	\$ 2.16	\$	2.16	0.00%
Consolidated Edison	\$ 2.24	\$	2.34	0.88%
DTE Energy Co.	\$ 2.06	\$	2.10	0.39%
Exelon Corp.	\$ 1.92	\$	2.60	6.25%
MGE Energy	\$ 1.34	\$	1.38	0.59%
NSTAR	\$ 2.18	\$	2.50	2.78%
Pinnacle West	\$ 1.63	\$	2.13	5.50%
SCANA Corp.	\$ 1.38	\$	1.78	5.22%
Southern Co.	\$ 1.39	\$	1.64	3.36%
Vectren Corp.	\$ 1.07	\$	1.27	3.49%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	\$ 0.80	\$	1.00	4.56%
Average				1.84%

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

Value Line Projected Earnings Per Share Growth

Company	 3-Year Avg. EPS	P	rojected EPS	Compound Growth Rate
Alliant Energy Corp.	\$ 2.02	\$	1.90	-1.04%
Ameren Corp.	\$ 3.13	\$	3.30	0.87%
CH Energy Group	\$ 2.67	\$	2.75	0.49%
Consolidated Edison	\$ 3.06	\$	3.05	-0.04%
DTE Energy Co.	\$ 3.08	\$	4.25	5.49%
Exelon Corp.	\$ 4.68	\$	6.60	5.88%
MGE Energy	\$ 1.66	\$	2.25	5.20%
NSTAR	\$ 3.35	\$	4.00	3.00%
Pinnacle West	\$ 3.19	\$	3.40	1.09%
SCANA Corp.	\$ 2.34	\$	3.25	5.60%
Southern Co.	\$ 1.81	\$	2.45	5.18%
Vectren Corp.	\$ 1.31	\$	2.00	7.31%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	\$ 1.75	\$	2.75	7.86%
Average				3.61%

Sustainable Growth Calculation

Company	Forecasted Payout Ratio	Forecasted Retention Ratio	Expected Return	Growth Rate
Alliant Energy Corp.	63.16%	36.84%	8.50%	3.13%
Ameren Corp.	79.39%	20.61%	11.00%	2.27%
CH Energy Group	78.55%	21.45%	8.50%	1.82%
Consolidated Edison	76.72%	23.28%	9.50%	2.21%
DTE Energy Co.	49.41%	50.59%	10.50%	5.31%
Exelon Corp.	39.39%	60.61%	15.50%	9.39%
MGE Energy	61.33%	38.67%	12.00%	4.64%
NSTAR	62.50%	37.50%	13.00%	4.88%
Pinnacle West	62.65%	37.35%	9.50%	3.55%
SCANA Corp.	54.77%	45.23%	12.00%	5.43%
Southern Co.	66.94%	33.06%	14.00%	4.63%
Vectren Corp.	63.50%	36.50%	12.00%	4.38%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	36.36%	63.64%	10.00%	6.36%
Average	61.13%	38.87%	11.23%	4.46%

RETURN ON EQUITY CALCULATION ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP												
	(1) Value Line <u>Dividend Gr.</u>	(2) Value Line <u>Earnings Gr.</u>	(3) Zack's <u>Earning Gr.</u>	(4) Retention <u>Earning Gr.</u>	(5) Average of <u>All Gr. Rates</u>							
Dividend Yield	4.48%	4.48%	4.48%	4.48%	4.48%							
Growth Rate	2.80%	4.36%	4.73%	4.46%	4.09%							
Expected Div. Yield	<u>4.54%</u>	<u>4.58%</u>	<u>4.58%</u>	<u>4.58%</u>	<u>4.57%</u>							
DCF Return on Equity	7.34%	8.94%	9.31%	9.04%	8.66%							

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY GAS COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP AVERAGE PRICE, DIVIDEND AND DIVIDEND YIELD

	-	Sept '03	Oct '03	Nov '03	Dec '03	Jan '04	Feb '04
AGL Resources	High Price (\$)	28.490	29.040	28.720	29.350	30.630	29.390
	Low Price (\$)	27.770	27.240	27.500	28.250	28.600	27.870
	Avg. Price (\$)	28.130	28.140	28.110	28.800	29.615	28.630
	Dividend (\$)	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280
	Mo. Avg. Div.	3.98%	3.98%	3.98%	3.89%	3.78%	3.91%
	6 mos. Avg.	3.92%					
Atmos Energy	High Price (\$)	24.980	24.950	24.890	25.000	25.960	26.700
	Low Price (\$)	23.810	24.050	24.270	23.920	24.300	24.800
	Avg. Price (\$)	24.395	24.500	24.580	24.460	25.130	25.750
	Dividend (\$)	0.300	0.300	0.305	0.305	0.305	0.305
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.92%	4.90%	4.96%	4.99%	4.85%	4.74%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.89%					
KeySpan	High Price (\$)	35.830	36.280	35.450	37.090	37.260	38.000
	Low Price (\$)	33.830	34.370	33.640	34.860	35.720	36.160
	Avg. Price (\$)	34.830	35.325	34.545	35.975	36.490	37.080
	Dividend (\$)	0.445	0.445	0.445	0.445	0.445	0.445
	Mo. Avg. Div.	5.11%	5.04%	5.15%	4.95%	4.88%	4.80%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.99%					
Laclede Group	High Price (\$)	28.650	29.000	29.610	30.000	30.150	31.190
	Low Price (\$)	26.150	27.200	27.960	28.190	28.260	29.500
	Avg. Price (\$)	27.400	28.100	28.785	29.095	29.205	30.345
	Dividend (\$)	0.335	0.335	0.335	0.335	0.340	0.340
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.89%	4.77%	4.66%	4.61%	4.66%	4.48%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.68%					
Northwest Natural Gas	High Price (\$)	30.110	30.500	30.850	31.300	31.970	32.000
	Low Price (\$)	28.400	28.510	28.910	29.500	29.950	30.070
	Avg. Price (\$)	29.255	29.505	29.880	30.400	30.960	31.035
	Dividend (\$)	0.315	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325
	Mo. Avg. Div.	4.31%	4.41%	4.35%	4.28%	4.20%	4.19%
	6 mos. Avg.	4.29%					
Peoples Energy	High Price (\$)	42.560	42.720	40.900	42.640	43.260	44.700
	Low Price (\$)	40.060	40.030	38.820	40.060	41.370	42.470
	Avg. Price (\$)	41.310	41.375	39.860	41.350	42.315	43.585
	Dividend (\$)	0.530	0.530	0.530	0.530	0.530	0.530
	Mo. Avg. Div.	5.13%	5.12%	5.32%	5.13%	5.01%	4.86%
	6 mos. Avg.	5.10%					
Average Dividend Yield		4.64%					
Average Dividend Tield		4.0470					

Source: Standard and Poor's Stock Guide, October 2003 through March 2004

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY GAS COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

Company	(1) Value Line DPS	(2) Value Line EPS	(3) Zacks	(4) Value Line <u>B x R</u>	
AGL Resources	0.73%	6.56%	5.00%	5.78%	
Atmos Energy	2.27%	7.22%	6.00%	4.25%	
KeySpan	1.31%	7.07%	6.00%	5.09%	
Laclede Group	0.44%	5.85%	4.00%	3.12%	
Northwest Natural Gas	1.69%	4.90%	4.00%	4.17%	
Peoples Energy	1.59%	4.20%	4.00%	4.74%	
Averages	1.34%	5.97%	4.83%	4.52%	
•	s' Estimates, March 2004 Survey, December 19, 200	3			

Value Line Projected Dividend Per Share Growth

Company	2002 DPS	ojected DPS	Compound Growth Rate
AGL Resources	\$ 1.08	\$ 1.12	0.73%
Atmos Energy	\$ 1.18	\$ 1.32	2.27%
KeySpan	\$ 1.78	\$ 1.90	1.31%
Laclede Group	\$ 1.34	\$ 1.37	0.44%
Northwest Natural Gas	\$ 1.26	\$ 1.37	1.69%
Peoples Energy	\$ 2.07	\$ 2.24	1.59%
Average			1.34%

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP DCF Growth Rate Analysis

Value Line Projected Earnings Per Share Growth

Company	_	-Year Avg. EPS	ojected EPS	Compound Growth Rate
AGL Resources	\$	1.54	\$ 2.25	6.56%
Atmos Energy	\$	1.32	\$ 2.00	7.22%
KeySpan	\$	2.19	\$ 3.30	7.07%
Laclede Group	\$	1.39	\$ 1.95	5.85%
Northwest Natural Gas	\$	1.76	\$ 2.35	4.90%
Peoples Energy	\$	2.89	\$ 3.70	4.20%
Average				5.97%

Sustainable Growth Calculation

Company	Forecasted Payout Ratio	Forecasted Retention Ratio	Expected Return	Growth Rate	
AGL Resources	49.78%	50.22%	11.50%	5.78%	
Atmos Energy	66.00%	34.00%	12.50%	4.25%	
KeySpan	57.58%	42.42%	12.00%	5.09%	
Laclede Group	70.26%	29.74%	10.50%	3.12%	
Northwest Natural Gas	58.30%	41.70%	10.00%	4.17%	
Peoples Energy	60.54%	39.46%	12.00%	4.74%	
Average	60.41%	39.59%	11.42%	4.52%	

RETURN ON EQUITY CALCULATION GAS COMPANY COMPARISON GROUP									
	(1) Value Line <u>Dividend Gr.</u>	(2) Value Line <u>Earnings Gr.</u>	(3) Zack's <u>Earning Gr.</u>	(4) Retention <u>Earning Gr.</u>	(5) Average of <u>All Gr. Rates</u>				
Dividend Yield	4.64%	4.64%	4.64%	4.64%	4.64%				
Growth Rate	1.34%	5.97%	4.83%	4.52%	4.17%				
Expected Div. Yield	4.67%	<u>4.78%</u>	<u>4.76%</u>	<u>4.75%</u>	<u>4.74%</u>				
DCF Return on Equity	6.01%	10.75%	9.59%	9.27%	8.91%				

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Electric Company Comparison Group

20-Year Treasury Bond

Line <u>No.</u>		Value Line
1 2 3 4	Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return	1.21% <u>9.91%</u> 11.12%
5 6	Risk-free Rate of Return, 20-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months	5.11%
8 9	Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6)	6.01%
10	Comparison Group Beta	0.68
11 12	Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 10 * Line 9)	4.09%
13 14	CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6)	9.20%
	5-Year Treasury Bond	
1 2 3 4	Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return	1.21% <u>9.91%</u> 11.12%
5 6	Risk-free Rate of Return, 5-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months	3.19%
8 9	Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6)	7.93%
10	Comparison Group Beta	0.68
11 12	Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 9 * Line 10)	5.40%
13 14	CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6)	8.59%

0.68

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Electric Company Comparison Group

Supporting Data for CAPM Analyses

20 Year Treasury Bond Data		5 Year Treasury Bond Data	
	Avg. Yield		Avg, Yield
September-03	5.21%	September-03	3.18%
October-03	5.21%	October-03	3.19%
November-03	5.17%	November-03	3.29%
December-03	5.11%	December-03	3.27%
January-04	5.01%	January-04	3.12%
February-04	<u>4.94%</u>	February-04	3.07%
6 month average	5.11%	6 month average	3.19%
Value Screen III Growth Rate Da	ata:	Value Line Betas	
Forecasted Data:		Comparison Group:	
Earnings	14.03%	Alliant Energy Corp.	0.75
Book Value	9.03%	Ameren Corp.	0.70
Dividends	6.68%	CH Energy Group	0.75
Dividenda	0.0070	Consolidated Edison	0.60
Average	9.91%	DTE Energy Co.	0.65
Source: Value Line Investment S		Exelon Corp.	0.70
Feb-04	Jarvey for windows,	MGE Energy	0.55
165-04		NSTAR	0.33
		Pinnacle West	0.80
		SCANA Corp.	0.65
		Scana corp. Southern Co.	0.60
		Vectren Corp.	0.75
		Wisconsin Energy Corp.	<u>0.65</u>

Average

Source: Value Line Investment Reports,

January 2, February 13, and March 5, 2004

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis

Historic Market Premium

	Geometric Mean	Arithmetic Mean	
Long-Term Annual Return on Stocks	10.20%	12.20%	
Long-Term Annual Income Return on Long-Term Government Bond	<u>5.20%</u>	<u>5.20%</u>	
Historical Market Risk Premium	5.00%	7.00%	
Electric Group Beta	<u>0.68</u>	<u>0.68</u>	
Beta * Market Premium	3.40%	4.77%	
Current 20-Year Tresury Bond Yield	<u>5.11%</u>	<u>5.11%</u>	
CAPM Cost of Equity	8.51%	9.87%	

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Natural Gas Company Comparison Group

20-Year Treasury Bond

Line <u>No.</u>		Value Line
1 2 3 4	Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return	1.21% <u>9.91%</u> 11.12%
5 6	Risk-free Rate of Return, 20-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months	5.11%
8 9	Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6)	6.01%
10	Comparison Group Beta	0.70
11 12	Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 10 * Line 9)	4.21%
13 14	CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6)	9.32%
	5-Year Treasury Bond	
1 2 3 4	Market Required Return Estimate Expected Dividend Yield Expected Growth Required Return	1.21% <u>9.91%</u> 11.12%
5 6	Risk-free Rate of Return, 5-Year Treasury Bond Average of Last Six Months	3.19%
8 9	Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 4 minus Line 6)	7.93%
10	Comparison Group Beta	0.70
11 12	Comparison Group Beta * Risk Premium @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 9 * Line 10)	5.55%
13 14	CAPM Return on Equity @ 6 Month Average RFR (Line 12 plus Line 6)	8.74%

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis Natural Gas Company Comparison Group

Supporting Data for CAPM Analyses

20 Year Treasury Bond Data		5 Year Treasury Bond Data	
	Avg. Yield		Avg. Yield
September-03	5.21%	September-03	3.18%
October-03	5.21%	October-03	3.19%
November-03	5.17%	November-03	3.29%
December-03	5.11%	December-03	3.27%
January-04	5.01%	January-04	3.12%
February-04	<u>4.94%</u>	February-04	<u>3.07%</u>
6 month average	5.11%	6 month average	3.19%
Value Screen III Growth Rate Data:		Value Line Betas	
		Comparison Group:	
Forecasted Data:			
Earnings	14.03%	AGL Resources	0.75
Book Value	9.03%	Atmos Energy	0.65
Dividends	<u>6.68%</u>	KeySpan	0.75
		Laclede Group	0.7
Average	9.91%	Northwest Natural Gas	0.6
Source: Value Line Investment Feb-04	Survey for Windows,	Peoples Energy	0.75
		Average	0.70

Source: Value Line Investment Reports, December 19, 2003

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Capital Asset Pricing Model Analysis

Historic Market Premium

	Geometric Mean	Arithmetic Mean	
Long-Term Annual Return on Stocks	10.20%	12.20%	
Long-Term Annual Income Return on Long-Term Government Bond	<u>5.20%</u>	5.20%	
Historical Market Risk Premium	5.00%	7.00%	
Natural Gas Group Beta	<u>0.7</u> 0	<u>0.70</u>	
Beta * Market Premium	3.50%	4.90%	
Current 20-Year Tresury Bond Yield	5.11%	<u>5.11%</u>	
CAPM Cost of Equity	8.61%	10.01%	

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG ELECTRIC COMPARISON GROUP Forecasted Long-Term Nominal GDP Growth

	(1)			(2)	(3) 5-Year	(4)	(5) DCF
	6-N	lo. Avg.		Annual	Value Line	Long-term	Cost of
Company		Price	E	Dividend	Dividend Gr.	GDP Growth	Equity
Ameren Corp.	\$	44.89	\$	2.54	0.62%	5.91%	10.65%
CH Energy Group	\$	45.29	\$	2.16	0.00%	5.91%	9.78%
Consolidated Edison	\$	41.56	\$	2.26	0.88%	5.91%	10.52%
DTE Energy Co.	\$	37.74	\$	2.06	0.39%	5.91%	10.43%
Exelon Corp.	\$	64.14	\$	2.20	6.25%	5.91%	9.59%
MGE Energy	\$	31.68	\$	1.35	0.59%	5.91%	9.46%
NSTAR	\$	47.87	\$	2.22	2.78%	5.91%	10.19%
Pinnacle West	\$	37.74	\$	1.80	5.50%	5.91%	10.87%
SCANA Corp.	\$	34.34	\$	1.38	5.22%	5.91%	10.04%
Southern Co.	\$	29.57	\$	1.40	3.36%	5.91%	10.39%
Vectren Corp.	\$	24.00	\$	1.14	3.49%	5.91%	10.43%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	\$	32.18	\$	0.80	4.56%	5.91%	8.36%

Average

10.06%

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG ELECTRIC COMPARISON GROUP Value Line Forecasted Retention Growth

	(1)		(2)		(3) 5-Year	(4) Projected	(5) DCF
	6-N	lo. Avg.		Annual	Value Line	Sustainable	Cost of
Company	!	Price	D	ividend	Dividend Gr.	Growth	Equity
	•		•	0.54	0.001/	0.400/	0.050/
Ameren Corp.	\$	44.89	\$	2.54	0.62%	3.13%	8.35%
CH Energy Group	\$	45.29	\$	2.16	0.00%	2.27%	6.67%
Consolidated Edison	\$	41.56	\$	2.26	0.88%	1.82%	7.13%
DTE Energy Co.	\$	37.74	\$	2.06	0.39%	2.21%	7.35%
Exelon Corp.	\$	64.14	\$	2.20	6.25%	5.31%	9.07%
MGE Energy	\$	31.68	\$	1.35	0.59%	9.39%	12.53%
NSTAR	\$	47.87	\$	2.22	2.78%	4.64%	9.11%
Pinnacle West	\$	37.74	\$	1.80	5.50%	4.88%	10.01%
SCANA Corp.	\$	34.34	\$	1.38	5.22%	3.55%	8.03%
Southern Co.	\$	29.57	\$	1.40	3.36%	5.43%	9.99%
Vectren Corp.	\$	24.00	\$	1.14	3.49%	4.63%	9.35%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	\$	32.18	\$	0.80	4.56%	4.38%	6.98%

Average

8.71%

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG ELECTRIC COMPARISON GROUP Industry Projected Growth

		(1)		(2)	(3) 5-Year	(4) Industry	(5) DCF
	6-N	/lo. Avg.	A	nnual	Value Line	Projected	Cost of
Company		Price	Di	vidend	Dividend Gr.	Growth	Equity
Ameren Corp.	\$	44.89	\$	2.54	0.62%	5.30%	10.14%
CH Energy Group	\$	45.29	\$	2.16	0.00%	5.30%	9.25%
Consolidated Edison	\$	41.56	\$	2.26	0.88%	5.30%	10.01%
DTE Energy Co.	\$	37.74	\$	2.06	0.39%	5.30%	9.92%
Exelon Corp.	\$	64.14	\$	2.20	6.25%	5.30%	9.06%
MGE Energy	\$	31.68	\$	1.35	0.59%	5.30%	8.93%
NSTAR	\$	47.87	\$	2.22	2.78%	5.30%	9.67%
Pinnacle West	\$	37.74	\$	1.80	5.50%	5.30%	10.37%
SCANA Corp.	\$	34.34	\$	1.38	5.22%	5.30%	9.52%
Southern Co.	\$	29.57	\$	1.40	3.36%	5.30%	9.88%
Vectren Corp.	\$	24.00	\$	1.14	3.49%	5.30%	9.92%
Wisconsin Energy Corp.	\$	32.18	\$	0.80	4.56%	5.30%	7.81%

Average

9.54%

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON GROUP Forecasted Long-Term Nominal GDP Growth

	(1) 6-Mo. Avg.		(2) Annual Dividend		(3) 5-Year	(4)	(5) DCF	
					Value Line	Long-term GDP Growth	Cost of Equity	
Company		Price	D	ividend	Dividend Gr.	GDP Glowin	Equity	
AGL Resources	\$	28.57	\$	1.12	0.73%	5.91%	9.18%	
Atmos Energy	\$	24.80	\$	1.22	2.27%	5.91%	10.34%	
KeySpan	\$	35.71	\$	1.78	1.31%	5.91%	10.21%	
Laclede Group	Ŝ	28.82	\$	1.36	0.44%	5.91%	9.82%	
Northwest Natural Gas	\$	30.17	Ŝ	1.30	1.69%	5.91%	9.68%	
Peoples Energy	\$	41.63	\$	2.12	1.59%	5.91%	10.36%	

Average

9.93%

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON GROUP Value Line Forecasted Retention Growth

	(1) 6-Mo. Avg.				(3) 5-Year	(4) Projected	(5) DCF Cost of Equity	
0					Value Line Dividend Gr.	Sustainable Growth		
Company		FILCE		IVIGENC	Dividend Gr.	0.0111		
AGL Resources	\$	28.57	\$	1.12	0.73%	5.78%	9.07%	
Atmos Energy	\$	24.80	\$	1.22	2.27%	4.25%	8.95%	
KeySpan	Ś	35.71	\$	1.78	1.31%	5.09%	9.52%	
Laclede Group	\$	28.82	\$	1.36	0.44%	3.12%	7.43%	
Northwest Natural Gas	\$	30.17	Ś	1.30	1.69%	4.17%	8.18%	
Peoples Energy	\$	41.63	\$	2.12	1.59%	4.74%	9.37%	

Average

8.75%

REVISED TWO-STAGE DCF CALCULATION ROSENBERG GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON GROUP Natural Gas Distribution Industry Projected Growth

	(1) 6-Mo. Avg. ly Price		(2) Annual Dividend		(3) 5-Year	(4) Industry	(5) DCF	
Company					Value Line Dividend Gr.	Projected Growth	Cost of Equity	
	*	00.57	¢	1 1 0	0.73%	5.70%	9.00%	
AGL Resources	\$	28.57	\$	1.12				
Atmos Energy	\$	24.80	\$	1.22	2.27%	5.70%	10.17%	
KeySpan	\$	35.71	\$	1.78	1.31%	5.70%	10.03%	
Laclede Group	\$	28.82	\$	1.36	0.44%	5.70%	9.64%	
Northwest Natural Gas	\$	30.17	\$	1.30	1.69%	5.70%	9.50%	
Peoples Energy	\$	41.63	\$	2.12	1.59%	5.70%	10. 19%	

Average

9.75%