
# CASE NUMBER:

# 99-448

KY. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS OF : 01/11/00



IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT E. PLEDGER VS POWERTEL/KENTUCKY, INC

SEQ ENTRY NBR DATE REMARKS

0001 11/16/1999 Order entered; amended complaint due 11/26 or case dismissed w/o further order



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY **PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION** 730 SCHENKEL LANE POST OFFICE BOX 615 FRANKFORT, KY. 40602 (502) 564-3940

November 16, 1999

Edward C. Horner Chief Operating Officer Powertel, Inc. 1233 O. G. Skinner Drive West Point, GA. 31833 1789

Honorable John E. Selent Attorney at Law Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 2000 Meidinger Tower 462 South Fourth Avenue Louisville, KY. 40202

RE: Case No. 99-448

We enclose one attested copy of the Commission's Order in the above case.

Sincerely,

Stephanie Bell Secretary of the Commission

SB/sa Enclosure

# COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

## BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

ROBERT E. PLEDGER COMPLAINANT

CASE NO. 99-448

POWERTEL, INC. DEFENDANT

#### <u>O R D E R</u>

On August 4, 1999, Robert E. Pledger, by counsel, filed with this Commission a letter stating a formal complaint against PowerTel, Inc. ("PowerTel"), a wireless telecommunications provider doing business in Kentucky. Mr. Pledger alleges that he applied for PowerTel service, and that, for credit reasons, PowerTel offered Mr. Pledger only prepaid service at substantially higher rates than those offered in the service plan for which Mr. Pledger applied. The letter of complaint also alleges that Mr. Pledger "by requiring a deposit," and further states that Mr. Pledger's attorneys have concluded that PowerTel is obligated by law to extend the less expensive service plan to Mr. Pledger if a deposit is offered. Despite acknowledging that a more expensive prepaid service plan was made available to Mr. Pledger, the letter of complaint characterizes the incident as a denial of service.

Attached to Mr. Pledger's letter of complaint, among other things, is a letter dated July 20, 1999, from James H. Benson, Director of Legal Affairs, PowerTel, to John Geoghegan of the Commission's Staff. Mr. Benson's letter states, among other things, that PowerTel has not refused service to Mr. Pledger; that the dispute concerns the rates Mr. Pledger will pay; and that this Commission has no jurisdiction over the rates of commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") providers such as PowerTel.

Pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001, Section 12, the Commission must examine any formal complaint to determine whether it states a *prima facie* case. For the following reasons, the Commission finds this Complaint to be deficient as a matter of law.

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

No state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a state from regulation of the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.

Thus, the statute specifically preempts states from regulating the rates of CMRS providers, except under certain conditions that do not apply here. That same section preserves the states' authority over the terms and conditions, other than rates, under which commercial mobile services are provided. As one United States District Court succinctly put it, the "preemptive reach of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) is limited on its face." <u>Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. State Corporation Com'n of the State of Kansas</u>, 966 F.Supp. 1043, 1048 (D. Kan. 1997). This Commission agrees that the statutory language is plain. Simply put, if a complaint concerns the rates a customer must pay for wireless telecommunications service, this Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint.

It is undisputed that PowerTel refused to offer Mr. Pledger the more attractive rate given to customers who meet its credit requirements. It is undisputed that Mr.

-2-

Pledger wishes to obtain a lower rate. No violation of PowerTel's tariff (which does not, in any case, contain PowerTel's rates) is alleged. The basis of the complaint clearly is dissatisfaction with the rates PowerTel requires Mr. Pledger to pay for service rather than with another term or condition of service. In a competitive market, Mr. Pledger's dissatisfaction with the rates offered him by PowerTel should simply result in his seeking better terms from another wireless carrier.

The Commission, having been sufficiently advised, HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. Pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001, Section 12(4)(a), Mr. Pledger may, within 10 days of the date of this Order, file an amendment to his complaint.

2. If no amendment is filed within 10 days of the date of this Order, the Complaint shall be dismissed without further Order.

Done at Frankfort, Kentucky, this 16th day of November, 1999.

By the Commission

ATTEST:



Attorneys at Law

2000 Meidinger Tower 462 South Fourth Avenue Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502) 540-2300 Fax (502) 585-2207

John E. Selent (502) 540-2315 (Direct Dial) selent@dinslaw.com Cincinnati (513) 977-8200 Fax (513) 977-8141

Dayton (937) 449-6400 Fax (937) 449-6405

August 3, 1999

Columbus (614) 628-6880 Fax (614) 628-6890

Lexington (606) 425-1000 Fax (606) 425-1099 Covington (606) 292-2502 Fax (513) 977-8141

Website Address www.dinshohl.com

# AUG 0 4 1999

CONTRIBSION

Helen C. Helton, Esq. Executive Director Public Service Commission 730 Schenkel Lane P.O. Box 615 Frankfort, KY 40602-0615

RE: Robert E. Pledger/Powertel

CASE 99-448

Dear Ms. Helton:

We are legal counsel to Mr. Robert E. Pledger. Mr. Pledger's home address is: 8302 Woodsman Court, Louisville, Kentucky 40219.

In the capacity as his legal counsel, Mr. Pledger has requested us to file a formal complaint with the Public Service Commission of the Commonwealth of Kentucky against Powertel. As you know, Powertel is a provider of personal communications services in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

In July of this year, Mr. Pledger went to the Powertel offices on Shelbyville Road in Louisville, Kentucky. At those offices Mr. Pledger applied for Powertel services. For credit reasons, Mr. Pledger was denied service. The only service he was offered was a prepaid service at *substantially* higher rates. Mr. Pledger advised Powertel that he could not afford the prepaid service and that the prepaid service did not satisfy his business needs.

Mr. Pledger then contacted us and we requested Powertel to extend Mr. Pledger service with a deposit, consistent with the rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission. Powertel refused. Powertel refused to extend service to Mr. Pledger by requiring a deposit, even though we advised Powertel that it was our opinion that Powertel was obligated to do so, and that by failing to

Helen C. Helton August 3, 1999 Page 2

do so Powertel was violating the rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission and its applicable orders. Mr. Pledger therefore complained, through us, to Mr. John Geoghegan at the Public Service Commission. A copy of Powertel's response to our informal complaint to Mr. Geoghegan and our response to that letter are attached for the Commission's convenience.

In conclusion, Mr. Pledger would request the Commission to order Powertel to extend service to him, and others similarly situated, under the Commission's applicable deposit rules and regulations, and applicable orders.

Thank you, and if you have any questions, please call me..

Very truly yours,

**DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP** John EYSelent

JES/bmt Enclosures

cc: Amy Dougherty, Esq. (w/enclosures) Mr. John Geoghegan (w/enclosures)

> Mr. Robert Pledger (w/enclosures) 8302 Woodsman Court Louisville, KY 40219

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Website Address www.dinshohl.com

July 30, 1999

Mr. John Geoghegan Kentucky Public Service Commission P.O. Box 615 Frankfort, KY 40602

<u>RE: Complaint No. 19991824</u>

Dear Mr. Geoghegan:

The purpose of this letter is to respond to the letter to you from Powertel dated July 20, 1999 in regard to the above-referenced matter.

Our response to that letter is two-fold.

First, Powertel states that it did not deny Mr. Pledger service because it offered him a prepaid account. The fact of the matter is that the prepaid account offered Mr. Pledger service at substantially higher rates than the post-pay account. In effect, therefore, service was denied. Powertel's argument is simply a smokescreen for the simple fact that service was effectively denied because the alternative was a prepaid service at substantially higher rates.

Second, Powertel argues that the deposit regulations and orders of the Public Service Commission do not apply to Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers ("CMRS") such as Powertel pursuant to Section 332 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. We do not so interpret Section 332 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Moreover, Powertel's position is inconsistent with the Commission's regulations at 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7, and the Commission's order in Administrative Case No. 97-312, a copy of which is attached for your convenience. Mr. John Geoghegan July 30, 1999 Page 2

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Thank you, and if you have any questions, please call me.

Very truly yours,

DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP John E/Selent

JES/bmt Enclosure

cc/Robert E. Pledger (w/enclosure)

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### COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

# BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

# THE APPLICATION OF BLUEGRASS CELLULAR FOR A WAIVER OF DEPOSIT REGULATIONS FOR CELLULAR SERVICE

CASE NO. 97-312

# <u>order</u>

On July 27, 1997, Kentucky RSA #3 Cellular General Partnership, Kentucky RSA #4 Cellular General Partnership, and Cumberland Cellular Partnership (collectively, "Bluegrass Cellular") filed an application with the Commission requesting that the utility be granted an exemption from the requirements of 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7. The regulation sets forth the terms, conditions, and amount of deposit which may be charged to applicants or customers to ensure payment of charges.

In the alternative, Bluegrass Cellular requested in its application that the Commission allow a deviation from the particular requirements of 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7, which govern the condition and dollar amount of deposits which can be charged to applicants and customers. Bluegrass Cellular wants to charge up to one-half of the yearly estimated usage as a deposit, with no ceiling on the dollar amount. Bluegrass Cellular makes the request pursuant to the provision of KRS 278.512.

As grounds for its application, Bluegrass Cellular states that cellular telephone service is unlike a traditional monopoly utility service.<sup>1</sup> All cellular telephone companies

Application at 5-7.

have at least one direct competitor and will have additional competitors due to the introduction of other wireless technologies such as personal communication systems. In addition, cellular service is a discretionary service. Disconnection for non-payment would not cause disconnection of a customer's traditional wireline telephone service. Therefore, a cellular customer would not have the same level of incentive to pay for cellular service in the event of financial difficulty.

Finally, cellular rates are based upon usage; cellular customers generally pay a per minute usage charge on every call. This charge can include local cellular charges as well as charges for the use of other cellular systems known as "roaming" charges. With the inclusion of these charges, the rate for cellular usage can exceed \$1.00 per minute. The customer's serving cellular utility must pay these "roaming" charges prior to collection from the customer. The end result is that monthly usage can vary greatly and can reach high levels by the time that payment is due. Bluegrass Cellular therefore argues that it should not be subject to the same deposit requirements as wireline utilities.

Bluegrass Cellular acknowledges that it has the authority to terminate service to delinquent customers.<sup>2</sup> However, the utility argues that this is not the most effective means of ensuring payment in a competitive market. Additionally, uncollectible payment losses must be recovered either in increased rates or, as more likely in a competitive environment, decreased opportunities for reduced rates to remaining customers. Therefore, the utility seeks flexibility in the collection of deposits from applicants and customers.

<sup>2</sup> Application at 8.

-2-

The Commission has reviewed Bluegrass Cellular's application and is of the opinion that Bluegrass Cellular has provided a reasonable basis to justify a deviation in its deposit rules from the requirements of 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7. However, such deviation must be limited to ensure that applicants for service and existing customers are not subject to arbitrary treatment or discrimination in the utility's determination of appropriate deposit amounts.

807 KAR 5:006, Section 7(1)(a), allows a deposit amount not to exceed two-twelfths of the actual or estimated bill where bills are rendered monthly. However, if bills are rendered quarterly, the regulation allows a deposit amount not to exceed four-twelfths of the actual or estimated bill. Due to the competitive nature of the cellular telephone industry and the fact that cellular service is billed in arrears, which often means that billings include calls made one to two months after the fact, it is reasonable to allow deviation to the extent that deposit amounts may be allowed which do not exceed four-twelfths of the actual or estimated bill.

However, Bluegrass Cellular should be aware that if an applicant or customer files either a formal or informal complaint with the Commission concerning the amount of a required deposit, then Bluegrass Cellular must demonstrate that the proposed deposit represents either an actual historic or reasonable estimated billing.

Additionally, 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7(1)(c), requires a recalculation of the customer's deposit, based upon actual usage, after 18 months upon customer request. To ensure fair and reasonable treatment of all customers, it is reasonable to require Bluegrass Cellular to recalculate deposits in accordance with the regulation without requiring a

-3-

customer request where Bluegrass Cellular has required a deposit in excess of two-twelfths of actual or estimated usage.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Bluegrass Cellular is granted a deviation from the requirements of 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7(1)(a), but only to the extent that the utility may charge a deposit to applicants or customers not to exceed four-twelfths of an actual or estimated bill.

2. Bluegrass Cellular shall be required to clearly demonstrate the reasonableness of the deposit should an applicant or customer file a complaint with the Commission concerning the amount of a required deposit.

3. Bluegrass Cellular shall recalculate deposits in accordance with 807 KAR 5:006, Section 7(1)(c), without a specific customer request where the utility has required a deposit in excess of two-twelfths of the actual or estimated bill.

4. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Bluegrass Cellular shall file amended tariffs to reflect the changes ordered herein.

Done at Frankfort, Kentucky, this 23rd day of September, 1997.

By the Commission

ATTEST:

**Executive Director** 



20 July 1999

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PSC Consumer Service

Mr. John Geoghegan Kentuoky Public Service Commission P.O. Box 615 Frankfort, KY 40602

RE: Complaint Number 19991824, John Scient for Robert Pledger

Dear Mr. Geoghegan:

This letter is in response to the above referenced complaint. In his complaint, Mr. Selent states that Powertel denied Mr. Pledger service due to "his lack of credit." This is not a correct statement. Powertel did not deny Mr. Pledger service. More accurately, Powertel did not grant Mr. Pledger a post-pay (credit) account because Mr. Pledger did not meet Powertel's standard credit requirements for a post-pay account. These standard credit requirements are applied to all new prospective customers on a non-discriminatory basis. However, Powertel did offer service to Mr. Pledger on a pre-paid basis. Mr. Pledger refused Powertel pre-paid service.

Based on the legal analysis provided to Powertel, the rules and regulations of the Kentucky Public Service Commission ("PSC") concerning carriers' rates do not apply to Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") Providers, like Powertel. In fact, Section 332 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 prohibits any State or local government from regulating the rates that a CMRS Provider charges its customers. This prohibition against State or local government rate regulation includes a carrier's acceptance (or not) of a deposit as security for providing service on a post pay (credit) basis. Therefore, the Kentucky PSC's deposit regulation do not apply to CMRS Providers, and thus, it is Powertel's position that the regulation does not apply to Powertel.

Again, Powertel did not deny Mr. Pledger service. Powertel merely offered Mr. Pledger a pre-paid account just as Powertel offers prepaid accounts to other prospective enstomers that do not meet Powertel's standard credit requirements for a post pay account.

If you have any questions about this response, contact me at 706-634-1086 immediately.

Sincerch James H. Benson Director of Legal Affairs

Cc: Jill Dorsey, Vice-President/General Counsel Rebecca Davis, Customer Support Specialist